Again the Categorical Imperative: Whoever Desires Peace and Morality—Prepare for War (Column 455)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

This morning we were informed of the outbreak of war in Ukraine (a truly good day for my mother, who wishes complete and total success to both sides. Don’t give up—keep going to the end). On such a day, I thought to myself that I can no longer postpone my tidings to the nation—indeed, to humanity and the world. This message has been simmering with me for several days already, but now, when the world sits biting its nails to hear what I have to say, I must not remain silent.

I’ll preface by saying that I am not versed in the particulars of the conflict, and therefore, although Putin is portrayed as the violent villain and the Ukrainians as the righteous (ask my mother), I’m not entirely sure that’s the case. But as always with me, this discussion will concern general principles and is thus not contingent on establishing the facts (how convenient to be a philosopher). I therefore issue a major disclaimer: the analysis that follows does not depend on the facts. It should be examined on the principled level (even if it assumes several factual premises).

Situation Overview

The immediate issue on the table is Ukraine’s joining the NATO alliance. The Russians demand that it not be admitted/join, adding demands for an American withdrawal from Europe altogether. Everyone understands that the talk of danger to Russian citizens or to Ukrainians of Russian ethnic origin, and the territorial demands, are mere pretexts. The aim is to stabilize Russia’s strategic standing as a great power and to try to drive the other side out of the arena. You thought the Cold War had ended; before our eyes it turns out—not quite.

The Leftist Fallacy: Playing the Game of Chicken—with Rabbits

A few weeks ago I received a WhatsApp lamenting humanity’s stupidity. Instead of sitting down for a rational discussion and reaching an agreement, these folks are walking themselves straight into a war that could become global (no worries—there’s no chance), endangering their lives and ours and world peace. Is this or that demand worth the lives of multitudes and the risk of world war?! I replied that this criticism applies to every conflict, for example between us and the Palestinians. I often hear this critique: what’s the logic of “by the sword you shall live” forever? Let both sides sit down, act rationally and with moderation, compromise, and be done. The path of war hasn’t exactly worked for us for over a hundred years.

This is an excellent and eminently rational critique, except—alas for all of us—it suffers from the well-known leftist fallacy: ignoring the supreme political principle that it takes two to tango. If you are rational and prepared to concede, who guarantees that the other side is also willing to concede? I remind you of what I wrote in column 450 (note the example there of the “Haters” and the “Terrorists”), how when there are two sides who consider themselves just (even if they are not truly just), both end up losing and there is no way out. You cannot scold both sides at once, for to accept the scolding they must first reach a bilateral agreement for mutual policy change—but the problem is that they are unwilling or unable to sit and make agreements. If they could do that, there would be no need for scolding. They would already agree on the content of their peace accord, and there would be no need for a preliminary agreement to conduct a bilateral rational policy.

Now I will extend the fallacy also to a case where one side knows it is in the wrong. Already in the fourth century the Roman writer Vegetius said: If you want peace, prepare for war. A conciliatory, peace-seeking policy will lead the other side to exploit it to gain achievements. One who knows that all his demands will be met by the other side’s compromise so as not to risk war (that is, if the other side is leftist)[1] will continue to demand more and more even if he is not in the right. I (the peace-seeking leftist) will of course concede more and more, since there is never justification for a war that endangers us and the world. This is a sure way to lose your drawers: they will strip you centimeter by centimeter, each time over a small demand not worth fighting over. In the end you will also lose your life—the very thing you so wished to save.

It reminds me of a favorite example. Reuven threatens Shimon: give me a shekel or I’ll kill you. Isn’t it right that Shimon give him a shekel and thus save both their lives? Is it rational to permit Shimon to kill the Reuven who threatens him? My answer is unequivocal: yes. Not only is it permitted; it is desirable (see my essay on killing a thief and the “Shai Dromi Law”). Under no circumstances is it right or proper to give him the shekel. The reason is that such capitulation will make violence pay, and humanity as a whole will learn that lesson. Next time they’ll ask for two shekels? Then when do you start killing? And even if they go on asking only one shekel each time, after you give a shekel and another shekel, you will eventually die of hunger. At precisely what moment will killing become justified (the moment when even leftism understands that there will be no peace here)?

In short, there is no point in playing the Game of Chicken with rabbits. In a situation where one side will certainly swerve the moment he sees danger, this is chicken against a rabbit. There is indeed a point in playing this game—but only from the fox’s/wolf’s side. A rabbit that enters the game of chicken against a wolf is not only cowardly but also an idiot. This is what Israel Aumann keeps crying hoarsely about regarding our conflicts here in the Middle East: if you want peace, prepare for war (and you need no game theory for that). If you are not prepared to risk war, two things will almost certainly happen: (1) you will lose all your assets; (2) in the end you will get war anyway. Your chances of attaining peace are virtually nil.

Note the logical equivalence between two claims: (1) Whoever desires peace should prepare for war. (2) Whoever is unwilling to risk war should forget about peace. Peacemongering is the most reliable recipe for getting farther from it and making the chance of attaining it negligible.

NATO’s Dilemma

As noted, the main point in the pre-war dispute was Ukraine’s joining NATO. The U.S. and its allies announced in advance that this was not on the agenda (pre-emptive capitulation), which of course led Putin to continue making further demands—and of course to get them, or to take them unimpeded. He wanted a complete American withdrawal from Europe, which of course had no chance of being accepted. I remember thinking he was not acting rationally. If he asked for a shekel, he would get it. Then he’d ask for another shekel and get that too. The art is to play chicken with rabbits, and to stick to demands that the rabbits can meet by conceding. Do not snap the leftist cord—i.e., do not reach a demand that cannot be met and will force even the leftist rabbit into war. That was Hitler’s mistake on several fronts—to our good fortune.

But Putin demanded more, precisely so that Heaven forbid his demands not be met. I quickly understood that, on the other hand, his offensive would not attempt to drive the Americans out of Europe but only to get his shekel in Ukraine. That he would of course attain. Hence it actually makes sense to present demands that will not be accepted, for then the threshold for war rises, and a mere invasion of Ukraine will no longer constitute a casus belli.

I assume you all already understand there will be no world war here. Sound the all-clear. Putin will do as he pleases, and the world will at most impose this or that sanction, which will have little effect and will not be broadly agreed upon. After a few months everything will calm down and be forgotten. Putin did not snap the cord in his chicken game, and the West, as expected, blinked first.

As a thought experiment, consider the difference between a situation in which Ukraine belongs to NATO and the present situation in which it is not a member but enjoys the West’s principled support. Contractually, there is a significant difference between the two: if a member of the alliance is attacked, the other members are obligated to join and defend it. This is not left to their discretion. By contrast, in the present situation—of mere sympathy, general goodwill, and principled opposition to aggression—the choice is theirs whether to join or not (mainly not). Let me add an assumption of my own: in my assessment, even had Ukraine been a NATO member, no one would have joined on its behalf. Such formal commitments have never prevented peace-seeking countries from evading their obligations. Aggressive states, by the way, are more punctilious about their commitments and alliances—not because they are more righteous, but because they are aware of the leftist fallacy: if you don’t prepare for war you will achieve nothing, certainly not peace. This is a utilitarian, not an ethical, consideration.

Now note what happens. Why was it so important for him to prevent Ukraine’s accession to NATO? Because such accession would hinder him from attacking it (for fear of global involvement and sliding into world war). Putin did not want Ukraine to join NATO—precisely so that he could attack it at leisure. And what is his pretext for the offensive? Preventing Ukraine’s accession to NATO, of course. This circularity is philosophically silly, but it turns out that in game theory and strategy it works quite well.

What Should NATO Have Done?

To my credit be it said (some praise not in my presence) that I said all this long before the war broke out. The moment I heard the West declare that Ukraine could not join NATO, it was clear to me the war would erupt. And I also understood that, contrary to the apocalyptic forecasts I was hearing, there was no chance this would turn into world war.

The question here is: if indeed NATO’s policy is not to be ready to join such a war, what could they have done? What is a rabbit to do in the face of a wolf’s threat? It seems to me the right step, emerging from this analysis, was… to admit Ukraine into NATO immediately. True, this would have tied their hands, but at least it would have sent Putin the message that attacking Ukraine carries great risk for him. In such a case, perhaps the game of chicken would have been played between two rabbits—which would make it more rational and reasonable from their perspective, with an expected gain greater than zero. In the end they of course would not have joined the war even though Ukraine was a member and despite the commitment toward it—but in his preliminary calculations Putin could not necessarily have counted on that. Such a move might have significantly increased the chance of preventing the war. If it breaks out anyway, opting not to join it remains available. So what did we lose? (The West’s credibility and deterrence are gone anyway.)

That is, a deliberately forceful and resolute policy—walking to the brink in the game of chicken—might have prevented war (the Bay of Pigs example under Kennedy is salient here). You can play chicken as a rabbit, i.e., play it while planning in advance to blink first—but one thing you cannot do: announce to your opponent in advance that this is your policy. The only thing more foolish, strategically, than being a rabbit is informing the wolf playing against you that you are a rabbit. At least disguise yourself as a lion, and only if that doesn’t work—run. The most foolish policy I can imagine is precisely the policy the West adopted, true to form. The results are before you in all their glory.

By the usual playbook and by basic strategic analysis (no math and no game theory), the aggressor facing a declared rabbit always drives forward and never refrains. Whereas when facing an undeclared rabbit, there is some chance he won’t move forward. True, if he decides to move forward anyway he will profit (and pay no price), but he does not know that in advance.

All of this analysis assumes we’re dealing with a wolf who can impose a price on his enemies. An aggressor without weapons will lose; but an aggressor who has tools in his arsenal to exact a price from his enemies (thus keeping them in rabbit mode) will always win. This peace-seeking policy obviously leads to more aggression, more violence, and greater distance from the coveted peace. Sadly and frustratingly, we continually discover that whoever desires peace must prepare for war (or at least make the sounds of readiness for war).

What Did Israel Do?

Israel, of course, tried to tread between the raindrops. It announced opposition to a Russian invasion but refrained from condemning Russia’s policy. Everyone understands the motivations and considerations. Our condemnation will not raise or lower anything in the global game, while it would bring heavy harm to our interests on our northeastern border with Syria. Should Israel have voiced a stronger stance? There’s no lack of criticism in the press, and it’s understandable. When we were in trouble (in the Holocaust, in our wars), we expected international involvement, not merely feeble condemnations—but we ourselves do not act that way. We all explain that the Allies should have fought for us and bombed Auschwitz, but none of us imagines IDF involvement in zones of violence and war around the world.

Yet there is a difference between the situations. The weight of our condemnation—let alone involvement—in the Ukraine campaign is devoid of consequential significance. It neither raises nor lowers. By contrast, in the Holocaust the discussion concerned actions that could have made a difference, by countries that were in a state of war anyway. Why should we adopt in Ukraine a policy that has no effect and cause ourselves to pay heavy strategic prices? A prime minister facing such a decision is not seated in the philosopher’s armchair. We will all pay the prices, and he is the one responsible. He lacks the privilege to make armchair judgments about absolute justice and morality.

But the local, provincial picture I’ve described is itself the result of the game of chicken. Had the West not adopted a rabbit policy, Syria would not be under complete Russian influence, and Israel would not feel alone vis-à-vis Russia and dependent upon it. In such a case, little Israel would not have to make such fearful calculations. Small players depend on the policies of the big ones; therefore, cowardly behavior by the small is also the result of the big ones’ rabbithood. Israel knows it has no one to rely on in time of trouble, and so it cannot afford to pay prices it cannot pay. If you are a rabbit, you cause others to become rabbits as well.

The Categorical Imperative: Whoever Desires Morality—Prepare for War

On a broader view, this is not merely a calculus of small and large, but of the categorical imperative. Every actor in the arena makes his own cost-benefit calculation, and in that sense he is ostensibly right. Yet the general situation is such that these “rational” actors always lose—because everyone is rational and everyone makes these cost-benefit calculations. So is this, in the end, truly the rational policy?

The picture fully parallels what I described in column 122. I explained there that although the categorical imperative is non-consequentialist (it does not aim to maximize the outcome), in practice, a non-consequentialist policy actually maximizes the outcome. One who acts not according to his profit-and-loss considerations is the one who brings about maximal gain (as in the prisoner’s dilemma). But this is conditioned on the other members of the club acting accordingly. Had the State of Israel acted by the categorical imperative and confronted Russia head-on, ready to pay heavy prices in our region, it would likely have found itself alone—its steps yielding no result, while it bore all the costs. It would eat the stinking fish and also be expelled from the city. Is it reasonable to expect it to act thus?

Seemingly, the categorical imperative is not consequentialist and the motivation to act by it is not consequentialist. Therefore, such a consideration is not a factor in the moral calculus. I am supposed to do what is right (the criterion being: what would the world look like if everyone did this), even if in practice the hoped-for results would not arrive. On that view, we ought to have declared war on Russia. But here, practical considerations do enter. Committing suicide for the sake of the categorical imperative is not necessarily a recommended ethical policy. Voting in elections or paying taxes are not overly heavy prices; there, the categorical imperative suffices to impose the demand to act by it even absent expected gain. But where the prices to be paid are heavy and perhaps irreversible, that can justifiably outweigh the categorical imperative. I am not willing to die for the categorical imperative.

I’m reminded now of the Tosafists on Shabbat 4a, cited in column 358. They wrote that it is implausible to forbid raking out bread that stuck to the oven on Shabbat—even though there is a rabbinic prohibition to rake it out—since refraining would bring the one who stuck it in to a capital transgression (baking/cooking). Even if we forbid it, say the Tosafists, he will not heed us—and in the subtext: rightly so. There is no logic in obeying a rabbinic prohibition and losing one’s life. It is more reasonable to transgress and save one’s life (and then perform many more mitzvot for the rest of one’s life). So, too, with the categorical imperative: it is fitting and proper to act by it—but not at any price. There are additional considerations, ethical and otherwise, that can and should affect real-world decisions. I have written more than once that the categorical imperative is an important ethical consideration, but not the only one; here you have a good example.

Note that had the West behaved non-rabbity, the situation would be different. In such a case, what would be required is behavior by each individual actor according to the categorical imperative, even though he is expected to pay prices. In that case, the price would not be great nor certain; then one could act by the categorical imperative—and then one would also be obligated to do so. The conclusion is that rabbit behavior is not only strategic folly; it is also moral wrongdoing. It leads each actor to behave in a way that does not conform to moral norms. In other words: not only whoever desires peace, but whoever desires morality—prepare for war.

Is Morality a Personal Norm?

The upshot is that morality is indeed personal at its root, but it is also conditioned on the existence of a collective framework. It is unreasonable to expect an agent living and acting in a wicked world to keep purely to the categorical imperative without regard to consequences. I say this even though the essence of the categorical imperative is non-consequentialist. Our moral intuition rebels against the demand to act thus.

It seems Maimonides writes similarly in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Bava Kamma (4:3):

If a legal case arises between a Jew and a gentile, the mode of judgment between them is as I will explain to you: if, by their laws, we would have an advantage, we judge them according to their laws and say to them, “Such is your law”; and if it would be better for us to judge by our law, we judge them according to our law and say to them, “Such is our law.”

On its face this is a terrible moral injustice. Maimonides senses this and writes:

Let this not be difficult in your eyes and do not be astonished—just as you are not astonished at the slaughter of animals though they have done no wrong—for one who has not perfected the human qualities is not truly a human being, and his purpose is only for the sake of the human. Discussion of this requires a separate book.

This can be explained in several ways. I’ll choose here an explanation that hangs on the personal versus the collective. Consider the prohibition to return a lost item to a gentile, which arouses in many of us a very uneasy feeling—and rightly so. But imagine you live in a society of gentiles who do not return lost items, whether mine or anyone else’s. In such a situation, is it sensible that I be scrupulous to return each of them his lost property?

The categorical imperative says yes, for if this were the general policy, the world would be better. But it seems to me our moral intuition decidedly says no. In a world where gentiles are constantly and mercilessly shafting Jews, it is indeed justified to adjudicate a Jew–gentile case in a biased way, contrary to the categorical imperative of morality. Perhaps this is a counter-categorical imperative: I would want there to be a universal law that whoever shafts me loses.

Perhaps this is the source of the feeling that sees Israeli conduct as legitimate, though it stands in stark contradiction to the categorical imperative. The imperative rests on a tacit gentleman’s agreement by which each of us acts. It is not conditioned on the agreement’s actual existence or on the attainment of results—but at least on its being in the background. In a cynical world where it is clear that no one is going to act by the imperative, purism that has me keep acting by it regardless of consequences seems detached and unreasonable even on the ethical plane.

[1] By the way, on the domestic front, leftists have already learned the lesson. In internal struggles they certainly do not behave as leftists; rather, they proudly and assertively impose their agenda on everyone around them. They understood that leftist policy will not advance leftism. I do not know when they will infer this on the international plane. This column seeks to make its modest contribution toward that.