Further on Spiritual Solipsism – Continued (Column 358)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

Dedicated to my dear son Shlomo, in honor of our nightly experiences,

and also to the “prophet” Jehoshaphat (known as Amar’e) Stoudemire, shlit”a.

Dear Jehoshaphat, please see the relevant section in my remarks as an initial contribution

to the Center for Judaism and Basketball you are about to establish (no need for a plaque on the wall).

In the previous column I presented two conceptions regarding the service of God:

• Spiritual solipsism – in which a person places himself at the center and sees his goal as maximizing his own merits. Others are extras on the court, which for him is an obstacle course (tests) against the Holy One, blessed be He (the judge), which he is supposed to finish with maximal success.
• Globalism – a person acts for the sake of others and the entire world, not only for himself. His goal is to improve the material and spiritual state of the world.

I explained that it is not necessarily correct to equate this distinction with egoism versus altruism. The solipsist is not necessarily an egoist. Even if there were no reward at all for his deeds, he understands that the mission imposed on him by God is to maximize his spiritual standing, and he acts devotedly to fulfill it.

In most cases, however, the difference between the two conceptions pertains mainly to intentions, since the actions look very similar. Each side strives to increase mitzvot as much as possible and to minimize transgressions, and the difference is only in the intention (whether this is done to increase my merits or to improve the world). Yet we also saw some practical ramifications, and I have now thought of additional illustrations (from the philosophy of sports).

Russell Westbrook as an Example

In a comment to the previous column I mentioned a clear example of this distinction. Think of a basketball player who racks up assists (passes to his teammates that lead them to score baskets and accumulate points), but does so in order to improve his standing on the assists leaderboard (cf. “Russell Westbrook”). Within this framework one can seemingly think of several practical differences between the conceptions. Let us consider several situations for this purpose.

For example, imagine that in the last second of the game, with his team down by one, Westbrook steals the ball and runs to the basket. Running with him is another player from his team who reaches the hoop in a slightly worse position for a shot than Westbrook himself, but Westbrook is one assist short of recording a triple-double in the game. A solipsist would, in such a case, pass the ball to his teammate so that he would score, and thereby he himself would reach ten assists. Here, however, this comes at the expense of the team’s chance to win (because the teammate is in a slightly worse position), and therefore this solipsism is also egoistic.

What would you say about a pass in a situation where both are in positions with the same chance to score? Here it is pure globalism. But even that is not precise, since the two situations are identical, and thus the question is one of altruism and not globalism. In terms of the benefit to the entire team there is no difference whether he passes or not. Moreover, as we have already seen, even if one invokes the reasoning of “who says your blood is redder,” your friend’s life is not worth more than your own. Therefore, if in terms of benefit to the entire team (the global consideration) it does not matter who scores, it is reasonable that in such a situation the person will shoot himself rather than pass.

And what shall we say about a case where Westbrook himself is in a slightly worse position, in which case passing to the teammate is called for, but the pass to the teammate is motivated by completing a triple-double and not by maximizing the chance to win? Here it is solipsism in intention that has no expression in the act (since a globalist would behave the same way).[1]

Now consider a situation in which the team is down one point and there are two options: either Westbrook scores two points or his teammate scores a three (and let us assume he is a perfect shooter). Passing to the teammate yields a greater team benefit, but the personal benefit says not to pass, of course. This is already closer to globalism than to altruism. In the opposite situation (where Westbrook himself is the perfect three-point shooter), the global consideration says to shoot himself, and of course in that case the move in question also maximizes the personal benefit.

You can see that it is quite difficult to distinguish between these two conceptions on the practical plane (at least when it comes to non-egoistic solipsism). Usually both lead to the same decision, and the difference lies only in intentions. For some reason, I am reminded here of the well-known story of two people fleeing from a lion. Reuven sees Shimon putting on running shoes and wonders: you will not manage to outrun the lion, with or without running shoes! Shimon answers him: to be saved, I don’t need to run faster than the lion — only faster than you…

Thus far I have described the two approaches, and in this column I will begin to examine halakhic ramifications of these two perspectives.

Slaughtering for a Sick Person on Shabbat

In Column 62 I briefly mentioned the discussion among the Rishonim and later authorities regarding slaughtering for a sick person on Shabbat. The Rosh, in the eighth chapter of Yoma, §14, writes:

They asked the Ra’avad, of blessed memory: a dangerously ill person who will not eat unless he eats meat. If there is before him a carcass (neveilah) and there is no slaughtered meat unless we slaughter on Shabbat. For some say: it is preferable that he himself transgress the prohibition of neveilah rather than others transgress the prohibition subject to stoning.

And he answered: the words of “some say” are reasonable, but one can say that the prohibition of Shabbat has already been set aside — by kindling, by cooking, and by heating hot water for him. Alternatively, it is impossible that there not be some minor somewhere in the world. But if the sick person needs to eat immediately and the carcass is available to him at once, while the slaughtered meat will be delayed for him, we certainly feed him the carcass and do not wait for slaughtering, skinning, and cooking.

And Rabbeinu Meir answered in a responsum and brought an analogy from “food preparation” on a Festival, where slaughtering on a Festival involves a positive commandment and a prohibition with respect to labor, and eating a carcass involves only a prohibition; or say to a non-Jew to tear open fowl, which is only rabbinically prohibited, since there is no Torah-level slaughter for fowl — rather, since the Torah permitted us food preparation on a Festival, for us every food preparation on a Festival is like on a weekday. So too here, since the Torah permitted saving life (pikuach nefesh), every melakhah one does on Shabbat for a dangerously ill person is as if done on a weekday. And wherever there are two prohibitions, we feed him the lighter one. The slaughtered meat — the food is permitted; but the carcass — the food itself is prohibited; and a lion crouches upon it. End quote.

And I heard [another reason]: we fear lest the sick person find the prohibited food repulsive and refrain, and place himself in danger.

And the Ran there (4b in Rif pagination) writes:

We have in the Gemara: “Our Rabbis taught: one who is seized by bulmos (dangerous hunger) — we feed him first the lighter prohibition.” Meaning that if two prohibitions are before us, one a mere “lav” (negative commandment), such as a carcass, and the other subject to karet, we feed him the “lav.” And so is the law for any sick person.

And the Ra’avad, of blessed memory, was asked thus: if there is a dangerously ill person who needs a chicken slaughtered for him, why not tell a non-Jew to tear it (otherwise) and feed him the carcass, which involves only a “lav,” and not slaughter and thereby set aside Shabbat, which carries the penalty of stoning?

And he answered: for this sick person, which prohibition stands and obstructs him? Certainly not the prohibition of a carcass, but the prohibition of Shabbat. Know this: for if it were not Shabbat, we would not seek a carcass for him, but slaughtered meat. Since that is the case, the prohibition that stands over him and obstructs him is one that has reverted to full permissibility, not another prohibition; therefore we do not permit for him the prohibition of a carcass. End quote.

But I am astonished: if so, if he found a fowl already torn open, let us feed it to him and not slaughter for him; for just as you say that the prohibition of Shabbat obstructs him from slaughtering, so the prohibition of a carcass obstructs him from eating this carcass — for if not for the prohibition of a carcass he would eat it. Why should the prohibition of Shabbat stand before him more than the prohibition of a carcass? Moreover, even if so, why not feed him the prohibition that is the least severe?

But it seems to me that with respect to a sick person, the prohibition of a carcass is not lighter than the prohibition of Shabbat. Granted a carcass is a “lav” and Shabbat is subject to stoning, yet there is another stringency in a carcass, for the one who eats it transgresses a “lav” for each olive-sized bite of it, as we say regarding a nazir who drank wine [Nazir 38b]: “They said to him: ‘Do not drink, do not drink,’ and if he drinks, he is liable for each and every [act].” But with respect to Shabbat, one transgresses only at the moment of slaughtering, and there is only one “lav” — for “the products of Shabbat are permitted,” since we hold [Bava Kamma 71a] “it is holy, but its products are not holy.” Therefore, the many “lavin” of a carcass are not called a lighter prohibition relative to the single “lav” of Shabbat, even though [Shabbat] is subject to stoning.

Most Rishonim rule that it is preferable to give him a carcass rather than to slaughter; yet none raises the obvious consideration that with a carcass the one who transgresses is the patient, whereas with slaughtering the one who transgresses is the slaughterer, who commits a transgression for the patient. Why should Reuven commit a (more severe) transgression so that Shimon will merit life? Why is it not preferable that Shimon himself transgress for his own sake? At the beginning of his words the Rosh seemingly brings this consideration, but it is presented together with the gap in severity between the prohibitions. It follows that if they are of the same level of severity, then it is obvious that the patient should transgress; but if there is a difference in severity, then it is not important who transgresses, but rather what has happened in the world overall. Bottom line, no one treats this argument as a decisive consideration.

It seems that, in halakhic terms, the question of who commits the transgression is not significant. From God’s perspective, the question is how many and which transgressions will be done, and it does not matter who does them. We are meant to look to the good of the entire world (from God’s perspective) and not to maximize our personal spiritual good.

One can think in the same category about the separation of conjoined twins in a symmetric case (see my article here). All the poskim prohibit performing a separation surgery because of the prohibition of murder. But as I explained there, in my view the consequentialist consideration is the important one: if we do not operate, both will die, whereas if we operate, one of them will be saved. From God’s perspective, the optimal outcome is to operate, because the world gains the life of one more person. Admittedly in such an operation the doctor performs an act of killing, rather than letting nature do so on its own, but the global consideration is the important one. Again, there is a tension here between the personal perspective (spiritual, not a base “interest”: the desire to avoid the prohibition of murder) and the perspective from God’s point of view.

Similarly there is tension regarding organ transplantation from a person who is brain-dead but not heart-dead. The weighing of life values is a consequentialist consideration in such a case, and the poskim assume it is forbidden. Yet in my opinion it is permitted and even obligatory.[2] In my article in Techumin 29 on organ donation, in chapters 2–3, I discussed global considerations in halakhah. A global consideration is nothing but a consideration from God’s point of view.

I will note that in Responsa Tashbetz III, end of §37, he brings at length the opinions of the Rishonim regarding slaughtering for a sick person, and there he does raise a solipsistic consideration that distinguishes between the patient’s transgression and that of another person. He also links this to the sugya of “sin so that your fellow may merit,” which we will address later.

Excessive Altruism

We have seen that from the globalist-altruist perspective I myself have no priority over others, and the calculation should be done from God’s point of view. But to the same extent, the other also has no priority over me, of course. The calculation is the same: from God’s point of view we are both equal, and therefore the maximal gain is decisive, even if it is my gain. For example, there is a rule that a person may not save himself with another’s life, and therefore there is a law of “be killed and do not transgress” regarding murder: who says your blood is redder?! What shall we say in a case of a person falling out of a window and about to kill another person standing below, and he will save himself by cushioning the blow? Must he divert himself to the side and die so as not to save himself at the cost of his fellow’s life? Tosafot, s.v. “Ein Ones,” Yevamot 53b–54a, say no, because the other’s blood is also not redder than mine:

And it speaks there of a murderer himself, for it is logical: what did you see that your blood is redder, etc.? And this applies only when they coerce him to kill with his own hands; but if they want to throw him upon the infant and he will be crushed thereby, on the contrary, one can say the reverse: what did you see that your fellow’s blood is redder, etc.? Since he is not killing with his hands and is considered merely passive, like the “ground of the world.” And there is no commandment to save one’s fellow with one’s body, for on the contrary, one’s own life takes precedence.

Again, this is not “me versus the other,” but God’s perspective versus personal perspectives. Moreover, I mentioned in the previous column that even from God’s point of view there is value in each person first taking care of himself (for that is how one best cares for the general state as well — concentric circles of identity. See Column 188 and Column 339 and the references in footnote 8 there). But that is when the spiritual cost of the two alternatives is roughly equal. When, however, on the general calculus it is preferable to care for one’s fellow, then there really is an obligation to care for him. Thus some poskim permitted giving up one’s life for the public, even though, as a matter of halakhah, one may not give up one’s life for the sake of a single individual (not only is there no obligation, but it is prohibited). And this is like what we saw in the Tosafot in Yevamot cited above. That is, even from a globalist view, it is not correct that there is no room at all to factor in my advantage over others. Globalism cannot be extreme, for global benefit itself requires a measure of solipsism. This somewhat dulls the edge of the entire discussion we are conducting here, of course — but such is life.

We will see this complexity as well in the law of “sin so that your fellow may merit,” to which we now turn.

The Dilemma: One Who Sticks Bread to the Oven

At the start of the previous column I mentioned that the motivation to conduct this inquiry was the sugya of one who sticks bread to the oven, which we learned in the first chapter of Tractate Shabbat (also discussed in Column 351, which dealt with declarative halakhot). In it there arises a discussion about whether “we tell a person: sin so that your fellow may merit.” We will now enter this sugya a bit and see some of the halakhic ramifications of these two conceptions, and the various complexities that blur the dichotomy between them.

Recall the case: a person stuck bread to the oven, and now there is a dilemma whether he may remove (r’diyat) it on Shabbat (which involves a rabbinic prohibition of removing bread on Shabbat) so that it will not bake and he would thereby avoid a severe prohibition of desecrating Shabbat on the Torah level (a sin-offering if unwitting, stoning if intentional). In the course of the Gemara, a distinction is drawn between sticking it unwittingly versus doing so intentionally. In each of these cases there is room to discuss a situation in which he himself removes the bread versus a situation in which others remove it.

The question the sugya addresses is whether “we tell a person to sin so that your fellow may merit” (obviously a light sin so that the fellow will avoid a severe one), or not. Seemingly there is here a comparison of spiritual benefits, and therefore in both cases one is called upon to make a cost-benefit calculation to determine what is preferable. On the face of it, however, it seems from the sugya that the calculation is solipsistic and not global, for from the global perspective (i.e., from God’s point of view) it is certainly preferable for the whole world that a light transgression be committed and a severe one avoided. In any case, as we have already seen, the alternatives are not opposed in such a stark way, and this benefit calculation is more complicated. The calculation can of course be made from a solipsistic perspective (the spiritual benefit to the person himself) or from a global perspective (the spiritual benefit to the whole world, from God’s point of view), or some combination of the two. We will now see the positions of the poskim in both situations.

Halakhic Ruling: When He Himself Removes It

In the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim §254:6, it is written:

And if he placed it [on the oven] on Shabbat, even intentionally, it is permitted for him to remove it before it bakes so that he not come to the liability of stoning.

We see that even when he did so unwittingly he is permitted to remove it, for he writes here “even intentionally.” We also see from his wording that the permission to remove it when the sticking was done intentionally is more difficult. This statement is not trivial, for there are two different parameters to examine here: the question of the outcome and the question of culpability. In terms of the outcome, when the sticking is intentional the result is liability to stoning,[3] whereas when unwitting it is only a sin-offering. On this plane it is easier to permit removal specifically for one who stuck it intentionally. On the other hand, there is the question of culpability. When he stuck the bread to the oven, he himself created the problem, and therefore it is less plausible to permit him to transgress in order to solve it: “Feed it to the wicked and let him die.” The Shulchan Aruch apparently assumes that the dimension of culpability is dominant, rather than the dimension of the outcome.

Indeed, the Mishnah Berurah there, subsec. 39, writes this explicitly:

“Even intentionally” — for one might have thought “feed it to the wicked and let him die”; therefore it teaches us that it is permitted. All the more so, if he stuck it unwittingly, it is permitted, so that he not come to liability for a sin-offering.

But the Magen Avraham there, subsec. 21, brings a dispute:

“Even intentionally.” But the Magid Mishneh in chap. 9 wrote that the unwitting case is the greater novelty, for since he remembered, therefore there is no liability for a sin-offering, for we require that both the beginning and end be unwitting; even so, it is permitted to remove it before he comes to liability for a sin-offering. See there, and there is no need for the Bach’s forced reading. In any case, if possible, he should do it with a change (Magid Mishneh, chap. 5).

The Magid Mishneh disputes the Mechaber, and in his view permission in the unwitting case is more difficult, because he looks at the outcome, and in the unwitting case the expected outcome is lighter and there is less reason to permit something in order to avoid it.[4]

Halakhic Ruling: When Others Remove It

Until now we dealt with permitting the person himself to remove the bread, and we saw a dispute about whether to look primarily at the outcome or at culpability (negligence). This dispute also pertains to permitting a person to remove it in order to save someone else who stuck the bread. In Shabbat 4a we see that if the sticking was unwitting, others are not permitted to remove it, for “we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow may merit.” And what about sticking it intentionally? The Gemara there says nothing on this matter. If the axis of culpability is decisive, then a fortiori we would not permit him to remove it in order to save one who stuck it intentionally. But if the axis of outcome is decisive, it is possible that for one who stuck it intentionally, others would be permitted to remove it (to save him from liability to stoning).

If I am correct, then according to the Shulchan Aruch, who assumes that culpability is the important axis, it emerges that with respect to others, removal was not permitted—neither in the unwitting case nor in the intentional case. It is no accident that he writes “it is permitted for him,” implying for him only, not for others. According to this, in practice others are indeed not permitted to remove it in either case. The Shulchan Aruch wrote only one of the four cases (he permitted him to remove it when he stuck it unwittingly, but he did not detail the ruling for him in the intentional case, nor for others in the unwitting and intentional cases), but one can infer from him all four: for him — permitted to remove it in both unwitting and intentional cases; for others — not permitted to remove it in either case.

The Magen Avraham, further on in that passage, writes:

And specifically he [is permitted], but others are forbidden to remove it (Ri”v), for one may not do a light transgression so that another not do a severe transgression, since the prohibition did not come about through him; moreover, his fellow was negligent in that he stuck it (Bach, Tosafot). In truth, the main issue depends on whether he was negligent; see Eruvin 32 in Tosafot and in §306.

We must understand that when he says his fellow was “negligent,” he does not mean “intentional.” In his view, even sticking it unwittingly is negligence (i.e., carelessness, since it requires a sin-offering, as opposed to coercion).[5] Therefore he rules here that there is no permission for others to remove it, whether the sticking was unwitting or intentional. This is indeed the conclusion that follows from the Shulchan Aruch, as we saw.

Note that this does not sit well with the Magid Mishneh cited above, since in his view the important axis is not the fellow’s negligence but the outcome. Therefore one cannot infer from the Gemara’s prohibition on removal in the unwitting case to the ruling regarding removal to save one who stuck it intentionally. But the words of the Magen Avraham here are brought in the name of the Bach, who was already noted above as not following the Magid Mishneh. If so, it would seem that the Magen Avraham rules not like the Magid Mishneh. Yet he does not hint that he intends to disagree with the Magid Mishneh here. Therefore one might explain that the Magen Avraham argues that indeed we can say like the Magid Mishneh that the main issue is the outcome when dealing with permission for the person himself. When a person himself is making his calculations, he should calculate consequentially — what will be the best outcome for himself. Here the solipsism converges with the globalism, for in both alternatives it is a sin the person himself commits. But when dealing with permission to sin in order to save another person, there the Magen Avraham claims that what matters is negligence (even according to the Magid Mishneh). Regarding others, the solipsistic calculation already differs from the global calculation, for globally (from God’s perspective) it is certainly preferable that only the light sin be done. But solipsism requires that I not worsen my own state even slightly in order to save another even from a severe transgression. If so, according to this explanation it seems that the conclusion arising from the Magen Avraham and the Magid Mishneh is solipsistic. But if we interpret the Magid Mishneh literally and see outcome as the only consideration (also with respect to others), then negligence is irrelevant and only the outcome matters. That is a global calculation.

The approach of the Magen Avraham is the prevalent one among the poskim (see Ba’er Heitev there, subsec. 10, and Mishnah Berurah subsec. 40, and others). Also in Tosafot s.v. “Ve-chi,” in Shabbat 4a, one sees a similar approach. Tosafot raises several difficulties against the Gemara’s assertion that we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow may merit, and he does not distinguish between sticking unwittingly (as in our sugya) and intentional sins (which other sugyot discuss). It seems that he too is addressing culpability rather than outcome. When the measure is culpability, then if in the unwitting case it is not permitted to remove, certainly in the intentional case it is not permitted. But if the measure is outcome, then the fact that in the unwitting case it was not permitted does not prove that in the intentional case (where the outcome is graver) it is also not permitted. We will return to Tosafot below.

And the Mishnah Berurah there, subsec. 40, after ruling that others are forbidden to remove it both in the unwitting and the intentional cases, writes:

And all this is with respect to baking; but regarding cooking, it is obvious that if one person forgot or transgressed and placed a pot near the fire, another must remove it as well so that his fellow not come to a prohibition, for in removing the pot there is no prohibition at all, and consequently there is a mitzvah to separate [him] from a prohibition.

Here it is clear that only the outcome matters, for the rescuer is not transgressing (there is a prohibition to remove bread from an oven, but not to take a dish off the fire), and therefore there is no reason to forbid him even if the rescued party was negligent (the novelty is that even when others are saving him we do not say “feed it to the wicked and let him die,” as the Mishnah Berurah brought in subsec. 39 in the name of the Bach regarding permitting him himself to remove it when he stuck it intentionally. Culpability does not play a role here).

Summary

The two axes we saw — culpability and outcome — differ in what they center: the global perspective (outcome) versus the solipsistic perspective (culpability: why should I sin if the other is at fault? We do not look at the world’s overall state). We saw two approaches: the Shulchan Aruch, Tosafot, the Mishnah Berurah, and the Magen Avraham hold that the main issue lies on the axis of culpability. The Magid Mishneh (literally understood) holds that the main issue is on the axis of outcome.

Clearly, however, even according to most poskim this is not purely a solipsistic perspective. For if the person did not transgress (as in slaughtering for a sick person on Shabbat), it is obvious that I must transgress in order to save him. That is certainly a global perspective. So too we saw regarding a case in which there is no transgression in my actions at all (the Mishnah Berurah on cooking versus baking). Yet these poskim qualify the global perspective and say that culpability has significance — that in situations in which the party being saved is culpable, I (the rescuer) am permitted to focus on my own state. The Magid Mishneh, by contrast, appears to be a pure globalist. Conversely, we saw that even the globalists mix in solipsistic considerations (i.e., they permit a person to prefer himself), for example in situations in which there is global equivalence between the alternatives.

In the next column we will see further expressions of this complexity.

[1] Of course, here the globalism is the good of the team and not of the whole world (otherwise he should throw the ball out of bounds instead of scoring, at least if the other team needs the victory more). One can argue, however, that the will to win contributes to the good of the whole world, for if every team seeks to win, the world of basketball will look good — competitive and interesting. If everyone gives way to the other, there is no point in playing the games (they would all end 0–0).

[2] In my aforementioned article in Techumin, at the end of chap. 3, I brought a dispute among the poskim regarding killing a treifah (a moribund person) in order to save a healthy person: the Noda BiYehuda (second ed., Yoreh De’ah §161) ruled that one may not kill a treifah to save a living person. But R. Yeshaya Pik (the questioner there), and the respondent rabbis in Responsa Tiferet Tzvi (Orach Chayim §14) and Or Gadol (§1) sided that it is permitted.

[3] There is a dispute among the Rishonim in that sugya as to whether, when a person refrains from removing because of a rabbinic prohibition, he would then be liable to stoning for the baking of the bread. I will not enter into that here.

[4] Following the Gemara, he notes that not only is there no liability to stoning in the unwitting case, there is not even liability to a sin-offering (for if he remembered that it is forbidden to stick it, and therefore is now deliberating whether to remove it, then at the time the bread bakes he is no longer unwitting, and in such a case there is no liability to a sin-offering). It is interesting that according to the Magid Mishneh the question of prohibition does not arise here at all. The permission to remove is not granted because of the prohibition but because of the suffering and trouble that will befall him: either an expense for a sin-offering or the penalty of stoning. If the problem were the prohibition, then the fact that he remembered after sticking would be irrelevant. That indeed exempts him from an offering, but the unwitting prohibition remains (and perhaps is even more serious).

[5] This is proven from the sugya itself, for it is explicitly ruled there that in the case of sticking unwittingly, others are forbidden to remove it; that is, in the terminology of the Magen Avraham, even such a case is defined as “negligence.”