On Two A Fortiori (Kal Va-Chomer) Arguments and the Secret of “Avodah Tzorekh Gavoah” (Column 360)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
This past weekend, on the eve of Parashat Va’era, someone reminded me of something I once wrote about the kal va-chomer (a fortiori) that Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah made from the frogs. That led me to think about it a bit more, and I recalled another kal va-chomer that touches on the same topic. Around it a few insights occurred to me that I wanted to present here.
The first kal va-chomer
The Talmud in Pesachim 53a discusses whether it is permitted to eat a spit-roasted kid on the Seder night (the concern is that this may lead people to consecrate a kid as an offering and then eat sacrificial meat outside the Temple). It relates that Todus of Rome instructed the people of Rome to eat a spit-roasted kid:
It was challenged: R. Yose said, “Todus of Rome instituted that the people of Rome eat spit-roasted kids on the nights of Passover.” They sent to him: “Were you not Todus, we would have decreed excommunication upon you, for you are feeding Israel sacrificial meat outside [the Temple].” Sacrificial meat—could that enter your mind?! Rather say: You are close to feeding Israel sacrificial meat outside [the Temple].
On the next folio the Talmud discusses Todus himself: why was excommunication not decreed upon him—was it because he was an important man (a Torah scholar), or was it fear of a tough guy?
They inquired: Was Todus of Rome a great man or a man of fists?
A statement is then cited to prove that Todus was an important man (a Torah scholar):
Come and hear: Another teaching that Todus of Rome expounded—What did Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah see that they gave [themselves] over for the sanctification of the Name to the fiery furnace? They reasoned a fortiori with themselves from the frogs: And if frogs, who are not commanded regarding the sanctification of the Name, it is written about them, “And they shall come into your house … and into your ovens and into your kneading troughs”—when are kneading troughs found near an oven? You must say, when the oven is hot—then we, who are commanded regarding the sanctification of the Name, all the more so.
Yet at the end the Talmud raises another possibility:
R. Yose bar Avin said: He was one who put merchandise into the purse of Torah scholars [a benefactor], for R. Yoḥanan said: “Whoever puts merchandise into the purse of Torah scholars merits and sits in the Heavenly Academy,” as it is said: “For in the shadow of wisdom is the shadow of money.”
So he was neither a scholar nor a strongman but a philanthropist. That teaches something about the social reality and the Sages’ attitude toward various types of figures—but that is not our topic. I would now like to return to the kal va-chomer from the frogs described above.
The difficulty
What does it mean to learn an a fortiori argument from frogs? Do frogs make value-laden decisions? They acted according to their nature—or rather, God Himself made them do it. And even if frogs had free will, are they a legitimate source from which to learn values? Who authorized them to issue rulings in Israel? True, the Sages say we can learn modesty from a cat, etc., but there’s a limit, no? To derive laws of pikuach nefesh (saving life) from the “decision”(!) of a band of frogs sounds unserious. It is hard to grasp the comparison Todus makes between Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, on the one hand, and frogs on the other. They are simply not on the same plane. Moreover, the Talmud itself notes this difference: we are commanded to sanctify God’s Name while the frogs are not. The very kal va-chomer rests on this point—yet that reasoning seems exactly what should refute it.
“Do not make yourselves loathsome”: a note on the Aggadot
Plainly, this is a cheap homily. A preacher wants to tell us something, and, as preachers do, he hangs it on ridiculous arguments and verses that have nothing to do with the matter. It sounds like a bad joke. Here Todus comes off like a third-rate homilist for the “Ein Yaakov crowd” between Mincha and Ma’ariv—people who don’t have the energy or ability to toil over the laws of “migo to extract” or “nat bar nat of one day.” From here I would prove that Todus was either a strongman or a donor—but certainly not draw proof that he was a Torah scholar. Bear in mind that the laws of martyrdom and sanctifying the Name are extensively treated in the Talmud; we have no shortage of halakhic sources and scriptural exegeses on them. That only sharpens the conclusion that resorting to frogs points more to ignorance (am-ha’aretz-ness) than to scholarship.
We have grown used to the Talmud bringing strange and puzzling derashot, hanging ideas on verses very loosely—vortlach. We have also grown used to people flocking to Bible and Aggadah lectures that contain no innovation, listening eagerly to trivial vortlach as if they were the living word of God. But to regard such a consideration as proof that the speaker is a great man—now that is truly astonishing and demands explanation.
The commentators deal with this kal va-chomer, from Rashi through Tosafot and on to later authorities like the Maharsha, the Chatam Sofer, and others. They discuss its assumptions and its necessity. They do relate to the accepted halakhic sources regarding martyrdom and sanctifying God’s Name, but even among them (I admit I did not search overly much) I did not find anyone who points out the absurdity of deriving a halakhic and ethical principle from frogs. Apparently, we have become accustomed to this eccentric genre. Incidentally, this lack of attention, to my mind, hints that the commentators themselves did not take Aggadot very seriously—and perhaps that is itself evidence for my general stance toward them. My sense is that in most cases these are homilies delivered to laypeople, as is common today among us. True, consummate scholars also engaged in it—but that is exactly what happens today as well. It is apparently legitimate (we see people consume it), but it raises questions about the need and propriety of engaging in serious exegesis of Aggadot.
This particular case, however, does require explanation, for this homily is cited as evidence of Todus’s greatness. The Sages themselves took this derash seriously (which I am far from sure about regarding other Aggadot). Years ago I therefore decided that here I must gird myself and look for a more reasonable explanation. I turned up a fine pearl (see here in a thread on the “Stop Here and Think” forum, and also here in the Q&A you will find a continuation and a few eulogistic words about me and my ilk), and I shall expand on it a bit here.[1]
In passing I will add that people have claimed that were I to invest similar effort in other Aggadot, perhaps my general view of them would change. Perhaps—but I am very doubtful, even after trying in a few cases. First, because in many cases I did not find (but “we did not find” is no proof); second, because the explanations of Aggadot, even when significant and important (very rarely), are doubtful indicators of the Aggadah’s true meaning and the homilist’s intention. It is clear that if enough smart people invest effort in interpreting any text—even Chipofo in the Congo (by the illustrious Morat R. Bornstein-Lazar)—they can produce pearls. After you read my words, you will have to decide whether what I offer is an interpretation (i.e., that I uncovered Todus’s intent) or a homily (as is customary). I myself am not entirely sure.
A dispute between Rashi and Tosafot
Rashi there explains why this kal va-chomer was needed:
“What did they see”—that they did not expound “and you shall live by them” and not die by them.
That is, Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah faced a halakhic dilemma: must they give up their lives or not? From the behavior of the frogs they concluded that they must. What was the reason not to give up their lives? Rashi explains that it is the derashah “and you shall live by them” (it is not clear whether this is anachronistic or whether already in their time this tannaitic derashah existed—which was disputed even among the Tannaim; see Yoma 85b and parallels). Note that Rashi inserts a serious halakhic discussion of martyrdom and sanctifying God’s Name—i.e., the frogs’ kal va-chomer participates in a real halakhic deliberation that Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah are conducting.[2] It is a source countering the derashah of “and you shall live by them” (and even overcomes it). The wonder only increases.
Tosafot s.v. “mah” there challenge Rashi:
“What did Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah see”—Rashi explains: what did they see that they did not expound “and you shall live by them and not die by them.” Difficulty: This was in public, and we conclude in Sanhedrin 74a that all agree that in public one must give up his life even for a minor commandment.
They continue Rashi’s approach as if this is a serious halakhic debate, and ask why indeed the derashah “and you shall live by them” is relevant, for in public one must give up one’s life even for a minor transgression—and certainly for idolatry. I would note that in Sanhedrin 74a R. Yishmael’s view is cited that regarding idolatry there is no requirement of “be killed rather than transgress,” and perhaps they were in doubt whether the law follows him and resolved it from the frogs. But if it was in public, as Tosafot say, that is not relevant.[3]
Rabbenu Tam answers:
Rabbenu Tam explains that the image Nebuchadnezzar made was not idolatry at all, but an effigy made to his own honor. Therefore it says “what did they see.” So it seems from the verse “Your god we do not serve, and the golden image we will not bow to”—implying that “his god” and “the image” are two different things. It also fits what we say in Ketubot 33b: “Had they flogged Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, they would have served the image.” And if it were idolatry—Heaven forbid that they would have bowed to it! (Granted, the word “served” is difficult.) And R. Yose explains: What did they see that they did not flee, for before the act they could have fled, as Daniel did, as it says in Helek (Sanhedrin 93a): three were in that counsel.
Rabbenu Tam explains that the statue was not idolatry at all but an honorific monument to Nebuchadnezzar; they were asked only to honor him, not to serve idolatry. If so, there was no demand to commit idolatry. Seemingly, that does not resolve the difficulty, for in a public setting one must give up one’s life even for a minor prohibition. It seems Rabbenu Tam’s intent is not merely that there was no idolatry—but that there was no prohibition at all.
If so, what was their dilemma? Why give up their lives if they were not being asked to transgress? Apparently, in the circumstances, refusing to bow to Nebuchadnezzar (even if he was not demanding a transgression) would constitute sanctification of God’s Name. The question was whether that requires—or is even worthwhile—martyrdom. But if honoring Nebuchadnezzar would constitute a ḥillul Hashem (desecration of God’s Name), then for that very “transgression” one would have to give up his life in public—and Tosafot’s question returns: what was their dilemma? It seems this is a case where the symmetry between sanctification and desecration of the Name breaks down. We tend to think that wherever doing X is a sanctification of the Name, refraining from X is a desecration—and vice versa (see Rambam, Yesodei HaTorah 5:1). But there are cases where the situations are not symmetric (see ibid. 5:11, though it is not entirely clear). For example, returning a lost object to a gentile is a sanctification of the Name, but refraining (when no one knows) is not a desecration. Similarly, showing honor to Nebuchadnezzar is not necessarily a desecration; but refusing to submit to him is an act of sanctification. Thus there was no obligation to give up life for a transgression, and still there is room to consider whether one should (though perhaps not must) give up life for sanctification of the Name. Perhaps that was their dilemma.
Explaining the kal va-chomer
We can now explain the comparison to frogs. According to Rabbenu Tam, the dilemma was whether to give up life for sanctification of the Name when they were not being asked to transgress. What were the two sides? Likely the sense that if they did not die and remained alive, they could serve God and do many more good deeds, bringing much benefit to the Master of the world (in the previous series I discussed the “globalist” perspective, from which a person weighs considerations from the vantage point of benefit to the Master of the world). Seemingly, God would prefer that they not die, rather than the one-time benefit of dying for sanctification of the Name. The assumption is that if God created us, He wants us and our deeds. We bring Him benefit by serving Him during our lives. Thus the question of martyrdom is not only a personal loss calculation but also alignment with the Creator’s plan (a global consideration of maximizing benefit from His perspective).
Enter the frogs. Precisely because they lack free choice, their “decision” to enter hot ovens and die is not their own decision. It is their nature—indeed, it is the act of God. He is the One who made them enter the ovens and die. The assumption is that frogs too were created by Him and thus also serve Him in some sense (see Perek Shirah on the frog that sings before Him, and Column 115 and here). And yet, God made them enter the ovens—meaning that by His reckoning, they would bring Him more benefit by giving up their lives for the sanctification of His Name than by continuing to live. That is precisely the answer to the dilemma of Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah. Note that the comparison is made because of the difference between them and humans. If it were their own choice, we could not learn anything from it—frogs are not halakhic authorities. But precisely the fact that they lack choice indicates that this is God’s policy, and thus we may learn from it. Therefore the Talmud indeed notes that they are not commanded regarding sanctifying the Name whereas we are—this is the basis of the kal va-chomer. It is not a refutation, as it might first seem, but the very logic that grounds it.[4]
Needless to say, this comparison is also not free of problems: human life is presumably of far greater value to God, so it is not clear how it can be compared to the lives of frogs. But here one can indeed say that the aggadic genre does not really intend a comparison to frogs; it uses them as an illustration of the consideration I described. Todus claims that Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, in effect, made (or, more precisely: could have made) God’s calculation and concluded that the one-time act of martyrdom is preferable to continued life—just as with the frogs. That is quite a significant claim—enough to see its proponent as a great man.
Explaining Rashi’s approach
Tosafot themselves hesitate whether to explain that Nebuchadnezzar’s image was not idolatry. The plain sense of the verses indicates that it was. Rashi also implies that he understood it as martyrdom to avoid a transgression (precisely what Tosafot question). I now wish to argue that even on that assumption one can offer exactly the same explanation of the kal va-chomer.
Consider a case where they were being asked to transgress, and they knew that since it was in public they were halakhically required to give up their lives. A person in such a situation naturally finds all kinds of justifications for why he should not die. I have mentioned (in Column 62 and elsewhere) the words of the Ḥasid Ya’avetz, one of the exiles from Spain, who said that simple folk stood up to the trial of forced conversion far more than scholars. The reason is that simple folk know they must give up their lives—and they do so. Scholars, by contrast, know the halakhah and the ways to minimize the gravity of the prohibition and escape the need to pay the price of exile or martyrdom—especially where the price is heavy and the temptation to find halakhic justifications grows. They will serve idolatry with the left hand and without intent, and tell themselves that in so doing they are exempt. The heavy price exacted can lead a person to believe that these justifications are available even when they are not. Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah may have been in a similar position. They were required to give up their lives, and it is entirely possible that they entertained justifications of the type: surely God does not want this; surely He would prefer that they remain alive and continue to serve Him and benefit the world.
Because they were great men, they sought to test these justifications before deciding. They looked at the frogs and told themselves what I described above: apparently God prefers martyrdom even at the price of foregoing the ongoing good and benefit they could bring Him. Thus they rejected the counsel of their inclination. If so, the comparison to frogs that I described above can explain Todus’s reasoning even if we assume (unlike Tosafot) that Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah were asked to transgress, and despite the fact that they had a clear halakhic obligation to give up their lives.
A side lesson: how to contend with the evil inclination
We can learn an important lesson. Sometimes a student or young man comes to a rabbi raising questions of faith. A common approach is to treat such questions as answers: the assumption is that he is not truly troubled by the questions but is using them to justify (to provide rational-intellectual cover for) his desires. He wants to permit himself sexual licentiousness and backs it with the claim that he has theological difficulties. That will justify leaving religious and halakhic commitment and present it (to others and to himself) as a rational, well-grounded step rather than yielding to desire. The assumption is: “They worshiped the stars only in order to permit themselves sexual immorality in public” (Sanhedrin 63b). Many rabbis in such a case will say there is no point in answering such questions, for they are really answers. What is needed is to hug him and give him warmth and love.
If I take the measure they take—i.e., reduce that rabbi psychologically (as he did to the young man)—I would say what I have said before: this is a very convenient exit for those who do not have answers. Giving warmth and love is much easier than seriously addressing the difficulties. It is also more convenient, for it is easy for a person to believe that his stance is free of problems and that he need not examine himself. Easiest of all is to think the problems are only with the questioner, not—God forbid—with us.
Beyond that, I object to this approach on two grounds: (1) How can one determine that these are not genuine questions but the counsel of the inclination? In most cases one cannot—so the rabbi who treats them that way, at least in those cases, does so because it is convenient for him or because he has no answers. It is entirely possible these are genuine difficulties that demand a response. (2) Even if indeed the inclination is the fundamental motivation and the questions only provide rational-intellectual cover, it is still important and right to answer the difficulties. If the difficulties are answered satisfactorily, that young man may not yield to his desires (for he himself raises the difficulties because he does not want to take the step without rational-intellectual backing).
The interpretation I proposed for the kal va-chomer of Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah is based on the notion that a person sometimes genuinely seeks justifications for a step he himself understands is improper. He is moved by desires and finds rational cover for them (see Column 199 on “the Hindik” and on dual consciousness). And still, it is important to contend with those justifications on their merits—and doing so can prevent the very step in question even if the desire, not the reason, is the true underlying force.
Another kal va-chomer
In Columns 120 and 170 I discussed a puzzling kal va-chomer regarding the qiqayon at the end of the Book of Jonah. I have already presented the difficulty and my explanations there, so here I will only point out its connection to Todus’s kal va-chomer and the discussion we have just had. That kal va-chomer is similar to Todus’s in two respects (beyond both being a fortiori arguments): Todus strangely compared human beings to frogs; there, the kal va-chomer strangely compares Jonah’s considerations to God’s. Beyond that, I will show that the underlying framework is similar in both cases (both concern the contribution human beings make to God).
The Book of Jonah revolves around a debate between God and Jonah regarding his mission to Nineveh. Its people were sinful, and God sends Jonah to bring them to repentance and to warn that if they do not repent Nineveh will be overturned. Jonah refuses to comply. I once saw an explanation (I think in an essay by Prof. Aviezer, which I could not now locate, but I assume it appears elsewhere) that Jonah essentially disagreed in principle with God’s policy. In his view, sinners should die because they do not fulfill their purpose, and God ought not to give them the option of repenting and being saved.
The book ends in a crescendo whose peak is the discussion around the qiqayon:
“And Jonah left the city and sat to the east of the city; he made himself a booth there and sat under it in the shade, till he would see what would happen in the city. And the Lord God appointed a qiqayon, and it came up over Jonah to be shade over his head to save him from his discomfort; and Jonah rejoiced over the qiqayon with great joy. And God appointed a worm when the dawn rose on the morrow, and it struck the qiqayon and it withered. And it came to pass when the sun rose that God appointed a sultry east wind, and the sun beat upon the head of Jonah and he fainted, and he asked that he might die, and said, ‘Better my death than my life.’ And God said to Jonah, ‘Do you do well to be angry about the qiqayon?’ And he said, ‘I do well to be angry, unto death.’ And the Lord said, ‘You have had pity on the qiqayon for which you did not labor and did not make grow, which came up in a night and perished in a night. And I—should I not have pity on Nineveh, the great city, wherein are more than one hundred and twenty thousand persons who cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand, and many cattle as well?’”
God’s kal va-chomer seems very puzzling. Apparently, Jonah did not pity the qiqayon but himself; he needed the shade it provided. God, by contrast, certainly does not need Nineveh—He pities it. So what room is there for a comparison? It calls to mind Todus’s comparison between people and frogs.
I explained the comparison there in two ways—one the focus of Column 120 and the other of Column 170: (1) In Column 120 I discussed the existence of altruistic actions. I argued that the mere fact that Jonah had an interest does not mean he did not pity the qiqayon. The existence of an interest does not prove that the action was only interest-driven and not altruistic. Jonah may indeed have needed the plant, but at the same time he also pitied it. (2) In Column 170 I discussed “the secret of avodah tzorekh gavoah,” focusing on the opposite resolution. I proposed there that God too does not only pity Nineveh—He needs it. “The secret of avodah tzorekh gavoah” says that God created us because He needs us. It is a “secret,” for theologies commonly maintain that a perfect Being cannot need mortal, frail creatures like us. What could be lacking to Him that we can do for Him? What does He lack and need? But as the Ari learns from the verse “Give strength to God,” the truth is that He indeed needs us—and for that He created us.[5]
In Column 170 I cited that in the second volume of Orot HaKodesh, R. Kook (the Ra’ayah) explains the secret of “service as a need of the Most High” through the problem of perfection and hishtalmut (self-perfecting). His claim is that a perfect entity cannot exist, for one of the perfections is the very capacity for hishtalmut—becoming more complete. Hishtalmut is not merely a means to arrive at a more complete state; it has value in itself. If so, then to a perfect entity this perfection is necessarily lacking: it cannot become more complete, for it is already perfect. We thus learn that by virtue of being perfect it lacks the perfection of being perfectible—hence, it is not truly perfect. I explained there that, per R. Kook, the potential for hishtalmut exists in God, but it cannot be actualized except through deficient creatures like us, who, because of our deficiencies, can become more complete. When we perfect ourselves, we do something for God that He Himself cannot do—we bring His potential for hishtalmut from potential to actual.[6]
This sheds quite a different light on the debate between God and Jonah. We can now understand that God’s claim to Jonah is that the very purpose and justification of human existence lies in our sinning and repenting (hishtalmut). Were God to destroy every person or society that sins, there would be no point to their existence. Perfect creatures would not provide Him the benefit for which all Creation was brought into being. Hence the dispute over the repentance of Nineveh’s inhabitants concerns the entire thrust of the book. The comparison to the qiqayon teaches Jonah that just as he needs the plant for shade, God needs human beings to bring His potential for hishtalmut into actuality. Therefore, not only does God act beyond the letter of the law to enable our repentance; much more than that: a world of wholly righteous people would be, from His perspective, superfluous. The world was created so that we would sin and return.[7]
The relationship between the two topics
At first glance there is a contradiction between these two topics. In Todus’s kal va-chomer we see that the benefit we bring God should not prevail over our duty to give up our lives; the benefit we bring Him by living does not justify avoiding martyrdom. That would suggest that God does not really need us. Whereas in Jonah we see the opposite: God needs us and does not want us destroyed, even if we have sinned; our continued life benefits Him more, and He is unwilling to forgo it.
One can say there is no contradiction, for perhaps the benefit our martyrdom provides Him surpasses the benefit of our continued lives. That is a quantitative consideration. Beyond that, there is a difference in vantage point. From God’s perspective, He prefers that we continue to live rather than die. But from our perspective, if there is an obligation or value to martyrdom, then that is what we must do—not wrangle with tendentious considerations allegedly made from God’s perspective (again, see the recent series about this), in the spirit of “Why involve yourself with the hidden matters of the Merciful?” (Behedi k’vassya d’Raḥmana lama lakh). We must leave His considerations to Him; we are to fulfill our obligations.
This is akin to the well-known “contradiction” between Abraham’s response to the plan to destroy Sodom—there he bargains with God like a market peddler—and his immediate, unhesitating readiness to bind his son Isaac. Here too the difference is vantage point: when it is a task laid upon you, you are not meant to philosophize—you are to carry it out as commanded. That we can learn from the frogs. But if you are a neutral party, you may view the picture from God’s vantage point and even contend with Him over what brings Him more benefit, as we see in the Book of Jonah.
[1] In my searches I now saw quite a few modern, foolish treatments (as is common in the field) of this kal va-chomer. I will mention only two that are more reasonable and worth reading: this one by R. Brandes and this one by Yaakov Meir (I was told it also appears in the “Yomi” group on Facebook).
[2] Of course I do not mean to say that Ḥananiah, Mishael, and Azariah actually made this calculation—and I am sure Rashi did not think so either. But he did think they could have made it, i.e., that it is a serious consideration from which halakhic conclusions can be drawn.
[3] The Maharsha here cites R. Yishmael and suggests perhaps it was not public because there were not ten Jews present.
[4] The question here is why this is a kal va-chomer and not merely an analogy. One might say the a fortiori form is rhetorical flourish and it is in fact only a comparison. But perhaps it is truly an a fortiori. As the Talmud itself describes, the kal va-chomer is based on the fact that we are commanded to sanctify God’s Name while frogs are not. If so, in our case there is more benefit to God and a greater sanctification of the Name.
[5] In a certain sense this means that God Himself does not act altruistically, for Creation was for His sake, not ours. In fact, it is not plausible that Creation was for our sake, for without Creation we would not exist at all. Logically, it is hard to accept that a being is brought into existence for its own sake: if it did not exist, there would be no one to care for. But perhaps with respect to God, caring for Himself is not egoism, for there altruism and egoism converge. Caring for God’s perfection is our altruism—and perhaps also His. (Again we return to the recent series, in which I discussed global considerations—i.e., considerations made from the vantage point of benefit to God.)
[6] See also the final lecture in the series on God and the world.
[7] I have already mentioned the ḥasidic reading of “I will sin and repent,” according to which it describes a person who thinks he wants ab initio to sin and then repent in order to attain the exalted level of a penitent, which is higher than that of a perfectly righteous person. Here one can see the conceptual root of that idea.
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In the book of D&D Bishvat P&A
It seems to me that Thodos, a Roman, unlike the author of the site, saw great value in cultivating the experiential world of the worshiper of God. Therefore, he believed that it was not enough to commemorate the Passover sacrifice, but that there was a need for an experiential illustration of the status by eating the goat roasted on its legs and insides, and on this point the Sages opposed him, because they are considered holy outside.
Even the frogs, do not teach themselves the obligation to surrender their souls for the sanctification of God, but rather give a person the mental strength to carry out what is necessary. Thodos was probably at the time of one of the decrees of the Roman emperors. Some want to associate it with Hadrian's extermination decrees, and there is (Prof. M. D. Harr) who links Theodosius to Domitian's attempt to force the Jews to worship the emperor.
Theodosius' sermon, which he learned from the frogs that jumped into the oven to fulfill the commandments of God, even though they were not commanded to sanctify God, was what gave the Jews the strength to stubbornly stand against the emperor's spies who were likely to murder them or torture them severely if they did not fulfill the emperor's decree. .Scholarly persuasion about the obligation to surrender one's soul will not necessarily help a person who sees the sword of the spies drawn in front of him, but the example of the frog jumping into the oven without even thinking twice And against her natural instinct, this example does it.
The deepening of the qualities of the human soul is also what led Thodos to assist the sages by putting money in their pockets, that is, investing money in the hands of the sages so that they can make a deal with it that will bring profit to the investor and the trader. In this way, there is no active giver and passive receiver, but an economic partnership is created, in which both the giver and the receiver are partners in its creation.
The deal helps the sage to earn a living with dignity and profit, but does not exempt him from the trouble of earning his living, and so the rich treat him not as the poor recipient of charity, but as a partner, both on the spiritual and economic levels. Making a deal with the consumer is described by Hazal as one of the most excellent ways of charity, a way that preserves the dignity of the recipient in the optimal way.
Indeed, Thodos ‘Gabra Raba’ was wise in the soul.
With greetings, Yaron Fish”l Corinaldi
In the 4th of Shvat
Theodosius' teaching on the dedication of the frogs, says that our dedication to doing the will of God should be without too much calculation, but rather as an existential instinct, similar to Rabbi Akiva's words to Pappus that we are like fish who cannot separate from the water that is our habitat.
Furthermore, according to the version of Midrash Tehillim 28, according to Theodosius, it was precisely the frogs who were "complete in themselves to sanctify the name of God Almighty" who remained alive, "all the frogs died, and those who went down into the oven did not die because they gave themselves up to the fire in order to fulfill the decree of God Almighty."
Hananiah Mishael and Azariah learned the law, according to Thodos Shem, from the saving of the frogs that entered the oven: ‘What if the frogs, who have no ancestral right or covenant, by giving themselves and surrendering their lives for the holiness of God, did not die, we who are the sons of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and have ancestral right and have been distinguished for the holiness of God – all the more so’ that there is hope of salvation.
With blessings, Simcha Fish”l Halevi Plankton
In contrast to Theodosius the Roman, who sees the dedication of the soul to the word of God as an existential necessity for the Jew, his fellow citizen Pelatien the Roman sees the dedication of the soul as part of the process of repentance and correction for the sin that led to exile, as he says there: Pelatien the Roman said: They sought from the Torah, as it is said: And you sought from there the God of yours and you found.
Lepion has a sermon on the Torah as an existential necessity, as he says (Song of Songs Rabbah 8:1) when Mount Sinai was torn off and stood over the heads of Israel, but in the process of repentance it is not enough to accept the Torah by forcing the mountain like a basin, here a renewed acceptance is needed from a conscious decision. Your God and you will find that you will seek Him with all your heart and with all your soul’
With blessings, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel”r
Paragraph 2, line 1
… The Plea has a sermon…
Ibid., line 2
… Re-admission from a decision…
It can be said that from the frogs, Toda learned the way of public struggle, which must be by charging against the enemy, even if some of the attackers are injured during the attack.
The frogs charge the Egyptian's house in order to conquer it and make it their territory. They receive an order from the leader of the group to penetrate every possible space, and they do so without considering what their personal fate will be.
From here, Hananiah Mishael and Azariah learn, according to Datodos, the tactics to be adopted in response to the king's decree to bow down and take pictures. Not to bow your head and not to run away, but to look straight at the guards and refuse. Then some of the brains will be killed, but there is no way they will kill them all. Ultimately, the king/emperor will realize that it is impossible to enforce his decree without uprooting all the Jews, and the king will not do this, because he still needs obedient taxpayers and government stability.
Palatine, the man of spirit (named after the famous philosopher), justifies the refusal to bow to the image as a spiritual act ‘and asking for the ’God’ from there. Theodos, the man of action, learns from the frogs that taking risks is an effective tactic of public struggle. Emperors are reluctant to break all the rules with their subjects, and most likely the ’status quo’ that exempts Jews from emperor worship – will return to its former state.
Best regards, Akiva Yosef Halevi Radetzky.
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… Theodosius learned the way of struggle…
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… That the’status quo’ that exempted Jews from the worship of the king – would return to us.
Josephus tells (Wars, Book 2, Chapter 10) about the attempt of the Emperor Gaius Caligula to place his statue in the Temple, for which he sent Petronius with a large military force to carry it out. After crowds of Jews begged Petronius near Acre not to place an image in the temple, Petronius gathered thousands of Jews near Tiberias to warn them that their refusal constituted a declaration of war on the Emperor.
Then, Josephus describes:
“The Jews answered him, that they offer sacrifices twice a day for the peace of the Emperor and the Romans, but if he wants to display the images in the temple, he must first slaughter the entire Jewish people, because they will willingly surrender their lives to the slaughter with their children and wives.”
Petronius's impression of the courage of the Jews, and also their fear of the destruction of the country, since the Jews avoided scattering and going to sow their fields – led him to take the risk and delay the execution of the emperor's order, and to appeal to him to cancel it. The emperor was very angry with Petronius and ordered him to be executed, but by the time the order reached the country – the emperor had already been murdered and his decree was canceled.
According to another source, Agrippa I, Caligula's friend, intervened and had the decree canceled, but the emperor ordered Petronius to commit suicide, accusing him of yielding to pressure from the Jews, but he was saved due to the murder of Caligula.
In any case, we have seen here that the determined declaration of masses of Jews about their willingness to give up their lives to prevent the execution of the decree – It ultimately helped to stop and even cancel the Roman attempt to place an image in the temple. Roman commanders were determined to bring about war with their determined subjects.
With regards, Ben-Zion Yohanan Corinaldi-Radetzky
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*When a lion roared, a kiss to the gra**
The Gemara in Pesachim 55:2 (just a few days ago in the Daf Yomi) says, “What did Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah see who gave themselves up for the holiness of God to the fiery furnace? They carried frogs themselves. And what about frogs, for it is written, “They came and went up into your house, your ovens, and your remains”; we who command the holiness of God all the more so.
The roaring lion is harsh, this is a baseless verse, because the frogs were indeed commanded for the holiness of God, for it is written, “And they came up and went up into your house, your ovens, and your remains”!
The Gra was there and he was only 7 years old, and he replied:
It is true that the frogs were commanded to enter the ovens, but they were not only commanded there but also to enter the beds and the sleeping room. If so, each frog could have said to its friends, you go into the oven and I will go into the bed or the room.
And if it nevertheless entered the oven even though it was not a mitzvah, it means that it was a muscle and a living being.
And it is said that when the lion heard this roar, he jumped up from his place, raised the Gra and kissed him on the forehead
Two lions roar and meet and neither of them is bothered that frogs have no choice and the story is absurd.
Incidentally, it is said that when they met in the Gra's adulthood, he said to the Sha'ga, "You are in the open and I am in the hidden."
To the best of my knowledge, the issue of animal consciousness and choice is a complex subject that is controversial among researchers. You are probably familiar with the arguments of Yuval Noah Harari.
Regarding consciousness I know (and as far as I understand there is no evidence one way or the other), but regarding choice I don't. Even regarding humans there is no evidence, so regarding animals I don't see how we can scientifically show their choice.
And to my heart, Yuval Noah Harari, I hope he is not the ”researcher” you are relying on. A big babbling babbling babbling about things he has no idea about.
For our purposes, this of course does not matter, because even if you think otherwise, the absolute majority of commentators still probably assume that animals have no choice, and therefore there is room for discussion according to their view.
In the book of D&C Bishvat P&C
The explanation of the Rabbi that each frog had the possibility of finding another place to enter fits well with the Rabbi's method that Hananiah Mishael and Azariah could have avoided worshiping the image by escaping to another place, and yet they chose to stay so that there would be sanctification of God in action and openly, and not just the prevention of blasphemy in a way that they would not feel. They learned this from the frogs who entered the oven, even though they could have dropped to another place.
With blessings, Y'fao
Perhaps the frogs believed, like Kant, that one should follow the categorical imperative, since if every frog escaped to another place, the commandment of God would be nullified. ‘And in your ovens and in your leftovers’, the categorical imperative requires that there be a frog that volunteers to enter the oven 🙂
In the 7th of Shvat, Rabbi Aryeh Stern, Rabbi of Jerusalem, explains (in his lesson “The Smite of the Frogs and the Sanctification of the Lord,” on the “Yeshiva Kerem Yavneh” website) according to the words of the Namukhi Yosef (Sanhedrin 18:1 on the pages of the Riv):
“But if he is a great man and pious and fears God and sees that the generation is broken by this, he is permitted to sanctify the Lord and give himself up even for a minor mitzvah, so that the people may see and learn to fear the Lord and love Him with all their hearts.”
And we used to say: “What did Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah see that they threw themselves into the fiery furnace”, interpretation: And they did not make an image of it, for was it not a monument of kings in honor of Balaam? Rather, since most of them were indignant and believed that it was a monument – there was sanctification of God in what they did.
And we say to them in the Midrash: “What does it matter to you to be stoned? I clothed my son; what does it matter to you to be saved? I took the lulav”, since they had declared themselves about the sanctity of God before the letter of the law, they certainly would not have been obligated to do so even at the time of the decree, since it was in their power to pass and nullify it. Rather, they would have been killed because the time required it’
In the opinion of the Maimonides, it is apparently impossible to explain this way, since it is written in the Basic Principles of the Torah 5:4 that a person is forbidden to be harsh on himself and to be killed in a place where the Torah does not require him. Even in the Mitzvot (Acts 9), which brought the teaching of Hananiah Mishael and Azariah of the Tzafdaim, it is precisely that “when a greater force comes upon us, he will ask him to forsake it, and he will be exalted.” And according to the Maimonides, it is still
With blessings, may you be blessed
This is exactly what I explained here.
Regarding Maimonides, in my opinion, it is better to agree with him. It is clear to me that he also agrees that it is permissible (perhaps only if it is a great person) to decide that the time is right for this and to give up one's life. What he writes is that such a decision should not be made just to be strict, and the Torah scholars disagree on this. It seems completely simple to me.
On the 15th of Shvat, Ramadhan writes regarding Nebuchadnezzar's image: "It is known what happened to Israel in the days of the wicked Nebuchadnezzar, and that everyone who was in Babylon bowed down to the image except Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah." It is possible that the deaf and the locksmith were among those who bowed down. And yet we have not seen the image of those who called them neither wicked nor gentiles nor disqualified from witnessing, and God did not think that The sin of the worshipers of the image will be heaped upon them, because they were forced, and thus God said: They did it before, I will also do it to them before in the days of Haman (Igrot Rambam, ed. by Kapach, p. 101).
This means that the image was idolatry, but one should not consider the one who bowed down to it as wicked and worshipped the image, because he was forced and did nothing but before. (And as Maimonides wrote in the Foundations of the Torah, even where it is necessary to surrender one's life, whoever passes and does not surrender his life is a compulsion and exempt.
Regarding the destruction that occurred in his time in North Africa, Maimonides wrote (ibid., p. 128), that since one is not compelled to transgress the Torah by deed, this compulsion does not oblige anyone to act, but only to speak, and they know very well that we do not believe in that speech, and it is not in the mouth of the speaker except to be saved from the king, in order to appease his mind with a simple word.
And whoever is killed so that he does not acknowledge the mission of that man, it will not be said of him except that he did what was right and good and has a great reward before God, and his virtue is supreme because he surrendered his life to the holiness of God, may God be blessed and exalted.
But whoever comes to ask us whether he will be killed or He will confess – – They tell him that he will confess and not be killed, but he will not stand in the kingdom of that king, but will sit in his house until he comes out, and if he needs to do something with his hands – he will do it secretly. For never has such a wonderful destruction been heard, in which there is no compulsion except in speech alone. And it does not appear from the words of our sages that they say “He will be killed and he will not say a single thing that is not an act”, but he will be killed when they force him to do an act or something that he is warned about’ (pp. 118).
Rabbi Kapach writes in a note that the words of the Maimonides in Hal’ Yesu’t that the Maimonides wrote that in the place where they said ‘He will pass and not be killed – then this is a compulsion on his soul,, it seems He repeated his words in the Letter of the Destruction, but brought what the Rabbi wrote in the name of the reason, which is that according to the Maimonides, if he is a great man and sees that the generation is broken, he is permitted to sanctify the Name and give up his soul even for a minor mitzvah, so that the people may see and learn to fear the Lord and love Him with all their hearts.
For the answer, it seems that the Maimonides' words in the Letter of the Destruction, which did not condition the permission to give up the soul on a great man who sees that the generation is broken, but that this is an intermediate situation. This is more serious than forcing him to commit an ordinary offense (which is not one of the three gravest), where he ruled in a clear way that it is forbidden to be more severe and give up his soul The soul, for here the Jew is required to appear in his speech as a disbeliever in the Torah.
Since this is an ‘intermediate situation’ – a person is permitted to surrender his soul so that he is not seen as a disbeliever in the Torah, but he is not obligated to do so because he is not required to commit the three grave offenses in action.
With greetings, Amioz Yaron Schnitzel”r
The entire column leads to the ”analytic” conclusion that God (perfection or the perfect) is a linguistic fiction. After all, the perfect is logically bound from the outset to the same added value “educational” that creatures give him. Thus, God, by his very definition, will achieve his ultimate goal only in retrospect when creatures complete their contribution to him. As long as time and the history that develops on him have not exhausted the process to its end, there is truly no separate and ”perfect” entity (that brought about that process in the first place…). So what does exist? What exists is a concept of “God” that is necessarily empty of content, since this concept itself is being created over the course of history in the minds of creatures and without any real equivalent in a separate world. In other words: the definition of God will acquire its “instruction” (in Frege's terms) only at the end of the process. Anyone familiar with Hegel's argument about “good infinity” and ”evil infinity” will recognize this immediately.
Doron, I get the impression that you have some knowledge of philosophy, and that is precisely why I am surprised every time I discover puzzling logical leaps in your arguments.
According to your logic, I don't actually exist now. I will only come into being when I complete my biographical development. Until then, nothing exists, and in the end I will jump out of the vacuum and be created out of nothing.
The fact that God is imperfect in the moment before creation, even if I accept this argument for the sake of discussion, does not mean that He did not exist then. He exists in the imperfect phase and then creates the world as part of His own completion. How do you get from this to the conclusion that God is a linguistic fiction? I scratch my head over and over again, but I cannot extract an answer from it. It is as confused as I am.
Not to mention that He is already perfect now, since we are in the middle of the process of self-education, and this is what completes Him.
Speaking of logical leaps…
I hope you won't be offended by the fact that it's hard for me to act like you and create a gas”sh (here I adopted a vulgar language) from the existence of his glory to the existence of his creator.
God “exists in his imperfect phase”..? Did you understand this sentence? Does it even have a meaning? In your opinion, the teaching of the concept “God” is an entity evolving in time (over history!) like humans, elephants or galaxies? A day will come and God, if he works hard, will finally achieve what he wants to exist in a perfect phase…
In the meantime, you are left without God in your hands but with a lot of “God”. Did we already say analytical?
This is not an equivalent derivation but an analogy or demonstration. It is not very complicated to understand. Indeed, the claim is that God is an evolving entity (our way). In fact, just as you and I are evolving entities. How do you arrive at the conclusion that He is a linguistic fiction? Maybe you have solutions…
Or are you presenting the following gibberish here: 1. God is defined as the perfect being (although there is no such thing as perfect). 2. Perfection is an empty term, since the perfect cannot be fulfilled and therefore is not perfect. Conclusion: God does not exist.
This is of course a fallacy, since the obvious conclusion is that definition 1 is nonsense. The conclusion is that God is not perfect (because there is no such thing as perfect). Indeed, you are right that something that is defined in an empty and contradictory way does not exist, but God certainly exists.
The essence of the analytical position, which is your position in this case, is the blurring of the distinction, which is basically Platonic, between form and content. This blurring is also the attempt to erase the clear hierarchy in which being (content or wholeness) necessarily precedes becoming (form or development).
The analytical model wants to subordinate everything to form, that is, to logic, and this is expressed in giving central emphasis to the derivational side of logic, that is, the “transition” inference from premise to conclusion. In essence, the analytical position tries to “reduce” rationality by basing all our claims on pure inferences, but ends its journey in an act of suicide - the emptying of the content of any claim whatsoever is also the emptying of itself.
Your assumption that God changes himself reinforces precisely this point. In a world where even God constantly changes identities, it is impossible to even talk about rationality. This is essentially the destruction of the objective Archimedean point for the world and its laws.
If the analyst chooses to say something - and in fact he always does so - then according to his method his speech is empty of content.
In the context of the question at hand, the syntheticist understands that the assumption of the eternal and unchanging perfection of God evokes a "strangeness" that is difficult to digest. The thing is that when he looks aside, he sees the analytical option, which is much worse. Therefore, he continues to adhere to his position. This is imperfect rationality, but it is the most that can be achieved.
Perhaps we don't really need to bother here any more than with other legends. The proof that Todos was a great man is that his words were enacted in a baraita, even without directly judging the content of the words. And the content itself is truly a matter of fact, but as you explained, with every rabbinic argument, one does not judge the inference but the argument itself, and if it comes to teaching fear of God and commitment to God, beyond the law of the law, then let it be justified and apply it to the Torah. Therefore, the commentators do not need to deal with the matter of fact itself, that the tsafards have no choice, but they do need to deal (and Tosafot deal) with the need in general to offer instruction to Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, that is, with the perception that they did something that was not a full and ordinary halakhic obligation.
I rest my case
Even those who included his words in the baraita made some kind of consideration. Why did they do this?
And if it is a matter of a purely religious doctrine, there is no explanation here as to why the Rishonim still discuss it. This is the chatter of the Baals and should not be judged in terms of halakhic law.
“It is logically improbable to accept that any creature was created for its own sake. If it did not exist, there would be no need to worry (there would be no one to worry about).”
The claim seems puzzling at first glance, what does it matter that there was no need to worry? Still, if he lives a good life, then his creation will be a good thing for him
As long as someone exists, there is a point in worrying about their well-being. But creating them so that they are well-being is absurd. Don't create and no one will lack anything.
I liked the explanation. The structure reminds me of the words of R. Tarpon - I am the Lord's Lord, the Lord of the Keren, the spy, I am the Lord of the Keren (proof from a frog to a frog reveals the difference in level between a person who sanctifies God with his life and one who sacrifices his soul)
But it seems to me simpler that when Chazal attributed miraculous and unnatural behavior to an animal, or even to an inanimate object, they also attributed to it a choice in everything included
We also found that the earth transmuted a command of God. And animals are rewarded for good deeds. All the terms of command and reward require, according to Maimonides, also a choice
So the question of free choice should not be discussed about a frog that jumps into the fire from a normal croaking frog.