Birth control in Halacha

With God’s help

2011

Birth control and contraception

Michai Avraham

To the rabbis, who read the answer.

Even if for some reason you decide to skip a line or two in the answer, I will draw your attention to the fact that at the end I added a chapter 6, which addresses the more fundamental and general points, which is intended for you, and not for the explanation of the Talita (which at that point will certainly be a shepherd without a soul). These are aspects that it would not have been right to include in the answer to the questioner.

The answer itself attempts to start from the beginning, and to provide the relevant sources discussed in full so that it can be read sequentially and critically. A significant portion of the material is familiar and well-known, and was written as part of the structure of a regular answer (to Lior and me, not to you).

There are fewer quotes and references to the Shulchan, as part of my halakhic perspective, as I explained last Shabbat. Precedents that are not from the Sages (and slightly more from the Rishonim) are not that important to me. I certainly think it is worthwhile and appropriate to go through them to see if anything is missed, but they have no real halakhic weight in my opinion.

Since I usually do not engage in preaching (for fear of my life, and also due to lack of skills), nor in thought and outlook (for fear of nullifying the Torah), I focused on the halakhic aspects. But as you will see, they are saturated with assumptions and worldviews, and this is done here in an explicit and conscious manner. For the fundamental aspects, see a nice and balanced discussion in Rabbi Yigal Ariel's article 'Reverch between pregnancies (halakhic reference)', in B'Zahar 10, which was also mentioned in my response (as the name suggests, there is a discussion there of the halakhic aspects, but it also needed the other aspects).

Nevertheless, I could not avoid letters addressed to the questioner, both at the beginning and in chapter 5 (see this as part of the 'Kip' website). The brevity on these subjects that require length, especially to the questioner who does not seem to me to be really interested in the final words on the subject, is due to my aforementioned criminal tendencies.

Therefore, please read the letters as if they were written to her, but the reply should be read as if it were written to you. And please treat it as if I had not written them.

For your convenience, I am attaching a table of contents.

Table of Contents

The question – birth control
A letter accompanying the answer (can be published on the 'Kip' website)
A brief halachic introduction
A. The commandments "Be fruitful and multiply," "Do not lay your hand on the evening," and "On the Sabbath, create."
B. Cancellation or postponement of the breeding and breeding charge
C. A note on contraception
D. Summary: The one who comes to the Halacha
E. The meta-halakhic questions
F. Addition to the Rabbis who read

The question I received – birth control

Hello Rabbi

I grew up in an education where I was taught that in general, you should have as many children as possible, unless you don't have the strength or have other problems. I also know that you need to contact a rabbi to get permission to space your children.

But I can't handle it.

Simply, I don't want many children. I'm healthy, we have good financial capacity, and a great environment. Not because of problems. I don't want it because it doesn't suit me, doesn't suit what I want to do in life, and doesn't suit me because life would be enslaved to children.

I simply don't want anyone to interfere with my question in the bedroom. I don't understand why I need a rabbi to decide my intimate questions. I also don't understand what the rabbi knows that I don't know. If he knows something about halacha, then he should say what the halacha is and I will decide whether to apply it. He is not a psychologist, and in fact he doesn't know anything that I don't know except halacha. On the contrary, I know myself better than he does.

What I'm actually asking: I'm actually asking if I will decide for myself what to do according to what is convenient for me - am I a sinner?

Lior

The answer

Hello Lior.

Beyond the halakhic aspect, your question also involves several broader aspects, such as: the attitude towards halakha, the status of considerations of convenience or career, the status of the common man vis-à-vis the posak (the question of autonomy), "You have a rabbi" (the obligation to consult a rabbi), the authority and area of expertise of the posak, the limits of the application of halakha, and more.

Before we even begin the discussion, I find it my duty to preface this by saying that, contrary to the understanding of Halacha implicit in your question, the decision in every area of life, including Halacha, is yours and no one else's. Even where Halacha unequivocally states its point, it is you who must decide whether to comply with this obligation or not. This is not a privilege, or any kind of privilege, but an obligation that the Torah imposes on us, in its words, "And choose life."

This duty has two faces: first – to choose, second – to choose correctly. To choose, an autonomous mental-spiritual position is required, and as I get the impression, it certainly exists in you. To choose correctly, information is also required, and you may be lacking a little of that. Therefore, I see my role in providing assistance as the degree of ability in making the decision, both in information and advice. Then you will be able to best fulfill the commandment “And choose life.”

Another clarification is necessary. Your question is phrased as if it were a question from an individual. But naturally, both spouses are involved, and both of them together should make the decisions on these issues. Furthermore, as we will see below, from the perspective of halakha, it is the man who is the one who commands in the commandment of "be fruitful and multiply," and the woman mainly assists him. Therefore, I treat the question as if it were raised by both spouses together.

As is the Torah's way, my answer will begin by clarifying the halakhic aspect. I assume that you are also aware of its importance, and that it is the fundamental foundation of the discussion. If you find the path difficult, you can read the practical summary in Chapter 4. Then, in Chapter 5, I will try to touch on the additional aspects you raised.

Best regards,

Michi

Halachic introduction

From your request, it can be understood that you are not talking about postponing the obligation but about canceling it. That is, you want to stop trying to have children, and not just postpone it. Still, your words are not clear whether you are talking about canceling or postponing. It is not yet clear whether you already have children, and how many, these are also important questions before we need an answer. Therefore, I will take the opportunity to clarify the issue from all these angles together.

I will divide the halakhic layer of the discussion into three chapters that deal with the three main aspects of the question:

The obligation to bring children into the world: the boundaries of the commandments "Be fruitful and multiply," "Do not lay your hand on the evening," and "On the Sabbath, create."
Canceling a halakhic obligation that is imposed on me, or postponing its fulfillment to a later date. What are the possible reasons for this, if any? Here we will distinguish between a situation in which the commandment of procreation and reproduction (having a son and a daughter) has already been fulfilled and a situation in which it has not yet been fulfilled.
Use of various contraceptives (the prohibitions associated with them, if any). I will only comment briefly on this subject, as it is a technical issue that is generally not essential for discussion, unless a special problem arises. Here we will mainly deal with the fundamental problems that concern the law of procreation and reproduction (= "Pur").
After that, I will add another chapter containing a halakhic summary of my remarks, and conclude with a chapter that concerns meta-halakhic questions.

A. The commandment to be fruitful and multiply, "Do not lay your hand on the evening" and "On the Sabbath you created"

In this chapter, I will review the boundaries of the commandment of fertility and reproduction, and two rabbinical commandments that branch off from it: "Do not lay your hand on the evening," and "On the Sabbath, create."

Sources of Charge and Initial Delimitations: "Produce and Multiply"

The first commandment that the Torah imposes on us (see Sefer Hinunchuh, Mitzvah 1), appears already in the Book of Creation on the sixth day, with the creation of Adam. There the Torah describes the creation of animals, and then it writes (Genesis 1:25-28):

And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth: And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them: and God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth. The earth and its fulness, and over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves on the earth:

The same statement, which can also be interpreted as a blessing, is interpreted by our sages as a command (they understood in the verse that the 'blessing' preceded the 'statement': "Be fruitful and multiply," and this statement is a command).[1]

Thus the Mishnah states in Yevamot 6a:

Matani. A lay priest may not marry an elonite – unless he has a wife and children; Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he has a wife and children, he may not marry an elonite, who is a prostitute as mentioned in the Torah. And the sages say: There is no prostitute except a convert, and one who is freed, and who was married on the grounds of prostitution.

In the Gemara there, they have difficulty explaining why the command is specifically directed at a priest:

3. El Resh Galuta to Rav Huna: 49. Because of her fertility and her fertility, her fertility and her fertility, he is a priest, and Israel is not a priest? He said to him: Because it is written in the Book of Leviticus, Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he has a wife and has sons, he shall not marry an illiterate woman, who is a harlot as mentioned in the Torah, then he is a priest, and Israel is not a priest, because he is a priest.

We see that there is an obligation to raise cows and to multiply, both for priests and for every person in Israel.[2]

And in the next section, there in the second chapter, we find:

Matani. A man shall not cease from his fruitfulness and increase – unless he has sons. The Bible says: two males, and the Bible says: male and female, as it is said: +In the beginning God created them+ male and female.

That is, there is no permission to stop and cancel procreation and reproduction, unless he already has descendants. According to the halakha, we rule according to the law that one fulfills the obligation of the mitzvah only when there is a son and a daughter. It is true that some have brought from Jerusalem (Yevamot 16:66) who taught in the opinion of the Lord that if one has two sons, then one must certainly have a son, and the dispute between the Lord and the Bish was only about a son and a daughter. This is also written by the Meiri and Toss, one of the two makkamai in the Babil Yavemot 66:2. However, according to the law, most poskim ruled otherwise, and for the fulfillment of the mitzvah it is required that one actually have a son and a daughter.

And so it seems that the Shulchan Abba Zechariah 61 ruled:

A. Every man is obligated to marry a wife in order to procreate and multiply. And anyone who does not engage in procreation and multiplication is shedding blood, diminishing the image, and causing the Divine Presence to depart from Israel.

E. Since a person has a male and a female, he fulfills the mitzvah of fertility and reproduction, and that is, that the son be not a eunuch or the female an Ayalonite.

And now, from the language of the halakhah at the end, we see that the obligation to procreate and multiply is not only an obligation to have children, but an obligation to ensure, to the extent of one's ability, the continuity of the chain, since the descendants must themselves have the ability to procreate and multiply, and without this the father will not have fulfilled the obligation of the mitzvah.

And this can also be seen in the language of the Shulchan Aruch later on, in the same place:

If a male and a female were born to him, and they died and left behind sons, then he fulfills the mitzvah of fertility and multiplication. In the Torah, when the sons were male and female, and they came from a male and a female, even though the male was the son of his daughter and the female was the daughter of his son, since they came from both of his sons, then he fulfills the mitzvah of fertility and multiplication. But if he had a son and a daughter, and they died, and one of them left behind a male and a female, he still does not fulfill this mitzvah. He said: If the son was a bastard or deaf, foolish and small, he fulfills the mitzvah. (B"11 in the name of the Rashba).

We see that there is a dimension of continuity here. Below we will discuss whether the mitzvah is in the action (the act of bringing forth) or in the result (providing offspring).

We have seen that this mitzvah is the first mitzvah, and it is mentioned in the Torah right at the creation of man. To such an extent is the mitzvah considered fundamental, that the baraita on the issue of Yevamot 3b states:

It is said, Rabbi Eliezer says: Anyone who does not engage in fertility and multiplication – as if he sheds blood, as it is said: +Genesis 9+ “Whoever sheds the blood of man by man, his blood shall be shed,” and it is written in the Book of Genesis: “And you shall be fruitful and multiply.” Rabbi Yaakov says: as if he diminishes the image, as it is said: +Genesis 9+ “For in the image of God He made man,” and it is written in the Book of Genesis: “And you shall be fruitful and multiply,” etc. Ben Azzai says: as if he sheds blood and diminishes the image, as it is said: “And you shall be fruitful and multiply.”

As we saw above, at the beginning of the Shulchan Abbaaz this sermon is presented to emphasize the thoroughness of the obligation. And yet, immediately afterwards we find that the Gemara makes it difficult for Ben Azzai himself:

They said to Ben Azai: There is a good seeker and a good fulfiller, a good fulfiller and no good seeker, and you are a good seeker and no good fulfiller! Ben Azai said to them: What shall I do, since my soul desires the Torah, may it ever be fulfilled by others?

Therefore, despite such a fundamental and serious obligation, Ben Azzai allows himself to withdraw from his wife and not engage in procreation and reproduction, as his soul yearned for the Torah.

It is difficult to avoid the feeling that there is a degree of irony here: Ben Azzai greatly increases the importance of engaging in the study of the Torah, and then announces that he himself does not take part in it because his soul yearns for the Torah. It is possible that his intention was to emphasize the importance of studying the Torah in this way (I will offer another explanation for this below). In any case, in practice his words were accepted and ruled as halakhic. Thus we find in the Shulchan Shulchan, s. 1:4:

And he whose soul desires the Torah, like the son of Azai, always, and clings to it all his days, and does not marry a wife, has no sin in his hand, and he does not let his desire overcome him.

The wording of the halacha in the Shulchan Arba and Rambam cited above teaches that the commandment for cows and sheep is for the man. This is also explained in the 13th chapter there:

A woman is not commanded to bear and reproduce.

The source of this is in the Gemara Yevamot 7:2b, which requires this from the wording of the verse "and he subdued it":

Matani'. The man commands her to be fruitful and multiply, but not the woman; Rabbi Yochanan ben Baruka says, about both of them he says: +Genesis 1+ And God blessed them and said to them [God], Be fruitful and multiply.

3. Where did I come from? Rabbi Ilaa said on behalf of Rabbi Elazar, son of Shimon, who said, "Read: +Genesis 1+ And they filled the earth and subdue it, each one on his way to the sheep, and there is no woman on her way to the sheep."

As stated, according to the halakhic ruling, it is not as the sages say, as Rabbi Chaim ben Baruka.

The fact that a woman is not obligated to perform the mitzvah of "Pur" does not mean that she can be exempted from it. Below we will see that there are methods that she is obligated to do so by the rabbis (the "Shabbat" mitzvah), but by all accounts she has an obligation to help her husband fulfill the mitzvah. Some see this as the purpose of consecration and marriage, to be an instrument for the mitzvah of "Pur". It is true that if she wants not to marry at all, and not to enter into this obligation, these stipulations can be seen as a possible basis for this. Here we will not go into the limits of the mitzvah of consecration on the man and the woman, since the question deals with a man and a woman who are already married and their obligation as such.

Sources of the charge and initial definitions: "Do not lay your hand on the Arab"

On the issue of Yevamot Sab Ab, we find the following baraita:

Datania, Rabbi Yehoshua says: If a man takes a wife in his youth – he will take a wife in his old age, if he has sons in his youth – he will have sons in his old age, as in: +Ecclesiastes 11+ Sow your seed in the morning and do not withhold your hand until evening, for you do not know whether this will prosper or that, or whether both of them will be good.

From this arises the obligation for a person to continue to have children even after he has fulfilled the mitzvah. This obligation is learned from the verse in Ecclesiastes: "In the morning sow your seed and at evening do not withhold your hand...".

However, from the course of the question there it appears that this baraita is not agreed upon, since as we saw above, the Mishnah there 62b states that if he has a son and a daughter, he can indeed nullify the obligation to procreate and reproduce. And so indeed the Gemara states on page 62b. However, for the conclusion of the question there we find:

Rabbi Matna: The halakha is according to Rabbi Yehoshua.

Ostensibly, this is the law.

In the Rambam, this rule is cited in Petu Mahal Ishut 16:

Even though a person fulfills the mitzvah of fertility and multiplication, he is commanded, according to the words of the scribes, not to refrain from fertility and multiplication as long as he has the strength, for whoever adds one soul to Israel is as if he had built a world. Likewise, the mitzvah of the Sages is that a man should not sit without a wife without coming to the point of reflection, and a woman should not sit without a man without becoming suspicious.

He gives two reasons for the obligation to marry a wife: to continue to breed and multiply as long as he has the strength, and to avoid becoming preoccupied. In any case, this is an obligation according to the rabbis.

But the RIF here writes:

And this is the word of the rabbis, but according to the Torah, since it has a male and a female, it fulfills the commandment of fertility and reproduction.

It seems that the Rif does not see any disagreement at all between the Mishnah and the Baraita, but rather the Mishnah deals with Torah law and the Baraita deals with rabbinic law. And Rabbi Yehoshua's halachic ruling is in the realm of rabbinic law.

In the same article, he wrote that the rationale for this is that it is only a rabbinic principle that one does not sell a wife's license in order to marry a woman after fulfilling the commandment of the Purim, and he himself disagrees with the Rif on this. In his opinion, the rationale is that he is not obliged to divorce his second wife if she does not give birth for ten years.

However, the Ramban in the Wars of Shem wrote that this is not a literal mitzvah, but rather a customary practice, and therefore it is not enforced:

And who is it according to the mitzvah of the rabbis and according to the custom of the land, since the Talmud says, "In the morning, sow your seed," and they did not mention a prohibition in this, but rather, if a woman marries, it is a mitzvah from the beginning, there is no compulsion, and no one is called a transgressor for someone who does not want to engage in it. But he will never annul a woman...

The Ramban believes that there is a kind of recommendation here for the sake of the land and not an actual law, and therefore it is not enforced.

The Shulchan Shulchan Abijah cites this controversy in the same verse:

Even though he is fertile and multi-generational, he is forbidden to remain without a wife, and he must marry a wife with sons if he has any doubt, even if he has several sons; and if he has no doubt about marrying a wife with sons, then he must sell a set, if he has no sons, he must sell so that he can marry a wife with sons. But if he has sons, he must not sell, but must marry a wife who is not with sons and must not remain without a wife. And even if he has sons, he must sell a set so that he can marry a wife with sons.

Haga: If someone knows that he is no longer a father of sons and is no longer fit to have children, he should marry a woman who is not a daughter of sons (N"y" in the book of the coming of the Lord). Likewise, if he has many sons and fears that if he marries a wife who is a daughter of sons, fights and quarrels will arise between the sons and his wife, it is permissible to marry a woman who is not a daughter of sons. However, it is forbidden to live without a wife because of this fear (55:33 R.F.G. /RS"G/).

But there is not necessarily a dispute here with the Ramban, but only a dispute about whether or not one recognizes the Sat. A Shura wrote in the Agam, Abba HaZ Ch. Sussi Lev:

And Ez Shapir wrote in 1555 that this is what the Ramban said, but because of the Deldina, we do not find that they disagree on it in Sha'a Daf 11 in Mark 1, Section 8 of the Desober Demochrin 75 that a woman who has sons may marry, meaning that the Ramban also believes so, therefore the verse must be so, and it is clear from B'S Mark 1, Section 14 that the Ramban brought to the halakhah.

Therefore, although the author of the Maor certainly disagrees with the Ramban (and the language of the Rif and the Rambam does not imply this), it appears from the Agam that we rule in the same way as he does. We should note that quite a few later scholars have actually taken the position of a "ba'am," but they also agree that there is room for relaxation of the voices of the rabbis in this mitzvah (see Hatz. Avhaez, 20, cited in Tzitz Eliezer, 6, 44, 62, Hilkat Yaakov, 3, 62, Nismat Avraham Avhaez, 5, p. 60, and Ain Otzar HaPoskim, 1, pp. 122-6).

Sources of the charge and initial definitions: "Shabbat created"

There is another boundary that is brought up by the Sages regarding the obligation to have cows and to multiply, and it is from the verse in Isaiah, “They did not wonder at the Sabbath that He created.” For example, in the issue of Pesach 5:1 (and other parallels) we find in a baraita:

We have said: He who is half slave and half free – serves his master one day and himself one day, the words of Beit Hillel, Beit Shammai say: You have corrected his master, but you have not corrected himself, to marry a slave girl he cannot, since he is already half free. To marry a free girl – he cannot, since he is still half slave. He will be nullified – and was not the world created except for fruitfulness and multiplication, as it is said +Isaiah why+ did not the Creator wonder (except) to rest in the Sabbath that He created! Rather: For the sake of correcting the world, He compels his master and makes him free, and writes a deed for half of his blood. And the Beit Hillel returned to the teaching of the Beit Shammai.

We see that there is an obligation to free the slave so that he can engage in foraging. And here, the source cited for this in the Gemara is actually a verse in Isaiah, and not the primary source from the Torah for the commandment for foraging: "Be fruitful and multiply." Why is this secondary source cited in the Sugiya?

We find two main directions in the first: 1. The commandment of "Shabbat" is an additional commandment that has broad implications beyond the regular commandment of the Sabbath (for example, women are also obligated to it). 2. There is no additional halakha here, but only an explanation and refinement of the importance of the commandment of the Sabbath. According to this method, the verse of "Leshabbat yitzra" is intended to prove the importance and centrality of the commandment of the Sabbath, by showing that the entire earth was not created except so that we might inhabit it by establishing descendants.

In the Toda 'Kofin', Ibid., we find:

Force his master - In the case of a slave woman, one does not force her master, unless he treats her in the manner of a prostitute, that is, because when he frees her, she may not fulfill her obligation, since she is not obligated.

The Tos begins by saying that the slave is not forced to be freed, except when the custom of the paqer is practiced with her. And the reason seems to be that a slave is not obligated to give birth, just like an ordinary woman. If so, why did they not bring the verse "be fruitful and multiply" here? It seems that the rest of the Tos' words refer to this point:

And if I tell a person to sin so that his friend may benefit, then the one who frees his slave commits a great sin in deed, and there is a great mitzvah that I am, that I do not wonder, "Bera created the Sabbath, created it as a damascene" (Berachot, page 44) and the Lord's Prayer that he frees his slave is a mitzvah that I am.

Thos explains that "Shor" is a great mitzvah, and it is more important than any other mitzvah. To prove this, he cites the verse in Isaiah, since the verse in the Torah only teaches that there is a mitzvah, but does not indicate its importance. As mentioned, in Isaiah this is presented as if it were the entire purpose of creation.

And in the Torah, "There is no confusion," Gittin 42:13 (see also the Torah, "It is said," 22:13):

The Creator did not create the Sabbath, but He created it – He did not take the time to call it fruitful and multiply because He was able to keep the Sabbath, all because of the commandments of fruitful and multiply. There was no one like Him, and here is one like Him, as we have explained.

Continuing in the text, he writes, as we said above, that verse 4 "on Shabbat" was brought to show that this is a great mitzvah:

I did not take the name of the one who called it because it is a great mitzvah, and so it is in the book of Batra Demagila (page 27). I gave her a Torah scroll to learn Torah and to marry a woman, saying that I am a Talmud Torah student, saying that a great teacher studies Torah, and so on. A woman who is not a Torah scholar is not a creator.

But later in their words, another excuse is given:

And Rabbi Yitzchak bar Rabbi Mordechai interprets Dankt to Shabbat Yatzare because it is a part of slavery, but its fruit and increase do not belong, but rather on the side of freedom. And this is somewhat understood in Jerusalem. Defrakin and Defak Damak, who said, "Women are not married on the appointed day." Shimon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yochanan says, because of the nullification of her fertility and multiplication. Interpretation: He should not wait for a husband until the appointed day, which is a time of joy and free from any sin. Rabbi Asi, the slave, what is he who marries on the appointed day? He said, "Let us hear from this that it is nullified. And was not the world created except for fertility and multiplication?" Shimon bar Abba said, in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, "Anyone who commands fertility and multiplication is forbidden to marry on the appointed day." Interpretation: Anything who commands fertility and multiplication because of Shabbat Yatzare, such as a slave, but his fruit and increase certainly do not oblige him.

And according to this, the Sabbath belongs to a slave woman, and it is not like that when she is half a slave and half a free woman, except that they practice the custom of the unbeliever with her, that is, because they do not store their ashes and multiply them, lest even after she is freed, she will not keep it.

If so, Tos' here writes that the commandment of "Shabbat" also applies to a woman and a slave, even though they are not obligated to perform the pu'r.[3] And so it also states in the B'Sh in Ab'A'Z 61:1-2 and other poskim.

On the other hand, the Maimonides, as well as the Shulchan Arbiter himself, do not mention the law of "Shabbat" anywhere. The language of the laws that exempt women from the Pur is also absolute, and there does not seem to be any reservation about this. The author of Torah Tamimah has already emphasized this in Bereishit, where he wrote that according to the Maimonides, "Shabbat" is not an independent commandment, but rather an explanation of the Pur commandment.

This indeed emerges from several Talmudic issues that cite the law of "Shabbat" instead of or in parallel with "prove and multiply." For example, in the issue of Megillah 27:

Hear what Rabbi Yochanan said on behalf of Rabbi Meir: One does not sell a Torah scroll except to study Torah, and to marry a woman, hear her name: Torah in Torah is pure blood. – It is not that I study Talmud, that Talmud brings about action. A woman is called – +Isaiah 45:5+ They did not wonder that the Creator created the Sabbath…

Although this is not necessary here either, as it is understandable that this verse was brought to indicate the centrality of the commandments of the Purim, as we saw above.

This is also seen in the issue of Yevamot Sab A.A., which is discussed within the limits of the mitzvot of the Purim:

Tanha Yidach: Rabbi Nathan says, in the Hebrew they say: male and female, and in the Hebrew they say: either male or female. Rava said: Does Dr. Nathan quote God? For example: +Isaiah, what+ did not the Creator wonder about the Sabbath that He created, and did He not serve it?

If so, here too we see that the verse "on the Sabbath you created" is presented only as an explanation for the scope of the obligation of the Purim, and not as an independent obligation.

To summarize, the Rambam apparently adopts the second method cited above in Tos, according to which the verse "for the Sabbath" merely explains the idea of "fruit and multiply," and it is cited in the Gemara to prove the importance of the commandment "fruit and multiply." In other words, according to his view, there is no independent obligation here, but rather a reason for the reading of the verse "fruit and multiply." For this reason, the commandment "for the Sabbath" is not cited in the Rambam and the Shulchan Arba. From this it is also clear that according to the Rambam and the Shulchan Arba there is no obligation on a woman or a slave to have children and multiply, neither from the Torah nor from the rabbinic tradition.

We have indeed found some who claim that the obligation of "Shabbat" is nothing more than the obligation to marry a wife, and is not at all related to having offspring. However, the latter (see Menach Mitzvah 1:28, and Novi from the Doctrine of the Faith, Abba Ha-Z, 6) rejected his words. Thus the Novi wrote there:

And here is what Rabbi Mebrad thought that the Sabbath created is also applicable to someone who is not fit to procreate, this is an error, and because Naim and Shekiv the Rabbi said it is a milta, and even though Rabbi Rav Govriya MM Baha was wrong, and this caused him to make an error, he saw in the words of the Torah that even here it is not applicable, he made a mistake, and that the Torah created is applicable even in a place where he does not observe the Torah. Look at their words in Gittin, page 41, a.d., in the book of the Torah, and they wrote that even if one can marry a slave, he does not observe the Torah, as is clear from the Torah of the Ba'i, when it is said that everyone admits that a slave who does not have a wife, and that if he could observe the Sabbath, all this would be because of the commandments of the Torah, and they would not be like their Rabbi, 27, in their words. And from this the aforementioned Rabbi saw that if it were permissible for him to take a slave, he would observe the Sabbath even though he does not observe the Torah. And indeed, the one who is mistakenly born and multiplies the return of the world, and even though he does not fulfill the commandment that the lineage is not called after him, in every way he fulfills the Sabbath that the world will be multiplied, but how can it be conceived that someone who does not give birth at all would belong to the Sabbath that was created? This is not acceptable, and this is explicitly stated in the opposite way, even in the matter of old age or barrenness, as in the case of the Sabbath. And this is the language of the Ramban in the Wars of the Ba'a'i. We should not make it difficult for our Rabbeinu, except to say that it is forbidden for a man to stand without a wife, even though he is not obligated in the Ba'a'i and the world knows that he is a S.T., even though he marries a woman who is a daughter of children, and on the Sabbath, on the Sabbath, on the Sabbath. Indeed, it is clear in his words that he marries a woman who is a daughter of children, on the Sabbath. And here the words of the Ramban mentioned above were cited in the section of the Lawgiver, section 1, paragraph 14, and therefore this matter is an error. And indeed, it is commanded to return after the permission so that he does not stand without a wife and constantly come to the point of contemplating a transgression.

Therefore, "Shabbat" is the obligation to fill the world with descendants, and there is a clear distinction between it and the obligation to marry a wife against thoughts of transgression, etc., as we saw above.

The Mitzvah Fence[4]

After we have seen the general definition of these obligations, we must discuss whether the boundary of the commandment of the Pur is an act of bringing forth, or of providing offspring? In other words: is it a commandment of action/effort, or a commandment of result?

A simple observation would seem to indicate that this is a mitzvah of consequence. As we have seen, the Torah wants us to establish descendants in order to settle the world, and the act of bringing forth (as well as the consecration) is nothing more than a kosher mitzvah. Therefore, it is not enough that we established descendants, and if they died, or were not themselves the ones to establish descendants, the father has not fulfilled his obligation. On the other hand, if his descendants died, but left behind descendants of their own, he fulfills his own obligation in them.

On the other hand, it can be seen from several sources that this is still a commandment of action, not a commandment of result. Although the purpose of the Torah is to provide descendants, this is nothing more than the purpose of the mitzvah. The halakhic definition of the mitzvah is effort, that is, the act of bringing about. The explanation for this is quite simple: the result is not in our hands, but in the hands of God. What we can do is only effort, that is, the act of bringing about. Therefore, the Torah imposes on us the obligation of effort, even though its purpose is the result.

How can we understand the rules that deal with results according to this method? It turns out that this method would see the result as a condition for fulfilling the mitzvah: the mitzvah itself is an act of bringing about, but when we have reached the result, we can stop trying, since we have fulfilled the obligation of trying. In other words: the obligation to maintain marital relations is conditional on the absence of children (a son and a daughter). When they already exist, the obligation is null and void.

It is possible to base the approach to this question on the two perceptions presented above regarding the commandment of "Shabbat": if this is another rabbinic commandment that also obligates women and slaves, then it seems that here there is indeed a consequential commandment (that the land be settled and not remain desolate), but this is with regard to the rabbinic commandment. In contrast, the commandment of the Torah is a commandment of action, that is, bringing, and therefore it is likely that it is imposed only on the man (in several places we see that the halakha views the woman as passive in the act of bringing, "the world's land," and therefore the act of bringing is done only by the man). In contrast, for the schools that "Shabbat" is nothing more than an explanation of the essence of the Torah commandment of the Torah itself, then there is a perception here of a consequential commandment, since the Torah commandment is intended to settle the land.

This is a complex scholarly question, and one that could be expanded upon. Since our concern here is with the halakhic ruling regarding the avoidance of or postponement of engaging in the practice of the Pur, I will therefore only cite a few primary sources to delimit the discussion.

The commandment of procreation and reproduction as a commandment of result: the method of the author of "Minach"

In the Menach of the Sakah, it states that if the son is born healthy, and after he is born he becomes injured and depressed (someone who cannot bear children), the father has not fulfilled the obligation of the commandment of the Pur. And in the Sakah, it added and wrote that if a deaf or dumb man begets sons and later regains his sight, the Yadach is exempt from the commandment of the Pur, similar to a Gentile who converts.

On the surface, this is a perception of a mitzvah of a clear result, since at the time of the act they were not the ones performing the mitzvah. On the other hand, this cannot be seen as conclusive evidence, since it is no better than the mere claim that this mitzvah depends on the results (the birth of a son and a daughter, who will themselves be the offspring). Therefore, it is still possible to see the result as a condition, and the boundary of the mitzvah in the act of bringing about the act itself.

Better evidence can be found in the words of the rabbi Abba Zechariah, 61, who cited several rishonim, who stated that even if a person begets a bastard, he fulfills the mitzvah. And the Manach (ibid., 11) proves that this applies even if the begetting was done in transgression. And he asks (ibid., 12:11) how can a person fulfill the obligation of the mitzvah of procreation and reproduction by begetting bastard sons, when this is a mitzvah that comes in transgression?[5]

The Manach resolves the difficulty according to the Acharonim's view that a mitzvah is defined as resulting in a transgression only if the transgression is committed at the time of performing the mitzvah.[6] Now we can understand that the mitzvah of procreation and reproduction is also fulfilled in the case of a bastard child, because in this case the transgression is committed at the time of the forbidden conception, while the mitzvah is fulfilled at the time the child is born. This is clear proof that in his opinion this is a consequential mitzvah.

The Manach there continues and adds in light of this that the act of bringing is not a mitzvah but only a kosher mitzvah, since one is possible without the other. He cites evidence for this from the law that if one did not give birth at all, or if one gave birth and the sons died (see Shulchan Abba Hezekiah 91:56), the mitzvah will not be fulfilled. And so he also writes there in the Skid.[7] We have already rejected this above.

In the Skid of the Menach, the Torah raises the question of the Torah scholar, Ibn R. 28:1. There, in the Sugiya, it is explained that if one were to force him to eat matzah, one would be exempt from the mitzvah of eating matzah. The Gemara there debates who was the one who forced him, and raises the possibility that one was forced to force him to eat matzah, and rejects that in this case he would not be exempt from the mitzvah because a fool is not a bar mitzvah, and performing the mitzvah while he is exempt from it is of no use. The Torah raises the question of how a gentile who fathered sons and converted would be exempt from the mitzvah of fertility and reproduction, when, while still a gentile, he is not obligated to perform the mitzvah at all. The Menach writes there that in light of his words above, there is no difficulty, since the mitzvah of performing the mitzvah is a mitzvah of consequence, and therefore if that person actually has sons, he would be exempt from the mitzvah. The rule that performing a mitzvah during an exemption is of no use is stated only in relation to mitzvahs of action (such as eating matzah) and not in relation to mitzvahs of consequence. In our case, only the kosher mitzvah was performed at the time of the exemption.

If so, the method of the author of the Manach is clear: the commandment of Pur is a commandment of consequence. Although the Toa apparently taught differently. Now we will present further evidence that this is not agreed upon, and there are methods that disagree with it.

The commandments of fertility and reproduction as a commandment of action: the method of the owners of the Toss

First, from the above-mentioned words of the Torah, it appears that he apparently does not accept the opinion of the Manach, and in his opinion the commandment of procreation and reproduction is a commandment of action and not a commandment of result. Therefore, in his opinion, if the commandment was fulfilled while the person was exempt from it, he does not fall into the category of a Yadach (and see there what will settle the issue of the R's issue regarding his breaking of the fast and eating matzah).[8]

A source that clearly disagrees with the Manach is found in Todd's 'Kofin' 22:13a.[9] The Gemara in 22 there cites the disagreement between B'S and B'H regarding someone who is half slave and half free:

My answer: He who is half slave and half free, serves his master one day and himself one day, the words of God; the Bible says: You have established his master, you have not established himself, he cannot marry a slave girl, he cannot marry a free girl, he will be nullified? And wasn't the world created except for fertility and multiplication, as it is said: +Isaiah 55:1+ The Creator did not wonder at the Sabbath that He created! Rather, they oppressed his master and made him a free man and wrote a deed for half his blood, and the Bible returned to instruct according to the words of God!

The law is that such a slave cannot marry a slave girl or a freedwoman, and therefore he cannot fulfill the commandment of the rabbi. The B'S claim that in such a situation, his rabbi is forced to free him, and God returned to instructing as they said.

And here, as is known, the rule in halakha is that one who does something that is reprehensible should not do it. In light of this, the Torah states:

He who has made a yoke of oxen and a yoke of oxen, and has rejected it, will he not do it, lest it be holy? And our Rabbi Yitzchak says, "If a man does not fulfill the vow of the Lord, he will not fulfill it, and he who has made a yoke of oxen and a yoke of oxen will not fulfill it until the end of the coming."

Thos asks why the act of procreation and reproduction would not come and reject the LT of "it shall not be holy"? They answer that the act rejects the LT only when the act takes place at the same time as the lav is also passed. The lav here is passed at the time of the hara, while the act takes place at the end of the bai'ah.

If the mitzvah of the Pur were fulfilled in the result, as the Manach believes, the question would not arise at all. The Tos' excuse also does not require the claim that it is a mitzvah of the result. Therefore, it is clear from the Tos' words that they understand that the mitzvah of the Pur is in the action and not in the result, since according to their view, the time for performing the mitzvah is the completion of the pregnancy and not the birth of the children.[10]

After writing all this, I saw that in the Agam Abba Zechariah, the second author of the book, 18, he wrote explicitly against the Manach, that the scope of the commandment is on the action and not on the result, and his view is from this text (and he even reasons this by saying that the result is not in our hands):[11]

And the reason is that it is not clear to say as a מנחכ that the mitzvah will not be on the deed, but the deed commanded in the Pur is not the birth of sons, this is not in his power, but the mitzvah and obligation upon which he is to conjure his wife until she is completely pregnant so that she can have children from her. And evidence for this is Matthew 22:13, 5:15, where it is written that since the woman is barren and has not performed the mitzvah until the completion of the pregnancy, she is not considered to have performed the mitzvah until the completion of the pregnancy. Therefore, when the completion of the pregnancy is complete, she is considered to have performed the mitzvah even though she has not yet conceived at all, since this derak is in his power to do so. And this obligation to divorce his wife was imposed on him by the priest until they gave birth to a son and a daughter, at which point he died. And the language of the Mishnah in Yevamot, page 61, is accurate, as it did not say how many sons a person is obligated to have, but rather it said that a person does not abrogate the priest's obligation if he has sons, meaning that the commandments of the priest on which he is a widow are the only ones in his power, and he cannot abrogate them until he has sons. And in any case, when he already has sons, even from the vows that a husband made when he was not obligated when he was a fool or a fool and did not fulfill the mitzvah in his actions, he should not be obligated again by this mitzvah, since he has sons for whom the Torah did not obligate this mitzvah for one who has sons, and he is necessarily exempt as if he were fulfilling the priest's obligation.

He also brings up the difficulty in his words from a convert, and explains that having children is a condition for the mitzvah, and when there are children, an exemption is created. We will now see the implications of this definition.

Intention: The method of the Rabbi of Dinov

As is well known, there was disagreement over whether or not mitzvot require intention (see Eruvin 13:2). Following them, the Amoraim also disagreed on this (see Berakhot 13:1, R. H. 28:2, and others), and finally the Poskim (see Shulchan Aruch 19:14). The Manach there in Skakkat explains to those opinions that mitzvot require intention, that according to the Torah, it follows that the Purim also requires intention in order to perform a mitzvah, as with all mitzvahs of action. However, according to his own method, he writes that intention is not necessary. The reason for this is that the act of bringing about a mitzvah is only kosher, and the mitzvah of a mitzvah is not subject to intention (such as building a sukkah or baking matzah). He does add that, ostensibly, intention will be required when a son and daughter are born to him. However, in the end, he argues that in a mitzvah that he does nothing about and its fulfillment is in the way that in any case, intention is not required in order to perform a mitzvah. Therefore, according to his claim, all opinions do not require the intention to leave the house.

And here in the book Derech Pekodich (Sixth Part 1, Part 1 and Introduction 1)[12] the Ratza of Dinov quoted the language of the Torah and the Shula, Abba Ha'ez, Sixth Part 1, which wrote: "Every man is obligated to marry a wife in order to bear children and multiply," and he specified that a man must choose a wife in order to fulfill the commandment of the Purim.[3]

He also wrote there in Ma'am 1 (and also in Si 25):

This is a clear statement that the observance of the commandments of the Torah requires intention. And here the quality of intention is to be prepared to fulfill in this act the commandments of the Creator, the Blessed One. And the need for this intention is immediately upon bringing a woman to help and every time at the time of the connection.

And here, in a mitzvah that specifically states a reason in the Torah, it is obligatory to specify the reason as well, and in the other case this does not occur. And here, in this mitzvah too, it is said, "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth," and it is not in man's power to fill the earth, and it is not in his choice to only strive in connection with the helper.

And here it seems to be an explicit reason in the Torah that I commanded this thing in order to fill the face of the world with the worshipers of the Lord. And also from the words "be fruitful and multiply," it seems so, a merciful explanation for this commandment in the words "be fruitful and multiply," and this is not in the power of man. For many times they will be preoccupied with the connection and God will reach for nothing. And the commandment would have been more appropriate to be "take a wife and come in to her," because this is within the power and choice of man. And the explanation in the words "be fruitful and multiply" is an explicit reason in the Torah and requires intention for this reason.

His argument is that the Torah's command to "be fruitful and multiply" is only a reason and not a command, since this result (=birth) is not at all in the hands of man. If so, it is clear that "be fruitful and multiply" is not a command, but a reason for the commandment of consecration, and the scope of the commandment is the act of bringing. He added there that wherever the reason is explicit in a verse, this reason must be specified in the commandment, and according to all opinions, the intention is precluding.[14] Therefore, he explains that the intention of the Purifier precludes the commandment of consecration according to all opinions (even according to those who rule that commandments do not require intention).[15]

His method is that the mitzvah of "Por" is a mitzvah of action and not of result (Ketos, against the Manach), even though he also agrees that the Torah is specifically interested in the result. For this reason, he also writes to the Hadith that the intention required when performing the mitzvah is an intention in action (in kiddushin and b'iya). And this is as we said above, that the result is the reason for the reading and not the scope of the obligation.

He continues to make it difficult there, by virtue of this principle (see Tor HaShalem, ibid., note 10), for the law that a person who converted and had sons in his lifetime fulfills the commandment of the Pur (at least if his sons also converted), similar to the difficulty of the above-mentioned Toa. He claims that while he was still a Gentile he did not intend to perform the commandment, and therefore could not have gone forth to the methods that require intention for commandments.[16] He explains that this additional intention, beyond the intention to fulfill the obligation (which is the intention of the regular commandment), does not hinder.

We will comment here on the question of the above-mentioned Toa, the Manach explained that since the mitzvah is a mitzvah of consequence, one can issue a Yadach even if the mitzvah of consequence is performed at the time of the exemption. This difficulty here can also be answered in a similar way: mitzvahs of consequence do not require intention, as the Manach wrote above (since giving birth is only a mitzvah of consequence that does not require intention, and the birth of children does not involve an act and therefore does not require intention either).

Issues of the firstborn 40 years ago

There is apparently a source in the Gemara for the perception of the commandment of Pur as a commandment of consequence. The Gemara in Khorot 44a cites two laws that concern the relationship between a Gentile who converted and his children:

Itamar, he had sons while he was an idolater and converted, Rabbi Yochanan says: He has no firstborn to inherit, and Rabbi Ben Lakish says: He has a firstborn to inherit. Rabbi Yochanan says: He has no firstborn to inherit – that is, he became the beginning of his life, and Rabbi Ben Lakish says: He has a firstborn to inherit – he converted like a little one born of my blood. And they added to Temiyehu, from Itamar, he had sons while he was an idolater and converted, Rabbi Yochanan said: He established fruitfulness and multiplication, and Rabbi Ben Lakish said: He did not establish. Rabbi Yochanan said: He established +Isaiah 55:1+, He did not create, He created on the Sabbath, and Rabbi Ben Lakish said: He did not establish fruitfulness and multiplication – he converted like a little one born of my blood.

The first halacha deals with the laws of inheritance for his sons after his conversion, and the second halacha deals with the laws of fertility and reproduction. Immediately afterwards, the Gemara makes a distinction between these two disputes:

And Zerika, if Itamar is a Kameita – Zerika said Rashbal, because of his debauchery, he worships idols and is not a descendant of the Ninth Dynasty, but Zerika – his mother thanks Rabbi Yochanan for not creating him for the Sabbath, and he does not worship him for the Sabbath; and if Itamar is a Kameita – Zerika said Rabbi Yochanan, but Zerika – his mother thanks Rabbi Yochanan for him.

The Gemara says that if only the first controversy were presented, we would think that the gentile son was not a descendant of the inheritance while still a gentile, and therefore when the father converts his son who was born to him as a Jew, he will indeed inherit twice as much as the firstborn (the gentile son who preceded this son is not considered his son in this matter), but with regard to the commandment of the Purim, we would think that the Rabbi would acknowledge the Rabbi that the commandment of the Purim is being fulfilled, since the Sus had already made "Shabbat."

The Gemara supposedly says that it is wrong for the convert to leave the Yad "Ch" for "R" because already in his conversion he fulfilled this mitzvah, and then we can remain with the view that it is a mitzvah of action. The action of the mitzvah was fulfilled in his conversion. However, in the Toda "Vaha", there, it is written about this:

And he who served him on the Sabbath – in the next chapter on his life (Yevamot, page 62) he says in another language that from the beginning, the sons of his offspring and his descendants were his descendants, and not the sons of his obligation, as he says in the fourth chapter on his death (Sanhedrin, page 95): It is proven that he does not count his offspring and his descendants, but rather that his seed refers to his descendants, and we would say that he served him on the Sabbath, as he says here, and regarding his servant, he says in Yevamot (page 62), that all admit that he has no obligation.

The Toss states that a goy is not obligated to perform the Pur (because it is a mitzvah that was said before the giving of the Torah and was not repeated after it), and therefore the Gemara's intention is that it is a consequential mitzvah, as the aforementioned Menach wrote: He fulfills the mitzvah of Pur because the Sus actually has sons who are related after him, even if their creation was at the time of the exemption.

Third option: between fulfilling a mitzvah and reaching a state of exemption

In the book of Hilkat, the legislator of the Achaemenids, 61:1-10, writes that a woman who became pregnant in a bath from the semen of a man and gave birth to a son or daughter, the man fulfilled the mitzvah of fertility and reproduction in this. He cites evidence for this from the book of the Yochud (attributed to Rabbi Hamai Gaon), which wrote that Ben Sira was the son of Jeremiah the prophet from his wife who became pregnant from him in a bath. Here there was no intention of a mitzvah, nor was there any act of conceiving (the conception was in the womb). The same is written by the House of Samuel (ibid., 61), and he proved this from the words of the Rabbi Yod Si 25:1-10, in the name of Samak. And see in the book of 16 Achaemenids, 61:1-10, who disagrees on the view of his father-in-law (= the Rabbi).

This example of conception in a bathtub is a clear example of the perception of the mitzvah of "Pur" as a mitzvah of consequence. Here, no action was taken at all, nor was there any intention, and yet the father fulfilled his obligation. The reason for this is that the "Sus" actually has a son, and this is the definition of the mitzvah.

Rabbi Ariel, in the Responsa Ahala Shel Torah, Avha'z 6th, cites the words of Rabbi Frank, in the Responsa Har Zvi, on the column Ahha'z 6th. Rabbi Frank resolves the question of the above-mentioned Manach, how a person fulfills his obligation by having a bastard child, and after all, there is a mitzvah here that comes with a transgression. Rabbi Ariel explains that although the one who gives birth to a bastard child does not fulfill the mitzvah of procreation and reproduction, and he has no reward for fulfilling the mitzvah, he nevertheless is freed from the mitzvah of procreation and reproduction. In practice, he has a son who will take after him, and therefore there is no reason to obligate him to bring another child into the world.[17]

He compares this to a gentile who had sons in his youth and converted. As we mentioned, most poskim do not owe a gentile a "for" (a "for") commandment, and yet after conversion he fulfills the mitzvah. Above, we proved that this is a "result" commandment, but the Rach"p defines it differently: Although there is no act of a mitzvah here, and he will not receive a reward for fulfilling the mitzvah, the Sus actually has children who relate to him, and therefore there is no reason to obligate him to bring more children into the world. He sees this as a "action" commandment, except that when the desired result is achieved, the condition has been met, and there is no reason to obligate him to act again.

In this way, Rabbi Ariel also reconciles the methods of Beit Shmuel and the ruling of the above-mentioned legislator, that if a woman becomes pregnant in a bathtub, she is exempt from the mitzvah of circumcision. He asks where there was any intention here, and there is even a lack of awareness that the pregnancy was created.[18] According to his proposal, the explanation is as stated by the above-mentioned Rachpa, that although the mitzvah of circumcision was not fulfilled here, in practice, since the result has been achieved, there is no reason to obligate her to bring more children into the world. This can be likened to someone who was born circumcised, for even if we define the mitzvah as an action mitzvah, there is still no point in obliging her to circumcise in such a situation, since the result has already occurred.

This seems to be a reasonable explanation for the language of the Gemara we saw above, "He served the Sabbath." In other words, we exempt the Gentile who converted from bringing additional children into the world, since he has already served the Sabbath into the world. Although there is no fulfillment of a mitzvah here, the desired situation has already been created.

There is apparently a sharper definition of a mitzvah of consequence here. However, up to this point we have understood that if a certain mitzvah is defined as a mitzvah of consequence, then when the result is achieved, the mitzvah is fulfilled, and there is even a reward for it (perhaps a lesser reward, since there is no reward for a reward). Now we distinguish between two different levels of fulfillment: 1. Fulfillment of the mitzvah (and receipt of reward). 2. Fulfillment of an obligation, or reaching a state of exemption. There are situations in which the mitzvah was not fulfilled, but the person's action brought him to a state in which he was freed from the mitzvah. Fulfillment is achieved solely through the action, but exemption from the mitzvah can be achieved through achieving the state, since the essence of the Torah's will has been fulfilled.

Another example of such an explanation from a different angle is the words of the Manach on the mitzvah of the stolen sukkah.[19] He brings up the question of why a source is required to invalidate a stolen sukkah, and is it not enough that it is a mitzvah that results in a transgression? He explains that without the additional source, one would think that eating in a stolen sukkah is eating in the sukkah, and is certainly not considered eating outside the sukkah. The additional source invalidates the sukkah, and turns eating in a stolen sukkah into eating outside the sukkah. Here too, there is a situation in which the mitzvah is not fulfilled, but there is no obligation to fulfill it (we are in an exempted state).

Summary

So far we have seen that there is a mitzvah of procreation that is imposed on the man, and the woman is supposed to assist him at most. The mitzvah is to bring forth a son and a daughter who are themselves children of the mitzvah. We have discussed the importance and centrality of the mitzvah, and two views regarding the relationship between it and the mitzvah of "Shabbat": Is "Shabbat" an explanation of the essence of the mitzvah of procreation, or is "Shabbat" an additional mitzvah from the rabbis, and there are opinions that in such a case it is also imposed on women. We have seen that this could have implications regarding the perception of the mitzvah of procreation itself, and we have cited various sources to show that three views can be found in the definition of the mitzvah: 1. A mitzvah of action (and the result is a condition). 2. A mitzvah of result (and the action is only a necessary effort, the instruments of the mitzvah). 3. A mitzvah of action that does not exist if we have reached a state of exemption.

B. Cancellation or postponement of the breeding and breeding charge

In this chapter, we will discuss the question of whether it is possible to postpone or cancel the mitzvah of "Pur". We will not enter here into questions of contraceptives (see the next chapter), and our assumption is that this is done without the prohibition of sperm destruction. Likewise, we will not discuss postponement and cancellation for various medical reasons (although we will comment on this), since the question before us concerns the cancellation of "Pur" due to financial constraints, career, or convenience.

Of course, a distinction must be made here between a situation in which there is already a son and a daughter, meaning that we have reached an exempt state, and a situation in which we have not yet fulfilled the obligation of the mitzvah. Things will depend on the question of whether there is a "Shabbat" mitzvah and what its nature is, and also on the question of whether the mitzvah of "Por" is a mitzvah of action or result. Therefore, we will divide the discussion into two different parts: a situation in which the mitzvah has already been fulfilled, and a situation in which it has not yet been fulfilled.

We note that there are different methods in this matter, some of which are very strict, and some of which are more lenient. Although the bulk of the discussions in the poskim are in cases of contraception for medical reasons, and in the question of sperm destruction, which we do not deal with here. We will discuss matters according to the sources reviewed above.

Primary sources

The Mishnah Yevamot 6a ab states:

Matani. A man will not cease from bearing and multiplying – unless he has sons.

And so it is in Baraita 63b, which we saw:

It is said that Rabbi Eliezer says: Anyone who does not engage in fertility and reproduction – it is as if he sheds blood… Rabbi Yaakov says: it is as if he diminishes the image… Ben Azzai says: it is as if he sheds blood and diminishes the image…

All of these are languages that teach about the obligation to engage in the mitzvah, and not just to fulfill it.

This also emerges from the words of the Rambam and the Shula, which were cited above. In chapter 1, the Shula writes as follows:

Every man is obligated to marry a wife in order to procreate and multiply. And anyone who does not engage in procreation and multiplication is shedding blood, diminishing the image, and causing the Divine Presence to depart from Israel.

There is an obligation here to engage in the FAR. Simply put, this means that there is no room to avoid this 'engagement', and this makes our entire discussion redundant.

It is not clear whether the obligation to engage in this stems from "fruit and multiply" or from "Shabbat," and this will depend on the different understandings of these commandments. Ostensibly, these are variations of commandments of action rather than of commandments of result, but as we have seen, it is possible that they nevertheless express a commandment of result, and the action is imposed on us only as a kosher mitzvah (because that is all we have). In any case, it certainly follows from this that there is an obligation to engage in the mitzvah, at least according to the rabbis, or as a kosher mitzvah.

A situation in which the mitzvah is not fulfilled: when there is no longer a son or daughter

In a situation where the mitzvah has not yet been fulfilled, there is certainly an obligation to practice and multiply as much as we can. Nevertheless, two reservations can be raised here:

We saw that Ben Azzai dismissed himself because his soul yearned for Torah, and that this was also ruled by the halakhic law. Are there other reasons that justify complete avoidance of Pur?
Even if the mitzvah cannot be completely avoided, one should discuss whether it is possible to postpone the fulfillment of the mitzvah until a later time.

Reference to constraints: Ben Azzai's exemption

We saw above that Ben Azzai ruled that a person whose soul desires the Torah is exempt from punishment. These things were brought to the fore in Shulchan Shulchan Sahib, 1:33-4:

3. A mitzvah for every man who marries a woman who is 18 years old, and who precedes the marriage of a 13-year-old, is a mitzvah from the best, but before the 13th he must not marry a woman who has become wan as in prostitution. And in no case shall he go beyond twenty years without a wife. And whoever has passed twenty years of age and does not want to marry, 24th he is forced to marry in order to fulfill the mitzvah of fertility and multiplication. Who is he who is engaged in Torah and is concerned with it, and fears marrying a woman so that he will not be troubled with his food and become disobedient to the Torah, it is permissible to delay.

Haga: And at that time, they did not force him to do so. Likewise, if someone did not fulfill his fertility and childbearing and came to marry a woman who did not have children, such as a barren, old, or young woman, because he desired her or because of her wealth, even though there was a Medina to protest against him, they did not for several generations insist on the matter of marriages. Even if he married a woman and lived with her for ten years, they did not force him to divorce her, even though he did not fulfill his fertility and childbearing, and so on in other matters of marriages. (Rivash, paragraph 15), provided that she is not forbidden to him.

4. And he whose soul desires the Torah, like the son of Azai, always, and clings to it all his days, and does not marry a wife, has no sin in his hand, and he does not let his desire overcome him.

That is, there is a basic obligation to marry a wife. It is permissible to marry her if it interferes with study, at most until the age of twenty. After that, only if his soul desires Torah can he continue and completely get rid of the pu'r (although see the legislator's section there, Sek. 1, which wrote that anyone can continue as long as he studies and marriage interferes. But this is not the opinion of the majority of poskim, and the author certainly did not simplify his language).

And so we also find in the Shulchan Shulchan Yod, Hilchot Talmud Torah, Si' Remo 52:

A man may study Torah and then marry a wife. If he marries a wife first, he is not allowed to engage in Torah because he has millstones around his neck. If he is not allowed to do so without a wife, because his instincts overpower him, he should marry a wife first.

In other words, there is a recommendation for everyone to engage in Torah study and only then get married, because married life and building a home interfere with study. The ages are detailed in the Abbaaz, in the halakha cited above.

These laws raise several fundamental difficulties:

What is unique about the commandment to study Torah, as opposed to other commandments?
What is unique about Ben Azai? After all, for everyone, marriage interferes with study, and yet we do not exempt him. Only someone whose soul yearned for Torah, like Ben Azai, is exempted from the Pur. What is unique about such a situation, and what is the basis for the exemption?
It is true that the commandment to study Torah is equivalent to all other commandments, as we find in Mishnah Peah and in the Sufuk of Kiddushin: “And study Torah is equivalent to all others.” On the other hand, in the Shulchan Shulchan Yod Si' Remo 18 we find:

A T"T is equivalent to all the mitzvot. Before him was the performance of a mitzvah and a T"T, if it is possible for a mitzvah to be performed by others, he will not stop studying Talmud, and if not, he will perform the mitzvah and return to his Torah.

In other words, truly studying Torah is equivalent to all the mitzvot, yet when it conflicts with some passing mitzvah, it rejects it. Why is this really the law?

The source of this law is the Gemara in Mok. 9b:

Hadar Yatvei and Ka Meabi Lahu: It is written +Proverbs 3+ She is more precious than pearls, and all your possessions cannot be compared to her, even the possessions of heaven – shall be compared to her, and it is written +Proverbs 8+ And all possessions cannot be compared to her – even the possessions of heaven will not be compared to her! – here in a mitzvah that can be performed by others, here – in a mitzvah that cannot be performed by others.

The Gemara states that a mitzvah that cannot be performed by others rejects Talmud Torah. And in the Todat "Kan", there in the Sugiya, they wrote:

Here, in a mitzvah that cannot be performed by others – performing a mitzvah is preferable, since even R. Ben Yochi prohibits the making of a sukkah and a lulav. In Yerushalmi, however, in the intermission from prayer and Kash, R. Ben Yochi does not prohibit it, and in Yerushalmi, one has learned and the other has learned, and there is no prohibition on learning because one has learned.[20]

There is an opinion here that fulfilling a mitzvah rejects the Torah, even with regard to Rashbi, who, like Ben Azzai, also has to stop in order to build a sukkah, etc. In other words, it seems that here there is no restriction of one whose soul yearns for Torah.

Why does a regular mitzvah really reject a T.T., which is against all the mitzvot? Furthermore, the Meiri here makes it difficult that even someone who engages in a regular mitzvah (not just Talmud Torah) is exempt from another mitzvah, and seemingly a legal requirement for someone who engages in a T.T. mitzvot to be exempt:

Despite the fact that they said that one who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from the mitzvah, there is no Talmud Torah in this regard, but rather one who was engaged in Torah and a mitzvah occurred to him. If it is possible for that mitzvah to be performed by others, he should not cancel it. And do not answer me about the Torah being omitted for the taking out of the dead and the bringing in of a bride, even if they are not possible for others, seeing that everything requires them to be multiplied with honor, and if it is not possible for him to be performed by others, such as there is no proper name for it except him or her, a mitzvah imposed on his body, such as the lulav and the shofar, honoring a father and mother, and burying a dead person in a place where there are no graves, and the like, the mitzvah precedes and cancels Talmud Torah in order to fulfill it, and does not relieve him of his obligation to fulfill the mitzvah of Talmud Torah, even if it is a minor mitzvah. And despite the fact that one who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from the mitzvah, it is not said so in Talmud Torah, since it is barren of knowledge of the fulfillment of other mitzvahs, they cancel it for every mitzvah that cannot be fulfilled by others. This is the error of the great commentators.

And some ask, and indeed, this is true even with other mitzvot, as it is said in Tractate Kedushin 32:1, that his father said to him, "Drink water, and he has a mitzvah to perform. If it is possible for a mitzvah to be performed by others, honor his father first. The great commentators reason that Talmud Torah was forced to make me hear that it will not be nullified, since it is possible for a mitzvah to be performed, which I believed, since they were rooted in the fulfillment of a mitzvah, it will be nullified because of every mitzvah, even if it is possible to perform it by others. And the great generations reason that the honor of his father is a passing hour, and if there were no passing hour, he could have canceled it for the fulfillment of the mitzvah, even if it was possible to perform it by others. But Talmud Torah, even if it is not a passing hour, does not allow him to fulfill a mitzvah that can be performed by others, since in general, Talmud Torah is every passing hour, and if it is not possible to perform it by others, Talmud Torah will be nullified, even if its time has passed:

He explains that the Torah is also a passing mitzvah, for the time I lost will not return. And yet, fulfilling any other mitzvah that is impossible for others rejects it, because the value of the Torah is so that we may fulfill it (to learn in order to fulfill it), and if learning prevents us from fulfilling it, it loses its meaning. Therefore, specifically regarding the mitzvah of studying Torah, despite its great importance, it is rejected in the face of every other mitzvah.

Now our difficulty only becomes more acute: Why is the commandment of the Purim exceptional, and is it rejected before the Supreme Court? And even if it is possible to reject it, since it can be considered a commandment that can also be fulfilled later (although this is not clear, since the outcome is not in his hands), it is still not clear why Ben Azzai can completely get rid of it?

There is room to explain that Ben Azzai, who always studied Torah, from his perspective studying Torah is like a passing mitzvah, since he cannot make up for the time he has lost. In contrast, an ordinary person who does not study all the time, if he does not study now, he will be able to make up for it and study later. But this is a narrow explanation, since every person reduces the value of his study because of the hassles involved in establishing and maintaining the house.

Therefore, we will explain this in a different way,[21] and I will give an example. As is known, the Maharik in Shosh 67 ruled that a person is not obligated to listen to his parents regarding the choice of a spouse. These things were brought to the halakhic court in Ramat Ya'akov, 25:

Haga: And likewise, if the father objects to his son marrying any woman the son desires, the son must listen to the father (from the root of מהריק שורש קס"ד /קס"ד/).

And apparently, these things stem from the rule that if his parents tell him to transgress the Torah, he is forbidden to listen to them. However, further study of the words of the Maharik there in the Saka G reveals that another reason also appears in his words:

And if it is enough if the father has the power to prohibit his son from marrying a woman whom the son desires, then it seems that if she is a woman who is righteous, then the father has no power to prohibit his son from marrying a woman, even in matters of money. Our rabbis told Rabbi Jeremiah, as he said, "The father's example." And so all the legal commentators that I have seen ruled. Especially here, it is a matter of physical sorrow to abandon a woman whom he desires and has to take another woman who is not so righteous in his eyes. And even more so, in my opinion, the matter is closer to being a mitzvah to transgressing the words of the Torah, for our rabbis, may God bless him, for they said, "It is forbidden for a man to sanctify a woman until he has seen her." But now it has been permitted lest they should precede us. As the Tosafot and the poskim wrote, they made sure that he should take a woman whom he desires and who pleases him. And in several places, the wise men, may God bless him, for they felt that the woman should be preferred over her husband.

And our Lord has already answered that if a father commands his son not to speak to a certain person and not to forgive him for what he did to him for a specified period of time, if the son wants to comply, he should not feel guilty about his father's command, because it is forbidden to hate any Jew. In the fourteenth column, it is appropriate. He did not hate according to the above, since there is a sin in the matter of a certain person, as in the above.

I think what he means is that there is a limit to the validity of the obligation to honor parents. When it concerns a fundamental violation of the way in which the son wants to live his life, the parents do not have the possibility of commanding him, even if it were not a mitzvah. The same is true regarding the law of the Rosh that the parents command the person not to speak to someone. There too, there is room to say that there is no obligation to listen to them even without there being a prohibition, because here there is interference in an area that is not under their control. A person does not have to give up essential things in his life in order to honor parents. This is the interpretation that the Maharik makes of the obligation to honor parents with their wealth and not his own, as a law of taking a wife.

The same is true of various rights that a person has, such as the right to his or her own property, or the right to form relationships, or the right to choose a career as one wishes, and not necessarily based on halakhic or moral values. All of these are possible boundaries that would delimit the territory of a commandment such as honoring one's parents from the standpoint of law. A restriction of a commandment by virtue of a conflict with a conflicting value is a limitation from the standpoint of law. But here we encounter limitations from the standpoint of law, that is, due to the definition of the commandment to honor one's parents itself. In parentheses, I say that it is possible that the prohibition against listening to one's parents when they command me to commit a transgression also stems from the same principle (and not from a conflict from the standpoint of law between two conflicting value forces). The command to commit a transgression, like the command to change something fundamental in my way of life, lies outside the legitimate territory of the parents.

There is room to say that this is the law in the matter under discussion. A person whose soul yearned for Torah, this is the way he wants to live his life. For this reason, he was permitted not to marry a woman because it would change his entire way of life. And note, this is not a consideration based on the importance of studying Torah, but on the meaning and importance of studying for that specific person. This is also the wording of the Gemara that Ben Azzai "was yearning for Torah." The Gemara did not provide an expression of the importance of the commandment to study Torah. Ben Azzai's uniqueness lies in his decision to dedicate his life to Torah, without necessarily being related to the importance of the commandment to study Torah. Therefore, this applies only to Ben Azzai and not to every student.[22]

It is very clear that if the matter were worthless in itself, that is, if this were merely a subjective whim of a person, the Sages would not allow him to avoid the mitzvah of honoring one's parents (as well as honoring one's parents, above). But since it is a value that is worthy in itself (or by legitimate right, such as ownership of wealth), then even if in itself it has no greater importance than the mitzvah that is opposite it, he nevertheless rejects it. This means that a person has the right to enhance a certain value and place it above other values, thereby changing their normal halachic order of importance. Of course, these things do not apply to all mitzvahs (a person cannot eat pork, even if he dedicates his life to studying the lives of pigs), but rather according to what we have received and according to common sense.

In light of these words, there is room to understand Ben Azzai's words differently from what we are accustomed to understanding them: on the one hand, he greatly intensifies the importance of the commandment of the Pur, and states that whoever does not engage in it is both a bloodsucker and a belittler of character. At the same time, he also states that if his soul desired Torah, he would be rid of even such a high rank. His purpose is to point out the mechanism of limiting the commandment of the Pur from its members, that is, by virtue of territorial considerations, and not a limitation from the outside (due to the importance of the commandment of Talmud Torah). Therefore, he uses language that his soul desired in the Torah, instead of bringing the obvious argument that Talmud Torah is against everyone. This is also the reason why this permission is unique to Ben Azzai, even though marriage harms learning for everyone. The rejection of the Pur is not because of the harm to learning, but because of the harm to something essential in the lifestyle I have chosen for myself. This exists only with Ben Azzai, and not with others.

After writing all this, I saw that similar formulations appear in several later texts, but their words usually deal only with postponing the mitzvah and not with canceling it as we have proposed here. See Mahrit Yod 34, Shulchan Rav Kontras Achron 1, HaEmek Shala Bereshit Shailat 5, 144, Kovebs Annotations Yevamot 155. And see also Shailat Amor Shailat 10, cited in Toss 87 13a. Their words indicate that Talmud Torah rejects the Purim because it is a mitzvah for life (like Talmud Torah), and its seriousness is precisely its weight. Since it is relevant for life, then it does not have a special time, and therefore it is postponed and postponed in the face of a passing mitzvah. According to our approach, there may be room to explain Ben Azzai's exemption in a similar way.

There are considerations that indicate that both the Sages and the Poskim refer to the commandment of Pur in a qualified and not blanket manner. For example, the Shulchan Aruch in Si' 1:3 writes:

A mitzvah is imposed on any man who marries a woman who is eighteen years old, and who precedes the marriage of a thirteen-year-old, a mitzvah from the best, but before the thirteenth he must not marry a woman who has become a prostitute. And in no case shall he go beyond twenty years without a wife. And whoever has passed twenty years of age and does not want to marry, 24th they force him to marry in order to fulfill the mitzvah of fertility and multiplication. Who is he who is engaged in the Torah and is concerned with it, and fears marrying a woman so that he will not be troubled with his sustenance and be deprived of the Torah, it is permissible to delay. Haga: And at this time they used not to force him to do so. Likewise, if someone does not fulfill the obligation to procreate and comes to marry a woman who is not a child, such as a barren, old, or young woman, because he desires her or because of her wealth, even though there was a Medina to protest against him, they did not for several generations insist on the matter of marriages. Even if he married a woman and lived with her for ten years, they did not force him to divorce her, even though he did not fulfill the obligation to procreate, and so on in other matters of marriages. (Rivash, paragraph 15), provided that she is not forbidden to him.

We see here that the mitzvah does not begin at the age of thirteen like the other mitzvahs, but at a later age (see Rambam 55:22, who placed this at the age of seventeen). The bearers of the tools (see the section on the legislator and B.S. ibid.) really ask why this mitzvah is exceptional, and does not begin at the normal age of maturity? They explain that the postponement is due to the mitzvah of studying Torah. However, according to our path, the answer is simpler: a person is not ready for marriage at a younger age, and therefore they were not obligated to do so. The boundaries of the mitzvah are not formal, but are determined according to additional constraints and the normal way of life.[23] If so, it seems simple that other considerations can also be taken into account in this context.

Another example is found in the words of Maimonides, Reft. 15, in the book of Ishoot, where he wrote:

The woman who inherited her husband after marriage, so that he may avoid her sin, is permissible. What are the things that are said about him having sons, and he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of fruitfulness and multiplication? But if he has not fulfilled it, he must perform the ritual every season until he has sons, because it is a positive mitzvah of the Torah, as stated in Genesis 1:28, Noah 9:1, Noah 9:7+ Be fruitful and multiply.

The Rambam links the commandment of "Pur" to the commandment of "Ona". And the latter (see Agam Abhai"z 33:28, and Emek Shala Shailta 167:1) asked why a person should not strive to "beg" every day until he fulfills the commandment (like the season of travelers)? In other words: How did they allow a person to be a sailor, whose season is far away, and did not require him to engage in a livelihood that allows for "eila" every day? They answer this, each according to their own way.

But according to our way of thinking, things are simple (and the above-mentioned Agam's writing is close to this), since the Torah does not obligate a person to deviate from the reasonable way of life. The commandment of Pur is not a formal commandment, and it is supposed to fit within the boundaries of normal life, and not disrupt it. For this reason, the commandment was linked to the commandment of repentance, even though, as the Ma'al-e-Atar wrote in this Rambam himself, we see that there is no essential connection between them. As stated, other considerations of a normal life are certainly not worse, and therefore it seems that they can also be taken into account.

As mentioned, all of these are considerations that deal with postponing the mitzvah, not its cancellation, but from their words we can perhaps learn something about cancellation, at least in extreme cases. And the matter still needs to be decided.

In conclusion, according to our proposal, there are two laws regarding postponing the pu'r mitzvah due to Torah study: Postponing marriage and the mitzvah of pu'r while studying Torah (until the age of twenty) stems from the importance of study. Ben Azzai's postponement is a different law, and its concern is the territorial demarcation of the mitzvah of pu'r due to the lifestyle that a person chooses for himself.

It seems that things depend on the two understandings we presented above regarding the mitzvah of "Por". If we see the mitzvah as a mitzvah of consequence, then there is more room for postponing it, and waiting for the result later (see below regarding postponement, and the law of rape on the last day). However, if it is a mitzvah of action - then avoiding it for such considerations is less reasonable. We have an obligation to constantly strive until we fulfill the mitzvah. It is true that the obligation of striving also has room to be seen as postponed, at least in the formulation we saw among the latter, which refers to striving within the framework of a normal lifestyle, and not obsessive striving every moment.

To summarize, the meaning of the above for us is that there may be a situation in which fundamental considerations will justify the cancellation of the commandment of "Por", if it very radically harms the way in which I have decided to live my life. Admittedly, this matter requires further substantiation, since the thesis presented here is only a suggestion. Furthermore, this permission certainly depends on the question of how positive this way of life is, how acute it is for the couple's life, and how much observing the commandment of "Por" will actually harm it. Therefore, it is difficult to rely on this reasoning in the matter of canceling a depor, except in very extreme cases. Admittedly, as we have seen, and will see below, this argument can constitute a more significant justification in simpler questions, such as postponing "Por" to a later time, and certainly in the question of having additional descendants after we already have a son and a daughter.

Publishing a five-volume work from his memory on the commandments of the Pur, constraints, and physical suffering

Although for some reason I did not find an explicit reference to this point, another aspect should be noted here that concerns the abrogation of the commandment of Pur.

The law states that one should not spend more than a fifth of one's wealth on charity ("He who spends should not spend more than a fifth." See Ketubot 51 and parallels). And here is what the Rema writes in his Ouch 6 Tarnu (see the sources of the law in the Bible):

Haga: And whoever does not have an etrog, or the rest of a mitzvah that is past, is not allowed to spend a great deal of money on it, and as they said: He who wastes should not spend more than five hundred, even if it is a mitzvah that is past (the Rosh and our Rabbi Yeruham 51:22); and indeed, a mitzvah that is good, but one who does not perform it should give all of his wealth before it is past (the Rashba and the Rav) (and see the end of the verse 598 in the Haga).

In other words, the poskim expand the words of the Gemara to all commandments of action, and determine that one may not spend more than a fifth of its value on a single mitzvah, even if the mitzvah is a transitory mitzvah.

Now we must remember that fulfilling the mitzvah of Pur is a positive mitzvah, and as such it also seems to be subject to the halachic restriction that no more than five hundredths of a penny may be spent on it. If a couple is in a difficult financial situation, there is certainly room to take this into account as well.

It is true that it was said that this mitzvah, by its very nature, requires a financial investment, and the Torah did not speak about it. As the author of the Manach writes, there are no considerations of economic necessity in the mitzvahs of war because this is part of their very definition. However, to the best of my judgment, this is not the case, since raising a child does not necessarily entail such significant expenses, at least for couples in a reasonable financial situation.

And here I found in the Agam Abhai Z. Ch. 4 Si' Lev (his words are quoted in full below), who wrote:

Therefore, it is not a problem when she is sick and it is difficult for her to conceive, which she cannot force, but even when it is difficult for him for some reason and not for her, such as because he is a weak man by nature and it is difficult for him to do work that would allow him to spend more on his expenses, etc. It is clear that Medina would be permitted, but in this he must trust in God that He will provide for him in abundance, even when there are many sons and daughters, and it is not permissible to deny a father who is prepared from heaven a livelihood even for everything he gives birth to, but when it is difficult for her, they must be permitted.

He apparently distinguishes between physical constraints and economic constraints, and he does not permit economic constraints to be taken into account in relation to the commandments of the Pur. Indeed, one who examines his words there will see that he is not talking about a halakhic prohibition, but about good conduct (meaning that it is appropriate to trust in God, but this is not a halakhic obligation). However, it should be remembered that his words are about the obligation of "Shabbat", and not about someone who has not yet fulfilled the commandment of the Pur itself. This means that he does not permit such a person at all, and from Medina. However, as stated, his words are tza because of the principle of issuing a five-volume work on positive commandments. And it is possible that he is talking about vague concerns, and not about a realistic assessment of the future (see the aforementioned article by Rabbi Yigal Ariel P.V.). Regarding reliance on a future assessment, see the discussion below.

Here is the place to add and say that there is room to compare severe non-economic hardship, and certainly severe physical hardship (as the aforementioned AGM said), and to say that it is no worse than the financial hardship of a five-figure sum. In the absence of clear criteria, it is perhaps possible to assess the non-economic constraints in the following way: how much a person would be willing to pay to avoid this hardship. If we are talking about a five-figure sum, there is room to allow the cancellation of a PUR in such a situation.

It is true that before making a decision in such a matter, one should consult and think carefully, as the hardship may be part of a flaw in fear of God. When the couple realize how important and central the mitzvah is, they may evaluate their hardship differently. But in the economic sense, the decision seems simpler, because there is a sharp line there and it is easy to evaluate. It is true that the poskim have already written that if a person can afford a higher expense in terms of his financial situation, he is permitted to be stricter on himself, and therefore it seems that here too the one who is strict will receive a blessing.

We will add another important point here. The woman's grief is even more significant, mainly because she herself is not commanded to perform the mitzvah (but perhaps "Shabbat," and this also does not appear in the Rambam and the Shulchan Arba). Although she is commanded to assist her husband in fulfilling the mitzvah, the husband's fulfillment of the mitzvah at the expense of his partner is not justified when the price she pays is high. The Shulchan Arba, author of Minchat Yitzchak, wrote thus:

If it were necessary to prevent him from using the toilet for a while, due to the doctors' order due to weakness and exhaustion of strength, he has no obligation at all, even if there is no rabbi, because what would be deducted from him himself, since there... everything is according to his strength... and if so, the wife's commandment, which is only to help her husband, certainly would not be deducted from him, and if so, the fact that she is used by a virgin for a while, with regard to her worship, would not be deducted from what she is not used at all.

And we find similar things in Hochma, Genesis 9:7, where he explains the reason why women were exempted from the commandments of Pur:

Prosper and multiply, etc. It is not far-fetched to say that the Torah exempted women from childbearing and multiplying and only obligated men, because the laws of God and His ways are “pleasant ways, and all its paths are peace,” and did not burden the Israeli with what the body is unable to accept… And if so, women who risk pregnancy and childbirth – and for this reason they said, “a common death,” see Tosafot Pag, 2, i.e., a common death – the Torah did not decree a command for cows to include women. Likewise, it is permissible to drink a cup of unripe fruit, and according to a Jewish custom, according to Rabbi Hanina, the end of the chapter on the birth of a child. Only for the fulfillment of sex did it by its nature that its desire to give birth was as strong as a man’s. And we find Rachel saying, “Give me sons, or else I will die.” And in this it is similar to what Rav Yosef said in the chapter on the birth of a child (77:2), that women are not commanded in childbearing and multiplying, since here, “I am the one – the one – enough for a cow and many” (Genesis 32:11), and it did not say, “Birth and multiply.” That is, In Adam and Eve, who blessed them before the sin, when she did not have labor pains, there was a commandment for both of them to be fruitful and multiply, and he told them, "Be fruitful and multiply" (ibid. 1:28). But after the sin, when she had labor pains, and she often took a risk from this, to the point that they said (when a woman kneels down and jumps with a child) that she would not need (her husband, therefore the Torah said, "Bring a sacrifice" - Neda 3:2). Therefore, in Noah, even though it is written, "And he said to them, be fruitful and multiply," was it not written before (ibid.), "And he blessed Noah and his sons," but their wives were not mentioned, since they were not commanded to be fruitful and multiply at all. And in Jacob, he said, "Be fruitful and multiply," and this is correct. And in the Maharsha of the Sanhedrin of Noah, he placed this in "and shall be established," and directed it to her, and he did not mention it.

If she is obligated to assist her husband, then what good did the Torah do by exempting her? Of course, the obligated husband must consider the grief of his wife, especially since she is not obligated, and he cannot fulfill his duties at her expense. Therefore, the Torah exempted her from this obligation.

Preventing a FUR due to assessing the future: In the footsteps of Drachman's sheep

The questions we raised earlier concern considerations that depend on the assessment of the future. This leads us to the issue of Berakhot 10:1, which describes Isaiah's visit to Hezekiah, who was sick and facing death:

Why do you die and not live – you die – in this world, and you will not live – in the world to come. He said to her: Why am I all alone? He said to her: Because you did not engage in fruitfulness and multiplication. He said to her: Because you have urged me by the Holy Spirit to build a house that will not be built. He said to her: Why do you have a sheep worth a drachma? Why do you have a servant, and what is the holy place in your midst – a servant?

Isaiah says that he was sentenced to death because he did not engage in the work of the priest. Hezekiah's reasoning was that he saw in the Holy Spirit that wicked sons would come out of him, and therefore he preferred to refrain from the work of the priest. To this Isaiah says to him: "What do you want with the sheep's heads for a drachma?", meaning that he is not required to make an account of a place, and if the commandment of the work of the priest was imposed on him, he must engage in it without accounting.

There is room for discussion. What is the basis of the argument? Hezekiah thought that it was possible to avoid the Pur if it would be harmful. Isaiah can answer him in two ways: 1. Adopt his halakhic premise and reject his deterministic assessment of the future: argue that it is not certain that it will actually be harmful. 2. Reject his halakhic premise, and say that even if it will be harmful in the future, he must fulfill the mitzvah.

Now Hezekiah turns to him and asks him to give him his daughter, and perhaps good sons will come out of him after all:

He said to him: "Please, my brother, let me have your brother, and let me have a share in the cause of my brother and your brother, and let me have a share in the building of his house." He said to him: "A decree has already been passed upon you." He said to him: "Son of Amoz, finish your prophecy and go out! This is how I was accepted from my father's house, my father - even if a sharp sword is placed on a man's neck, he should not withhold himself from mercy."

Isaiah tells him that a decree has already been passed on him, and simply means that there is a decree that the sons will be wicked. If so, it is clear that Isaiah's claim was not that the predicted future is not necessarily true, but rather a halachic claim: one should not avoid procreation out of considerations of the character of the offspring.

Although Rashi here interpreted it differently:

A decree was issued – that you would die.

We see that he was sensitive to the double meaning, and was careful not to interpret that the decree is about the character of the sons. The decree is that they should die. It seems that according to Rashi, the Gemara should be concluded differently: 'Benin demaelo' is the end of the dialogue. After that, a new discussion begins, regarding death, which also continues on. The Rabbi who is the Maharsha in the Chiddushei Agdot here was sensitive to this, and reinforced Rashi's interpretation of the rest of the issue.

In any case, according to Rashi's interpretation, it is still possible to understand that the nature of the sons was not completely fixed in the decree. And evidence of this is Hezekiah's request that he give him his daughter as a wife, and through the merit of both of them other sons would emerge.

Hezekiah's answer is that one must not despair of mercy, but it is not clear whether one must despair of healing (this is probably how Rashi would interpret it), or of changing the decree regarding sons (according to our suggestion. See Maharsha, where he rejected this). Later in the Gemara it is implied that the intention is the decree regarding death, since Hezekiah's conclusion was to pray for it so that he may live:

Itmar Nami, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi (Eliezer) +Tradition of the Shas: [Eleazar]+ The words of Taruyeh: Even if a sharp sword is placed on a person's neck, he should not withhold himself from mercy, as it is said: +Job 13+ Surely he will kill me, I wish him well. Rabbi Hanan said: Even if the dreamer tells a person that tomorrow he will die – he should not withhold himself from mercy, as it is said: +The assembly of the Lord+ because of the multitude of dreams and vanities and many words, because he fears God. Immediately: +Isaiah 38+ And Hezekiah turned his face to the wall and prayed to the Lord.

If so, the conclusion is that such considerations should not be made when discussing whether it is possible to avoid a foreclosure. Although this is possible only where the character of the sons is not completely fixed, that is, where the assessment of the future is uncertain. Furthermore, here the assessment of the future is based on prophecy and not on a realistic assessment (see more on this below).

The Meiri here summarizes the issue as follows:

The positive commandments of fertility and reproduction are not for a person to forfeit because he suspects himself or his partner of not producing decent seed, whether by rumor, by reason, or by experience, for a person has nothing in the secrets of God, and as they said in the Hadi Kabbai Drachmana, why should you and the MM, he should strive with his mate in what is appropriate to strive with a mate until he sees that his mate is destined to produce decent sons, as they warned in the examination of his brother and the daughter of a scholar, and similar to this:

His words can also be loaded with the two aforementioned meanings, although it is somewhat implied from his language that Isaiah's reasoning was that the future is not truly completely certain, and not the halakhic reasoning. In other words, he accepts Hezekiah's halakhic argument that if it is indeed known that the sons will produce wicked people, there is justification for not observing the Purim. As we noted above, it appears from Rashi's words that these words are also meant in a situation where the future is not completely certain.

Now we must discuss whether an ordinary person can avoid a forger out of the assessment that his sons will produce men who are not from me? If the Holy Spirit is not sufficient for this, it turns out that ordinary human assessments and considerations are certainly not sufficient. Although if we understand that Isaiah claimed that the future is uncertain, it is possible that an ordinary human assessment would be better than the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit predicts what is expected to happen without divine choice and intervention. But human assessments serve us in all areas, and there is no reason to assume that they will not come true. Furthermore, it is possible that it is precisely a realistic assessment that can be relied upon and a prophecy not (like a law "it is not in heaven").

It is also worth discussing whether a person is permitted to avoid a forefather because of considerations that he may not be able to support his descendants at a reasonable financial level? Here it seems even less likely, because if wickedness is not a sufficient reason, then a financial situation certainly is not. On the other hand, the financial situation also affects the rest of the family, and therefore perhaps it is a legitimate consideration. On the other hand, the character of the sons in themselves is not a justified reason to avoid a forefather, since this concerns mainly those sons with whom the discussion is concerned, and regarding whom it is forbidden to enter into considerations that they are worthless. Furthermore, financial considerations are legitimate, since if I get into financial trouble, I will not be the world's ruler. On the other hand, the character of the sons is not a legitimate consideration that I am required to consider.

Again, I saw that the poskim already needed this, and wrote similar things. The Rashal in Yeshivah, p. 4, 6, wrote:

If her sons do not follow a straight path, and it is feared that she will not grow crops of such a nature that she has the permission (to drink a cup of akrin).

Although he is talking about a situation where a woman already has children (since she already has offspring), it should be noted that he even permits drinking a glass of Ekrin, which may be a prohibition against sperm corruption. If one simply avoids having sex during ovulation, it may be easier (see below).

Again I found in the book Hasidim Si' Shau, who wrote:

If he takes a woman whose brother and mother are bad, and do not reciprocate kindness, it is clear that the seed is bad, and for this reason it is not said in the Hadith of the Lambs, "A drachma for her is for you."

Even if we do not accept his worldview that deterministically determines the character of the offspring from the mother's brother or sister (and the poskim have already written that this is not true today), we still see that a realistic assessment can be taken into account in relation to the father, and it does not fall into the trap of the Drachman sheep.

There is also room to hinge this discussion on the question of whether the commandment of Pur is a commandment of action or a commandment of result. Hezekiah's entire consideration seems to be based on the fact that it is a commandment of result. He claims that the expected result is not positive, and therefore he is exempt from the commandment. It is possible to further refine the matter by arguing that if we see the essence of the commandment of Pur as 'restoring the land,' meaning that it is essentially a "Shabbat" commandment, then there is room to argue, as Hezekiah did, that reestablishing the land in the hands of the wicked is not a worthy goal.

The question is, what does Isaiah answer him? Does he claim that the commandment is about the action, and not about the result (which is a lamb worth a drachma, which, as we have seen, is also given to heaven and is not in our hands). Or does he claim that the commandment is indeed about the result, but that the Holy Spirit is not completely reliable in predicting the results. Alternatively, he could argue that even if the commandment is consequential, the character of the children is still not exempt from its fulfillment (the land will be restored not precisely to the righteous but to every person. We must ensure that it does not become desolate).

In this context, it is appropriate to refer here to the words of the wonderful Gemara in the Soph. of the Book of Leviticus (60:2):

It is said, Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said: From the day the Temple was destroyed, it is a law that we decree upon ourselves not to eat meat or drink wine, but we do not decree upon the people, even though the majority of the people are able to abide by it; and from the day the kingdom of wickedness spread, which decrees evil and harsh decrees upon us, and abrogates the Torah and Mitzvot from it, and does not allow us to enter the week of the son, and I said to her: For Jesus the son, it is a law that we decree upon ourselves not to marry a wife and not to have sons, and the seed of Abraham our father was found to be all by itself, but let them rest in Israel, it is better that they should be wise and not be evildoers.

In other words, in a place and time where it is not possible to keep a mitzvot, the law allows for a decree that Israel will not keep a p'or, and Abraham's seed will automatically perish. The Gemara rejects this statement with a technical argument: "It is better for them to be shuggin and not to be mazidin." Ostensibly, the statement is correct, but the public will not abide by it.

It should also be noted here that the terminology of the Gemara seems inaccurate, since as long as a decree has not been issued on a forer, there is no prohibition at all in this. So why is it that someone who violates this is called "accidental"? The correct terminology should have been that they did not issue a decree because it is a decree that the public cannot abide by. Therefore, it seems clear that the Gemara means that this is a law of the Torah, and not a rabbinical decree. The Torah law is that when it is impossible to fulfill a mitzvot, there is no mitzvot on a forer. This is the meaning of "resting," that the land will be inhabited by those who worship God and keep His mitzvot (and not by the wicked, like the expected sons of Hezekiah). Now it is clear that the Gemara explains that the sages did not reveal this to the public so that they would only be accusatory and not apostate.[24]

In any case, it seems from this that a realistic assessment of the future can be a justified reason for avoiding contraception. These things can be relevant regarding contraception when there is a realistic concern (based on a medical assessment) of giving birth to sick children, etc.

Postponing a POR to a later date

When we address the question of whether it is permissible to postpone the performance of the mitzvah of the Purim until a later time, we enter into the issues of postponing mitzvahs in general. First, there is the collection of rules (most of which are quite similar to each other, and it is not necessary to enter into the distinctions between them): delaying a mitzvah, hurrying ahead of the mitzvah, not transgressing the mitzvahs, a mitzvah that comes to you, do not miss it, loving a mitzvah at its time, and so on. All of these are rules that apply to all mitzvahs, and they establish the obligation to perform the mitzvah immediately when its time comes. Some commentators explain these rules with the fear that the mitzvah will not be performed in the end. But there is certainly also loving a mitzvah, and the obligation to hasten in fulfilling our obligations.

Although the halakhic status of all these obligations is not entirely unambiguous. These are not actually positive commandments per se, but rather rules and principles for how to relate to positive commandments. Indeed, several poskim have written that these principles are deferred where there are various constraints (see, for example, Beshad Hemad 2:149a, and 4:114b; Chazo"a Yod Si' Kang Sak"a, and others). It is important to understand that deferral is not abrogation, since the abrogation of a commandment of a "Pur" is the offense of a positive abrogation, while deferral is a violation of these principles, which is of course easier.

It is true that such a postponement should take into account the possibility that we will ultimately be forced to fail to fulfill the mitzvah itself, and then there is a real cancellation here (in most cases, the postponement does not endanger the very existence, but perhaps due to forgetfulness).

And yet, the question of rape itself must also be discussed more generally: if a person has postponed and delayed the mitzvah, and thereby perhaps violated the above principles, when he is raped in the end and does not fulfill it at all, is it considered rape or not? This brings us to the question of "last day rape," which we will mention here only briefly.

Many pens have already been broken on the question of rape on the last day. The source of this is the Shulchan Shulchan Yad in Hala Nedarim, Si' Rlev 12, in Ramah:

Whoever swears or vows to do something within a year, or on a certain day, must do it immediately or in the morning when that day arrives, lest he forget later and not do it, and violate his vow and oath. And if he does not do it immediately, because he said he still has time to do it, and he forgets or is forced later and does not do it, 11 is a case of rape (Ranan 5: How is the custom). Some say that there are no cases of rape (Chiddushei Aguda, chapter Mi Sha'Azhu).

The Rema's words at the beginning of his speech mean that, in all opinions, it is appropriate to hurry up and fulfill the mitzvah at the beginning of time, because of the fear that he will eventually forget and it will not be fulfilled (as we recall, the fear is greater for us, since it is not about forgetting but about the fear that they will not be able to produce descendants).

The reason for the obligation to hurry that is given at the beginning of the Shulchan Arba's words is probably the collection of laws cited above. Later in his words, a debate is presented on the question of retrospective law, whether when he did not do so and was raped, whether it is considered rape or not.

Here the matter is presented as a dispute between the Agudah (also cited by the B.I. C. Rad) who believed that it was not rape, and the Namukhi (and not the Raan) who believed that it was rape.[25] We note that this question may also depend on the two perceptions presented above. If the commandment of the Pur is a commandment of result, then the person is coerced for the result. But if it is a commandment of action – then he was not coerced for the action, but only for part of the time.

In any case, the T"Z there in the Ski"T rejected the opinion of the Association, and ruled as a reason, and also saw in the Sha'at there in the Ski"T that he brought further evidence to the T"Z's ruling. If so, according to the law, rape on the last day is rape.

Now we will look at the laws of delay as they appear in the halacha itself. Maimonides in Pet 5:1 writes:

The woman who inherited her husband after marriage, so that he may avoid her sin, is permissible. What are the things that are said about him having sons, and he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of fruitfulness and multiplication? But if he has not fulfilled it, he must perform the ritual every season until he has sons, because it is a positive mitzvah of the Torah, as stated in Genesis 1:28, Noah 9:1, Noah 9:7+ Be fruitful and multiply.

These words were transcribed into the halakhic text in Shulchan Abba Zechariah 6:16. It is proven from their words that as long as the mitzvah has not been fulfilled, there is an obligation to visit one's wife at every season (which is determined for each type of person, and is usually at least once a week during the permitted times. See Shulchan Abba Zechariah 6:16, and Orach 6:11).

We have already noted above that the connection between the commandment of the Pur and the obligation to perform atonement is unclear, since the commandment of the Pur is a man's obligation towards his wife, and the commandment of the Pur is a commandment to the place. Some of the latter wanted to learn from this that the Maimonides sees the two commandments as one, meaning that the commandment of the Pur is also part of the commandment of the Pur, since all the kiddushin are instruments of a mitzvah for the Pur. In other words: a person must behave in a manner that is characteristic of women in order to fulfill the commandment of the Pur. However, the Maharmab on Atar already writes that the Maharmab himself sees that there is no connection between the commandments (since there is an obligation to perform atonement even after the Pur is fulfilled). Others have divided between these two laws (see the Maharmab on Atar, and Rosh Ketubot Pa'a 312, and Meromi Sde Pesachim 462, and the Emek Sha'la Sha'ilta 167, 171, and more).

Above, we offered another explanation for the words of the Shulchan Arba and the Rambam. Although there is no direct connection between the two commandments, the duty of the priest to intercede is as much as he can in his normal lifestyle. The commandment of repentance determines how much the wife needs her husband in the marital relations between them, and therefore the Sages determined that the duty of the priest is like the commandment of repentance. We also saw there that postponing the priest due to a passing mitzvah (according to the Maharit, the Amash, the Koach, and others), and perhaps also due to one's normal lifestyle, is possible.

In light of what we have said above, it is important to note that in any case, the obligation to come to his wife every season is also not a simple fulfillment of the mitzvah of the Pur, since if he rejects her and ultimately rapes her, this is considered rape against her (last-day rape). Likewise, on the other hand, if he did not hurry but fulfilled the mitzvah, he certainly has the mitzvah of the Pur, and he did not nullify this act. Therefore, it is clear that the obligation to beg every season is only due to the entirety of the principles (such as the delay of a mitzvah. See above) that determine the obligation to hurry and strive for the mitzvah and fulfill it at the beginning of the possible time, and not due to the mitzvah of the Pur itself. Above, we cited the language of the Shulchan Aruch in Si' 1:53, which says that one should not delay marrying a woman beyond the age of twenty, but he certainly does not see this as nullifying the mitzvah of the Pur, but only an obligation to hurry.

Indeed, the language of the Rambam in Petu Mahal' Ishut HaB is:

The man is commanded to bear and multiply, but not the woman. And since the man is obligated by this mitzvah from the age of seventeen, and since twenty years have passed and he has not married a woman, then this transgresses and nullifies a positive mitzvah. And if he was engaged in Torah and was concerned about it and was afraid of marrying a woman so that he would not be troubled with maintenance and would be deprived of the Torah, then this is permissible to delay, because the one who is engaged in the mitzvah is exempt from the mitzvah, especially in Talmud Torah.

He apparently sees this as a cancellation of an act. But it seems that he simply does not mean that there is actually a cancellation of an act here, since if he later brings forth a son or a daughter, he will certainly have fulfilled the mitzvah. His intention is to say that there is a cancellation of the obligation to strive for the fulfillment of this act (compare with the words of the Rambam in the Hebrew text, Milah 1:12, and 13). It seems that for this reason the author of the Shulchan Arba (1:13) was careful not to copy the Rambam's language so as not to use the term cancellation of an act.

So, we saw that if a person rejected the mitzvah, he did not violate a law, and even if in the end he was raped and was unable to conceive, this is considered rape. This is only an obligation according to the law of early marriages and changing a mitzvah, etc.

It is true that it is permissible to say that after the sages established in the halakhic law that there is a duty to have sex at any time, if he does not do so and ends up being raped and has no children, he is not considered raped but rather an accident. The source of this explanation can be found in the words of the Rashba, Shavuot 18, a.d., which discusses a man who came to his wife near her period (which is a rabbinical prohibition), and she saw blood and was found to have violated the prohibition of circumcision. The Rashba there states that although there is no Torah prohibition against having sex near her period, and therefore he has no Torah offense for having sex near her period, then his having sex with a woman who is not raped but an accident. He discussed this at length in Keil Hemdah, p. Balak, letter 4. However, it seems that this opinion is not agreed upon in the halakhic law.

The implication of this is that postponing the mitzvah of a wedding is probably not a valid cancellation, but at most bad conduct, since one misses the mitzvah and does not fulfill it promptly. From this we can learn that there is room for permitting this when there are severe constraints on the couple.

We have already mentioned above what the poskim wrote (Shadach and Chazva), that there is room for suspending the fulfillment of a positive commandment in a place where there are constraints. We also saw above that where the constraints are more severe (such as taking a five-day tax out of one's pocket), this may even justify the cancellation of the commandment.

And if we also add the territorial explanation from above, that in cases where this severely harms the lifestyle the couple has chosen, it may even be permissible to refrain from having children. As stated, there the matter still needs to be decided, and the law certainly depends on the question of how positive this lifestyle is, how acute it is for their lives, and how much fulfilling the mitzvah of the Pur will harm it. But with regard to postponing the fulfillment of the mitzvah, there is room to add that explanation to the vote as well.

Although in Eruvin 3b we find:

And the rabbi Abba bar Papa went on to say that Rabbi Abba bar Papa said: Joshua was not punished except for the fact that he destroyed Israel in one night from its fruits and its offspring, as it is said +Joshua the Lord+ And when Joshua was in Jericho, he lifted up his eyes and saw, etc., and it is written and said (to him) +The tradition of the Shas: [No]+ For I am the captain of the army of the Lord, now I have come, etc. He said to him: Last night you always destroyed the evening meal, and now you have destroyed the study of Torah. – For which of them did you come? – He said to him: Now I have come. Immediately: +Joshua the Eighth+ And Joshua went that night into the valley. And Rabbi Yochanan said: It teaches that he walked in the depths of the law. And Gamiri: Any time the Ark and the Shechinah are not in their place – they are forbidden to be in the eighth of the table.

Joshua was punished even though there was a reason to cancel Israel from the Purim. It is true that we see that there is a disagreement here, and it is possible that they disagreed on this point itself. I also saw that Rabbi Aviner cites the name of Rabbi Auerbach of Tiberias,[26] who explained that he was punished because he canceled Clal Israel from the Purim, but this is not the case for an individual.

A situation in which the mitzvah has already been fulfilled: when he already has a son and a daughter

When the mitzvah is already in place, we saw above that there are obligations such as "on Shabbat" or "on the eve do not lay your hand" (see Rambam 55:16, and Shulchan Ar 61:58). Therefore, the permission to stop the mitzvah of Pur due to the fact that there is already a son and a daughter is certainly not correct. Hence, what we have seen now that if a mitzvah of Pur can be observed, one can prevent one's wife from having a period if she forgives him, does not mean to stop completely, but only to waive the pretext for a few periods. But of course he should continue and strive to multiply additional descendants. See on this the Mishnah Hilchot Ha-Ha 61:2 and more.

Although some of the latter have written that these duties are lighter, since they are rabbinical duties. And certainly these things are correct according to the words of the Ramban above, who wrote that they are nothing but good conduct of the earthly life, and we cited above from the Agam who wrote that the halakhah is according to the Ramban and that we did not find anyone who disagrees with the halakhah on this. We also saw in the Rambam and in the Shulchan Arash that if his wife is forgiven and he has already performed a pu'r, he is certainly entitled to prevent her from performing a pu'r for a few seasons, which does not exist with respect to the mitzvot of pu'r from the Torah. The explanation we gave at the beginning should also be added here, according to which when this significantly harms the way of life that is important to the couple, there is more room for leniency in this regard.

And so the Hidda writes (Baraki Yosef, Abba Zechariah 31:12):

Because of the commandment for the evening, you rarely do it… Read the text: For the evening, do not rest your hands – let it not rest completely, and whoever sleeps with a woman between the chapters, even if they are far apart, do not rest your hands on her, and fulfill the mitzvah from the words of the scribes.

We see that even without any constraint, a distant clerk is enough for us to fulfill the obligation of "do not lay your hand on the evening." In other words, there is no prohibition on interrupting the pregnancy in such a situation. The discussion arises only with respect to a complete interruption. A complete interruption is prohibited (according to the rabbis, as stated in the above-mentioned Ramban), or at least not recommended (according to the above-mentioned Ramban).

All this without constraint. And what about a situation in which there is some constraint? The Agam Abheza Chai writes about this in the book of the 12th century:

And here is actually a mitzvah of a response if the woman forgives with a whole heart, she is exempt, and when the woman is the one who does not want to use the mitzvah, which is not related to her deen at all. But even without a mitzvah, the woman is enslaved to the husband if the husband wants to, and therefore if both of them want to prevent using the mitzvah, they are permitted. But 27 is when the husband fulfills the mitzvah of a "Pur" - that is, when he has a son and a daughter, if he does not yet exist, he is still obligated to perform a "Ba'ul" every time until he fulfills a "Pur" as explained in the Rambam, Reft. 50 of the Rabbis, and also in Sha'a Aha, 30 of the rabbinic text. And in any case, your first question is simplified to the fact that a "Pur" is not permitted to skip the days when she can conceive and perform a "Ba'il" only on the days when, according to the opinion of doctors in our time, she cannot conceive, because she is obligated to perform a "Ba'il" for a "Pur". But if a "Pur" has already existed and the obligation is only on the part of a mitzvah of a response, they are permitted to do so if the pregnancy or the pain of growing is difficult for her, otherwise this is a mitzvah of a "Shabbat" from the Rabbis, reading Dolarab Don't rest there, it's worth it, in the 6th and 7th days.

It is seen that in his opinion, if a woman has difficulty conceiving or the pain of childbirth, he is permitted to cancel her period. It is clear from his words that he does not intend to delay, meaning only to lose a few periods, but that this is also permitted permanently.

And so it is in the Agam Abha'az Chd Si' Lev:

What I wrote in the Sha'ar Ha-A'a, section 22, that if they already have a son and a daughter who can conceive, they are allowed to skip the days and have intercourse only on days that, according to doctors in our time, she will not be able to conceive if conception or the pain of growth is difficult for her, is forbidden by the mitzvah of Shabbat from the rabbis, which was written in the 1555, which is according to Darban, the end of the book of the coming of the Lord (65 A.B.) that the mitzvah and the evening do not rest is not really obligatory. Here it is clarified in the Sha'ar Ha-A'a, section 6, section 6. The woman who bequeathed to her husband another time that she married, that he should prevent her from committing a sin, is permitted in the Sha'ar Ha-A'a, if she fulfills the mitzvah of Pur, but if she does not fulfill it, she is obliged to have intercourse every season until she fulfills it. It is clarified that for the sake of Shabbat, it is permissible to prevent several seasons and she is not obliged to have intercourse when she bequeathed to him that there is an obligation to have intercourse every season, because it must be said that there is no obligation of Shabbat on him from the rabbis as in the Torah, and there is no interpretation that they have fixed that it is obligatory in Pur. It is not appropriate to make it easy for the rabbis because of some difficulty, only in the place of illness and sorrow, good and bad. Here are some positive matters that the rabbis did not rule out as appropriate in the writings on page 61. And also for these things, not all the rabbis permitted, but it is necessary to say that this is another obligation that Rabbi Yehoshua in Yevamot 62, a reading of Dekhalat, does not completely abrogate and is somewhat precise from the language of the reading, saying, "Do not rest your hand," which means that it does not completely abrogate, and what he said there, as if Rabbi Yehoshua, because of the language of the Mishnah, does not abrogate, since he has children, is also permitted to completely abrogate, and as Rashi says, "If he has children, he must abrogate, since Rabbi Yehoshua, who is a model for Rabbi Yehoshua, did not obligate him with the mitzvot of the Pur without a limit, but rather with a new obligation that does not abrogate from the Pur, therefore it is only for the matter that he is obliged to take a wife who has children naturally. He may have sons even if he refrains from ejaculating, even if it is difficult for him, even with a little difficulty, and this is sufficient for fulfilling the obligation of Shabbat. And so it is understood from the language of the Rambam who wrote in Pet 16 that even though the Purim of the Lord has a command from the rabbis = from the rabbis = that he should not cancel a rabbinical commandment that has power, then it is forbidden to say that it is a complete prohibition, but it is not about the obligation as a Purim of the Torah, which is an obligation on him to procreate as many children as possible from the rabbis. If the Purim had a duty on him all his days without a shiur, he would not have written such language and would not have extended it at all, but rather written that even though he had a shiur for the Purim of the Torah, he had a shiur for the Purim of the Torah, and he was obligated all his days, as in Dankit in Peah, Pa'a, Ma'a, Ta'a, and in Teruma, Pa'g, from Terumat Ha'A and from Bekurim, Pa'b, 17. But this is because this is not a regulation of the Sages regarding the Purim commandments, but rather that the Purim commandment also exists from the rabbis, but they established that he is obligated from the rabbis also with the obligation of Shabbat, which is a new obligation not to cancel a Purim as long as he has power. This obligation does not require him to pay the fine every season and when it is difficult for him or her, even though there is no fear of illness in this, it is permissible when he allows the one who has imposed the obligation to pay the fine. But I wrote there that a man who has a son and a daughter is permitted to skip the days that she can conceive, and to have a child only on the days that, according to the doctors, she cannot conceive, so that she will never conceive again and the Sabbath issue will not be fulfilled at all. This is precisely because it is not a real obligation on him, but only a mitzvah. He has to marry a woman who has sons, and he is not forced to do so, and he is not called a transgressor who is not a complete obligation imposed on him by the rabbis. Therefore, it does not matter when she is sick and the pregnancy is difficult for her, which he cannot force, but even when it is difficult for him for some reason and not for her, such as when he is a weak man by nature and it is difficult for him to do work that he can spend more on raising, etc. It is clear that Medina would be permitted, but in this he must trust in God that He will provide for him in abundance, even when there are many sons and daughters, and it is not permissible to prevent a man who is prepared from heaven to provide for everything he gives birth to, but when it is difficult for her, they should be permitted. And Ez Shapir wrote in 1555 that this is what the Ramban said, but because of the Deldina, we do not find that they disagree on it in Sha'a Daf 11 in Mark 1, Section 8 of the Desober Demochrin 75 that a woman who has sons may marry, meaning that the Ramban also believes so, therefore the verse must be so, and it is clear from B'S Mark 1, Section 14 that the Ramban brought to the halakhah.

We see that he believes that even a minor difficulty is enough for us to permit it, if the commandment of the Pur is already present.

It is true that there are also other opinions among the latter, who see the obligation of "Shabbat" as a complete obligation. However, we will argue that such is the law, and such is the simplicity of the main poskim. It is true that even those who are strict and consider the law of "and the evening" to be a complete rabbinical law, find it appropriate to leniently address many voices in this regard, as we have already mentioned above. For example, the Chass Ha-Tzhab

It is not the same as other positive commandments, in that a person must pain himself in order to fulfill the commandments of his Creator, the Almighty. But this is a reason because the Sabbath of the world is the Sabbath of the body, and the Sabbath of the body is preferable. And since the world is not settled by those who have a Yarkon and are sick and at risk of giving birth, this does not require one to destroy oneself in order to settle the world…

According to the law, a woman who has not yet given birth and has not observed Shabbat, may not drink a cup of eschatological water unless it is to save from miscarriage and the pain of childbirth, etc. But if she has already observed Shabbat, then she is free even without any pain at all.

In other words, he believes that there is a rabbinical commandment of "Shabbat," and yet in his opinion it is certainly possible to make calculations for the future (and it is not a matter of sheep or a drachma), and to take into account the woman's grief, even without any physical grief at all.

Although each couple should examine themselves to see how difficult this is, as there is clear guidance that even if they have a son and a daughter, they must continue to engage in the practice of foreclosure. However, there is permission to be lenient when the matter is difficult, and certainly a blessing will come upon those who are stricter on themselves.

C. A note on contraception

The entire discussion so far has dealt with the question of reproductive health law. In the background, there is also the question of sperm destruction, which raises a debate about what means are permitted to be used to prevent or delay pregnancy, even where it is permitted by reproductive health law.

We saw in the words of the author of the Agam that he speaks of using it during times when one is not capable of conceiving (other than during ovulation). This is a permissible contraceptive method, since there is no concern that it will destroy the sperm, and it only reflects considerations of the woman. Although there are some poskim who also see this as destroying the sperm (such as the Maharsham and others. See in Manchat Yitzchak, Ch. 3:27 and 1:35), their words are difficult to reconcile (since this is not fundamentally different from using it during times when one is not ovulating, which is certainly not destroying the sperm). Regarding the cup of a contraceptive (or pill), some also see this as permissible in terms of the prohibition of destroying the sperm, since it is the neutralization of the woman and not the man. However, there are those who disagree with this, and so on.

If one wishes to take other measures (such as in rare situations of a short cycle, in which a woman does not have permissible periods without ovulation), one must resort to the question of "apricot in the fluff" and similar ones. We will not need this question here, as it concerns entirely different issues.

In any case, sperm destruction is a formal halakhic question, and the essential question is the question of the rabbinic authority. Therefore, everything said so far must be applied as if it were a matter of use outside of ovulation, and this is how the principled discussion is conducted. The use of other contraceptive methods is a technical question, and it requires a rabbinic reference and question in itself.

D. Summary: The one who comes to the Halacha

From what we have said so far, the law is as follows:

If you have not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of "Por", meaning that you do not have a son or a daughter, you have an absolute obligation to fulfill the mitzvah. In addition, there is an obligation to hasten to fulfill the mitzvah and not delay.
In principle, there is room to hang the question of the delay on the question of whether the mitzvah of the Pur is on the act of bringing about or on the result (that there be a son and a daughter). If there is an obligation on the effort, then there is less room to postpone it. If it is an obligation on the result, there is room to wait and bring about the result at a later time. We have seen that the first and the last differed on this, and perhaps there is room to be stricter (as the Torah provides). What is more, it seems that the Agam is right that the obligation is on the action, and not on the result, which is beyond our control. As we have seen, the result is a condition of the mitzvah (or it is an exempted state, as it was defined above).
But even if the obligation is to make an effort, if there are constraints (health, financial, or other), there is room to consider at least at an extreme level of constraints (as we saw in the considerations of territory) to cancel, and at a lesser level of constraints to postpone. We have seen that several poskim wrote that it is permissible to postpone the fulfillment of a positive commandment in a place where there is a financial loss. It is true that the argument must be considered here that here there is a fear that the commandment will not be fulfilled at all in the end, and in this case there is less room to be lenient in the postponement.
Additionally, we have seen that if the financial situation is not easy, and the expenses of raising a child will exceed one-fifth of your income, then you are allowed to consider abstaining, at least temporarily.

As mentioned, there is reason to believe that non-economic hardship could perhaps also be measured in such financial terms (i.e., if we were willing to pay a fifth of our wealth to get out of it), and allow for a positive annulment. Here, consultation with an external party (posk) is required, as in my opinion it is difficult for you to make such a decision. Moreover, the assessment of non-economic hardship is not objective, and depends on your degree of understanding of the strength and importance of the halachic obligation to have children and to have children.

Therefore, the intensity of the constraints and distress may justify postponing the mitzvah, and in extreme cases even its cancellation. As we have seen, future considerations are not necessarily trivial, if they are based on realistic concerns resulting from a supervised assessment of the situation.

I will mention two cases where a need for postponement may arise: It is likely that if there are several sons and no daughter, or vice versa, that the mitzvah of "Por" has not yet been fulfilled but there are children, there is room for greater leniency in postponing the next pregnancy. And certainly if there are very many sons or daughters, then the difficulty is great. Even immediately after birth, there are many jurists who make it easier, and allow the tashim to be postponed for a certain period of time (some set a time of one or two years, but there is no clear source for this and it is a subjective assessment).

Although, when postponing pregnancy, one must take into account the fact that some women have premature menopause, and therefore will not be able to get pregnant earlier than expected. In Aggad 2:1, we find that sixty of Avtzan's children died, and only the youngest Oved remained alive. Similarly, in the Gemara in Berakhot 5:1, where Riyoh reports that all ten of his sons died. Therefore, one must take into account that the 'planning' that is being talked about today takes considerable risks. Not everything is in our hands, including the actual birth and certainly the survival of the children and their being fertile themselves.

Regarding the question of who should make the decision that each solution matches the relevant level of constraint, and how it should be made, see the last chapter.

If the commandment of the priest has already been fulfilled, it is appropriate to continue to strive to establish additional descendants, according to the law of "and evening" and "Shabbat" (the poskim tend to confuse these two, and indeed the difference is not unambiguous). We have seen that in principle this effort requires a cleric only rarely (in the Be'ama and Baraki), and perhaps there is no ordinary rabbinic law here, but rather the guidance of the land (Ramban). And since this dispute concerns rabbinic law, there is much room for leniency. It is true that when there are no constraints, it is appropriate to use one's strength to the extent possible. But in this case there is room for leniency if the matter is difficult (such as immediately after birth), and even in cases of difficulty, one should leniency for what is certain. The poskim have established all sorts of limits on the length of stay after pregnancy (one or two years), but it seems that they have no clear source and are merely estimates, so I will not go into this here.
We also saw that in relation to "Shabbat" it is permissible to make future calculations and it is not a matter of sheep for a drachma. Fear of bad buildings or lack of education, as well as economic concerns are possible considerations.

All of this is on the halakhic level. Indeed, those with souls will be as strict with themselves as possible, and as the Maimonides says, "according to their strength," and will weigh the loss of a mitzvah against its reward.

We have seen that making decisions on this issue based on estimates of what is expected in the future is problematic, unless they are realistic estimates based on the present.
All of this applies to use on days when ovulation is not occurring. Other contraceptive methods require a separate question and permission.

As is clear from the entire discussion so far, the consideration of whether to refrain from performing the mitzvah or to postpone it is not unambiguous. Much remains for the decision of those concerned. This does not mean that this decision is unimportant or that the law has nothing to say about it, but that like many other decisions, although they concern the halakhic level, they have a subjective dimension, related to the assessment of reality, values and desires, and especially the fear of God. This leads us directly to the final part of the discussion, which deals with decision-making on this issue and in general.

E. The meta-halakhic questions

In the opening, I mentioned some more general aspects that arose from the question. Now I will return and briefly address them, while referring to the commandments of the Pur in light of the conclusions of the previous section.

You are faced with questions of fulfilling the commandments of the Lord, and against them all kinds of constraints. In the background of things, it should be remembered that this is an important positive commandment, which some see as the purpose of the existence of the world. The considerations we take into account should take this into account. The assessment of the difficulties we face also takes on a different proportion when we consider this background. It is important to take into account that one of our most important desires is to serve God, beyond the other desires whose honor is placed in their place. Even if we make a lenient decision, it is important to make sure that we are aware of the spiritual cost it has, and that it is also important in our eyes.

Some general aspects

Sages who have dealt with these questions speak at length about the importance of the mitzvah of the Lord, and about questions of faith, effort, and trust in God, especially when we enter into assessments of the intensity of constraints and hardships, and future assessments in general. Our considerations do not always come true, and God, the Holy One, manages His world in ways He sees fit, and therefore not everything is always left to us and our decisions.

For example, we saw the words of the author of the Agam who tends to prohibit postponing the puer for economic reasons, out of the need for confidence in God. I already noted there that these are things that concern the view and worship of God and not Halacha, even though his language makes this unclear.

Additional questions you must consider are the continuity of the Jewish people and their physical and spiritual strength. Focusing on ourselves is legitimate, but we are also part of the community, and therefore we also have a duty to the continuity of generations, to the transmission of the Torah from Mount Sinai to the future, and to the continued existence of the Jewish people.

The obligation of halakhic autonomy

As I said earlier, even in questions where there is a settled halakhic ruling, the bottom line is that the obligation and the right to decide are yours. No one else can decide for you. In a previous article[27] I showed that a person has an obligation to decide halakhic matters autonomously, of course if he is sane. On the other hand, if a person is not familiar with the ways of halakhic law, he must ask a posk. And even then, ultimately, the choice of whether to obey the halakhic order is his.

This is even more true with regard to questions where there is no definitive and unambiguous halakha, and especially if the matter depends on feelings and constraints that are inherently subjective. On the one hand, in such cases there is a serious concern that the person will follow their instincts and not make correct decisions. On the other hand, the authority of the posek does not exist in such areas, and he can only intervene as long as the person allows him to. In other words, the concern about incorrect decisions and harming the worship of God should be your concern, not that of the posek who answers you. You should be the one who refers the question to him, to ensure that you make the correct decision. It is true that such a question does not have to be a question for a decision, but for consultation. Therefore, you should tell the rabbi beforehand that you are coming to consult and not for him to decide for you (especially since some rabbis themselves are not aware of this distinction), and then you will also receive an answer that takes this into account.

Therefore, whoever told you (if there was such a person) that you need to get "approval" from a rabbi to get pregnant was wrong. But you should definitely go and consult with him.

The scope of the halakhic field

In my words here, I have seemingly assumed that the scope of halakhic reference is limited, and that there are questions that fall outside of it. This is certainly true in my opinion. But precisely because of this, it is important for me to emphasize again that the question of the "Por" is certainly a halakhic question for all intents and purposes. The halakhic law could have set limits and obligated everyone as it wished. But the fact is that it chose not to do so.[28] As we have seen, it left the choice and decision to each person, according to their spiritual level and their degree of commitment to serving God. As we have seen, in most cases the halakhic law hinges the decision on an assessment of constraints and hardships, and therefore this comes back to you. Still, I made sure to note the importance of the mitzvah in the background of the matter, so that you can make a more correct decision.

The Halachic Territory: Halachic Law and the Rabbi

In your question, you expressed surprise at why the law, or the rabbi, would interfere in your private life. It is clear from your words that the problems you are referring to are not medical, nor is there any particular financial hardship. It is a desire for self-fulfillment, to live your life as you wish without unnecessary burdens.

I tell you that the law certainly interferes in our lives. Everyone who is committed to the law pays a price. You wouldn't say that you want to eat pork or desecrate the Sabbath (after all, this also severely limits our careers), and therefore you don't understand why the law interferes in these matters. The law does this by right, since it was given to us by the One who created us.

Still, I tried to show you that despite the Creator's fundamental right to intervene in our lives, there is still room for considerations of self-realization in our decision-making. Sometimes the halacha recognizes the legitimacy of people's personal choices, and sees them as a personal area or territory that is not interfered with, both in relation to honoring parents and in relation to the Father.

If there are things that are very, very important to you, there is a place to consider them in decisions about having children, and perhaps even at a stage when the mitzvah has not yet been fulfilled, as I tried to show in my words above.

But you must take into account that with all due respect to the desire to fulfill yourself on the career level, the continuity of the chain is no less a fulfillment for you. And even if not, it is important to the Torah, to God, and to the people of Israel. These important values are certainly not automatically rejected in the face of desires and wishes. Therefore, even in such commandments where territorial considerations have a place at the principle level, things must be considered very carefully and with awareness of the costs of every decision we make.

So much for the Halacha. However, contrary to the Halacha, the Rabbi does not and cannot interfere in your life in any way. At most, he is an advisor or a provider of information. Ultimately, you are the one who makes the decision. From your perspective, it is important that this be done with all the factual, halachic, and ethical background in your hands, and therefore it is important to turn to the Rabbi.

The personal dimensions

So far I have addressed the ethical, spiritual, and service-to-God dimensions of this decision. However, such a decision also has personal aspects that are not always apparent to young people.

Often the constraints are not as difficult as you think. Every couple who embraces their first child is convinced that it is an impossible task. The fact is that billions of couples have already gone through this process and most of them have met it with dignity. Proportion is very important to you.

On the other hand, a career is not everything. Sometimes, from an early perspective, it seems that children might hold us back, and this discourages us from having them. On the other hand, from a more mature and calm perspective, we see that difficulties can be dealt with in other ways.

As I wrote in my words, avoidance and delay may end in us not being able to have children at all. There is premature labor, and there is incorrect timing. Despite the feeling so characteristic of our generation of controlling our destiny, the situation is not entirely like that. When we ultimately see that as a result of the delays and avoidance, we are deprived of a child, or alternatively, we have one son and sometimes he is sick or disabled and we want to add more children but now it is too late, we may find ourselves in great sorrow, a distortion that cannot be corrected and a disadvantage that cannot be counted. Here I am already talking about the egoistic level, and not just about the ethical one.

Summary

You opened your question by saying that you were taught and educated that one should have as many children as possible. You saw in my answer that things are not so simple, and that this obligation is not unqualified.

Here I tried to show you that no one interferes with your bedroom (as you say), and in general no one interferes with your halakhic questions either. All decisions are yours alone. Halakhic does interfere with our personal lives, but it too sometimes withdraws from our personal territory.

The rabbi is first and foremost a halakhic expert. It is worth contacting him primarily to obtain information. On the other hand, he is not a psychologist, but sometimes he is a person of experience, and perhaps wisdom, and it is worth hearing what he says on other levels as well. And certainly in areas that concern the worship of God. It is worth subjecting our decisions to the criticism of someone who is not involved in the matter, but it is definitely recommended to choose someone who also understands personal considerations and is willing to take them into account and give them legitimacy as much as possible (and certainly not every rabbi is like that).

It is very important that the decision be made with an understanding of all aspects, halakhic, intellectual, and others, and with consideration for the values underlying halakhic and worship of Hashem. Even if one decides not to have children, it should come from a deep sense of dilemma, of tension between personal desires and duty. Anyone who does not feel this tension when making decisions not to have children, even after fulfilling the mitzvah, is not a true worshipper of Hashem.

Ultimately, the considerations are yours, and I am only an advisor. However, you must know that with the right comes responsibility. The responsibility for the results of your decisions, both on a personal level and in the service of God, falls on your shoulders, and on the shoulders of no one else.

successfully.

F. Addition to the Rabbis who read

A few methodological and critical comments that occurred to me while studying the topic.

There is a taboo that is generally accepted in the public regarding permits. People do allow themselves to 'overlap', but it is clear to everyone that it is not halachically okay (that is why most of them do not go to ask. And rightly so from their perspective, because the answers will usually be negative, unless there is a very good reason. The permits are also not published and therefore there is a reluctance to ask. See the next section).
I think a similar taboo also exists among the poskim. They also usually do not need questions such as the withdrawal of a five-volume book from one's fund for a positive commandment, and even if they do, it is done in an unreasoned footnote (like the Agam). The same applies to clarifying the legitimacy of future evaluation considerations ("Bahdi Kabbashi", if it is referred to at all, is quoted almost automatically without review or examination).
I did not address in my remarks questions such as population density on Earth in general. Is it permissible/needful/forbidden to address such considerations? This is certainly related to the issue of Drachman sheep, and other profound questions.
Everything else in this area is explained by local explanations. There is almost no direct discussion in halakhic literature about considerations that justify cancellation or postponement before the fulfillment of the mitzvah, except at most in medical and other circumstances, or postponement after the fulfillment of the mitzvah. In an initial review, I did not find an exhaustive clarification of the fundamental issue from its sources.
Beyond established norms, there are concerns and a tendency not to allow public discussion of delicate matters. This avoidance of allowing public discussion is understandable, for fear of a slippery slope and biased interpretation. On the other hand, this also comes at a heavy price. As a result of not conducting a real discussion in the public domain, the rabbis themselves are not always aware of the various aspects and possibilities, and certainly not of criticism and needs, and therefore sometimes they formulate a position according to inclinations of the heart, according to unconscious (and not necessary) norms, etc., and they themselves are convinced that this is the position of the halakhah. Even when there is familiarity with the sources, this does not mean that there is awareness of their meaning and the various possibilities for applying them.

Therefore, in my opinion, nowadays it is worthwhile to give public access to almost every halakhic discussion. This is better than a situation in which the person who gives public access to the discussion is someone who is not really committed, and/or knowledgeable in halakhic law, and then it will be difficult to repair the damage (and there are quite a few examples of this). In an age where information is hackneyed and accessible, there are many speakers and rabbis of all kinds, and especially since the public discussion is open and uncensored, there is no point in keeping things inside because of one or another's concerns. The worst is not worth the damage.

And even if a public debate has arisen, and even if it is opened by people who demonstrate ignorance or blatant bias, it is not advisable for the defendant to be content with slander or general statements, but to offer a detailed and reasoned discussion with sources. Afterwards, of course, it is possible (and desirable) to slander as well.

There is confusion between considerations of sperm destruction and considerations of the "Fur" (like between season and "Fur"). In my answer, I made sure to distinguish between the questions. The question of sperm destruction is essentially technical (as far as I understand), and therefore it can be solved technically. The fundamental questions with which I dealt concern the "Fur".
For example, a friend told me about a yeshiva graduate who went for an interview for medical school. He was asked what he would do in the event of a non-medical need for an abortion? He replied: If it is a halakhic problem – I will sell the knife to a gentile. But with regard to the moral problem – I have no idea how it can be solved. His intention was, of course, to defy them for addressing the question to him as a religious person, and not understanding that it should bother them no less than he does (and in my opinion more).

As mentioned, even in the matter under discussion, there is confusion between the question of sperm destruction, which is technical (even if it is linked to the prohibition of murder), and the more substantive questions concerning the Forer.

An important part of decisions of this type is based on norms that have taken root. However, I believe that some of the norms by which we act today were shaped by the inspiration of the period after the Holocaust (and certainly in the Diaspora), in which there was a real problem of continuity and fear for the future of the Jewish people, and certainly for the survival of those who observe the commandments and the Torah (for example, the Agam, the offering of Yitzhak, the cutting of Yaakov and many other important poskim, all of whom experienced the Holocaust in person or nearby, and experienced with great intensity the need for the restoration of the Jewish people after it). I believe that today the situation is different (with all the dangers that face the state and the people). To the best of my judgment, there is room for reexamination and forging a more balanced approach, especially against the background of the importance of personal fulfillment.
It is true that changing circumstances can bring both relief and aggravation. The state of affluence that prevails today should lead to less tolerance for claims of the type in question. Today, raising children is less difficult (although we are more spoiled, and the standards we demand for our children are higher).

On the other hand, as Rabbi Yisrael Yagel rightly pointed out to me, the infant mortality rate has decreased significantly in recent years, and therefore the fear that if we delay fulfilling the mitzvah, we will not be able to leave the house is certainly lower (although of course it still exists).

The poskim have no regard for 'territorial' considerations. If such a question were addressed to an ordinary poskim, he would wave it off from all sides (with some degree of justice. The question is only whether it would be useful). In my opinion, this stems from three main reasons:
1. In general, poskim tend to see every question as a halakhic dilemma, and to translate everything into halakhic terms. At most, they are willing to acknowledge a conflict between one halakhic value and another.

2. Limiting the scope of a halakhic value, that is, not because of a conflict with another halakhic value, is not very popular among poskim. There is a sensitivity here that the halakhah will be limited to certain areas only, as if there are issues in which the halakhah has no authority in the essential sense. This is a conceptual error, since this does not necessarily indicate substantial inaccessibility. I addressed this in Chapter 5, and referred to Yedidia Stern's article that distinguishes between substantial and accidental inaccessibility.

3. The automatic negation that the judge feels towards personal considerations, as if everything is the advice of the evil inclination. Considerations of personal fulfillment do not receive the consideration they deserve.

These phenomena can be seen in my articles on halakhic territory. There I cited the comments of two important poskim (Rabbi Ariel and Rabbi Ovadia) on the questions of honoring parents versus going to a katzonah and going to a Haredi yeshiva. Both analyze these questions as if there is a dilemma between two laws here (and therefore the question of honoring parents versus performing a mitzvah, etc.) arises. In my opinion, there is a limitation here of the obligation to honor parents from legio and not from bar, that is, the limitation is not due to a conflicting law but rather due to the right to personal realization (this is what I called considerations of 'halakhic territory').

There is a phenomenon that emerges very clearly in the literature that discusses the rejection and abrogation of the Purim, and it is the failure to distinguish between the view and the halakhah. Many teach unequivocal instructions regarding the questions of the Purim, and rely on considerations of confidence in God and intercession, or other meta-halakhic considerations.[29] This is problematic in several ways:
1. Consideration of authority. A poskim does not have automatic authority on these questions. The ability and philosophical depth of some poskim are also questionable (to put it mildly) in my opinion (for example, the Badatz removes kosher status from Pepsi-Cola because of an advertisement that features monkeys and evolution).

2. Moral consideration. Even if the posak's ideological-intellectual position is correct, in questions of this type the decision should be left to the questioner, and the rabbi's role is mainly to inform him of the ethical considerations that he must take into account. Only if the questioner submits the decision to the rabbi, then is there a place for him to take the decision itself into his own hands. From a moral perspective, the rabbi must give people the right to decide on their worship of God, and not present them with false representations of recommendations as if they were binding halakhic decisions. When they come to ask halakhic questions, they must be given halakhic answers (and it is possible to add advice and recommendations, when they are presented as such), and when they come for consultation (see my explanatory letters), then it is of course permissible and obligatory to give them advice and recommendations.

3. Psychological consideration. Recommendations that are presented as binding laws sometimes lead to a situation where people do not follow the recommendations because they do not comply with them, and now they are in a situation where, according to their understanding, they have violated the law. From here, the short way is to kick out all halachic obligations, or at least not come to ask (to follow them themselves "it is better if they are mistaken"). And the severity of the poskim is found to lead to a serious loophole.

4. Since sources of information are accessible today, there will be questions that will later turn out to them that the posak presented them with a recommendation that is legally binding. As a result, people's trust in posaks is decreasing (and these are everyday occurrences, for those who know).

5. Consideration of truth. No less than all the previous considerations, there is a basic obligation to tell the truth, and such a misrepresentation is not true. The wise have already said about this: Plato is beloved and Socrates is beloved, but the truth is beloved above all.

[1] There are additional sources, see in the sources and notes of the Rambam, Frankel edition, on the fifth verse of the book of Ishos Ha-A.

[2] The Netziv in the Emek question, Q. 5, and Q. 6, bring up a disagreement among the Rishonim regarding the obligation of non-Jews to pay the Purim. According to the halakha, it is accepted to assume that they are not obligated to do so.

[3] Regarding a slave, see Shulchan Abba Zechariah 157, and in contrast to this, the sources cited in Menach Mitzvah 158. See also the sources cited in the note above regarding a Gentile. If a Gentile is obligated to pay a penalty, it is likely that the slave is certainly obligated to pay it.

[4] For a review of the questions discussed here, see the article on Parashat Bereishit, in the book Benetiv HaMitzvot, Gabriel Hazut and Michael Avraham, Mida Tova, Kfar Hasidim 5771.

[5] Several Rishonim wrote that in a mitzvah that follows a transgression, one does not break the obligation of the mitzvah. Either from Torah (see Tod"a "Mesum" Sukkah 30 a"a, and more), or at least from Rabbinic sources (Vatud"a "Hahua" Sukkah 9 a"a, and more).

[6] See Shaar El-Malech, Lulav, 58:55, and the dispute between R. Y. and R. T. in the Todah, 'Amer Ula', B. K. 67:1.

[7] It should be noted that according to this, there may be no need for his previous excuse, since the latter wrote that in the mitzvahs of consequence there is no rule that a mitzvah following a transgression is invalid. See on this in Ong Yot 9, 30 and 31, 32, and in the Ha-Hag, and in the Safat Emet Shabbat 15b, and in the collection of notes to 31.

[8] This source is not entirely unambiguous, as it could be understood that although the mitzvah is a mitzvah of consequence, nevertheless if the action was performed while he was exempt, it does not constitute a yadach. Hence, the view of the manach from there is also not so unambiguous. Admittedly, this explanation already brings us very close to understanding a mitzvah of action and not a mitzvah of consequence.

[9] And see also the second Todah, Hagiga 2b.

[10] The Manach also wondered how the mitzvah is fulfilled at the completion of the beyah, since it is not at all clear that the woman will conceive and have a child as a result of this beyah, and it is certainly not reasonable to assume that two children will be born from her. Regarding the second question, it seems that there is no real difficulty here, since if the perception is that this is a mitzvah of action, then the completion of the beyahs of all the children together constitutes the fulfillment of the mitzvah. The mitzvah is fulfilled at the moment of the completion of the beyah of the first two children. The children are a condition that clarifies that the beyah was a mitzvah.

Although the first question is also unclear: the Toss claim that the prohibition of 'it shall not be holy' cannot be permitted, because the act does not occur at the same time as the Hav. Although it is true that not every final act of worship will be considered the time of performing the mitzvah, it is clear that the mitzvah is fulfilled at any final act of worship, and therefore in any case it does not occur at the time of committing the offense, and therefore there is no room for it to be permitted on the part of the doer who rejects the Law.

[11] See also the article by Rabbi Baruch Finkelstein, Techumin 27. There he presents implications for the dispute between the Manach and the AGM regarding in vitro fertilization, and claims that according to the AGM, this does not fulfill the commandment of the Purim.

But I think he is mistaken in this, since although according to the Agam's method the boundary of the mitzvah is the effort to have children and not the result, it cannot necessarily be concluded from this that the effort will be specifically through conception. It is possible that in vitro fertilization is also part of this effort (compare the examples such as "He had sons in his womb" cited above). And in fact, Rabbi Finkelstein himself cites in his article there the words of several poskim who believe that the extraction of semen for this purpose does not entail the prohibition of sperm destruction, since it is done for the sake of the Lord. It is very likely that those poskim will also say that this effort is an observance of the mitzvah of the Lord. The Agam himself writes so in his words there (see there where he discusses the aspect of not committing adultery that also exists in the hand, in addition to the prohibition of sperm destruction).

[12] See the notes to the Menach, published by the Jerusalem Institute, Mitzvah 1, note 18, and in the complete volume of Avha'z 31, notes 5 and 6.

[13] In the book Derech HaMelech, the author of the Manach, cites the name of his father-in-law, who, in his order of wedding and kiddushin, used to warn the groom that he should prepare for the mitzvah by following the methods that require intention. It seems that he was referring to the mitzvah of kiddushin, and not to the mitzvah of Pur, which, according to his method, does not require intention at all.

And indeed, it is necessary to discuss whether Kiddushin is a mitzvah in the Pnach, or whether it is only a law that regulates the manner in which procreation and reproduction are carried out (the kosher mitzvah, or the mitzvah's devices). From the precise language of the Toshu'a cited above, it seems that it is only a means to procreation. However, from the language of the Maimonides at the beginning of the chapter "Ishut", and in his "Safmatz" in "Ashe Rig", and also from the language of the Hichun, it seems that it is an independent mitzvah. And many have already discussed this, and so on.

[14] And similarly, the 20th chapter in the book of the Sukkah, which states that it must be consecrated "so that your generations may know," and see also the Mishnah Berurah, which states the same. Likewise, the Gemara of the Rabbis states regarding the blowing of the shofar that there is a law of "remembering the sound of the trumpet" to consecrate it at the time of blowing.

[15] Although this is a specific intention related to the content of the mitzvah, and not a general intention to fulfill an obligation (which is the subject of the dispute about whether mitzvahs require intention), as in the case of the sukkah.

[16] He claims that even if this intention is not useful, he was still not obligated by the mitzvah as an Israelite. This assumption must be discussed, and so on.

[17] A similar argument can be found in the novellas of Grach HaLevi on Maimonides, 5:5, Korban Pesach, regarding the law of a small child who sacrificed a large amount between two Pesachs. He claims that a small child for whom a Pesach sacrifice was made has fulfilled his obligation (and therefore does not bring a second Pesach after he has grown), even though he was not obligated to do so. I expanded on this and other examples in the article on P. and Yeshiva, in my book La'ashot Mitsvitsich, Kfar Hasidim 5771.

[18] Above, we explained that the commandments of consequence do not require intention. And we stated that the manach raised the possibility that he would be intentional when his children were born, but ultimately he rejected it.

[19] As is known, his words sparked great controversy among the latter. See sources in the Jerusalem Institute edition of the Manach, note 15.

[20] Reka'a mentioned there regarding the question of Shabbat 11:1. It seems that there is a disagreement between Babylonian and Jerusalemite scholars on this, and Akhm (see Shafa'a here).

[21] See my articles on the posthumous and on the statute, in the book of Acts, Kfar Hasidim 5771. And for more detail in my article on Meishrim 4, Yeruham 576.

[22] I call such considerations considerations of 'halakhic territory', which limit the scope of application of a particular mitzvah to considerations internal to that mitzvah, and not to considerations external to it. In my three articles above, I cite many additional examples of this.

[23] I returned and saw that this is what Rabbi Yigal Ariel explained at length in his article 'Family Planning', Tzohar 10, in Chapter 5, and he also quoted from the Maharal. In Chapter 6, he stated that there are several basic human conditions that must be met before marriage (such as preparing one's needs, and even the very act of choosing the woman one wants to live with and rejecting others), and they are not rejected by the commandments of the Purim.

[24] One might ask why the sages themselves, who knew the law, did not refrain from procreation? Are we all today sons of the people of the land from that generation? This is unlikely. And it seems that the consideration was that if they refrained from procreation, what would remain of the people of Israel would be only sons of the people of the land, and this certainly does not make sense. If Abraham's seed was not already exhausted, then it would be better to have in it also the sons of the 18th century.

[25] See also the Ketzaveh and Natiyam Si' 5a Ska, which further complicated the association. And the Gerach in Stencil Si' 6t, settled their questions, and claimed that there is no dispute here at all. And see also the Chayyah of Rabbi Shimon in the texts Si' 1 and Si' 5a Ska, and the Ka'yyah of Shem Si' 2 and the Ha'iluy of Meychit Si' 6 and more.

[26] http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/kitveyet/assia/tihnun-2.htm

[27] 'Autonomy and Authority in Halacha', in Meishram I, Yeruham 1972.

[28] See relevant distinctions in the (non-exhaustive) booklet by Yedidia Stern, Halacha Rulings on Political Questions, published by the Israel Democracy Institute.

[29] For example, Rabbi Yigal Ariel's article is called 'Space Between Pregnancy (Halakhic Reference)'. The weight of the intellectual and meta-Halakhic principles there is very great. I will comment that in my opinion he actually makes a very successful combination between Halakhic thought and thought.