Is it possible to "naturalize" in the Land of Israel in the middle of Yom Tov Shani?
The Spring – 2013
Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham
outline:
introduction
The Dispute Between the Rosh and His Rabbis
Halacha ruling
Explanation of the controversy: Back to the question of 'naturalization'
Explanation of Maharam's method: "From the sun to the moon"
Projection: 'Migo because of yesterday'
Three side points
A side consideration of 'no-pluge'
Clever and foolish
The riddle of the rabbi and another one
Summary
introduction
In an article published about Rabbi Avraham Gnichovsky zt"l (hereinafter: the Rabbi), Rosh Yeshiva of Tzevin and a student of theHazo"a who passed away in early 2013, recounts, among other things, the following incident:[1] Ra's parents lived in Belgium and came to visit Israel. On the second Yom Tav of the calendar, a poor man came to them and asked them for charity, and Ra's mother took out money and gave it to him. The astonished father wondered how she could do this in the midst of the second Yom Tav, and she explained that she had decided that morning that they were staying in the land, and therefore, for her, it was no longer a Yom Tov. In this way, she tried to force her husband to agree to stay in the Land of Israel so that she would not be desecrated on a Yom Tov.[2]
The Rabbi had been discussing this question for many years, whether a person could indeed decide in the middle of the day that he had ceased to be a foreigner. He once raised this question in his yeshiva class, noting that he had not found a solution to it in any halakhic source. Then a young man from the yeshiva students, the son of Rabbi Nathan Gashtatner, zt"l, stood up and said that a Jew had appeared before his father and asked this question in practice. To the Rabbi's question, he said that his father said that he did not know what to answer, and that such a question should be asked to theHazo"a.[3] It turns out he directed the question toHazo"a, who replied that he too had been asked this question many years earlier,[4] and he did not know how to answer it. In the first case theHazo"a He sent the question in a letter to Rabbi Chaim Ozer, the late Rabbi of Vilna. He replied that it is indeed possible to accept the ruling of a Jew during the holiday, although he did not provide any evidence for his statement. The newspaper reports that the Rabbi was very happy to hear that his mother had done the right thing, but he still remained puzzled as to the source of the Rabbi's ruling in this passage.
Of course, there are two assumptions here that underlie the discussion: A. Those who are thinking of returning abroad should also observe the second Yot in Israel. B. In Israel, the second Yot is not observed today either. Both of these assumptions are accepted in halakhic law, although each of them is disputed by rishonim and poskim (see a long discussion inMinchat Yitzhak (Ch. 4:1-4 and many more). We will of course include both here for the sake of discussion.
Under these two assumptions, it seems that two main questions remain in this matter:
- If indeed there is no relevant source that requires continuing to observe the second Yot, then what is the point of being satisfied? Simply put, whoever decided to naturalize in Israel is not obligated to observe the second Yot. So why do all these poskim not rule and remain in doubt, when they do not have any source that teaches that the HaKhg does not require observing the second Yot? This means that there was a doubt here, but they were unable to resolve it. It is not clear what the doubt is in this.
- After we understand the question of why one should continue to keep a second YOT after deciding to naturalize, we must understand how and why the Supreme Court ultimately ruled as it did.
My assumption is that there was no doubt in the minds of humans (whether such a decision is final and decisive), since it is only a technical doubt and there is no place to ask anyone else and make a general ruling on this. It is quite clear that these poskim had a fundamental doubt in the laws of Yot Sheni.
In this article, I will attempt to answer both questions: a. Explain what the doubt was. b. Although lions are not to be slaughtered after death (see the Rosh's words quoted below), I will attempt here, with their respect, to also cite a source that conclusively establishes this ruling, and to justify the ruling of the Garach.
The Dispute Between the Rosh and His Rabbis
thecolumn Rabbi C. Schutz brings up a dispute between the Rosh and his rabbi, the Maharam of Rothenburg:
If a person whose father or mother dies and was a minor at the time and grew up before the thirtieth day has passed, the Rabbi of Rottenburg wrote that one must mourn from the time of the death of the deceased, and it is not counted from the day of burial, but from the seventh and thirty days, all of which are counted from the time of the death of the deceased. And if the thirty days have passed before the death of the deceased, the decree of the seventh and thirty days is nullified from him, and the twelve-month decree from the day of burial is nullified from him, and the Rosh z"l wrote that since he was minor at the time of the burial, even if he grew up within the thirtieth or even within the seventh, all mourning laws are nullified from him:
This is a minor whose father or mother has died, and he is increasing within the thirty days of mourning. The question is whether he should mourn according to the law of a distant rumor (from the day he heard it), or is he exempt from this mourning. It seems that he rules according to the opinion of his father, the Rosh.
The source of the words is in Genesis, the end of the third chapter of the book of Deuteronomy (see Tzo). At the beginning of the words, he quotes the ruling of his rabbi, the Maharam of Rothenburg:
Rabbi Meir, the late, wrote: "If a person whose father and mother died and he was young at the same time and before they passed thirty days, he became thirteen and one day old. It seems to me that he is obligated to mourn when he grows up, seven and thirty, and it is not counted from the day of burial until he grows up. And it is like someone who hears a rumor about a close relative, who mourns for him after the funeral, and counts seven and thirty, and even on the back, the days of mourning are not counted as seven, but as thirty. Here are days that passed while he was young, they are not counted as thirty. Footprints were a reason for cutting thirty, that is, ironing and cutting, which is a sign of a foot injury, and it is forbidden to shave and wash the foot, but while he was young, he did not mourn at all. Likewise, if he was young during thirty and after thirty he grew up, it is like a rumor about a close relative, and when the foot is found, it becomes distant, and it is not customary to do so except for one hour, and the decree of seven and thirty is nullified from him. And who is he who completes twelve months for his father and mother from the day of burial and not from the day he was made?" Big.
The Maharam rules that the minor is acting according to a distant rumor, meaning that he is obligated to mourn. Although there is room for a distinction between such a situation and a situation of distant rumor, as he writes:
And even though there is some distinction between hearing on foot and this matter, it is said that a man is not obligated, but rather a daily person, but here a man is not obligated at all, and yet it is said that since at the time of death it was not appropriate to mourn, he will be exempted from the world.
But ultimately he denies the division, and provides evidence for his statement that there is no delay in mitzvot:
Is it not permissible to delay in the mitzvah of the Ḥadīth in the chapter on covering the blood (page 57a) and the Holy One says in Yevamot in the chapter on the Four Achin (page 33a), such as if I had cut two hairs on Shabbat, I would have given them to her, and Shabbat was on the opposite side, and even on the back between the evenings of Shabbat, if it was small and not obligatory, I would not have said that, because I cut between the evenings, I cut the whole day from the prohibition, so it is Shabbat.
His second view is from the issue of Yevamot 33a, where, in a discussion of the law, there is no prohibition that applies to the prohibition. The Gemara assumes for granted that a minor who has grown up in the middle of Shabbat must continue to observe Shabbat (therefore, if he works or enters the Temple, the prohibition of zerot and Shabbat apply to him at once). However, the fact that he is rejected from that Shabbat does not exempt him from continuing to observe it. If so, argues the Maharam of Rothenburg, the law is the same for a minor who grew up during the days of mourning.
The Rosh, continuing his remarks there, does indeed begin his remarks with an apology, but ultimately he disagrees with his rabbi, and in his view, a minor is exempt from mourning when he grows up. At the beginning of his remarks, he accepts the explanation that divides between an exemption due to the day and an exemption for the man:
And even though the Torah does not restore the lion after his death, it is necessary to study it, and I understand that there is a distinction between the here and now, a barren land, and a day of mourning for a small one, at a time when he had to mourn, he passed away because of his smallness, and the obligation of mourning for eternity has ceased.
He later provides evidence for these statements, but from the perspective of our discussion here, what is more important is the rejection of Maharam's view on the issue of yevamot:
And what he brought as evidence that he had two hairs on Shabbat is not evidence that the end of the payment is not the beginning, and it is like a second Passover, according to the Rabbis, because the end of Shabbat affects the obligation and one is obligated to observe Shabbat:
The Rosh explains that there is a big difference between a minor who grew up on Shabbat and a minor who grew up in mourning. What obligates the mourning is the death of the father. If the son is minor at that moment, then he is rejected from this mitzvah at the time he undertook it, and therefore now the question arises whether or not he returns and is seen when he grows up. But on Shabbat, my obligation to observe Shabbat at some moment in the middle of Shabbat is an obligation by virtue of this moment itself, and not by virtue of any previous moment. Therefore, it is of no importance that the person was minor at the moment Shabbat began until now, because on Shabbat, it is not the moment Shabbat began that obligates its observance, but rather at every moment it is a new obligation by virtue of this moment itself. And indeed, the Maharam's words seem at first glance very puzzling. In the following, we will try to explain his opinion.
Halacha ruling
onKN Regarding the Rosh, there are jurists who ruled as the Maharam (R. Yerucham andB.A. Which is also mentioned inShch Ibid. and see also16 There is a SCB that discusses this at length).
In theory we saw incolumn He is decisive according to the opinion of the Rosh. And so it is inin me name:
And Rabbi Yerucham (228, 1922) after he brought the words of Rabbi Meir and the words of the Rosh, wrote, "And in any case, the words of Rabbi Meir are full of words of acceptance, even more so to be severe. And it does not seem to me that this is a valid halakha according to the testimony and valid halakha (Mok. 18) according to the words of Michael in Abel, so we conclude according to the words of the Rosh:
Also inShulchan Arba'ah The Supreme Court's ruling is decisive, as is the opinion of the Rosh:
A minor whose father and mother die, and even if he grows up within seven days, all mourning laws are nullified from him and he is not obligated to do so.
The reasoning for the ruling according to the opinion of the Rosh is given inin me There, because the ruling was in accordance with the words of Michael in Abel. In other words, this is not a substantive decision but rather one based on the rules of jurisprudence.
Explanation of the controversy: Back to the question of 'naturalization'
We have already mentioned that what is important to discuss is not the halakhic discussion itself, but the debate over the evidence on the issue of yevamot. As mentioned, Maharam's view seems extremely puzzling. What does Shabbat have to do with mourning? And is there a binding moment on Shabbat at the beginning of Shabbat by virtue of which one is obligated to observe the entire rest of Shabbat? It is not clear why Maharam even links this question to the din dihvi in mitzvot.
In explaining his method, he seems to have understood that indeed, even on Shabbat, the first moment is what obligates its observance. Therefore, if there is a delay in a mitzvot, then anyone who was delayed in the first moment (between the evenings) is no longer obligated to observe the rest of Shabbat. However, it is precisely in this light that we see in the issue of Yevamot that according to the law there is no delay in a mitzvot, and therefore, although this is indeed his understanding of Shabbat (that there is a binding moment at the beginning of it), he is nevertheless obligated to observe the rest of Shabbat.
We have learned that beyond the disagreement between the Maharam and the Rosh regarding the obligation to mourn and postpone in the case of mitzvot, the root of the disagreement over the evidence regarding the issue of yevamot is in the question of how to understand the obligation to observe Shabbat, and thus the novelty of the issue of yevamot: According to the Rosh, the obligation to observe every moment on Shabbat is by virtue of this moment itself (unlike mourning), and precisely because of this, a minor who has grown in the middle of Shabbat must complete Shabbat, and this is not a situation of being postponed and seen. In contrast, according to the Maharam, the obligation to observe Shabbat is prepared by the first moment (between the evenings), and by virtue of it, one must also observe the remaining moments of Shabbat (exactly as in mourning). According to this, the novelty of the issue of yevamot is that there is no postponement in the case of mitzvot, and therefore a minor who has grown in the middle of Shabbat must continue to observe the rest of Shabbat.
Now we can understand the implications for the question of naturalization that we discussed above. The Maharam of Rothenburg apparently perceives the Yot as a single unit of time that is entirely rooted in the first moment. This is the defining moment by virtue of which one must observe the Yot. If so, there is certainly a side to be satisfied that even if it was decided within the second Yot to naturalize in Israel, there is an obligation to continue observing it until the end, since in the obligatory moment, an obligation arises to observe the entire Yot. Although according to the Rosh, it seems that each moment on Shabbat or Yot stands on its own and is obligatory by virtue of itself, and therefore it is clear that in his opinion there is no need to observe the remainder of the Yot after one decides to naturalize in Israel.
If so, we can now understand the two questions presented above: A. The doubt as to whether, despite the decision to naturalize, there is an obligation to continue to observe the second Yot is because there was a party that the obligation in the Bin Shemesh requires observing the entire second Yot. B. Regarding the decision of the Garach, it is now also clear. We have seen that according to the law, the second Yot is a Rosh, and therefore it is clear that each moment of the second Yot stands on its own, and therefore when the decision has already been made to naturalize in Israel, there is no reason to continue observing the entire second Yot.
Explanation of Maharam's method: "From the sun to the moon"
In the margins of my remarks, I will try to explain more about the Maharam's method, which on its face seems puzzling. Why do we think that on Shabbat or Yot there is a defining moment by virtue of which we must observe the rest of the day, and in any case, if we are absent on it, then according to the Mitzvot, there is a delay in the mitzvot, we are no longer obligated to continue observing it? Ostensibly, Shabbat and Yot are positive at every moment, they are independent and by virtue of themselves they come. This is precisely the Rosh's reasoning, and by virtue of it he makes it difficult for Maharam. Ostensibly, this really seems obvious.
In the law of Muktzeh, we find the law of "Migo datkatsai and Shemeshhot itkatsai for the whole of a day." This law deals with a situation in which there is a Muktzeh object whose allocation was removed from it during Shabbat or Yot (such as a base that the Muktzeh on which it fell fell from it during Shabbat). In such a situation, the law is that the prohibition of Muktzeh remains on it until the end of Shabbat/Yot (later I will comment on the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the R.S. and the ruling of the law on this).
Apparently, the principle of 'Migo Datkatsai' states exactly what the Maharam believed: it is the moment between the suns that determines the status of the object throughout the entire day. If so, then apparently we have found a clear source in the Sages for the Maharam of Rothenburg's view. If the Rosh is indeed right that every moment on Yot or Shabbat stands on its own, then it is not clear why the status of the object in the moment between the suns would determine the prohibition throughout the entire Shabbat/Yot?!
Although the prevailing perception in the law of 'Migo Datkatsai' is not like that.Sea channels 2 Chronicles 17 brings several firstborn (The owner of the light and more) who wrote that the law of the prohibition of ad-Daktzai is based on the law of preparation. On Shabbat and Yom Kippur there is a law "and they shall prepare what they will bring," meaning that there is an obligation to prepare the objects in advance for use on the good days. Indeed, in Rish Bitza we found disagreement regarding the law of preparation, and on Pesach there is a strong opinion that ad-Daktza is prohibited from the Torah (it is possible that he follows his view in Rish Bitza, as we also see in Rashi, 2:2). According to the majority of opinions, the prohibition of ad-Daktza is only rabbinical. But even if it is rabbinical, the Rishonim and Aharonim cite some evidence that the Sages established the prohibition of ad-Daktzai as a derivative or extension from the rabbinical law of preparation. An object that was not prepared a day in advance is ad-Daktzai and is prohibited from use and shaking on Shabbat/Yom Kippur. If so, it is now clear that the law of 'Migo Datkatsai' is immediately derived from this concept: an object that was prohibited in today's law was clearly not prepared a day earlier. If so, the object was prohibited from use throughout the entire day, because it was not prepared.
According to this understanding, which some Rishonim and most Aharonim assume as self-evident, the law of Migo Datkatsai should not be seen as a source for the above-mentioned Maharam's perception. According to this explanation, 'Migo Datkatsai' is a specific element of the law of Muqtza, and nothing can be learned from it about the nature of the temporary obligation in Halacha. Certainly, nothing can be deduced from it regarding the prohibitions of work that there is a defining moment by virtue of which we are obligated to the prohibitions of work throughout the entire day (and why did we find Migo Datkatsai on the prohibitions of work?!).
But the truth is, the Torah is clear: in simple terms, the formulation of this principle, "From the moment between the sundowns to the moment of the whole day," does not seem to be this understanding. The language implies that the moment between the sundowns is truly the defining moment for the entire Sabbath, and there is a defining moment here. What makes these first and last men interpret it this way? Because they assume from reason that it is not possible to conceive of a defining moment. They assume that the obligations of the Sabbath or the Yot at any given moment are by virtue of that moment and not by virtue of any previous moment. Therefore, against their will, they force the language to explain the logic of this law.
On the other hand, I would like to argue that Maharam truly learned the law of 'Migo Datkatsai' differently. He learned it literally, that a moment between the evenings is a defining moment, and whoever was not obligated to do so is no longer obligated to keep that Shabbat/Yot.[5] It is worth noting that the Responsorial Psalm Deer Land (Frommer) C. Med deals with whether one who crosses the date line must begin to observe Shabbat. He places this in the Didan inquiry, and raises such an understanding regarding 'migo datkatsai'.
He hangs this judgment there in the words of theAbenz Ohh Si' Pet Sk'd who investigates regarding all the temporary obligations of the Torah whether they are a new obligation at every moment or not. The author Deer Land A decisive name whose obligation does not apply at every moment. This is discussed in the Responsa. Zion Building C. 3d Regarding someone who ate in the middle of Yom Kippur, is he obliged to continue fasting for the rest of the fast?[6] From the Rasham, Rashba cites Kiddushin 21, which obligates the Haditha in this, and so does the consensus of the latter. In any case, from there we see that the obligation to fast, which is a temporary obligation, is separate for each and every moment, according to the opinion of the Rosh Mok, mentioned above, which we saw was also ruled out by law.
Projection: 'Migo because of yesterday'
In any case, if we return to the matter of understanding the law of 'Migo Datkatsai', it seems to the rabbinic scholars that the matter depends on the Rishonim's dispute regarding 'Migo Datkatsai because of the day that passed.' There is a discussion in the Rishonim regarding a situation such as an etrog on the last holiday of Sukkot, whether it is muktzeh or not. On the seventh day, the etrog was muktzeh for its mitzvot, but on the eighth day there is no longer a mitzvah to take four species. On the other hand, in the interval between the seventh and eighth shemesh, it was still muktzeh for the sake of it. Here the question arises whether we say here 'Migo Datkatsai' and prohibit it on the eighth day as well or not.
In the Toda "Nima", Bitza 4 a"a (see also Sukkah 10 a"b Toda "Ed", and Bitza 3 a"b Da "Ed" and more), they wrote:
And they did not say that because of a day that was in the past, they said that it was in the future, such as between the sundowners of the beginning of a good day or between the sundowners of a Sabbath, that it might be a Sabbath.[7]
On the other hand, the Ritva in Sukkah 40b goes to great lengths to prove that although an etrog is not muktzeh because between the evenings one must go to the chumara and not take it (but rather take it from the day before), in the Sukkah even between the evenings one must go to the chumara and sit in it (if one wants to eat), and therefore the Sukkah will be muktzeh even on the eighth day:
And the reason is that it is written that the Sabbath and the day of rest and the preparation should be a day preparing for the Sabbath from the day before, according to our Rabbis, if a sukkah was set aside on the Sabbath and the day of rest, if it did not have the preparation from the day before, even though it had the preparation from the day before, even though it had the preparation from the day before, then a sukkah that was set aside for its mitzvah on the seventh day between the Shemitshet did not have the preparation from the day before and was prohibited for the entire day. However, if the etrog was not set aside between the Shemitshet and the Shemitshet, its preparation from the day before of the Shemitshet was removed and it was prepared for the Shemitshet, and therefore it is permitted…
We see that in his opinion they said, 'I am not a slave because of the day that passed.'
Apparently, this dispute depends on the understanding of the law of 'migo datkatsai'. The opinion of the scholars is that even if the sukkah is prohibited between the shemesh and the shemesh is sufficient, then the entire prohibition is only due to the concern that the shemesh belongs to the previous day. If so, there is no moment on the eighth day when the sukkah was prohibited, and therefore, according to the MNM, it is permitted on the entire eighth day: if it was prohibited between the shemesh and the shemesh, this means that the shemesh belongs to the seventh, and then the sukkah certainly should not be prohibited on the eighth by virtue of 'migo datkatsai'. If the sukkah was not prohibited between the shemesh and the shemesh of the eighth, then certainly there is no reason to prohibit it on the eighth by virtue of 'migo datkatsai'. Therefore, according to the MNM, the sukkah is permitted on the eighth.
What does the Ritva believe? In the passage cited above, he writes in an explanation that the law of Muktzeh is based on a rabbinical expansion of the law of preparation. Therefore, it is clear in his opinion that even if the object was forbidden for the entire seventh day, it was not prepared for the eighth and therefore it must be forbidden. In his opinion, there is no need for there to be a moment on the eighth day when the object is forbidden in order for it to be forbidden for the entire day. It is sufficient that it was forbidden for the entire seventh. Therefore, in his opinion, they say, "Migo datkatzai because of the day that passed."
What do the Thos believe? Thos clearly sees that in order for an object to be prohibited by virtue of 'migo datkatsai', there must be a moment of prohibition in the object on that very day (= on the eighth day). Therefore, according to them, a prohibition due to the previous day does not constitute 'migo datkatsai'. If so, we see that Thos understood 'migo datkatsai' in the same way as theDeer Land The above: Once an object is forbidden for one moment in a day, it is forbidden for the rest of the day, and not from a preparatory law. My argument is that this is also what the Maharam of Rothenburg learned. There is a fundamental view here regarding the essence of the temporary obligations of Shabbat and Yom Kippur, which all occur by virtue of the first moment, which is the moment that establishes the obligation to observe that day. This is not a special law of the Mukhtza only, as can be seen from the Ritva andThe owner of the light.
Three side points
Three points that require clarification in this matter are the muktaza for half a Sabbath, the law of Nol, and the halachic ruling regarding 'migo datkatzai', and we will look at them briefly.
A. In the issue of a betel nut, 26b, a discussion was held as to whether or not there is a muktzeh for half of Shabbat, and the halakhic view is that there is no muktzeh for half of Shabbat. This concerns an object that was permitted and was set aside in the middle of Shabbat, and then returned and was thrown away (such as a muktzeh that was placed on Shabbat on a base and then fell off it later in the Shabbat).Sea channels There he already states that if the understanding of the prohibition of the muktze is that it is because the object did not undergo preparation a day earlier, then it is not clear that there is a muktze for half a Sabbath. After all, the object was permitted between the shekels and therefore it underwent preparation. He explains there that according to this view, the object is seen as if it were reborn, and therefore it is not considered prepared a day earlier. It is as if it were born (see below). Although the owner Deer Land He mentions this issue itself as evidence for his statement. We should note that according to the halakhic tradition, there is no mukta for half a Sabbath, and this may be the point of contention itself, and therefore no evidence should be brought from here.
On the other hand, if there is no muktzeh for half a Sabbath, it seems clearly not according to our words. After all, the object is forbidden for its time and during the rest of the Sabbath it is permitted. We see from this that it is possible to discuss each moment separately. Although there is no necessity here, since it can be explained that precisely because the object was permitted between the shekels, its status during the rest of the day is open, meaning that at each moment it is discussed anew. A prohibition at another moment of the day does not prohibit the entire day. Only a prohibition between the shekels prohibits the entire day, because between the shekels is the defining moment.[8]
on. The law of being born must also be discussed in light of our words. Ostensibly, whoever believes that being born is a muktaza, it is because the object did not exist from the beginning and therefore it did not undergo preparation. For the methods In the car And according to the Ritva, it is sufficient that the object did not undergo preparation in order to prohibit it. But according to the understanding of Tos and Mahram, it is not sufficient that the object does not undergo preparation (since this also exists in the muktaza due to the past day), but rather it must be prohibited at one moment of the day. But an object that was born was of course not prohibited at any moment, so why, according to their view, is it prohibited? Indeed, there is room to say that the prohibition of being born is a separate prohibition, and in particular that one must distinguish between different types of born, and the latter have already elaborated on this, and so on.[9]
third. The halachic ruling still needs to be discussed. The law of the muktzeh is controversial. Conditions: For the Rashi, there is no muktzeh for the Rishi. According to the halachic ruling, most poskim ruled that the Rashi is on Shabbat and the Rishi is on Yot. Reka in his glosses toShulchan Arba'ah O'H Si' Shaq (at the beginning of the sign, as well as on theMGA (Skyt) explains that the disagreement over the conditions is only with regard to the law of 'migo datkatsai', meaning that according to the law on Shabbat there is no law of 'migo datkatsai'. It is true that certain prohibitions of muktzeh also exist on Shabbat (those that R.S. admits), but not 'migo datkatsai'. And apparently according to this, what we have proposed here cannot be said, since on Shabbat it is not appropriate to speak of a defining moment for the understanding of the Maharam and the Tos' in the law of 'migo datkatsai'. It is true that many disagree with Reka on this (primarily the R.S.). See Sea channels 19), and they believe that even on Shabbat, the halakha has a law of 'migo datkatzai', and the disagreement between the Rabbis and the Rabbis is also about the prohibition of muktzeh itself, and not only about the law of 'migo datkatzai'.[10]
Although our discussion of naturalization on the second Yom Tiv deals with Yom Tiv and not Shabbat, and on Yom Tiv it is certain that the KJV has a law of 'migo datkatsai', and therefore even without going into this issue it seems possible to interpret the Ra'g's question from the words of the Maharam, as I explained above.
A side consideration of 'no-pluge'
There is room to discuss the question of naturalization also from a side consideration.Hazo"a In his discussion of the date line inpamphlet 18 hours, writes as a matter of opinion The Khazars That the line passes 90 degrees from Jerusalem, but since this location is inside China and it does not make sense that in one place on land there would be Shabbat and next to it there would be Shabbos, he innovated that the line would never pass on land, and thus "moved" it eastward, to the coastline of China. From this he ruled that the day that the inhabitants of Japan observed as Sunday would actually be Shabbos. His basic assumption is that it is wrong to divide one land into two different dates, where in the same place there would be Shabbos customs and there would be Shabbos customs.
According to this reasoning, someone asked (in the discussion on the aforementioned forum): Is there no reason for a person to practice Jewish customs for half a day and to practice secular customs for the other half of the day? I will answer this on several levels: A. Some have argued thatHazo"a In this (Rabbi Tykoczynski)Their day on Earth) and more. B. Furthermore, in the issue of the date line, it was possible to determine that the line runs through the sea and not through land. But here we are not dealing with determining a line, but rather with a substantive question. Therefore, here there is no option for a different determination, except at most to require that one behave holy all day long. But this is an obligation without basis, since we are dealing with a person who has decided not to return abroad. Therefore, the situation here should not be likened to the question of the date line. C. A distinction must be made between one place where Shabbat is observed in part and a weekday in part, which is a prominent public matter, and an individual person who does indeed behave according to the custom of his place (because he is now in Israel). After all, if he is required to observe the rest of the Yot, he will be even more exceptional in relation to his surroundings.
Clever and foolish
They also raised in the forum that in light of our words, the judgment of a wise man who was foolish in the middle of Shabbat or Yot should be discussed. Ostensibly, according to the Maharam's opinion, he must continue to observe the rest of Shabbat, since between the evenings he was wise and had already committed to observing the entire Shabbat. However, it seems to me that this is not the case, since even if from the principle of the law we were to oblige him to observe Shabbat, a fool or a minor is not obligated to do so. Therefore, even if from the perspective of pure law he is indeed obligated to observe the rest of the day, there is no one to whom this demand should be directed. This is a gave, not a gave.
The riddle of the rabbi and another one
In the name of the Rev. Rabbi Zacharias (the article was written during the shiva for his passing), we will quote here his words in his lesson in "Kol HaLashon." There he deals mainly with the various halachic implications of the passage of the Rev. Rabbi, regarding prayer, three meals, the blessing of the food, Hillel, tefillin, and more. There is good news for Pelfel in some of his words there, and others. Here I will only mention that the lesson there opens with a riddle: How is it possible that three brothers, sons of the same father and mother, stand in the synagogue on the first day of the Passover seder, one says a complete Hillel, the second says half Hillel, and the third says the first part, skipping half Hillel ("We are not for us, the Lord is not for us") and skipping the second part ("I loved it because the Lord will hear").
His answer there is that it is a brother who is a resident of Israel, and his two brothers from abroad are staying with him on the first day of the Passover holiday. The brother from Israel says half of Hillel as in the holiday, and one of the brothers from abroad is about to return abroad, and therefore he says full Hillel as in the first Yot (since for him it is the second Yot of exiles). The third brother said the first chapter because he thought he was returning abroad, and then decided in the middle of the Hillel to stay and naturalize in Israel. From that moment on, he said half of Hillel, and therefore he says only the first chapter and not the second.[11]
Of course, the riddle can be expanded to four brothers: one says both chapters, and the second says neither of them. The third says the first and not the second. And the fourth says the second and not the first. How did the fourth brother's situation arise?
If you have plowed my cart, you will find my riddle…
Summary
We began our discussion with the ruling of the Rach'a regarding someone who decided to stay in Israel in the middle of the second Yot, that he could stop observing Yot in the middle of the day. We wondered what the sides of the doubt were and why the decision was unanimous. We explained that the sides of the doubt depend on the question of whether the Shabbat and Yot obligations are due to a defining moment at the beginning of the day or whether at any moment it is an independent obligation. We saw that the Maharam of Rothenburg and the Rosh disagreed on this, and most poskim ruled the halakhah as Rosh, which is in line with the ruling of the Rach'a and theHazo"aWe then discussed the implications of the two views regarding the understanding of the law of 'Migo Datkatsai', and we saw that even in that context it can be seen as a disagreement between the Rishonim, with the implication we presented being 'Migo Datkatsai because of the day that passed.' We concluded with a riddle through which the Rabbi Zacharias presented the question, and with a slight expansion of it, which we left as entertainment for the reader.
Abstract
We discuss a problem raised by Rabbi Abraham Genihovsky ZETZA"L, about a tourist from abroad that decides in the middle of YOM TOV SHENY to stay in Israel. There are some POSKIM who stated that he can stop kipping YOM TOV, and we explain the SOFEK and the PSAK HALAKHA LEMA'ASEH. We show that it depends on the HALAKHIC character of the obligation to keep YOMIM TOVIM. If there is a defining moment for such obligation of the whole day, or every minute stands on its own. We sow some RISHONIM disputes about it (especially in the context of MIGO DEITKATSAEY principle of ISUR MUKTSEH). We end with an illustration by a puzzle, for the soul of Rabbi Abraham Genihovsky.
[1] 'Hamodia' newspaper, Saturday, Parashat Bereishit, 5773. The newspaper was not in my possession, and I am taking the information from the 'Stop Here Thinking' forum on the Internet: http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?whichpage=1&topic_id=2979781&forum_id=1364
After some time, I was referred to the Rabbi's lesson on this subject in "Kol Halashon", Chavham Pesach, 18 Nissan 5767 (lesson 12 in the list of 36 lessons by the Rabbi, who is Rabbi No. 33 in the telephone directory), where he deals with this. I thank my friend Rabbi Eli Eisenberg for the referral to the lesson in "Kol Halashon", as well as for the references to the Responsorial Psalm. To instruct Nathan And in fact, what is presented inYeshurun IAF cited in the notes below.
[2] I will not go into the fascinating question here of whether this is indeed beneficial retroactively, that is, whether when they decide not to return, does it prevent the prohibition, or if they do decide to return, does it become clear retroactively that they have violated a second-year muktzeh. This should be linked to the law of 'saving a blessing', meaning someone who blessed and then decided not to eat (see the fourth book in the Talmudic Logic series, Logic of Time in the Talmud, Michael Avraham, Israel Belfer, Dov Gabbay and Uri Shield, College Publications, London 2011, a little in chapter twelve regarding conditions, and for more detail regarding additional contexts, see there in chapter twenty.
It is also necessary to discuss, even if it is beneficial to amend the prohibition retroactively, whether the husband must obey and not return abroad just so that his wife does not commit the desecration of a second Yot (especially since he is a rabbi). From the explanation, it seems simply not to be the case, and see our comments there, and so on.
[3] After some time, I reviewed the discussion in the Responsorial Psalm. To instruct Nathan Harangue Chaib 27-3 (also mentioned in the lesson in Kol HaLashon). There we see that the question was asked toHazo"a In the beginning of 5700, and he immediately answered that they could stop observing the second Yot even in the middle of the day.
There, in S. 27, he attempts to provide evidence for this law, and concludes from Ritva Eruvin 39a that there is no impediment to stopping in the middle of the Yot, as in S. 28-10. The discussion is only on the question of whether when he received the Yot on the night of the Yot, he is obligated to complete it according to the law of the one who is worthless, but not on the question of whether this is an obligation from the law.
From all his words it appears that he deals only with technical questions (such as whether it is worthless, etc.), but from the principle of the law it is clear to him that one must stop in the middle. In this article we deal with the essential question, and below we will see that from the principle of the law one must continue to observe the entire second Yot.
We should also note that in a lesson in "Kol Halashon" it is mentioned thatMinchat Yitzhak The Supreme Court also ruled thatHazo"a, and brought back thereEleazar's offering The Holy Father was satisfied with this because he took upon himself the sanctity of the day. In all of this, the discussion revolves around the issue in Genesis 32:2, "They observe that day as holy and the next day as holy." However, this issue is not decisive, as shown inTo instruct Nathan C. 27.
[4] In the lesson of the Ra'ag it is implied thatThe Prophet He passed the question of RNG to RHA, but this is of course not possible (RHA died in 1940, when RNG was an eight-year-old boy – see Wikipedia (Approximately 'Nathan Gestatner'). Therefore I assume thatHazo"a I asked this question (or something similar) to the RAA many years ago. And they actually directed me to the file Yeshurun 11, p. 176, where it is stated that Rabbi Shach, may God bless him, related that he was with the Rebbe in the year 1934 (when he was two years old), when the Rebbe's question came.Hazo"a About a ship that arrived in Israel in the middle of the second Yot Shani. The incident is briefly mentioned without a source also in a lesson in "Kol HaLashon".
[5] Many rishonim and ach'aronim discussed the reason for the prohibition of muktza, and brought several reasons for it beyond the law of preparation. But the Gemara clearly states that muktza is related to preparation and therefore the other reasons are merely added (a and that they are stated only in the matter of eating and not shaking, or vice versa, etc.). And indeed, with regard to the issue of the prohibition of a taktza, most, like the ach'aronim, believe that it is based on the concept of muktza as an extension of preparation. See Shevut Yitzhak, by Rabbi Drazi, C. A. and others.
[6] We discussed this more recently. See The dates in Halacha The Exile Zvin on Yok in the second chapter (mainly around notes 37-38), and also in my book Two carts and a hot air balloon Chapter Thirteen, Section 3, on the relationship between the law and its content.
[7] Although specifically regarding the etrog, there are opinions that say that it is dedicated because of a past day because it is dedicated because of a mitzvah, according to the Toss. But for us here, only the principle is important.
[8] We should note that the prohibition of the muktzeh during those moments on Shabbat when the object is truly muktzeh does not depend on the general law of muktzeh (i.e., the law of 'migo datkatzai').
[9] See also Barish Bitza (2 A.D.) a discussion of whether or not a person was born from a place of birth, and in the first and last names there.
[10] See, for example, Rabbi Shlomo Una's book, File of issues on the issue of allocation, C. 12. See also his discussion there of 'Migo Datkatsai'.
[11] It is true that there is a discussion regarding Hillel, since it turns out that he said a Hillel that was not complete and not halved, and it is not clear whether it would not be better for him to already say a complete Hillel (since there is no prohibition in this).