Beer Bulletin – 2014

Dedicated to the second nucleus of 'Be' at the end of the year (5764)

0. General Introduction: Halacha, Mitzvot and What's Beyond

We have accepted that the foundation of the entire Torah is the law. Yeshayahu Leibowitz has already formulated this sharply (as is his custom), saying that various sects and movements were included in Judaism, or left it, not because of their views, but solely in light of their commitment to the law. For example, Hasidism, despite its renewed views that seemed to many to go outside the traditional fence, is today included within the framework of the Judaism of the law (what is now called 'Orthodoxy'). In contrast, the Karaites and their ilk were decisively excluded from the fence, solely due to the lack of commitment to the law. Many have already insisted that even Spinoza, who is now considered a heretic in terms of his views, was excluded from traditional Judaism mainly because the conclusions from these views involved a lack of commitment to the law.

And yet, despite what has been said here, there are several very fundamental aspects in the Torah that do not enter the system of mitzvot. However, it is clear that this is not always the case because their importance is less, but sometimes it is precisely because of their greater importance. As we will see below, some of the most fundamental spiritual-religious obligations do not enter the system of mitzvot precisely because of their importance. As we continue our discussion, we will see that some of them do indeed have halakhic expressions, but they are only partial.

There are several examples of this fundamental principle. We will discuss some of the most important ones, one by one.

1. The commandment of repentance.
2. The work of measurements.
3. Talmud Torah.
4. The love of God.
5. choice.

Those of these examples that do appear in the list of commandments appear immediately at the beginning of it (and therefore they are also detailed in the Rambam's Book of Science, which is the first and most basic of the fourteen books of the 'Strong Hand'). This indicates that they constitute the most fundamental basis of the Torah and the worship of God. As we will see below, even those that appear there are not included in the halakha in their entirety, but only in a small part of them. And there are those that are not included in the list of commandments at all (choice, and according to some opinions also improvement of character and repentance).

During the discussion of these issues, we will see several different mechanisms that can explain this unique phenomenon: why such basic issues are not fully included in the system of commandments.

It should be noted that most of these matters were discussed by the Rambam within the framework of the laws of repentance. In the following, we will draw conclusions from this regarding the essence of these laws in the Rambam.

In light of the above, questions arise regarding mitzvot such as faith in God, as they enter the system of mitzvot despite being central to the Torah and Halacha. Therefore, we will conclude our remarks with a discussion of the mitzvot of faith, which opens the Rambam's list of mitzvot.

1. The commandment of repentance

The Ramban, in his commentary on Deuteronomy (beginning of Deuteronomy 15), simply states that there is a mitzvah to make repentance. This mitzvah is learned from the verse (ibid.): 'And the Sabbath is until the Lord your God.'

In contrast, the Rambam in Hilchot Teshuvah (7:5) writes that this verse is a promise from God that the end of Israel will come to repentance. As the Ramban himself already notes (ibid.), according to the Rambam's view, there is no positive commandment here, but rather a prophecy and a promise.

And here is a well-known contradiction in the words of the Rambam in his laws regarding the commandment of repentance. On the one hand, in the Book of Mitzvot (Mitzvah 33) he writes:

It is that we are commanded to confess the sins and transgressions we have committed before God Almighty and to say them with repentance.

Therefore, in the Book of Mitzvot, the matter of confession is presented as a conditional mitzvah. If one makes a confession, he must say a confession with the confession. The confession itself is not mentioned at all in the Rambam's list of mitzvot.

This is how the author of Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah Shasad 4) concludes, explaining that if he does not repent, he is not punished at all for not repenting (he is punished only for the offense he committed). He adds that even if he repented and did not confess, he did not violate the positive commandment of confession at all, since this is not a positive commandment at all (this is an "existential" commandment, for whoever does it has a reward, but whoever transgresses it and does not commit it has not canceled anything).

In light of what emerges from the words of the Maimonides quoted above, the matter is clear and simple. It is unlikely that someone who repented and did not confess would be worse off (since he nullified the act of confession) than someone who did not repent at all.

Although the latter consideration is based on the unquestionable assumption that performing Teshuvah, even if it is not included in the number of mitzvot, has a positive value. We will return to this point below.

In contrast to all this, in the list of commandments before the laws of repentance, he writes:

There is one positive commandment, and it is that the sinner turns from his sin before God and confesses.

From here, a different picture emerges. The person who has sinned is commanded to turn from his evil deeds, and in addition to this, he is also commanded to confess. Here, repentance is a positive positive commandment (one who did not do it sinned by undoing an action), and it seems that it is included in the number of commandments.

In the explanation of Maimonides' method, various directions were stated. We will propose one direction here, according to the principle established at the beginning of our remarks.

Maimonides believes that the matter of repentance is a great virtue, and it is clear that there is an absolute obligation to repent of our bad deeds. However, in his opinion, such an obligation has no place within the framework of the number of mitzvot. This is an extra-halakhic obligation.

For this reason, in his Book of Mitzvot, where the Rambam lists the mitzvot that are included in the list of mitzvot in the Torah, the mitzvot of repentance does not appear as a positive mitzvot. The reason for this is that in this list, the Rambam lists everything that is commanded in the Torah as a mitzvot. However, in his book 'The Strong Hand', the Rambam attempts to collect everything that a person from Israel is obligated to do (whether it is a mitzvot or for another reason, such as the mitzvot of the rabbis, healthy practices and correct views, virtues, etc.). Therefore, there does appear an obligation to do repentance. If so, according to the Rambam too, there is an obligation to do repentance, but it is not considered a positive mitzvot.

The reason why the obligation to repent is not included in the list of commandments is that including it there would change its basic character. Someone who repents by virtue of a command is not similar to someone who does so by virtue of an understanding that he must turn from his evil deeds. Of course, this does not detract from the strength of the obligation to repent. On the contrary, this consideration indicates that the obligation to repent is so fundamental that including it in the list of commandments would detract from its value, and place it as only one of the 313 commandments.

2. The work of measurements

A similar discussion to the one we conducted regarding the commandment of repentance can also be made regarding the obligation to work and improve our qualities.

There are some commandments that include the obligation to improve our qualities within the framework of the positive commandment of "and walk in his ways." Maimonides, in the Book of Mitzvot (Acts 8), writes as follows:

And the eighth commandment is that it commands us to resemble Him, exalted according to our ability. And He said (Deuteronomy 28): 'And you shall walk in His ways.' And He doubled this commandment and said (Deuteronomy 10 and Deuteronomy 11): 'To walk in all His ways.'

And this interpretation comes from what the Holy One, blessed be He, is called merciful, you too were merciful. What the Holy One, blessed be He, is called kind, you too were kind. What the Holy One, blessed be He, is called righteous, you too were righteous. What the Holy One, blessed be He, is called a follower, you too were follower. And this is the language of the books (Sup. Akev).

And this commandment has already been repeated in another language, and it says (Deuteronomy 13): 'You shall walk after the Lord your God.' And it also comes out explicitly (Sotah 14:1) that it is about being likened to the good deeds and important qualities in which God will be described, exalting himself above the parable, exalting himself above all with great exaltation.

On the other hand, there are those who do not find a clear halakhic source for the obligation to improve our qualities. It is not clear to me whether this stems from a disagreement with these words of the Rambam, or because the commandment to walk in the ways of God does not include the full obligation to improve our qualities (in several ways, etc.).

For example, it is known that Rabbi Chaim Vital (the distinguished disciple of the holy Ari) asked: Why didn't the Torah command us to improve our qualities? He answers this by saying that the obligation to improve our qualities is a condition for any person to be capable of being commanded. If he needs to be commanded to improve his qualities, the command will not benefit him at all.

Some have put it differently: Improving one's morals is part of the most basic human form. If someone is not a human being, one cannot be commanded with mitzvot.

Let us give an example from the well-known story of the yeshiva student who reached the "Man of the Temple" section and began meeting pious virgins, in order to fulfill the important commandment of "Fru and multiply." After a while, he rejected all of them, saying that he had not found anyone suitable for him. The supervisor at that yeshiva called that student and told him that he needed to work on improving his character, as he seemed to be "proud." It is unlikely that any of those lustful girls were found suitable for his majesty.

After a year of intensive work on the virtues, the same student returned to the supervisor and told him that he was ready to start the process again. However, it seems that nothing has changed for him. He repeatedly rejected all the girls he met, just like in the previous round. When the supervisor asked him to explain this (how it fit with the intensive work on the virtues he had done throughout the year), the same student replied: "If last year, when I was a proud girl, none of those girls suited me, how much more so now, after a year of work, when I am already a famous humble girl, none of them will suit me."

This is exactly what someone who works on their virtues looks like because there is a mitzvah, or a section in halakha, that requires them to improve their virtues. Improving their virtues should come from a self-awareness of the importance of the matter, and not from submission to a commandment.

Rav Kook, in several of his letters, formulates this more sharply. Chazal renews for us a revolutionary innovation: 'Greater is he who commands and does a mitzvah than he who does not command and does it.' Whatever the explanation, it is clear that there are things about which our basic intuition is still correct, namely that the one who does not command and does it is greater. We will deal here with several examples of such issues. Improving morals is one of the most prominent of them.

3. Talmud Torah

It is well-known that Talmud Torah is the foundation of the entire Torah. Sages throughout the generations have extended and expanded on the importance of this mitzvah. Thus, Maimonides writes in mitzvah 11:

It is He who commanded us to study the wisdom of the Torah and to learn it. This is what is called Talmud Torah, and it is He who said (Parashat Shema): ‘And you shall memorize it for your children’…and there (in my book) it is said: ‘And you shall memorize it, that it may be sharp in your mouth. When a person asks you something, do not stammer for him, but tell him immediately. And this commandment has already been repeated many times…and the hasty has already spread about this mitzvah and to always study it in many places of the Talmud.

One of the strongest expressions of the importance of the commandment to study Torah is the concept of 'abrogation of Torah' (which already appears in Shas, and is also implied in the language of Maimonides above). Whenever a person does not study Torah, not only does he not receive a reward for the commandment, but he is punished for the prohibition of abrogation of Torah.

A piquant example of the depth of the foundation of Torah abrogation can be seen in a famous question. There is a well-known Sage statement: 'We abrogate Talmud Torah for the reading of the Megillah.' And some of the commentators have asked: What is the abrogation of Torah here? Is not the reading of the Megillah itself included in the scope of Torah study?

Some respond to this in light of the statement of the visionary, Yish, that there is a concept of 'nullification of Torah by quality.' There are types of Torah study that are included in the mitzvah of Talmud Torah, but since they constitute a lower type, they are considered nullification of Torah. This is nullification of Torah in terms of the quality of study. Reading the Megillah is an important mitzvah in terms of Nissa's publications, and everyone is obligated to do it on Purim. However, reading the Megillah is still considered nullification of Torah by quality compared to the theoretical study of halakha. It is the depth of the study of Torah that defines the quality of study.

And here, precisely against the backdrop of all of the above, we find a surprising halacha. In the Gemara (Menachot 77b) Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai states (in fact, he! In the Gemara, he is presented as someone who is strict in the commandment of Talmud Torah, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael[1]):

Anyone who recites Kiryat Shema morning and evening fulfills the commandment, "This Torah scroll shall not be touched from your mouth."

This suggests that it is sufficient to recite the Shema morning and evening to fulfill the obligation of studying Torah. If so, it is not clear how one can explain the reference to every moment in which one does not study Torah as 'abrogation of Torah.'

Although it is possible to say that "not to be touched" is only one of the commandments of Talmud Torah (in the Rambam above, we saw that the commandment is repeated several times), it is possible that there are additional commandments that oblige us to always meditate on it.

However, from the simple explanation of the Gemara in Nedarim, it seems that this is not true. The Gemara in Tractate Nedarim (8a) provides the following halakha:

And Rabbi Gidel said, Rav said: He who says, "I will be circumcised and I will change this chapter, I will change this tractate," is a great vow, a vow to the God of Israel.

In other words, an oath to study a chapter of the Torah is a valid oath (and not a vow). The G.M. emphasizes this:

And is he not sworn and standing, and no oath is binding upon an oath?

That is, an oath to do something that a person has already sworn and is ready (halachically obligated) to do, is not valid. And the rabbinic argument is:

A. K.M.L.: Since I was a prisoner in Kiryat Shema, morning and evening, because of the soldier's oath to her.

The Gamma says that there is an innovation in the laws of Talmud Torah by Rabbi Gidel. Rabbi Gidel teaches us, following the words of the aforementioned Rashbi, that in fact there is no obligation to study any chapter or mishna, and therefore this oath is an oath to do something that one is not obligated to do. Such an oath is a valid oath. If so, it follows from this that there is no obligation from the Torah, no matter what verse, to study Torah beyond the obligation to recite the Shema morning and evening.

It should be noted that the first commentators on the website disagree on this matter. From the Rosh's commentary there (and also from the words of the commentary, which was printed instead of Rashi's), it appears that there is really no obligation at all to study Torah beyond reciting the Shema morning and evening. The Rabbi disagrees and believes that there is an obligation to study all the time, but this is an obligation that is not actually from the Torah. In any case, it turns out that there is no ordinary positive commandment to study all the time, or to study the entire Torah. How does this reconcile with the concept of 'abrogation of Torah'?

Here we encounter once again a very fundamental Torah matter, Talmud Torah, which seems to be a matter that is agreed upon by all commentators and all poskim, and its importance is undeniable (it is stated in Shas in several places that the abrogation of Torah is a grave sin for which we are punished). Nevertheless, it is not fully included in the formal halakhic framework (Minyan HaMitzvot). Although it appears in the Rambam's Minyan HaMitzvot (and it is even stated there that there is an obligation to study every moment), it appears from the above-mentioned Gemara and Rishonim that it does not have such a halakhic status.[2]

We should note that the Rambam does not really address in detail the obligation to study Torah in the laws of repentance. In the last chapter, he briefly discusses the obligation to study for the sake of God, and this too seems to be part of the general obligation to serve God for the sake of God and with love. This may stem from his different approach to this mitzvah, as we saw above (it is possible that he understands that this is a regular mitzvah like all mitzvahs, in contrast to the aforementioned Ran and Rosh). See more on this in the chapter below on the significance of the laws of repentance.

4. The love of God

Another mitzvah, which also appears at the beginning of the Rambam's list of mitzvot, is the mitzvah of loving God. Thus he writes in mitzvah 3:

And it is that we are commanded to love Him, and that we observe and become wise in His commandments and actions until we attain Him and delight in attaining Him, the ultimate pleasure. And this is the obligatory love.

And the language of my book (Parashat Shema): Since it is said, 'You shall love the Lord your God,' I do not know how to love the place. Learn to say: 'And these words which I command you today shall be upon your heart.' From this you know the One who said and the world was.

Maimonides further explains that we have the duty to love God, the Blessed, above all creatures, and to seek, call, and return everyone to His service, the Exalted, and to believe in Him, as our forefather Abraham did.

The details of the laws concerning the love of God appear in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Vol. 2. There the Rambam specifies that the basic obligation is:

To observe His great and wonderful works and creations, and to see in them His wisdom, which has no value and no end, one immediately loves, praises, glorifies, and desires a great desire to know the Great Name.

Immediately afterwards, Maimonides begins to detail, over the course of three chapters, his cosmology (wheels, angels, etc.), as part of the elaboration of the path to the love of God:

And according to these things, I explain great rules from the actions of the Lord of the worlds, so that they may be an opening for the understanding to love God. As the Sages said regarding love: 'Through this you know the One who said and the world came into being.'

It is worth noting the difference between the two formulations: In the Book of Commandments, Maimonides states that one must observe His commandments and actions in order to delight in them. And here Maimonides states that we must observe His actions and creations, as is evident from the detail that follows immediately afterwards.

In any case, it is quite clear that contemplation is nothing more than an instrument of a mitzvah. There is no mitzvah in studying the natural sciences, but rather it is an instrument of a mitzvah, through which the mitzvah of loving God is fulfilled. It is the intention in studying that determines whether or not there is a mitzvah fulfillment here. The same is true of 'contemplating His commandments,' in the formulation of the Book of Mitzvot. Here too, it seems that Torah study constitutes an instrument for fulfilling the mitzvah of loving God. Of course, studying Torah is also a special mitzvah in itself, and we have already discussed this above. However, as we have already noted above, according to the Rambam himself, the status of this mitzvah is truly unclear.

And here, at the end of the Laws of Repentance, the Rambam returns to addressing the love of God. The entire chapter 10 is dedicated to the obligation to worship God out of love and not fear. This, according to the Rambam, is worshiping God 'for His own sake'.[3] In Halacha 2 and Halacha 3, Maimonides writes as follows:

The worker out of love engages in the Torah and the mitzvot and walks in the paths of wisdom not for anything in the world. Not out of fear of evil nor in order to inherit goodness, but does the truth because it is truth, and the end of goodness is to come in general…and this is the virtue that the Blessed One commanded us through Moses our Lord, as it is said: ‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’ And when he loves the Name with a proper love, he will immediately do all the mitzvot out of love.

And what is the proper love? He who loves God with a great, exceedingly great, very intense love…like the lovesick ones whose minds are never free from the love of that woman whom he is always smitten with. Whether when he sits down, when he gets up, or when he eats and drinks…and the entire Song of Songs is a parable about this matter.

It is puzzling that it is in the Laws of Repentance that the Rambam details the scope of the commandment to love God. In the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, where the main theme of love of God is found (as explained in the list of commandments at the beginning of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah), there is only a laconic reference, which deals mainly with the path to reaching love and not with the scope of the commandment itself.

Maimonides concludes the chapter on the laws of repentance as follows:

Therefore, man must dedicate himself to understanding and enlightening himself with the wisdom and understanding that inform him of his Creator, according to the power that man has to understand and attain, as we explained in the laws of the fundamentals of the Torah.

This actually includes everything that Maimonides wrote in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah: the obligation to educate God as a way to love Him.

It seems that the solution to this problem also lies in the principle we are emphasizing in these pages. The commandment to love God is a commandment like any other 32 commandments. However, the principle of loving God as a fundamental principle in the worship of God is one of the essences of the Torah and the worship of God in general. This principle does not enter the halakhic framework, since its inclusion there would diminish it.

The elementary halachic standard, which obligates everyone, is to learn about reality and the mitzvot in order to reach love. This is what is detailed in the laws of love of God (which appear in the Basic Torah). The obligation in practice is much broader. In practice, a person must always strive to love God. He must also fulfill all the mitzvot out of love for God.

Of course, fulfilling a commandment out of love for God will be fulfilling the commandment of love for God, but it is not a halakhic obligation that is imposed on everyone. The reason for this is that if it were imposed as an obligation, it would neutralize its main value (as we saw above regarding the virtues). Perhaps there is also another reason, because complete love is a great virtue that is difficult to demand of everyone. The halakhic requirement is only the minimum level required of each person according to his or her strength.

In any case, it is clear that there is no concession or devaluation of the duty to love God here. The reason it is not fully included in the halakhic framework and in the number of commandments is precisely because of its greatness and importance, not because of its lack of value.

However, it seems that here appears another explanation, of a different nature than those we have encountered so far, for the non-inclusion of the love of God in the list of commandments. Maimonides states in the fourth root (cf. also his words in the ninth root) that the commandments that include the entire Torah should not be included in the list of commandments. His examples are 'Keep my statutes,' 'And keep my watch,' 'Be holy,' and so on.

Some of these commandments are not included because they have no practical content whatsoever, beyond the obligations included in the other commandments. This is a repetition devoid of halakhic content. However, in some of them (such as "Be holy," and see the Ramban's "Phi" at the beginning of "Phi" Kedoshim) it seems that the underlying principle is that something too basic cannot be included in the number of commandments. This is a root that accompanies every commandment and commandment, and it is not logically possible to list it as one of the other regular commandments.

Love of God, beyond its importance and fundamentality, is also a comprehensive mitzvah. As we have seen, all the mitzvot must be done out of love. Therefore, there is a logical problem in including this obligation itself in the list of mitzvot. Consider for yourself: How could it be possible to fulfill the mitzvot of love of God itself (if it were included in the list of mitzvot) out of love? Or not out of love?

In other words: Absurdly enough, the number of mitzvot includes only those mitzvot that can be kept even for no reason. The mitzvot of loving God cannot be kept in this way.

5. Choice

The issue of choice is discussed in the Law of Repentance, Chapter 5-6. Although some commentators have learned that there is such an obligation from the verse "And you chose life," I am not aware of a rabbi who has brought the obligation to choose within the framework of the number of commandments.

This is supposedly the most basic duty that every person is obligated to perform. Why do we not include it in the list of mitzvot?

The answer is very simple. Precisely because of its fundamental nature, the obligation to choose cannot be included as a regular mitzvah in the number of mitzvot. In another version, one could say: If a person does not choose, what is the point of commanding him to choose?! And that this mitzvah will encourage him to choose more than anything else. Or in a third version: The mitzvah to choose is included in each of the 13 mitzvot, since the obligation to fulfill that mitzvah includes a fundamental element of choice in fulfilling that mitzvah. The mitzvah to bless the blessing of food also includes, of course, the obligation to choose to bless.

This claim also has implications that are not as trivial as one might think. Is it better to educate a child, or a student, to think independently and make autonomous decisions, even at the cost of choosing not the way we want him to? Or is it better for him to perform a commandment, even as a commandment of learned people?

The condemnation of the prophets ('And you shall fear me from the commandments of learned men') and of the sages for performing mitzvot out of habit is clear. However, it cannot necessarily be learned from it that it is better to develop autonomous service to God when there is a risk of losing everything, over service to God out of habit, which is 'safer'.

Various educators and scholars disagree on this question. Of course, the answers are not limited to just 'yes' or 'no'. There are different doses of autonomy, which also depend on the ages of the learners. However, one point can still be drawn from the above consideration: autonomy is important, and this is the fundamental duty that each of us has to choose our own path.

Extreme expressions of the importance of this duty can be found in two places (one according to the literal meaning of the Bible, and the other as an extension of a popular sermon).

The prophet Elijah says to the people on Mount Carmel (1 Kings 18:21):

How long will you ignore both points? If the Lord is God, follow Him, and if Baal is, follow Him.

There is a tendency to see these things as a form of provocation, or a demagogic argument. However, in my humble opinion, Elijah the prophet is simply stating the obvious: it is better for them to follow their husbands out of choice, than to continue serving God out of inertia.

The second example is our mother Rebecca. When Rebecca was pregnant with Jacob and Esau, the verse says: 'And she went to inquire of the Lord,' and it is explained by the Sages that the reference is to the house of learning of Shem and Eber. The Sages and other commentators already felt the difficulty inherent in the verse: What bothered Rebecca that she went to inquire of the Lord in the house of learning of Shem and Eber?

This can perhaps be deciphered from the answer she receives:

Two nations shall be in your womb, and two peoples from your bowels shall be separated; and one nation shall be devoted to another, and the elder shall serve the younger.

In light of this answer, it is clear what the Sages interpret in the Midrash, that Rebekah felt that when she passed by houses of worship, the fetus in her womb was trying to hatch and come out. And when she passed by houses of worship, it was trying to come out again. This situation embarrassed her: What did the fetus in her womb really want? Therefore, she went to ask God. God answered her, through the name and the past tense, that there were two sons in her womb, not one. One tended to come out near houses of worship, and the other near houses of worship.

So far, the Sage Midrash is explicit. The popular sermon adds and asks why this answer calmed Rivka? Is the fact that she has two different sons better than one son who is hesitant? The well-known answer is: Two sons, one Haredi and one Apikor, are better than one son who is a 'Mazrochnik'.

In our language, this is said a little differently: the explanation is that she did think that this was not a son who was wavering, but a son who was undecided on both counts. He did not choose but was dragged, and therefore when they were near houses of worship, he wanted to leave, and so did near study halls. The environment determines his actions, his views, and his thoughts. To this, God, blessed be He, answers her that these are two sons, each of whom chooses his path autonomously: one chooses evil, and the other chooses good. However, both choose and are not dragged.

The conclusion is that this is indeed a better situation than one that 'leaves both sides out.' Therefore, Rivka accepts the answer and is relieved of her distress.

This means that choice is itself an obligation, and therefore also a value. There is an obligation to choose (even if one chooses evil). On the second floor, there is an additional obligation: to choose good. Both floors together cannot be included in the number of commandments. The first floor, for the reasons explained above. And the second floor, because one cannot be commanded what to choose. The essence of choice is that it is free. Everyone chooses what they decide on. Otherwise, there would be no choice here.

The Torah and God certainly expect us to choose goodness, but the command to do so is in the form of a secret command. This is the logical problem we encountered in relation to the work of God (and to a lesser extent in relation to virtue), but here it appears in a much more extreme and acute form.

In light of what has been said here, it is not clear who we should see as the greater educational failure: the one who chooses evil or the one who does not choose at all (even if he keeps some commandments out of habit). The one violates the commandment on the first level, and the other violates the commandment on the second level.

However, this is usually an imaginary dilemma. In the lessons in the month of Elul, we emphasized that in fact, whoever chooses, almost always chooses good. Sin is almost always the result of being dragged along, that is, of not choosing. Therefore, a situation of complete choice of evil is almost entirely theoretical (we presented this through the philosophical problem of 'weakness of will').

Therefore, the simple assumption is that he who chooses evil, probably did not choose. If so, the failure of the sinner is usually twofold: he neither chose, nor did he do evil. We have learned that the dilemma presented above is merely theoretical. In fact, the educational goal is to create a student, or an educator, who will actually choose (not just feel that he is choosing), and who will usually also choose what is good and true.

The conclusion is that the main work we have to do with our willpower and choice is in a situation where we have a dilemma about whether to choose. We must choose to choose, and the rest will come anyway.

By the way, it's worth doing exercises in choosing. We can set ourselves various challenges, beyond the duties imposed on us, just to improve the choosing dimension within us, and make it dominant.

We will add that even when joining the army, one can think about the same dilemma. There is an ideal in military education to create a soldier who is as disciplined as possible. On the other hand, it is important to create a soldier who thinks and has a 'big head.' The risk is that such a soldier may (or may) refuse an order, take initiatives that could be wrong, and so on. Therefore, there is a tendency to educate soldiers closer to the pole of discipline, and further away from the pole of autonomy. Even when trying to instill values in soldiers, this is done through fixed orders and fixed formulations (and problematic in themselves) of 'IDF values.'

This is also one of the reasons why refusing an order, from various directions, almost automatically arouses opposition. There is a conditioned social reflex to condemn those who refuse an order. However, I think it is also important to see the virtue that a soldier who refuses an order has. The orders he does carry out, he does out of identification, and in any case he will do them better. And of course, if orders are given that should not be carried out, he really will not carry them out.

The dosage is of course important. Not every nonsense order is refused. However, when it crosses a red line, we are definitely obligated to refuse it. This is not just the right of every soldier. It is his duty!

6. The meaning of the laws of repentance

In light of all that has been said so far, we can now return to asking ourselves what the content of the Maimonides' laws of repentance are.

These laws seemingly contain a random collection of topics, and there does not seem to be any connection between them. The answer itself, of course, occupies a central place (five chapters: chapters 1-4 and chapter 7). The topic of choice occupies two chapters (chapters 5-6). The topic of reward (the world to come and the days of the Messiah) occupies two chapters (chapters 8-9). And the obligation to serve God for His sake and out of love occupies one chapter (chapter 10). What do all of these have in common?

First, it is worth noting that three of the topics discussed so far are included in the laws of repentance (love of God, choice, repentance). Although Talmud Torah is not actually discussed there, this may stem from the Rambam's view that it is actually a regular mitzvah (see our discussion there).[4] The virtues are indeed mentioned in the 53rd chapter of the Book of Mormon, but they do not occupy a central place. The main discussion of virtues is in the law of opinions (in the Rambam, following Chazal, these 'opinions' are virtues and not rationalities and views as we would use them today). However, we saw above that the virtues according to the Rambam are also included in the number of mitzvot, and therefore they are considered a regular mitzvah.

If so, the obvious conclusion is that the laws of repentance are in fact laws of choice. Included here are the fundamental laws that are not included in the list of commandments. These are the laws that, due to their fundamental nature, were not included in the list of commandments, or that appeared in it only at an elementary and partial level, and not in their full manifestation in the worship of Hashem. In another version, it is said: The laws of repentance are the laws of the worship of Hashem. These, by their very nature, cannot be fully included in the formal law, since they constitute a foundation for it, which must be prior to and external to it.

This is also the reason why the discussion of the issue of choice is specifically included in the laws of repentance. As we saw above, every mitzvah includes within it a dimension of choice. A person must choose to bless, pray, honor one's parents, not eat pork, and so on. However, in the issue of repentance, as in the other issues we have discussed so far, choice appears in its purity. The subject of the laws of repentance is the choice itself, and not any content of the choice. In the terms of the previous chapter that dealt with choice, it was said that the laws of repentance deal with level one (whether to choose) and not level two (what to choose). In this they differ fundamentally from all other laws.

Even in Talmud Torah, in love of God, in repentance, in virtue, and certainly in choice itself, the basic question: whether to observe or transgress, does not involve obeying a commandment or transgressing it. Improving virtue is not a commandment (for some rabbis), and therefore the decision to do so is autonomous. The same is true for Talmud Torah (beyond the morning and evening rabbinical laws). The same is true for love of God (beyond the minimum specified in the laws of the foundations of the Torah). And so it is with repentance (according to the Maimonides' own system, which does not include among the mitzvot a positive mitzvot to make repentance). In all these cases, we must decide on our path autonomously and out of full choice, and not out of a commandment. Therefore, it is precisely here that the power of choice appears in its purity, and therefore it is precisely here that Maimonides places his discussion on the subject of choice (laws of choice!?).

This also seems to be the reason why in these rulings Maimonides deviates from his usual path, and tries to convince us to repent. So does Rabbi Yonah in his book 'Sha'arei Teshuvah'. So does Rabbi Chayyah, author of 'Hobot HaLevvot', in his book, regarding all virtues. The moral books of our first rabbis are rare. This is a genre that is essentially modern. However, on these issues, the first rabbis already try to convince us to do what is incumbent upon us.

The entire seventh chapter of Rambam's Laws of Repentance is devoted to persuasive arguments. We have not found this anywhere else in his book 'The Strong Hand'. In chapter 7, Rambam writes:

Since every person has the right to repent, as we have explained, a person should strive to repent and shake off his sins, so that he may die repentant, so that he may merit the reward of the next world.

Let not the repentant person imagine that he is distant from the virtue of the righteous because of the transgressions and sins he has committed. This is not so, but he is beloved and pleasing before the Creator, and as if he had never sinned. And not only that, but he has been greatly rewarded… and our sages said: Where the repentant person stands…

All the prophets commanded the answer…

Great is the answer that brings a person closer to the Divine Presence… The answer brings those who are far away closer: Yesterday he was a stranger before the place, loathed and distant and abominable. And today he is loved and pleasant, close and friendly…

How excellent is the virtue of repentance. Yesterday he was separated from the God of Israel… shouting and not being answered… and doing the commandments and having them destroyed in his presence… and today he is glued to the Divine Presence… shouting and being answered immediately… and doing the commandments and having them accepted with ease and joy… and nothing more than that which pleases them…

The reason for this unique phenomenon is that in other mitzvot, persuasion can be based on the very fundamental obligation to fulfill the commandments of God in the Torah. Perhaps we can also add to this the punishment imposed on those who do not fulfill their duties. However, in these contexts that appear in the laws of repentance, there is no command, and therefore the punishment is not explicit (although, it does exist). Therefore, it is precisely on these issues that the sages try to convince us. They try to influence us to choose autonomously on the right path, even without the existence of a full command.

7. Faith

In light of all that has been said so far, a difficult question arises and becomes even more acute.

The first commandment that appears in the list of commandments, and therefore clearly the one considered most fundamental by the Rambam, is the commandment of faith. The Rambam writes:

The first commandment is the commandment that commanded us to believe in the Godhead. And it is that we believe that there is a cause and a reason, that He is the cause of all that exists. And He said, "I am the Lord your God."

And at the end of the final plagues (23b) they said: "313 commandments were spoken to Moses at Sinai. May read: 'The Torah commanded us Moses.'"

That is, the number of the Torah (=611). And they made it difficult and said: "Torah in gematria, which one is it? Shit maa and Hadesri, which one is it (=611 is it)." And the answer was: "I am, and it will not be heard from the mouth of the mighty one."

Now it has already been explained to you that "I am the Lord" is one of the six hundred and thirteen commandments, and it is a commandment of faith, as we have explained.

The problem with including the commandment of faith in the framework of the list of commandments is obvious. First, there is a circularity here: if I do not believe, then I cannot be commanded to do anything, and certainly not to believe. Furthermore, the very commandment to believe is paradoxical. If I do not believe, how will the commandment help me with this? Faith in its essence is an autonomous matter that is left to the decision of each person. Someone who does not believe cannot do so by virtue of a commandment.

In fact, all the reasons we have encountered so far for not including any commandments in the list of mitzvot exist, and even more so, in the mitzvot of faith. However, here there is at least one point beyond everything that has been said so far: ostensibly, faith cannot be an obligation at all. This is not at all a formal problem, whether to include it in the list of mitzvot or not. In the other matters discussed so far, our argument was that these are absolute obligations, but due to their importance they cannot be formally included in the list of mitzvot. However, in the context of the mitzvot of faith, this is a matter that cannot be considered an obligation at all. Nor is it an obligation outside of halakhic law, or outside of the formal system of mitzvot. Faith is a condition for entering into the obligation to the system of mitzvot. It cannot be included in it, and it also constitutes a condition for it.

First, it should be noted that it seems that Maimonides himself also felt this difficulty, as he takes the trouble to prove from the Gemara in the Beatings that this is indeed one of the 313 commandments. The need to provide evidence for his words indicates that Maimonides himself felt this difficulty.

The fundamental explanation for this question seems to lie in a fundamental misunderstanding about faith. There is a widespread feeling today that faith is a matter of personal decision. Some believe, and some do not. Like any debate about views and values, there is also a debate about faith. Some will go so far as to say that faith is something that is inherently opposed to thinking and using reason. They will add that if there were proof, or some kind of rational consideration, we would not need faith.

This is a fundamental error. The Torah assumes that faith is present in every person. If it were not there, not only could it not be commanded, it could not be expected to be formed at all. The concept of God cannot be created by human decision. Either it exists within us or it does not. Descartes' anthropological argument claims that the very existence of such a concept within us indicates the existence of God himself. The accepted discourse about each person's subjective God (which each person creates for himself) is mistaken and misleading.

Therefore, the basis of Maimonides' command is not a command to believe. It is a command not to deny what is already within us. Someone who declares himself a non-believer is also a believer. He merely denies this belief, for various reasons (some of which are justified, and some perhaps less so). The command is to continue to obey this inner command, not to deny it, and also to act according to it.

The proof that the Rambam brings from the Gemara in Beatings is precisely for this principle itself: that faith is found in each of us, and therefore it is possible for us to be commanded not to deny it. The fact that this is one of the 13 commandments is itself evidence of this principle.

Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, in his book 'Kovets Ma'arim', asks how one can make claims against an Eskimo who has never heard of Mount Sinai, nor of the first Adam, or of Noah, for not keeping the seven commandments of the sons of Noah that are imposed on him. His answer is that every person has the initial intuition that the world has a Creator, and therefore we also have a role that He assigns us to perform in it. Anyone who does not understand this role, for some reason, is expected to embark on a journey of exploration and clarification, in order to clarify this role. The demand inherent in the commandments of faith is to embark on this journey. At the end of the journey, we discover that everything is already within us. Like the Hasidic story (see the entry 'Paulo Coelho') about the man who went out to look for treasure under a bridge in distant Prague, and discovered that it was under the oven in his house in the village.

We have learned that there are indeed duties that, due to their fundamental nature, are not included in the list of commandments. However, the most fundamental duty of all is nevertheless included in the list of commandments. If up to this point we could have reached the conclusion that the commandments are only second-rate duties, and the most fundamental duties are those that are not included in them, then the commandment of faith comes and reveals to us a deeper level. The foundation of everything is nevertheless found in the commandments. Even that which is outside the commandments, and seemingly deeper and more fundamental than them, begins with them.

The inclusion of the commandment of faith in the list of commandments suggests to us that faith is already within every person. From this point, which truly cannot be reached through a commandment, and therefore God Himself plants it within us, all other duties emerge. Those within us and those not. Those within the list of commandments and those not. This commandment is placed first, for from here also the list of commandments begins. To the same extent, everything also begins from a point that is deep within us. Not under the bridge in Prague, but under the oven at home.

"It is neither in heaven nor beyond the sea."…For the word is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart to do it."

[1] Incidentally, there in the G.M. it is told of Dama, the nephew of Rabbi Yishmael, who finished studying the entire Torah, and asked his uncle whether he was now permitted to study Greek wisdom. Rabbi Yishmael answers him by way of refinement that he can do so only if he finds 'a time that is neither of the day nor of the night' (since all day and all night are obligatory in the commandment of Talmud Torah). This is the approach of Rabbi Yishmael, who 'makes it easy' in the commandment of Talmud Torah.

[2] And this will settle a problem that my students have asked me. In the book of Menachot 69b, a son of Dema, the nephew of Rabbi Yishmael, asks his uncle: "Such as I, who have learned the entire Torah, what is the point of studying Greek wisdom?" And it seems difficult, because if he asks Rabbi Yishmael this halacha, he apparently does not know the entire Torah. If so, how does he base his desire to engage in Greek wisdom on this?

And according to our words, the matter is well explained. Indeed, this question is not included in the Torah (and not only in Halacha!). In terms of the formal obligation of Halacha, it is sufficient to recite the Kash morning and evening to fulfill the obligation of studying Talmud Torah. A cousin who knows the entire Torah still does not know the answer to this question, since it is not included in the Torah. He asks his uncle a non-halachaic question, or 'Da'at Torah': What is appropriate to do for someone who has learned the entire Torah? And this is the correct interpretation.

[3] I remind you of what we saw in one of our lessons in the words of the Rambam himself (Hilchots of Illicit Worship, 3:56). There it emerges from his words that 'for her sake' means without any reason (not even out of love). Food for thought!

[4] It should be noted that in the last chapter, Maimonides actually made quite a bit of reference to Talmud Torah, and to the obligation to do so for its own sake. However, it does not appear there that he refers to Talmud Torah as a category separate from the observance of the commandments and the worship of God in general.

It is true that the commentators there discussed the Maimonides' citation of the Sages' statement that one should worship for no other purpose and thereby come to worship God for His sake. Some insisted that Maimonides was quoting this in relation to study only, in contrast to the text in the Gemara, which also refers to the observance of mitzvot.

In light of what is said here, it is certainly possible that the Rambam deals with the laws of Talmud Torah in the details of the laws, but at the end of the laws of Teshuvah he deals with the obligation to learn for its own sake. Indeed, this obligation is not included in the law (and even someone who does not learn for its own sake is exempt from the halachic commandment). In this sense, there is a situation here parallel to what we saw in the commandment of loving God, which is also listed as a mitzvah, but some of its issues (the informal part) are discussed in the laws of Teshuvah.

It should also be noted that in relation to the Talmud Torah, Maimonides speaks here of 'for her sake', while in relation to other commandments he writes that they must be done out of love ('for her sake', not 'for her sake').

Finally, I still need to study Maimonides' method regarding Talmud Torah.