A Look at the Law of Destroying Idolatry in Our Times: The s’passt nisht Principle (Column 447)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
Yesterday I was sent a link to a Facebook discussion opened by Haggai Mishgav about the question of destroying idolatry (Avodah Zarah) nowadays. He raises several interesting halakhic points and considerations, especially regarding the application of halakha in our day.
Halakhic Background
Idolatry is one of the three cardinal sins for which we are commanded to give up our lives rather than transgress. As such, the Torah extends the prohibition to its ancillary aspects (abizrayhu of Avodah Zarah). Among other things, we are obligated to destroy the accessories of idolatry, i.e., ritual implements—and certainly the idols themselves or their representations. This is explicit in several places in the Torah, as Maimonides writes in Positive Commandment 185 (and so in the Sefer ha-Chinukh, mitzvah 436):
“The 185th commandment is that we were commanded to destroy idolatry and all its houses by every manner of destruction and ruin—by breaking, burning, tearing down, cutting—each item by the method most appropriate to it; that is, by whatever most strongly and swiftly brings about its destruction. The intent is that we leave them no trace. As it says (Deut. 12:2), ‘You shall surely destroy all the places where the nations … served [their gods],’ and it also says (end of Va’etchanan) ‘Their altars you shall break,’ and again (Deut. 12:3) ‘You shall tear down their altars.’ And because the Talmud states in Sanhedrin 90a, ‘A positive commandment regarding idolatry’—they wondered what positive commandment there is with respect to idolatry; Rav Ḥisda explained: ‘And you shall tear down [their altars].’ And the language of the Sifrei (Re’eh): From where do we know that if one cut down an asherah tree and it regrew—even ten times—he is obligated to cut it down again? Scripture says: ‘You shall surely destroy.’ And it says there: ‘And you shall destroy their name from that place’—in the Land of Israel you are commanded to pursue them, but you are not commanded to pursue them outside the Land.”
These are not all the sources. The Torah already commands this in Exodus 31:11–13 and elsewhere. As is apparent at the end of his words, the obligation of “and you shall tear down” is stronger and more emphatic in the Land of Israel. Details appear in Rambam, Laws of Idolatry, chs. 7–8.
However, halakha recognizes several ways to nullify idolatry, and where nullification is effective the law of destruction does not apply. There are many details in the law of nullification (see Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah §142; Rambam, Avodah Zarah 8:6 and on; and a survey of the principles here). I won’t enter into them here, but simply put, an act is usually required; thought alone does not suffice. There is also a difference between an idol accessory owned by a gentile and one owned by a Jew (the latter is never nullifiable), and acquisition by a Jew can negate the possibility of nullification, and more.
The Question
Mishgav relates about a teenager who found a small idol in an archaeological site and came to ask a rabbi whether he may sell it (the figurine is worth a lot of money). The rabbi answered that the statue must be smashed, pursuant to the law of destroying idolatry. He raised several points that rabbi apparently didn’t consider (it’s not clear how he knows that), and they are certainly worthy of discussion and thought. Before getting to them, I’ll bring a story I heard over thirty years ago on a recording by Rabbi Zilberstein.
A Pilpul in the Laws of Shabbat
Rabbi Zilberstein told that one day Rabbi Disler (Rosh Yeshiva of “Orayta” for ba’alei teshuva—we know each other) came to him with a question. A student from his yeshiva hosted a secular friend for Shabbat. The guest worked in archaeology, and when he arrived on Shabbat he held a gift for his host—a figurine from a dig. The host didn’t flinch and didn’t bat an eye; he grabbed the idol and smashed it on the spot. Afterwards he came to Rabbi Disler to ask whether it was permitted to do this on Shabbat. He took it for granted that he had to smash the idol, and I assume his friend’s astonishment didn’t bother him either (“There is no counsel and no wisdom against the Lord”). All that troubled him was a question in the laws of Shabbat. One could debate at length which prohibition is involved—whether this is destructive or constructive, etc.—but here I’ll bring what Rabbi Zilberstein answered. That’s the punchline of the story.
Rabbi Zilberstein opened with a difficulty that the author of the Avnei Nezer raised regarding a contradiction in the Sefer ha-Chinukh. In mitzvah 425 the Chinukh writes that there is a mitzvah to wage war and kill the Seven Nations in the Land of Israel:
“To kill the Seven Nations who held our land before we conquered it from them—the Canaanite and the Amorite, etc.—and to destroy them wherever we find them, as it says (Deut. 7:2): ‘You shall utterly destroy them,’ and the command is repeated in Shoftim (Deut. 20:17): ‘For you shall utterly destroy them—the Hittite and the Amorite, etc.’
“Among the roots of the commandment: because these Seven Nations began to practice all kinds of idolatry and all the abominations that the Lord despises; therefore, since they are the essence and initial foundation of idolatry, we were commanded to blot them out and destroy them from under heaven—they shall not be remembered or mentioned among the living. And our command to destroy them yields us benefit: that we erase their memory from the world and will not learn from their deeds. And we will also gain moral instruction from this—that we should not turn after idolatry. For in pursuing every member of this evil family to kill him for engaging in idolatry, it will not enter any man’s heart to act as they did in any way.” …
“This commandment applies to men and women, in every place and at all times that we have the power to kill them…”
Here he writes that the mitzvah applies also to women.
By contrast, in mitzvah 604 he deals with the commandment to blot out Amalek:
“We were commanded to erase the seed of Amalek and destroy his memory from the world—male and female, adult and child; regarding this it is said (Deut. 25:19): ‘You shall blot out the remembrance of Amalek,’ and ‘remembrance’ includes everything.”
“This is among the commandments incumbent on the entire community, as our Sages said (Sanhedrin 20b): Three commandments were given to Israel upon entering the Land—to appoint a king, to build the Temple, and to eradicate the seed of Amalek. In truth, the obligation also falls on every individual male Jew to kill and destroy them from the world if he has the power—wherever and whenever—if perchance he finds one of their descendants.”
Here he rules that the commandment is imposed on the public, but practically only the males are obligated to carry it out.[1]
Rabbi Zilberstein reported that the Avnei Nezer raises this contradiction, and when I heard on the cassette his resolution I was sure it was one of the famous inventions of Rabbi Zilberstein—or that he found it in a children’s pilpul book. But no. Later I found it stated explicitly by a holy “High Priest,” namely in Responsa Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayyim §550:
“The Chinukh at the end of Parashat Ki Teitzei (mitzvah 603) writes that women are not commanded regarding the eradication of Amalek—only males, who are men of war [and therefore they are exempt also from the remembrance]. This is astonishing, for regarding the killing of the Seven Nations he writes in mitzvah 425 that it applies to males and females. The Mishneh la-Melekh already hinted at this in his notes.”
Now fasten your seatbelts and hold tight. Note his answer:
“(b) What seems in this matter is as follows: The Chinukh also writes that upon every individual there is an obligation—if one of the seed of Amalek comes into his hand—to kill him. This can occur for a woman as well, as with Sisera and Yael. So why did he write that the commandment is only upon the males, who are men of war? One must say that it is a positive time-bound commandment, for it does not apply on Shabbat, since the obligation to kill Amalek is not more stringent than other capital offenses, which do not override Shabbat. It is understandable that during a time of war Scripture says (Deut. 20) ‘until it is subdued,’ even on Shabbat (Shabbat 19a). But since women are not ‘people of war,’ rather it only applies when an individual happens to come into their hand, it does not override Shabbat. And since Shabbat is not a time for this commandment for women, it is considered that there is no time at all for them regarding it, as is evident from Mishnah Keritot ch. 1 regarding ‘one who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first,’ where Beit Hillel compares it to one who miscarries on the day eighty that fell on Shabbat, and Beit Shammai did not answer except by saying that Shabbat is fit for a public offering; but if it were not fit for any offering, it would be like the night. And do not object that since the time of this commandment for men is during war… We hold (Shabbat 62a) that women are a separate category; and since for women there is no eradicating Amalek at all on Shabbat, it is not considered a time for this commandment at all for them, and thus for them it is time-bound (see Sefer ha-Kaneh regarding circumcision).”
“(c) But regarding killing the Seven Nations—even according to the early authorities in Kiddushin 34a (see there in the Ran and Tosafot R. Akiva Eiger, item 7), who hold that where there is also a negative commandment, women are obligated in the positive one—here too we have the negative commandment ‘You shall not keep alive any soul’ (Deut. 20:16). But even according to what appears from the simple reading of Tosafot in Kiddushin 34a to the contrary—behold, the killing of the Seven Nations is ‘so that they will not teach you to act [after their abominations]’ (Deut. 20:18), and it is akin to killing dangerous creatures. This is considered a labor not needed for its own sake (melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa), regarding which, according to most authorities, one is exempt; and it applies by Torah law even on Shabbat.”
“(d) One might think that since the killing of the Seven Nations applies on Shabbat, that would establish ‘time of the commandment’ also regarding the killing of Amalek—just as the time of a private offering is established because public offerings are fit then. But it is not analogous, for killing Amalek is for the past, to take vengeance upon him, whereas killing the Seven Nations is for the future—‘so that they will not teach you.’ They are not the same category.”
In short, he says that there is a mitzvah also on the individual to kill Amalekites; therefore this is not limited to wartime obligations. Seemingly, that should apply to women as well—but at the same time, it does not override Shabbat (the prohibition of taking a life). Thus, this mitzvah applies only on the six weekdays and not on Shabbat, making it a positive time-bound commandment—and therefore women are exempt. By contrast, regarding the killing of the Seven Nations, the Chinukh explicitly writes (see the citation above) that it is in order that we not be ensnared in their ways. If so, this is a melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, like killing a snake or dangerous creatures in order that they not harm us (see Shabbat 3a). Hence, killing the Seven Nations is mandated even on Shabbat and is therefore not time-bound,[2] and consequently women are obligated as well.[3] It is unbelievable that a Jew would write this resolution in earnest.
We learn from here that killing the Seven Nations—and apparently also destroying their idols—is done so that we not be ensnared by them. From this Rabbi Zilberstein inferred that the smashing of the idol on Shabbat was a case of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, and therefore its prohibition is rabbinic; accordingly, the Torah-level positive commandment of destroying idolatry overrides this rabbinic prohibition.
I must say that this recorded stand-up routine, which I heard while hospitalized, made my day (I’ve always loved pilpulei de-oraita). I owe him thanks for removing one-sixtieth of my ailments, and it seems we can count him the first “medical clown” (see here that this practice began in 1986; that is precisely the year I heard this tape).
Now let us return to Mishgav’s considerations (I recommend reading his post now). I will preface that he presents these reflections not as absolute statements, and he himself writes that one could rule contrary to them. His criticism is of the rabbi who, he claims, didn’t take them into account at all (it’s unclear how he knows; though at least regarding some rabbis it’s quite plausible). In any case, I will discuss them on their merits.
Theft from the Public
Mishgav’s first point is that by law one may not sell the statue (like any archaeological find), irrespective of the prohibition; therefore doing so constitutes theft from the public. If, for the sake of argument, we assume there is a halakhic obligation to smash the statue, then as I understand it his claim is halakhically mistaken.
Even if the statue were merely an object prohibited for benefit, there would be no theft involved (some hold there is no ownership over items prohibited for benefit),[4] and according to other views there may be theft, but certainly no duty of restitution.[5] But all this applies if we were dealing with a regular prohibition of benefit. With idolatry, however, it is not only prohibited to benefit from it; there is a halakhic duty to smash and destroy the idol, and in such a case it is obvious there is no ownership and no theft. Dina de-malkhuta (the law of the land) applies to monetary matters, not to prohibitions; it cannot permit use of items prohibited for benefit or cancel the duty to smash them. Therefore, once I see such a figurine, I am obligated to smash it. And even merely from the standpoint of enforcing mitzvot there is an obligation to destroy the idol, to compel others—who are ignoring their halakhic duty—not to transgress it.
This story reminds me of something that happened to me. A young man studying at the Haredi yeshiva in Yeruham, the son of our friends, used to visit our home. One day he asked to borrow from us a book by Joseph Heller (the author of Catch-22 and the Talmud). While he was in the yeshiva, the spiritual supervisor saw the secular book in his possession—heaven forfend—and confiscated it from him. He felt uncomfortable, but in the end he mustered courage and told me. I told him to inform the supervisor that if he did not return the book I would summon him to a rabbinical court for theft. The young man went to the supervisor, who said he couldn’t find the book (perhaps true, perhaps not). Meanwhile the supervisor argued there was no theft here because reading such books is forbidden and they are like an object prohibited for benefit (the implication being that he destroyed the “prohibited” item, and didn’t merely misplace it). I told him that when I seek his halakhic opinion about what is permitted or forbidden to read, he will be the first to know. In the meantime, I added, I expect full payment for the value of the book; otherwise I will sue him in a rabbinical court. In the end I received payment, and I certainly did not forgive the theft (I assume he also did not repent; in any case I received no request for appeasement or reconciliation).
While this was ongoing I wondered whether in such a situation there truly is a prohibition of theft. According to him it was absolutely forbidden; let’s assume for the sake of discussion that it was an object prohibited for benefit (though even if reading were forbidden, it’s not clear whence he derived a prohibition of benefit). If indeed that is the situation according to him, then at most he “stole” an item prohibited for benefit, and in doing so he even fulfilled the mitzvah of “surely rebuke your fellow” and the duty to coerce compliance with mitzvot. He prevented me from sinning, and if he were permitted to strike me to compel me, then certainly he would be permitted to coerce me monetarily (per Ramban’s well-known logic at the end of Bava Batra: if you coerce him with his body, coerce him with his money). Above I wrote regarding theft involving items prohibited for benefit and argued there is definitely room to permit.
But in a case where there is a dispute whether there is a prohibition of benefit, it is obvious that you have no right to steal from me an item that, according to your opinion, is prohibited for benefit if, according to my view, it is not prohibited—and of course you cannot force me to act in accordance with your position. He (and recall that we are speaking of a spiritual supervisor, which makes the argument much worse) appoints himself judge, decides what is forbidden or permitted, and even coerces me to comply although my position is different. I’m not naive; it’s clear to me that as a Haredi he does not recognize my position as legitimate. The next step is that “heretics” like me might even allow text messaging with 150 justifications—heaven help us.
Returning to our matter: simply put, smashing the figurine does not involve theft.
National Consciousness and Identity
Mishgav’s next claim is that such figurines—and archaeology in general—are important for our national consciousness and identity, and that such a consideration also has a place and weight in the halakhic decision. True, this particular figurine is not really important on the macroscopic level, but the accumulation of data is important; every piece contributes to the overall picture.
Even if it were a cardinal find, I’m not sure that would permit waiving the duty to destroy this figurine (which counts as abizrayhu of idolatry). But to argue based on the marginal contribution of this particular figurine to a general picture that is important for national consciousness and identity seems to me far too remote a consideration to permit abizrayhu of Avodah Zarah.
Public Needs
Mishgav then turns to a discussion of the importance of “public opinion” in halakha. I didn’t fully understand what he meant, or why he presents it as a continuation of the previous point (consciousness and identity). From his examples, it seems he means public needs. He compares this to the permission to relocate graves for public needs. I gather his claim is twofold: (a) We see that public needs permit prohibitions; (b) What determines public needs are the norms accepted by society (therefore we do not limit ourselves to living in small houses to minimize the need to move graves). Perhaps this is what he meant by “public opinion,” namely that if the public considers something important to it in terms of consciousness and identity, that carries halakhic weight (and not necessarily the posek’s personal assessment of what’s important).
Again, it seems difficult to permit a prohibition of abizrayhu of idolatry on the basis of such a consideration—especially
A. I have difficulty understanding how it is possible to treat archaeological finds today as if they were still objects of idolatry. The world has changed and culture has changed, and the halakha seems ridiculous. From an archaeological point of view, the contribution of one figurine may be marginal, but if we follow this principle, in which we discuss objects of idolatry today as if the worship continues today and not as if it is an object whose function is educational - then our findings destroy every single figurine according to halakha and nullify the study (of the figurines at least). Isn't that a shame?
I understood that this was also the halakhic conclusion at the end of the discussion:
“But here we are talking about a statue whose entire species has already become extinct and does not exist at all in the world. This is a cancellation made for this entire form of worship and religion, and not like a regular cancellation made for a specific item. In such a situation, the explanation gives that there is no need for cancellation for this particular statue, and it is permissible and does not require loss.”
Maybe I didn't understand correctly
Indeed. Nevertheless, the archaeological "Bel Tashchit" was conspicuous by its absence from the break.
I will tie the tie that was left as an exercise. That is the gist of things. The overseer is not permitted to perform a loss in a book because the owner of the book has a system and adheres to his system, which is permissible. And if so, we are also not permitted today to perform a loss in idolatry (even if for some reason they did not cancel) because those idolaters had a system and adhered to their system, which is the truth. [But the right to autonomy was beneficial to the owner of the book against the overseer only so that he would not violate his financial rights by virtue of the obligation to perform the loss, but in idolatry idolatry you claim that the right to autonomy of those idolaters fundamentally nullifies the obligation to perform the loss, since today there is no violation of any financial right of the worshipers that they have lost, and here the right to autonomy has become an exclusive judgment according to his system].
In other words, before us is the argument that the position of the other person is important, one that consists of the right to autonomy and judgment according to his system. In the case of the overseer, this argument operated within the halakhic system and recognized the rights of a person with a system within it. And in the case of idolatry, you operate this argument outside the halakhic system and recognize the rights of a person with a system in general. And even though this argument operates outside the halakhic system, you continue to give it a Jewish stamp of approval as a kind of offense in its own right. The vision of pluralism and peace.
I don't think it's about their rights. It's about my duties to respect others and not harm them. Therefore, it doesn't depend on whether they are still alive and well.
By my definition, this is not the vision of pluralism but the vision of tolerance.
But the difference in fact between pluralism and tolerance (in your definitions) is that it is possible to draw a legitimate and an illegitimate boundary. Whereas here you have completely erased the examination of the contents and everything rests on the seriousness of the method of the holder of the position, since even the most serious sin between a person and a place is treated with respect by those who commit it if they hold to their method. It turns out that in fact this is complete pluralism, and only the intellectual infrastructure is different.
First, that's not the difference. It's just a metaphor for the difference. The essential difference is whether I believe he's right like me (=pluralism) or whether I just respect his wrong position (=tolerance). I haven't erased that difference at all either. In this case, it seems to me that the balance is not to harm the statue. Of course, it's impossible to draw a sharp line and criterion, but that's the meaning of the word "spast not." "spast not" means that it's unthinkable to do such a thing, and not just that it's simply inappropriate.
(The difference in fact would be a negation of the essential difference).
If here the balance means not harming the idol, then what is the negative treatment of idolatry in the system? There is a maximum here on the axis of error (idolatrous worship) and a minimum on the axis of harm to honor (since their minds are worshipped and only their memory is heard on the level) and the balance is negative of harm. It is like Barak saying that he naturally accepts two things, Jewish and democratic, but gives Jewishness the weight of a grain of wheat.
I am talking about a permanent and declared policy of fragmentation and not about a specific action taken by a private individual in his home. This is a policy that today seems very problematic. The harm is not to the ancient dead but to respect for the historical heritage of humanity and an improper attitude towards ideas.
Regarding the question of the line, I distinguished in my words between substantive criticism and hostile criticism, which should generally not be taken into account.
Linguistic note: ‘Spast Nicht’ is simply ‘not appropriate’. That's the literal translation. In the sense of –not fitting. And it certainly doesn't mean ‘unthinkable’. So I'm not sure that's the right term for this discussion. ‘Spast Nicht’ is a matter of what is acceptable, what is appropriate. And what is inappropriate. It's a gentle, not harsh, expression.
If so, then I was wrong. I don't understand Yiddish.
I am happy about the discussion, which on the one hand makes a very important and correct comment in my opinion, on the other hand, I think it opens a very large opening for a discussion about who is truly worthy and able to make meta-halachic considerations like "spas nitzheim" - and hence the path to a debate about the very ability and breadth of shoulders of this or that rabbi to address these considerations (and this reaches everywhere, such as the discussion regarding certain rulings of Rabbi Melamed, regarding the conversion outline, and this can reach any ruling that has significance and public resonance).
How long will it take before telling gays not to get married becomes a no-brainer and the halacha is abolished? Do you think that will happen?
I tried to read and understand the last paragraph regarding the contradiction to your general approach regarding the independent systems, but I was unable to understand. Forgive me.
My questions:
A. Ostensibly, if there is a place for moral scales in halakhah, then they are dependent systems.
B. Is the decision within halakhic or outside halakhic? Why is the decision on the side of morality?
We will answer that the claim of the ”fast not” is too far-reaching, and in my opinion it seems to lack any basis in halakhah. In my opinion, the analogy to saving a Gentile on Shabbat is not accurate. There, the considerations and claims are relevant, and more specific (and do not seem to me to be that sufficient…). What Noam criticized above is only a sign that the permission proposed here is actually – to the best of my judgment – devoid of any content (and not a mere ‘slippery slope’ claim). Have we shown such a sweeping permission, or what sounds like it??
Admittedly, I would suggest another argument for permission (apart from the reason for ‘general annulment’, which also seems to me much more reasonable). I would suggest perhaps as a kind of analogy to the prediction of Yom Kippur, verse 2, regarding the matter of moridin and eimin a'lin - that it no longer achieves its desired purpose, and rather, it causes its reversal. And since the purpose of the commandment to destroy Didan is similar (or identical) to the law of moridin - perhaps there is room to argue that at least in the case of shi'v ve'al ta'ase', one should refrain from destroying it. And I would also like to say this: Perhaps in our day, the publication of foreign works of all kinds that have already passed and their memory has been erased from the world is the glory of the Kingdom of Heaven, and shows us the historical march towards the goal of shi'v ve'al ta'ase'. Perhaps this is what should be said.
It is clearly baseless, that is exactly what I claimed. And yet it is used, sometimes consciously and sometimes not. The reasons such as the fact that it is not useful or the multiple honor of the Kingdom of Heaven are part of the Spasst Nietzsche, because beyond the fact that some of these reasons are nonsense (the multiple honor of the Kingdom of Heaven), even if they were not such according to the law, they would not have required a reading (certainly in a place where the law appears in the Torah several times for the law – such as the loss of a עז). Therefore, it is clear that the attitude towards the secular does not stem from the fact that it is not useful but from the fact that it is not appropriate to treat a person in this way. Spasst Nietzsche.
It is the law for rescuing a Gentile on Shabbat, as well as for going to court, which almost everyone allows themselves. These are sweeping permissions that are not tested in the rules of the law (although they try to present it that way), and therefore it is clear to me that they are based on Spasst Nietzsche.
His Honor did not explain at all what the clowning was in the words of the crown jewels.
This is self-evident. First and foremost, all this chatter, even if it were true, has no hint in the teachings of the school. He writes it as a simple matter. Second, there is a requirement of a reason for reading, and third, even if it is true, the explanation that it becomes a deed of time is far from clear. And fourth, according to the method of R”Yi and the Rambam, who ruled similarly that it is a Torah prohibition.
It seems to me that the law requires that the image be lost according to the halakhah, but since there is a fear of "hostility" from all sorts of "modernists", I recommend that the image be lost in Sana'a, since we are sworn not to provoke the nations, and this also includes "not to provoke the Israeli nation" (as mentioned in the name of Rabbi Chaim Ozer of Vilna in the introduction to the Responsa Bnei Banim by Hari Henkin). By losing the image, we are correcting the sin of the Jews that led to the destruction of the First Temple, and by committing the loss in Sana'a, we are helping to correct the defect that caused the destruction of the Second Temple.
With greetings, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kwas
In any case, there is a ‘modern idolatry’, namely the ‘spaghetti monster’ that the statement ‘es past nicht’ cancels out from the ‘pasta’torah, and again there is no substance in it.
With greetings, as a round of applause to Aksinger, Yeshiva Itari
It should be noted that in ancient times, smashing other people's idols was much more 'fast nisht'. After all, those idols were worshipped by the rest of the world's nations, and harming them was 'harming the soul of our neighbors.' But this is exactly the revolution that the Torah wanted to create, to bring about a situation where 'the idols will be cut down.' Our Creator has charged us to be the 'flag bearers' of the monotheistic revolution, and therefore to fight against idols and their symbols.
With greetings, Ch. B. Dak
Regarding the fertility figurines, it should be noted that in addition to being accessories, they were designed in a way that would also arouse the "Yitzra Deryot" (fertility idol), and this "idol" dances in our time even more than before, and that is enough to be abhorred.
With greetings, H.B. D.K.
In the book of Proverbs, the duty to erase leaven is comparable to the duty to erase leaven, in which two reasons are stated: (a) Lest one should not erase with a whole heart. (b) Lest one should eat it.
And something like this can be said in the book of Proverbs. There is a side that the erasure comes to internalize in the heart of the person the aversion and revulsion of the idol, and there is a side that the erasure comes to prevent people from failing in idolatry.
Perhaps there will be a difference between the two explanations in the book of Proverbs, which has already gone out of fashion, that the fear that someone will be drawn to the fact is remote, but the revulsion and revulsion from it is not null and void and there is a place to erase in order to express this revulsion.
Best regards, Gabriel Haftsadi Zweidinimovsky
In the Bible, the word "idolatry" refers to nations that abandoned their idols. It seems to refer to Greek or Roman or Egyptian and Arab idols, whose peoples converted to monotheistic religions and abandoned their pagan religion. But in Canaanite statues, etc., we did not find that the Canaanites became monotheists, but rather assimilated into other pagan religions and did not abandon the idols of Canaan, but rather incorporated them into the pantheon of the nations they joined, and as for the idols of Canaan, etc., there was never a conscious abandonment of them.
And perhaps there is another reason for allowing the occupation of statues for the purpose of archaeological research, which is to say that there is a kind of "but you have learned to understand and teach" in this. For this purpose, it was permitted to study the abominations of the Gentiles. The permission of "You shall learn to understand and to teach" was interpreted by the Rishonim as learning how to be saved from pagan influence or learning in order to know how to judge the worshipers of the Law (see the article by Rabbi Zvi Tal (Teich), "You shall not learn to do, but you shall learn to understand and to teach", the weekly page of Bar-Ilan University, issue 616, Shofim 5765), but just as the Rambam learned from the ways of pagan worship in the Nabataean land-working, reasons for the Torah commandments that were intended to negate the Law, Thus, archaeological research can teach us about identifying places and interpreting obscure texts, and perhaps there is a side to this of ‘understanding and teaching’, and so on.
Best regards, Eliam Fish”l Werkheimer’
In S”D’ Bader”R P”B
The feeling of ’fast not’ regarding the breaking of statues stems from our being, whether we like it or not, part of the Western world that has been fighting for its flag of ‘live and let live’. As believers, we are not allowed to be carried away by the concept of ‘a man by his faith shall live’ which is ready to accommodate heresy, infidelities and idolatry.
However, since ’every time shines in its own way– it must be said that in an era of openness, the fight against heresy, infidelities and idolatry should focus more on information and pleasant ways. For ’postmodernism’ There is a negative side to total despair in seeking truth – but it also has a positive side – breaking the arrogant pride of Western man, who is more willing to open up and listen to views that come from Eastern and ancient cultures.
And like Abraham, whose path began with a violent and cynical outburst against idolatry, he developed a new way of bringing those far away closer through explanation and through pleasant ways – thus perhaps a ‘window of opportunity’ of the path of rapprochement and explanation has opened up for us today.
In Abraham's generation, his influence was not evident, the inhabitants of the land respected him greatly as ’the president of God’ but the ‘sin of the Amorites’ remained in its full severity, and the ’fourth generation’ Abraham was commanded to return to the aggressive path of war against idols and their worshipers.
There was a brief attempt in the days of Solomon, during whose time people came from all over the world to listen to his wisdom. Even during the Second Temple period (and thereafter until the Bar Kokhba revolt) – there was a strong cultural influence of the Jewish people, who were perceived by their surroundings as a ’nation of philosophers’ whose lives revolved around the Torah and the synagogue, and their inspiration led to the widespread influence of monotheism, but the disciples of Judaism – Christianity and Islam – refused to acknowledge the ’source’ and became disillusioned.
The modernity that led to the decline of Christianity's influence and to more critical perceptions – Today, we can open ourselves more and more to the pure source of monotheism, and gradually the interest of the Gentiles in returning to the reality of the ‘sons of Noah’ and ’righteous among the nations’ is growing. In this situation, – there is room to emphasize more the ‘ways of goodness’.
Of course, we will not bring idols into our home, but we can do as Abraham did, who suspected that his guests were ‘Arabs who bow down to the dust at their feet’ and therefore acted tactfully and gently and offered them to wash their feet before they sat down to the feast of kings that he had prepared for them. ‘The left repels and the right draws near’.
With greetings, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel”r
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A0%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%9F
The story with the caretaker is beautiful.
It is a mistake to think that Az is idle in our world.
See the Damanhur temple in the heart of modern Italy.
One must understand that the root of the matter there is the attribution of “supernatural powers” to matter, under the guise of beautiful modern words such as the influence of art on the human soul. It seems that they would be happy to adopt such an ancient icon there.
Not to mention villages in India where Az still occurs in its primitive form, including prayers to statues, offering food to idols, etc.
By the way, in the past I wondered what the place of immersing vessels is in our day. Until I was exposed to these..
https://www.masa.co.il/article/%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%94%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%A9-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%93%D7%9D-%D7%A6%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%98%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%94/
In the 1st of Adar 1572
As I saw on Wikipedia, entry ‘Milchod 22’, the author raises the contradiction that if the soldier submits a request to be discharged as mentally ill – then the very request for exemption indicates sanity,
In this way, one can also argue against the argument that the photographer is already exempt from the Torah of Ezra, that the very request for permission to keep the photographer, and so on with the intention of selling or researching it – indicates that it is considered due to its archaeological value, and apparently its archaeological value is in being an object that was used for worship. And ch”b.
With greetings, Simcha Fish”l Halevi Plankton
In the book of the Adar Adar, see Rabbi Yuval Sherlow's article "The Confiscation of Objects by a Teacher (Neyer Emda)" (on the website "Tzhar La'tika") and in the Torah sources cited there in note 2: Responsa Mishnah Hilchot, Part 6, Refad; Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Hankin, Confiscation of Objects from Students", Tecumin 8, pp. 186-202; Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Ben-Yaakov, "The Responsibility of a Teacher for a Confiscated Object", Tecumin 19, pp. 51-54; Rabbi Gideon Ben-Moshe, Confiscation of Objects by a Teacher in a Classroom, Pa'emi Ya'akov 4, pp. 22-27.
Regarding 'damage caused to an object', Rabbi Sharlo concludes: 'When the object is in the teacher's hands, he is responsible for it and is entrusted with its safekeeping. If the teacher places the object in the place designated for this purpose according to the school's instructions, the object passes from the teacher's responsibility to the school's responsibility. The question of the source of the teacher's authority, and what is included in this authority, also has broad significance regarding the status of the teacher or the school in relation to damage caused to the object.
If the confiscation is permitted, it seems that the parents do not agree that the school or the teacher will not bear some responsibility for the object, and therefore the teacher should be seen as a gratuitous custodian. If the matter is based on the removal of a harmful person, it seems that there is no responsibility on the part of the teacher, provided that there is no intentional crime that is unnecessary because it is not included in the removal of the harmful person. If it is a question of granting validity by virtue of the authority of the government, it is possible that he is even less of a guardian. Indeed, it seems that the teacher is liable for damages if the crime is in the form of guardianship.
With blessings, Hanoch Hanach Feinschmecker-Palty
Regarding a yeshiva supervisor, the judge has reason to say that the entry of a student into the yeshiva is considered the acceptance of the yeshiva heads regarding him as a "marah da'atra," and if their halakhic view is that a particular book is a "false book" that requires ginizah or yantra, then their student is obligated to adopt this halakhic approach for the entire time he is in the yeshiva.
Rabbi Michi, if what you are saying is true, that the principle of ‘fast not’ has no halachic basis, and yet we accept it, then haven’t we completely relaxed the leash? Any honest and moral person would do what they see fit!?
I ask this not as a challenge, but a genuine question: Isn’t what you are proposing exactly the platform of ‘Reform’ Judaism?
Good question, and in my words I already hinted at the slippery slope and the concerns about it. And yet I will say a few things about it. First, your claim can be understood on two levels: A. This itself is an incorrect policy. The slippery slope is an indication of this. B. This itself is acceptable, but there are claims about future concerns. See these distinctions in column 429. I will address both claims.
A1. Even if decisions are not made in this way in the end, it is still important to understand that this is how it would have been appropriate to act were it not for the slippery slope (see column 429).
A2. In my opinion, the concerns about slippery slopes are exaggerated. Correct consideration cannot be silenced because of future concerns (see the above column). It is clear that the matter is built on true intention and honesty. Those who want to make the world a nobody can always do so, but we are all supposed to give an account of our actions. And the heart knows whether to be crooked or crooked. When such a policy is adopted in certain places where it is justified, it does not mean that the leash is permitted. Each on its own merits.
B1. The step itself is justified in certain circumstances. The sages themselves spoke of a transgression for its own sake, and of its ways: ways of grace, ways of peace, appearances, punishment beyond the law, freezing laws (I detailed them in the third book of the trilogy), and so on. And they did not fear that the leash would be permitted. There are situations that require a deviation from the law. All of these are considerations that are taken in very specific places. Again, those who want to loosen the leash do not need me for this.
B2. The difference between this and reform is in the scope and nature of the considerations. If all nonsense is a sphat nietz, then it is reform. But if it is used sparingly in certain circumstances and is required, it is perfectly fine.
In short, one of the great successes of the reform was the abdication of halakhic Judaism. Out of fear of reform, we do not allow ourselves to do anything. See again my remarks about slippery slope arguments in the above column.
The specific story of Ez may be different from the whole Spas Nitz thing you're talking about. Partly because of what you mentioned - that Ez long ago simply passed away. Now the only thing it is is an archaeological item. In everyone's eyes. There is no one in the world who sees her as Ez in the sense that we need to lose.
And maybe this connects to what we say in Chazal: They asked for mercy on us and the creation of Ez was abolished from the world. Thus, a real change was created in a central prohibition of the Torah.
I didn't read most of the post, if that helps, Rema”a (Yora De'ah, Mark 1)
But the shape of a two-and-a-half (cross) worn around the neck as a memorial is not called a tsalman and is permitted with pleasure. So far.
I don't think it has anything to do with us. There, we're talking about something that isn't used for עז at all. It's just that its form is like עז.
In B”D A’ Badar P”B
Ramda”A – Hello,
The shape of a cross hung around the neck in remembrance, ostensibly expresses that the statue belongs to the Christian faith, but since it is not a statue that is worshipped – it is not called a ‘statue’ and is permitted in pleasure.
And from now on, it is necessary to inquire with archaeologists whether the ’statues’statues’ Considered to be a statue that is worshipped, or just an amulet that brings blessings and abundance, Shaul is less of a statue of the idol that is actually worshipped (although there is a belief that it was an amulet to attract abundance – donkey. More of a form that is hung only for remembrance and expression of religious loyalty)
Maybe Misgav Misgav will clarify this archaeological question for us 🙂
With blessings, Sh’ Z”el Mak”ek Tsa'alim
Regarding what you wrote about the book Catch-22, how does that align with what you wrote about saving oneself with the money of one's friend? After all, there it is also possible to force one's friend with his money, according to the commandment: "You shall not stand for the blood of your friend and take his money in order to save yourself."
I wrote here that if it were really about saving from a crime, then it seems permissible. But he decided that it was a crime and now he is forcing it on me. Next he will come to my house to rob all the kosher food I have.
Beyond that, he may have saved the guy from a crime, but not me. I have many such books. Therefore, he has no justification to destroy the book, but at most to confiscate it.
So according to this, it is permissible to save yourself with your friend's money in order to save him from a crime. You shall not stand for the blood of your friend.
I mean, I remember that on the one hand it is forbidden to save yourself with your friend's money, and on the other hand, according to the move you explained here in the column, it is permitted, seemingly in contradiction to this law.
This is what the Rashba writes in the Teshuva, and perhaps this is really the explanation. I have always wondered why he writes that because of his duty to save me, I am not guilty of theft. Now I think that perhaps the explanation is as you say. This is an interesting comment. You are actually saying that there is theft, but it is permitted, just as it is permitted to violate it by force of law on the commandments.
But to the point, assuming that the friend is not here, he is not obligated to save me, and therefore I do not have permission to rob him in order to be saved. Therefore, basically, a person does not save himself with his friend's money, but at most saves his friend from committing a crime with his friend's money. Therefore, it is also unlikely that this is the explanation in the Rashba that does not divide.
And Zimri's act is justified according to this, since Pinchas came to save him from a transgression and yet it is permissible to kill him under the law of persecution. Perhaps because the rescue does not justify killing the sinner. If he had come to harm Zimri's property, then there would not have been a law of persecution here.
In the Responsa Yod it is ruled:
“Riba from the Torah, which is in the form of a loan on a fixed amount, is issued by the dayiyim, who would coerce and prepare him until his soul departs, but there is no court that descends to his assets… ” (161:5).
How does this fit in with the opinion of the Ramban, that until you coerce him with his body, you coerce him with his property.
And another question regarding coercion, can anyone coerce? Or only in the dayiyim? And does this apply to all the mitzvot? Or only to the positive mitzvot?
reminder
For some reason I missed this message. Sorry.
This doesn't work out. See the Chiddaeus of Rabbi Shmuel B ”B ’ T-Y at great length. Although in principle it is possible to resolve this in the following way: it is forbidden to go to his assets and pay in his place (because legally he does not really owe me and there is no right of mine that has been violated here), but it is permissible to take a pledge from them in order to force them to pay. And this is financial coercion.
Now I saw here that Rabbi Shaviv, the late, is making your question difficult, and I think he is answering in a similar way to me:
https://www.etzion.org.il/he/halakha/studies-halakha/philosophy-halakha/%D7%9B%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%95%D7%AA
For a discussion of coercion, see Netivot and Mashovav Ch”m C 3 at length. They disagree on whether coercion is to the point of death, and whether it is for every person.
There are reviews online. See, for example, two These are:
https://daat.ac.il/mishpat-ivri/skirot/311-2.htm
https://din.org.il/2019/03/14/%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%9B%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%99-%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%95%D7%95%D7%AA/
I saw in the link you sent that the authority to coerce is not in the hands of individuals, and this resolves the issues I raised above regarding a person saving himself with his friend's money. But it's still difficult to understand what you wrote in the post about the book and the statues of Ezra, because your entire foundation is based on the issue of coercion, and it seems that it is not in the authority of individuals.
Would it be correct to say that regarding the commandment to destroy a book, the Torah permitted harm to another's property, but regarding other cases (a book, for example) there is no such permission?
To Oren – Hello
Apparently, even though it is a ‘prohibition of enjoyment’ it is not at all ‘money’ and therefore it is not ‘money of others’.
Best regards, Yaron Fish–Ordner
I don't think so. As Shchel wrote, it is a prohibition of enjoyment. Although I noted above that there may be a prohibition of stealing enjoyment, there is no obligation to return it. But money is also forbidden to be taken unless by force, as the Ramban explains.
But an individual has no coercive authority.