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Liberalism and Its Limits (Column 470)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

Some time ago I saw a report describing a demonstration by strippers who were protesting, among other things, against women’s organizations (!). Their claim was that organizations that ostensibly care about them and their rights are in fact trying to force them into unprofitable and boring jobs (a cashier with a monthly salary of NIS 5,000), while they themselves, of their own free choice, prefer to work as strippers—a more lucrative and enjoyable profession. Through the liberal-feminist smoke screen one sometimes hears similar voices with regard to prostitution and pornography as well. The protesters argue that this is paternalistic coercion (in fact, “maternalistic”) by women’s organizations that, for some reason, have decided these occupations are illegitimate and therefore wage an all-out war against them, refusing to grant legitimacy to women who freely choose them. Beyond the fight against these phenomena as such, there is also the silencing of those who think differently or express a different position. This is not conducted as a debate between opinions but through defamation and paternalistic gagging of opposing views.

In this column I wish to touch a bit on liberal coercion, even though I have addressed it more than once. It can be attacked from the right (that is, from the conservative direction) by pointing to inconsistency and bias in the “liberals’” illiberal attitude toward various phenomena and their selective “openness.” But here I want to attack them from the left (from the liberal direction) and argue that indeed one should not stop anywhere in the middle. To that end, I will focus precisely on edge cases that are seemingly agreed upon by a broader audience, and I will claim that true liberalism should not stop even there. I emphasize already that I am focusing on arguments in the normative (value) realm, not on the factual assumptions connected to this discussion. At the very least, it is important for me to distinguish clearly between these realms.

Silencing Through the Discourse of Exploitation

The prevalent discourse in women’s organizations around these phenomena is that they involve the exploitation of women in distress; therefore, their “free” choice is meaningless. The circumstances in which these phenomena occur do not allow people—men or women—to choose freely, and thus talk of freedom and free will is itself a product of exploitation. Women deny the constraints that drove them and naïvely or disingenuously claim that they “freely” choose to be strippers or prostitutes; similar claims are made against those who support organ trading or surrogacy. In all these contexts, voices of protest receive a similar reception (silencing and delegitimization), and the consent of the men and women involved is presented as not truly consensual, the result of exploitation of distress. We are told that the choice—as well as the protests I described—are products of exploitation, a kind of Stockholm syndrome.

We must remember that arguments in favor of engaging in these fields rest on a very fundamental liberal principle, one even anchored in law: freedom of occupation. Women claim that they have the right to choose such occupations, as long as they do not coerce anyone and no one coerces them. Their claim is that the accusations of their exploitation are paternalistic. Here women’s organizations “explain” to adult women and men who choose a certain field of occupation what is good for them, what they think, and what is or is not done of their free choice. As a thought experiment, consider the Haredi claim that women are not suited to study Torah and therefore this should be prevented. Note that the scrupulous among the Haredim will tell you that those who desire it are driven by foreign feminist winds, and this is not their authentic will. Sound familiar? Do liberals accept such claims?

It sounds very much like religious discourse. We are used to religious people explaining to secular people that they are like “captured children” who do not make decisions responsibly and judiciously; they are not exposed to relevant information, did not receive proper education, and therefore they err and cause harm (at best, not their fault—poor souls). The Haredim explain (to a large extent justifiably, in my opinion) that secular people are not exposed to religious alternatives due to their upbringing and the social and educational brainwashing they undergo. They cannot seriously and fairly consider the religious option. A religious person generally does not treat a secular position as a legitimate stance freely chosen, worthy of legitimacy and esteem. Will liberals accept such an argument? And what shall we say about prohibiting being secular for these reasons? After all, those who choose it do so without real deliberation, no?! It is easy to point to the distress that leads one to “choose” thus. In the past we heard such discourse from other “religious” directions as well—communists, fascists, nationalists, and all ideologues. Essentially, anyone who seriously holds an ideology tends to treat dissenters this way. In recent years, however, this discourse has reawakened in full force on the liberal side, which is surprising, since ostensibly that camp’s banner is freedom, multiplicity of narratives, and so forth. Liberalism at least presents itself as devoid of ideology.

Think of Haredi women who dare to express support for the Haredi way of life that is “forced” upon them. They immediately receive learned explanations from liberal feminists that they speak out of distress, cannot really express a free opinion, and therefore their view should not be taken into account (see in columns 116 and 165, and especially 203). The same happens to women who choose not to abort the fetus in their wombs even if their situation is difficult (under the “nefarious” influence of the Efrat organization, for example), or women who wish to be paid surrogates, and similarly men or women who wish to donate an organ for payment.

It seems that freedom of occupation—and in fact freedom in general—is a slogan that serves only one direction in the discourse. Freedom of occupation is waved as a banner in protests about bans on chametz or importing pork, but for some reason it is absent in all the contexts I mentioned above. Liberalism is exposed here in its nakedness. It employs the very methods it accuses its opponents of using. Anyone who thinks differently or raises different arguments is silenced and portrayed as illegitimate. And all this is done in order to… enable openness and freedom for everyone.

Sharpening the Claim: An Assault from Right and Left

I want to sharpen my claim. There is a trite and ancient argument that liberal pluralism is directed only toward groups that are themselves pluralistic-liberal. Liberalism is unwilling to accept any position other than its own; that is, its pluralism ends at its own perimeter. They are very open toward… themselves and those like them. Of course, there are exceptions that receive different treatment, and I mean primarily groups of the “marginalized” (Palestinians, Blacks, Mizrahim, women, and on rare occasions even Haredim). These may also be fundamentalist, chauvinist, and benighted as they wish, and they will still enjoy staunch liberal protection.

But these are old and hackneyed (and also correct) claims. They point to inconsistency, bias, and dishonesty in liberal discourse. Such critiques usually come from the conservative side (and sometimes also from honest liberals—there are a few), aiming to attack the liberal position and present it as impossible and impracticable, and therefore also dishonest. The claim is that one cannot truly be liberal to the end; therefore, they should not demand liberalism of others if they themselves do not live up to it.

Before that, it is important to clarify that the fight and silencing directed at positions that support such extreme behaviors (like stripping or prostitution, for example) also enjoy sympathy in the broader (conservative) public, since the “liberals” are doing the job for them. A religious person will not oppose liberals who seek to prevent prostitution and stripping, certainly not incest within the family or Holocaust denial. He attacks them on less extreme cases, and his aim is usually to point out a contradiction that emerges in their doctrine. Such an assault essentially tells liberals that the discourse about exploitation and lack of choice is a wrapper that covers dogmatic-religious value conceptions, and therefore the critics demand that liberals be honest, respect conservative conceptions, and perhaps even join them. The claim is that they are not truly liberal; but in the liberal world it is uncomfortable and illegitimate to say that a certain occupation is unworthy, so they resort to detours. This is the root of talk about exploitation and coerced “choice,” instead of admitting that there is objective, binding right and wrong, and not everyone can set their own.

Incidentally, the same liberal wrapper operates in the opposite direction: when speaking of a woman’s freedom to have an abortion, liberals of course completely ignore the severe distress that leads her to decide to do so. There, freedom is sacred even if the decision is made out of great distress, and whoever opposes it is benighted and fanatical. And what about the prohibition of homosexuality? That too, after all, is a decision made under severe distress. Perhaps that, too, should be prohibited by law? Are there decisions we make not because of cost-benefit considerations, coping with distress, and the like? Almost every decision of ours is like that.

As noted, the assault from the right—that is, from the conservative direction—points to a contradiction that emerges within liberal doctrine. The claim is that the discourse of exploitation and lack of choice is a wrapper covering dogmatic-religious value conceptions, and therefore they demand that liberals be honest, respect conservative conceptions, and perhaps even join them. In the liberal world it is uncomfortable and illegitimate to say that a certain occupation is unworthy, so they resort to detours and speak of exploitation, etc. Incidentally, that wrapper operates in the opposite direction when speaking of a woman’s freedom to have an abortion, completely ignoring the severe distress that leads her to decide to do so. There, freedom is sacred, and whoever opposes it is benighted and fanatical.

But yours truly attacks the “liberals” from the left—that is, calls on them to be consistent. Attacks from the right call on them to be consistent and adopt conservatism across the board, whereas my attack, from the left, calls on them to adopt liberalism across the entire front. Therefore I choose to speak here precisely about edge cases. I want to argue for the right of a brother and sister, a mother and her son, etc., to establish a family; or argue for the freedom to engage in prostitution, stripping, organ trading, surrogacy; to deny the Holocaust; to allow missionary activity, and so on. As I mentioned, all these are examples of contexts in which liberals wage a war of annihilation with the finest inquisitorial methods (including silencing, hiding information, delegitimization, and more). My aim is not to justify such means from the conservative side (“see, you do it too”) but to deny them also from the “liberal” side. My claim is that there should be no limit to liberalism; any activity and occupation should be allowed as long as the parties are consenting adults and there is no proven harm to others. In fact, my claim is the essence of liberalism: there is no justification for coercing opinions in the absence of harm to others.

Is There Not Exploitation Here?

Within this discourse we are presented with cases of women in distress who ostensibly made decisions under severe pressures and ultimately found themselves in situations they can no longer leave. People involved in the field testify that these are the common cases, and it is apparently quite rare to find others (cases of men and women who chose these occupations freely and not out of distress).

I admit I have not examined the situation in depth, but my impression is that the discourse is highly skewed; therefore, I am not impressed by the pictures presented to me. Even without checking, it is quite clear to me that there are also many other cases—men and women who choose such behaviors and occupations of their own free will. From time to time, as noted, I can even discern such voices that managed to penetrate the liberal media gag, as in the article linked above.

Moreover, defining an adult’s choice as non-autonomous merely because it is made out of distress is problematic. My basic assumption is that if there are women who want a good income and, for that purpose, are willing to sell their bodies—through prostitution, stripping, modeling, acting in theater or cinema (to me it is the same), selling organs, surrogacy, and the like—this is a legitimate consideration that every person makes when choosing a profession. One weighs input against output and makes a more or less informed decision. As long as they understand what they are getting into and what the consequences will be, they have the right to choose such a profession, however “ancient.” The fact that some live in economic or familial distress does not really change this; every person who chooses a profession does so because otherwise they will experience economic distress.

Consider, for example, various sports, such as boxing, in which people strike each other very hard in the face under state supervision and with the money of spectators who watch these horrors. Boxers end their lives with severe illnesses and a greatly diminished quality of life. Why does no one think to prohibit that occupation? One could say they too choose it out of distress (the urge to compete, gain fame, and earn money). In fact, almost all professional sports are dangerous and unhealthy, and they are likely chosen for the same reasons. Ostensibly, there would be room to ban such sports. Incidentally, in most of these sports there are businesspeople who profit at the expense of the athletes’ bodies (some of whom themselves earn not badly, like the women). Despite all this, sport is considered a value that society encourages. I note again that I am entirely in favor, as long as the consequences are presented to the participants and as long as they are adults capable of choosing their path responsibly and judiciously. To the same extent, I support opening—with regulation—all the occupations listed above.

This reminds me of a story about an older acquaintance of ours who fell into financial difficulty. She looked for work at a kiosk and offered the owner to arrange the newspapers every morning. He replied that he felt uncomfortable assigning such a task to an older woman (it is hard and “undignified”). Ostensibly he assumed that what brought her to choose this job were difficult circumstances, and therefore he feared he was exploiting her. But she was, of course, very angry, since under the pretense of “caring” for her he was actually rejecting her choice. She had made her calculation and decided it was worthwhile to do a hard, perhaps not so dignified, job for fair pay. He, out of “concern” for her health and dignity, denies her the possibility of living with dignity. This is precisely the kind of paternalism I oppose here.

In the past I discussed Nozick’s explanation for the difference between permissible inducement and forbidden extortion. Inducement means an offer of consideration for something you will do for me, and if you do not— you will not receive it. As long as this is the nature of the deal, there is nothing wrong with it, and the law cannot prohibit it. Extortion, by contrast, is quite similar: if you do something, you will not receive; and if you do not— you will receive. The explanation for the difference is that extortion is the application of force, and that must be prohibited. But exploiting distress is the essence of commerce. In halakhah it is ruled that even “if they coerced him and he sold, the sale is a valid sale.” The assumption there is that in every sale, distress (economic) is what compels us to sell things. People trade to make a living. I do not intend here to defend that halakhic thesis, but bring it as an example supporting my general argument here.

The Basic Claim

My basic claim is that even if I accept that there are problematic cases—situations in which the choice is truly coerced (though it is very hard to draw a line here)—and for the sake of argument I also accept that this is the case in most instances, it still does not follow that we must impose prohibitions. Those concerned about the situation of strippers or prostitutes who choose these occupations due to their difficult circumstances (this is not always the case; there are those who could live otherwise, but this is a good and more convenient income for them) should kindly see to it that they have a decent income, rather than coercing them into “respectable” occupations that will leave them in their hardship.

More generally, it is not right to impose any policy on the entire public—certainly not to silence people—even if some individuals are in a problematic situation. At most, one should address the problems that arise. Thus, for example, orderly regulation of these occupations would allow people to choose them freely and ensure that this is indeed the case. When there are market failures—assuming there truly are, and that this is not merely a wrapper for ideological intervention—the state can intervene and supervise prices and costs, as it does in all areas of life.

Beyond the liberal consideration of freedom of occupation—according to which each person should be allowed to decide for himself or herself what to do, as long as others are not harmed—there is also a practical, consequentialist consideration: the very prohibition of such occupations and behaviors significantly contributes to the crime, violence, and deprivation of rights that arise around them. Once prostitution is prohibited, it becomes both more lucrative and more persecuted; regulation is prevented, and criminal organizations are drawn into the field to traffic in women and strip them of their rights. If there were orderly regulation for women or men who wish to sell themselves for any purpose whatsoever—under which the problems and difficulties they are entering would be transparently presented and there would be oversight of what is done with them—I see no problem in that.

You won’t believe it, but in my view even secularity should be given room and not be prohibited by law. There is certainly room to require that anyone who decides to be secular, for whatever reason, first attend seminars that will clarify the folly he is committing and the heavy price he and we will pay for his ill-advised choice; and there must certainly be regulation to ensure that secular people are not raised lacking knowledge of alternatives and deprived of the information that would allow them to choose rationally and freely (sometimes this is called the Ministry of Education and compulsory education law). It is also very important to ensure that if a secular person chooses to become religious, this option will not put him (and likewise a religious person) in a severe social predicament. In my opinion, that choice is in many cases more threatening than the trade in women, and is made on the basis of much less information. Incidentally—this you surely expect less—I think even homosexuality should be permitted by law, as long as all aspects, costs, and alternatives are made transparent to everyone, even though the decision there is made out of very serious distress.

By contrast, abortion, for example, should in my opinion be prohibited by law. There, not only is the decision made under severe distress and not freely, but terrible harm is also inflicted on another person (he is killed). If a woman has difficulty caring for the child she has given birth to, the state can consider ways to assist, but not permit her to kill the fetus. Distress does not permit murder. This example brings me to discuss the qualifications to the extreme libertarian model I have presented here.

Qualifications

The picture I have presented so far is that there is no justification for coercing the free decisions of adult human beings. Coercion in the name of society’s (or its majority’s) values is unjustified. Therefore, even if there are ugly deeds—such as stripping and prostitution, secularity and Sabbath desecration, incest, and more—from which all or most of us recoil, there is no justification to coerce others to refrain from them.

Nevertheless, the liberal freedom I espouse is not unlimited. Here are a few qualifications that, in my opinion as well, it is important to adhere to and not transgress:

  1. When one person’s freedom causes harm to society and the environment, there is room to limit it. For example, occupations that unreasonably pollute the environment may be restricted. Occupations that will cause health problems, mental or physical (sports), impose a future burden (financial and otherwise) on society, and there is room to limit them. The boundary is not sharp, of course, for by this one could also restrict fatty or unhealthy foods and go very far. The same applies to the trade and use of drugs, at least hard drugs that lead to addiction and health problems, physical and mental, and cause harm to others and society as a whole.[1]

Incidentally, nudity or walking in a very provocative manner in public are examples in a greyer area. Seemingly, no one is harmed, and one cannot restrict someone merely because another thinks he is acting wrongly. And even if the other feels uncomfortable—let him cope. After all, one may feel uncomfortable seeing women or Ashkenazim in the street. Even so, blatant public nudity is perceived as something that objectively disturbs—akin to a pit in the public domain. It is not easy to define this, but I understand those who support forbidding it (I support that as well). But this too applies to the public domain, not within a club or closed institution that anyone can choose whether to enter. I note that prostitution or stripping typically do not take place in the public domain.

  1. When decisions are made by people who cannot make a free and rational decision, there is room to limit them. It cannot be denied that there is a whiff of paternalism here of the sort I opposed above, and therefore I must elaborate. I think we will agree that influence over children must be limited. Children are human beings who cannot be fully responsible for the decisions they make, and therefore society ought to protect them. And what about adults who make rash decisions without reviewing the options? Seemingly, making a decision with incomplete information resembles the decisions of children.

For example, I fully agree that the views of Haredi women who express support for the Haredi way should not carry great weight. The reason is that Haredi society does not allow them to study Torah; therefore, their ability to formulate a critical position regarding religious principles is very limited. A Haredi woman will, in most cases, view what the rabbi says as if it were Torah from Sinai, without the ability to understand that there are different sources, that human interpretation is involved, that there are different approaches, and that one can choose one’s path even within the halakhic and religious framework. What weight does such a person’s decision carry? In this regard, there is merit to the paternalistic claim of women’s organizations and liberals of various kinds (see on this in column 203).

On the other hand, which of us makes decisions entirely impartially and rationally and with complete information? This can be said of every person and group in every context. Therefore, I think such a claim may lead to the conclusion that there is not much room to respect such a position and give it weight; but if a Haredi woman chooses her path thus, there is no justification to coerce her away from it. This is an argument against esteem for positions formed in such a way, but it usually does not justify coercion. An adult may choose to make decisions without reviewing all possibilities. It is not wise, but it is his or her decision, and it should be allowed. Incidentally, this is also true of a secular person, who usually forms a position without relevant information and without hearing relevant arguments (in my view this is done there in a more problematic fashion than the typical religious person’s decision about his path, though there too the majority do not truly weigh different arguments).

By contrast, choosing an educational path for children is a more difficult question. Here parents make decisions not only for themselves but also for their children. In the Haredi case (and essentially also the secular), such decisions can place their children in a difficult situation. Consider formerly Haredi individuals who face a broken trough educationally and occupationally, as well as socially. In this question the decision harms another person, and there is room for coercion (just as children are removed from the custody of dysfunctional parents who make very poor decisions for them). On the other hand, every child, in every kind of home, is strongly influenced by parental decisions regardless of their views, and thus it is difficult—and therefore unjustified—to prevent such influence. The boundary is problematic, and the slope here particularly slippery.

  1. Freedom to make extreme decisions (such as selling one’s body in its varieties) requires that the decisions be reversible. The stripper or prostitute who freely chooses her occupation must also have the option to stop at any time she wishes. Because of this argument, I also support slavery entered into with the consent of both parties (as well as polygamy and keeping harems in the style of Goel Ratzon—of course, with adult women and not children), so long as those involved can end it whenever they wish. In extreme cases it is not right to allow binding a person for life, even if this is done of his own will. As the Sages already said: “A laborer may retract even at midday.”
  2. Transparency, regulation, and oversight. Such decisions should be allowed only if they are made with full transparency, awareness of alternatives and costs, and thereafter accompanied by regulation and supervision. A person who binds himself must be aware of the alternatives before him, the consequences, the significance of the contract he signs, and there must, of course, be oversight to ensure the contract is indeed kept to the letter and that he may exit the situation at any time (and of course be fined accordingly) if he so wishes.

I will end with two background remarks for this discussion. Each requires extensive clarification, but here I will sketch the principled lines merely to complete our discussion.

Liberalism and Pluralism

One might get the impression that I am expressing a pluralistic position, but that is decidedly not the case. I am the last person to advocate pluralism according to which everyone is right and there are no mistakes. I also do not oppose paternalism at the epistemic or philosophical level. I have often written that I have no idea why there is anything wrong with the simple logical statement that if I am right, then whoever thinks otherwise is (in my view) wrong. If being faithful to logic and consistent means paternalism, then I am a proud paternalist. My claim is that even if those who think otherwise are wrong, it is their right and duty to make their own decisions. In the terminology I have used more than once (see for example here), this is tolerance, not pluralism. I think he is wrong, and perhaps even does ugly deeds (but not harmful, at least not to others), and I nevertheless oppose coercion against him. My opposition to paternalism derives from values, not philosophical considerations, and it focuses on deeds rather than thinking. In the realm of thought I am a proud paternalist, but practically I am unwilling to exercise coercion in its name. I have no objection to the claim that a person who forms decisions irresponsibly and illogically is not worthy of esteem, yet I still see no justification to coerce him onto a different path. As an adult, this is how he makes decisions.

The proper way to address all these (to me) loathsome professions is through regulation that will ensure fairness and transparency and the rights and freedom of choice of individuals. Thus prostitution, stripping, and consanguineous marriages (as long as both parties are adults, make free and transparent decisions, and the meaning of their choice is explained to them) should be formalized—ensuring all the qualifications listed in the previous section.

Among the “liberals” I critique here, the slogan is that there are no right and wrong, and each has his narrative; but in practice we have seen that, for them as well, there are quite a few “wrong” people. Liberal discourse presents them as not wrong but simply lacking sense, and therefore their “view” is no view at all—but that is euphemistic language. My principled approach is not pluralistic but rejects coercion of any kind (except for the exceptions described above), certainly in a democratic state and society.

Neither the pluralist-“liberals” nor the conservatives, in my view, accept or usually manage to understand this complex position. For me, the dichotomous dispute between these two positions is merely an internal division within the religious-fanatic world. The only question in the debate is in the name of which “religion” to coerce and whom to silence. Here I oppose that “religiosity” in all its shades.

How Does This Square with Religiosity?

The last sentence brings me to my conclusion. How can I speak against religiosity, and even against coercion, when I am a religious person committed to halakhah? I have already explained that I am not a pluralist—that is, I do not claim that everyone is right. Secular people, in my view, are gravely mistaken, and yet I contend that one must not coerce them or forbid them to be such. Conversely, prostitutes and strippers are also, in my opinion, mistaken, and I would be very pleased were they not to choose such paths,[2] yet I maintain that there is no justification to impose prohibitions on these occupations.

I say this as one who believes in Torah and halakhah, and at the same time in the liberalism and freedom that should be afforded in a democratic state. Even if there were justification for coercion within halakhah (which I greatly doubt), that could occur in a society that is wholly religious and operates on the basis of religious and halakhic consent of all its parts. In a society like ours there is no justification for religious coercion—and, equally, not for other coercions. The state is not supposed to educate any of us, and I would not want it to set what is morally permitted and forbidden and decide for us (as opposed to protection and preventing harm). If there were a religious majority here, I would not want a prohibition on being secular—just as I would not want the opposite. Likewise, I am not willing for there to be a legal prohibition on homosexuality or Sabbath desecration, despite the halakhic prohibition entailed.

A Final Note: Between Values and Facts

It is important for me to note that my fundamental claim is normative rather than practical. One can, of course, argue on the practical plane about whether a certain action or occupation causes harm or imposes costs on society or not. This is a marginal debate for me, since it is primarily practical. Those who argue that prostitution or stripping or organ trading cause harm and impose a burden on society make a factual claim, and I have no interest in disputing it. They may be right (as noted, I have not examined these fields in depth). My discussion here concerns only the normative plane and is thus hypothetical: assuming there is no direct harm to others, the ugliness of such an occupation as such, or paternalism—justified or unjustified—toward those who chose it, are not reasons that justify coercion.

Clearly, the boundary is not sharp. Every activity carries some cost to others, and the question will always arise: how high is the cost, and does it justify coercion or not? Therefore, it is usually difficult to separate the practical and normative questions; but for my purposes here, the principled distinction suffices. The practical aspects should be discussed in each such matter on its own terms after we agree on the fundamental normative plane.

[1] Note that with drugs as well, it is true that the prohibition imposed by society produces part of the very problems it seeks to combat. The ban leads to the high price of drugs, which prompts the crime and violence around them. That is, here too the coercion creates part of the problems inherent in this field.

[2] See Rabbi Ila’i Ofran’s book, Torah of the Soul, in the essay from p. 165 onward, for a fine description of why these occupations are problematic (a subject choosing to be an object). But as I argue above, the problematic nature in itself does not justify coercion and prohibition.

46 תגובות

  1. I know that you wrote that your discussion is purely principled and ethical and that you ignore the factual question, but I think that it is impossible to ignore the factual question, because in my opinion this division that you are making (between women who made a rational and informed choice and brainwashed women) is largely artificial. That is to say, you are actually talking about mature women (hypothetical or not) who sat down, calculated their income and expenses, and came to the conclusion that prostitution or striptease is a profitable profession for them, and that because they have no ethical problem with this story, they cannot be banned, and certainly cannot be decided for them that they do not know what they are talking about and do not choose freely. However, even if there are such women (for the sake of the discussion and even for the sake of the discussion, I am willing to agree that there are) they are the minority of the minority among women in the sex industry of all its varieties. I know little about this subject. I haven't worked directly with women in prostitution, but I have friends who do it, and the reality is harsh and monstrous, light years away from the sterile description of the business administration student who decides to finance her master's degree with a little prostitution. The average age for entering prostitution is about 12 (!) – don't take me up on the number, but that's the order of magnitude. The vast majority of women in prostitution have been severely sexually abused *before* they entered the world of prostitution – abuse that ”allows” them to have the severe dissociation required of a woman who is engaged in such a ”profession” ” dissociation that most of them eventually achieve reluctantly through hard drugs, so that they enter a cycle in which they work in prostitution to finance the drugs that allow them to continue working in prostitution. The life expectancy of women in prostitution is appallingly low - I can't remember the numbers right now, but they die very young, from overdoses or sexually transmitted diseases or murder. They are raped, beaten, sold, and most of their money goes to pimps or drug dealers. Defining the world of prostitution through the extreme cases of educated and thoughtful women who make an informed choice is an injustice to the entire silent and trampled majority of women (and men) in prostitution. The question of whether there are a few who made an informed choice is almost irrelevant, for two reasons: first - because of what I said, that those women who made an informed and sober choice, if they exist, are a minority of the minority, and turning a blind eye to this whole story because of those extreme cases is an injustice, and second - Because even those women who have already entered the circle of prostitution and now have no choice but to choose to continue there because the alternative is worse, even if their choice is informed (and many times it is, it is to continue or die of hunger or murder) it is only because the reality they live in is so distorted and terrible that the only rational choice is to continue prostitution – but this choice is rational only given this world of the sex industry. This world makes the choice rational, but I do not want a world in which this is the rational choice. Therefore, this phenomenon needs to be fought, with the emphasis on collecting and punishing the consumers and the pimps and not the women. I will emphasize that I have no problem with your analysis in itself, it is fine, you defined the problem well and discussed it, but it was said that the operation was successful and the patient died. There is no need to reach statements about false consciousness and the like to deny the phenomenon of prostitution, even without any paternalism: and if there are those who have to suffer a little paternalism for their sisters, let them suffer. This is precisely an example of a case where liberalism needs to be stopped because taking it to the end is offensive.

    1. And so it makes much more sense to regulate the profession, make it safer and invest in enforcement, etc., as opposed to “fighting” it, which would simply expose those who enter it to greater risks.

      In any case, he addressed this point in the article.

      1. David Shalom.
        In your words, you have already written my answer (which already appears in the column itself), and Noam has formulated it beautifully. Each of us is influenced by the experiences we have had. This is what shapes us for better or worse. In the end, every adult is supposed to be able to make his own decisions, even if you and I have criticism of them and even if we have explanations for why he made them.

        1. To the best of my knowledge, reality proves that even in cases where prostitution is regulated - its ill effects do not go away and may even be increased. And my point is not that I have any criticism of their decision, but that the existing reality creates a situation in which they are forced to choose something that is to their detriment. Every adult is supposed to be sovereign - but you are talking about a sterile, detached and ideal reality. The actual reality is not like that, and ignoring it does not do the world any good.

  2. "My basic assumption is that if there are women who want a good income and are willing to sell their bodies to do so, to prostitution, striptease, modeling, acting in theater or cinema (it's the same thing in my opinion)." Why is it the same?

  3. “I will emphasize here that I am focusing on claims on the value plane, and not on the factual assumptions related to this discussion. At the very least, it is important for me to clearly distinguish between these planes”. In other words (this is how I interpret it, and if I am wrong, please correct me) you are focusing on deontological claims (what you for some reason usually call a ‘substantive discussion’) that deal with the boundaries of the scope of values, and not on consequential claims that deal with agreed-upon values.
    The problem is that you are trying to derive practical implications from this ”substantive” plane, when these (perhaps) are contrary to the implications that are derived from the factual plane, that is, from consequential considerations towards more agreed-upon values.
    In the article you linked, Michal Rozin's words were quoted “that in the future society she sees, there is no place for nudity. And why is that? Because it lets men think they can buy a wife, and that our work causes the bad treatment of women. That is, the point is a consequential matter, Rozin and others think that the phenomenon of prostitution currently harms the status of all women. Perhaps in a well-regulated world there is room to allow this matter, but in the current society it is an important step towards a general social-perceptual correction [personally, I tend to think so, and this is one single point that I learned and received from Meirav Michaeli's words]. It is a general consequential matter, we are not dealing with the question of whether the individual's own occupation is "proper" or not, but rather with the question of how this occupation affects the general. And the preoccupation with the life histories and plight of those engaged in the field is indeed a blind eye to the plight of the demilta and nothing will fall on him. Therefore, the division you wrote at the end that it is done in closed clubs and other things that were forbidden are done publicly is not a relevant division. They don't really deal with this "essential" level and aren't interested in it.
    Like in the famous column 372 (to the left) about judging according to his method. There you wrote that you were discussing only the abstract question of whether "there is a moral flaw in him" and the only implication you brought up was regarding the "reward" component of punishment, which should not be applied to someone who chose and acted in accordance with his values and only identified the values incorrectly, and then you rightly claimed that regarding this abstract question, then whoever for some reason deals with it really should judge a person according to his method. The problem is as soon as we try to derive practical consequences from these abstract claims, and here, in my opinion, we inevitably enter the usual consequentialist arena and it imposes its own, and as you wrote there, from the perspective of punishment to deterrence (and even revenge) it has no relevance to the above abstract question.

    1. By the same logic, I would ban secularism, because from it one can learn not to be moral, not to be Zionist, or not to be a believer. There is no end to the matter, and such distant consequences do not justify violating freedom of occupation. Sexual permissiveness in society also causes the same thing and in a much deeper way, in my opinion, and no one would think of banning it.

      1. Apparently, there is an end to the matter, and these are not distant consequences, and there is a difference between a small restriction on a small number of people in something that is not central to their lives and a large restriction on a large number in something central to their lives. [In any case, a state is not built on considerations of pure principle, and preoccupation with them is a special kind of distraction from the considerations that truly guide people].

        1. Indeed, you don't build a state with them, but you don't build a state without them either. I argue that we shouldn't descend straight to practical considerations before we whitewash the ethical and principled considerations, detached from the facts. That's why I focused on them, not because they alone are what build a state on. Absolutely not.

  4. Those who shape their opinions, their dress, and their behavior according to the fashion of morality, the fashion of dress, and the fashion of manners are not liberals.

    Why do you continue to call them liberals? They are globalist fashionistas. Not liberals.

    A liberal is a person who comes from the understanding that everything is vanity, and therefore nothing matters. Only from this understanding do they reach true freedom.

  5. There are apparently two differences: 1. Liberals claim that it is possible to verify those women according to their method, i.e. that those women would tell others in their situation not to be strippers, and this proves that they do not want it.
    2. The liberals claim that usually someone who becomes a prostitute is because she does not have good starting data, and therefore the liberals' goal is to cost her the starting point.
    3. The claim also seems to be that by choosing them they cause harm to others since this legitimizes a damaged life without progress on the economic and educational ladder.
    4. What should be noted is that if liberals start from the premise that there is no real value choice (postmodern) then it is not clear in what name a value can be imposed, and not only are there no absolute values, there is also not necessarily an ‘I’ The absolute that unites them (according to the evolutionist liberals) and therefore does not belong to false consciousness?

    1. 1. I'm not sure I understand your argument. So I'm just saying that different people make different choices in the same circumstances. That's what free will means.
      2. Everyone has their own starting data that influences their choices. I explained this in the column.
      3. Everyone gives legitimacy to all sorts of things. People are supposed to choose their own path regardless of the legitimacy they receive from others.
      4. I'm not sure I understand. But if you claim that in the absence of absolute values, it's impossible to impose on their behalf – I agree.

  6. Should a person who tries to jump off a bridge be stopped?
    Should cults be allowed to operate?

    1. Regarding cults, it's easier. As long as it's about adults and there's no abuse and everything is transparent and there's a convenient way out, then yes.
      Regarding suicide, that's a good question. In principle, there's no justification for intervening, unless it's clear that there's some kind of insanity here. Alternatively, if it's clear that in the longer term he'll agree and admit to saving him. I don't have a criterion for diagnosis.
      All of this speaks of coercion, of course. Persuasion is always permissible and desirable.

  7. On the Sabbath, you shall not defile your daughter by prostitution.

    In the column on the Sabbath, the author has "deserved" to "live with the times" and to raise awareness of a woman's right to sell her body, precisely in the parsha of the holy ones, the commandment "you shall not defile your daughter for prostitution." Thus, the author is more concerned with the commandments of "liberalism" than the liberals themselves, who cry out indignation against prostitution and nudity, which turn women into objects while exploiting their plight.

    Regarding the physical, social, and psychological harm caused to those who fall into this occupation, long-term harms See Wikipedia entry ‘Prostitution’, in the chapter ‘Harms of Prostitution’. Prostitution comes in most cases from a background of abuse and violence, involves the ongoing trauma of humiliation and exploitation, and clearly leads to ’complex post-traumatic stress disorder’, low self-image, social disgrace, depression and suicide that accompany the unhappiness long after the end of the ’career’. The definition of the Torah is precise. Anyone who has fallen into this feels ‘depraved’, a worthless object.

    And the harm is not just to the unfortunate woman who has fallen into prostitution. The humiliation is to all women who see how society considers them a ’sexual object’ Simply sold in butcher shops and weighed by the liter, the temptation of men by prostitution and striptease establishments harms their family lives and their wives' and fills the country with lewdness.

    If, after all, there is something in which even liberals are close to the "Orcha Dehaimanota", we should hold them in high esteem and not try to be "more liberal than liberal" 🙂 In terms of the "Parashat Kedoshim", the previous post is more appropriate, which attempts to make it easier for the gentiles and to uphold "and love the gentile".

    With best wishes, Yiftach Lahad Argamon-Bakshi

    1. And it happened in one of the ’shtetelach’ that a Jewish boy joined the ‘liberal’ party. They asked his father ‘what is a ‘liberal’?. The proud father replied: ‘My son loves everyone, Liber Alleluia!’ 🙂

      With greetings, Akiva Yosef Halevi Radetzky

    2. Paragraph 2, line 3
      … involves ongoing trauma of humiliation and exploitation, and in most cases results…

      1. In the 26th of Nissan P.B.

        And what the author of the post claimed, that according to the same principle that society intervenes and strives not to allow a woman to harm herself through prostitution, it would be appropriate to ban the sport of boxing, in which competitors beat each other to death. For the defendant, his words are absolutely right, and this cruel sport in which people torture and endanger themselves and their friends is appropriate.

        It is conceivable that in the 21st century, a modern country would have gladiatorial fights, in which people go out to kill and be killed for the sake of "entertainment." Boxing is not far from this in its cruelty and barbarity, and apart from the danger and pain to the competitors themselves, After all, there is a message encouraging violence in general in making violence a ’sport’.

        It seems that they have not gone in this direction, because among men there is much less male solidarity than female solidarity. And it is a shame … The physical and mental damage of boxing can be very serious, so Ramada”a should be praised for raising his spear against this lost and destructive ‘fun’, and I wish they would replace it with the much gentler wrestling and judo.

        Best regards, Shatsushi Luvingara, a Tokyo-based talkbacker’

        1. Paragraph 1, line 3
          … And it is appropriate to ban this cruel ‘sport’…

          1. השלכת הדיון על זכות האדם לבחור להיפגע על שאלת הגיור says:

            In the case of B.E. 111, the court ruled that one of the implications of the discussion of whether society is permitted to allow and assist a person to make a choice that may cause him harm could be that, according to the explanation, routine applies if there is acceptance of the reward and punishment of the commandments even if he does not keep them. Is the court permitted to assist a person to accept such an undertaking that will cause him to be punished for what he does?

            In this way, Rabbi Kook discussed in one of his answers in the Cohen opinion that converting a person who is not prepared to keep the commandments could be a double fraud. If the conversion does not apply, we have been found to be deceiving the person who will marry him or the person who will rely on him for kashrut and joining the minyan, who will fail in being a non-Jew. And if so, the conversion applies. We are exhausted from failing the immigrant when he is presented with the account for all the offenses he was liable to punishment for due to his conversion, and it is difficult to assume that the convert was fully aware of the grave responsibility he took on in accepting the burden of the commandments.

            Best regards, Solomon Chico de Blanco

            1. Rabbi Kook's words in the Cohen C. Kand opinion, where he agrees with the 1985 Argentine regulation. I quoted his words in my first response to Rabbi Ronen Neuwirt's article, Inspiration Instead of Precision, on the Mossaf Shabbat website.

              Best regards, Shatz DeBlanco

            2. Paragraph 2, line 6
              … Full awareness of the heavy responsibility he took upon himself in accepting the burden of the commandments.

  8. Although from the point of view of damages, etc., to practitioners, it is necessary to examine whether such a ban will truly reduce the expected damage (quantity times intensity) or will fail and be as harmful as drought laws.

  9. There is a certain kind of denial here, in my opinion, because exploitation and so on’ is something that is really very difficult to define and draw a clear line, so you basically erase the whole concept and say as long as it comes from a person's choice, then it's fine and that's it.
    Do you think an employee should also be allowed to sleep with her boss? With her psychologist? Should the concept of a power relationship be erased because it is consensual? Should the minimum wage be abolished and a monthly salary be approved, even though it is clear that in general thinking there will be many who will be taken advantage of. Should cults be approved in which members of the cult ask to be beaten, beaten up, and used, in order to atone for their sins? Does allowing all these things really sound logical to you?

    1. I wrote that when there are market failures on the economic level, they intervene. But that is a policy consideration, not a moral one. In principle, all of this is permitted.

      1. And if it weren't for the 'workers' committees', we, our wives and children would be enslaved in the 'sweatshops', working in the heat until our souls were exhausted, without vacations, without sick days, without adequate pay, etc., etc. And the author has already written that the condition of slaves in ancient times was incomparably better than the condition of workers in the days of the 'pig capitalism' of the industrial revolution, when their employer had no concern for their fate. Is this the 'glorious era' that you miss?

        With best wishes, Hillel Feiner-Glossinos

          1. השקעה ברווחת העובדים - מרבה את רווחיות המפעל says:

            The welfare of the worker and the profitability of the factory – do not contradict each other. An employee who benefits from improved working conditions – will work more motivated. Even the employer's need to pay his employees a decent wage – obliges him to develop and improve production methods in order to earn more. Those who employ cheap workers have no incentive to develop.

            Improving the welfare of the workers – leads to an increase in their standard of living and an increase in their consumption. This also leads to the development of the economy so that it can satisfy the growing consumption. So that improving the situation of the worker – leads to an increase in the profitability of the entire economy.

            Best regards, P”g

        1. It was the other way around. The Industrial Revolution freed masses of people from sweatshop jobs to lighter jobs. The workers' committees opposed the Industrial Revolution (fearing that mechanization would reduce the need for manual laborers who worked from dawn until dusk, etc.) and God had mercy on us and the capitalists defeated the workers' committees. If the workers' committees had won, we, our wives, and our children would have been enslaved in the sweatshops.

          1. המאבק על הגבלת שעות העבודה - קצת היסטוריה (למשה) says:

            On the Sabbath, the work of an employee shall not be delayed

            To Moses, Shalom Rav,

            See Wikipedia, entry ‘8-hour workday’, that the basic rights of the worker – were not a matter of course. On the contrary, ‘during the Industrial Revolution in Britain… industrial production in large factories – changed the lifestyle of the working person, imposing long working hours and difficult working conditions. Working conditions were unsupervised, and as a result, the health and well-being of the workers were harmed. During this period, child labor was commonplace, and the workday lasted between 10 and 16 hours, six days a week’.

            The struggle to limit working hours was started by a socialist industrialist named Robert Owen, who implemented it in his factory in 1810, but it took more than a century for the idea to become a reality in the Western world. In England, in 1847, working hours for women and children were limited to 10 hours a day! In Canada, workers fought for a nine-hour workday in 1872. In the United States, in 1886, they fought unsuccessfully to limit working hours to 8 hours! (See Wikipedia entry ‘May Day’).

            The first country to enact a law limiting working hours to 8 hours was Spain in 1919. France enacted the ‘40-hour week law’ Only in 1936. In short, many years and struggles by labor organizations were needed to reach this achievement that protects the welfare of workers and provides them with humane conditions, allowing them to devote time to their families and to cultivate their education.

            Indeed, there are companies in which labor organizations have accumulated excessive power over the years, which has led to their conversion from protecting basic workers' rights to fighters for preferential rights, especially for those close to the plate. This is especially true when the employer is public, which allows those with political power to celebrate without accounting.

            But the healthy reality is that the two just demands - the welfare of workers and the profitability of the factory - both violate and complement each other. This idea was already conceived by Moses when he was a prince in Egypt. He went to Pharaoh and convinced him that a weekly day of rest for his slaves would only increase their productivity, and he allowed them to rest on Shabbat.

            With greetings, Eliam Fishel Werkheimer

            By the way, the visionary of the state, Dr. B. Z. Herzl, went further and spoke of a seven-hour work day, and therefore proposed that the Star of David on the state flag be surrounded by seven gold stars to represent the seven hours of work in a day. But unlike the vision of the state, humanity did not agree to a seven-hour work day.

            1. You're missing the point. Workers' committees and every group in the world look after their own interests and that's perfectly fine. But a group that looks after its own interests has a narrow view and, in addition to harming others, sometimes they harm the group itself. Workers' committees tried to stop the industrial revolution and fortunately for us they didn't succeed if they had succeeded because limiting working hours wouldn't have helped get us out of work from the heat of the moment until we gave up. After the fruits of the industrial revolution came, there are things that workers' committees succeeded in their struggle for. In any case, laws that prohibited workers' organizations are invalid and laws that give workers' committees ownership of assets that don't belong to them are invalid. There is no place where "workers' organizations have accumulated excessive power"; there are places where laws were enacted that gave workers' committees assets that don't belong to them.

              1. In the book of 12, With the agreement of the local Torah scholar, who will find the right balance between the need for free competition that advances the market and benefits consumers, and the need for workers to prevent wild competition of ‘one eats another, Chaim Blau’.

                With regards, Chaim Blau

              2. 'נר לא' - נר למאה' - - יתרונותיה הכלכליים של השותפות says:

                In the case of a partnership, there are situations where partnership is beneficial to both parties and allows resources to be pooled and tasks to be divided in a way that benefits everyone. Of course, this can only be done voluntarily, when the partners come together out of free will and a sense of brotherhood and mutual trust.

                Perhaps that is why in most years, Labor Day falls on May 1st in the parsha of the saints. Both because the parsha calls for the commandment, “You shall not do the work of an hired hand,” but also because the condition for a successful partnership is the mutual love of “Love your neighbor as yourself” and the aspiration to live in holiness like the ministering angels, who have no envy or competition between them. They are the basic conditions for the possibility of a successful cooperative society, where we live in the consciousness of ‘If I am not for me - who is for me’ but also ‘When I am for myself – what am I.

                Best regards, Hillel Feiner-Glossinos

  10. I really don't understand why Rabbi Mikhi insists on calling these people liberals when they are not at all. They are progressives and not liberals. Progressivism is the religion of equality while the highest value (and the only one. And in truth, it is not a value at all but a means) of liberalism is freedom. Equality and freedom are not the same thing. Indeed, progressivism was born out of liberalism, but it is the religion in which religious coercion is the greatest of all religions.

    In truth, progressives are the greatest enemies of liberals, not conservatives.

    See here:

    https://iyun.org.il/article/perils-of-liberalism/classic-liberalism-and-progressivism/

    1. And you can also see it here:

      https://www.zavitaheret.com/%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%96%D7%9D-%D7%A7%D7%9C%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%99-%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%95%D7%90-%D7%A0%D7%91%D7%93%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%98%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%96

    2. And in relation to these two religions:

      Freedom (or autonomy) is not a value but a means (essential and necessary). The emptiness of the secular world has turned this instrument into an end.

      Not only is equality not a value, it is also not a means. It is an anti-value. It is the enemy of every other value and of values in general (I explained this in one of the columns here why).

      1. On the 27th of Nissan P.B.

        To Emmanuel, Greetings,

        The communist concept that everyone should receive whether they invested or were lazy is indeed problematic from a moral perspective because it deprives people of the incentive to invest and leads to stagnation.

        But there is equality that is morally beneficial, and it is ‘equality of opportunity’ that allows even those who were not born into easy living conditions – the opportunity to toil and advance. Otherwise, we will live in a fixed world, where ‘then poverty will never end, with no chance of getting out of it’.

        Best regards, Eliam Fishel Werkheimer

        1. No one is against equal opportunities (except that there really is no such thing as absolute equal opportunities). It's just basic fairness. And it's not the equality that progressives talk about. It's actually much worse than communism, which has a great truth at its heart (” Each contributes according to his ability and receives according to his needs “) which is truly the core of the commandments of charity, but which, without God's supervision and under the rule of the ego and human nature, is many times worse than even pig capitalism.

          Easy or difficult living conditions are relative and have nothing to do with happiness and joy. Besides, sociological preoccupation with a person's socioeconomic position (his position on the social ladder) is a preoccupation with lies and lies and characterizes the postmodern progressive emptiness that lacks the values and goals of its “believers” (You can't call them believers. They are “anti-believers”)

  11. My aspiration to have what my neighbor has is the envy that takes a person out of the world. On the other hand, “Love your neighbor as yourself,” the aspiration that the good I have received will also be for my neighbor, is a great rule in the Torah. But even in this. The real good that I can give to my neighbor is good that does not feed him, as if it were a “free meal,” and therefore the Maimonides writes that the best charity is to “give the needy a stipend” with which he can support himself.

    With greetings, Apoor

  12. A question regarding what you wrote at the end of the column: “Even if there is justification for coercion within the framework of Halacha (very doubtful in my opinion)”.
    Why so doubtful? After all, the rule that the commandments are coercive is well known.

      1. And if the majority are religious? (And if all of us?) Apparently, according to the liberal spirit of your words, neither. (G.N. I very much identify) Therefore, the question returns to how one can be liberal, not from the perspective of pluralism (which supports the truth of another way) which you referred to in the article, but from the perspective of coercion. Basically, there are penalties for offenses and coercion for the commandments as well.

        1. Even in a liberal state there are punishments. In a state of Halacha, when criminals recognize that Halacha must be observed, there is room for punishment and coercion.

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