Reflections Following the Film “Refused” (Column 349)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In recent years I have become acquainted with the phenomenon of get-refusal and the distress of women who find themselves in such a situation. Quite a few cases are sent to me asking that I find a solution (which of course is not legally recognized, since the Rabbinate has a coercive monopoly in this domain). In most of them I do not manage to find a solution, but in some I do. In part of those, I participated on a panel that annulled the kiddushin (in a manner not recognized by the law or by the Rabbinate, but halakhically valid), and in others I write expert opinions that are sent to the rabbinical courts handling the case (which usually dismiss them with scorn). Still, I think this extra-institutional activity bears fruit, since my impression in recent years is that the Rabbinate, despite its generally very conservative approach, has moved quite a bit in its attitude toward the phenomenon and in how it is handled. My sense is that constant pressure is yielding some results.
A few days ago I was sent the film “Refused,” which deals with the phenomenon of get-refusal and with the condition of the refused women (I am filmed near the end, sitting on a panel that annulled the kiddushin of a woman refused a get). I will take this opportunity to comment on the film and on the phenomenon more generally.
Halakhic background
Get-refusal arises against the halakhic backdrop that grants the husband the exclusive right to dissolve the union. The husband is the one who divorces his wife, but this is also true for kiddushin (the husband sanctifies the woman, not the other way around). What creates the asymmetry is that while kiddushin requires the woman’s consent, divorce does not. The husband can divorce her against her will. Yet this asymmetry too has largely been erased due to the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom, which forbids divorcing a woman against her will and also forbids taking an additional wife alongside one’s existing wife. Seemingly, there is now symmetry between husband and wife in divorce as well, at least on the practical level. Still, an asymmetry remains due to the halakhic difference regarding the prohibition of adultery. Halakhically, a husband who has relations with another (unmarried) woman does not transgress a particularly severe prohibition (plainly a rabbinic prohibition, and perhaps this involves neglecting a positive commandment of marriage; there are opinions that in certain circumstances even that does not apply), whereas a married woman who has relations with a man, married or not, violates a severe prohibition of arayot and is liable to capital punishment (as is her partner).
This halakhic difference creates a situation in which a husband who does not receive his wife’s consent to divorce can live with another woman without too heavy a halakhic price, while a woman who does not receive the husband’s consent remains a married woman in every respect. Any sexual relations she engages in under such circumstances are a prohibition of arayot, and children from such relations are mamzerim. Thus, even after the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom, the symmetry is not complete, and for this reason there exists a mechanism granting a husband permission from one hundred rabbis to marry an additional wife alongside his current one. A woman has no such possibility, since her prohibition is a Torah-level prohibition of arayot.
Formal symmetry in the modern world
Formally, one could quibble and argue that, at the end of the day, there is full symmetry between woman and man. The prohibition and punishment in halakha are always identical for the two partners to the transgression. Any sexual act that is forbidden to the woman is equally forbidden to her partner, and both are punished in the same way. Just as a married woman may not have relations with another man, so too it is forbidden for that man to have relations with her. For example, think of Leah who is married to Jacob. True, Jacob may have relations with Rachel, but to the same degree Rachel may have relations with Jacob. And likewise regarding Leah, who is forbidden to have relations with David, to the same degree David is forbidden to have relations with her. If so, there appears to be complete symmetry between man and woman.
But that is only a formal angle. The formal symmetry I described holds only when speaking of a specific pair (a specific man and a specific woman). If there is a problem preventing a particular couple from marrying, it exists equally for both. Yet when one looks at the general situation from the vantage point of an individual vis-à-vis the rest of the world—namely, one asks what options a given woman or man has—there the symmetry disappears. Practically speaking, a married woman has no solution for forming another relationship (if she wishes to dissolve the union), whereas a married man does (even if, due to the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom, the original union has not been dissolved).
In a certain sense, this picture cuts between the modern world and the traditional world. The modern world advocates marriages of love after acquaintance; accordingly, the restrictions address both partners. A particular man and woman fell in love and wish to marry. Regarding this question, the situation is indeed entirely symmetrical: if it is permitted, it is permitted to both, and if prohibited, it is prohibited to both. But in a traditional world, the match is generally not made on the basis of prior acquaintance but through search and suitability, with the acquaintance and emotional bond forming afterward. There, the question is what options stand before the woman or the man vis-à-vis the world—whom he or she may get to know and with whom each can try to build a home. With respect to this question, there is a clear asymmetry between men and women: a married woman has no options at all, whereas a married man can try his luck among all unmarried women.
The film “Refused”
The film depicts the problem of get-refusal and the constraints it imposes on women. It follows several women who have been for years in a state of refusal, within which the husband also tries to extort them and to extract various concessions (regarding property or children). One of the women is a convert who came to Judaism and found there an inequality she had not been aware of. She found herself practically an agunah because her husband refuses to give her a get, and she realizes that for the rest of her life she is not going to enter such a system. The film presents a very typical negotiation between the spouses via a rabbi who has influence over the husband, in which various incentives are offered to persuade him to release his wife.
In one of the cases I myself handled, the Rabbinate courted the husband and offered him a monetary bribe to release his wife. Note well: a state institution in Israel offered a monetary bribe to a person so that he would comply with the law (the court ruled that he must divorce his wife). In the end, after we had already annulled the kiddushin, the bribe achieved its purpose. The husband relented, and the Rabbinate presented this as an achievement worthy of pride and as an expression of its great dedication to solving the problem of women refused a get (which did not really manifest in the proceedings, to put it mildly). This reflects the impotence of the state institutions in confronting the power and unequal status that halakha grants the husband.
Despite the natural empathy I feel for women in such circumstances and the activity I try to engage in to advance their cause, while watching I found myself reflecting on get-refusal and the discourse around it, and I will now present those reflections.
The film’s bias
It is hard to face situations in which one sees a woman suffering for years and crying out of helplessness—especially when there is, in the background, a genuine halakhic injustice. Still, the picture presented in the film is one-sided and, in my opinion, also misleading. From my experience, in almost every such case (indeed, in almost every human situation) there are two sides to the coin. Naturally, the film presents only the woman’s side, but the husband is also a human being and he too has a point of view.
For example, in one case in which I was involved, after we annulled the kiddushin, I happened—by chance—to learn that the couple’s story had been going on for many years and had made its way through three court instances. The husband accused his wife of kidnapping their daughter (she traveled with her to Israel and refused to return her abroad), and the magistrate’s court and then the district court ruled that there had indeed been a kidnapping. The Supreme Court reversed the decision—though it too agreed that there had been a kidnapping—yet ruled that, due to the child’s welfare, she should not be returned to the husband abroad.[1] Once I heard this, I thought to myself that get-refusal likely served the husband as a bargaining chip in his dispute with his wife over returning the child. Suddenly, this looked rather legitimate (even if not legal), and I concluded that, had I known this from the start, I would not have intervened in that case. I stress that the annulment of kiddushin in that case is entirely valid, and I fully stand behind the ruling. But the motivation to intervene and conduct a parallel extra-institutional procedure does not exist when, on the human-moral plane, we are not speaking of saving the oppressed from his oppressor.
This case illustrates the fact that, in such a dispute, there are usually two sides, and one must hear both in order to form a view. Each side has reasons for its conduct, and even if that conduct is improper and subject to criticism, the full picture is almost always different from what it appears at first glance. From watching the film, I had the impression that even in the cases presented there it is quite plausible that there was another side we were not shown (and at times this is even hinted at in the film itself). Thus, for example, in the case of the Belgian convert, I gathered that a similar situation existed. There too the mother took the child, and the husband is apparently trying to use whatever tools he has to force her to allow meetings. If so, the film is decidedly slanted toward the women, and naturally the other side is not presented. But to the best of my understanding and knowledge, in most cases there is indeed another side.
This is a lesson for social debates in general, and especially for matters of religion and state. By their nature, such debates are laden with emotional baggage; they involve people who suffer and are embittered, and it is very easy to present images of misery and misfortune in order to sway public opinion. Moreover, a film focuses on particular characters, and it is very difficult within that medium to present a general and balanced picture that covers all sides and situations (see, for example, Column 335 on the film “The Social Dilemma”). On the other hand, film is a powerful medium, since it places the viewer in the shoes of the sufferer and inside the situation, creating identification with the characters. A personal encounter is a powerful medium for generating identification (cf. the common critique of films like “The Godfather,” which create identification with very cruel and negative characters). Thus, for example, films that depict suffering Palestinians—or, alternatively, cruel and murderous ones—convince people to support this or that political agenda. But again, this is an unbalanced picture of particular cases that does not take account of the full range of factors, and this is true even where the director is not trying to manipulate and is being honest in presenting the picture. The problem arises from the very medium. Therefore one must be very cautious about forming an opinion on the basis of such films—even though it is certainly important to watch them and to take into account what they present.
Inequality and the problems it creates
What I have written here is not a defense brief for the equality of halakha or of rabbinical court procedures. Halakha contains a problem of inequality and of granting excessive power to the husband over his wife. Even without judging this and discussing whether there is room to change it (Rabbeinu Gershom apparently tried to introduce some change in an egalitarian direction), it is still clear that this is what generates most of the phenomena I have described. If there were halakhic symmetry between the parties, there would generally be no need for the parties to deploy levers of power, and the phenomena I have described would not appear—or certainly not with such intensity. Because of this fundamental problem, and because the parties and the courts try to grapple with it, additional pathologies arise; attempted solutions and workarounds create yet more problems; and the halakhic-social snowball rolls downhill, generating ever more suffering and difficulties along the way.
By the way, as part of this phenomenon, it is important to understand that not a few of the problems that arise around marriage in Israeli society at large (common-law unions, living without marriage, and the like) are a result of imposing halakha on the public sphere (which ostensibly is intended to prevent them). When one cannot divorce conveniently, freely, and equally, people are deterred from marrying. Some marry “according to the law of Moses and Israel” and do not register, which of course can create problems of mamzerut, consanguineous marriages, and more. Those who have already married sometimes do not divorce but live with partners alongside their regular relationship (polyamory, anyone?). Thus, at least de facto, polygamy is created under the protection of law, and a troubling anarchy in the realm of personal status. This is bound up with halakhic and legal problems that are not simple, and all this is the result of the desire of the Rabbinate and the religious public to promote family life and to protect the institution of marriage in Israel.[2] Problems that arise on the halakhic plane swell on the social-public plane and create serious social and personal difficulties. The attempts to circumvent them in turn generate further problems. The assault comes each time from a different direction, and in the process the matter of personal status—and certainly the attempt to give it a halakhic character—dissolves. This is of course part of a broader phenomenon of the disintegration of traditional family units, but I suspect that here in Israel the policy that imposes halakha on the public contributes not insignificantly to these processes.
Another example is the impact of the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom came to improve the situation to some degree, but now women too can refuse to consent to a get. Thus we reach a situation in which, according to Rabbinate data, the number of men refused a get exceeds the number of women refused a get. This is an example of the same phenomenon of adding epicycles and deferents in an attempt to solve the problem within the existing paradigm, but causing the emergence of other problems from different—and sometimes unexpected—directions. The free market and individual initiative will always confound attempts at centralist social engineering.[3]
As I explained above, even when kidnapping a child is used as a weapon to force a get, sometimes the situation created is the opposite: the kidnapping generates the refusal, or at least encourages it. This holds even if the woman’s initial motivation was to obtain a get; still, with such an impulsive act she shoots herself in the foot and creates the ongoing problem. This is naturally accompanied by constant propaganda against the husband such that the child himself no longer wishes to live with him, and thus the rabbinical court or civil court will rule (the child’s welfare). In short, this is a snowball effect with many problems generated both by the halakhic complications and by the attempts to solve or circumvent them. Usually when we think up a method of social engineering—that is, to manage life in the way that seems most sensible to us—life kicks back from unexpected directions. Life is far more complicated than we think and than this film depicts.
People who are not committed to halakha
As I explained, a man deemed married has more halakhic options, because relations with another woman are not as severe a prohibition as they are for a married woman who has relations with another man. But in a large share of cases, we are dealing with people who are not very troubled by halakha (and those who have been through all this will in any case usually not enter a halakhic marriage again). The film itself presents a case of a woman refused a get who came to our court while pregnant by another partner.[4] That woman did not allow the halakhic constraints to affect her. And yet it is clear that such men and women also wish to marry formally—and at times even halakhically—and this is not possible for them.[5]
Religious coercion is usually practiced “for the benefit” of the secular (to help them preserve their Jewish identity and to save them the troubles of intermarriage, and so forth). At least this is what its proponents declare, and I personally believe them. But the costs are such that, in the end, the goal is not achieved, and in many cases the situation even worsens. Moreover, as a result the secular are very angry about the coercion and about the religious, and they see it as a power mechanism aimed at self-interest—amassing power, money, and positions for the religious—and above all, creating a religious character for the state. The desire to help them and to know better than they do what they themselves want is, in my view, absurd. There is no logic in paying such a price in order to “help” adults who do not want that help and then to absorb from them the ricochets and accusations for having done so.
In any case, again and again one can observe that the combination of halakhic coercion with a public that is not committed to halakha—whom one tries to force to behave according to it—is a sure recipe for trouble.
Suggestions
We cannot avoid saying something about alternatives. I will briefly point to several planes on which the situation can be improved, moving here from the weighty to the lighter.
First, there is the option of separating religion and state. The state would allow anyone to marry according to his or her understanding and in whatever forms they choose. Proper registration would be required, of course, to provide relevant information to all who need it. Note that today, when this is not allowed, there is no orderly registration and anarchy reigns. People take the law into their own hands, marry privately, and do not register. Thus a situation is created in which there is no proper legal tracking of the personal status of many Israeli citizens.
Second, other alternatives can be offered alongside the halakhic one. People who do not wish to manage their personal-status matters via the Rabbinate will do so via the civil courts or municipalities, as is customary worldwide. In this way we will not have to manage the lives of people who do not desire it. In the most conservative and moderate formulation, this is essentially Rabbi Dichovsky’s proposal to conduct “Noahide marriages” in Israel even for Jews. Dismantling monopolies generally benefits the system, and this is also true in the religious sphere (kashrut, marriage, burial, and so forth). But dismantling such a monopoly does not mean the absence of regulation. The regulator would merely ensure that each such track is conducted transparently (in line with its stated policy), so that consumers know what they are getting. And, of course, proper personal-status registration is needed for the public good, and that too is the regulator’s role.
Third, the rabbinical courts must display greater halakhic flexibility. There is no reason always to capitulate to the more conservative directions and to fear their own shadow. Very few times in human history have rabbinical courts been given authority and power to act under the law and with its backing, and this should be leveraged toward positive directions (today it is leveraged mainly toward negative ones). There are circumstances in which the kiddushin can be annulled without any concern, but the courts are very reluctant to do so. Again, beyond political fear (of conservative circles), there is concern about harming the stability of the couple’s bond and the institution of marriage. But they fail to notice that their policy harms, at least as much and usually more, the marital bond and the institution of marriage. Beyond this, as a general matter, policy considerations should come at stage B, after discussing the matter on its merits. First and foremost, they should acknowledge that, on the merits, kiddushin can be annulled in certain circumstances (which, to my understanding, are quite broad).[6] Within this framework, state mechanisms should be enabled to assist such proceedings, such as Prof. Berachyahu Lifshitz’s proposal (full disclosure: a friend) for the state to confiscate the money of kiddushin, or Rabbi Shilat’s proposal to physically flog get-refusers until they say “I am willing,” as well as conditions and pre-nuptial contracts, and more.
Concluding note: On the nature of the marriage contract
Marriage is, essentially, a kind of contract. I have already written here in the past that I am dismayed to see how crudely this contract is trampled. Infidelity by spouses is received in broad circles with disturbing leniency, ignoring the contractual and moral dimension of the matter. But at times this is a reaction to the fact that the establishment and the law try to force the contract’s continued existence even where there is no place for it.
On the other hand, it is a very binding contract; therefore it is important to institute efficient, clear, and as equal as possible ways to dissolve it. The policy of the Sages and the halakhic tradition that adopts an approach of trying to make dissolution difficult has no place in our day. It is fitting to ensure that a home is not dissolved on a mere whim, but once a decision has been made there is no justification for the path of suffering that the spouses must traverse and inflict upon one another. That path can be halakhic or otherwise, in accordance with the suggestions in the previous section—but in a modern world, such a path must exist.
One cannot run a state in the twenty-first century according to traditions and rules that were set and tailored for Jews in Babylonia or in the Land of Israel in the first centuries of the Common Era, in medieval Provence or North Africa, or in the Ottoman Empire of the early modern period. It is utterly unreasonable to determine the wishes of women in twenty-first-century Israel (טב למיתב טן דו) according to precedents and insights from those times and places. And certainly one cannot expect there not to arise public anger when such a frozen policy is imposed on a public that is not at all committed to the entire halakhic system (even were it updated and contemporary). That anger is what generates a host of outrageous phenomena and engenders problems from different and unexpected directions, and of course gives rise to an angry and unbalanced discourse—some of which could be seen in the film mentioned above.
[1] I have used this ruling more than once in the past to present the logical paradox known as the “paradox of adjudication.” See, for example, Column 257.
[2] As our sages have already said (ibid., ibid.): The institution of marriage is a wonderful institution—but who among us wishes to live in an institution?!
[3] On this, Milton Friedman already said that what saves the State of Israel is two thousand years of exile. Despite all the government’s attempts to ruin the state, individual initiative and the diasporic mentality that leads us to evade and ignore the law prevent those attempts from succeeding.
[4] By mistake—or simply to heighten the drama—the situation is presented there as if there is urgency to annul the kiddushin in order to save the child from mamzerut, which is of course a misunderstanding. Annulment of the kiddushin, to the extent it is done, operates retroactively, and the child is not a mamzer even if this happens after he is born.
[5] It is true that on this plane there is symmetry between man and woman: he too cannot remarry without first separating from his first wife.
Yes, indeed. In my opinion, the best way over time is to put aside the sacredness of the covenant (similar to a marriage) and actively choose what can be called a “covenant marriage” in which there is no ownership dimension whatsoever, but rather an agreement between two equal parties. This is the model of Noahide marriage as described by the Maimonides. In my opinion, this is a Jewish marriage (as Rabbi Daychovsky wrote, “And are not the children of Israel the sons of Noah?”). In this type of relationship, there is no prohibition against “coming to the free woman” and there is certainly no “prostitution” involved, because these are exclusive relationships. And as the Maimonides wrote: “The matter does not depend on him alone.” But at any time he or she may interpret this from this as a divorce (Hilchot Malachim, 9:8) and as the Rogzover explains. It is important to note that Rabbi Daychovsky ruled this only in retrospect that there is no need for a divorce from a civil marriage and not from the outset. But the explanation is also correct from the outset.
I tend to agree, although I find Rabbi Daychowski's (and also Rogzover's) suggestion inaccurate. There is no need for a get because it is a marriage without a child, as Maimonides describes in the book of Hebrews (this is probably what you meant by your words). I have expanded in several places on marriage as a two-tier model (universal - marriage, and on a particular basis - child marriage), and on the nefm in this. The get permits child marriage and marriage is a natural state of living together in a marital unit, "entering the house" of Maimonides there, and which is broken by ceasing to live together. "taking out of his house" in his language there.
Although this proposal still assumes halakhic control in the field of child marriage, and therefore seeks halakhic recognition or some kind of halakhic status for such a relationship, I tend to think that it is more appropriate to open up the market and not demand halakhic recognition as a condition for personal status in the legal realm.
You wrote –
Marriage is essentially a kind of contract. I have already written here in the past that it is out of place for me to see how this contract is trampled underfoot. Infidelity of spouses is accepted in wide circles with disturbing tolerance, while ignoring the contractual and moral dimension of the matter.
Well why?
For a non-religious person, who said that it is immoral, and even if there is a contract, it is not certain that there is one here
It is immoral because you are acting against a person to whom you promised not to do so. And there is definitely a contract here, even without regard to the law.
I don't think there is any agreement or understanding about the terms of the contract, so it probably has no binding force.
The ketubah is in Aramaic, so most Israelis don't understand what it says and think it's just an esoteric ceremony.
Even among the population that understands Aramaic, the ketubah is not taken seriously as a binding document (they sign – ‘and balance and أفرنس والکلکل’ and then send the woman to work)
If we want a ketubah as a binding document, we will have to write it in a simple way with clear rules and sanctions in the body of the text and not assume that everyone agrees on the meaning of the contract (what exactly does ‘and you will love’ mean?)
I guess I would like to see a ‘thin’ ketubah that defines the minimum set of duties and rights.
No cheating, no physical or verbal violence plus a clear financial agreement.
It might be worth adding an appendix regarding children - how many do you want and who will take care of them (I don't know how to make this binding)
There should be a clause that allows the contract to be terminated with reasonable notice (including a mediation mechanism) without sanctions for the breach (assuming the thin contract was not breached)
The ketubah is not the marriage contract. Everyone understands what marriage means, and conversely, the details in the ketubah are usually something theoretical that in many cases is not implemented.
Does everyone understand what marriage means?
I have yet to meet a non-trivial concept that everyone understands/agrees on its meaning.
I would be happy if the rabbi could summarize what marriage means and let the audience judge …
I suggest another fun game: try in good faith to offer a summary of what marriage means to the reasonable person, and then volunteer someone to make you happy by summarizing the difference between their summary and yours.
Gabriel, I would be happy to try and answer. But before that, please, if you could break our ears what the following expressions mean:
“concept”, “trivial”, “understand”, “summarize”, “judge”, and ”the audience”. After you define the meaning of these expressions for me, I can try and answer you.
Yes, yes.
The one-sidedness is also in the fact that there are many men who refuse a divorce on the part of the woman, since the law in the State of Israel does not permit the forcible divorce of a woman.
Unfortunately, I had to endure long months of litigation and a difficult situation, for us and the children, of being “separated”‘ until my ex-wife kindly agreed to divorce me for a considerable sum.
At the time, we founded the organization “Zchut Avot” which deals with discrimination against divorced fathers. During a visit we made to Rabbi Eli Ben Dahan, who was then the head of the rabbinical courts, he told us that statistics show that there are many more divorce cases opened by men that have not yet been closed due to the woman's refusal to accept a divorce, than cases opened by women = the opposite situation, described in the film.
There was once a case of a divorce decree in the Safed court. The subject is very interesting to me, and perhaps to other people. I would be happy if the rabbi wrote a column of thanks about it.
Indeed, this is a very interesting ruling. The first half of it is probably based on a ruling that I wrote (where they talk about canceling Kiddushin as a branch). Maybe I'll write about it sometime if I get the chance. I have to say that I really didn't agree with that ruling.
1. I am very puzzled by you. Very conservative rabbis allow many agunah. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef allowed many agunah, as did Rabbi Goren and the Garzan. In general, all of Halacha is full of allowing agunah.
2. Why can't society conduct itself according to the rules of the Gemara? I emphasize that this is not about the conduct of the state, where there is not so much Halacha from the days of the Gemara.
3. Can you explain the reason for canceling a kiddushin retroactively because the woman did not want to be agunah? Is it possible to cancel all cases of agunah in the world in this way?
1. The halacha is “full” in allowing agunot when it is not known whether the husband is alive, not when he refuses to grant a get.
1. Pok Hezi. And also see Beit Halachmi's response here.
2. Pok Hezi how the courts practice.
3. See the ruling I referred to. The Gemara itself (Bek Ki) speaks of the retroactive cancellation of kiddushin.
I have already written in the past that the perspective of the halakha is almost the opposite of the intention of the Torah.
From the Torah's perspective, the essence of the get is to protect the woman from being abused by her husband. And the halakha creates the opposite situation.
And if she finds no favor in his eyes because he finds in her a matter of shame, and he writes her a book of divorce and gives it to her and sends her out of his house
The issue of granting a get is obligatory in the event that she does not please him. And if he does not give a divorce, then he is violating what is written a few verses later:
For if a man is found stealing a soul from his brother among the children of Israel, and he and his friend are put to death, and that thief is put to death, and you shall cut off the evil one from your kin.
The man who does not give a wife a divorce is very similar to one who steals a soul and is liable to death. When death is liable, legal matters and contracts are void.
The halakha ignores this important matter that lies at the basis of the get.
What a strange conclusion.
1. Who said he was going over what was written a few verses later?
2. According to the written Torah, the man is the only one who can give a divorce.
3. According to the written Torah, a divorce is granted based on the woman's will. How exactly does this protect the woman?
1. Who said? The Torah. Holding someone by force is very similar to stealing a soul. Is the explanation unclear or what exactly is unclear there? Or is there an agenda here that ignores the reader's understanding.
2. I said that according to the Torah, a man must give a divorce. It is not up to him to choose. Finding favor because he found something shameful in her is not a matter of choice and decision, but rather a description of a situation in which he must give a divorce.
3. The moment you hold someone you hate (because they deceived you or betrayed you) then you are abusing them. And the Torah opposes this.
The criminal mind of a certain type of man is incapable of understanding the words of the Torah as simply as they must be allowed to be abusing them.
1. This is your own inference. “holding someone by force is very similar to stealing a soul” This is your own thought. Just for the record, I hope you understand the big difference between kidnapping a human being and not divorcing a woman.
2. If the man must give a divorce, it means he is the only one who can break the relationship. What is the difference between this and the Halacha?
3. According to the Torah, there is a problem with being married to someone who has sexual immorality. What exactly is the connection to what you are saying?
1. There is a certain type of men who want the opportunity to abuse a woman, so in their imagination the difference is great, while the difference is almost nonexistent. In both cases, it is an action that violates the freedom of the other party and is forced upon him against his will.
2. According to the Torah, the man cannot. He must. A man does not have this freedom that abusive men want him to have.
3. The Torah does not say that it is problematic that she has any shame. The Torah says that if for this reason you discovered she suddenly does not like you, you should divorce her. (And not start abusing her for hiding things from you.)
1. Don't you understand that you are speaking your mind and that is not simple?
2. And if he doesn't listen?
3. The fact that in modern Hebrew “ki” means “because” does not mean that this is the interpretation of the Torah. As is known, in the Torah it has four interpretations and I assume you know this. Even if you say that the interpretation of the word “ki” is “because” it does not fit your view. According to what you say, the Torah should have stopped after the sentence “and if it did not please him” because according to what you say, anyone who hates his wife is obligated to divorce her and what does it matter whether there is any shame in her or not?
Show me where the halacha says that it is permissible to abuse a woman.
4. In your opinion, do divorces happen against the man's will? So for what case was it written, "And she was given a book of divorces?" After all, it is completely unnecessary if divorces happen even without the man doing anything.
1. I always say what I think, just as everyone always says what they think. It can't be otherwise. And so I explained that there is a certain type of men with a certain mindset that allows them to abuse a woman and treat her like a slave girl, and they, in turn, will understand that this is a misinterpretation of the Torah in the distorted form of their mindset.
2. If he doesn't listen, he is violating a Torah prohibition. And if it gets to the point where he is willing to free her for money, then it becomes exactly the same as the law of a thief and a seller who is liable to death. And the law ignores this.
3. Because he found her nakedness, a big deal in explaining how it is possible that she suddenly doesn't like him. It is true that this point is subject to interpretations as to whether this is a mandatory condition or just an example.
4. The book of circumcisions is in the social order to prevent a situation of prostitution and for the woman that when she goes to another man she will be able to prove to him that she is not the wife of any man but is free.
1. Do you really not see the difference between kidnapping a person and preventing him from getting married or something else? Even if both are shocking, that doesn't mean they are the same thing.
2. As you say.
3 According to what you say, the Torah should have stopped after the sentence "And if she did not please him" because according to what you say, anyone who hates his wife is obligated to divorce her and what does it matter if there is any shame in her or not? You didn't answer that.
4. If the divorce is against his will, the court can write the bill. There is no reason in the world that the man would have to give the get.
1. You raised another important point that abusers are sinning against. The situation where someone is neither at home nor has a get is a forbidden situation according to the Torah. And sending her away from his house, a woman who is sent away from her house must have a get. The opposite situation is forbidden. But the abusers lack the intelligence to understand this.
The problem is not actually the kidnapping, but rather the combination of kidnapping and abuse with an emphasis on the abuse. Unlike the case where you kidnapped someone and made them happy in person. The whole point of refusing a get is one: abuse. And the Torah says that social contracts like marriage do not justify the violation of basic rights like freedom. And the halakha does not accept that.
3. As I said, the matter of sexual immorality is not completely clear, but there is an addition to it for not finding favor. It is not just a situation of conflict, but something that causes a disconnection that cannot be bridged, which then requires a get, and this is an individual matter for each person. It could be something different.
4. In the Torah, there is no court that tells a person what to do, and there are no rabbis who marry and divorce, and all that bureaucratic mess that comes with it. There is a social order that every person must participate in. And whoever does not is a sinner.
Are you a Karaite? (It doesn't matter at all to the discussion, but maybe it explains why you're talking nonsense)
1.A. Your move: It says that when a divorce is given, one must send one away from home, which means that one must not send one away from home without a divorce. You decided that on your own. B. The problem with kidnapping is the kidnapping itself. If you kidnapped and then released him, then you are no longer kidnapping him. C. No one justifies the husbands who refuse to give a divorce.
3. What a strange way God chose to write His method according to your opinion. Why would there be a commandment that is written in a fixed form and is actually individual? According to what you say, it should have been written that they are in a very deep conflict (something style and he hates her).
4. Because he will be surprised by you, etc. See there.
I am the final arbiter. I am neither a reader nor an amora.
1. According to the Torah, it is forbidden to send a woman away without a get.
Beyond the obvious cases that everyone would agree are kidnappings, there are intermediate cases that raise questions, and therefore it is not a well-defined concept. For example, if a rabbi succeeds in getting others to follow him, there is a type of kidnapping that was done psychologically. He has taken over their desire and they have no control or choice over it.
Therefore, I say (and you do not understand) that what is important to determine whether a certain action is bad or good is not the actual ”kidnapping” but what is the interest behind the action and whether it is beneficial or harmful to the person. But you cannot understand that. So skip.
3. You are caught on an issue that I said is problematic and subject to interpretation. But the exaggerated compromise that you advocate is certainly not one of them.
For people like you, the Torah had to write an explicit verse:
If a man is found stealing a soul from his brother among the children of Israel and he is robbed, and his friend, and that thief dies, and you cut off the evil one from your kin.
But that still doesn't help because you interpret things in a distorted way that allows kidnapping and robbery.
4. Because it will be surprising that you are the one who chooses to go for advice. And you arose and went up. And not that they rise and go down to your life of their own accord to justify their wages.
After the separation of religion and state, will the concept of marriage have any legal meaning at all?
Marriage has been a religious concept for the past thousands of years (true, this is only because religion and morality were identified with each other) – based on the prohibition of adultery.
A number of laws can abolish the concept of marriage altogether, and that's it. It is a religious/moral matter between a person and himself, and it is considered a personal contract, in parallel with which a legal contract will be signed, if anyone is interested in it. There will be no difference between students who rent an apartment together and a family with a flourishing relationship and ten children.
Between this extreme and the current situation, the line can be drawn in all sorts of places – recognizing same-sex marriage but not polygamy, and so on. But these decisions will be arbitrary.
The imagined "problem" can be easily solved by recognizing that it is an imagined set of rules.
Words that kill life
Obviously. Why does every legal system in the world have a personal status section (marriage and divorce)? This has legal implications: Who inherits who. Who makes decisions. Who gets rights from their spouse, etc.
You can of course not set defaults and tell people that they have to determine everything themselves. But I don't think that's effective, and many won't do it.
Why does every legal system in the world have a personal status section (marriage and divorce)?
Perhaps because the notion that almost any form of cohabitation is legitimate is quite new (cohabitation between a man and a woman without marriage has been accepted mainly in recent decades, homosexuality a little later, and polyamory is currently struggling for legitimacy)
Absolutely not. As I explained, even if everything is acceptable, it is necessary to regulate personal status by law in order to prevent anarchy in various aspects of the family unit.
I have a somewhat ignorant question in practical halakhic law:
Is the permit based on the law of the rabbinic rabbinate, and therefore requires a court, or is it based on a mistake? And so why is a court needed to decide that it is a mistake? Why can't a single judge see (especially in extreme cases) that there is an unreasonable and logical case here, and in essence, automatically? And does the cancellation of the kiddushin zev have some specific legal application that requires more than the judge's understanding that there is a case of a mistake here?
This ignorance characterizes quite a few rabbis and rabbis who really get confused between these concepts. You are in good company.
We are talking about something like a mistake, but here it is a cancellation due to a future event and not current information, which is why we called it an estimate. If you are interested, you can read the ruling.
Your comment about the need for a court is very correct. In principle, this is a halachic ruling and not a judicial decision, especially since we did this for a woman without the husband being present. But in marital matters (a matter of private life) it is customary to make decisions in a court of law.
In the same way, someone who sold an apartment and discovered that a few months later its price had gone up – will not only demand that the sale be canceled because ‘estimated’ that if he had known that the price would go up he would not have sold, but will also appoint his representatives to be a court’ that will unilaterally cancel the agreement he signed. As it is written: ‘He is the party to the dispute, he is the witness, he is the judge’ 🙂
In amazement, Chayim Balau
Shchel, when the opportunity arises, I will pass on your questions and concerns to Rabbi Ashi and Rabina. I am sure they will be happy to answer you.
What kind of estimate is this that if she knew that he would run away immediately after the wedding, she would not be consecrated? What is the difference between this and if she knew that after 10 years he would beat her, she would not be consecrated? Or that he would not remember her birthdays in 20 years? In my opinion, this estimate is a bit difficult. The estimate there in the question is also about some kind of defect or reality in their hearts (or in the husband) - regardless of the mistake - being smitten with boils or a convert. This is a reality that already exists and there is concern. Here it is a behavioral matter. No one knew and could not have known (except God Almighty) this, and according to the rabbi, this reality of running away did not exist at the time of the consecration. This situation is also not similar to someone who converts his religion after a week of marriage by surprise. This is a matter of quarrel. There are people (in the US) who also divorced after a month or a week because of quarrels. Could it also be said about them that there is a reasonable estimate and that the sanctification is nullified?
I answered these things in detail in the judgment. Simply put, the Gemara in the Book of Numbers does not refer to information that existed at the time of the transaction, but rather to future information (the brother-in-law became a convert after the wedding). And with regard to the seller of his property knowingly to a foreigner, even the event that annulled the transaction occurred after it.
When he ran away the day after the wedding, there is no ten du here, and therefore even for the assumption of the Gemara in the Book of Numbers that it is permissible for a woman to marry anyone and receive ten du at any price, here she did not receive her ten du it is impossible to say that it was permissible for her. And simply.
In a place where she received a period of cohabitation and things happened later, it is truly more complicated, although even in these situations it can be said that the kiddushin are void because she was not willing to accept the ten du. But this requires an expansion compared to the cases in the Gemara (such expansions have already been made in the poskim).
Also according to you, if at the moment of the wedding he planned to run away, then it's like being struck by a boil.
I meant to respond to Emmanuel before I saw the previous response, and you can delete my unnecessary responses here.
It's not unnecessary. You're right. But I don't think it's necessary, because even if you don't plan it in advance, you can still cancel the kiddushin. In the meantime, I included that too.
One must also ask the question of the one who has removed his care from his people. Can't the bride, the Knesset of Israel, claim that she knew at the time of the Sinai covenant that the groom would decide to stop caring for his bride and leave her exposed to the vagaries of nature? Did the bride know that she had undertaken to keep the thirteen commandments? Isn't there a great Torah-like understanding here?
With blessings, Y Ben-Shephan
And perhaps this is the interpretation of ‘the generation received it in the days of Ahasuerus’, in which the Blessed One showed that even in situations of ‘hiding face’ the Blessed One continues to ‘operate behind the scenes’ in order to save, help and protect ‘His Bride’ and He will not abandon her forever.
With greetings, Yaron Dov Spiegel-Yishef’
She could, but she didn't claim, hence the great knowledge of the great knowledge.
On the 21st of Kislev, 5781
To Ashtamudana, – Greetings,
The claim that ’God has abandoned the land’ has been leveled at the people of Israel not once but twice, starting with the Gentiles who said in the biblical period ‘Where is your God’, and continuing in the Middle Ages when the Gentiles presented the statue of the ‘Church triumphant‘ in front of the humiliated ‘Synagogue’, and said to the Jews ‘Man and Manan Rahimech Shapira in Rivata, Arum Beginya Sepif Mador Arivata?’
Historical experience shows that what sustained the people of Israel throughout all generations was the belief that the ’hidden face’ was temporary, and their hope for a bright future in which God would reveal himself and save his people did not fade. In Spain, where many Jews followed the light of the Aristotelian view that denied divine intervention in the world – there were hundreds of thousands who did not hold out in times of trouble and abandoned the hopeless religion.
Those who believed that ’there is a future’ are the ones who kept the embers of Judaism unextinguished.
With best wishes, Yaron Noam Spiegel Borlai
This is certainly a good question. But in my opinion, there is not much of a claim here, as in the case of a bride whose husband holds her and after a while, when he sees that she is standing her ground and her possibilities have grown, he releases her. Like the one who says, "I am not fed and I do not do it."
It should be noted that the bride is the people of Israel for all its generations, not just us. In this view, God gave the bride ten two, and only when he saw that we were more mature does he release her.
In the S”D ”K ”K ”K
Ramda”A –Shalom Rav,
Well, it seems that it was not the ‘groom’ who decided not to interfere, but the ’bride’ who asked him ‘not to stir up trouble or to make trouble’. I know and already know all the laws of nature and I manage without your help!
It occurred to me that this is why we open the prayer with ’Magen Avraham’. To teach us that even the greatest achiever among giants. A man who had great wealth that he had acquired through his labor and reached, a man who was so respected by the society in which he lived that they called him ‘President of God, you are among us’, a man who had defeated mighty kings – still continued to recognize his need for his God to help and protect and save and woke up every morning to pray to his God and ask him for help.
With best wishes, Yaron Noam Spiegel Borlai
In the Bible, the divorce in the Torah is intended to allow a man and a woman to build an independent life after the divorce. In contrast, the divorces that various ‘women's organizations’ lead to are one-way. The woman will go out into her own independent life while her ex-husband will be the main breadwinner of the ‘new family’.
Not only is the divorced man required to pay exorbitant ‘alimony’ beyond his financial means – he realizes that this is just the beginning of his troubles, because every Monday and Thursday he is expected to be sued for one ‘extraordinary expense’ or another. He is thrown out of his home. He will only see his children as part of ‘visitation arrangements’ Restrictive, but it will continue to be a ‘bottomless pit’ that will satisfy the ever-increasing financial demands of his ex-wife and her lawyers.
So some ’swallow their own guts’ and continue to live as slaves to the ’divorced wife's finances, with no chance of getting back on track and establishing an independent life, some break down and commit suicide, and some try to take advantage of their right to delay the granting of the get, in order to ensure themselves a reasonable financial existence after the divorce without being a victim of incessant ’economic violence’.
The solution that will speed up the divorce process is to ensure fair conditions for both parties. When both parents are allowed a reasonable financial existence and maintain contact with the children even after the divorce – The way is paved for a divorce process that is conducted with respect and mutual consent, for the benefit of both parents and children.
Best regards, Yaron Borlai Halevi Werkheimer
Not the permission of two hundred rabbis, but one hundred rabbis
Let's hear what Spich says: “For example, in one of the cases I was involved in, **after** we canceled the kiddushin, I happened to find out that the couple's story had already been going on for many years, and had been through three court instances.”
So maybe it's not such a bad idea for the Rabbinate to have a monopoly – because unskilled rabbis like you come in – who are not familiar with the legal instances and the couple's family history and rule without knowing the reality – on canceling the kiddushin,
The privatization of the courts causes a misunderstanding of what a political systemic concept is. [In parentheses, I would like to note that I would be happy for there to be alternatives to the Rabbinical Court and for it not to be a monopoly – but your above comment proves why (among other things) the alternative you propose is not good]
My ears heard what Shefi said very well, and unfortunately they also read the nonsense you write. The Rabbinate was also unaware, and acted in its own unprofessional and even scandalous manner.
If you had exercised a minimal ability to read, which you clearly do not have, you would have seen that I distinguished between the validity of a passage and the motivation to resort to a case. A distinction that has no place in an official institution.
As for your assessments of me, any further criticism from an ignorant person only strengthens me in my ways. So thank you for your words. Go ahead and succeed.
1. Personal service contracts [in the language of halakhah] can be canceled unilaterally. In halakhah and by law. At most, compensation must be paid.
2. A large part of the problem in the field of coercion of the gittin is that the court does not have the ability to coerce by beatings, this primitive means works well. Unlike imprisonment.
And in my opinion it also fits today's moral standards. Just as one takes away someone else's property by force, so one should take away someone else's freedom by force.
1. Although I did not understand the background to this message. But not every personal service contract can be canceled. For example, it is about the enslavement of an employee and not a contractor. It is also likely that it is an employee for a minimum period of time, such as a day, for example.
2. I do not know how much this will work, but I have already written in the past that I completely agree (this is a suggestion made by Rabbi Shilat).