The Arbitrariness of Will in Leibowitz's Doctrine – Positivism and Pluralism

2006

Avi Sagi, in his article "Leibovitz: The Man Against His Thought"[1] criticizes Yeshayahu Leibowitz by firmly stating that he was inconsistent with the conclusions that are supposed to arise from his thought. It seems to me that this criticism, which also represents other similar criticisms of Leibowitz's thought, is based on a fundamental failure in understanding his doctrine. Furthermore, in my opinion, there is a typical failure in the analysis of positivist positions in general, which I mainly wish to address in this article. For these reasons, the purpose of the present article is not to respond specifically to Sagi's words. His article will serve us as a clear typological representative of whatever approach is the subject of the discussion.

The failure I will describe here has deep roots in the cultural-philosophical development of the current century, which is now beginning to leave its mark on contemporary Jewish thought, and I will attempt to address this briefly in the third and final chapter of the article.

A. Sagi's criticism

In his aforementioned article, Sagi points out, and in my opinion rightly so, the revolutionary nature of Leibowitz's assertion that Judaism is a normative-value system, and not a system of truth claims about the world. Leibowitz, as a product of a positivist world of thought, refused to base his faith and his work of God on a system of truth claims about the world, since these necessarily include claims that cannot be substantiated by rigorous empirical cognition, as positivism demands.[2]

For this reason, for Leibowitz, the system of serving God is based on a moral decision by the person, who decides to take upon himself the burden of a commandment. This is not the result of faith in revelation, or some physical-historical event, but, as Leibowitz repeatedly emphasizes, a voluntary, 'arbitrary' decision.

The reasoning for this position, as Sagi describes, is based on two parallel paths that can be described schematically as follows:

The first line of argument is based on the incommensurability of values, that is, on the lack of the ability to rationally decide in a conflict between two different basic (=non-derived) values, due to the lack of a common (value) measure. From this situation, Leibowitz (implicitly) concludes that in the absence of a rational way of deciding, a person must decide 'arbitrarily' between these values.

The second argument is based on the naturalistic fallacy of Hume, according to which one cannot derive what is proper from what is present, or alternatively, it is not possible to base values on facts alone. Another assumption must always be added to the foundation argument that connects the plane of facts with the plane of values. In the context of serving God and keeping the commandments, it is said that the mere revelation at Mount Sinai cannot constitute a basis for the obligation, which is essentially value-based, to accept the burden of the commandments that were specified there. To the factual plane, which deals, for example, with revelation, one must add the autonomous decision of the person to accept upon himself the burden of the commandments given in the revelation at Mount Sinai. This is the addition that links the factual plane to the normative-value plane. Here again, there is an 'arbitrary' decision, since it is not based on facts or rational reasoning.

From these two arguments it follows that the person standing at a value crossroads must decide 'irrationally' (in positivist terms), or 'arbitrarily' in Leibowitz's terminology, which value direction he chooses.

Continuing his remarks, Sagi points out that Leibowitz concluded from the situation of a conflict between values that since he cannot convince others to act 'correctly', if a person wants to change the beliefs and behavior of others, he must engage in a struggle (and even a violent struggle, in certain contexts and ways) with them in order to impose his own values.

Sagi claims that from Leibowitz's basic position, a pluralist position should necessarily have emerged (at least in the weak sense, see explanation and references there). He goes on to argue that Leibowitz, being an advocate, as stated, of a value-cultural struggle, did not move in the direction required by his own doctrine. Sagi claims that Leibowitz was wrong on this point, and sinned by inconsistency. If Leibowitz indeed assumes that a person's values are not justified, and that his choice of them is arbitrary, he cannot call for a value-cultural struggle that assumes the priority of his own value system over alternative systems.

Continuing his remarks, Sagi comments that Leibowitz was also wrong in believing that a value decision cannot have any justification, since justification does not have to be universal. A value decision that is not universal, but not arbitrary, is possible. It will have personal-subjective justifications.

Sagi concludes and says:

The conclusion is that Leibowitz's view allows for and perhaps even requires a pluralistic worldview, unfortunately what I have called weak pluralism. Leibowitz refused to acknowledge things even when they were presented to him. The very man who succeeded in applying to the Jewish sphere the idea that a moral-religious commitment is not based on truth claims in relation to the world, was reluctant to apply this idea to polemics in the Jewish world itself. In doing so, he indirectly returned to the claim that Judaism in the Orthodox interpretation is based on truth claims.

Continuing his remarks, Sagi claims that this contradiction resurfaces in the analysis of Leibowitz's perception of the shift in the question of the meaning of the religious world from the causal context to the question of meaning.

I will not elaborate here on this argument of Sagi's, since in my opinion it is nothing more than a restatement of his predecessor's from a different angle. The gist of his argument is that Leibowitz established that the Jewish-Halakhic world can only be understood in terms of meaning, and not in terms of rational-causal foundation. A cultural world can only be understood from within itself and in its own terms, and not through any objective system, or any other, that is external to it.

This shift reaffirms, according to Sagi, the pluralist position underlying Leibowitzian thought, and his reasoning:

After all, if the meaning of an activity is internal, there is no room for comparison and for setting a common standard for examining the value of other ethical systems... I do not see how Leibowitz can deny this position that underlies the foundation of his value perception.

In conclusion to his article, Sagi writes the following:

The rejection of the pluralist position is often based on the assumption that you do not truly believe in your own world of values, that you are not committed to your values if you do not deny the world of others. This position is not at all necessary. A person's loyalty to his values is not measured by the degree to which he denies the world of others, but by the degree to which he is willing to consistently live his values and be committed to them in difficult situations as in easy ones. Value loyalty is related to a person's disposition to his values, and not necessarily to their cognitive priority over other positions. This clear lesson emerges from Leibowitz's doctrine, even if he did not explicitly admit it.

That's all for Sagi's criticism.

If Sagi had claimed that it was possible, on a principled level, to establish a position of Jewish pluralism on the basis of Leibowitz's doctrine, I would have remained silent, even though I do not agree with that either. However, Sagi's argument is much more pointed: he claims that Leibowitz erred in not drawing the pluralist conclusions. The immigrants necessarily from the premises of his doctrine. It seems to me that in this claim, regarding the necessary emanation of a pluralist position from Leibowitzian premises, Sagi himself is clearly mistaken, as I will try to show in the next chapter. As stated in the introduction, in my humble opinion this fallacy has a broad significance, much more than this or that correction to the understanding of Leibowitz's doctrine, and I will address this in the remainder of my remarks.

B. Positivism and Pluralism

In Leibowitz's argument (according to Sagi's reconstruction, which seems reasonable on a principled level), there are two levels of discussion: First, he assumes an arbitrary choice of values. Second, despite this, he assumes that there may be situations in which someone would be interested in imposing his arbitrary values on others. Hence, since the path of persuasion is not open to him, Leibowitz, who advocates the arbitrariness of value choice, finds himself forced to choose a (sometimes violent) struggle.

Sagi challenges Leibowitz's intolerant conclusions, but it seems to me that the debate is not on the level of the ways of struggle and the relationship between value systems, that is, in the conclusion from these two levels of discussion, but on a more fundamental level. The debate is on the fundamental level of discussion, where Leibowitz states that despite arbitrariness, it is possible for a person to want to impose his values on others. In particular, Sagi challenges what such a desire presupposes, namely the assumption that a person who advocates an alternative value system, which contradicts my own, is mistaken. As cited in the quote at the end of the previous chapter, Sagi states that a person's loyalty to his values does not necessarily derive from the negation of alternative value systems.

A deeper examination of Leibowitz's positions, which takes into account their distinct positivist orientation, clearly shows that he seriously believed in the value system he chose, and even gave it the value of truth.[3] Therefore, it is clear that if someone chooses to adopt a contradictory value system, he should not receive pluralistic treatment from the positivist Klyubovitch.

It seems that the focal point of the misunderstanding lies in the relationship to the rationality of values, and to positivist rationality in general. It would be more accurate to say that the focus of the discussion is on the question of the meaning of the 'arbitrariness of the will' in Leibowitz's terminology.

My main argument is that when Leibowitz claims that there is no factual basis for values, what he calls in his language an "arbitrary" choice, this does not mean that he has no faith in them, or that they have no truth value. He only means that they cannot be objectively, intellectually, or empirically justified, and that they cannot be argued about and convinced of.

Sagi's interpretation of Leibowitz's doctrine suggests that a person's act of value choice is nothing more than arbitrary indeterminism. A person chooses his values just like that, just like a die 'chooses' to land on one of its faces.

The distinction between an arbitrary action and an act of choice is well-known and I see no need to clarify it here.[4] A choice is an act of decision, which, although it does not have an intellectual or other reason, in the conventional sense of the term 'reason', that is, it is not deterministic, but on the other hand it is clearly not arbitrary (indeterministic). The result of this decision is a belief, in the full sense of the word, in the value system that the person has chosen to adopt. Although this choice has no rational justification, certainly not in positivist terms, this does not mean that it is not true. I do not mean here 'truth' in the sense of conformity to the state of affairs in the world, but a binding belief subject to the law of contradiction. A person's responsibility for the consequences and meaning of his moral choice, which Leibowitz himself often emphasizes, clearly assumes that it is not arbitrary.

It is quite clear that when Leibowitz speaks of an 'arbitrary' choice of values, he means to deny their position on a factual-empirical basis, or on an intellectual-rational decision between contradictory (incommensurable) values, that is, to deny the possibility of positivist justification. However, this does not mean that they do not in themselves have a true meaning. His position holds that there is no point and possibility in arguing about values, but this does not mean that they are all right. As stated above, values are also subject, according to Leibowitz, to the law of contradiction.

There is a common distinction between conflicts of belief (BELIEFS), cognitive conflicts, and those of desires (DESIRES), conative conflicts.[5] In cognitive conflicts, when a person formulates a position, he or she already denies everything that contradicts it, meaning that there is simply no possibility of a true cognitive conflict. In conative conflicts, on the other hand, it is possible to want two contradictory things at the same time. Williams has already pointed out that a normative conflict, that is, a conflict between obligations, is not similar to a conative conflict but rather to a cognitive conflict.[6] I recognized a certain duty as valid for me, negating the legitimacy of the conflicting duties.[7]

Although the main point is about the consistency of a person's own position, that is, if he accepts as his duty to do X, he denies not doing it (or doing not-X). I would like to argue that for Leibowitz, this applies not only to the person himself, but also to others who hold such obligations. A person who adopts a certain value system, according to Leibowitz, necessarily denies the other who holds a contradictory system. This is what I meant above when I said that Leibowitz gives true value to a person's ('arbitrary') value choices.

In Leibowitz's book 'Faith, History and Values'[8] A lecture on tolerance is presented (from 1979), where Leibowitz discusses the positions of the Radbaz and the Maimonides on this issue. The gist of the remarks is that in the Radbaz's opinion, a person cannot be punished if he acts based on the best of his judgment, even if he is primarily an infidel (in the opinion of Rabbi Tzadok HaCohen of Lublin, cited there, such a person is a coercion), and in the Maimonides' opinion, such a person should be punished severely. However, it is clear to everyone, including Leibowitz himself, that such a person is certainly wrong. The debate is only about the degree of tolerance that should be exercised toward him. Leibowitz, as usual, leans towards the Maimonides' position on this issue as well.

According to Halacha, clear and severe sanctions are imposed on idolaters, and on criminals in general, and I do not see how it is possible to offer a substantive pluralistic interpretation, even in the weak sense, of the Jewish-Halakhic system. In any case, it is clear that Leibowitz himself certainly did not do so, and he even says so explicitly in several places (see, for example, the long quote I will provide at the end of the article).[9]

Leibowitz claims that since it is impossible to convince a person to change his values through rational discussion, he has no choice but to fight him in order to impose on him the 'correct' value system, that is, Leibowitz's own. This seemingly puzzling position stems precisely from the fact that Leibowitz does indeed fully believe in the values he has chosen, and they are not arbitrary in his eyes. In any case, it is also clear that alternative systems that contradict them are considered wrong in his eyes. It is true that Leibowitz claims that it is impossible to convince others of his error, but this does not mean that he is not wrong.

We saw above the connection that exists between duties (values and norms) and cognition (and not desire). Even in the cognitive world, there are sentences that have no 'rational' justification (in the positivist view), and yet they are considered true in the eyes of the believer in them, and in any case their opposite is considered false in his eyes. For example, what is the analogy of a positivist who suddenly discovers that a certain concept that is well defined in his eyes, and understandable to every intelligent person, fails to be grasped by his interlocutor. In such a case, he will have no choice but to fight that particular fool, until he understands what every intelligent person should understand. The meaning of self-evident basic terms cannot be rationally convinced, and therefore there is no choice but to fight those who do not accept them. The inability to convince, certainly in the case of a positivist like Leibowitz, does not necessarily indicate a state of relative truth or justice.

Leibowitz's stubborn formulations regarding the 'arbitrariness of value decisions' are what cause confusion in understanding his words (and these are very prominent in Dialogue A with Tony Lavie, which will be mentioned later). It is clear that Leibowitz is not aiming for an arbitrary decision in the indeterministic sense, otherwise there would be no point in voicing his opinions and in endlessly preaching and rebuking those who do not agree with them. In his view, the choice of moral and justice values is just as 'arbitrary' as the choice of religious values, and in any case there would be no point in convincing them, or preaching their existence.

My main argument is that Leibowitz insists on 'arbitrariness' solely to exclude from the position that this decision is the result of rational, empirical consideration, or the operation of the mind. His purpose is to emphasize that this is the free operation of the will, and it does not depend at all on the mind, on consciousness, or on thinking. It is clear that according to Leibowitz, the value system that a person chooses through the operation of his will is absolute, and all systems that are not commensurable with it are wrong (unjust/moral/proper).

I will try to expand a little on the misunderstanding of the positivist position, because I think it has a broader importance than the discussion here. For the sake of discussion, I will define rigid positivism, in rough terms, as the position that claims that there is no point in dealing with sentences and concepts that cannot be precisely defined and proven. According to this position, every concept used should be clear and well-defined, and every claim made should be provable (or disprovable).

It is clear that such an approach assumes the existence of a system of atomic fundamental concepts, which cannot be defined, and through which all other concepts are defined. Likewise, at the basis of any such positivist thinking there should be several fundamental theorems, axioms, which cannot be proven, and through which all derived claims are proven.

Since the positivist demands a strict and clear definition for every concept, and a proof for every claim, one can ask him what basis he offers for his own fundamental theorems, and what his own definition of his fundamental concepts is. Since it is not possible to offer a basis or definition (in the aforementioned positivist sense) for concepts and claims at the atomic level, one could think that they are arbitrary.

It seems to me that the sharp transition made in the twentieth century between positivism, which dominated its first half, and postmodernism, which followed it, is based on an argument of this type. Since a claim is true only if it has a serious proof, then the axioms, which of course cannot be proven, are arbitrary. In any case, any person or group can adopt axioms as they wish, and the only requirement they must meet is consistency with their assumptions. In such a process, we arrive, as if by magic, from positivism, which is apparently strict in its demands on the concept of truth, directly to the nihilistic postmodern skepticism according to which there is no truth at all. The result is that each group and its narrative (and in our terms, its basic system of assumptions and definitions). In my opinion, this is a description (schematic and simplistic, of course) of a cultural-philosophical process that was the basis of some of the central intellectual transformations of the twentieth century.

Here the question arises: what did that positivist of the early-mid-twentieth century think, and whether he was not aware of the relativity of his basic assumptions. How did those basic assumptions meet his strict requirements for justification by proof? It is clear that the positivist perceived that there are claims and concepts that are self-evident. They are not arbitrary, and they are not simply unfounded. It was clear to him that these are sentences, or concepts, that do not need substantiation at all, since they are understandable to any reasonable person. In other words: they are arbitrary (=not justifiable), but true (=their opposite is inconsistent with them, and therefore false).

Let us now try to think about what will happen when the same rigid positivist defined above meets another positivist, no less rigid than himself, who has adopted a set of basic premises that is different from his own and contradicts it. Under the strict criteria, accepted by both, according to which proof is required for every claim, it is clear that neither of them will be able to convince their friend that he is wrong. On the other hand, as stated above, each of them believes that he is necessarily right and the other is of course wrong. It is clear that in such a situation, each of them will have no choice but to go into battle against his friend.

It should be noted that this positivist believes in his system of basic assumptions with complete faith, yet he is aware that they are acceptable only to him and the members of his group and not to the members of the opposing group, and he is also aware that he has no way of convincing them of his system. Is he obliged to conclude from this that each of these systems of assumptions has the same truth value, or alternatively: does he necessarily have to reach pluralism? Perhaps so, and then we will reach Sagi's position, but this cannot be said for sure. It is certainly possible that such a positivist will continue to hold to his position, and in any case believe that his friend is completely wrong, even though it is clear to him that he cannot rationally convince his friend of its correctness.

In fact, it can be said that positivism and postmodernism share the assumption that a claim is true only if it can be proven, and their positions are divided on the question of whether such proofs can indeed be provided. The positivist thought so, and the postmodernist thinks not. Hence, one firmly advocates his rationalist position, and the other completely renounces the concepts of truth in their classical, absolute sense.

So far we have seen the situation of the positivist in terms of his cognitive world. His assumptions and basic concepts are self-evident things that do not require 'rational' justification, and therefore their opposite will naturally be considered false, even though they have no such justification.

The position of Leibowitz, the positivist, in the world of values is parallel (in terms of the truth value that can be attributed to his sentences) to his position cognitively. The values are the postulates of the will, whose status for Leibowitz is completely parallel to the status of the postulates of reason and cognition.[10] As someone who has already lived in the postmodern era, he is well aware of the relativity of values, and the differences in the beliefs of different groups of people. However, he is still a positivist, and as such he believes in the complete belief in the value system that he has adopted. He has no way of convincing his fellow opponents of its correctness, because, as Sagi wrote, it is not based on any state of affairs in the world, nor on any rational proof of any kind. However, despite all this, it is clear to him that they are wrong, that is, they are acting incorrectly. It is true that his ideological opponents are not mistaken in their reading of reality, but their error nevertheless stems from the laws of logic, and in particular the law of contradiction. For example, if I do believe that an Israeli is obligated to decide in favor of accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven of the God of Israel, I cannot accept the equal status of alternative value systems that do not choose to do so.

For this reason, Leibowitz states that there is no way to prove (and as a positivist, this means that there is also no way to convince) the other person of the correctness of the system I have adopted, and in his terms: it is 'arbitrary'. However, this does not mean that the other person is not wrong, as Leibowitz is certainly wrong. In any case, it is clear that the only way to restore him to the right is to fight him.[11]

After all, we have a position that decisively favors a particular ethical or religious world, does not base it on factual-empirical reality, and yet is not pluralistic towards other positions. Contrary to Sagi's assertion, there is no philosophical error here. This is precisely the position, which is completely consistent, of Yeshayahu Leibowitz.

Sagi seeks to take Leibowitz's doctrine in the same way that the postmodernist takes his spiritual father (!), the positivist. The postmodernist claims that if indeed a true claim is only a claim that has proof, as the positivist claims, then since at the basis of every proof stand fundamental assumptions, which of course cannot be proven, then all systems of assumptions are equally valid, as the postmodernist claims.

Along exactly the same lines, Sagi argues that if Leibowitz cannot prove his value positions, he must accept the equal status of all value systems that correspond to them, that is, advocate pluralism (or at least weak pluralism). Sagi's mistake is that he did not perceive that Leibowitz also examines the alternative positions from his own perspective, and he does not see anything wrong with this. If he believes in any value position, it is clear to him that the laws of logic apply to it, and therefore he is also obliged to deny its opposite, as well as anyone who holds to its opposite.

The concept of the incommensurability of values in Leibowitz's doctrine also needs to undergo a parallel transformation. According to Leibowitz, the incommensurability of values means that there is no 'rational' way, in the positivist sense, that is, a way of proof or empirical observation, to decide between values. However, this does not mean that every value dilemma is incommensurable in the essential sense, that is, that it is impossible to be convinced that one side is right and the other is wrong. Although it is not possible to convince someone else who disagrees with me, I can still certainly believe that he is wrong, and in the same way I can also decide the value dilemma before me. As explained above, the value decision is not arbitrary (at least in the eyes of the decider himself), but it is only not objectively justifiable and persuasive.

My basic argument is that a person's awareness that he operates within the system of values and basic assumptions he has chosen does not contradict his ability to believe that parallel systems are wrong. From the Jewish-Halakhic value system that Leibowitz adopted in a manner that he calls 'arbitrary' (but of course not arbitrary in the essential sense), Leibowitz states that all other beliefs are idolatry, and are therefore wrong and invalid. I do not see this as an inconsistency of any kind.

Sagi's claim that belief in a value system does not necessarily mean the negation of alternative systems that contradict it is also based on this position. The identification he makes between Leibowitz's assertion about the lack of empirical-rational foundation for the value system, and the lack of truth value for that system, or its non-subordination to the law of contradiction, is wrong. Just as a certain system of cognitive axioms cannot be rationally substantiated in the eyes of the positivist, and yet it is true and the converse is wrong.

Sagi himself apparently advocates the position that adopting a value system is an act of arbitrary choice whose outcome is not subject to the law of contradiction (at least outwardly, that is, towards the other). This may be a possible position (unlikely in my opinion), but it is clear that in Leibowitz's eyes this is not the case. Even if there is no rational-empirical basis for a value choice, the outcome of such a choice is certainly subject to the law of contradiction. In my humble opinion, if Sagi does not impose his own beliefs on Leibowitz, there will be no contradiction in his words.

C. Conclusions

Beyond defending Leibowitz's doctrine, which is important in itself, I would like to point out here a broader implication of the argument in the previous chapter. It seems to me that the same path I followed in my interpretation of Leibowitz's doctrine, and as an alternative to Sagi's interpretation, can also be followed in interpreting the positivist-postmodern crisis in general.

As stated above, the transition that occurred from the positivist position that dominated the first half of the twentieth century to the postmodernism of its second half occurred due to drawing conclusions about the status of basic premises. As I tried to argue, this inference is not necessary. Indeed, every proof is based on basic premises, and these themselves, of course, have no proof. However, the identification that positivism makes between truth and commonness is what had to be broken. The positivist who believed in his basic premises even without proof, when he met another positivist who believed in a different system, did not have to conclude that they were of equal status. He must conclude, as a true positivist would do, that his basic premises are true even without universal justification. He must recognize that even in his doctrine there are truth claims that are not based on serious proof. In the previous terminology it was said that he must give up rigid positivism (defined above), and recognize the existence of basic claims that do not need proof.[12]

In fact, more can be said than that. Everyday experience teaches us that it is also possible to convince those who think differently from us through various arguments, and usually this is done without proof. This means that not only does truth not necessarily involve proof, as in the case of assumptions, but even the ability to convince does not necessarily involve it.

We see people changing systems of values and beliefs following an encounter with alternative systems, and this indicates the possibility of persuasion also in discussions about values and beliefs. This is usually not done through proof, since there are alternative ways of persuasion, which are also rational and legitimate. Proof is a sufficient condition for truthfulness, but not a necessary condition. Although some have called such changes by names such as 'brainwashing', this is not necessarily the case. It is possible to change a position 'rationally', or at least 'reasonably', even without relying on proof in the strict sense.[13]

A contemporary person who is aware that he assumes a certain set of axioms need not assume that it is arbitrary even if he cannot provide a proof for it using positivist criteria. I can state that my friend is wrong even if I rely on my own assumptions. Awareness of this does not necessarily lead to pluralism, and certainly not to postmodernism.

On this point, I think that Leibowitz himself is not right, but in the opposite direction from Sagi. The inability to provide proof does not necessarily mean embarking on a violent struggle (nor does it necessarily imply pluralism), since one can also try to convince in less stringent ways. Leibowitz, as a proud positivist product of the first half of the twentieth century, was not willing to hear about such ideas, since for him, 'rational' persuasion is only achieved by providing evidence.

In another way, we can say that the assumption common to positivism and postmodernism, that a true claim is only a proven claim, and that it can be convinced only by providing evidence, is wrong. The postmodernist is right in his criticism of the naive positivist, who believes that unconditional, objective proofs can be provided for all his claims. But his nihilistic conclusion, and even its more moderate pluralistic cousin, are not bound by this. One can simply give up the assumption that truth is identical with frequency. If one does not make such an assumption, one can adopt the postmodernist's critique without giving up the concepts of truth. The values I choose, as well as my cognitive assumptions, are correct, even though they cannot be proven. Moreover, in my opinion (and this is contrary to Leibowitz's position) it is also possible to conduct a dialogue and convince one another of these claims.

In recent years, voices have begun to be heard claiming the legitimacy of an Orthodox, yet pluralistic, and sometimes even postmodern, religious Judaism. It seems to me that at the root of these positions lies the same misunderstanding of the disconnect between the way in which a person adopts his assumptions and their essential content. It is now accepted that a person decides to worship God in a way that is not based on a realistic state of affairs, or on proof in the strict sense. As we have seen, despite this, that person can remain faithful to the halakhic commandment of condemning alternative values, and even punishing those who follow them (in cases where this is required). From my perspective, despite being aware that I have no objective ability to convince others, I can believe that I am right, and in any case it is also clear to me that my neighbor is wrong.

It is interesting to note that, according to my impression, a significant portion of those who believe this, just like Sagi, tend to rely on Leibowitz's doctrine, which ostensibly presents a completely opposite approach. In my opinion, they fall into the same trap I pointed out earlier. They identify an inability to provide 'rational' evidence with the absence of any truth value.

As I noted above, it is indeed possible in principle to draw such conclusions from the impossibility of providing evidence, and in this sense, Leibowitz's doctrine does indeed open the door to Jewish pluralism, but these conclusions are certainly not necessary, as Sagi claimed.

Beyond that, as I briefly noted above, in my humble opinion, such a position cannot be anchored within the Orthodox-Halakhic framework, regardless of a Leibowitzian or other interpretation, but this is a discussion that deserves a place of its own and there is no room for it here.

Sagi claimed that Leibowitz supposedly opened the way for Jewish-Halakhic pluralism. Ironically, I think it was he who made it possible for those of us who are aware of the subjectivity of our activities and the narrative within which we operate to remain faithful to the law in its non-pluralistic forms. As mentioned, a 'subjective' adoption of a value system does not necessarily mean pluralism.

In conclusion, I will present here some representative and instructive excerpts from Leibowitz's article 'Jews Among Their People, In Their Land, and Among the Nations':[14]

As for values – the problem of Jewish essence in our generation must be distinguished between different systems of values, which conflict with each other in human thought and action. A theocentric religious system is essential to the Judaism of the Torah and the commandments, which presents the service of God as the goal… the cancellation of human values – both personal as the mercy of a father for his son, and general as the destiny of the people and humanity as a whole in the covenant between the parts – in favor of the service of God. In the anthropocentric humanist system, everything revolves around the axis of man as the supreme value, a form of the deification of man, as in Kant’s doctrine…

There is also a false humanism, atheism in religious guise – which is Christianity. Here too, man himself is the center, and his redemption is the central theme of the intention, while God is merely a tool, a means, and an instrument for the realization of redemption…

However, there is also a value system that is not only inferior and unacceptable, but also abhorrent: the ethnocentric concept, which presents as the goal neither God nor man, but a human collective – a people, a race, a state, etc.… This is the concept that is the source of much of the evil and wickedness in human reality, and its final logical conclusion is fascism…

Despite this shared consciousness and common will [of the people of Israel], this group is also deeply divided – between those who observe the Torah and commandments and those who break the yoke of the Torah and commandments. . . If the Jew does not fulfill his obligation – he is a criminal Jew, and if he were to actually adhere to the Torah, he would be punished by a court of law, even with the death penalty, and he does not cease to be a Jew because of that…

However, behind the curtain of shared declarations and feelings, there is a deep rift in terms of lifestyle, which does not allow for sharing life in practice, and the end of the difference in reality will outweigh the sharing in consciousness. A religious Jew (or Jewess) and a free-spirited Jew (or Jewess), each of whom stands on his own, cannot marry – because of the laws of niddah and family purity… and a Jew who observes Shabbat and a Jew who does not observe Shabbat cannot jointly maintain an agricultural or industrial enterprise, or a store, or an office, or even joint experimental scientific research… and a Jew who observes kosher and a Jew who does not observe kosher cannot dine together at the same table. No marriages, no joint economic and technical activity, no sip that brings hearts closer – is it possible that the unity of the nation will continue to exist for many years under these conditions? And this is nothing new: throughout the history of Israel, the Torah and the commandments were the factor that divided the people…

What we need for our spiritual recovery is precisely what the innocent (or gullible) among us shy away from – what is called, in European political jargon, a "culture war."

In these passages, as well as in many others, Leibowitz takes the trouble to distinguish clearly, and even rank, between correct (theocentric), inferior and invalid (anthropocentric), and abhorrent (ethnocentric) values. He then explains that the halakhic offender's sentence is death (when there is a court with real authority to do so). He adds that we must divide ourselves from each other due to our different desires and values, and finally he laments the urgent and vital need to wage a culture war. After all, according to Dashgi, from the Gothic Revolution anyone who does not draw conclusions from it regarding tolerance and Jewish-halakhic pluralism (including Leibowitz himself) is simply mistaken.[15]

For those who listen to the melody that emerges from Leibowitz's teaching (not necessarily from his actual behavior)[16]This is precisely the main message he wanted to convey. Deciding on a choice in a value system is indeed not deterministic, that is, contrary to scientific knowledge (as Leibowitz understands it), it is not forced upon us by reality or reason, as some think, but it is also not arbitrary, as others may think. It is the result of the action of the will, not of the mind,[17] However, it requires no less than the result of an intellectual decision. It is subject to the laws of logic, and in particular the law of contradiction, and therefore it necessarily negates the value systems that are opposed to it.

In my humble opinion, two conclusions clearly emerge from the above: A. There is no connection between Leibowitz's doctrine and pluralism. B. This part of Leibowitz's doctrine, to the best of my understanding, is free from contradiction.

Beyond the conclusions concerning Leibowitz's doctrine, as a generalization of this form of observation, I have tried to point out that postmodernism is not a necessary consequence of positivism, as might be inferred from the history of the twentieth century. In my remarks above, I also hinted that the possibilities for an approach to Jewish-Orthodox pluralism that have emerged in recent years, as well as the postmodern avant-garde of these approaches, are plagued by a similar flaw. A detailed discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this article.

[1] knowledge, Booklet 38, Winter 2017.

[2] On the other hand, Leibowitz's positivism is expressed in the opposite way, precisely in that his examinations of Judaism are essentially empirical. He examined Judaism as a living phenomenon, and did not rely fundamentally on quotations from canonical texts, but rather on illustrations of his own words.

[3] A 'truth value' for a particular statement means in our context that the statement is subject to the law of contradiction. If it is true, its negation is false. I do not mean to claim that there must be a correspondence between it and some state of affairs in the world.

[4] For a clear and simple description, see Chapter 5 of Richard Taylor's book, Metaphysics, Free University, Adam, Jerusalem, 1983.

[5] See for example, Moral dilemmas, Daniel Statman, Magnes, Jerusalem, 1991, p. 36.

[6]  B. WILLIAMS, 'ETHICAL CONSISTENCY' IN 'PRACTICAL REASONING', RAZ (ED.) OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1978.

[7] I believe that this assumption is at the foundation of the accepted deontic logics. See the aforementioned book by Statman, and Avraham Meydan's article 'Deontic Logics and Possible Worlds', in The just and the unjust, edited by Marcelo Daskal, University Publishing House, 1977.

[8] Akadmon, and Jerusalem, 1982. See ibid., page 181.

[9] See the long quote I will provide at the end of the article from his book 'Judaism, the Jewish People and the State of Israel'.

[10] See, for example, Leibowitz's reference in the last article in his book 'Faith, History and Values,' where he attempts to clarify the status of values as postulates of the will.

[11] See for example, one of many, in Tony Lavie's book, What is above and what is below, Maariv Bookstore, Or Yehuda, 1997, p. 88.

[12] Today, following Gödel's incompleteness theorems, the distinction between frequency (in the strict mathematical sense) and truth is much clearer, and these things are ancient.

[13] For a detailed presentation of such a position, see Chaim Perlman's book, The Kingdom of Rhetoric, Magnes, Jerusalem, 1984, mainly in the introduction, and then throughout the book. Perlman's other books deal with this issue in various ways.

[14] From his book Judaism, the Jewish people and the State of Israel, Schocken, fifth printing, 1979, page 291 ff.

[15] As I noted above, perhaps such conclusions can be drawn from Leibowitz's approach, but I highly doubt that this is indeed the case. In any case, it is clear that Leibowitz's non-pluralistic position is not inconsistent with his assumptions, as Sagi wanted to claim. Not at all.

[16] See on this subject the article by Hanna Kasher,  knowledge, issue 40, which claims against Leibowitz that someone who behaves like a tolerant person and appears like a tolerant person is probably a tolerant person, even if he himself is not willing to admit it.

[17] See a discussion of this at length and in great detail in Tony Lavie's book above, especially in Dialogues I.