Simultaneous submission to normative systems parallel to God's will

2006

The Jewish faith is unique in several ways. One of the most prominent of these is the commitment that derives from it to a detailed and comprehensive system of norms: the Halacha. Therefore, a discussion that deals with submission to the Halacha, or to the will of God in its broadest sense (which will be explained below), is in itself an indirect engagement with issues of faith. However, the discussion that follows, which concerns the possibility of being subject to other normative systems simultaneously with submission to the Halacha-Torah system, touches much more directly on the realm of faith. In such a discussion, we will naturally come to a direct engagement with the fundamental source of commitment to the Halacha and the Torah in general, which is faith in God.

Part One

Introduction: The Polynormativity Problem

A. Presenting the problem

The question of subordination to normative systems in general, and the possibility of subordination to several parallel normative systems (hereinafter referred to as 'polynormativity') in particular, arises in various contexts in philosophy, and especially in the philosophy of law. Recently, this question has been at the heart of various dilemmas regarding the path of Judaism, and of the observant Jew. In these contexts, dilemmas arise of incompatibility between the principles of Judaism (at least in their traditional sense) and modern reality and modern values, or with the provisions of civil law, and the like.

It is important to distinguish here between two different levels of discussion:

1. Whether, and how, can 'outside' values be introduced into the halakhic framework? This question deals with the issue of changes in halakhic law, or the relationship between conservatism and innovation.
2. Does Halacha need to be changed at all, or is it possible to be subject to an external value system at the same time as being subject to Halacha?[1]

The methods of discussing these questions can also be divided into two types:

• Halachic discussions. These discussions will be conducted in light of halachic precedents, that is, references by various jurists and thinkers, or in light of the examination of authoritative Jewish sources.
• A priori-conceptual discussions, which are analytical in nature. Such a discussion will deal with questions about the terms that make up the dilemma: What is 'halakhah'? What is 'subordination'? What is a 'normative system'? The methods of such a discussion are philosophical, essentially a priori, and not ordinary halakhic methods.[2]

There is a clear connection between the form of the discussion and the level of the question we are dealing with. Those who deal with a question on level 1 (how, if at all, can the halakhah be changed), which is an intra-halakhic question in nature, must conduct the discussion using a type A method (halakhic methods, and perhaps also meta-halakhic Torah methods). They must examine the question of what changes the halakhah allows, mainly in light of precedents. In contrast, those who deal with a question from level 2 (subordination to parallel normative systems) cannot examine this within one of the systems, and in particular not within the halakhic system, but outside the two systems under discussion. As will be immediately clear, and in more detail below, it is not possible to decide about subordination to a normative system using tools, or according to principles, drawn from the system under discussion.

If so, it is clear that a fundamental problem arises here: How can we decide a question that is by its very nature extra-systemic? What system (normative, logical, or other) should we use to decide this question? There is no doubt that these methods of decision should be based on extra-systemic (a priori) principles, and as far as possible on principles that are perceived as universal. It is important to emphasize that since this is a meta-normative decision, no precedent can have decisive significance in a question such as this. Precedents, by their very nature, are drawn from within one of the systems, and therefore they can serve at most as an illustration, or as a stimulus to thinking in a certain direction. A statement by Maimonides, and even by Moses, regarding the scope of commitment to the Torah system cannot have authoritative significance regarding the question we are discussing.[3] Therefore, the discussion of question 2 will be conducted using type B methods (philosophical, a priori).[4]

Against this background, it is clear that the discussion of the second question, namely the one that deals with the very subjection to normative systems external to halakhah, poses a different challenge to those who deal with it. This question is essential and essential for establishing a Torah position, but its examination cannot be done with the tools accepted in dealing with other halakhic issues. As stated, it is impossible to challenge the exclusive subjection to halakhah, and at the same time do so by relying on [the authority of] halakhic precedents. In this context, the conclusions of the a priori discussion are decisive. Even if a precedent is indeed found for a position that is denied in the a priori consideration, we must reject it, or at most remain in the "needs consideration" position.[5]

Despite the above, and this is the other side of the same coin, it is clear that even if the a priori discussion does indeed yield a theoretical possibility for a situation of polynormativity, this does not mean that there is Torah legitimacy for it. It is certainly possible, for example, that heresy is primarily a consistent and possible position on a meta-normative level, or on a fundamental philosophical level. If this is indeed the case, then an a priori discussion will not reveal any problem with such a view. However, it is clear that such a discussion is not sufficient to determine the halakhic legitimacy of such a view. Here, the issue of subordination to parallel systems must be examined based on precedents, and based on a discussion of halakhic sources, an a posteriori examination. The discussion here will be conducted using the first method above. Things will be clarified further later.

In any case, it is precisely at this level of discussion, the a posteriori, that we arrive at the subject of the present book: faith. Here polynormativity is examined through a faith-based prism, that is, in a discussion about the source of validity of the systems of norms under discussion. Behind the halakhic system stands an entity that gives it its meaning: God. The question is how one can be subject to parallel systems, when behind them stands an entity, or source of validity, other than God (and perhaps not even 'entities' in the ontological sense). As we will see towards the end of the discussion, this is a discussion that touches at its core on questions of faith and apostasy.

Shai A. Wesner's article, 'On the Meaning of Loyalty to Halacha' (entree Issue 11, hereinafter: Wosner), constitutes a clear example of the discussion of this (second) question.[6] Wesner argues that it is possible to be subject to several normative systems simultaneously, and therefore the discussion of how to act when a conflict arises between halakha and values external to it does not always involve changes in halakha or the concession of the parallel system in favor of halakha.[7] This is a contradiction between parallel and different normative systems, and therefore must be resolved by means external to the two systems in question (this is a common problem in various moral theories, which discuss the possibility of deciding between conflicting values, or in fact the possibility of determining a scale of values).[8].

It is not surprising, therefore, that Schwozner prefaces his statement, quite rightly, with the disclaimer (see the end of Section A, ibid.) that all the precedents he discusses are of primarily illustrative significance. As we saw above, the basis of the discussion of this (second) question lies on the a priori level, and therefore this is the appropriate course to take when dealing with this question. However, despite the aforementioned disclaimer, Schwozner in his article places emphasis specifically on the precedents, and therefore my feeling is that the a priori aspects required to address this question were not (in his case, and in general) given due consideration. Below it appears that the same is true with respect to the a posteriori aspects, and therefore they too will be discussed later.

In this article, I would like to examine the second question, namely the possibility of polynormativity in relation to halakhah. In other words, we will try to examine whether it is possible for the believing person to be simultaneously subject to another normative system. As we have seen, in examining such a question we cannot be satisfied with a discussion of precedents, and we must also, and perhaps primarily, examine it from a conceptual-a priori perspective. As mentioned, further on, another layer of discussion will come, an a posteriori, intra-halakhic layer. However, before beginning the discussion, it is necessary to refine the subject matter a little more, and this is the subject of the next chapter.

B. Refining the question: polynormativity in relation to 'halakhah' and in relation to 'the will of God'

To eliminate misunderstandings that may arise in the course of things, we must discuss the question of whether God's will can also be expressed in non-halakhic realms.

It can be argued that God's will is that we observe the moral commandments, the laws of the state, or additional norms, beyond the halakhic norms. If so, there is apparently a possible Torah basis here for subordination to additional systems beyond the halakhic, that is, for polynormativity. Many sources can be cited for such an approach, starting from the Torah ("And you did what was right and good," "Her ways are pleasant," "Dina de Malchuta," etc.), and continuing in traditional halakhic practice.

I think that there is not much innovation in such an approach, since sages and poskim often use considerations of this type. Furthermore, it is clear that most of them treat such problems as intra-halakhic, or at least intra-Torahic, problems. According to many approaches, the accepted interpretation of the term 'halakhah' itself is: the collection of commandments that express God's will for man, or at least the binding part of God's will ('Lefin Meshorat Din', 'Midad Hasidut', 'Lechat Yedi Shimei', etc., are generally not perceived as part of the halakhic system, despite the fact that they also certainly express God's will).[9]

This can be viewed from a slightly different angle: there is no fundamental difference between an approach that understands that hasbara is a legitimate source for creating halakhic obligations (as explained in the Talmud: "Why did I read it, it is a sabbath?", "What is the problem of my mother reading, and what is the problem of my mother reading it?"), and an approach that claims that these obligations are not halakhic but are nevertheless binding.[10] This is a question that is primarily semantic, and therefore it is not of interest to us here. It follows that the distinction between God's will outside of halakhic law and halakhic law is a distinction of only limited value, at least in our context.

The conclusion from all of the above is that even if a conflict arises between the Halacha, in its narrow sense, and other requirements of the Torah (or of God), that is, other parts of God's will, this is actually an intra-Torah problem, and some would say: intra-Halachic.[11] Several such situations appear in Torah literature, and there is nothing significantly new in pointing this out.

Therefore, a different question is called for here, which some contemporary approaches (such as those mentioned above) seem to raise precisely: an approach of subordination to several different normative systems, which is here called 'polynormativity'. This approach makes the following claim: Although the will of God, in its broadest sense (and not necessarily in the narrow, halakhic sense), leads to decision A, a different normative system, to which the Jew can also be subject, instructs him to act in a different direction (B). In such a situation, despite the Torah's teaching (the will of God, in the aforementioned broad sense), the person can choose direction B, while taking into account the 'price' of violating the will of God (the formulation is taken from Wesner's article, ed. and further on in our discussion in Part Three).[12] This is the question that the present article addresses.

The dilemma of polynormativity can be examined on three different levels:

1. It is possible to examine whether polynormativity is a consistent situation from a general philosophical perspective. This level requires consideration and justification from a philosophical perspective a priori (Discussion Level 2 and Method B above). In what follows, I will show that from a priori perspective it is indeed a consistent situation.
2. The second level of examination is empirical in nature. We must examine the factual claim that there are situations in which a person finds himself subject to two normative systems. It seems to me that it is clear that there are indeed such situations. Many of the workers of foreign labor, or infidels of various kinds, are in such situations. For example, many of the believers in the two (partnership, or dualism of its types) are like this. Therefore, the results of the examination on this level are clear, and we will hardly deal with it in the present discussion.
3. The third level is the substantive discussion (Discussion Level 1 and Method A above): Is it possible to accept Legitimate from a Jewish point of view The subordination to another normative system, even one that is external (and perhaps even contradictory) to the will of God. It is important to clarify and say that the claim regarding the halachic-Jewish legitimacy of a polynormative position is a claim that is not directed at a particular or unknown Jew (there is no empirical claim here that there is a Jew with a polynormative position, which is the concern of the previous level). Nor is it a philosophical claim (i.e., a claim that polynormativity is a possible situation, which is the concern of the first level). This claim is a claim about the Torah. In other words, the discussion here is whether the Torah allows a Jew to act against the system of the will of God while being aware of the cost and taking responsibility for his actions, and at the same time defining himself as an keeper of the Torah and commandments (perhaps in a broader sense: 'Orthodox'). In terms of the philosophy of law, there is a question here about the possibility of a kind of 'conscientious refusal' to the will of God. This is the level at which, as mentioned above, the discussion moves to the normal halakhic level.

It is clear that a distinction must be made, at least on the third level of discussion, between different types of normative systems. It is possible that there are systems that, from the perspective of God's will, are 'the word of authority,' meaning that they do not concern the commandments of the Torah (God's will). However, even if the intention is an external normative system that does not contradict the Torah in its content, it is necessary to examine whether such a situation does not create a problem similar to that of the belief in duality, since here there is an acceptance of an additional burden on top of the burden of the Kingdom of Heaven (dualism). It is clear that such a problem exists even more strongly with regard to a system that contradicts the Torah (but there are, of course, also more direct and obvious problems there).

As stated, if the claim about polynormativity is an a priori claim, i.e. a claim on the first level, or an empirical claim, i.e. a claim on the second level, then we will see below that these are indeed possible situations. As I have already mentioned, and we will elaborate further below, this is the classic situation of heresy. However, as mentioned, it is unlikely that the claim of those who advocate polynormativity (if there are any at all) is the claim: We are heretics. This is a trivial and worthless claim, at least in the context of a Torah-Halakhic discussion. Therefore, it is implied that at least in some cases a claim is presented that there is Torah legitimacy for this, and this is the third level of discussion.

It already appears from the preliminary discussion held above that the claim about Torah legitimacy for polynormativity in relation to the will of God is very problematic. It is seemingly very difficult to understand how it is possible to act against the will of God, and at the same time receive Torah legitimacy for it. Furthermore, it is necessary to discuss whether such a perception does not itself indicate non-subordination to the will of God, which is by its very nature total. This problem will be discussed later in the article.

We will now begin a more systematic discussion, along the lines outlined above. In the next part of the article (the second), we will examine the a priori possibility of the existence of a situation in which there is subordination to parallel (polynormative), and even contradictory, normative systems. Can such a situation even arise, and does it not contain an internal contradiction? This is the first level of discussion. After I show that this is possible a priori, I will return to the discussion of the other two levels, and especially the third level, that of Torah legitimacy, which is the more essential. This discussion is divided into two parts: in the third part of the article, we will deal with an initial a posteriori, pre-halakhic discussion. And in the fourth part, we will deal with a Torah-halakhic discussion. Finally, a concluding chapter will appear.

Part Two

A priori analysis: Is a polynormative approach consistent?

C. A priori analysis of polynormative situations

In order to examine a priori a polynormative situation, we employ, as stated above, general philosophical methods. To this end, we must define several basic concepts (which will be underlined below), and examine the possible relationships between them. The discussion is somewhat formal, and therefore I will try to keep it as brief as possible, but it is difficult to avoid it altogether for the reasons explained above.

'Normative system', in the sense discussed below, is a system that contains at least two components:

1. A collection of commands (norms) that bind those who are subject to it. These commands must be: A. unambiguous (not ambiguous). B. non-contradictory, or at least contain unambiguous rules of conduct even for situations of contradiction.
2. A collection of interpretive means. I deliberately do not use the term 'rules' here, as this element is problematic. The rules of interpretation cannot be defined absolutely and objectively, and there may be disputes regarding the question of what these rules are in relation to a given normative system, and whether they are even 'rules' in the strict, conventional sense of this term.[13]

'subordination' For the normative system, this means, of course, that the person assumes an obligation (at some level, not necessarily full) to carry out everything the system requires of him according to the rules of interpretation, at least as he himself understands them.

Now we must ask ourselves how such subordination is created. There is no doubt that the principle from which subordination to the normative system is derived is not found within it. If this principle were to be found within the framework of the system itself, a fundamental problem would arise here: how am I subject to this principle itself, even before I have decided on my principled subordination to the system.

For example, subordination to halakha cannot itself be a halakhic principle. For if it were a halakhic principle, then the question of subordination to this principle itself would also arise within the framework of the same discussion.[14] Therefore, it is clear that the principle that determines subordination to any system, and in particular to halakha, always lies outside the system in question.[15]

This statement can also be reached from a different angle. The existence of a certain normative system is a fact. All of its sentences are in the form of a demand that someone demands of me, and therefore they are nothing more than a fact: there is a system (or: entity, see below) that demands of me a set of demands. The commitment of any person to such a system is a value norm (moral, religious, civil, or other), which is obtained from a decision that a person takes upon himself to commit to and be subject to the system. The mere fact that someone commands me to do something is not enough to create an obligation on my part to carry out the command. It is well known that there is no way to draw a value conclusion from a factual statement.[16]

We are again faced, and this time from a different angle, with the claim that in order to establish, or justify, a decision to be subject to some normative system, one must rely on a principle that determines the reason for this subjection. We saw above that this principle necessarily lies outside the system in question. Here we added that it also cannot be a mere fact, otherwise it would not be sufficient to raise a long-standing concern for our pain (if it were a mere fact, it too would not be able to constitute a sufficient basis for creating an obligation, or subjection, just like the system of imperatives itself).[17]

Let us give another example of this claim. If we want to base a value conclusion, such as that acts of kindness are an act that is right to do, on the assumption that acts of kindness benefit the one in need of it (and in another sense, also the doer himself), we cannot do so. The fact that acts of kindness benefit the one in need is a fact. Values cannot be deduced from a fact. In order to base the above conclusion, we must rely on a super-principle, which is not factual, such as: that it is right to do good to others.[18] If we continue the example further, we can say that the sentence that someone commands me to do good to others cannot constitute a sufficient basis for the norm in question. The reason for this is that this too is nothing more than a fact. To complete the basis, and to deduce the normative obligation, we will need an additional principle that says that for some reason there is an obligation to obey that person's instructions.

So, our conclusion so far is that in order to create a commitment to any normative system, we need a principle that exists outside the system in question. This principle must have a value dimension (and not a purely factual one), and it is the one that will bridge the factual plane (the existence of a normative system) and the value-normative plane (the commitment, or subordination, to that system).

In light of what has been said so far, we will now define the concept 'Value principle'. This is the same principle whose function is to bridge the factual and normative planes. As mentioned, this principle is outside the normative system, and its function is to give 'value' to the imperatives of the normative system (at least for me), in order to create my commitment to it. The principle of value is a bridge between the facts (that there are imperatives) and the normative commitment in relation to them (the subordination to them).

This bridging principle, which, as mentioned above, necessarily lies outside the system in question, expresses a reason for the person's decision to accept subordination to the system of norms. This decision can be based on recognition of the wisdom or goodness of the normative system, or of the one who commanded us to obey it, or on fear of the non-existence of its principles, or on gratitude towards the one who commands, or even on an arbitrary decision without any basis (such as Yeshayahu Leibowitz's approach to subordination to Halacha), and the like.[19]

We will now distinguish between two different types of value principles:

1. It is possible that the decision on subordination to the normative system will be made by individually examining each of the norms contained in it, and accepting each of them separately. Such a principle is called 'Principle of Individual Value'.
2. There is also the possibility of making such a decision overwhelmingly, as a result of a priori trust in the one who created this system and commanded us to uphold it (= the source of authority), or a priori trust in the system itself for some other reason.[20] this is 'Overall Value Principle'Such a principle usually constitutes an a priori motive for accepting a commitment to the entire system as a single unit.[21]

We will now define two types of normative systems:

1. 'Partial systems'These are systems whose requirements leave a neutral margin, meaning that in realistic situations that fall within the margin, they do not demand anything from their subordinates.
2. 'Complete systems'These are systems that impose imperatives in all areas of human activity (and perhaps even thought). In such systems, there is no space for neutral states.

Let us now examine the possible relationships between two different normative systems. If they are both 'complete systems', then the relationship between them is one of two possible ones: 1. They completely overlap, and then (at least de facto) there is no situation of two different systems here.[22] 2. They contradict each other.

In the situation of two complete systems, when the instructions of each system are unambiguous (assumption a in the definition of a normative system above), there is no possibility of a third type of relationship between two 'complete' systems.[23]

If the two normative systems are 'partial', then in addition to the two previous types of relationship, a state of foreignness is also possible in principle, that is, the coexistence of the two systems, which are different and at the same time not contradictory (they simply deal with foreign sets of realistic situations).[24]

Now we ask: Is it possible for a person to be subject to two different, and even contradictory, normative systems to be consistent and rational? Is there not an inconsistency, or internal contradiction, within that person's doctrine? As we recall, clarifying this question is the purpose of the current chapter.

Here we must distinguish between different situations, in which two types of value principles and two types of normative systems are involved. If the two systems are 'complete', then in a situation of overlap there is subordination to only one system. Whereas in a situation where there is a difference between them, they are necessarily contradictory, and therefore it seems ostensibly impossible to be subject to both at the same time.

But this is not accurate. If the value principles underlying both systems are individual value principles, then it is truly impossible to accept a commitment to both systems together. If the value principle is individual, then the commitment to the system in question is based on an examination of each of its principles. Therefore, in a polynormative situation in such a context, there is a simultaneous acceptance of a principle and its opposite. On the other hand, if at least one of the principles underlying these systems is 'overarching', a situation of subordination to both is possible despite the contradiction. Subordination is interpreted as an obligation to uphold both. Admittedly, here it is an obligation that cannot be realized, and therefore a normative dilemma arises here.

For example, if a person accepts the halakhic system because of a 'principle of universal value', for example, an obligation to observe what their Creator commands them to do out of gratitude towards them, then there is not necessarily a recognition that each of the principles of the system has a specific basis that is acceptable to them in itself. If so, it is possible for one of the commandments to contradict a norm of another normative system to which it is subject, for example the system of human morality (at least as he himself understands it). Such a situation is possible whether the principle of value of the other system is universal or specific.

It is clear that if we had a specific principle of value for each commandment and commandment, then the obligation to destroy Amalek would be justified in itself in a specific manner, and if this were indeed acceptable to us, no contradiction could arise between this commandment and any moral principle.[25]

If at least one of the systems is partial, then in the first two types of relationship between them (overlap or contradiction) the situation is similar to that described in relation to 'complete' systems. If the relationship is one of co-existence (i.e. there is no contradiction between them), then this is the trivial situation, and it is quite clear that there is no a priori restriction on accepting commitment, or subordination, to both of them together.[26]

Our conclusion from this chapter is that a state of subordination to several normative systems is a priori possible, and even logically-philosophically consistent, in two cases: 1. When the two systems are partial and foreign, and therefore there is no contradiction between them. 2. When there is an area of overlap between them (when one of them is complete, or even in partial systems that discuss non-foreign areas), and this is as long as the value principle underlying at least one of them is comprehensive. If the value principles for the two systems are individual, this is not possible.

Therefore, even polynormativity that concerns contradictory systems (and certainly those that are not contradictory) is possible a priori (i.e. logically consistent). Of course, when there is a contradiction between the two systems in question, it is incumbent on the person subject to both systems, if he is in such a contradictory situation, to decide which one he obeys in the situation in question.

This conclusion is on the a priori-philosophical level. We are now tasked with applying this description to a situation of simultaneous subordination to different normative systems, one of which is the halakhic system.

First, we must examine whether the halakhic system is ‘complete’ or ‘partial.’ This depends on the question of whether there are words of authority within the framework of the Torah and halakhic law, and this is not the place to discuss this.[27] We saw above that situations of polynormativity may exist in both cases (whether the system is complete or partial). This depends on the question of what value principles underlie the halakhic-Torah system. If so, it is actually more important to understand what the value principle is that underlies subordination to halakhic law.

In most cases, and perhaps in all, this is a 'broad value principle' (for example, the assumption that there is an obligation to obey the Creator of the world, the duty to be grateful, etc.). It is difficult to see a specific value principle that underlies submission to halakha. Such a situation would describe a person who accepts submission to halakha only after examining each halakhic principle in detail, and accepting it on its own.[28]

In a footnote above, we cited the words of Rava in his discussion with the Sadducees on this matter in his Babylonian Shabbos, p. 11, in which we saw a clear approach of the principle of absolute value, as follows.

The Reformation, or other similar movements, can be described as[29] As movements that accept the burden of Halacha in light of individual value principles, and therefore do not accept the burden of some of the Halacha (those that do not pass the individual test). Orthodoxy, by its very nature, is built on overarching value principles (of course, each Orthodox Jew may have a different value principle, but it seems that it will always be overarching).

In light of this discussion, a surprising conclusion emerges. It is precisely an Orthodox person, who, as we have seen, accepts the burden of halakha as a result of a general, rather than individual, value principle, who is exposed to the creation of situations of subordination to conflicting systems. In contrast, a Reformer, who accepts halakha in light of individual value principles, in a situation of contradiction will generally not accept the burden of the halakha that is problematic in his eyes. As already mentioned above, questions concerning the Reform are usually questions that deal with changes in halakha and not with subordination to systems parallel to it, and therefore they are not of interest to us here.

So, let's summarize the discussion on the first, a priori level.: Situations of subordination to an additional and contradictory normative system are possible a priori. Surprisingly, they may (or may) arise precisely among the Orthodox Jew..

The second level of the discussion, as defined above in Chapter 2, deals with the question of whether a phenomenon of halachic polynormativity does indeed appear in reality. The answer to this is clearly positive. We have argued that worshippers of idols are sometimes in a similar situation. They believe in and are subject to God, and at the same time to additional systems. Polytheism, in general, is a clear expression of such a situation.

Therefore, the empirical question is not essential to the discussion, and the answer to it is also affirmative. We will now move on to the third part of the article, in which we will discuss the third, a posteriori level: whether there can be justification, or legitimacy, from a Torah perspective, for a polynormative situation.

Part Three

Initial a posteriori analysis

D. General Introduction

As we have seen, the dilemma of commitment, or subordination, to two contradictory normative systems is also a law of 'inevitability' and not just a law of 'desire.' That is, the fact that they are in themselves contradictory is not enough to reject the possibility of such a situation, since it also depends on the value principles that cause a person (the 'inevitability') to adhere to them, and these, by their very nature, lie outside the two systems in question.

In discussing the Torah's legitimacy for polynormativity, we must consider systems of different natures. There are systems that clearly contradict the will of God as expressed in the Torah. There are those that contradict only partially, and there are those that do not contradict at all. The relationship between the systems, of course, also depends on their nature compared to the nature of the Torah system (the will of God). This depends on questions such as: Are they 'complete'? Are their value principles comprehensive or particular? And so on.

The nature of the Torah system itself is also not entirely clear (see the note above). It can be seen as a complete system (without neutral spaces), or as partial. If it is indeed partial, then seemingly another normative system can enter the neutral space. For example, it is possible that engaging in art, or in chess, is neutral in terms of God's will, and therefore the system of chess rules is a system that naturally enters the Torah system. Other examples could be a system of economic laws, or political-state areas for which we do not have clear Torah instructions (see, for example, the aforementioned article by Yedidia Stern).[30]

As mentioned, in all these situations, an analysis of the Torah-Halakhic system itself is required in order to reach a conclusion as to whether or not there is a Torah-Halakhic vacuum in the context in question. However, this is not the subject of this article. Here we are dealing with a different question: Even if there are parallel systems, and precisely when there is no vacuum, is it possible to be subject to them simultaneously with the Torah and Halakhic?

When it comes to a value system, or at least one with value dimensions, the situation seems more complicated, since it turns out that there are guidelines, if only general ones, that arise from the will of God regarding behavior in such areas. However, at least in principle, the system of accepted human morality can be considered as falling within the realm of halakhic authority (although we have noted that it may itself have a halakhic dimension, and certainly a Torah status). The same applies to the system of modern values mentioned above, etc.

Even if the Torah system is complete (in the sense defined above), there may be normative systems that are neutral in its regard. For example, even if there is Torah guidance for every situation in life, there may be additional systems whose provisions do not necessarily contradict its provisions (such as the civil law system). Therefore, in principle, a person can be subject to both (see the footnote above on such situations).

When there are systems whose provisions clearly contradict those of the Torah system (God's will), it is likely to be very difficult to find halachic legitimacy for subordination to them. However, as we will see later, even in a neutral situation, the situation of polynormativity is not simple. Ostensibly, there is a consideration here of subordination to another entity beyond God, and this in itself can constitute a Torah problem.

It should be noted that systems to which the relationship is not one of subordination (such as our 'evil inclination') do not raise this problem, and therefore there seems to be no principled impediment to polynormativity in relation to them, unless their instructions clearly contradict the instructions of the Torah. In such a situation, the problem is not polynormativity, but a simple state of sin. The problem of polynormativity arises only when there is another factor to which we are subject, in parallel with God. Of course, the question arises as to what that factor is, and what it is forbidden to be. Is, for example, subordination to my own principles problematic? Or perhaps only a 'divine' factor in some sense (in a sense similar to that which emerges in the context of idolatry. See the discussion below) raises the problem?

In his aforementioned article, Wesner proposes a polynormative model of compliance with halakha. We will briefly explain it through an example that he himself provides (see note 23, ibid.). Let us suppose that a doctor was asked by a film actor whether, in his condition, he was permitted to participate in a commercial in which he was required to smoke a cigarette, and the fee for participation was very high. The doctor's answer was: Medically, you are not allowed to participate in the film, because smoking carries a medical risk. On the other hand, I personally strongly recommend that you participate in the film, in order to earn the enormous fee.

The laws of medicine, which are likened here to the laws of halakhah, unequivocally command him not to participate in the film. From a medical point of view, this is not true. On the other hand, the laws of (economic) survival, or at least convenience and pleasure, command him to participate in this film. Both considerations are correct, and therefore a person can find himself subject to both normative systems, and although he advocates for preserving health, whether mild or severe, he will in this case adopt the decision of the corresponding normative system.

Wesner offers a similar view of halakhah. Halakhah does not command us to do things, but rather states that they have value, and the transgressor pays a ‘price’ (moral, spiritual, religious, or other). However, it is possible that a parallel normative system will lead him to do actions that are not in accordance with halakhic rulings, since he is willing to do so and pay the price.

It should be noted, as Wesner himself emphasizes, that there is no suggestion here of changing the halakha, or of its creative interpretation. There is also no claim here about the use of extra-halakhic rules (which are sometimes inserted into the halakha), such as 'its ways are its ways of pleasure' and so on. As Wesner himself explains, this is also not a reliance on the 'fifth part of the Shulchan Aruch'. There is an action here based on extra-Torah considerations while paying the Torah 'price' involved in such actions (such as paying the health price involved in participating in the aforementioned film).

When there is a conflict between the halakhic-Torah system and another system (morality, civil law, etc.), the polynormative person can find himself choosing to act according to the dictates of one system or the other. Sometimes he chooses to obey the law, and sometimes to violate it. This depends on his scale of values, according to which he ranks these systems, and the different prices placed on the act in question. This is how he comes to the decision of how he should act in this situation.

Because polynormativity situations are complicated and diverse, and therefore difficult to characterize a priori, we will begin by addressing, albeit only in a general way, a few examples, and only then will we return to the discussion on a general level.

E. The need for substantive polynormativity: a preliminary analysis

There are several examples of systems that can be in conflict with the halakhic system. We will now attempt to present and briefly discuss the relevance of some of them.

Wesner gives the following examples of normative systems that can be in conflict with Halacha: Kabbalah (=Torah of the Secret), Evirah Lishma, the law of money according to the concept of the Rabbi Shekap (the human legal system), and vegetarianism. Additional normative systems can also be added here, such as: universal moral principles, civil law, modern values (self-realization and expression, freedom), and the like.

All of the systems cited by Wesner as precedents are systems that can themselves be seen as expressions of God's will. Therefore, all of these systems can be classified as normative systems that also draw, like the halakha itself, from God's will. As we have seen, a conflict between the halakha and the will of God exists in halakhic literature, and in several contexts the poskim have already addressed this. As stated, there will be those who will place the entire discussion within the halakha, and there are those who will prefer to see it as a discussion between the halakha and external systems that also express God's will. However, in any case, this is a conflict that takes place entirely within the system of God's will, and therefore the differences between these two approaches are not essential to our matter.

There is no doubt that all the precedents cited by Wesner were perceived by the thinkers they discussed as expressions of God's will. Rabbi Malady certainly perceived the principles of Kabbalistic halakhah as an authentic expression of God's will, as did Rabbi Hanzir and Rabbi Kook (and earlier commentators, such as the Abarbanel and the Ramban on the Torah) who spoke about vegetarianism. The examples of transgression for its own sake are also based on values that are a clear expression of God's will (saving the people of Israel, etc.). One can add here the principle of 'time to do for God, you have transgressed your Torah' (such as writing a Toshab'ap, etc.). It is important to note that for all of these, reliable sources can be cited from the written and oral Torah, including clearly halakhic sources, which will prove that this is indeed God's will.

Therefore, in all these cases there is no need to resort to polynormativity, since there are systems here that express the will of God (which does appear outside of the law). As stated, these are conflicts that have existed since time immemorial in halakhic literature. As stated, some would introduce these values into the halakhic system, through principles such as 'its ways are its ways of pleasantness' and the like, but this is not fundamentally different from the assertion that the will of God can be revealed outside of the law. The common denominator in all of these is that they do not see the possibility of subordination to normative systems that do not express the will of God. The root of the matter is that even if there is subordination here to another normative system, there is no other entity behind it.

The need for a polynormative approach arises at the essential level only when it is not possible to reasonably substantiate the claim that the value we adhere to is indeed the will of God, in other words: when the entity that establishes subordination to the system in question is not God (and perhaps even when there is no such entity at all). For example, if we believe in full equality for women, and on the other hand, a sincere and honest study of the halakhic literature reveals that this value, at least as it is perceived today, probably does not exceed it, then a conflict is created that is insoluble within the system of God's will.

Let's be more concrete. The disqualification of women as witnesses, for example, is clearly evident from halakhic literature. On the other hand, the modern approach sees a woman as a kosher witness for all intents and purposes. Here it would be very difficult to argue that it is God's will that we qualify women as witnesses, and more generally, that we equate men with men in all respects, when the entire halakhic law cries out to the contrary. Whoever claims this, his words reek of subjugating the concept of "God's will" to the speaker's private beliefs. When the Torah determined that a woman is disqualified as a witness, is there not a clear expression of God's will here? Here it would also be useless to argue that there is a will of God that is not within the halakhic system, since the halakhic law clearly states things on this subject. It is unlikely that God, the Almighty, says clear things in the law, and on the other hand His (extra-halakhic) will is that we go beyond them. Therefore, in cases such as these, it is not possible to see the conflict as taking place within the system of God's will. Here the question arises regarding the possibility and legitimacy of polynormativity.[31]

It is important to emphasize another aspect here. In all these cases, the conflict with halakha is not accidental, and therefore it is not reasonable to speak of halakha as setting a 'price'. We will elaborate a little more on this point.

The conflict between the values of soul-preservation and Shabbat is only accidental. The two values in themselves are not fundamentally contradictory, and therefore both constitute an authentic expression of God's will. There are very specific situations in which these two values conflict (an incident of 'pikuach nefesh' on Shabbat). Only in the context of an accidental conflict is there room to discuss what God's will is being done when the values in question conflict. Even in a situation in which there is a conflict between God's halakhic will and a non-halakhic will, this is only possible when the conflict is accidental.

For example, it cannot be claimed that there is an extra-halakhic (moral) will of God that we not kill Amalek. Halakhah states very clearly that it is God's will that we destroy him. The modern moral values that condemn such a step are in fundamental contradiction to the halakhic will of God, and therefore clearly do not constitute an expression of God's will. It is very difficult to accept a claim that God, the Blessed and Exalted, has established in His Torah a commandment that He Himself does not want us to abide by. If so, it is precisely here that the need to examine the essential polynormative approach arises. In cases where the conflict is accidental, the problem is less clear, if it exists at all.

The clash between the woman's disqualification from testifying and judging and the modern appeal to it is also fundamental. This is not a situation of a coincidental clustering of the two circumstances into one inn (like 'pikuach nefesh' on Shabbat), but a frontal contradiction. Therefore, it is clear that here too we cannot speak of rejection, neither within the halakha nor outside it.[32] Here too, the proposal regarding polynormativity should be examined.

The same is true for other cases discussed in recent years: universal moral values (for example, attitude towards non-Jews, at least for some systems), and according to certain approaches also some of the laws of the state (refusals of an order, etc.). Artistic values and freedom of creation, various forms of personal expression that do not comply with Halacha, and more.

In such situations, contrary to the examples cited by Wesner, the only way that allows for subordination to Torah and Halacha, and at the same time to these additional systems, is polynormativity.

It is important to note that such an approach, in such contexts, has no precedent. The reason for this is very simple: such an approach is simply not possible for a Jew who observes Torah and mitzvot, as will be explained in the next section (and in the discussion that will follow regarding the author’s words).Education) Submission to other systems of this type, in practice, means non-submission to the law, or to the will of God, if not more (see below).

There is one precedent that Wesner cites in which an approach that allows for polynormativity does indeed appear explicitly, and that is The Education BookAllegedly the owner The Education Book Proposes the 'price' model described above. According to this model, the law does not express the will of God but only sets a price for each step of transgression. Therefore, seemingly there is no prohibition against a woman testifying, but only a halachic determination that if she testifies there is a 'price' for it. In other words, this goes against halachic values, but it may be consistent with non-halachic values.

Such an approach, of course, requires evidence. It seems strange to say that the Torah punishes a person who has violated one of its commandments, even though he has not done anything wrong. As mentioned, in the book of education itself, such a proposal is made, to perceive the law as 'setting a 'price', but it should be noted that it is rejected there out of hand. The author Education (Mitzvah 7) asks why every commandment not to do requires both a punishment and a warning. The Talmud in several places makes it difficult: Do we find a punishment and a warning from the above? That is, it is not enough for us to know the punishment, and the Torah must also write a warning. And the author explains Education If there were no warning, we would think that the punishment was nothing more than setting a price (in his language: 'like buying and selling'), but in transgressing the law there is no transgression against the will of God.

It should be noted that the author of the book raises this argument as an explanation for the eva amina underlying the aforementioned Gemara's difficulties. However, the fact that the Talmud everywhere insists that a warning is also necessary indicates that there is a clear assumption that this is not the Halacha's understanding. The Talmud assumes that every punishment also includes a warning precisely to discourage thoughts of this kind, and this is precisely the conclusion that emerges from the author's words. If so, in conclusion, the author actually proves from the Talmud that there are no punishments in Halacha that are merely a price.

An interesting anecdote in this context arises from the words of a Educational facilitator In the Mitzvah of 557, Sec. 4.position There he raises the possibility of understanding the prohibition of 'conquering his prophecy' in this way, and rejects it outright. The author ofposition There is no warning about a prophet who falsifies his prophecy, but only punishment.[33] Therefore, he offers an interpretation according to which the prophet Jonah fled from the port of Jaffa because he wanted to conquer his prophecy. Jonah understood that this was a legitimate act, but that it had a 'price', and he did so out of a willingness to accept the punishment (the 'price'). However, the Manach himself rejected this outright, and the reason for this is probably the above-mentioned words of Baal Education himself, who deduces from the Talmud that every commandment and commandment requires punishment and warning.[34]

We see that this proposal, which was explicitly raised inThe Education Book, was rejected with clear evidence from the Talmud. If so, the conclusion that emerges from this is that a proposal to understand the halakha in this way cannot be based on the words of the education, especially when he himself proves from the Talmud that this is not the case. In fact, in the case of the author Education The clearest evidence of the impossibility of giving Torah legitimacy to polynormativity appears.

In conclusion, a normative system whose provisions contradict the halacha, if it claims that it also expresses the will of God, is subject to the obligation of proof. Here, a subjective feeling will not suffice. When there is a fundamental and not accidental contradiction between it and the halacha, it is unlikely that God, the Almighty, conveys to us a single message in the halacha, while His 'true' will is that we not obey it. This is exactly what the author ofEducationIn these situations, the only possible way out for those who adhere to these two normative systems is a polynormative approach. In the next section, we will discuss the possibility of Torah legitimacy for such an approach for systems that are fundamentally contradictory, and then we will generalize the discussion to other systems as well.

Part Four

Halachic Analysis: Can there be Torah legitimacy for polynormativity?

So far we have refined the essence and meaning of halachic polynormativity. We have seen that the discussion is relevant mainly when it comes to subordination to a system that fundamentally contradicts halachic law (or the will of God). Such a situation does not allow us to claim that this is also the will of God. Therefore, in situations of this type, the only solution that allows subordination to both systems is polynormativity, that is, subordination to both systems, and in effect, a renunciation of the prevalent perception of the totality of the will of God.

A priori, following the refinement of the problem, it seems that Torah legitimacy for such an approach is very problematic. As we have seen, it is true that this is a possible and consistent situation in the philosophical sense, and its justification is necessarily made in extra-Torah terms, and therefore there is no need for Torah justification for such an approach. However, this in itself suggests that Torah justification for such a situation seems unlikely. In any case, in principle it is still interesting to examine the position of Halacha, and the Torah in general, on such an approach. Is this indeed a possible option for a Jew who is subject to Halacha (even if only partially)?

As we have explained, theoretically, such an approach does not require intra-Torah justification, but it is nevertheless important to examine whether such justification exists. We must examine whether someone who advocates such a position is necessarily not considered subject to halakha? What is the Torah-halakhic status of such a person (is he an epikurs)? Beyond the question of whether this or that step he takes is in accordance with halakha (it may be considered an 'offense for its own sake,' for example), there is room to ask what the status of such an approach is in terms of beliefs and opinions?

F. Idolatry and dualism

The first question that arises in the context of substantive polynormativity directly concerns the foundations of faith: Is there not heresy, and perhaps even idolatry, in subordination to another normative system?

There seems to be a fundamental problem with the very act of subordination to normative systems parallel to the Torah, those that do not express the will of God, since this acknowledges a source of authority other than God. Behind every normative system stands a binding principle (called above a 'value principle'). Sometimes this principle is backed by an entity (or, in accepted theological terminology: a 'personal God'), and sometimes not. When a person accepts a commitment to extra-Torah principles, there is a strong sense of theological dualism, or a belief in 'sharing.' As if there are two sovereigns to whom the person is subject, and not just God alone. If there is indeed sharing here, this is a contradiction to the belief in uniqueness, which is one of the principles of Judaism.

I will repeat this more. The main problem with the belief in cooperation is not its specific content, but the very fact that it is 'foreign' (like 'foreign worship'). The very fact that a person bends himself to something other than the Torah and God is problematic. The acts of worship of Baal Peor, or other idols, generally do not constitute direct violations of prohibitions in the Torah (although they are often accompanied by elements of incest, and even murder, this is clearly not the problematic nature of the prohibition of fornication). To break open is not an act that contradicts the halakha, but solely because of the fact that it is done as part of the worship of Peor, that is, as part of submission to another sovereignty beyond God. The problematic nature is the very submission and worship to another entity, beyond God and His will as expressed in the Torah, and not the act itself.

If faith in God does not exist at all, and a person submits only to the other system (the idol), this is heresy and idolatry. However, it is clear that this problem exists even if faith and submission to God exist simultaneously with submission to the idol. This is exactly what is called 'work in partnership', or dualism, which contradicts the principle of faith in the uniqueness of God and His reality as the one and only God, embracing all.

As stated above, this problem can also exist in subordination to a normative system that does not contradict Halacha, just as the acts of worship to various idols do not necessarily contradict Halacha in themselves. The very subordination to another factor is the root of the problem of 'sharing'.

If so, we must examine the relationship between polynormativity and polytheism (=multiple gods, or idols).

The claim that polynormativity is identified with idolatry is not so simple. First, a distinction must be made between heretical beliefs of all kinds and what is called in halakhic terms 'idolatrous worship.' The concept of 'idolatrous worship' in its halakhic meaning involves two essential components: 1. Ritual acts. 2. That the acts are performed towards a specific entity (idol).[35]

These two components are seemingly absent in most of the examples we have given above. For example, modern moral principles and values do not involve belief in a concrete being (a personal god). There is no 'idol' here, at least in the classical sense of the term, since there is seemingly no ontology behind these sets of norms.[36] In addition, commitment to these normative systems does not ostensibly involve ritual actions. While this commitment usually requires the individual to act in a manner consistent with the dictates of the system in question, it is difficult to see these actions as worship (especially given the atheistic basis of modern norms). In the words of Maimonides: There is no 'acceptance of God' here. We will now discuss these two components, one after the other.

1. Let's begin the discussion with the second component: the idol. When we ask ourselves what the idol was that the ancient idolaters worshipped, it seems that the ancient idol is nothing more than a piece of wood, or stone, that the believer worships in all sorts of ways. If so, we must ask ourselves, is the existence of that stone essential to the problematic nature of the prohibition of idolatry? And what if someone does all the actions without a concrete stone? Or for an abstract 'stone'?

Is the prohibition of idolatry actually made more severe when accompanied by the foolish naivety of believing in trees and stones? Apparently, the main problem is the very subjection to another factor beyond God, and not necessarily to this or that piece of stone. When the heretical belief is more intelligent, and the entity to which we are subject is more abstract, it seems that there will be a prohibition that is no less severe, and perhaps even more severe.

In our modern world, we are accustomed to virtual realities, and sometimes even attribute to them (usually metaphorically, but not always) real characteristics and effects. Therefore, in our time, it is easier to understand the lack of necessity of the ontological component that previously stood behind the prohibition of 'idolatry'.

Worshiping an idol was the only way that could create a commitment to a normative system in the ancient world. In the ancient world, there was no willingness to accept the burden of abstract systems, those that do not have a concrete entity behind them (this was the main innovation of our forefather Abraham), and therefore behind all idolatry was an idol. However, it is very clear that the problematic nature of the concept of 'idolatry' will exist even without such an entity, or when this entity is abstract. In our world, after the invention of 'secularism', a commitment to normative systems that do not have any entity behind them can be created. However, it seems that the problematic nature of a complete commitment to extra-Torah systems remains.

And perhaps even more can be said. It seems that there is also evidence of Yahuwah here, for in the modern world there is a belief in some kind of 'image of man' that requires a certain way of activity, perhaps as opposed (according to the secular-humanist view) to the 'image of God' that requires activity according to the Torah.

There is room to liken the modern situation to what the Sages described (see, for example, the Midrash on Esther 3:2) with the wicked Haman. Haman, according to the Sages, made himself an idol, and obliged everyone to bow down to him (some commentators have explained this as why Mordechai did not kneel or bow down, even though he thereby endangered all of Israel). Here we are dealing with a being who is not transcendent, and seemingly without any 'religious' connotation, but an ordinary person. And yet the Sages see here the possibility of idolatry towards him. Isn't the work of the image of modern man (or perhaps: the work of man for himself) largely parallel to this description? Modern man, who is more sophisticated, has turned himself (or the idea of humanity: 'the image of man', or: 'the image of man') into[37] to an abstract idol before which he worships. Whether the similarity is sufficient even for the formal halakhic level or not, the spirit of the matter seems quite similar.

We will briefly touch on another point in this context. I mentioned above (in a footnote) that there is a weighty philosophical problem, and in my opinion a decisive one, in the very act of submitting to a system of norms that is not anchored in an existing entity that constitutes the source of its validity. Is it really possible to speak of 'submission' to a system of which I myself am the creator? I do not mean a psychological claim that this submission will not hold (i.e., will not be effective: 'If there is no God in this place, then kill me'), but rather a substantive claim that such submission indicates the creation of an implicit idol, even if the person does not acknowledge its existence. This idol is no less tangible to me than the idol hidden in a piece of wood or a piece of stone to which the idolaters of the ancient world bowed.

When a person is in a dilemma, for example between moral aspects and a religious-halakhic command, he cannot be satisfied with the fact that his conscience (=he himself) does not allow him to do a certain act that the Torah commands him to do. This statement is equivalent to saying: I do not want to fulfill the Torah command. If so, in fact, there is no subjection here to the Torah system, nor is there any subjection here to another normative system. A conflict between subjection to two normative systems (especially if one of them is the Torah, or the will of God), necessitates the existence of some kind of 'idol' (='human image').

If so, one can think that there is actually a real idol here, in the ontological sense, but that man denies it due to its abstract nature, and therefore invents for himself the possibility of commitment to a system of norms without any binding source. The discussion of this issue is long and exists in the literature, and therefore I will not do it here. However, this point is important for the purpose of the argument here, and therefore it is important to point it out.

So, the conclusion so far is that there are weighty arguments in favor of the statement that the normative systems under discussion, at least to the extent that they constitute weighty competition to the Torah system, do draw their weight from some 'idol' or another. De facto, at least halakhically, it seems very clear that there is indeed an 'idol' here.

2. So far we have discussed the first component (the idol). In order to present the second discussion on its own, we will separate it from the previous discussion, and assume that in the systems under discussion there is indeed an idol (from a halakhic point of view). Now we must discuss whether there is also a ritual component here. The second component of the prohibition of idolatry, worship, is apparently not present here. The actions required within the framework of the normative systems under discussion here do not simply fall within the scope of religious worship. However, here too there is a full commitment to values external to the Torah, and therefore it is again unclear whether the ritual dimension is so essential to the matter. We will also attempt to go through a process of abstraction in this discussion, as in the previous one.

If the required worship was more abstract, and did not specifically manifest itself in sacrifices, or in distinct ritual acts, does this alleviate the substance of the matter? Maimonides rules that if it is done in its proper way, then even if it is not in one of the four acts (of offering sacrifices), it violates the prohibition of idolatry (see Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:6, and Maimonides in Pihamash ibid., and in Halacha 87:32-3, and more). Does behavior that is clear and distinct according to the principles of a normative system different from that of the Torah (and let us assume for the time being, for the purposes of the present discussion, that there is an idol that commands it), not fall within the scope of idolatry?

We will add another point to the current discussion. Engaging in idolatry that is not worship (such as healing oneself with Asherah sticks, see Pesachim 25:1 and Baran and Shar ibid.) constitutes, according to Halacha, an accessory to idolatry. For this too, one must be killed and not transgressed (see, for example, Talmudic Encyclopedia(The meaning of 'accessories' is 'accessories'). Therefore, non-ritual engagement with the same idol, which would involve various actions, is certainly conceivable and would also be considered accessory worship.

Therefore, worship of a pseudo-idol (or: virtual idol), even if it is abstract worship (pseudo-idol), can raise halakhic problems of the prohibition of idolatry. This is because there may indeed be an 'idol' in the background, at least in some sense, or perhaps there is no need for such an idol at all (and, for that matter, a virtual 'idol'). Statements that refer to such ideas as 'idolatry' sometimes arise in the context of sermons and moral discussions, but I believe that there is also a halakhic dimension here that definitely needs to be considered.

Now let us move on to the next level of the argument. As we saw above, a distinction must be made between an abstract belief, which is heresy or heresy, and a belief that requires worship, in which case we already fall within the scope of the prohibition of idolatry. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to show that polynormativity has a problem of false belief. That is, even if we conclude, despite the above arguments, that polynormativity does not meet the formal halachic criteria of the prohibition of idolatry, it still certainly has a problem of false belief of 'sharing.' It turns out that such a situation is no worse than sharing the name of God with something else, an action that does not involve actual sharing at all but only a deceptive form of speech in the literal sense (see Bavli Sukkah 52b and Sanhedrin 63b, and more).

Ultimately, even if there is no formal prohibition of idolatry here, there are nevertheless elements of a shared belief in God, and therefore polynormativity is suspect as a dualistic heretical belief. God requires me not to accept women's testimony in the Jewish Law, while I accept upon myself the submission to another set of rules, in which a woman has the status of a kosher witness. This system is so binding for me that sometimes I reject God's commands in its face. There is a strong and unequivocal submission here, to the point of surrender, to another factor (even if abstract), which evokes a strong sense of dualism.[38]

If so, our conclusion is that at least in the sense of beliefs and opinions Polynormativity involves some form of polytheism..

As stated above, this set of problems can exist in principle (although not necessarily) even in a situation where there is subordination to systems that do not fundamentally contradict Halacha, but rather the fact that they are different from it and external to it (see, for example, the discussion that we will conduct below on the words of the Maimonides in Halacha Melachim). This is similar to the situation in ordinary idolatry, where, as we explained above, the problem is not in the acts of worship themselves, or in the contradiction between them and the commandments of the Torah, but in the fact that they are 'foreign', that is, they are done out of subordination to a different system.

It could perhaps be argued that there is no unambiguous halachic reasoning in the matters so far, but given the ambiguity found in the laws of idolatry and the laws of faith in general, this is not surprising. The laws of idolatry are not perceived as relevant to our generation, and therefore have not been extensively studied. However, I believe that simple intuition dictates what we are saying.

We will end the chapter with a quote from the halakhah that opens the "Strong Faith" (see also, especially, Maimonides' first belief in his introduction to Part 5), where I believe our conclusion is clearly implied:

A. The foundation of the foundations and the pillar of wisdom is the knowledge that there is a first existing name and that it creates everything that exists, and all that exists from heaven and earth and what is between them were not found except from the truth of its existence.

B. And if it is conceivable that it does not exist, nothing else can exist.

3. If it were to occur to us that all that exists apart from Him are not existing, He alone would be existing and would not nullify His nullification. All that exists need Him and He, blessed be He, does not need them or any of them. Therefore, His truth is not like the truth of one of them.

D. It is that the prophet says, ‘And God is truth’ – He alone is the truth and there is no other truth like His truth. It is that the Torah says there is none other besides Him, meaning there is no truth found besides Him like Him…

6. And knowing this is a positive commandment, as it says, “I am the Lord your God.” And whoever thinks that there is another God besides this has transgressed without doing it, as it says: “You shall have no other gods before me.” And he disbelieved mainly, because this is the great principle on which everything depends.

7. This God is one, not two or more than two, but one who is unique among the ones found in the world…

Maimonides' main claim is that God does not need any addition, and that everything that exists depends only on Him, and he also states that all normative systems, and not just all entities (material or spiritual), do not exist (and are obligatory) except from the truth of their existence. And to say that there is a reality, or a norm, that does not depend on Him, turns out that this too is a test of heresy. Therefore, belief in, or submission to, a normative system that is not an expression of God's will (especially if it contradicts His will) is nothing but heresy in its truth and uniqueness.

We will end the chapter with a comment from another angle. Someone who is subject to another normative system that contradicts God's will (as mentioned, only in such a situation do we need substantial polynormativity), believes that he (or the source of authority of that system) knows better than God what is appropriate to do in a given situation. If God does not think that this is the appropriate thing to do, is it conceivable that this would still be the more appropriate action?[39] From this angle, one can ask whether that person indeed believes in the same God (good, omnipotent, and omniscient) in whom traditional-halachic Judaism believes? This is not a problem of sharing, but of the image of God in the polynormative person's belief, and so on (precisely in this context, see the words of Rabbi Kook cited below in the concluding chapter).[40]

G. Additional Halachic Prohibitions

So far we have dealt with the question of whether polynormativity involves prohibitions of heresy or idolatry. Now, in summary, we will turn to two additional halachic aspects that relate (or at least are tangential) to the issue of polynormativity.

1. "Do not follow your heart and your eyes."

Maimonides in the book of Avoda Zara, chapter 2, verse 3, refers to a situation in which a person thinks of upholding norms that do not originate in the Torah, and in particular those that contradict what is written in it and its principles. It seems from his language there that he defines this as the non-law of 'You shall not follow your heart and your eyes,' and he warns that a person should not rely on his own opinion contrary to the Torah, as he may be wrong.[41]

We see here a much more far-reaching argument than the argument about polynormativity. Maimonides states that even if a person adds things from his own mind, and sees them as a divine command, because he may be mistaken, there is a prohibition here of 'do not turn after your own heart.' The fact that this prohibition is detailed in the book of Avoda Zarah means that it belongs to the family of these prohibitions (which, as we know, is very broad, at least according to Maimonides).

And this is what Maimonides says there:

And it is not only idolatry that is forbidden to turn to in thought, but any thought that causes a person to uproot the main principles of the Torah. We are warned not to bring it to our hearts, and we will not be distracted by it, and we will be considered and drawn to the thoughts of the heart. Because a person's mind is short, and not all opinions can reach the truth for his ignorant, and if every person follows the thoughts of his heart, he will be found destroying the world according to his short-sightedness...

And the Torah warned about this matter, and it says, "And do not turn after your hearts and after your eyes, after which you prostitute yourselves." That is, each of you should not be drawn to his own short-sightedness and imagine that his thinking reaches the truth. Thus the Sages said: "After your hearts" - this is sexual immorality, and "after your eyes" - this is prostitution.

And in Halacha 5 there the Rambam continues and writes:

Likewise, the tribes of Israel are not like Israel in any way. They are not accepted in repentance forever, as it is said: "All who come to her will not return nor will they attain the dwellings of life."

And the men are those who follow the thoughts of their hearts foolishly in the things we have said, until they are found transgressing the Torah in order to anger, with disgust for the soul, with a high hand, and say that there is no sin in this. And it is forbidden to speak with them and to answer them at all, as it is said: 'Do not go near the door of her house,' and you consider the men to be an idolatrous act.

It is not clear whether there is an additional aspect here to those brought up above, or whether we encounter here the accessories of idolatry discussed above, but here they are classified within the framework of the independent prohibition of 'You shall not turn after your heart and after your eyes.' It is important to note, and many have already emphasized this, that this prohibition appears in the Rambam within the framework of the laws of idolatry. In any case, it is clear that a polynormative position is certainly a reasonable candidate and fits the Rambam's descriptions here.

2. 'Don't add'.

One should also examine the limits of 'do not add'. Ostensibly, this is a prohibition opposite to the one under discussion, since here a person transgresses only if he does think that God commands him to do so. If he does something for another reason, there is no prohibition of 'do not add' here (see Rambam, Hala Memariam, 2:9 and Benu'ak, ibid.). True, here too there is no reference to a situation in which a person does something out of submission to another normative system, whose origin is not in God. The discussion in Rambam revolves around a Jewish scholar who adds a law as a limit to the laws of the Torah, as opposed to a Jewish scholar who wants to add something on the grounds that it is written in the Torah itself.

The prohibition of "You shall not add to" was stated for every person from Israel. It was precisely with regard to the Sages that the Rishonim differed as to whether this prohibition also applied to them or whether they were exempt from it by virtue of their status (see Babil R. 16b in Tud "Vetukaim" and in Chai' Rashba ibid.). From the words of the Rambam here it appears that even one who adds to a commandment and treats it as the will of God, transgresses the Law: "You shall not add to" (Thou shalt not add to).

It should be noted that the situation here is the opposite of the prohibition of "do not turn aside" discussed above. The root of the prohibition here is precisely because of the change in the halakhic system itself, and anyone who does so because of considerations of seemingly external systems is not subject to this prohibition at all.

But this is not simple. It is precisely the sages, in their function as judges who legislate and amend regulations, who are warned (according to some of the first) not to present their laws as part of the laws of the Torah. They must clearly distinguish between the areas (between interpretation and legislation), and inform the public of this as well. However, the common person may be warned about "do not add," even if he is inventing a religion, and innovating something out of the wisdom of reason, in light of a normative system that is external to the will of God.

The prohibition of "do not add" is branched and complex, and our early rabbis differed on it, and there is no room here to dwell on it at length, and we have come only to stir the heart of the reader.[42]

H. Maimonides in Kings: 'The Decisiveness of Knowledge' and 'Renewal of Religion'

In light of all that we have said so far, we must examine the words of the Maimonides in 1 Kings 58:11, where he writes:

Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to do them is one of the righteous among the nations of the world, and he has a share in the world to come. And he should accept them and do them because God, the Holy One, commanded them in the Torah, and we were informed by Moses our Rabbi that the sons of Noah were commanded to do them before. But if they do them because of the will of God, then this is not a resident alien and he is not one of the righteous among the nations of the world, but (viii. 13) and not one of their sages.[43]

It seems from the Rambam's language that he accepts a situation in which mitzvot are observed for other reasons, that is, as a result of subordination to another normative system (the 'decision of opinion'), which in this case does not contradict the halakhic one. In other words, it seems that in the eyes of the Rambam, although this is not Hasidism, it is not actual heresy.[44]

However, it seems that this is not the intention of the Rambam, since he is not talking here about someone who accepts a different normative system, but about someone who fulfills a commandment not because of a command from God. It is important to emphasize that the Rambam is talking about someone who fulfills the commandments to which he is obligated, but who does so because of a different source of authority, and not about someone who practices according to a different system of norms.[45] From his words, it seems that the assessment of someone who upholds a different set of norms will be different. In any case, it seems that these words of Maimonides contain a significant source that shows that submission to a different system is not heresy, nor is it a real transgression against the will of God (he is not a Hasid, but he is not a criminal either).

However, if we carefully examine the language of the Rambam, we will see that the two cases he contrasts are performing a commandment due to the 'decision of reason', as opposed to the belief that God commanded this in the Torah given by Moses. The Rambam does not contrast the concept of 'decision of reason' with the very existence of being because it is God's will. This means that 'decision of reason' also means the belief that one must do so because of God's will, but it is opposed to the belief that sees the only expression of God's will in the Torah handed down to us from Sinai. According to this, 'decision of reason' is a command that a person makes up in his heart and does not find it in the Torah, or someone who thinks that the Torah was not given by Moses, and that it is not binding. If so, the Rambam is contrasting here situations of deciding on God's will from reason, as opposed to deciding that it is God's will because it is written in the Torah given by Moses from Sinai.[46]

If so, the conclusion is that there is no reference at all in Maimonides' words to a person doing something because of another normative system, which is not at all the will of God, and in particular a system whose commandments are contrary to the will of God. It is clear, for the reasons detailed above, that such a situation is classified by him as illegitimate, and therefore it is not surprising that he does not find it appropriate to address it at all.

In fact, there is a situation here that the Maimonides calls elsewhere 'reinvention of religion'. 'Reinvention of religion' is the innovation of a mitzvah that does not appear in the Torah, but the one who innovates it thinks that it is imposed on him by God (see, for example, the Maimonides' words in Halachaim 16:9 and in the book of the key in the Frankel edition, ibid.). In light of our above remarks, it appears that even in his above-quoted remarks (ibid. 18:11) the Maimonides speaks of someone who 'reinvention of religion', that is, who invents a mitzvah that, to the best of his understanding, does not appear in the Torah (or that one does not need to obey the Torah that commands it), but in his opinion the Holy One expects him to fulfill it. This is the will of God that is not expressed in the Torah (a category to which we referred above in Chapter 2).

If so, there is no contradiction in these words of Maimonides to our claim above, that the situation of a normative system with another source of authority, meaning norms whose validity is not based on God, is equivalent to theological dualism, and as a teaching.

And I found that in the book Honor of kings (They cited in the Likotim in the Frankel edition on this halakha) They cited a midrash From the book of Rabbi Eliezer, and the late:

But if they performed seven commandments and said from the mouth of so-and-so, we heard either from our own knowledge that such is the decisive knowledge, or they shared in it, then if they performed these seven commandments, they do not receive their reward except in this world.

There is an explicit reference here to someone who performs seven mitzvot because of a sharing of a z, and this comes as an additional category, different from that of 'decision of mind'. If so, it seems that the decision of mind is not in the sense of sharing. However, this formulation is actually very appropriate to what was said above. According to what we said above, it seems that the intention of this midrash is that there is a situation of 'decision of mind', which is a 'new religion', that is, a decision on an additional mitzvah according to the will of God. In contrast, there is a situation of a different normative system, which does fall under what is called 'sharing of a z.'[47]

Summary

This article examined the possibility of a Jew who is bound by halakhah being bound by another normative system (moral rules, civil law, various aspects of modernity, etc.). We saw that if the other system expresses the will of God in his eyes, then there is nothing here but an internal halakhic, or Torah, problem, the likes of which we find many. This is not a fundamental philosophical problem, but a question of distinction and order of priority between different areas of God's service, or of changes and adjustments in halakhah. In this article, we focused on the discussion of the possibility of subordination to normative systems whose source of authority is different, that is, one that is not related to the will of God, even in its broadest sense.

We have seen that a state of subordination to such systems is certainly philosophically possible, and a priori it can certainly be consistent. We have also seen that such a state is particularly typical for a Jew with an essentially Orthodox faith (derived from an overarching value principle), since among Reform Jews this type of problem usually does not appear at all.

However, despite all this, we have also seen that there is no possibility of such a situation from the Torah perspective itself. We have seen the author's viewEducation, that the Halacha and Talmud certainly do not perceive the status of the Torah and Halacha in this way. We expanded and said that from a traditional Jewish perspective this is nothing more than a certain type of heresy in collaboration. We also discussed certain elements of the prohibition of 'you shall not transgress' that appear in polynormativity.

Let us now return to the approaches (mentioned at the beginning of our discussion) that propose submission to normative systems parallel to the Torah and halakha. If indeed what is being discussed there (each case must be examined on its own merits) are systems that do not express the will of God as it appears in the Torah (written and oral), the conclusion is that these are nothing more than proposals for denial, mainly. This, of course, is nothing new, since such proposals have been put forward since time immemorial. These are indeed consistent proposals, but, on the other hand, it is important to understand that these proposals should not be seen as a possible path in the service of God, as can sometimes be seen from the language of those who propose them. Accepting the yoke of such a system means a lack of submission to the fundamental principle of the Torahic system, which claims the totality of the will of God and His Torah.

In fact, the conclusion that emerges from this is that submission to the Torah requires, by its very nature, the absence of extra-Torah normative systems. Every norm must be examined in terms of its relationship to the will of God. Therefore, the only relevant discussion in this context is the discussion of the possibility of understanding the will of God in different ways (within and outside of the law), or a discussion about neutral intervals, or a discussion (of type 1, in the above division) about changes and adjustments in the law and its interpretation (the relationship between innovation and reform).[48].

In light of what we have said here, subordination to additional normative systems to the Torah, such as civil law, modern values, or morality, is possible from a Torah perspective only if we understand that each of these is itself the will of God, or alternatively that it deals with the realm of authority in which the Torah leaves us room for action as we understand it (a neutral space).

According to this, it is clear that in both cases (when the additional system is an expression of God's will, or when it deals with a neutral interval of halakhah) if there is a conflict (which must be accidental, as we have seen) between two such normative systems, the Torah-halakhic system will necessarily have the upper hand.

As stated above, the claim that a polynormative situation is possible has no standing in terms of Torah discussion. Such a claim means: 'I do not accept the authority of the law, at least in certain cases.' As stated above, this is in fact the claim of many heretics, and therefore I do not find much innovation in it. Our conclusion is that the essential problem with the polynormative approach is not a lack of philosophical consistency, but the fact that it represents dualism, that is, heresy (=lack of submission to the Torah system) of a type of belief in co-existence, and perhaps even a real prohibition of idolatry, and therefore by its very nature it cannot gain Torah legitimacy.

But now, surprisingly, it seems that a dimension of inconsistency has also been created here retroactively. Although not on the philosophical-a priori level, but on the level of faith itself. If indeed the subordination to the law is complete, then the subordination to the additional normative system violates several principles of the law itself (idolatry, heretical beliefs, 'you shall not change', and so on). It contradicts clear evidence from the Talmud (as the author has brought Education) that this is not the perception of the law itself (contrary to the example of the doctor and the actor cited above). If so, de facto it follows that the polynormative Jew's statement about his submission to the law is incorrect. In such a situation, the value principle that underlies the commitment to the second system itself contradicts the law. Full commitment to the law cannot be accompanied by a commitment to another system that contradicts it. This is already an inconsistency, and not just a problem with belief in and submission to the law.

I will conclude with an anecdote, which will serve as an illustration of the last point. There is a common sarcastic statement made by Haredim towards the people of the 'Mercaz HaRav', that they have great reverence for God, but there is a problem with the essence of the 'God' they fear. Some time ago, a friend drew my attention to the fact that the source of these words, ironically, is Rabbi Kook himself. Rabbi Kook writes very similar things (which were probably directed at the people of the old settlement), and the late:[49]

There is apostasy that is like confession, and confession that is like apostasy. How can a person admit that the Torah is from heaven, but that heaven appears to him in such strange forms that there is nothing left of the true faith in him?

Even in polynormativity, there is apparently a subordination to the Torah and to the Halacha, but it is not clear what subordination, what Torah and what Halacha (and as we have seen, we can perhaps also add: what G-d, blessed be He), is being discussed here. As we saw above (at the end of chapter 6, and also see the words of the Maimonides quoted in the note there), it is not clear whether there is a subordination here to the same G-d, blessed be He, of whom the Torah speaks.

Despite everything, it is important to add, and not just to soften the above criticism, that at least with respect to certain polynormative approaches, the conclusion of Rav Kook's words there may be no less relevant (and is also related to the above-mentioned words of Maimonides in the MUN):

And [there is] apostasy that is like a confession. How, a person apostates the Torah from heaven, but his apostasy is founded only on that absorption that he absorbed from the drawing of the form of heaven that is in minds filled with thoughts of vanity and chaos, and he says the Torah has a higher source than this. And he begins to find its foundation in the greatness of the human spirit, from the depth of his morality and the height of his wisdom, despite the fact that he has not yet reached the center of truth in this, MMM This apostasy as a confession is important, and it is getting closer and closer to the confession of the faith of an artist…

And look at it carefully.

Clarification needed: In my remarks here, there is no attempt to classify and determine the status of any specific person, but rather to examine a principled approach, and nothing more. Every proposal (including that of Wesner, which was mentioned and discussed quite a bit during the discussion) must be examined on its merits: what its intentions and direction are, and what its essential details are. Only then can concrete conclusions be reached about it.[50]

[1] It should be noted that there are those who do not distinguish between the two questions. When one wants to argue for a parallel commitment to an external value, one sometimes uses the terminology of 'changes in halakhah'.

[2] The term 'a priori' will be used below to mean: prior to halakhah, or to halakhic-Torah discussion. We do not mean here the conventional philosophical meaning of the term (=prior to experience in general).

[3] It is clear that if we present evidence that Moses our Rabbi (= the Torah) does not require us to submit in the sense in question, or that he does not deny parallel submission to another normative system, this would solve the problem, but in such a case there is simply no problem, and there is no room for discussion (other than eliminating errors in the interpretation of the Torah). As will be explained in more detail below, we are dealing with the legitimacy of submission to another normative system (which often contradicts, in one way or another, the Torah) without authorization from the Torah, or from those who gave the Torah.

[4] The question of subordination to parallel systems has recently been raised, in one form or another, in several articles. This is reflected, for example, in various issues of entree (See, for example, the article by Shai A. Wesner (in issue 11), and the articles by Aryeh Baratz and Dr. Moshe Meir in issue 12, which at least touch on this question (see also my response to them in the next issue), and more.

In issue 11 of entree Yitzhak Geiger reviews what he calls 'New Religious Zionism' (NRZ). One of the characteristics he suggests for this phenomenon is the willingness of some NRZ members to consider subordination to normative systems other than the halakhic one. It is interesting to note that another characteristic of NRZ members, as Geiger's article also suggests, concerns precisely the first question: basing innovative positions, even those that deny the authority of rabbis, or at least challenge the hegemony of a single type of ruling, on precedents, sometimes marginal, and even esoteric, that express diverse approaches. There is an ambivalent attitude here towards the authority of Torah jurists and thinkers: on the one hand, challenging their authority, and on the other, using them themselves and their diverse opinions as an authority that legitimizes such a challenge.

[5] And about this the sages said (Babli Khulin 124a): "O God, if Joshua son of Nun had not said to me from his name (and in the Shtamk there is the letter E: from his mouth), we would not have obeyed him."

[6] To the best of my knowledge, he is almost the only one who has put the point in question on the table. Many refer to, or implicitly assume, the possibility of polynormativity. Most of them wrap this in considerations of changes in halakhah. Very few of them raise the possibility of a non-halakhic justification for a polynormative approach.

In the following, we will refer to Wesner's article at length, and therefore, in order to eliminate any misunderstandings that may arise, the reader is referred here to the 'necessary clarification' that appears at the end of this article.

[7] A point for thought. The term 'changes' does not usually appear in relation to morality, or civil law, or other cultural values. For some reason, in certain contexts of public debate morality is eternal, fixed, and unchanging, while it is the law that requires changes.

[8] See for example in the book Moral dilemmas, Daniel Statman, Magnes, Jerusalem 1991, who discusses in detail incommensurability, that is: the lack of a common measure, of values.

[9] For the definition of the concept of 'halakha', see, for example, Yosef Ahituv's article, 'Notes on the Use of the Concept of Halakha in Orthodox Discourse', in the collection Renewed Jewish Commitment H.B., Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar (editors), Hartman Institute and the United Kibbutz, Tel Aviv 2001.

[10] See, for example, the article by Rabbi Menachem Mendel Kosher, 'Sabrah Da'Oriyata', at the beginning of his book on the teachings of the Rogchober, Northern decoder, Tzafnat Pa'anach Institute, Jerusalem 1955. Also see the well-known dispute between the P'ni and the Tsalach in the blessings of the 35th chapter, and the words are ancient.

[11] This is related to the question of whether the commandment to do what is right and good has a halakhic status. A related question is the status of the commandments to do before the law (which some learn from the verse "Be holy," see, for example, Ramban, Reish P. Kedoshima). Here too, it must be discussed whether the commandment to do before the law is a law, that is, it is related to the halakhic law. If indeed it is, then it is a commandment that is itself a law. Furthermore, if indeed it is, then it is a bit puzzling why the enumerators of the commandments did not enumerate it.

There are other solutions to this (for example, that the boundary of such an obligation is not objective and equal for every Jew, and therefore it can enter into the law and there is no contradiction in this). Another possibility is that it is not something in general, or a general matter, which is not enumerated (such as a doubt from the Torah regarding a specific matter, or half a shiur that is forbidden by the Torah, etc.), and so on.

[12] The point of 'price' is important, since it seems to me that this is where Wosner, for example, sees the distinction between Orthodoxy and Reform. Reform does not see a price in transgressing part of the law, if it contradicts other values. Therefore, the Reformer actually proposes to change the law, that is, to remove from it the elements that contradict its other values. Wosner proposes an Orthodox position, which allows for complete submission to the law, that is, not to change the law, but also not always to obey it: although there is a price for actions that are halachic transgressions, there are cases in which we must do them despite the price. Below, we will liken this to a 'conscientious objection' to the commandments of the law.

So, the Reformers deal with the first question above, and Wozner suggests that Orthodoxy deal with the second. At the end of the second part of our article, we will discuss this phenomenon, and there we will see that indeed only within an Orthodox framework can such discussions arise.

[13] There are many other problems with respect to rules of interpretation, and with respect to rules in general. Some of them are presented by Wittgenstein, the best known of which is the problem of following a rule. For our purposes here, these problems are not significant, since we will assume that the system is defined with respect to each particular person. I will assume here that a person who is committed to the normative system acts according to rules that are acceptable to him, or at least according to his interpretation of the rules that the system itself contains. These are what will be called the 'rules of interpretation' below.

The problematic nature of interpretive actions is irrelevant to the present discussion, for if there is a debate, or ambiguity, regarding the question of what is the correct interpretation of the normative system, there is no question here of the very subjection to it. I am completely subject to the normative system, as I interpret it now, even if other people may have different interpretations regarding the question of what exactly it instructs to do in this or that situation. The rules of interpretation, for the purposes of our discussion, are the modes of interpretation adopted by the person in question in relation to the normative system in question.

True, sometimes the person himself can find himself in a state of doubt or ambiguity regarding the proper (correct) interpretation. In such a situation, rules of conduct in a state of doubt (in interpretation, or due to substantial ambiguity of the principles of the system) are relevant. These can belong to the principles of interpretation or to principles that belong to the system itself. In the halakhic context, there are rules of both types, but for our purposes here this is of no importance.

[14] In the halakhic context, this question is raised by some commentators in the context of the Sinaitic oath. The text in Tractate Nazir 4:1 (as well as in Nedim 8:1, Shavuot 27:1, and in other parallels) states (at least according to the understanding of some commentators) that we are obligated to the commandments due to an oath that we swore to do so at Sinai. The question is how can Israel be obligated to obey the law based on an oath, when the obligation to observe Shavuot is also based on the law. The command to observe Shavuot is one of the Torah commandments, that is, part of the law. Whoever disobeys the law will not be obligated, among other things, to the command to observe his oaths.

This question can be understood as a technical question: What is the use of an oath? It does not provide any deterrence beyond the mere transgression of God's will in the Torah and Halacha, and for someone who is willing to transgress the commandments of the Torah, even an oath will not benefit him. However, more profoundly, this question is the very question we are discussing: How can someone be subjected to a normative system, when the principle that creates the subjection is a principle that itself belongs to the system in question.

For an interesting implication of this argument, see, for example, the response Tiara stones, Chayid Si' Sh'6.

In a certain sense, this is also the difficulty that commentators raise regarding the Rambam's decision to include the commandment of faith as one of the Torah commandments. Several commentators raise this issue: How can one command someone to believe in the existence of the commandment (6 in the purple)? And there is no room here to dwell on this.

[15] In the context of the civil law system, see a discussion of this point at the beginning of Chaim Ganz's book, Obedience and refusal, Kibbutz Hameuchad, Tel Aviv 1996.

[16] Without value principles, we fall into a trap that Yom calls the 'naturalistic fallacy.' This fallacy is drawing a value conclusion from factual data. See my articles on this in 'The Expertise of the Halacha Judge as an Evaluator of Reality', Noon July, Tel Aviv, summer 2001.

[17] Although he saw in Jacob Yehoshua Ross's article, 'Why is there an obligation to obey the commandments of God?', in Between religion and morality, editors: Daniel Statman and Avi Sagi, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 1999. His conclusion there seemingly contradicts our words, but upon closer examination it becomes clear that this is not the case, and this is not the place.

[18] One can continue to divide between the quasi-factual claim that it is right to do something, and the claim that I am obligated to do it. This is a trite question in 20th-century analytical philosophy, and I will not address it here.

[19] See also Ross's aforementioned article on this matter.

[20] In relation to civil law, considerations of social order, or the maintenance of social agreements, can be raised. See this at length in the aforementioned book by Chaim Ganz.

[21] This distinction is found in several places in the Sage Midrash. I think the most prominent of them is in the Babylonian Shabbat 58:1, where the same Sadducee says to Rava: "Ama paziza dakdemitu pomichhu loudnihu...Birasha iba'i go to the heavens, whether he ignites his kabbalah or not, not his kabbalah."

The same Sadducee tells the Rabbi that we should accept the Torah based on a detailed examination of the principles to which we commit ourselves. Rabbi there answers him: "I am a man who is sincere in what is written in the law, 'The upright will be comforted,' but you are a man who is sincere in what is written in the law: 'And the treacherous will be destroyed.'" Rashi there interprets: 'We have walked with Him in sincerity, as is the way of those who act out of love, and we have trusted in Him that He will not accuse us of anything that we cannot stand by." That is, we accepted the Torah in its entirety, based on a 'principle of universal value' (a priori): a universal and a priori trust in the givers of the Torah. That Sadducee thought that there was no way to establish submission to a normative system in a universal manner. He argued that we should examine each component of the system in itself, and only on this basis is it reasonable to accept the commitment to it.

This midrash seems to allude to another well-known midrash that can be understood as dealing with this subject. The midrash is quoted in my book (beginning of P. and this is the blessing, and is alluded to in Babylonian 77:2, 78, and in parallel) about God, the Blessed One, who courted the nations to give them the Torah, and they asked Him what was written in it? And each nation finds a commandment that is unacceptable to them (Esau - you shall not murder, Ishmael - you shall not steal, Ammon and Moab - you shall not commit adultery). Therefore, all the nations, each for its own reasons, reject God's offer to accept the Torah. Here too, we see an approach that accepts the Torah on the basis of individual value principles, that is, it examines the commandments in themselves, and does not place sweeping, a priori trust in the givers of the Torah.

The lack of distinction between these two types of value principles is at the heart of many debates about the problematic nature of certain laws. The claims (secular or Reform) about the irrationality of observing laws that are not visible to us ('outdated' laws) are often claims that require examining Torah values according to an 'individual value principle', and do not recognize 'overarching value principles'.

I would also like to point out that the discussion here is also related to the philosophical distinction between CONSTITUTIVE and REGULATIVE systems of law. In analytical philosophy, it is customary to distinguish between a constitutive system of law, which does not constitute an instrument for any purpose, and a regulative system of law, which is merely a means to an end. It is clear that a constitutive system cannot be changed, since it stands on its own and does not constitute a means to an end external to it. Whereas a regulative system can be examined in light of its success in achieving the ends for which it was defined.

A general value principle is in fact a claim that the system is constitutive, at least de facto. It cannot be examined individually, and usually (though not always), at least from our point of view, it is not intended to achieve a goal. A specific value principle indicates that the system is intentional and not constitutive, that is, each component of it is intended to achieve the goals indicated by the value principle that underlies it. The specific value principle usually assumes implicitly, and separately for each law, that this particular law is intended to achieve a specific goal, and therefore it is appropriate to make it. There is no room here to elaborate on this further.

[22] For example, there are certain expressions in the writings of Rav Kook that indicate a view that morality and halakha are fundamentally overlapping systems. The question of whether both are 'complete' is an interesting one, and see a hint on this below.

[23] In principle, there could be a situation where both systems are complete, meaning they contain norms for the entire space of reality, and yet there is no contradiction between them. For example, if one system instructs in a given situation to stand on one leg, and the other system instructs in such a situation to say, "Shema Yisrael." Since both actions can be done together, and there is no fundamental contradiction between them, there is seemingly no contradiction between complete and different systems.

This description is correct in principle, and therefore such a situation can be considered as two partial systems. This will not change the analysis above much, and therefore I did not consider this possibility. It should be noted that in most of the cases of interest, the commandment to stand on one foot and the commandment to say "Shema Yisrael" are indeed contradictory, since one system says to do something specific and nothing else, and the other the opposite (in this context it is interesting to think, for example, about the relationship between prayer, Doron, and war. And more generally: between the commandment of security and the duty of effort).

Since I am trying to be brief in the formal part of the article, I have not further detailed the possibilities and ramifications that can arise in the various branches of the analysis here. A general theory of subordination to normative systems is not our concern here.

[24] If one is partial and one is complete, of course, a relationship of overlap is not possible, since they are certainly different from each other. In such a situation, a relationship of foreignness, that is, coexistence, is also not possible, since one of them is a 'complete system.' It is true that inclusion is possible, meaning that one of the systems is contained in the other, and the difference between them is only in a domain that is not common to both. Of course, a contradiction is also possible, if they contradict in a domain that is common to both.

In my above response to Dr. Moshe Meir's article, I stated that, in his opinion, humanistic secularism and religion are systems that relate to each other in a way of inclusion, in certain senses. However, in fact, the truth is that they are contradictory. Secularism not only means being moral (if at all), but also that there is no need or reason to keep commandments. Therefore, the field of discussion of secularism, like that of the Torah (to distinguish it), also extends over the entire space of reality. There is no relationship of inclusion here, but rather one of contradiction. See also our comments on this in the previous comment.

[25] Here too, there is a caveat that is important to note. It is possible for an action to be desirable in one respect and undesirable in another. For example, I want to eat chocolate because of the pleasure principle (the principle that I want to do what gives me pleasure), but I do not want to eat it because of the survival principle (that it is desirable to eat only what is not harmful to survival, i.e., health).

For the sake of simplicity of analysis, I assume in the discussion that an individual value principle is a summary of these two considerations. That is, one possible value principle is: pleasure is preferable to health. Or its opposite: health is preferable to pleasure. In such a situation, no problem can arise in two systems that are based on individual value principles. And compare to the comment above (the one before the previous one).

[26] We stated above that there is no a priori restriction in such a situation, but it is important to note that there is certainly a possible a posteriori restriction on such a situation. It is possible that the very subjection to another system contradicts the totality required by the second system, even though there is no direct contradiction between their provisions. Below we will see this in more detail in relation to the Torah system.

[27] With regard to halakha, it is clear that there are neutral areas, meaning that it is a partial system. With regard to the will of God in its broadest sense (see our remarks above, p. 2), the problem is more complicated, and there are different approaches here. This matter is mentioned in Yedidia Stern's article, 'Halakhic Accessibility to Policy Issues', in the collection Between Authority and Autonomy in the Israeli Tradition, Zeev Safrai and Avi Sagi (eds.), Kibbutz Hameuchad and Loyal Torah and Work, Tel Aviv 1997. However, I did not find any reasoning or references on this issue there, and therefore I will cite two sources here as examples.

1. Maimonides IIPIAMS Tractate Avot Sofa divides the different types of speech into five parts: mitzvah, mozhar, maroch, ergif, racha. If so, in the Hadiya we see that there are parts of racha (which are not even desirable or remote, meaning not those that are not halakhically determined, but even completely neutral) in reality, even in the context of God's will.
2. On the other hand, see The duties of the hearts, in R. Bachayi Sephardi, Sha'ar Avodat Elokim (Sha'ar 3), Chapter 4, who writes to the Hadiya that in the sense of the will of God (not in the sense of Halacha) there is no area of permission (i.e.: beyond the 'desired' and the 'distant', in the terms of the aforementioned Maimonides).

There is no room here to expand further on this issue.

[28] There are meta-halakhic approaches that understand that every halakhic commandment is necessarily also moral (this seems to be related to the (seeming, in my opinion) dilemma called the 'A' and Tifron dilemma': is morality good because God commanded it, or did God command it because it is good, and so on), and therefore there is a kind of individual value principle here. According to such an approach, there is no possible situation of contradiction between morality and any of the principles of halakhic law. These approaches require a separate discussion, and therefore I will not enter into them here. See on this in the book by Statman and Saghai Religion and morality, Bialik Institute, Jerusalem 1993, in detail.

[29] It is accepted that the difference between the Reform and Conservative movements is in commitment to Halacha. According to the classification criteria proposed here, this difference becomes very blurred, and is not the place here.

[30] Although, contrary to what Stern's article implies, in my opinion these examples are not neutral, and so are different areas of reality. See on this subject my articles 'The Expertise of the Halacha Judge as an Evaluator of Reality', Noon, Issue 7, Summer 2016.

[31] We note here that all the examples given here are merely examples. One could argue that it is possible to justify these modern values (such as the sweeping equality of women) within the halakhic-Torahic system, for example by claiming that women today are not like women in the time of the Torah and the Sages. Here, one must examine his claim from a halakhic perspective, since it is not clear to what extent the laws in question truly depend on the changed nature of women. However, even if this is true, and we do indeed decide to change the halakhic attitude towards women, we will still treat this here as a mere demonstration of the problematic nature of polynormativity.

If it is claimed that in all value conflicts a Torah justification can be found for external systems, this argument effectively makes the discussion completely unnecessary, since in such a case the discussion returns to the Torah system. As mentioned, whenever we truly need the polynormative solution, it will be when we cannot justify the claim that adherence to the value in question is the will of God. If any belief can be justified within the Torah framework, it seems that the concept of 'justification' loses most of its meaning. Therefore, below we will assume that there are cases in which only the polynormative solution can allow subordination to two normative systems, and we will discuss the possibility of such a solution.

[32] Solutions within the halakha to this conflict can be proposed, for example a regulation that qualifies women to testify (as the Rishonim make clear, which is beneficial, at least in certain circumstances, or there are circumstances when no other testimony is possible, such as in the women's bathhouse, where the Rishonim qualified women's testimony).

It is perhaps also possible to argue, although this requires proof, that the objection was based on the status and character of women during the time of the Sages (similar to the well-known Meiri argument about the Gentiles), and as in the previous comment. However, if the discussion is at the substantive level, then the only 'solution' is polynormativity.

[33] And the latter have already commented on him and rejected his words. See, for example, in the comments on the website of the Jerusalem Institute edition of the book Educational facilitatorAnd the latter have already commented on him and rejected his words. See, for example, in the comments on the website of the Jerusalem Institute edition of the book Educational facilitator.

[34] Some also interpret the words of Rabbi Gershom in the same way in the book of the Babylonian Tmura 3:2, where it is possible that a person will be obligated to take an oath and will be punished for it in the 27th century. Although he saw there in Rashi, and in light of this, Rabbi Gershom's words are not necessary. I once saw these two examples in a short article by Rabbi Dov Lando (Rosh Yeshiva of Slobodka D.B.) in some memoir book, but I do not remember the exact source.

[35] The characterization of the prohibition of idolatry is very problematic (for example: what exactly is 'acceptance of God'), and I am not aware of anyone who has dealt with this in an exhaustive manner. See the article by Dror Pixler and Gil Nadel, Areas, issue 22, 5762, p. 68, and the places mentioned there. See also the article by Nadav Shnerb, sent toNoon (5763), and has not yet been published.

[36] We have become accustomed, especially since Kant, to the legitimacy of systems of rules that are not backed by a concrete, or even abstract, entity. This is a very problematic belief, and indeed, an unreasonable one. One could go so far as to say that there is a secularization of the idea of religious divinity here. However, that is not the subject of the discussion here. For our purposes, it is important that most humanist secularists are subject to moral principles not because of some entity that commands them, but as a personal and autonomous decision.

A similar problem arises in the context of the laws of nature. Here too we have become accustomed (ironically, precisely following Descartes) to the fact that an explanation of an event in terms of 'this is a law of nature' is a sufficient explanation, even if there is no entity that causes the event in question to occur. In fact, according to the Humeian view that understands the concept of 'cause' as a temporal trace, the concepts of causal causation in their classical sense disappear. According to Hume's method, there are no causes at all for physical or other events. Hume thereby opposes modern approaches to the philosophy of science, which Ze'ev Böchler calls (in his book Three Copernican Revolutions, Zmora-Bitan and University of Haifa, Tel Aviv 1999), entitled: 'Actualism'.

See a discussion (which I do not agree with in its details, and I disagree) on this in the book by Yuval Steinitz (a student of Bachler), A scientific logical rocket to God and back, Zmora-Bitan, Tel Aviv 1998, mainly in Chapter 2.

These questions are related to the discussion of whether religious, moral, and even scientific statements are statements about the world or only about us, and this is also not the place to discuss this.

[37] The terminology commonly used in the modern world: 'human image', which replaced the original terminology: 'image of God', somewhat indicates this trend. As is known (see Rambam, Reish Hal', Idolatry) in the days of man, idolatry (='human image') began to be practiced.

[38] In light of what we have said here, it follows that if there is a commitment to universal morality, but it is rejected in the face of the Torah's commandments in every case of conflict, this is not a problematic approach, since there is no entity here that 'threatens' the supreme status of the Blessed One. Dualism demands equal status, at least in some sense, to the Blessed One himself. Therefore, submission to civil law, for example, is not problematic, as long as it is clear that its commandments are rejected in the face of the Halacha's commandments, in every case of conflict. Here the law stands on a different level than the Blessed One, and therefore there is no essential duality here.

Although it would be appropriate to say that a view that sees submission to the law as a binding system, not by virtue of the Torah, can also raise such problems, but it is clearly less so (if it exists at all). It seems to me that the Haredi claims about the element of idolatry in the renewed Jewish nationalism are directed towards this aspect.

[39] See Sagi and Statman's book, Religion and morality (pp. 94-97), who discuss a point very similar to the one discussed here. They argue that the strong dependence of morality on religion and the 27th century can be rejected without harming the sovereignty, freedom, and all ability of God, if we adopt a position that the laws of morality are a necessity, akin to logical necessity, and therefore it is not correct to say that God is subject to it, but that there is simply no other option.

[40] These two questions raise a different description of polynormativity. Such a position represents not only a commitment to another normative system, but also a non-traditional commitment to the Torah system (God's will).

Regarding the point that false belief, or a false image of God, means belief in another God, see the words of Maimonides. Teacher of the Confused, Cha"a Chapter 60, and Z"l:

And I am not saying that the one who attributes titles to God will be exalted without properly attaining them, or that he is sharing, or that he attained them not as He is, but rather I am saying that he has deprived the reality of God from his consciousness without realizing it… But the one who attributes a title to Him knows nothing except the name alone, but the thing about which it seems to him that this name is said is a non-existent thing, but rather it is a false invention, and as if he had placed this name on an absent thing, since in reality there is nothing that is so…

Maimonides states that anyone who attributes incorrect titles to God does not actually believe in God, but in another entity that does not exist at all. He uses his well-known example of a distorted description of an elephant to clarify the matter.

[41] From the language of the Rambam here, it seems that a situation is possible in which God's will appears outside the Torah, but there is a concern about making a mistake in drawing such a conclusion. This point is important in the discussion that follows, as it should not be learned from it that God's will cannot be found outside the Torah, as I have already noted in detail in the chapters above.

[42] See for example the entry 'Do not add' (and also 'Do not subtract') in The Talmudic Encyclopedia, Volume 3.

[43] The latter understood this halakha also in relation to the observance of Jewish commandments, and not only in relation to a resident alien, and so did the commentary. See, for example, the Responsa Ung Yot Si' 19:15 'and', and in the Responsorial Psalm Asking and answering Taninah Cha"a Si' Na"a, meaning 'what', and Chag Si' Za'a and Talitai Cha"a Si' Ta'b, meaning 'and it will be seen'.

[44] And perhaps it is possible to interpret various verses in the Prophets against this background, such as: "They forsook me and kept my Torah," etc., etc.

[45] This distinction concerns many defense arguments against Jews who do not observe Torah and mitzvot, who also supposedly observe many mitzvot (between man and his fellow man, etc.). From these words of the Maimonides it is clear that this has no religious significance. Although there is an opinion in halakha that mitzvot do not require intention, this is only for those in whose spiritual world the concept of a 'mitzvah' exists. Someone whose world lacks this concept cannot be called a 'mitzvot'. The situation here is similar to the words of the Rishonim regarding 'reverse intention' (intention not to leave a covenant), who wrote that in this case, a covenant does not leave a covenant (although in that context the argument is not agreed upon, but here it seems simple).

[46] As we saw above, it is very difficult to argue that there are laws that originate from hearsay and are not explicitly written in the Torah, and the Talmud itself assumes that if there is hearsay, an explicit biblical source is not needed. According to this, it is clear that the problem according to Maimonides with someone who invents a religion is only if this religion actually appears in the Torah, or if it is explicitly denied in Torah verses or tradition. In these cases, the person who observes it not because it appears in the Torah, undermines tradition. If so, the basis of the matter according to Maimonides is not apostasy in God and His commandments, but rather an undermining of the tradition through which the Torah came to us.

[47] Although even in the case of cooperation, it is not clear from this midrash whether there is actual idolatry here, since it only refers to the question of what reward that person will receive for performing the mitzvah. There is no reference here to the actual cooperation. On the other hand, it is certainly possible to learn from this midrash that there is idolatry in cooperation with an entity (or system) that commands mitzvot that do not contradict the Torah, and as is sometimes described here, it commands the mitzvot of the Torah itself. And as we said above, such a thing can be called cooperation regardless of the concrete content of the commandments.

It should be noted that the Noahides are not warned about sharing, and therefore it is doubtful whether we can learn from the laws of the resident alien to the laws concerning Israel. In general, it is worth discussing whether there is a difference, whether in Israel or among the Noahides, between belief in sharing and worshipping idols in sharing (which is the common halachic appearance of the concept of 'sharing'), and so on.

[48] On this subject, see, for example, the article by Rabbi Yuval Sherlow in issue 6 of entreeAnd there is much more to discuss about this, and so on.

[49] The Lights of Faith, Shadow of Light – Heresy, edited by Rabbi Moshe Gurvitz, Jerusalem Edition, 1979, p. 48.

[50] I will note here that in the case of Wosner, the trend and essence are not entirely clear to me. On the one hand, all the examples he cites are examples of areas that are associated with the work of God, and in our terms: with the will of God. On the other hand, he is careful to emphasize that he does not mean one of the types of solutions accepted in the philosophical-halakhic world (see the beginning of his article), but rather with 'normative duality,' as he puts it. Therefore, I truly and sincerely do not intend here to analyze his arguments. I used his words because he is the only one I found who clearly and sharply raises the polynormative option. As I have already noted, to the best of my knowledge, this kind of view is hidden, in one form or another, in many writers in these fields in recent years.