On Subjective Dimensions in Halakha (Column 374)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
It is commonly thought that Halakha took shape as a system that relies on objective criteria, meaning criteria that apply to any person in the same situation. If the criteria are met, an obligation, prohibition, or exemption takes effect—and this does not depend on which person is involved. In this column I wish to present halakhic rules whose determining criteria are subjective.
Sharpening the Question: Between Norms and Facts
Despite the above, it is clear that there are halakhot that include a subjective element. For example, all the mitzvot of emotion are mitzvot that address our inner life. In that sense, they are subjective. The commandments to love, for instance, are ostensibly subjective, since they command us to love. Love is a subjective feeling. They impose upon us a duty to love, but each person loves in his or her own way, in forms and intensities that are personally relevant.
But these examples are not relevant to our discussion. First, because in Column 22 I pointed out that, at least according to certain approaches, even these mitzvot focus on objective and practical criteria rather than on the heart (they impose duties of action, not duties of feeling). Beyond that, even if the duty addresses our inner life, that does not mean it is a subjective duty. There is a duty to love a person because he is a fellow Jew, because he is a convert, or a duty to love the Holy One, blessed be He. The realization that takes place in the psyche is, of course, subjective in the sense that it takes place within our inner self, but the duty itself is objective and defined by criteria that do not depend on personality. Everyone is obligated to love his fellow or to love God; only the implementation occurs in the psyche. There is no criterion that in some situation one person is obligated and another is not, or that one person negates a positive commandment and another does not. The halakhic criteria of these mitzvot are not subjective. One might perhaps say that every person has his own way to perform these mitzvot (and even that is not certain), but there is no subjective halakha here in the sense I described above.
There are additional halakhic references to the subjective dimension of the person, beyond mitzvot concerning emotion. Some of them are not mitzvot at all but other halakhic rules. For example, intent to accept the commandments is required in the conversion process; intent is required to effect acquisition in transactions and in betrothal; intent to give charity obligates (“in your mouth”—this is charity); and the like. Yet even in all of these halakhot, although the address is indeed our subjective dimension, the halakhic definitions are objective. To acquire, one needs intent to acquire; to convert, one needs intent to accept the commandments, and so forth. Here, too, the criteria are objective; at most, the realization is subjective (in the sense that it occurs within our inner life).
Consider another example: the mitzvah of Torah study. Ostensibly, this mitzvah is a striking exception (see the end of this article). Based on a contradiction between the sugya in Menachot 99 and the sugya in Berakhot 35b, several later authorities wrote that the mitzvah of Torah study itself is defined differently for each individual. A person must dedicate what he can, within his constraints, to Torah study—but each person is required to a different measure and intensity. A working person is different from a full-time learner; a person whose work takes much time is different from one whose work takes less time; a family man is different from a single person; and similarly regarding the rest of a person’s pursuits (to my understanding, it seems there is even consideration of nonessential pursuits, such as hobbies, and the like). Here it appears that we are no longer addressing only the subjective dimension but the very halakhic definition. The halakhic criteria themselves are subjective (varying from person to person).
But this example, too, is still not what I seek. In the mitzvah of Torah study, the definition is objective, but its implementation varies from person to person. Everyone is required to dedicate what he can, and in that sense the definition is entirely general—only what he “can” do varies from one person to another. This can be compared to the duty to tithe, where it is clear that each person has a different quantity of produce from which he tithes. Still, it is undisputed that this is an obligation whose definitions are objective. The same holds for vows and oaths, where a person can shape prohibitions for himself and upon himself, but the definitions are objective: what Reuven vows binds him. The content of a vow can vary from person to person (similar to the tithing example), but the definition is objective.
In any case, when it comes to norms, one could, in principle, conceive of criteria that depend on the person. There are duties upon priests that do not apply to others, or upon men that do not apply to women. Thus, subjectivity in norms is, in principle, possible. By contrast, when we deal with facts, it seems unlikely to find subjective treatment. Facts are, ostensibly, the same facts with respect to all human beings. A clear example of such a halakhic context is the laws of evidence. Evidence deals with facts, and if a certain fact is accepted, it obligates regardless of who the person is.[1] In this column I wish to argue that even on the factual plane there are halakhic contexts defined subjectively.
Dreams in Halakha
In a paper on Midah Tovah for Parashat Miketz (5757), I discussed the place of dreams in Halakha. The aggadic and philosophical literature elaborates on the meaning of dreams. See, for example, Abarbanel on Parashat Miketz (regarding Pharaoh’s dreams) and the Akedat Yitzchak (Gate 29), and Ein Yaakov on the chapter “HaRo’eh” (Berakhot 59b), which expand on these topics. They distinguish between dreams rooted in bodily causes, such as “digestion of food that raises vapors,” or due to an imbalance of temperament from bodily health—these are false dreams “that have no substance.” However, there are dreams that are instruction and communication from Heaven, of which our Sages said (Berakhot 57b): “A dream is one-sixtieth of prophecy.”[2] And in Maharsha’s Hiddushei Aggadot to Berakhot 55b (s.v. “shekol ha-halomot”), regarding the story of Bar Hedya who interpreted dreams according to his will, he wrote that a person has power to act as seems right in his eyes, and the desires of a person dictate the correct interpretation of dreams. He connects this to the verse (Proverbs 22:9): “He who has a good eye will be blessed.”[3] Our concern here, however, is the status of dreams in Halakha.[4]
Excommunication in a Dream
In the sugya in Nedarim 8a–b it is stated:
Rav Yosef said: If they excommunicated him in a dream—he needs ten people to release him; and [this is when] they teach halakha, but if they teach [only] Mishnah and not halakha—[that] not; and if there are none who teach halakha, even [ten] who teach Mishnah and not halakha; and if there are none, let him go and sit at a crossroads and offer greetings to groups of ten, until he chances upon ten who study halakha. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If he knows who placed him under the ban, may that person release him? He said to him: To place him under a ban they appointed him an agent; to release him they did not appoint him an agent. Rav Acha said to Rav Ashi: [If] they excommunicated him and [then] released him in his dream—what [is the law]? He said to him: Just as grain cannot be without chaff, so a dream cannot be without idle matters.
And the Ran there writes:
“They excommunicated him in a dream—he needs ten people to release him”—for it is possible that he was excommunicated by agency of the Omnipresent; therefore he needs ten to release him, for the Shekhinah is with them.
In other words, excommunication in a dream requires release just like excommunication by ordinary people. The reason is that it is possible the excommunication occurred by agency of the Omnipresent. It would seem here that the dream is a reliable medium, and therefore an excommunication that occurs within it is like a regular excommunication. If the dream were the result of “digestion of food that raises vapors,” there would be no reason to fear its content. Hence it appears that the dream is an objective medium that God Himself uses to convey messages to us. This is a different sphere of reality itself and not merely a subjective matter.
However, from the plain sense of the Gemara it appears this rule applies only out of doubt—i.e., out of concern that perhaps there was substance to that dream. If so, the dream is not a fully ordinary medium, but at most one of doubtful reliability. Apparently, the doubt in question is precisely whether the dream is a natural event produced by bodily processes—then one should disregard its contents—or whether the dream is a medium through which divine messages from above are conveyed—then one should treat its contents as reliable. Indeed, at the end of the sugya, when discussing the case where the ban was released for him in a dream, the Gemara says the release is invalid, because it is impossible for a dream to be without idle matters. It is clear that there is doubt here, so we fear that the excommunication is reliable, and at the same time we suspect that the release is unreliable.
It thus seems we must temper the conclusion above. The dream is indeed another facet of reality, but not a fully reliable one. It contains true elements as well as false ones. From the plain sense of the Gemara and its commentators it appears that both elements are necessarily present. That is, every dream is composed of the two mechanisms we presented above: bodily events serve the Almighty to convey messages, but those messages are hidden and embedded within a subjective complex that prevents us from drawing unequivocal conclusions from dream events.
This rule is codified in Rambam, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 7:12 (and in the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 334:35):[5]
One who was excommunicated in a dream—even if he knows who excommunicated him—requires ten people who study halakhot to release him from his excommunication. If he cannot find [them], he must exert himself after them up to a parasang. If he does not find [ten who study halakhah], those who study Mishnah may release him; if he does not find [them], ten who can read the Torah; if he does not find [them], even ten who cannot read. If he does not find ten in his locale, even three may release him.
Thus far we have dealt with excommunication in a dream. From Rashi cited above we saw that he views the dream as a reliable (or doubtfully reliable) medium; therefore release is required. But it is also possible to understand that the requirement of release reflects recognition of the dream’s impact on the dreamer, and not necessarily of its objective reliability as such. If that is the conception, then the dream is indeed entirely subjective, and the halakhot derived from it are not substantive halakhot, but rather measures to address our subjective problems. Now we will see examples in the realms of prohibitions and monetary law that express a real reliability of the dream.
Vow and Excommunication
The first example concerns a vow in a dream. The Ran on the Nedarim sugya writes:
“Just as grain cannot be without chaff”—as it is written (Jeremiah 23), “He that has [My] word, let him speak My word faithfully. What is the straw to the grain?” One must consider whether one who was excommunicated in his dream must observe all the laws of one under a ban. It seems to me that although we say here that one who was excommunicated in his dream requires release, we cannot learn from this that one who vowed in a dream requires release, for here the reason is that we can say he was excommunicated from Heaven, which cannot be said regarding a vow. However, I saw in a responsum of the Rashba (Siman 960) that such a case came before him and he required release.
Ostensibly, according to the logic we presented, there is no place to treat a vow made in a dream, for the vow was made by the person himself, and that certainly does not occur properly in a dream. Indeed, this is the Ran’s view. But the Rashba, whom he cites, holds that even a vow in a dream requires release.
One might think the Rashba holds that God imposed the vow upon the person, and therefore it requires release. That claim entails several halakhic assumptions that are far from simple (can the Almighty impose vows upon us? Perhaps the Nazirite status of Samson is an example), and thus the Ran does not accept it as reasonable. It may be that the Rashba’s intent is that the person in the dream is the one vowing, and it is as if the fully awake person vowed. Here is a third conception of dreams: they are not only divine messages or random products of physiological events, but products of the person’s subconscious thoughts and desires, and as such they express his true will and have halakhic ramifications. This is not a simple conception either, since will is not enough to constitute a vow. One also needs hafla’ah—a decision and a verbal declaration. It seems that speech in a dream is not only an expression of a hidden desire but also of a decision and even of speech itself.
Moreover, it is not clear why the Rashba sees a connection between the rule that excommunication in a dream requires release and the rule that a vow requires release. Excommunication in a dream is a message from God, whereas a vow in a dream is a different mechanism whose reliability does not depend on the dream’s function as a medium for messages from above, but on the person’s will. Even if the conception I described is correct, it is still not clear how one can prove it from the laws of excommunication in a dream.
I once thought to distinguish between the one who excommunicates and the one excommunicated in the dream,[6] namely to assume that the person excommunicated in the dream is not the real person but the figure in the dream; and if the ban takes effect, that means the person in the dream is deemed an authentic expression of the real person, and therefore his excommunication of himself takes effect. According to this, there is room for the Rashba’s inference from the laws of excommunication to the law of vows, since we see from the laws of excommunication that the aims and desires of the person in the dream express the real person’s desires, and thus his vows, too, require release. But all this seems problematic and without source.
Charity
The author of Tzafnat Paneach, in Responsum 200 (also cited in his novellae to Sanhedrin 30a), extends the above rule of the Rashba and rules that if a person vows charity in a dream, that is charity—since it is a vow made in his dream. He refers to the Gemara in Berakhot 55b (see the notes to his novellae there, §189): “R. Yonatan said: A person is shown only what arises from the thoughts of his heart.” That is, he adopts the conception that what a person does in a dream is his own act (expressing his hidden will), as we suggested in explaining the Rashba above. Note that although vows generally require hafla’ah—verbal articulation—to take effect, with respect to charity (as with fasts) there is a rule of “generosity of heart,” whereby firm resolve in the heart also suffices. It seems that the Tzafnat Paneach understands the Rashba’s words in the manner we suggested, that a vow in a dream expresses a person’s true will. One should observe that this appears to run counter to Rema, Yoreh De’ah end of Siman 259, who writes explicitly that in such a case the money is not [deemed] charity, for “the words of dreams neither help nor harm.” The Rema presumably rules like the Ran—that one cannot vow in a dream.[7]
From what has been said thus far it follows that the reliability of the dream, even when it exists, is toward the person himself—both as actor and as subject (vow, excommunication, etc.). What about objective questions? Is the dream a reliable medium in truly objective senses? We must examine this on two planes: (1) with respect to prohibitions that do not depend on a person’s will (unlike a vow or an oath); (2) with respect to the laws of evidence and monetary law, where the ruling and treatment concern other people as well. Both questions are treated in the Sanhedrin sugya, which we shall now examine.
The Dream as Evidence in Issur and in Monetary Law
In Sanhedrin 30a we find (the source of these laws is in the Tosefta, Ma’aser Sheni 5; see also Yerushalmi, Ma’aser Sheni 4:4–6):
[…] If one was distressed about money his father left him, and the “master of the dream” came and said to him: “They are such-and-such [an amount], in such-and-such a place, and they are Ma’aser Sheni funds”—this [case] happened, and they said: The words of dreams neither help nor harm.
A man searched and did not know where were the coins his father had left him (it implies he knew such coins existed and knew his father had left them), and the “master of the dream”[8] came and said they are in a certain place, or that they are Ma’aser Sheni funds. In such a case the Gemara rules that the evidence is inadmissible, for the words of dreams neither help nor harm. The implication is that if the coins were indeed found in the place revealed in the dream, they are not considered his—and of course they are not considered Ma’aser Sheni, but ordinary money.
This is codified in Rambam, Hilkhot Ma’aser Sheni 6:6, and in Hilkhot Zechiyah u’Matanah 10:7, and in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, end of Siman 255. Accordingly, if a person sees in his dream someone revealing to him that Ma’aser Sheni coins of his father are hidden in a certain place, and he indeed finds coins there, he may take them and use them as ordinary money. Likewise, if it is revealed to a person that coins hidden in some place are deposit funds of Reuven deposited with his father, and upon searching coins are indeed found there, that person may take the coins, and there is no proof that they belong to the depositor.
Several later authorities (see Torat Chayim to Sanhedrin there, and Ha’amek She’elah, Parashat Miketz, She’ilta 29, §16; and in fact this is already explicit in the She’iltot there) noted that in the dream scenario here there are strong indications that this dream has substance. It is a case where a man was “distressed” about these coins—i.e., he knows there are Ma’aser Sheni coins and is searching for them—and after the dream revelation he indeed finds the stated amount in that very place. Yet nevertheless the halakha rules that the words of dreams neither help nor harm. Here we have a very clear statement that the dream has no standing in objective halakha, even when it seems manifestly reliable. Why indeed does the dream not constitute evidence in such cases?
At least in these situations, the problem is not the dream’s inherent reliability, for the indicators show it is reliable. But we must recall the rule that a dream cannot be without idle matters. Therefore, even with a dream that is clearly reliable, we fear that some of the particulars involved are incorrect, and thus we cannot rely on all the details. Perhaps the coins are indeed in that place, but the detail that they are Ma’aser Sheni is a corrupted element—the “chaff” mixed into an otherwise reliable dream.
If so, the picture here is the same as we saw above: a dream interweaves elements that are messages from above, but they are wrapped in many random details that are the product of “bodily vapors,” etc., so one cannot know which of the dream’s elements can be relied upon.
What About Doubt in Issur That Should Lead to Stringency?
Note that, as a matter of halakha, we do not even treat this as a doubt that those coins are Ma’aser Sheni. In the monetary context—i.e., in the depositor’s claim against the heir of the deceased depositary—one can say that even where there is doubt we do not give the coins to the depositor, because of the rule: the one who seeks to extract [money] from another bears the burden of proof. But regarding Ma’aser Sheni, the discussion concerns a case of doubtful prohibition, and ostensibly we should be stringent and treat those coins as Ma’aser Sheni, for the general rule is that a doubt in a Torah prohibition is ruled stringently.
It seems, then, that a dream does not even rise to the level of doubt. Anything not demonstrably verified as reliable is assumed to be outright falsehood. Why is that the treatment? As we saw, although there is no dream without idle matters, the indicators here show that there are certainly reliable elements as well. How can one ignore them entirely? I note that above we concluded that a dream has the status of a doubt. If, as we saw here, the content of a dream does not even constitute a doubt of reliability, why does one excommunicated in a dream require release? And why, according to the Rashba, does a vow (and according to the Tzafnat Paneach, charity) in a dream take effect? From the sugya in Nedarim it is clear that a dream has at least the status of a doubt.
The Approach of the Tashbetz and Others: Distinguishing Between Doubt in Monetary Law and Doubt in Issur
The Tashbetz (II, Siman 128) discusses at length the status of dreams. In general, he distinguishes between true dreams transmitted to us by an angel and false dreams transmitted by a demon. He then again distinguishes between dreams sent from above and dreams that are the result of vapors from bodily processes, etc. His conclusion is that a dream is indeed a matter of doubt.
From here he derives that in practice we must distinguish between how we treat a dream in monetary law and how we treat it in prohibitions: in issur we should be stringent, for a doubt in a Torah prohibition is ruled stringently; therefore, excommunication requires release (and if released in the dream it is ineffective). In monetary law, by contrast, we do not extract [money] based on a doubt. So rules as well the author of Yad Malakhi (Klalei HaDinim, rule 167). Regarding Ma’aser Sheni, which ostensibly is a matter of issur, the Tashbetz claims it is a monetary question (not an issur question), and therefore here, too, the halakha requires us to leave the money in its prior status, as it was presumed before the dream. So writes the Ran in his comments to the Sanhedrin sugya—because with Ma’aser Sheni one is removing the funds from private possession to the possession of the Most High.[9]
It is thus clear that according to the Tashbetz, if we are dealing with coins that were hidden and we knew nothing about them, and the “master of the dream” told us that they are Ma’aser Sheni funds, we should be stringent and treat them as Ma’aser Sheni—for there was no prior presumption regarding them (see below for the Rambam’s view of this). The Tashbetz apparently understands that the Gemara deals with a dream that testified about coins in one’s possession, not about hidden coins.[10]
The View of Rambam
But in the Rambam’s view, this cannot be said, for he brings this halakha in Hilkhot Ma’aser Sheni 6:6, and writes as follows:
If they said to him in a dream, “The Ma’aser Sheni of your father that you are seeking is in such-and-such a place”—even though he found there what was told him, it is not Ma’aser [Sheni]; the words of dreams neither help nor harm.
Rambam emphasizes that we have an indication that the dream spoke truth (for after he searched for the coins he found them exactly where the “master of the dream” said they were hidden), and even so the words of dreams neither help nor harm. That is, the “master of the dream” also revealed the place of concealment, and still the coins are deemed ordinary. This is not as the Tashbetz stated. This is also implied from his reasoning (and, indeed, from the Gemara’s own reasoning): we are not dealing with a doubt established on the basis of a presumption, but that the words of dreams have no standing at all. They do not even create a doubt.
Similarly in Hilkhot Zechiyah u’Matanah 10:7, Rambam writes:
If one was distressed about money his father left him and did not know where he hid it, and they said to him in a dream, “They are such-and-such [an amount], in such-and-such a place, and they belong to such-and-such a person, and they are Ma’aser Sheni”—and he found them in the place stated and in the number stated—this occurred, and the Sages said: The words of dreams neither help nor harm.
Thus, in both places we are dealing with coins that were not in his possession but were revealed to him as a result of the dream. In such a case it is difficult to see how any prior presumption could apply to them. I note that the author of Yad Malakhi (Klalei HaDinim, 167), who essentially views dreams as the Tashbetz did, proves from Horayot 13b that even in issur the words of dreams have no standing (see at length in Shdei Chemed, Klalei HaDaled, §45). This accords with the Rambam’s view regarding Ma’aser Sheni.
Therefore, the conclusion that suggests itself is that—at least according to Rambam (and from the plain sense of the Gemara)—dreams have no halakhic standing whatsoever, neither in issur nor in monetary law, and do not even suffice to create a doubt. The Perishah (end of Siman 255) writes similarly. He notes that the Tur omits the case of Ma’aser Sheni, and it seems he learns like the Mordechai, who distinguishes between monetary law and issur; but he writes that Rambam likens Ma’aser Sheni to a deposit. In his words:
It is implied from the Mordechai that only with Ma’aser and charity funds is the law thus, not with a deposit, for that involves robbery of others. [But] in brackets there he [adds]: Yet Rambam, chapter 10 of Zechiyah, also wrote the same regarding deposit funds—as our master [the Tur] wrote.
Subjective Dimensions of Halakha
Yet the question regarding excommunication remains: if according to the Rambam dreams have no standing at all, neither in issur nor in monetary matters, then why is it necessary to release one who was excommunicated in a dream? As we noted above, Rambam himself rules thus in Hilkhot Talmud Torah. It seems, then, that Rambam does not distinguish between monetary law and issur, but another distinction applies—between excommunication in a dream and testimony in a dream about Ma’aser Sheni or a deposit. What accounts for this distinction? How is excommunication different from Ma’aser Sheni, which is also a matter of issur?[11]
It seems that excommunication is an exceptional case, for its consequences concern only the dreamer himself. In such a case the dream has standing—at least out of doubt—so the person must be concerned about what occurred in his dream. By contrast, in any matter that concerns others—not necessarily monetary (for example, the fact that the coins are Ma’aser Sheni concerns others halakhically as well, since there are things others are forbidden to do with those coins)—the dream has no standing at all, not even as a doubt. The reason is not lack of reliability in the dream (for, objectively, we saw its status is that of a doubt, and this is also evident from Rambam’s ruling about excommunication in a dream). The reason is that in the objective dimension of Halakha—its public domain—dreams have no standing. Dreams, even if highly reliable, by their very definition belong only to Halakha’s subjective dimension. The novelty is that even when the dream is reliable and makes clear statements about reality, we do not heed it. That is the meaning of the rule: “The words of dreams neither help nor harm.”[12]
Another interesting implication of this is warning (hatra’ah) that a person receives in his dream. Ostensibly this is a personal matter, and therefore the dream has halakhic standing and the warning would be valid. On the other hand, it seems a court could not act upon it (there, too, he would not be believed to say he received a warning, both because a single witness is not believed in this and because he renders himself wicked). And what about heavenly punishments? It is not clear whether warning is required for heavenly punishments (for warning was given only to distinguish between inadvertent and deliberate transgression, and the Almighty knows what is in a person’s heart), but some views hold it is. Assuming so, it seems that warning in a dream would be valid, since it concerns only the person himself. Indeed, in Kli Chemdah, Parashat Vayera, §4, this topic is discussed at length (see there why warning would be required for heavenly punishments at all), and he explains that the warning is invalid only because a dream necessarily includes idle elements. In our terms: the dream is valid in the subjective dimension, but even there its standing is doubtful. For excommunication, a doubtful status suffices to be stringent; for warning, a definite warning is required, not a doubtful one.[13]
Further Halakhic Examples: Admission of a Litigant and “Shavya Anafshei”
Above we saw subjective dimensions in Halakha in the contexts of vows and oaths and the like. All these are essentially different from what we saw in Rambam’s view regarding dreams. In the law of dreams we saw that the dream has subjective standing even where its objective reliability exists. Although we are dealing with a fact, we do not take it into account in the public–objective sphere. One might analogize this to the rule of shavya anafshei chatichah de’issura, whereby a person is believed to testify about something so long as the consequences are only for himself. A woman who comes and testifies that she is a married woman is not believed regarding others (for she is a single witness and a woman), but regarding herself we treat it as an issur—she herself becomes forbidden to marry by virtue of that testimony. Ostensibly, whether she is married is a factual question. If we have concluded she is not married, why should she herself be forbidden by virtue of her testimony? And if she is believed that she is married, why should we not believe her regarding other implications that concern others? Later authorities have dealt with this question, but let us first raise a similar question arising from the credibility of a litigant’s admission.
When a person testifies against himself, he is believed like one hundred witnesses (see Kiddushin 65b and parallels). For example, if a person says he owes so-and-so 100 shekels, he is believed like one hundred witnesses. What does “like one hundred witnesses” mean? In Halakha, one hundred have no advantage over two (two are like one hundred). It seems the Gemara intends that he is indeed more believed than two witnesses (and even more than one hundred). Thus, for example, if there are two witnesses against his admission (they say he does not owe), he nevertheless must pay the sum he admitted to. But there is a limitation on the credibility of a litigant’s admission. When it is “to the detriment of others” (chav le’acheirinei; see Ketubot 19a and parallels), meaning his admission has consequences that obligate other people, he is not believed. Again, the same difficulty arises: if factually he is believed that he borrowed, why not accept his testimony with all its consequences? And if he is not believed, why is he himself obligated to pay?
Here, to be sure, there seems to be a good explanation. A person’s credibility to obligate himself is based on the logical assumption that a person does not lie in order to obligate himself. People lie to gain, not to lose. But when he harms others, there is concern he is lying in order to harm them (like any litigant or witness suspected of lying for gain). But this cannot resolve the difficulty, for an admission that harms others is an admission that, first and foremost, obligates himself—only that it also has ramifications for others. If it obligates him, then clearly he is not lying. If so, from our perspective this is reliable testimony; why then should we not accept it regarding others as well?[14]
Admission of a Litigant and “Shavya Anafshei” as Subjective Halakhot
I wish to propose an explanation to these difficulties in terms of subjective halakha. The person is indeed believed in his admission, and he is also believed to obligate himself in issurim (for a person does not lie to harm himself; this is true as well of the shavya anafshei rule). But as we saw with dreams, there are certain sources from which—even if we extract reliable facts—we use them only with respect to the person himself and not with respect to the objective world. A fact drawn from a dream, from the person’s own admission, or from his taking an issur upon himself is accepted only regarding himself. It has subjective force. Not because the source is unreliable or the fact is untrue, but by definition it belongs to the subjective sphere. Halakha does not allow us to use such sources in the public–objective domain.
In Column 306, I explained the credibility of a litigant’s admission according to Mahari Beirav in a similar manner. It is commonly understood from his words that, because of the difficulties I described, he argues that a litigant’s admission is not credibility but a vow: the person vows to give money to so-and-so and is not believed that he owes him. That formulation, as stated, is certainly incorrect. It cannot be said, for he certainly did not intend to vow; there is no vow without intent to vow. In addition, that interpretation of his words faces unanswerable difficulties. I therefore suggested there that his intent is that, because a person can vow to give the money, he can also accept credibility (this is credibility by virtue of “it is within his power”—be-yado). Here I add and explain further: the credibility truly exists even according to Mahari Beirav, but because it is founded on the person’s own ability to do something (“be-yado”), it grants him credibility only with respect to himself. It is subjective credibility, and only in that sense he compared it to a vow.
A similar discussion arises concerning the rule of shavya anafshei (see, for example, Ketzot HaChoshen 34:4, who also likens it to a litigant’s admission). There, too, due to the same problems, some view it as a kind of vow rather than credibility—but the difficulties with that interpretation are similar. It is clear that a woman who says she is a married woman did not intend to vow an issur upon herself, but to testify; therefore, one cannot say it obligates her as a vow. It is clearly credibility, yet it does not apply to others. My contention is that it is indeed credibility, but it belongs to the subjective sphere. Only facts based on the testimony of objective witnesses are accepted in court. Facts extracted from the statements of the litigants themselves have only subjective force.
Beyond resolving the difficulties that arise against the view that does not see this as credibility, there are further implications. For example, the principle that when it is “to the detriment of others” there is no credibility does not stem from the concern that he lies to harm others (as is commonly explained), but simply because the credibility exists only with respect to himself. Theoretically, even if there were a case where the testimony concerns others but does not actually harm them, it may still be that there would be no credibility. Beyond that, it seems there is certainly reason to be stringent and not marry that woman, even though with respect to me she has no credibility that she is a married woman. The fact is that she is a married woman—only that, halakhically, I am not required to accept that fact. But clearly, if in reality she is married, it is appropriate to refrain from relations or from marrying her. It may even be a halakhic obligation to be stringent, since with respect to me her statement at least creates a doubt that she is a married woman. I do not accept it as testimony, but it creates a state of doubt (for it is credibility, and thus, even for me, reality is as she says).
This is somewhat similar to the disqualification of testimony by relatives. There, too, it emerges from the Gemara and the poskim that the issue is not concern for their reliability but a scriptural decree. If so, when two relatives come and testify about something, reality is indeed as they say—but we are not obligated to accept it as such, because it is based on the testimony of relatives. If two relatives come and testify that a woman is married, I am under no obligation to accept their testimony. Is it reasonable that I could now marry her? The testimony of relatives is reliable; there is only a scriptural decree not to accept it. If so, in reality she is married, and therefore it follows that I ought (or at least have reason) to be stringent. Indeed, I have already noted that the disqualification of a person to testify and judge in his own case (the disqualification of a party to the case) is a particular instance of the disqualification of relatives (as emerges from Responsa Ritva, Siman 52).[15]
[1] Of course, different halakhic contexts require evidence of different kinds and strengths (one witness or two, a migo to extract, etc.), but that relates to the difference between halakhic truth and factual truth. If there is clear factual truth, it will be recognized as such and will obligate in every context (there are those who disagree, but this is my view).
[2] See also Margaliyot HaYam, Sanhedrin 30a, §7, and the Tashbetz cited below, who wrote similarly. By contrast, see Sefer Chassidim (ed. R. Margaliyot), §444.
[3] See also Responsa Rashba I, Siman 408; examine there carefully.
[4] For comprehensive surveys, see Shdei Chemed—Klallim, system 4, rule 45; Divrei Yatziv, Yoreh De’ah, Siman 122; Margaliyot HaYam, Sanhedrin 30a, §7; Pardes Yosef, Parashat Miketz; Kli Chemdah, Parashat Vayera, §4, and the sources cited there.
[5] Rema there disagrees with the possibility of permitting with three.
[6] See my discussions of Ron Aharoni’s distinction between the human being as subject and as object, discussed in Columns 157–158, 367, and elsewhere.
[7] Note that the Rema ostensibly does not address whether there is hafla’ah here. But if we pay attention, he is not dealing with one who vowed in a dream, but with one who was told in a dream that some funds had already been pledged in the past to charity (and there, there was hafla’ah). In that situation, the sole question is the dream’s reliability, and on that he says that a dream cannot be without idle matters.
[8] See Margaliyot HaYam there, §7, who cites several interpretations of “the master of the dream”: the minister in charge of dreams, or the person concerned (and in Tashbetz II, Siman 128, he raises the possibility that it was someone else who dreamt, and he is called “the master of the dream”).
[9] See the discussion in Kli Chemdah, Parashat Vayera, §4.
[10] In Responsa Divrei Yatziv, Yoreh De’ah, Siman 122, he elaborates on the law of dreams, scrutinizes the language of the early authorities, and shows, for each, how the case is situated (some set it in various doubtful circumstances; others set it in situations where the coins had a prior presumption). His conclusion is that the matter remains in doubt. He proves this as well from the Tur (Choshen Mishpat, end of Siman 255) and the Mordechai (Bava Batra, ch. 1, end of Siman 458), and it seems he learned thus even in Rambam. Likewise, Kli Chemdah (Parashat Vayera, §4) explains the Rashba’s responsum cited above in the Ran.
[11] The author of Shivat Tzion, Siman 52, explains that with excommunication in a dream we are concerned even for a remote matter, for chamira sakanta mei-issura (danger is more severe than prohibition). He explains that excommunication is not an obligation upon the community but an expression of an indictment that exists against him in Heaven; therefore, he requires release.
[12] One implication of our analysis is that excommunication in a dream does not obligate the public to treat him as excommunicated; it only obligates him to observe the laws of one under a ban (similar to mourning; see Rambam, Hilkhot Talmud Torah, ch. 7). The excommunication requires release only to free the person himself from his obligations, but society is not at all meant to act based on what arises in an individual’s dream—even concerning that very dreamer himself. We stress that the community’s exemption from the practices of excommunication toward the dreamer does not stem from his lack of credibility to testify about the excommunication that appeared in his dream, for in matters of issur even a single witness is valid, and even if he is a party to the case. The exemption stems from the fact that even if his testimony is true, excommunication in Reuven’s dream does not concern—certainly does not obligate—the actions and attitudes of Shimon, even Shimon’s attitudes toward Reuven (the dreamer) himself. This also emerges from Shivat Tzion, Siman 52, who explains that with excommunication in a dream we are concerned even for a remote matter, for chamira sakanta mei-issura. He assumes there that excommunication is not an obligation upon the community but an expression of an indictment in Heaven; therefore, release is required.
[13] One might note the rule that warning by a demon (murtar min pi shed) is, in practice, valid warning (see Bavli, Makkot 6b). See this at the end of the aforementioned Kli Chemdah.
[14] Some have wished to explain that when it harms others there is concern he wishes to take revenge on them and is thus willing to suffer himself in order to make others suffer—like “let me die with the Philistines.” But this explanation is forced.
[15] See all this in my Migo Monograph.
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A. You said that in the public domain, dreams that are true are reliable and yet according to the law they are not taken into account, and it is similar to the admission of the Ba’ad and the Shaviya Anafshiya that the facts are not reliable and yet according to the law they are taken into account, as long as they do not contradict existing law. But this explanation in dreams is not simple, because if a fact is true then it is true and why care about the context of the revelation, and therefore strong evidence is needed. But it is not known that they came. Excommunication is a special matter that Heaven deals with and is not a matter of loyalty, and in other matters for the Rambam, a dream is nothing. For the Shavcha, a dream is doubtful in every matter (even objectively). The language of the Rashba in the reply there seems fragmentary at first and perhaps he is only referring to it as something that he has permission for and nothing more (he did not say that the vow is valid but that it must be permitted).
B. Perhaps another example of subjectivity is your method regarding autonomy in halacha. I remember that you wrote two innovations in this. A. A person acts according to his conclusion, B. Even if in truth he bets that he is wrong because all the poskim are against him. Innovation B. is strictly subjective halacha. Because everyone knows that he is wrong and even he in truth knows this, except that for himself he has special laws based on his study of the issues. (By the way, when I think of myself, the conclusion that has sunk in for me is that for innovation B. no evidence has been presented and there is no reason to accept it. A person acts according to his conclusion if he believes that when Elijah comes he will agree with him, and therefore it is not a matter of subjectivity).
A. In the case of the declaration of the truth and the declaration of the truth, in my opinion the facts are indeed reliable and yet they are not used (with regard to others).
Regarding dreams, this is clearly not the obvious view. That is why I wrote what I wrote. After all, the Maimonides says that a dream is nothing in a situation where it is clear that the dream is indeed reliable (there are clear indications of this in reality). This is the evidence itself, according to my argument, according to the Maimonides method. And the law of the truth and the declaration of the truth are additional evidence of the matter. The accumulation of cases in itself strengthens the thesis.
B. This is interesting, but on second thought, in my opinion, it is a different matter. If we were to seek the truth and yet ignore the true halachic conclusion, this would be a good example. But in my understanding, we are not looking for the truth there, but for the autonomous truth (my truth). This is a weighing of the truth + the value of autonomy.
Regarding the criterion of what if Elijah comes, what will he say? The case of Rem who did not rule on a halakhic law like him because they did not reach the end of his mind is a counterexample. If Rem was such a genius, then it is likely that when I disagree with him, he is the one who is right. And, indeed, I myself admit this (after all, the statement that they did not reach the end of his mind is a statement by other sages, not his). And yet they do not rule like him, and as I understand it, this is because of the value of autonomy. After all, in such a case, if Elijah comes, it is likely that I also understand that he would say as Rem.
By the way, the rule “not in heaven is it” means exactly this: We follow my truth even if it is clear that it is not the real truth (according to heaven).
I was indeed wrong in what I wrote that you believe that the facts in the confession of a litigant are unreliable. After reading, I wandered in thought and detached myself from the explicit matters. For the rest of the questions, I need to extend and divide them into sections, even though on further thought they are intertwined. And forgive my temporary mind for not having had time to think further and perhaps succeed in refining it further (or realizing that I am wrong, etc.). Everything revolves around the fact that the innovation seems to be such a great and astonishing innovation that in order to support it, at least a few fat and good verses and explicit conclusions are needed, and these are not available. Regarding autonomy (section b), I wrote separately but will send it later, since the extensions here are enough for now. And perhaps long questions allow for short answers.
A1. Who, like you, is afraid of being ignored in that the halakha does not and cannot deal with facts, but with norms. Therefore, one must carefully define what is meant by the statement that the facts are correct and yet are not taken into account. We know the facts alone, and the halakha tells us that these two-tenths are permissible to use as a shari'ah, even though they are two-tenths and they are permissible to use as a shari'ah. Is there no essence and no commandment and now the person is completely permitted to do so, like a cancellation by majority? Or does the essence element remain, but in a miraculous way the commandment element has disappeared (I will write more about this in section A2)? Or does the commandment element also remain, but the person does not transgress it (as if by mistake, according to your opinion)?
Whoever behaves shari'ah in these shari'ahs, then if they are two-tenths, has failed in the prohibition (has harmed the eternal in the Hod, as I heard you say not long ago) and now what does the halakha tell him - that he is permitted even though he is actually prohibited? Or that he is permitted like eating an apple? The definition is simply vague. You briefly addressed this, saying that it is appropriate to refrain from carrying her, the one who said, "I am a man's wife, even though we do not live by her." I still don't understand.
A2. R. Shimon says that even in a place where the Torah has innovated doubt, like doubt, we would say that the one who violates the prohibition has failed and that one must be careful as in all spicuk, except that here there is a “great and wonderful innovation, but we should not be clever about it, and the decree of Scripture is that we are permitted to be lenient” (Sh. 1:7). And indeed one should think a lot about these things, but see, please, also see how sensitive he was to the great lenience in this matter. And he did not come to this except because overwhelming evidence forced him and he did not hang in the air for help. Therefore, we will do everything righteous to avoid this innovation, the verse here states that there is no need to make much effort, and so on.
A3. If you had not risen again in Israel, what would we understand? We would understand that it is possible to detach ourselves from the facts and become stricter but not lenient. Yes, it is possible to say that we do not believe at all that a piece is a piece of prohibition, but we will force him to act according to his words as if he had loyalty. And even in the case of witnesses, the law did not say that it was a fact that the witnesses were right, but rather a command to act as if they were right. And whether they were really right or not, that is already the law for the Messiah. Therefore, in dreams where the disconnection from the facts is an exaggeration, the simplistic and old interpretation is that we do not believe the dream at all and the indications are not sufficient. So much for the ‘usual’ perception that our ancestors told us.
And what evidence did you bring to the contrary? One piece of evidence is that there is an indication that the dream is indeed reliable. And to this the plausible answer is that just as one does not retain from dream to dream in the same person, one does not retain from detail to detail in the same dream, because the dream is nothing but a collection of distinct details without anything to bring them together, and therefore the indication is nothing. And what is true in a dream is that in some way one knows and has forgotten. Just as in hypnosis one sometimes brings to mind things that one did not know that one knows and along with them one also ‘remembers’ things that did not exist and were not created. Second evidence that refers to excommunication in a dream at least as a doubt. But this is nothing but excommunication, which is a matter of the world that the heavens deal with and therefore it is precisely in it that they fear that the heavens will come. And these are the words of the Rambam in dreams.
And regarding the accumulation of cases of confession of the equivalent and the equivalent, it is, as you wrote, precisely according to your innovation that they are indeed faithful (meaning your innovation that the halakha has decreed here that even those who believe in them are permitted to act as if they do not believe in them? What exactly the halakhic component in the matter is different from the factual component is not entirely clear to me). But only you understand it that way. No one thinks (I don't) that in a matter of fact, this equivalent of the equivalent of the equivalent of the equivalent is particularly reliable, because a person has a thousand strange reasons to invent inventions and make mistakes, and it is necessary to examine and predict whether people believe with all their hearts in the owners of a thing and compare their equivalents to pieces of the equivalent, but the halakha says that they are forced to act according to his words. And whoever believes this person is indeed forbidden to eat the piece. But to renew a normative instruction that one must behave as if one is indeed faithful – this the halakha does not do. And this is neither strange nor surprising, and there is no halakha here that renews permission for the voice to act against the known reality that something is forbidden. And in any case it is not similar to a dream. I have repeated myself here and have not added anything to what is explicitly stated in the column La Apoki and renew against it and if there is no need to answer it again then so be it. But what can I do, without repeated explanation I am apparently not convinced.
A4. By the way, true prophecy is also sometimes in a dream [in many places a prophet and a dreamer are mentioned together, and even Abraham in the covenant between the pieces fell into a deep sleep. And there is in Jeremiah (chapter 31) who writes a prophecy thus says the Lord of hosts, etc. and concludes “Therefore I awoke and saw and I slept a surety for myself”. That is, in simple terms, he saw all this in a dream and understood that it was a prophecy]. Therefore, it seems that if one dreams about the future and it comes true like a prophecy, then we argue that the entire dream is entirely true and a prophecy and the prophet is a true prophet and is authorized to issue timely instructions, etc. That is, a dream about the future that came true is indeed an indication of general reliability. But a dream about the past can always be attributed to something that he knew in some way and forgot. Do you think a prophecy in a dream that meets all the conditions makes the prophet a true prophet who can issue timely instructions?
A5. A request from the front. I only saw the answer of the Rashba, 1st of March 1968, here https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14649&st=&pgnum=272 and I am afraid that the wording is incorrect. At the beginning it says ‘even’ and it is not clear what this means. And he also does not mention the obvious matter of excommunication in a dream. And it seems that he does not provide evidence that a vow should be permitted in a dream, but only evidence that if one permits it towards Heaven, he will permit it in ten. And he does not say anything about why one should really permit it (therefore, it is understood that this is just a slight concern, like something one has that permits. But if one cannot permit it, one should not fear it at all). Perhaps you have another version, or perhaps it is more corrected?
A1. Unlikely. The obligation to treat them as false dreams stems from the fact that they are false dreams. If the halakha recognizes them as such, it would also be obligatory. The halakha does deal with norms and not facts, but the clarification of the facts is the basis for the halakhic determination. Just as a judge clarifies the facts and then makes a ruling. His factual determination has a binding halakhic status.
A2. I didn't understand. But perhaps it will be explained later.
A3. Very unlike. If there are details in a dream that indicate reliability, it is impossible to say that the other details were not there. At most, there is room to be satisfied with them, but it is clear that it is impossible to make a firm determination that they should not be taken into account. Note that I am not saying that one holds one detail to another, but that one is satisfied with the other detail.
Why would the halakha force a person to act according to incorrect facts just because he said them? This seems really far-fetched to me. Then Mahary Ben Lev came and proposed a mechanism for a vow, but we both agree that it is not logical. What remains is my suggestion.
A4. A prophecy in a dream that is consistent with it certainly makes him a prophet, at least sufficiently so.
A5. I am not currently on the subject. This is in the project of the answer:
You asked someone who vowed in a dream, by the will of many, not to eat in such and such a house until such and such a time. Is this permissible, like other vows made while awake, and should it be permitted? Or since he vowed by the will of many, can he permit it even if it is not a mitzvah and in three, like other vows, or not?
Answer: In shavuot and vows, in any case, it is permissible in the presence of three vows, as in the case of a certain vow. In tractate Berakhot (page 552), we are taught that the one who sees the dream and his soul is sad about it should go and pay it in my presence/in front of him three drachmas of mercy. And I saw in the answer of the wise men that he was asked about someone who swore or made a vow in a dream. And he answered, "Bring ten people who are knowledgeable about the circumstances and have mercy on him, and they will forgive him his vow and his oath, as if he had vowed and sworn in a waking state." And he brings evidence from that, as it is said (Yoma, page 562), "If a person sins against his fellow and dies, he brings ten people and prostrates himself at his grave. And he says, "I have sinned against the Lord, the God of Israel, and against so-and-so." And they all answer, "Forgive me three times." And it is fitting for every person to behave in this way.
I'll think about it.
A2 This, in my opinion, is an exact parallel from R’ Shimon's words to the principle in your claim that the halakha overrules objective facts. But perhaps I misunderstood the legal relationship you present between objective facts and halakhic facts and halakhic norms. In fact, it is found here, although https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=20983&st=&pgnum=33&hilite=
A5. Thank you. This is exactly the same wording (which seems strange to me). Apparently that's what it is.
A3. Worthless. It is absurd that the halakha would force one person to behave harshly based on incorrect facts just because he said so, but it is not absurd that the halakha would allow all other people to behave harshly based on incorrect facts just because they were discovered in a certain way? Please bring this closer to my understanding.
And even though you wrote and secondly I still don't understand what the halakhic instruction is here. If these are really ma'at ma'er sheni then it is still forbidden to behave in a halal manner and the halakha does not renew the permit here. Does it renew a prohibition here? What would we do without this halakha (that there is no status for dreams) and what are we doing differently now? Is this supposed to affect the behavior of people who fear God, or just the enforcement of the B”D? I am a little surprised that it is not explained in the column, what is so obvious, simple and easy?
A5. There is no nef”m but since it has risen, it has risen. I received a photocopy of the Jerusalem Institute edition, with a more revised title and an additional sentence at the beginning: “[These things were not said in the Gemara, but rather in a dream, but I fear for the sake of the future, I fear for the sake of the future] even in shavuot and vows”.
In the month of Adar, 5750
Let's explain that there is evidence that is in the form of "signs" and "eyeprints". The person's certainty that this happened, even though he cannot define what his evidence is, but he has a clear and certain impression that this is what happened.
In such a case, he is faithful because "a piece of evidence is required of him who is provided, not of him to whom things are clear. Not so in teaching others who do not have clear knowledge. Here one must act according to defined rules of evidence.
Best regards, Yaron Fish”l Ordner
But if the things are clear to him, then on his own part he is forbidden even without the law of Shavia. He who says to a woman, "I have sanctified you," is forbidden in her kinship. I understand that the intention is not that the new ones say that on his own part he is forbidden in her kinship (because he alone knows this if he is speaking the truth), but rather that the intention is that the Lord forces him to withdraw from her kinship even though the Lord does not know anything about himself. But forcing all the world's inhabitants to behave as if the woman is a man's wife is no reason to do so, because there is really no good enough reason to believe him.
What would we do if this law of Shavia were not there? Would we say, "He is unfaithful, and therefore the woman is free and permitted to the world," and we would not hinder him if he wanted to disassociate himself in her kinship, because we assume that he is indeed permitted, and the law came and renewed it, and we would hinder him (the law is stricter on him). Or would we say that he is indeed faithful in our eyes, and therefore the woman is the wife of a man and is forbidden to everyone, and he is forbidden by her relatives, and we would also prevent him if he wanted to allow himself to be with her relatives, and the halakha came and renewed it, even though he is faithful and we know that the woman is the wife of a man, we should still act as if she is free (the halakha is universal)?
In the case of a person who bears the head of a person,
Telg ” Shalom Rav,
The law ‘Shviyya Anafshiya Chicha דיסורא’ means that even if he retracts his previous testimony, for example if he claims that today he is no longer as sure as he was in the past that this was the case – we go by his first testimony, as in the case of witnesses ‘the witness does not repeat and tell’.
But with regard to others, his initial testimony is not accepted, since two witnesses are needed and the testimony is accepted in the court, etc. When a person testifies concerning himself – then he is the witness and the judge with regard to himself, and it is not possible to cancel what he testified and ruled with regard to himself, but with regard to others he cannot testify or rule.
And regarding this week's interpretation: Just as in the testimony that binds others, the individual is only "half a witness", and wherever it is said "witness" it refers to two witnesses - so too in the building of the Tabernacle, the individual is only "half a witness" that requires connection and completion with the others.
With the blessing of Shabbat Tava, Yaron Fishel Ordner
Halakha requires him to act according to the facts because they are true. Others are allowed to ignore them because they have the right not to accept the facts if they originate from the person himself.
I didn't understand the question. Is it permissible to eat them in his place (not in Jerusalem). Regarding the question of whether there is a point in being stricter? It is possible, but it is not a halakhic obligation. Another way of putting it: He has permission not to accept these facts if he doesn't believe them.
The others are allowed to pass through prohibitions that are still forbidden to them. If that's not an oxymoron then I'm having a hard time understanding it.
Is this directed at me?
General expression of frustration
By the way, you wrote above (regarding the bastard doubt for the sake of the word) that ”maybe it will be explained later”. Do you mean that a sequel is expected? (Or was I supposed to understand from the continuation of the answer or some other interpretation)
I wrote that I don't understand, but after reading your next paragraphs, maybe it will become clear to me.
On the 24th of Adar, Tessah
It seems that when the dream inspires repentance and good deeds, the halakha tends to feel like a dream, since the awakening to repentance and the good that arises from the dream is always good. How can we determine whether this dream was a divine hint or a “case of the body”? The main thing is that we used the dream to awaken to improve our ways and improve our deeds, and this is always good, of course, not in the narveim 🙂
With blessings, Menashe Fishel Halevi Zuchmir
But, unlike the woman who testifies that she is a man's wife, as far as I know, a priest's wife who tells her husband that she was raped is forbidden to him, unless he thinks she is lying on purpose in order to get a divorce. In other words, it is possible that the woman's subjective claim is binding on another person according to the principle of the law.
So is a woman who tells her husband that she saw blood. He doesn't have to see it himself.
There is no connection. One witness is faithful in prohibitions. When it comes to subjective faithfulness, it is only in contexts that require testimony (two witnesses)
A priest's wife who testifies that she was raped receives a ketubah
[I'm not used to leaving here without understanding, so I'd like to continue clarifying. I'll start in a separate post because the other one is already getting boring and the place is cramped.]
What do you mean about dreams:
Option A. Even someone who believes in the accuracy of the dream (at least as a doubter) is allowed to ignore it. A positive innovation of the halakha in this case.
Option B. Only someone who doesn't believe in the accuracy of the dream (not even as a doubter) is allowed to ignore it. Like one deaf witness, a fool, and a minor in the prohibitions. The halakha just didn't give the dream the stamp it gives to two witnesses (at least as a doubter).
Both options exist. I raised the second as an additional option. In my opinion, anyone who believes in a dream should not ignore it, even if it does not have a full halakhic obligation.
So I'm discussing the first one. You say that someone who believes in a dream (for example, if you had such a dream, you said that it is clear that there is at least some doubt here, even about details that have not been verified) is still allowed to ignore it and there is no full halakhic obligation in this. That is, he thinks that the coins are a 50% chance, let's say, but since it came from the dream, then he is allowed to ignore it. But if he had arrived at the same factual position of 50% in another way (one pile of coins out of two piles is a 50% chance. Or an example without an iktafa isurah), then he is not allowed to ignore it and he would have a full halakhic obligation to act within the bounds of doubt. Did I understand correctly? (I hope I didn't understand correctly)
I'm sorry to disappoint you. You understood correctly.
He is allowed to ignore it, but if it is really a matter of fact, then he fails in the prohibition, right? Not that he is allowed and permitted, like a cancellation by majority.
I think the wording is like those things from the Torah that are doubtful to the rabbi. But, circumcision abroad, a bastard, impurity in the womb, and so on. As is known, the Rabbi in Kiddushin wrote that it is permissible to make someone else stumble, even if such a prohibition is certain (because the one who is stumbled is doubtful).
Here too, one can ask, and what about the party who is truly a bastard? Truly circumcised? Truly unclean? This was permitted by the laws of spikut for the gabra. This does not mean that the prohibition of the hafza has been abrogated.
Although there is no nef”m and I am not sure that these are two different possibilities at all. If this is permissible for me, then there is no prohibition. The question is, has there been a change in the object itself? Who said that there is something in the object itself?! On the party that is a mas”sh, he ate a mas”sh, but there is no prohibition here.
If there is something in the object itself, then perhaps there is room for the claim that it is appropriate to be stricter even though there is no halachic obligation to be stricter.
To say that in dreams the very prohibition is transformed into a permission is an exaggerated innovation (and then dreams do indeed “remove”). For those who say that there is doubt in the Torah as a whole, then all the seriousness in doubts is that the intellect does not fail in the pursuit of a prohibition. And if so, in the passages of the Law before us, the intellect remains the same, that it is not worth failing in a prohibition. And since the very prohibition is not transformed into a permission, then it is not clear (to me) what is involved here in saying that there is a permission.
I will quote the words of R. Shimon for the benefit of the matter, because his words also transcended my understanding, and my heart tells me that in the end, you and he are aiming at one thing (Chapter 1, Chapter 7, 45, indeed):
“Indeed, according to what is explained in our words, even though the Torah permitted the spikkut, the prohibition was not turned into a permit, and only the Torah said that a person is permitted to do so, putting himself in doubt and an obstacle, even though if he violates the prohibition, he will be punished somewhat. Accordingly, in all prohibitions where the law of spikkut in the Torah is not interpreted as a prohibition or a permit, it is certainly appropriate for every person to feel for himself to withdraw from doubt as if it were a danger. … And even though the Torah did not specifically warn about this, to feel lest he fall into the prohibition, reason dictates so, just as every person protects himself from all doubt and harm, even without the warning of the Torah.
And if so, what the Torah revealed to us in three places, regarding impurity in a community, and regarding a bastard, and regarding foreskin abroad, we are entitled to be lenient and not to feel that he might fail in the prohibition. Even if he fails in the prohibition even in the three prohibitions that make you atone, we are nevertheless entitled to do so from the beginning. And this is truly a great and wonderful innovation, but we should not be clever about it and cut it off, etc.
I did not get to understand the oxymoron that is written here, and since reason dictates avoidance, then what does the Torah introduce to him? If you do understand what R. Shimon says, perhaps you can say whether in his terms you are saying that in dreams the prohibition becomes a permission (like the Rabbi in the question of foreskin abroad) or that the one who fails needs atonement but we are allowed to do so from the beginning (like Rabbi Shimon Eliva Dharambam in the question of foreskin abroad).
“It is proper” to be stricter I don't understand what that is. Before actions there is an explicit obligation and there is an obligation that is explained by reason and after actions there is an obligation of atonement or nothing.
The R”S only says that he will not be sued for putting himself in doubt, but still if he violates the prohibition, there is a prohibition here. With us, we are not talking about doubt, and therefore it is impossible to say such a thing. If it is permitted, then it is permitted. In dreams, a person is allowed to disregard the facts, and then there is no prohibition. Even on the side where there is factual evidence, there is no prohibition in this. The prohibition is always what is imposed on the man. As stated, this is only one of the possibilities.
My understanding is that in general, there is no ‘claim’ on the Knesset itself to provide (if the piece ends in fat – nothing happened). And there is always an obligation to atone for failing to comply with the prohibition (if the piece ends in milk).
So I formulate/summarize (hopefully for the last time): In dreams, in the saviah, and in the notification of a party, in all three you say, at least as one of the options, that it is permitted for others to ignore ’their knowledge’ (at various levels) and even if the knowledge is indeed correct, there is no need for atonement and the prohibition becomes a permit, as in the annulment by majority.
This is not our concern here, but in your opinion I did not understand what the actual meaning of the prohibitions of sufficiency is according to the R”S method? It seems that it has no meaning. If you have violated a prohibition, you have violated it, and if not, then you have not.
Indeed.
In fact, I do understand what you wrote. For the Rambam, who believes that the Torah is not a word, there is really no prohibition in the Spicot. Whoever actually encounters a prohibition has a defect in something spiritual and will be punished in the next world, and if he finds out, he must atone for it. Therefore, it is reasonable to avoid a scoundrel (we can call it a prohibition of a scoundrel), like a poisonous doubt.
The claim not to put oneself in doubt cannot depend on the actual result (this is lit man deplig). Even in a prohibition that was held for one witness and was punished, the floggings are not only because the Amimra went beyond the limits of obeying one witness, and the evidence (according to the Rambam anyway, chapter 3 scoundrel) is that if it later turned out that the piece of fat was not scoundrel.
And since there is no claim (from the Torah) and there is also the explanation to avoid it, then on the one hand there is no room for the Torah to innovate that there is no claim in doubt about the foreskin, and on the other hand technically it does not have the possibility to innovate against the explanation, and so what did the Halacha innovate in doubt about the foreskin?
On this, Rabbi said that we should not be clever. And who will stand in the secret of the saints.
In short, there is indeed nothing new in the prohibition of doubting the Torah. I don't have time now to go into the words of the Rabbi and see if this is what he is saying, but in any case these are puzzling things.
I accept the true righteous ones, if you were to teach a series of lessons on the order of the gates of righteousness, our righteous Messiah would immediately come and the legs of the ancient serpent would be cut off and the light of the sun would be sevenfold and all the traffic lights would be green.
It's an old dream of mine. But it's a very long and complex story.
What about all the dreams of deceased people nowadays who came to their family members to ask them to pay a small debt, for example (a story about a deceased person who came to his family members to ask them to pay a debt of 5 shekels to a professional who had made a hole in the deceased's belt and had forgotten to pay him, his family members went and inquired and indeed it was so and the debt was paid)
How should we treat Hai's story, and there are many more like it?
Not related to our issue. Here the question is whether there is a moral obligation to uphold the words of the dead. This has nothing to do with the law of evidence (the question of what reality is).
By the way, where do you send a rabbi if you want to ask about anything?
Here in the answer. A new question is being raised.
That is, here a new question is being raised? If so, I wanted to ask Arona. I went to Kol HaLashon to the obituaries section for all sorts of great people who passed away, especially those I knew and did not have time to hear a eulogy for. Among them, I heard about the Gaon Rabbi Yehezkel Bertler, as I learned late that he was a wonderful and terrible genius, even if he had existed in previous generations (whom the younger ones were not afraid to talk to and argue with because he would have answered), but the older ones would have trembled very, very much from him, and it is a pity that I did not get to know him. Did the rabbi, when he studied at the Kollel Hazo, get to know him?
Here, only matters related to this column and the comments on it are raised. I meant a new question in the reply. See the reply at the top of the page and there he raised a new question.
I didn't know him.
Shalom Rabbi, a really enjoyable and interesting column! I eagerly await every scholarly column.
In the context of the column, I am studying Tractate Berakhot and the laws of benedictions in general, and there are many details that vary subjectively depending on the person's feelings, an example I saw not long ago - regarding sweets made from a grain-like wafer covered with lots of chocolate and toppings, you blessed everything, to the conclusion that Rabbi Eliezer Melamed rules that the blessing is determined according to the person's opinion - if he is mainly interested in chocolate, he will bless everything, but if the waffle is his main concern, he will bless food. And so on in the laws of the blessing Shehayinu, Tobtove HaMek, and so on (although these blessings have more objective criteria)
I think that here it is like a vow and therefore does not concern us. The objective rule is that blessings are given according to what one prefers, but each person has his own preferences.