A Broad View of the Conversion Controversies (Column 469)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In recent months, following a ruling by Rabbi Melamed on the subject, the discussion about conversion has been renewed, particularly regarding the acceptance of commandments (kabbalat mitzvot) in conversion. I was asked here for my opinion, and I said I would respond in a column dedicated to the topic of conversion. In the discussion that followed that question, various sources were brought that seemingly waive acceptance of commandments in conversion. In my view, there is no such source, and I will clarify this below.

Background

On Shabbat Parashat Vayikra, Rabbi Melamed published a halakhic ruling in which he argued that conversion should not be ruled out in the absence of acceptance of commandments (i.e., that a conversion should be allowed when, in the court’s assessment, the convert is expected from the outset to live as a “traditional” Jew). He writes that although most decisors oppose this, there are quite a few who support it (at least claim it is valid post facto), and therefore, in his opinion, the state may recognize such conversions, certainly in exigent circumstances.

As expected (and he certainly anticipated this), those who have been criticizing him in recent months immediately pounced and used these remarks to prove their claims about him. Against the detractors rose the defenders, demonstrating with “signs and wonders” that he is correct and that this is simply part of a broader persecution against him. I have already written on the site (see column 410) that although in most of the questions under debate with him I tend to Rabbi Melamed’s side, I do not at all agree that most of the critiques are illegitimate or that they amount to bans and ostracism. In my eyes, most are reasonable and substantive—even though I disagree with most of them.

Even in the latest debate about conversion, amid the heated rhetoric one can indeed find substantive treatments. See, for example, the critique of Rabbi Tavdi here and the defense by Rabbi Schatz here, who go through the sources Rabbi Melamed cited one by one and analyze them. Each one’s starting point is clear, but neither of them rants; rather, they present interpretive arguments to support their position. Nevertheless, despite the substantive nature of these two responses, I cannot avoid pointing out a hidden one-sidedness. Note that the debate rages over each and every source Rabbi Melamed brought. Rabbi Tavdi criticizes Rabbi Melamed and shows that he erred in his interpretation of every source he cited, while Rabbi Schatz, by contrast, explains that he was right in each of them. How does a debate arise over every single source, with each side enlisting all of them to its side? In an ordinary case I would expect each to lean on certain sources, say that others are debatable, and still others run against his view, and in the end decide, with reasons, how to rule among the sources. A pattern in which all sources point my way smells tendentious. However, as I will explain below, there is a possibility that this reflects not partisanship but simply misunderstanding and confusion.

General Direction

I was asked what I think of Rabbi Melamed’s ruling on conversion. People wondered whether the “persecution” is justified or not. You all surely know the claim that just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not after you. But note that, to the same extent, the claim that people tend to persecute you does not mean such persecutions are never justified. On my first reading, I thought that here Rabbi Melamed missed by a wide margin. Later I realized things are more complicated. He likely missed, but perhaps not by quite so much.

In my opinion, Rabbi Melamed’s remarks—as well as the critique and defense of him, detractors and defenders alike—suffer from several conceptual confusions that greatly impede the discussion. No wonder both sides read the same sources and understand them (as I noted, each one of them) in opposite ways. I think the concepts are not clearly distinguished for the disputants, and that is the main cause of the confusion. My view of Rabbi Melamed’s position on the conversion issue depends on what he himself meant, and that is hard to understand from his words. The question that arose on the site on this matter and the brief discussion after it clarified for me that the matter indeed requires sharpening and organization.

In this column I wanted to disperse the fog a bit and present my principled position on conversion. I presented it at length in my essay “Gates of Conversion: On Coercion and Good Intentions,” and here I will focus mainly on two points from it. In my assessment, once the fog is dispersed it is likely that both sides will be able to agree to this thesis, at least to some extent. If the debate was born of confusion, perhaps removing the confusion can remove the debate.

A Principled Stance and Methodological Rules

To set the framework, I will begin at the end. My position consists of two claims, one stringent and the other lenient:

• Stringency — In my view there is no room whatsoever to compromise on acceptance of commandments in conversion. One who calls to abolish it, or claims it is unnecessary, is plainly mistaken. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge there is no source that says so—but that is not very important. Even if such a source existed, it would be wrong.
• Leniency — The content of that acceptance of commandments is minimal. It is very different from what people usually sketch.

Before getting into details, I will preface that this double picture is very typical. I once heard from Rabbi Blumenzweig (formerly head of the Hesder Yeshiva in Yeruham) that one who is very stringent in a given matter will usually be very lenient in it from other angles. The example he gave was the Chazon Ish’s approach to the sabbatical year (shemittah). He was very stringent about the heter mechirah, but that forced him to adopt far-reaching halakhic leniencies so that people could actually live according to his stringent approach (something not typical of other decisors who do not trouble themselves to check whether their stringencies are practically implementable). Regarding conversion, since that essay I have been considered very stringent because of the first claim. But I do not state the second claim (the lenient one) merely for reasons of feasibility and practicality. I truly believe both claims are correct as a matter of law. I am, in principle, opposed to changing halakhah in exigent circumstances, except where there exists, in principle, a halakhic path that allows it—and then one should point to it also in non-exigent circumstances (there are rare exceptions, not for now).

I will close the introduction with another methodological rule. As is known, in my eyes precedents carry very little weight. Building a halakhic discussion on citations of the Rishonim and Aharonim, and certainly of contemporary decisors, is second-order decision-making, which I strongly oppose. The matter should be discussed from primary sources (which have formal authority) and through conceptual analysis. Only then may one bring sources from great decisors and evaluate them on their merits. A discussion that suffices with citing so-and-so’s view, especially if he is a contemporary scholar, is of encyclopedic value, not halakhic discussion. If I have my own position, then with all due respect to contemporary scholars and scholars of previous generations, I am supposed to adhere to it. Of course I will take their words into account and examine them seriously before forming a stance, but in the end what matters is my conclusion.

Still, I will qualify this approach in the case of conversion. My essay bore the subtitle “On Coercion and Good Intentions,” and I argued there that although the intentions of Rabbi Druckman’s conversion apparatus were likely positive, their actions were coercive. A person who has his own halakhic approach can and should act according to it. But in conversion, which has ramifications for the entire public, the situation is different. One who has a lenient approach to conversion that is not accepted by the vast majority of decisors cannot convert people according to his view, for he thereby turns them into Jews and imposes his stance on the entire public. In such a matter, a relatively broad consensus is required (even if not wall-to-wall agreement—that would be “law for the messianic era”). These remarks, of course, apply also to my own position, and I think that the position I present here in fact enjoys a very broad consensus. The conceptual analysis I will present can lead one who discusses the matter to realize that he is mixing layers of discourse and that his true position resembles mine. But of course, if I fail to convince a broad group of decisors, then those who hold this view must not act coercively and convert people according to it.

Is Acceptance of Commandments in Conversion Necessary—and Why?

The Talmud in Bekhorot 30b states:

“Our Rabbis taught: One who comes to accept the matters of fellowship except for one matter—we do not accept him. A gentile who comes to accept the words of Torah except for one matter—we do not accept him. R. Yose b. R. Yehudah says: even [if he rejects] one fine point of the words of the Scribes.”

That is, one who comes to convert must accept the system in its entirety. If he accepts it except for one matter, he is not a convert. From the Talmud’s language one might understand that we do not accept him ab initio but post facto he is a convert; however, the accepted understanding among decisors and commentators is that he is not a convert at all. It seems to me that this is also the plain meaning of the Talmud. “We do not accept him” means we do not treat him as a fellow or a Jew (see Rashi there, s.v. mekablin, and Maimonides, Hilkhot Metamei Mishkav 10:2).

Here an important point arises regarding the omission by the decisors. Both Maimonides and the Shulchan Aruch present a conversion process comprising three components: circumcision (for a man), immersion, and the offering of blood (a sacrifice, when the Temple stood). Both omit the dictum we saw about one who accepts “except for one matter.” Maimonides is all the more puzzling, since he brings the law about acceptance into the fellowship but omits the law about acceptance for a convert. Seemingly, for some hidden reason the decisors understood that this dictum is not the halakhic ruling, and from here some have questioned the need for acceptance of commandments in conversion. Indeed, in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De’ah 268:1, in describing the process of conversion, the author mentions circumcision and immersion but not acceptance of commandments. So too Maimonides, Hilkhot Issurei Bi’ah 13:1:

“Through three things Israel entered the covenant: circumcision, immersion, and an offering.”

Further on there he deals with the order between circumcision and immersion and which of them is indispensable, but there is no reference to acceptance of commandments. However, in 13:17 he writes:

“A convert whom they did not investigate, or to whom they did not inform the commandments and their punishments, and he was circumcised and immersed before three laymen—he is a convert; even if it was known that he converted for some [ulterior] matter—since he was circumcised and immersed, he has left the category of gentiles. We are suspicious of him until his righteousness becomes clear. And even if he reverted and worshiped idols, he is like a sinning Israelite—his betrothal is valid, and one must return his lost property. Since he immersed he became like an Israelite; therefore Samson and Solomon maintained their wives, even though their secret was revealed.”

Here mention is made of informing him of the commandments and their punishments—but this is not indispensable.

By contrast, in the Shulchan Aruch 268:2–3, the author does speak of informing him of certain commandments:

“2. When someone comes to convert, we say to him: ‘What did you see that you came to convert? Do you not know that Israel at this time are afflicted, oppressed, and harried, and that troubles come upon them?’ If he says: ‘I know, and I am unworthy to join them,’ we accept him immediately, and we inform him of the fundamentals of the religion—that God is one and the prohibition of idolatry—and we elaborate with him on this matter. And we inform him of some of the lighter commandments and some of the more stringent ones, and we inform him of some of the punishments for the commandments, and we say to him: ‘Before you came to this state, if you ate forbidden fat you were not liable to karet; if you desecrated the Sabbath you were not liable to stoning; but now, if you eat forbidden fat you are liable to karet; if you desecrate the Sabbath you are liable to stoning.’ We do not overburden him nor are we exacting with him. And just as we inform him of the punishments, so we inform him of the reward of the commandments, and we tell him that by performing these commandments he merits the life of the World to Come, and that there is no perfectly righteous person except one who is wise and performs these commandments and knows them. And we say to him: ‘Know that the World to Come is reserved only for the righteous, and they are Israel; and that what you see—that Israel are in distress in this world—is for their good, for they cannot receive an abundance of good in this world like idolaters, lest their hearts become haughty and they go astray and lose the reward of the World to Come; and the Holy One, blessed be He, does not bring upon them an abundance of calamities so that they not be lost. Rather, all the idolaters will perish, and they stand.’ And we elaborate on this to endear [the commandments] to him. If he accepts, we circumcise him immediately and wait until he heals completely; afterwards we immerse him in a proper immersion without any interposition… and three [scholars] stand over him and inform him of some of the lighter commandments and some of the more stringent ones a second time, while he is standing in the water… and he recites the blessing over the immersion after he rises from the water, and once he immerses he is like an Israelite; if he reverts to his old ways, he is a sinning Israelite, and if he betroths, his betrothal is valid.”

“3. All the matters of the convert—whether informing him of the commandments (to accept them), or the circumcision, or the immersion—must be in the presence of three who are qualified to judge, and by day… This is only ab initio; but post facto, if he was not circumcised or immersed except before two [or relatives], or at night, even if he did not immerse for the sake of conversion (e.g., a man immersed because of a seminal emission or a woman immersed for menstruation), he is a convert and is permitted to marry an Israelite woman—except for acceptance of the commandments, which is indispensable if it was not by day and before three. According to the Rif and the Rambam, even post facto if he circumcised or immersed before two or at night, it is indispensable and he is forbidden to an Israelite woman; but if he married an Israelite woman and had a son from her, we do not invalidate him.”

That is, there is a process of clarifying why the person has come to convert; there is also informing him of some commandments and the fundamentals of the religion, and reward and punishment (even twice); and the convert himself is meant to accept this (“if he accepts, we circumcise him immediately…”). Moreover, at the start of §3 it is brought that informing him of the commandments must also be done before a court qualified to judge (and unlike circumcision and immersion, here it is even indispensable), meaning that in the author’s view this is an essential and indispensable part of conversion. True, this is “some commandments” and not all, and it does not state here that if he fails to accept one matter the conversion is void. Thus there is a requirement of informing him of commandments and accepting them; the only question is the required scope.

The Meaning of Omitting Acceptance of Commandments

Let us assume for the discussion that acceptance of commandments was entirely omitted by these decisors, or at most mentioned by them in passing. What does that mean? Can we infer from this that it is not an essential part of conversion? In my view, certainly not. On the contrary: the omission stems from the opposite reason—acceptance of commandments is the essence of conversion, not one more detail in the procedure.

For example, in the laws of acquisition in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat) you will not find a rule that one must intend to acquire. You will find the rules and details of acts of acquisition and their precise intentions, but not the very need for an intent to acquire. Why? Because the intent to acquire is not part of the procedure of acquisition; it is the essence of the transactional act. One who wants to acquire consults the Shulchan Aruch for how to do so. Therefore the author speaks to someone who wants to acquire and guides him how to do it. One who does not want to acquire is not addressed by these rules. There is no need to say that if you lifted some object without intent to acquire it, you did not acquire it. Hence there is no point or need to write in the Shulchan Aruch a legal requirement that a person must want to acquire, because this is not actually needed. If you do not want—don’t. But then, if you do not want it, you will of course not acquire.

The same applies to conversion. The laws of conversion address one who wants to convert and prescribe what he must do for his conversion to be valid. One who does not want to convert has violated nothing—but he is not a convert. The assumption is that the desire to convert means a desire to join the servants of God who are obligated in His commandments, in the well-known words of Rav Saadiah Gaon: “Our nation is a nation only by virtue of its Torahs.” Therefore acceptance of commandments need not be mentioned as one more detail in the conversion procedure. It is the essence of conversion, and one who lacks it is not performing conversion at all. These laws do not speak to him. He is like one who picks up an object in his yard without intending to acquire it.

Indeed, this is explicit in Maimonides’ language. After he describes that Israel in the wilderness underwent circumcision, immersion, and sacrifice as a process of conversion, in 13:4 he writes about future generations:

“Likewise for future generations: when a gentile wishes to enter the covenant and to seek shelter under the wings of the Divine Presence and accepts upon himself the yoke of the Torah, he needs circumcision, immersion, and an offering; and if she is a woman—immersion and offering, as it is said, ‘As you, so the stranger.’ Just as you [entered] with circumcision, immersion, and offering, so too the convert for future generations with circumcision, immersion, and offering.”

Here “and accepts upon himself the yoke of the Torah” suddenly appears—but then he immediately reverts to describing the process with only three components: circumcision, immersion, and offering. What does this mean? His words are clear: when a gentile wishes to enter the covenant, i.e., to seek shelter under the wings of the Divine Presence and to accept the yoke of the Torah and commandments, the way to do so is by circumcision, immersion, and offering. Acceptance of the yoke of the Torah is not part of the procedure of conversion but the intention that animates the entire matter. If the gentile wants to accept the yoke of the Torah, the conversion procedure is what he must do. From here, conversion means acceptance of the yoke of the Torah. This is likely also the meaning of Maimonides at the beginning of these laws: “Through three things Israel entered the covenant,” and he specifies: circumcision, immersion, and offering. Entry into the covenant with the Almighty is a commitment to the yoke of Torah and commandments, and the way to perform it is by the conversion procedure.

It is therefore no wonder that Maimonides and the Shulchan Aruch omit the law of a convert who accepts “except for one matter.” If he is not accepting the yoke of the Torah but choosing for himself what to take and what to leave, he is not accepting a yoke—so he is not a convert. Not because a required element in the procedure is missing, but simply because he does not want to convert. Exactly as with one who picks up an object without intending to acquire it. Therefore, in describing the conversion process there is no need or point in including acceptance of the yoke of the Torah and commandments. One possible consequence is that if the convert does not accept one matter because he believes that this is not the correct interpretation of the Torah, he is still a convert. Only if excluding that one matter amounts, in principle, to not accepting the yoke of the Torah, is his conversion invalid.

A Conceptual Consideration

This conclusion also follows clearly from conceptual analysis—from logic. What, exactly, defines the process of conversion if not acceptance of commandments? What should the convert want? To suffer together with us? That is mere masochism. Conversion is not entry into a masochistic sect. If he is ready to suffer with us because he believes what we believe and identifies with the reason for the suffering—then he wants to convert. If he merely wants to speak Hebrew instead of Swedish—that is not conversion. I have written more than once (see, for example, my essay here and columns 336–337) that there is no Judaism apart from obligation in the commandments. This is a necessary and sufficient condition.

If someone wishes to define a “conversion” that is national-civic (joining the Jewish people in an ethno-cultural sense), I have nothing to say to him. That is no different from joining the Belgian or Tanzanian nation, and the gates of definitions are certainly not closed. Nation and peoplehood are very open and amorphous concepts, and each group defines them as it wishes. But that is not conversion, and it has no religious or halakhic significance. It is a decision by a society, a people, or a state, not a halakhic decision. Therefore rabbis and dayanim should not be engaged with it, but rather civil servants or judges.

We may now understand the Talmud in Bekhorot itself. If the decisors omitted the rule about acceptance “except for one matter” because it is obvious, then why did the Talmud bring it? Note that the Talmud presents the rule for conversion together with the same rule for acceptance into the fellowship. In acceptance into the fellowship, there was certainly room to say that even if a person accepts it except for one matter, he is still a fellow, for there we are not discussing a principled acceptance of an entire comprehensive system. At most he would be a fellow for eating non-sacred food in purity but not for some other matter. Therefore, regarding fellowship the Talmud had to teach that acceptance except for one matter is not valid; we would not have known this without its novelty. In contrast, with respect to conversion there is no novelty here, for as we saw this follows from conceptual analysis alone. It may be that the Talmud mentions it merely to draw an analogy to acceptance of fellowship. In effect, it is saying: just as acceptance of Judaism except for one matter is invalid (which is obvious and need not be stated), so acceptance of fellowship except for one matter is invalid.[1]

The Dispute about Acceptance of Commandments: Two Meanings of the Term

In these debates, various sources were cited that seem ready to waive acceptance of commandments in the conversion process (see also the discussion on the question raised on the site). This is a conceptual confusion. The term “acceptance of commandments” appears in the conversion discourse with two different meanings: (1) acceptance of commandments as the essence of conversion—this is what I have discussed until now—the acceptance in the convert’s heart: his motivation to enter this process and his understanding of it; and (2) “acceptance of commandments” as a formal act within the conversion procedure—an entirely different meaning.

When we inform the convert of the commandments and hear from him that he accepts them upon himself, that is a formal act that is part of the procedure. Regarding that act, one can debate whether it is rabbinic or biblical, whether it is indispensable, and perhaps even whether it is necessary at all. But one must not confuse this with the convert’s fundamental motivation and intention, where it is agreed by all, without dissent, that we are speaking about acceptance of the yoke of the Torah.

Indeed, there are opinions that the need to articulate that intention at the moment of conversion is unnecessary or not indispensable, or is needed only rabbinically, etc., but this has nothing to do with the court’s need to assess what is in the convert’s heart—why he has come and what he understands. The court must assess whether this convert is coming because he wants to fulfill commandments, and whether he understands that he is becoming obligated in them and that he will be punished or rewarded for his deeds—for without this the conversion is invalid. That is certainly indispensable. If the court can assess this without a formal act of acceptance, the conversion may perhaps be valid (although the Shulchan Aruch implies otherwise, since it requires this to be done before three, indispensably), and the disputes among the decisors revolve about this—and only this. Therefore these disputes have nothing to do with my principled claim about acceptance of commandments as the essence of conversion.

So much for the stringent claim: acceptance of commandments certainly makes or breaks the conversion. Now I will move to the lenient claim: the content of that acceptance.

The Content of Acceptance of Commandments

Most of the disputes around acceptance of commandments in conversion are not about its necessity but about its scope. Rabbi Melamed speaks of acceptance of commandments at the level of “traditionalism.” Others quote Maimonides about “some commandments” and “fundamentals of the faith,” to show there is no need to commit to all the commandments. Unlike the earlier debate (on which I also have a clear stance), these disputes seem to me rather empty.

No one disputes that the convert is not meant to finish the Talmud during the conversion process. He is not meant to know all halakhah in detail—hardly any born Jew does. Moreover, he is not meant to commit to doing everything and never failing—no born Jew manages that either. Up to here, all agree. So what remains? It turns out that “acceptance of commandments” means that he commits in principle to the yoke of the commandments, meaning he understands that from the moment of conversion this entire system obligates him, and that he will be rewarded and punished for his deeds. Note well: this is not an academic learning that “Jews think one must keep Shabbat and not eat pork.” That is academic knowledge. Acceptance of commandments means that he understands that from now on this obligates him. Not that “Jews think it obligates him,” but that he himself understands and agrees.

Nothing beyond that is required. It is reasonable that he knows in advance he will not live up to it (if he is a realistic person). It is reasonable that he knows that not always will his effort be maximal (if he is realistic). He may even think that there are particular laws that he will, from the outset, not even strive to keep—and that too is perfectly fine as far as the validity of the conversion goes (of course it is not fine halakhically). All that is required is only his understanding that the thing obligates him and that he will be punished, and that he accepts this upon himself at the moment of conversion.

One may wonder: how can someone understand that this obligates him and that he will be punished, and yet plan in advance to violate some law? This wonder may sound very reasonable—to a Martian. But we, who dwell in houses of clay, know full well that people are complex creatures. Faithful Jews and great righteous people cut corners in this or that law even though they know they will be punished. Drives, biases, interests, social pressures, psychological difficulties, and more—all of these often lead us to do something that, even in our own view, is not right. To expand on this, I can only refer you to columns 172–173 on weakness of will. This is roughly like a penitent who accepts upon himself “never to return to this sin” (see Maimonides, Hilkhot Teshuvah 2:2) when it is clear to him even at that moment that, in practice, this will not happen. And yet such acceptance is valid repentance, for we are all human; if at that moment we genuinely want it—even if later we will not strive enough—that is repentance (see the commentaries to Maimonides there).

Returning to the content of acceptance of commandments: the conclusion is that there is no need to commit to actually keeping commandments, and the court does not even need an assessment that the convert will do so. What is needed is an assessment that the convert understands the implications of his conversion (obligation, reward and punishment) and that he accepts them upon himself. If the court is persuaded that this is the situation—the conversion is entirely valid, even if from that moment onward the convert does not keep anything at all.

Note that I am not saying merely that if the convert sins after converting this does not invalidate the conversion and he is a sinning Israelite. That is obvious and accepted and needs no elaboration. Clearly, what determines validity is only what was in the convert’s heart at that moment. What he does afterwards changes nothing. Here I wish to say more: even if at the moment of conversion the convert had in his heart no intention to keep any commandment, as long as he understands the implications and accepts them upon himself, the conversion is valid. The content of acceptance of commandments is extremely minimal—far below the view of the “lenient” side in the debate with Rabbi Melamed.

Let me take an example I heard from my friend Rabbi Aharon Katz, may he live long, former head of the Institute for Advanced Torah Studies, when he served as a conversion judge. He told me that a convert appeared before them on Friday, and afterward it became known that that evening (Friday night) he married his chosen one in a large hall with a band, desecrating Shabbat publicly. The court annulled his conversion, for it was clear to them that the event had been organized before the conversion. This was not a sin that occurred after conversion (in which case he is a sinning Israelite). Such a case reveals, retroactively, that at the moment of conversion he did not intend to accept the commandments. On the face of it, the analysis sounds very persuasive. But in light of what I described above, I am not sure they were right. If that convert did not intend to keep Shabbat at the moment of conversion, but he understood the significance of his actions and accepted the implications, he is still a convert in the strictest sense. Admittedly, the court’s decision there is not necessarily mistaken, for it may be that when they heard of his actions they reassessed that from the outset he did not truly intend to accept, and he did not really believe that this obligates him and that his actions would have consequences (otherwise, why not marry on Sunday? And why marry without a rabbi, not “according to the law of Moses and Israel”?). If that was their assessment, their decision was correct.

My intention here is merely to sharpen my distinction, not to set down definitive rulings about that particular case. What is decisive is the assessment of the court that sat in judgment. If the court concludes that there was no acceptance of commandments (in the minimal sense I described) at the moment of conversion, the conversion is invalid. It is hard to lay down rules that will apply to all cases, but it is very important to understand the framework. The court must understand what it needs to assess in order to determine the validity of a conversion, but the assessment itself is entrusted solely to them. Such an assessment is, of course, very complex, and we can never have certainty, but that is the reality. There are other cases in halakhah (not only in conversion) where a court must assess what is in a person’s heart—with all the human difficulty that entails.

No wonder people try to bypass the need for such an amorphous assessment by claiming that actual observance is the indicator by which we gauge the prior intention. That allows us to discuss easier, decisive questions, like how many laws must be kept to provide such an indicator—and all the debates revolve around this. But I do not think there is a general answer; hence, the discussion about the scope of observance is, in my eyes, nonsense. The relevant question is the assessment in the specific case before us—not general criteria. In any case, it is crucial to understand that actual observance is, at most, an indicator (if at all), not a self-standing requirement. Therefore the debate about the required scope of acceptance is pointless and meaningless. Acceptance must be comprehensive and complete, covering the whole of halakhah, but its practical manifestations may—at least in principle—be nil, and the conversion can still be valid.

If we accept the framework I have outlined—and it seems to me that everyone can and should agree to it (it is practically necessary; I do not see a logical, plausible alternative halakhic position)—we find that all these disputes arise from conceptual confusion and are, in part, simply empty.

Conversion to “Traditionalism”

Returning to the question of conversion to “traditionalism” that Rabbi Melamed proposed and that sparked the current debate—we must examine precisely what he means. If he means that practical observance is not what matters, I agree. But then even if the convert will not keep anything—not even at a traditionalist level—the conversion can be valid (as long as the court assesses that there was acceptance of commandments in the sense I described), unless we decide that behavior below “traditionalism” expresses a lack of acceptance from the outset, which I rather doubt (but, of course, every case stands on its own).

I will note that I have written here more than once (see, for example, here and many more) that in my eyes “traditionalists” are halakhically worse than atheists. The latter are coerced in the sense that they believe in nothing (like infants taken captive). But many traditionalists know and recognize halakhah and are, on a principled level, committed to it (their ideal model is one who does keep it), and yet they cut corners. Unlike atheists, such traditionalists are full-fledged transgressors. And nevertheless, I will now say that although a traditionalist Jew is a greater sinner than an atheist, conversion to traditionalism is preferable to conversion to atheism (which is not conversion at all). Conversion to traditionalism, in this sense, entails full acceptance of commandments. As I explained, practical observance is not essential to the validity of the conversion.

Since I expect comments on this point, I will add that here I mean traditionalists who believe in everything but cut corners in observance. There are also the opposite kind of traditionalists—those who keep some things despite believing in nothing (they are committed to the tradition of “father’s house,” like Ahad Ha’am). These are secular in the strictest sense; their commandments are worthless, and one who “converts” to that sort of traditionalism is a very great gentile indeed.

Since the start of the debate, Rabbi Melamed has published several columns in B’Sheva in which he tries to explain his position (the latest I saw was this). I think I read them all, and I still have not found a satisfactory explanation of his claim. There are conflicting notes in his words. In some places it seems he means what I have said here; in others he enters the pointless debates about the scope of observance itself. It is quite clear to me that he is not aware of the distinctions I have made here, for if he were, he could present his position more clearly and convincingly—to himself and certainly to others. The same holds for his opponents. Even if one of them disagrees with something I said, it would be easier for him to address the arguments and ground his position within the framework I proposed. As conducted, the debate is practically a dialogue of the deaf. It rages about the extent of observance meant to be performed; one says thus and the other thus, with no substantive arguments apart from citing and cataloging sources and precedents, and the question becomes how many sources support each side.

Interpretations of Precedents

You can now go through all the debates on the site here and in the articles surrounding Rabbi Melamed’s words, and you will see that in most cases this is a dialogue of the deaf. Sometimes people explain that there is no need for acceptance of commandments when the source says there is no need for the act of acceptance. Sometimes people speak of conversions for the sake of marriage or conversions for side reasons, but these precedents are utterly irrelevant. In earlier periods it was obvious to people that conversion obligates them in commandments and brings punishment, even if they did it only to marry. Therefore there is full, valid acceptance of commandments there. In many cases a gentile understood that the Jewish God punishes Jews, and he understood that when he converts he joins those who are obligated by Jewish law (in the ancient world, a plurality of gods was normal). Thus it is not necessarily a case of someone who does not believe at all in the truth of the system. There are cases where it is clear that the convert will not keep commandments and nevertheless he was converted—but as I explained, it may be that the assessment was that he understands and accepts upon himself the implications, and then practical observance has no bearing on the conversion.

In light of the analysis I have presented, both Rabbi Melamed’s words and those of his opponents—and especially the relevance of the precedents that each side brings and their analysis—become very obscure and, usually, not very relevant. Are we dealing with observance in practice? An assessment of observance at the moment of conversion? Understanding and acceptance of the meaning even without intent to observe? The content of the formal act of acceptance in the conversion procedure? And so on. There is no point now in going peddler-like through all the arguments, but whoever reviews them will see that almost all of these discussions become unnecessary.

First-Order and Second-Order Decision-Making

The picture I have drawn regarding acceptance of commandments in conversion seems to me self-evident and very logical, and I find it hard to see how anyone could disagree. At most, one can argue that in a given situation there is or is not an indicator of the convert’s intentions; but I do not see anything else to debate. Therefore, each side should first state whether he accepts this general picture, and then add the nuance within it over which he wishes to argue. After all, when reading the sides’ claims it is not clear at all what the debate is about, and even less clear where—if anywhere—each speaker departs from the picture I have sketched. I can interpret all sides so that they all agree to the picture described here and are only caught up in different words born of conceptual mixing.

The reliance on precedents and their analysis in this debate is a hallmark of second-order decision-making, which unfortunately characterizes most halakhic debates today (and not only today). In this column one can clearly see the drawbacks of such decision-making and such modes of discussion. By contrast, I have proposed here first-order analysis and decision-making, which comprises conceptual analysis, basic definitions, and constructing a general picture as it emerges from authoritative sources and from reason. Note that all this was done without recourse to any later decisor—and certainly no contemporary one—and even the few early sources are brought here merely as illustration.

I think that, upon reading the column, you will see two clear advantages of first-order halakhic analysis: it renders much of the second-order discussion (and the discussion of precedents) superfluous; and even if one accepts the importance of precedents, such analysis sheds a different light on the content of those precedents and their relevance to the debate.

In this context, it is worth seeing my remark here in the debate about the philological-historical approach in the humanities (in the discussion of R. David Zvi Hoffmann’s position on conversion).

[1] I do not know whether those decisors had a different textual reading, or they read the existing text as I have. In the text before us it does not look merely like an analogy (especially since the law of acceptance into fellowship is brought before acceptance of commandments).