With God’s help

The Frontline in the Home Front – 2007

A. Introduction

Joining the army is like leaving the incubator of the yeshiva to the outside world. When one leaves an educational framework and moves into a framework of work or military service, various halakhic-moral problems arise with greater intensity. One of the most prominent of these is the problem of theft.

As we know, in our many sins, even though our sages said that theft dances at the head of all offenses, we find various permissiveness for this prohibition. These are expressed in various terms, in the army and in civilian life: 'to carry', 'to complete equipment', 'to lift', 'to take what is due to me', 'to return an injury to a rich person or body who exploits me (= Robin Hood)', and so on. The laundry of words succeeds in purifying the filth, and helps people ignore the moral-halachic problematic nature of their actions.

With regard to the prohibition of theft, the moral dimension is particularly prominent, beyond the halakhic one. Here, the kinds of tricks that might have a place in times of need in other halakhic contexts will not be helpful. In moral prohibitions, we must 'trick' the halakhic law in the opposite direction, and sometimes we must be strict even where it may not prohibit it (such as stealing copyrights, software, disks, etc.).

Beyond the prohibition of theft, such thefts also involve blasphemy. Regarding this, Maimonides states in his book, Foundations of the Torah, that there is blasphemy even in permissible acts, especially if they are committed by someone who is expected not to do them (see the quote at the end of the article).

Of course, in places where it is not even possible to see this as a hoarding ('equipment completion'), a son of a son of a son of a son, there is no place to go after the aforementioned laundry of words.

In the sixth of eight chapters, Maimonides emphasizes the contradiction between the statement of the Sages and the position of the philosophers. On the one hand, a person should not say, "I cannot eat pork," but rather, "I cannot, I cannot, but what shall I do, and my Father in heaven has decreed it for me?" In other words, the ideal type is the one who fulfills the commandments because of God's command and not because of the inclination of the heart. On the other hand, the philosophers have already said that the one who rules in his soul - even though he does good and important deeds - does them and desires evil actions, and longs for them to conquer his inclination. But the pious - is the one who is drawn into his actions... and does good deeds - and desires and longs for them. And there is agreement among the philosophers that the pious is more important and more complete than the one who rules in his soul.

Maimonides reconciles the two claims, saying that the ruler of his own desires is superior in the commandments of the Shema (in another, slightly different wording: between a person and a place), but the pious is superior in the moral commandments (in another, slightly different wording: between a person and his fellow man).

Therefore, in the prohibition of theft, as in other moral prohibitions, we must not be satisfied with proper behavior. There is another goal, and that is to internalize the repulsive and abhorrent attitude of the soul towards itself. See on this the words of the Manach Mitzvah Rachad cited below in Pg.

Thus, education commands the following:

And the Rambam wrote in his remembrance (Gezva 1:1-2) that even a gentile and an idolater is forbidden to rob or oppress, and if he robs or oppresses, he must return. And in the Gemara (Bek 119:1), the Z"al said that even people who are allowed to lose their bodies, such as the menin, are forbidden to lose their wealth and rob or steal from them. They said for this reason that perhaps worthy offspring will come out of them and their wealth will be theirs. It can also be said that their intention in their remembrance of the blessing is to distance themselves so that a person does not get used to this, because there will be aversion in the soul when it gets used to the lesser and bad states, and it is a strong sin that attracts sin.

The conclusion from what has been said so far is that the prohibition of theft is a moral and halakhic prohibition. This characterization requires that one not circumvent this prohibition, since circumventing violates at the very least the prohibition of moral theft and blasphemy. Likewise, we must internalize a mental repulsion from this prohibition, and not be satisfied with merely behaving appropriately in accordance with the law.

Below we will try to elaborate a little on this nature of the prohibition of theft, and see some of its implications.

B. The foundation of the 'gates of righteousness'

The boundaries of the prohibition against stealing are relatively simple. It is forbidden to lay hands on another person's property. Of course, one has to be careful with formal boundaries such as when the stolen property is purchased, what the difference is between theft and robbery, what the obligation to return it is, and so on. However, the prohibition itself, in practice, except in very specific situations, is relatively simple in definition. As we saw above, there is a moral layer beyond the halakhic layer, and if we take it into account, the situation becomes much simpler. One must refrain from laying hands on any property belonging to another person, or the public, even when we do not have a clear halakhic ruling. Not only because of doubt from the Torah, but also because of the moral prohibition. As we will now see, this picture also has a halakhic basis.

The Harash, in chapter 5 of his book Shaarei Yosher, insists that the prohibition of theft is different from all the prohibitions of the Torah. He begins with the Maharishi Bassen's question, why in cases of property, the defendant is not required to be more severe than the defendant, as in all the prohibitions of the Torah.

The Harash explains that the prohibition of theft is determined according to the legal guidance of the laws of property, and not according to the boundaries of prohibition and permission that are determined in the Torah itself. Therefore, after the rabbinic court rules according to the legal-halachic system that its author has drawn up on the evidence, and goes to the defendant's side, the prohibition of theft no longer exists.

Therefore, as the Gershash states at the beginning of the chapter, in almost every other prohibition in the Torah, the command establishes the prohibition. However, in the prohibition of theft, the command only serves to give a seal of approval to a legal prohibition established in a pre-halakhic human system.

In his words, it can be seen that he gives two different reasons for this:

1. The Torah commands us not to steal. However, the concept of 'stealing' presupposes prior concepts of property and ownership. The prohibition of stealing is the taking of another's property and possessions. Therefore, a commandment against stealing presupposes the existence of prior legal concepts. However, it is not clear where these concepts are defined? We are forced to say that they were defined even before the commandment against stealing, that is, in a pre-halakhic legal system (see page 2a of the same book).
2. The reason we keep the Torah is our reasoning that the Creator's commandments must be kept. Therefore, when that reasoning leads us to the legal conclusion that it is forbidden to steal, we must also keep that reasoning (see page 4b of the same book).

The first argument leads to the conclusion that the Torah itself gives a seal of approval to the moral-legal prohibition. Ultimately, it derives its validity from the Torah's policies. The Torah combs through the definitions of ownership and property for us as a society. In contrast, the second argument leads to a much broader view: the prohibition of theft does not derive its force from the power of the Torah given to us. God expects us to observe it even independently of the obligation to observe the Torah. Just as we must observe the Torah, so we must also observe the explanation regarding theft.

The second argument leads us to the conclusion that the boundaries of the moral prohibition can also be broader than the boundaries of the prohibition against stealing. Situations can arise in which there is no formal halakhic prohibition of stealing, but God expects us in the 27th chapter not to touch these types of wealth.

Therefore, although the Gerash brought his principle to the fore, that the defendant may not be more severe in the laws of doubt about theft, the meaning of this principle is generally more severe.

This is probably also the intention of education, in the mitzvah 29, which says:

The root of the mitzvah is known, which is something that reason takes far away from, and it is appropriate to take it away from, because the weak thief knows that if someone stronger than him came upon him, he too would be robbed, and it is a cause for the destruction of the settlement.

C. Consequences

One can think of various implications of this concept of the prohibition of theft.

The Garshash himself points to several examples. For example, stealing from a Gentile is not forbidden by the Torah, according to some opinions. However, the moral-legal prohibition still stands. The Maga writes that someone who steals an etrog from a Gentile, even if it is permissible to steal from a Gentile, still cannot take it on Sukkot, since there is no law here that is "for you." Although a formal halachic prohibition of theft is not violated, the etrog is not one's. And so in education, the beginning of the mitzvah of rak'at is established. The Garshash adds here that there is also a legal prohibition on using money that is not one's (since this is the very meaning of the concept of "ownership," which of course also exists among Gentiles).

It is possible that sometimes this prohibition will be even more severe. Not only in terms of blasphemy, but even within the limits of the prohibition of theft itself.

For example, the Israeli Rabbi in his response to the act of kivia writes that there is a prohibition against saving oneself with the wealth of a Gentile, which is more severe than that of an Israeli. The reason for this is that the prohibition against robbing a Gentile stems from the laws of the law, but the Gentile is not commanded nor does he want to save me with his wealth. Therefore, even if in Israel, according to most of the Rishonim (except for Rashi in the Book of 60b), it is permissible to save oneself with the wealth of his neighbor (and pay later), for a Gentile it is not clear that this is the case. If the permission is based on the fact that the owner is also commanded and wants to save me with his wealth, then for a Gentile who does not want, and perhaps does not command, to save me, there is no permission to take his wealth in order to save me.

We note that the Israeli Foreign Minister concludes that in an act of war the situation is different, and there it is permissible, and so on.

It is worth mentioning here also the words of the Menach in the Mitzvah of the 2nd Saka, who writes:

But it seems to me that those who believe that the theft of a Gentile is a rabbinic act, since the theft of a Gentile is possible because the Torah is forbidden, and those who believe that in order to collect (through a legal process or in order to return or pay) it is forbidden to steal from the Torah, from this it seems that the Torah did not prohibit this from the law of money alone, only this bad measure itself was forbidden by the Torah. So Shlomo stole, he only stole, the Torah prohibited from his friend's money. So it is possible that a Gentile did not prohibit it because his money was given to those methods, but stealing is forbidden from his own, so that he does not learn this bad measure, so even a Gentile is forbidden so that he does not get used to it, and the Torah was strict about this. But apparently, according to these methods, even with less than a single shubh, a non-Native transgresses this, who has accustomed himself to it and not because of half a lesson...

The Menach shows that the basis of the prohibition against stealing is the mental habit, and this itself is one basis for the prohibition from the Torah. And above Mina (ibid. in the Sakabit) states that there is a prohibition against stealing even one's own (i.e., stealing one's own from the thief).

Of course, in this context the problem of desecration and sanctification of the Name also arises. The Gamma explicitly states that stealing from a Gentile constitutes desecration of the Name (and in the Tanakh of Debi Eliyahu it means that the entire prohibition against stealing from a Gentile is only on the grounds of desecration of the Name), and therefore in certain respects it is prohibited with a more severe prohibition than stealing from a Jew. In the BK 133b it is stated that even if the loss of a Gentile is permitted, if it involves desecration of the Name, his loss is also prohibited (V.A. Yerushalmi B.M. P.B. 55).

D. Some practical examples

As mentioned, the halachic limits of theft, and especially the moral ones, are not complicated to define, as they almost always have to be followed strictly. However, this is precisely why they are sometimes more difficult to abide by.

• It is clear that it is forbidden to steal an individual's money, and perhaps even more so, public money. Generally, there is no permission to harm someone who has harmed us by taking their money, but there are special circumstances here (preventing harm, or taking justice for oneself where permitted by the boundaries of this law).
• The prohibition from the Torah is also for less than a penny (in theft. The early scholars were divided on theft. See the commentary on the Mitzvah of the 24th century). Although there is no obligation to return the stolen goods in the 24th century, since there is forgiveness. It should be noted that forgiveness does not permit the prohibitions of theft and theft themselves.
• It is also forbidden to rob abstract rights, such as computer software, etc., even though sometimes it seems that no one loses from it (certainly not the army. And the 'exploitative' Microsoft is commanded by the MTA to rob it, especially since these are Gentiles). The formal halakhic definition is not entirely clear, but at least morally there is no doubt here.
• Permission to use money allows its use, but it should be noted that permission must be given by the owner of the money. For mitzvah purposes, there is an opinion that it is permissible for a religious person to perform a mitzvah with money, and then it is permissible to use it even without permission. However, there are those who may not be comfortable with this, and there one must be careful. To the same extent, a clear exemption allows use even if it is not a mitzvah.
• In private finance, the situation is simpler, but in public finance, the situations of granting permission can be quite complicated.

For example, when the commander in charge gives permission to use, one must carefully clarify for what purposes the permission was given, and not expand it beyond what is stated.

When the commander tells me to use some object (phone, pen, computer, etc.), it is necessary to discuss whether this is a permit for my private needs or for military needs. In both cases, even if permission is granted, the permit is not self-evident. It depends on whether this permit is within the authority of the commander who gave me the permission. Is he authorized to order such use for military needs, and/or for private needs.

For example, a platoon sergeant can order the use of platoon property for unit needs. However, he cannot allow me to make private calls on the military phone, since he is not the one paying the bill or the one who will have to balance the deficit in the unit's budget by cutting elsewhere.

• A commander who is authorized to grant permission to use is the same one to whom the army gives the discretion to distribute the budget, and he can decide to dedicate something from the budget to the welfare of the unit's personnel.
• By the way, even a fully qualified commander, if his order is unreasonable, does not constitute a permit for use. For example, a battalion commander can order the use of battalion property for any private needs, for example when, at his discretion, soldiers need to contact home for the purpose of unit morale. However, even if the budget is in his hands, he cannot order soldiers to take a vehicle from the base for private entertainment (of course, the unit's planned entertainment can be different). Situations are complicated, and it is precisely in such situations that it is important to remember that prohibitions on theft are not just a formal question, but also a moral question. In cases of doubt, there is room for exaggeration.
• Using someone's "mafia" in warehousing or maintenance to obtain equipment that is not legally assigned to them is also problematic.
• Stealing is not something that is done out of hand. Whoever steals is obligated to return the stolen property. Restitution must be made even when the theft is not the theft of a specific object, but rather the waste or use of military funds. The same applies when the stolen object is lost, funds must be returned according to its value.
• Make sure that the refund is made to the same fund from which the funds are missing. For example, unauthorized use of the telephone requires the cost of the call to be refunded to the unit fund. Make sure that the fund is at the level that pays the telephone bill (do not return to the petty cash of the department or section, when the branch is paying the telephone bill).
• When returning property to the army, it must be done in a way that it will actually return to the army itself. For example, it should not be returned to a storekeeper if there is a fear that he will not record the return, but will use it to cover up deficiencies for which he is responsible.
• During our military service, it was customary for every soldier who was discharged to receive from his comrades the equipment he lacked, so that he would not have to pay for the shortcomings. The assumption was that such a situation could continue from one to the next, and eventually 'the last one would turn off the light.' When they shut down the army (!) there would no longer be a need for this equipment.

There is reason to criticize such an arrangement, but it seems that there is no real prohibition, and there is room for allowing it. It seems that a soldier is allowed to transfer his equipment to another soldier, as long as the shortage is not concealed from the army authorities, and it is not supplemented illegally. Of course, if the shortage causes an operational problem, it must be reported immediately, although this is not political theft.

• If there is a fear that the generous giver will use improper methods to make up for his lack, it is not permissible to accept from him. The recipient is committing a blind act, blasphemy, and perhaps even moral theft.
• The Gamma of the Rabbis says that it is forbidden (from the Rabbinic tradition) to buy from the hand of a thief because he is holding the hands of those who commit a crime. Likewise, anything that is suspected to be stolen is forbidden to be taken.
• There is room for caution in the use of equipment, even if it is not actual theft. Taking food beyond what is needed in the unit, which is common among sergeants and sergeants (and they even feel that it is for the good of the community, and not for their own personal benefit), is very problematic. Beyond theft, there is also 'not to be damaged' here, and perhaps also a report from the Sabbath loss.
• Such caution is doubly required when it comes to damage to property, and not in the law of robbery. And this is not the place to clarify the relationship between robbery and damage. It should be remembered: a person who causes harm is also liable for rape.
• The restoration of lost property also requires not to stand on the property of others. When you see property that is about to be lost, or wasted in vain, you should try to prevent it. Those who do not do so usually violate the restoration of lost property. This requires thinking about efficiency, both for ourselves and for those around us.

Such situations place the soldier in difficult dilemmas. Sometimes his environment expects him to behave this way, and when he is in a position (sergeant, sergeant) this is perceived as disloyalty to the unit. It seems to me that if we are careful about appropriate and ethical behavior in all areas of life, such behavior will also be accepted with more understanding by the environment, and perhaps we will even have the opportunity to influence it in some way.

E. End

Serving in the military is an opportunity for us to come into contact with different populations that yeshiva members don't usually encounter. There are several important aspects to this: First, sanctification and blasphemy, regarding what they will think of us. However, perhaps even more importantly, it is an opportunity to instill norms in the wider public that they are usually unaware of.

People who are considered to be highly moral, and they really are in most areas of life, do not scruple about using public property, or about various violations of other people's property, sometimes simply because they have never been faced with the requirement to meet such a standard, and have never thought that there is any problem with it. As we have seen, sometimes there is even an ideology that confirms the legitimacy of these actions. The common service is a golden opportunity to educate the general public (along with ourselves) to meet more appropriate standards in relation to public and private property.

In conclusion, we have seen that the prohibition of theft is unique in the sense that it touches on a moral level, which is not only additional to the Torah prohibition but even underlies it. We have seen several implications for this matter. We mentioned the concept of blasphemy that is involved in the offense of theft. And perhaps at this point we will also conclude.

Maimonides, in his book Yesodei HaTorah, 5:11, writes:

And there are other things that are generally blasphemy. And if a person great in the Torah and famous in Hasidism does them, things that people follow him for. And even though they are not offenses, he has blasphemed the Name, such as if he took and did not give the purchase price immediately. And if he has something and the sellers are found to be demanding it and he is holding it back. Or if he increases in laughter or eating and drinking with and among the people of the land. Or if his speech with people is not calm and he does not receive them with a good attitude, but is quarrelsome and angry. And in such things, everything according to the greatness of a wise man should be scrupulous about himself and act from the beginning according to the law.

Likewise, if the wise man is careful about himself, and his speech is at ease with people, and his mind is mixed with theirs, and he receives them with good humor, and is offended by them, and does not offend them. He respects them, even those who make fun of him. And he bears and gives in faith. And he does not abound in the idolatries of the peoples of the earth and their dwellings. And he does not always see anything but engages in Torah, wrapped in a turban, crowned with tefillin, and does all his actions in front of the law. And he does not stray far and does not be surprised. Until they find everyone praising him, loving him, and desiring his actions, then this one has sanctified the Name, and about him the Scripture says, "And he said to me, 'You are my servant, Israel, in whom I will glorify you.'"