Torah beliefs and their halachic status

2016

 outline:

• Sabra Da'urayah or Rabbinical

Not all explanations are equal.

The Blessing of the Nahannin – the method of the Peni Yehoshua who is understood from the Torah

The main part of the blessing is from the Torah, the text from the rabbis.

The Blessing of the Nahanin – The Method of the Tzalach, Sabra the Rabbi

Resolving the issue of the 'Zalach' on the front page

The advantage of the verse over the explanation is the commandment.

• Explanation of the dispute over whether a reason can be binding according to the law

introduction

Two Exams in the Mitzvot System

Interpretative reasoning and reasoning that establishes a new law

• The commandment in the Mishnah of Maimonides

introduction

Maimonides' distinction between two types of negation

Content and commandment in every mitzvah from the Torah

Some Shades of Laws from the Writings of the Scribes: The Law of Doubt

The rule of doubt in the laws that are explained

Interim summary

Sermons of the Sages are based on Sabra

Note: The role of the command in the work of God

• A Gentile who keeps the seven commandments explains
• Even idolatry is not complete without receiving authority.
• The prohibitions of giving to a child, and their obligation in the laws of heaven

introduction

Obligation of minors in the mitzvot that the mind inclines to

Expansion of small positives in all Noahide commandments

Oath taking

• Charges that originate from God's will

introduction

God's will

Source of the book 'Mesilat Yesharim'

• The reasons for omitting the command in debts explained

introduction

Basic duties and duties that are incidental to the Delta

1. Correction of dimensions
2. The commandment of repentance
3. The commandment of studying Torah

• A. The opinion of Rashbi was translated into Halacha in the Shavuot Laws.
• B. Studying Torah alone and the commandment to study Torah alone
• C. Continuing the issue as a kind of material
• D. Resolving the contradiction in the words of Rashbi

A note on the commandment of settling in Israel according to Maimonides

A note on the balanced commandments

Summary and Comment on the Halakhic Status of Fundamental Obligations and Reasons in General

• Current discussions

introduction

Distinguishing between interpretive beliefs and substantive beliefs

Example: Prohibition of genetic manipulation

Genetic manipulation as an extension of the prison ban

The halachic difference between the two options

An interesting example of a deduction from a statement

 

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Torah beliefs and their halachic status

Explanation is a central tool for clarifying laws and sometimes even creating them. There is still a lack of systematic work on distinguishing between explanations and their types and clarifying the status of explanation in halakha in general. The question of explanation is of course intrinsically linked to the question of the meaning of the command in a verse, since explanation usually comes as a substitute for a command verse. In this article, I will attempt to draw initial lines for clarifying the status of explanations in halakha and, through this, also for clarifying the meaning of the commandments.

• A. Sabra Da'urayah or Rabbinical

Not all explanations are equal.

At the beginning of Rabbi M.M. Kosher's book, Northern decoder,[1] A pamphlet entitled "Sabrah from the Torah" appears. Rabbi Kasher opens it with several Talmudic sources that refer to the sabrah as a counterpart to the verse: "Why did I read the sabrah?" (Ketubot 22a), "I've heard the mother read and I've heard the mother read" (Berachot 4b, and parallels in the Shas tradition there) and more. Likewise, in the issue of Shabbat Tzob 2b, we learn the work of collecting from the sabrah and much more along this path.[2]

And in truth, the seemingly puzzling things are, since in every rabbinical regulation or decree there is a reason for which it was amended or decreed, and if every reason is from the Torah, then there would be no rabbinical laws at all. It is true that there was a place to divide between reasons for the substance of the matter and reasons for a reservation and a boundary. If the prohibition itself is based on a reason, then it is from the Torah, but if there is a reason to strengthen some mitzvah or to establish a boundary for it, but the act itself does not have a substantial problem with it, then this is a rabbinical law. Such a distinction can perhaps explain the status of decrees, but why are the regulations (such as Hanukkah and Purim) also only rabbinical, when they are surely based on a substantial reason?

Therefore, it seems necessary to say that there are several levels of interpretations, stronger and weaker, and only the stronger interpretations create laws of the Torah. But the laws that are created from weaker interpretations are the laws of the rabbis. We also found in the response to the Hadiya Jacob's Return H.G. Si' Kala, where he rejects the words of the one who says that only the rabbis understood, and this is his language:

Even what emerges according to the words of the rabbinic council, which is from the side of the explanation, is only from the rabbis, this rule is not valid for several reasons… And according to the defense counsel, according to his words, the Shass of Pesachim, page 68, do they all admit or not, because it is difficult from several points of view. The Shass makes it difficult for the rabbinic council to call it a rabbinic council, and the rabbinic council to make it difficult for the rabbinic council to declare it a rabbinic council, page 22, and if, according to the words of the rabbinic council, the rabbinic council is only from the rabbis. Also according to the rabbinic council’s excuse, it is proven, There are no equal explanations, a false explanation and a false explanation.And so the island of Passover, because the GK understood it to be the day of the giving of the Torah, and he called Nami, "The Helper," as it is written, "You shall assemble for the Lord your God."

He is precise and says that there is no room for the claim that Sabra is only from the rabbis, since the Talmud sees Sabra as the voice of a verse and his view is that if Sabra were from the rabbis, there would be no room for the question "Why did I call it Sabra?" On the other hand, he writes that by virtue of the issue of Pesach, there are Sabras that are not strong enough, or there is a counter-explanation, and therefore the laws that are learned from them are laws from the rabbis, and they are our words.

The Blessing of the Nahanin – The Method of the Peni Yehoshua Who Explained the Torah

One of the main sources that comes up in discussions about the status of the explanation is around the issue of Birkat Ha-A, where the Gemara discusses the source of the law of Birkat Ha-Hananin (the blessing on food before it). It rejects several suggestions for sources for this law, and in conclusion it states:

Rather, it is understood: It is forbidden for a person to enjoy this world without a blessing.

Our rabbis taught: It is forbidden for a person to enjoy this world without a blessing, and whoever enjoys this world without a blessing – above. What is its regulation – let him go to a wise man. – Let him go to a wise man – what is his duty? Is his duty a prohibition! – Rather, Rava said: Let him go to a wise man from above and teach him blessings, so that he does not fall into the trap of embezzlement.

Rav Yehuda said, Shmuel said: Anyone who enjoys this world without a blessing – is as if he enjoys the heavenly sanctuary, as it is said: The earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof. Rabbi Levi Rami: It is written: The earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof, and it is written: The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, and the earth he gave to men! No question, here – first the blessing, Here – after a blessing.

Rabbi Hanina bar Papa said: Anyone who enjoys this world without a blessing is as if he is robbing the Holy One, blessed be He, and the assembly of Israel, as it is said: He who robs his father and mother and says, "There is no sin," is a companion of a corrupter, etc.

The source of the law of the blessing of the blessed is the explanation that one who benefits from the Holy Spirit without a blessing is considered to be from above, enjoying the heavenly sanctuary, or stealing from God and the Knesset of Israel.

It is no wonder that now thepenny On a website, the following difficulty arises:

In the Gemara, except for a reason, it is forbidden for a person to do so. This means that from the language of all the poskim, from which they conclude that here all the blessings of the rabbis are from the bar, from the blessing of food alone, and from the Rashba, the blessing of the seventh of them, after which it is from the Torah, but with the rest of the blessings, it is accepted. And apparently, it is surprising that in all the Shas, it means that it is from the Torah, and rather, the Shas is difficult, why do I call it a reason? And in truth, from the language of the Torah, there is no ruling that it is permissible, because it was written and called the context above, that is, a reference to the Bible, it is possible that we are referring to this matter itself, since it is a reason, I will not read it.

He asks why the KYL says that the blessings of the Nahanin are from the rabbis and are sufficient for the kula (doubtful blessings for the kula), since it is a Torah opinion and therefore we had to be strict in the kula? To this he answers urgently:

Who does it seem to the rabbi that even if you were to say that this explanation is not from the Torah, even if it is fair, it is fair to grant blessings to ease, because it does not belong to the stricter, because it is forbidden to bless a blessing that does not require G-d, and in any case, it is exhausted, so it is fair. And from the reason itself, it is fair to say that the one who recites the blessing over food does not recite it before it, because it is not obligatory but rather a justification and he refrains himself for the sake of G-d's honor, so it does not belong to the rabbi. And if the food is blessed, who is it after it? If so, he does not enjoy this world without a blessing. So it seems to me, and still, see, and read the last booklet:

The bottom line is that he still remains in the CSA.[3]

The main part of the blessing is from the Torah, the text from the rabbis.

Therefore, it seems to reconcile and divide between the obligation of the blessing of the Nahannin, which is a maht (desbara da'Orah), and the form and wording of the blessing (Shem and Malchut, etc.), which is of course a correction of the Sages. In any case, if a person is in doubt about the blessings, he must indeed be stricter and recite the blessing of the dhawi spiqa da'Orah, but he must not say the form that includes Shem and Malchut, which is only a rabbinical doubt and even the prohibition of the renunciation of the name of the fatiha bi'ah (as the Rabbis wrote).penny Himself). And from this we come to a wonderful innovation in the Dinah that in doubt, blessings should indeed be intensified, but not to say the full form, but only to thank God with our tongue for giving us the food.[4]And whoever did not do so undoubtedly violated the Torah prohibition of enjoying the Awza without a blessing, and there is a kind of doubtful embezzlement in it.

We have assumed here that the form prescribed by the Sages is only a rabbinical obligation. Although it is possible to make thepenny After all, there must be a reason underlying this form, so if there is a reason from the Torah, why shouldn't this also be part of the Torah law? And we will try to settle it according to what we saw above inJacob's Return, that while there is a reason for this, the main reason is to thank God and not to enjoy without a blessing, and therefore the main reason for the confession is indeed the law of the Torah. But the reason for saying the confession specifically in such a form is not the main reason ("a simple reason," as it is said there), and therefore it is only a rabbinical obligation.

And yet, such a clear distinction must be discussed.penny That the main explanation that it is forbidden to enjoy the Awza without a blessing is sufficient explanation for the law to be from the Torah? After all, he could have easily settled his question (why doubt the blessings to be lenient) and said that this explanation is cliché and therefore the law that emerges from it is from the rabbis? It is true that it could have been said that this seemed to thepenny He explains that this is an important explanation and not a cliché, but it seems that this is still not enough, since the S.S. barely remained on the Gemara and could have settled it this way.

And it seems thatpenny I believe that if any law arises from mere interpretation, then it is necessarily Torah law and cannot be from the rabbis. The law of the rabbis is a law that was established or decreed by an authorized rabbinical court. Of course, they always have reasons for establishing or decreeing, but a regulation is stated in the form of a law and is not dependent on a reason. When a law is presented that hangs its foundation on interpretation, then it becomes clear that it is not rabbinical law but a law that is binding by its own merit without regulation. It is binding by the very fact that the interpretation makes it binding and not because some rabbinical court has established it. Therefore, such a law seems to bepenny necessarily according to Torah law. On the other hand, the form of the blessing really looks like a regulation of the Sages. There they established halachic principles (Shem and Malchut) and did not at all talk about the explanation underlying these definitions (although it is clear that there is an explanation there too). These laws are binding because an authorized Rabbi determined that a blessing must be said in such a form, and therefore it is clear to thepenny That this is the law of the rabbis. Therefore, a law that is based on a reason is a law of the Torah, and a law that is based on a regulation of the Sages, even though it is based on a reason (even though it is apparently a cliché and therefore needed a regulation) is the law of the rabbis.

And indeed, the course of the issue in the blessings is that they look for a source for the blessing of the Ḥanāṇīn before it, and end up hanging it on the explanation. If there were a rabbinical ruling here, then the Gemara would have to say that there is no source, but that the Sages established this law. And of course, like all rabbinical rulings, there is a reason for it, but this is not the way in which the Gemara presents a rabbinical ruling. In the Gemara here, the explanation is presented as a source that requires reciting the blessing before eating, and not as a reason for the Sages' ruling, and therefore it means to the Hadith that this is a Torah law.

And here, in the commentary of the students of Rabbeinu Yonah on the Rif in the blessings there (page 25a of the Rif pages), we find a great innovation:

From what is its correctness, Rava said, he should go to a wise sage, knowledgeable in the field, etc. That is, someone who does not know the blessings on which matter he may eat, and if he does eat, he will be obligated to make a sacrifice of filth every time, and from among them, he should go to a wise one and teach him the blessings of each and every thing, and God, even if he did not know anything except the blessing that everything comes out of filth, gave them (4:41) and on all of them, if he said that everything comes out, but one must learn in order to recite the blessing that is appropriate for each and every thing:

According to them, whoever eats without a blessing is obligated to offer a guilt offering for excusing himself. And these words are strange, since eating without a blessing is only a rabbinical prohibition, and if so, is there any ulil in offering such a guilt offering? It seems that they also believe thatpenny Eating without a blessing is a Torah prohibition.[5]

And according to our method, it seems that what they wrote here that even the blessing "Shehkol" is exempt from evasion is due to the above reasoning. Their claim is that a blessing in any form removes it from evasion, because in the end, he thanked God. Although when he blessed in the wrong form, he did not discharge the obligation of the rabbis (who prescribed a specific form for each blessing), but according to Torah, he was exempt from evasion.

The Blessing of the Nahanin – The Method of the Tzalach, Sabra the Rabbi

thesuccessful In his innovations there he achieves the premise of thepenny And writes:

And what the Gaon Baal Pani Yehoshua Dachion Damasik wrote about the reason is, in any case, it is from the Torah, so I will forget what they said, "Why did I read the reason?" It is a reason, because it is a reason that is as useful as reading. And I say that it only pertains to the law of the laws, as in the Ketubah, page 22 [a], where the word that forbade is the word that permitted, and in Baba Kama, page 40, where the evidence is taken from his companion, etc., in which places the Gemara makes it difficult to read the reason. But to say that something that he explains is an important mitzvah from the Torah, we have not heard of it. If this is so, then all the mitzvot were written for the Hanun, which are rational, and furthermore, this reason that it is forbidden to enjoy the OZ without a blessing is a reason that will be applied to all who come to the world, and thus the blessing of the Nahanin will be obligatory even on the children of Noah, I wonder. But surely the intention is that since it is a reason for this, the Sages established the blessings of the Nahanin.[6].

He divides between arguments that are "in accordance with the laws" and arguments that establish a new obligation. An argument that interprets a principle or commandment that has its source in the Torah can receive the status of a Torah, since it is an interpretation of what the Torah itself says, and after the interpretation is the content of the commandment of the Torah itself. But in this case, the Gemara presents an argument that establishes a new law and not an exception to an existing law that has its source in the Torah, and in this it is clear that it does not belong to say that the general argument is a Torah.

It makes it difficult to grasp thepenny Two problems: 1. According to him, all the inhabitants of the world should have pledged themselves to recite the blessing of Nahanin, and we have never heard this. 2. According to him, the verses of the intellectual commandments are unnecessary. Below we will offer a solution to these problems.

Resolving the problems of the 'Zalach' on the front page

We brought up two questions raised by thesuccessful Towards thepennyRegarding the obligation of non-Jews to recite the blessing of HaNahnin, it is necessary to add and clarify the words of Rabbi Nissim Gaon in his introduction to Shas (which was printed in the Barish edition of Tractate Berakhot), who writes about this:

And if the respondent replies and says, "Since you say that everyone who is of sound mind is obligated to the mitzvot, and why did the Holy One, blessed be He, single out Israel to give them a lesson and burden them with its mitzvot, they are alone, and there is no other nation besides them, and are they not all equal in the law of the obligation of the mitzvot?" And it must be answered, and how is it possible for them to be punished for something that they were not obligated to do and that was not given to them? And do they not have to answer, because if we had been commanded, we would have done it, and if we had been warned, we would have been careful and accepted as they received. And indeed, we are explaining this as the answer to the claims, and we say that all the mitzvot that depend on understanding and on the understanding of the law, have already been obligated by them from the day that God created man on the earth, on him and on his seed after him for generations to come. And the mitzvot that are known by hearing from the words of the prophets, our God did not fail to obligate the ancients what was appropriate in the eyes of His wisdom to obligate them. Rather, we find that the first Adam claimed some of them as mitzvot..."

The RNG states that mitzvot that are based on the Sabra are binding on everyone who understands the Sabra, and there is no need for a commandment. If so, it seems that thesuccessful Saying that even the Gentiles had to commit to the blessings of the Nahannin.

Although there is room to explain this according to our way, that indeed Gentiles are also obligated to recite the blessing of the sabbath, but only mainly the confession, since this is the only law that is based on the sabbath. However, the form that the Sages established, which is only from the rabbis and does not contain a sabbath, exempts Gentiles from this. The reason why not all Gentiles do this is either because they do not fulfill their duties at all, or because they do not understand the sabbath and therefore do not fulfill it. And indeed, those among them who believe and understand that one must give thanks for what they have received before eating do indeed do so. For example, it is known that Christians are also careful to recite the blessing and give thanks before eating.

Regarding the second difficulty of thesuccessful Regarding the need for verses for intellectual commandments, as will be explained below, this is our main concern here.

First, I will note that in my articles on conspiring witnesses and the decree of the scripture[7] I have shown that there are reasons for the decree of the Scripture, and what is more, that many times these reasons are even obvious to us as humans. This naturally raises the question of why in such cases it is even necessary to write the verse (= decree of the Scripture)? I divided it into several different possibilities to explain this. A) The explanation is not unambiguous and strong enough for us to act according to it, and therefore a verse is required. B) The explanation contradicts other halachic principles, and therefore we would not act according to it if it were not for the permission of the decree of the Scripture. C) We understand the explanation only after the Scripture has revealed the law to us, but now it is a simple explanation. All of these explanations can also explain the need for verses in intellectual commandments.

Perhaps another explanation could be added here, and that is that the verses are sometimes needed to add various halachic details and definitions to a mitzvah that we would not know from the explanation. For example, the prohibition of murder is certainly one of the rational mitzvahs, but the law of cause, limitation, and the end of the heat of the day, and the need for warning and two witnesses, and other laws of a murderer in halachah, all of these would not be apparent to us from mere explanation (after all, from a moral point of view, a murderer is a murderer for all intents and purposes. He does it intentionally and it will certainly happen, but he does it in an indirect or strange way. There is nothing morally wrong with that).[8]

Of course, in a case like the blessing of the Hananin, where we understand the explanation without a verse and it is unambiguous and does not contradict any other principle, there it is enough for us to act in accordance with it. In such situations, if a verse is indeed cited, the Gemara asks, "Why did he call me an explanation?" And when there is no verse, it is the same Torah law as when there is a verse, and this is what thepenny.

The advantage of the verse over the explanation is the imperative.

But it seems more appropriate to say that the verses are actually required in the intellectual mitzvot in a fundamental way, and in principle the explanation itself is not enough. They are not required only to add specific halakhic boundaries or to strengthen the explanation, but to add a commandment, which is another dimension in the mitzvah itself. To clarify matters, we will first make some important introductions and then return to explaining the methods ofpenny Andsuccessful And the matter of explanation in general

• on. Explanation of the dispute over whether a reason can be binding according to the law

introduction

When we see the explanation as a substitute for the command in a verse, we implicitly assume that the command contains nothing beyond the disclosure of information. When God commands me to put on tefillin, He is simply revealing to me that this is His will. Hence, if I have an explanation that tells me that this is God's will or that this is the right thing to do (I will distinguish between these two types of explanations later), in such a situation there is no need for the verse.

In this chapter I will try to show that this assumption is incorrect. At least in Maimonides' method (and not only in it) the verses have a role that is not just conveying information about God's will. We will see that understanding the disagreement of the latter that we have seen is related to understanding the meaning of the explanation and the command.

Two Exams in the Mitzvot System

Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman b.Article file, in the article "The Repentance", cites the words of Ramchal who distinguishes between two aspects in every mitzvah and every transgression: the dimension of obedience/rebellion and the essential dimension. When a person eats pork, there are two aspects to this transgression: he rebels against the commandment not to eat pork, and he brings about the spiritual harm that this prohibition came to prevent. The same is true when a person performs a mitzvah, such as putting on tefillin, he obeys the commandment and beyond that he also brings about the benefit or correction for which we were commanded in this mitzvah. And so it is with every mitzvah or transgression. See the article there for his evidence and some implications for this distinction.

The source of this matter can be found in the words of the Rishonim who wrote to explain the statement of the Sages (BK 38a):

Rabbi Bariya Drabna said: To say that even if they are observed – they do not receive a reward for them. And is it not? And the Tanya, Ram says: How is it that even a gentile who engages in Torah is a high priest? Talmud: That a person does them and lives by them, it is not said of priests, Levites, and Israelites, but a person, have you learned that even a gentile who engages in Torah is a high priest? Say: They do not receive a reward for them as one who commands and does them, but as one who does not command and does them, Rabbi Hanina: The one who commands and does them is greater than the one who does not command and does them.

The Gemara states that even a Gentile who performs a mitzvah has a reward even though he is not commanded to do so. It then adds and states that the one who does and does the mitzvah is greater than the one who does not. It clearly seems that there is a connection between these two things. The Gentile fulfills the mitzvah and brings benefit from it, but this is only the essential dimension of the mitzvah. The Gentile does not have the dimension of obedience to the mitzvah, since he is not commanded. This is an explanation of the rule that the one who does and does the mitzvah is greater, since the one who does the mitzvah has both of these matters, while the one who does not have the essential dimension.

This concept of the great one who commands and does the mitzvah is explained in Toss Rosh Kiddushin 3:1 (and see also Ritva there what he brought on behalf of the Ramban):

The one who commands and does is great… and furthermore, the Holy One, blessed be He, does not need anything for all the commandments, except that He says and His will is done. Thus, the one who commands and does is doing the will of His Creator. But one who does not command and does not belong to the house of God, doing the will of His Creator, because He did not command him anything, and from the Lord there is reward.

The conclusion that this is the meaning of the mitzvah for women who are not mitzvahs is written in the Ramban there:

But women certainly receive a reward for their performance of good commandments that are time-consuming, as they said here. The one who does the commandment and does more is greater than the one who does not do the commandment and does not do it. In any case, he has a reward even though he does not do the commandment and does it... But the one who does the commandments of the Torah as prescribed, even though he was not commanded in them, is like women and the Gentiles who receive a reward for them, all of whose ways are ways of pleasantness and all of whose paths are peace.

He states the following explicitly: He who does not command and does (like the woman and the Gentile) has only one virtue in his action: the essence, since there is no command there and therefore there is no obedience to the command in his action.

Now we can understand why a verse is essentially required for all intellectual commandments (Question 2 of thesuccessful). The explanation shows us that there is a substantial benefit in this act, since it brings some spiritual correction to the world or to us. But the verse always adds another dimension to every mitzvah, and that is the command. Without the verse that fulfills the mitzvah, it would not be a mitzvah and a doer, that is, it would bring the spiritual benefit but would not fulfill God's command. This requires the verse to be a mitzvah and a doer, even if it adds nothing to the scope of the mitzvah or to the strength of the explanation.

The explanatory dimension is universal, and it obligates everyone who understands the explanation. This is as RNG wrote and also thesuccessful himself (which made it difficult why according to thepenny Gentiles are not obligated to recite the blessings of the HaNanhen. Problem 1). But since a verse is added that commands this act, the commandment is addressed only to Israel and adds a commandment dimension to the essential explanation. When there is a verse that commands the act, there are two dimensions to the act of the commandment, and this is the need for the verse.

This is the settlement of the question ofsuccessful. But now we can also understand the essence of the controversy. A mitzvah that is based on a sabbath without a verse is like someone who does it without a mitzvah and does it. And this is different from a mitzvah that we have a commandment for, which the one who fulfills has two benefits: the essence and obedience. A clear example of such a case is the blessings of the HaNahnin, since there is a sabbath but no commandment. Therefore, this is a test case, and we must examine the halachic meaning of such a situation: is it a duty from the Torah or not? Is it still a mitzvah from the Torah when there is a sabbath without a commandment (2)penny) Or does the law of the Torah also require a commandment (20)successful)? But before we examine the matter, let us return and note the division of thesuccessful Which now seems obvious.

Interpretative reasoning and reasoning that establishes a new law

We saw thatsuccessful Distinguish between opinions that renew a new obligation, where these obligations are only from the rabbis, and opinions that renew a law or detail in a mitzvah that has another source in the Torah, where this detail would actually be from the Torah. In light of the explanation we have proposed that the need for the verse is to add a dimension of imperative to the mitzvah, we can now better understand the distinction of thesuccessfulIf the explanation is only an interpretation of a commandment that has its origin in the verse, that is, it only comes to add a detail or a boundary to this commandment, then it reveals to us the intention of the verse. And now that we have interpreted the verse in this way, it is clear that there is a command from the verse also for the explanation. Therefore, according to thesuccessful Such an explanation establishes a law that is obligatory from the Torah, like any law that has a verse in the Torah that commands it. For example, the work of earning income on Shabbat is an extension of the prohibition on the work of spending, and therefore it is certainly forbidden from the Torah even without an explicit command. The command on the prohibition of earning income is the general command that prohibits work on Shabbat, and the explanation only reveals that earning income is also included in this command.

On the other hand, an argument that renews the obligation to recite the blessing before eating is an argument that establishes a new law (and not an exception to an existing law), and here there is no source that prohibits it. Such an argument, argues thesuccessful, cannot establish a mitzvah from the Torah, since a prohibition from the Torah requires a command, that is, a source in the Torah. According to his view, even if there is a substantial justification for this obligation, that is, that it leads to some spiritual correction or benefit, it is still impossible for this prohibition to be from the Torah without a command because it lacks the dimension of obedience to the command, and the one who does it is like one who does not command and does it.

thepenny, on the other hand, believes that even an explanation that renews a prohibition or commandment creates a halakhah from the Torah. It is certainly possible and even probable that he agrees with everything we have said so far, and still, in his opinion, a commandment is not required to establish a Torah prohibition, and it is sufficient that there is a substantive issue in it. From his perspective, there are two types of Torah prohibitions: prohibitions from explanation that have substantive content but no dimension of obedience to the commandment, and prohibitions that are based on a verse that have both dimensions. In contrast tosuccessful, thepenny He believes that even mitzvot that are not commanded can be considered mitzvot from the Torah.

It seems that the foundation of these matters can be found in Maimonides' method regarding the distinction between Torah and rabbinic law and in his understanding of the significance of the commandments in the service of God, and we will deal with this in the next chapter.

• third. The commandment in the Mishnah of Maimonides

introduction

A standard factual statement is called an indicative sentence. When I say that there is now light outside, I am conveying information. When Reuven tells Shimon that he likes to drink water, he is conveying information about himself and his tendencies. Even when he asks him for water, we can say that he is only conveying information about his desires (that he wants water and wants Shimon to bring it to him). But what happens when he commands him to bring him water? Is this just an indicative sentence that conveys information about his desire and nothing more?

In the previous chapter, we began to see that a mandatory verse is not just a directive verse. When the Torah commands us to do something, it is not just a revelation of information about its will. A directive verse is a neutral verse, which gives us information and nothing more. But a mandatory verse contains something beyond information about God's will. A mandatory verse is a verse that imposes an obligation on us. Explanation can also bring to our attention information that this is the right thing to do or that this is God's will for us. But when there is a mandatory verse, something is added to us beyond this information: a halakhic obligation is added.

It is important to understand that this is also the case in the legal context. When the Knesset enacts any law, it not only informs us that this is the right thing to do, but also imposes a legal obligation on us as citizens. If I knew that members of the Knesset really wanted me to pay taxes, that would not be enough to create a legal obligation. Therefore, in the act of legislation there is something beyond the provision of information (it imposes an obligation), and this is the case, in contrast, with the imperative of the verse.

The explanation can only be a substitute for the verse as a source of information, since it can bring the information to our attention even without a verse. It makes the verse superfluous in terms of the information contained therein that the action is appropriate or not (and therefore God probably also expects us to do or not do it). But the explanation cannot create a full halachic obligation. When there is an explanation without a verse, God expects us to do it, but it cannot be said that He commands us to do it. There is a command only in the verse. The verse is essentially the halachic legislation.

In this chapter, we will discuss this element in understanding the meaning of the imperative verses as it is expressed in the Maimonides' method.

Maimonides' distinction between two types of negation[9]

Maimonides, in the eighth root, deals with the distinction between two types of negation:

The eighth root that it is not appropriate to include the negation of the obligation with the warning: Know that the warning is one of the two parts of the command. And this is because you command a mitzvah – that he do one thing, or that he do not do it. Just as you command him to eat – and you tell him to eat, or you command him to refrain from eating – and you tell him not to eat. And there is no name in the Arabic language that would include these two matters together. And those who speak in the work of logic have already remembered this and said this to their language, “However, the command and the warning do not have a name in the Arabic language that they can be grouped together,” and we were forced to call both of them by the name of one of them, which is the command… and the name that includes them together in the Hebrew language is a decree. And so the sages called every mitzvah, whether done or not done, a royal decree.

Indeed, the negation of the imperative is a different matter, and it is that you negate a subject from a subject, and there is nothing about the imperative at all in it. In your saying, "So-and-so did not eat last night, and so-and-so did not drink the wine, and Reuven is not the father of Shimon, and the like," this is all negation of the imperative, there is no scent of an imperative in it... Indeed, the Hebrews mostly negated with the word "no" itself, with which they would warn. And they also negated with "not" and whatever is connected to it from the predicates, such as "inno," "they are not," and "you are not," and "you are not." However, the negation in Hebrew with the word "no" is like the saying, "And no prophet has arisen in Israel like Moses," "No one has lied," "You will not arise in times of trouble," and "No one has stood, nor has he risen, nor has he moved from it," and many such things... Now the difference between warning and negation is clear to you.

We brought this up to point out the sharp distinction that Maimonides makes between an indicative verse that conveys a fact to us and an imperative verse that imposes an obligation on us.

Maimonides, continuing his remarks there in the original, insists that only a mandatory verse can be included in the list of commandments, not indicative verses. Facts, even those that refer to God's will, cannot be included in the list of commandments. This means that a verse that is considered a mandatory verse not only gives us information about God's will but also commands us and thereby imposes an obligation on us. It adds the mandatory dimension to what we called in the previous chapter the essential dimension of a mitzvah. A regular verse does two things: it gives us information (that this is proper and that this is God's will) and imposes an obligation on us, but the explanation does only the first of the two.

Content and commandment in every mitzvah from the Torah[10]

Root t in the introduction The Book of Commandments, is divided into two parts: In the first part, Maimonides states that if a mitzvah is repeated several times in the Torah, it is counted only once. In the second part, he states that even a verse in general, i.e. a verse from which several different prohibitions are learned, is also counted only once. The RIP in his article on the root of the 9th (in the first volume of his edition ofThe Book of Commandments (3) He wondered about the Maimonides' method, which apparently contradicted his teaching. From the first part of the root, it appears that what determines the number of commandments is the content of the commandment, while from the second part, it appears that what determines the existence of a verse. It remains there in the Tza.

But the explanation seems simple: we are in the clear. Maimonides' criterion for defining a mitzvah from the Torah is twofold: that there be a mandatory verse concerning it (and therefore one commandment for several actions is considered one mitzvah) and that there be in fact a specific content that is desirable or forbidden (and therefore when an action with a specific content is stated in several commandments, it is considered one mitzvah). This is what connects the two parts of the root ת that tries to paint this general picture. The explanation of things is probably what we saw above: the content is the essential dimension of the mitzvah, and the verse adds the mandatory dimension. Only when both of these are fulfilled is it a mitzvah from the Torah.

The need for a commandment verse to be considered a mitzvah can explain a long-standing mystery regarding the Maimonides' root ב. As is well known, Maimonides there states that the laws learned from the sermon's teachings are in the status of the words of the scribes, that is, the laws of the rabbis. I will not go into all the variety of interpretations that have been proposed for Maimonides' words here, as I have dealt with this in great detail in my book The Spirit of Justice In the second part. Here he merely says that from several places in his words it is clear that he means to say that in his opinion these are the actual rabbinic laws. There in my book I showed from several places in the works of Maimonides that according to him the definition of the concept "Da'orita" is as its literal translation: that which appears in the Torah, or at least emerges from it in a simple interpretation (and not in the Midrash). The simple interpretation reveals what is in the verse itself, and therefore what is interpreted in this way is considered to be found in the text itself. This is a Halacha Da'orita, because it is found in the text itself.

But in the second root, the Rambam writes that the laws taught in the midrash are "like branches that emerge from the roots" (this is how the sermons emerge from the verses), and I explained there that according to the Rambam, these laws are an expansion of the verses and not an exposure of what is found in their depth. According to the Rambam, the function of a midrash is to expand the idea of the verse and not to expose what is found within it. And since, according to the Rambam, a law from the Torah is only a law that is written in the Torah or revealed from within it, then the expansions of what is written in the verse are not laws from the Torah. This is the reason why, according to the Rambam, the laws taught in the midrash are not laws from the Torah. Therefore, according to his view, in several places, the LBM is also a law from the words of the scribes (and it suffices to say that it is a law from the Torah).[11], since it is also not written in the Torah.

From this we can also understand what Maimonides writes in his introduction toThe Book of Commandments (at the end of the root 14), that a law learned in a seminary is not subject to punishment, that there are no penalties unless it is warned. This is how the Rambam interprets the rule there: "There is no punishment from the law," even though, as the Rambam concluded in his interpretations there for most of the Rishonim, "law" is only a qu'ach. According to the Rambam, law is everything that is learned from the teachings of the sermon and is not explicitly written in the Torah. And the reason why there are no penalties for such a law is because there is a punishment here without a warning. Only what is written in the Torah for the sermon or is interpreted in a simple way is a warning that allows for punishment. I will mention here that in the language of the Sages, "warning" is a no, meaning that according to the Rambam, there are no penalties because a law learned in a seminary is not a no from the Torah.

This picture connects to what we saw in his words in Shoshat 9 and Shoshat 8, that a mitzvah from the Torah is only a mitzvah that has a unique content and its own commandment. When there is no commandment, even if there is content, it is not a mitzvah from the Torah. Therefore, if the commandment is learned from a lecture, it is not a commandment because it is not found in the content of a verse. A warning is only what is written or found in the Torah itself.

Some Shades of Laws from the Writings of the Scribes: The Law of Doubt

In several places we see that the definition of the laws of the rabbis (or the sayings of the scribes) in the Maimonides' method is not uniform. Regarding the LBM, we see in several places that they are sufficient for the Kola (see, for example, inPIAMS (P.7, from the collection of the Holy Scriptures, etc.), while the laws taught in the midrash seem to be sufficient for the purpose. In my book The Spirit of Justice In the second part, I suggested that according to Maimonides, there is a complete continuum of levels of validity between the Torah and the rabbis, and here I will present four of them: Pure rabbis are regulations and decrees, then there are the LBM and sermons, which are not actual Torah but also not regular laws from the rabbis, and then there is what appears in the Torah for the Hadith, which is the Torah.

I showed there^[12] The laws of doubt do not apply equally to all types. The doubt of the LBM is as valid as the doubt of the rabbis. But the doubt of the sermons is as valid as the doubt of the Torah. And in the explanation of the words, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shekap and the Gersh in his commentary,Listen carefully. Shamatah A, who wrote that according to Maimonides, all the laws of the rabbis are subject to "not to deviate" (see Reish Hilchot Memariam and Shorush A), nevertheless the rabbis doubted the validity of the law because the foundation of the validity of the laws of the rabbis lies in the obligation to obey the sages (not to deviate from their words).[13]And if I have a doubt – then doubt is not rebellion. Rebellion is only when there is a clear command and I do not obey it. Therefore, the doubt of the rabbis that it is a pure command should be lenient.

Now we can understand why doubt in the Torah is a matter of strictness. As we have seen, every Halacha in the Torah includes a command and a substance. When I am in doubt, the dimension of the command disappears, for as we have seen, doubt in a command is not a command (and therefore doubt in rebellion against it is not rebellion). Therefore, the obligation to be strict in doubt in the Torah is solely because there is also doubt in the substance. If I am presented with a doubt about milk or a doubt about fat, I must be strict because of the fear that there may be milk here. The command not to eat milk is not significant in situations of doubt, and as the Mushnet says. But when the prohibition is a pure command (without substance), there is no obligation to be strict in doubt.

In my book, I argued that the LBM was not written in the Torah because it has no essence of its own (or an essence not important enough to be prohibited from the Torah), and therefore it is a pure command. Hence, a doubt in the LBM is a quola, like a rabbinic doubt. On the other hand, we saw above that a sermon according to the Rambam is not a warning, that is, the law that emerges from it is a prohibition without a command (since there is no explicit verse that prohibits it). The conclusion is that the halakha that is learned in a sermon is an essence without a command, and hence it follows that it is a sfiqah to a graver, like a doubt in the Torah. And in this, all the laws of sfiqah in the Rambam are well explained.

The rule of doubt in the laws that are explained

We have learned that in every law of the Torah there is a command and a substance. If there is no command and there is a substance, there is a sufficiency for the substance, like a law of the Torah, and if there is a command and there is no substance, there is a sufficiency for the word. What about the law of interpretation? We saw above that according to thepenny And betweensuccessful This is a halacha that is from the Torah in terms of its essence, but there is no commandment regarding it. According to our approach here, it would appear that sifika is a strict one, but it is not a regular halacha from the Torah (no punishments for it because there is no warning for it). Maimonides would also call it "Divrei Sofrim" like the Halam. This does not mean that it is a regulation or decree, of course, but rather that this halacha merely branches off from the Scripture and is not found in it in its entirety, just like the halacha that is taught in a midrash. This is a halacha from the Torah without a commandment, which can indeed be called "Divrei Sofrim", but certainly does not mean a regulation or decree. As we explained, according to Maimonides, it is not a halacha from the Torah because it is not found in the Scripture.

Now we can understand that in the course of the Gemara in the blessings we see that the hasbara is the source of the law of the blessings of the blessed, and we explained that this means that it is essentially a law of Torah and not a regulation or decree. This is the essence of the law of Torah even though it does not contain a commandment. We can also now see that the righteouspenny who claims that one should be stricter in doubting the halakha of interpretation as in doubting the Torah, since we have seen here that the halakha of interpretation, like the halakha of midrash, is spoken of in detail. On the other hand, thesuccessful who says that this is not entirely a Halacha from the Torah, although his claim that one should not be strict is not correct according to our way. He assumes that the term "Drabnan" is uniform, but as we explained in the Maimonides' method, it seems that this is not the case. Therefore, we also needed the explanation above that according to thepenny If in doubt, the blessings should be truly strengthened and repeated, but not in the form prescribed by the Sages (Shem and Malchut), in the name of.

What remains for us to explain is the method of the disciples of Rabbeinu Yonah, who wrote that eating without a blessing requires a sacrifice of omission. And we have difficulty finding out where we found that a prohibition from the words of the scribes (in fact, this is only the cancellation of the actions of the rabbis) requires a sacrifice? Is there no shilin in the aid here? These things are also explained according to our method. In my above-mentioned article on the sacrifice of Hashem, I distinguished between guilt and sin. Sin comes from the disregard of the command (accidentally), while guilt comes from the sin (the essence), even without a command at all. Therefore, guilt also comes from intentional sin, as if it were an accident, since the essential damage occurred regardless of the question of guilt and disregard of the command. The difference between accidental and intentional sin exists only in sin, because the name of sin is related to the command and rebellion against it, and there is a difference between unintentional and intentional rebellion, as taught. Thus, the guilt of a prostitute comes without sin (there is no law on the scapegoat), and the guilt of embezzlement also comes for embezzlement in the case of konmut, even though we have not found a commandment for this at all, and likewise, the students of our Rabbanu Yonah require the guilt of embezzlement for eating without a blessing, even though there is no prohibition in this. In my article there, I elaborated on this and showed this for all types of accusations. If so, there is further support for our claim here that eating without a blessing violates a Sabra, and whoever does so violates a Mehut without a commandment. Therefore, he is required to be guilty, since guilt comes about a Mehut without a commandment. Such guilt is not shilly-shally in the case of help, even if there is no violation of a commandment here. The guilt is the victim who completes the picture of the prohibitions of Sabra (i.e. prohibitions for which there is no commandment).

Interim summary

We have learned that the halacha of the regular Torah has a substance (which can also be reached with a sabra or a sermon) and a command (which is renewed from a verse or from the LBM). We have seen that the laws that are renewed from a sabra and for which we do not have a verse are divided into two types: sabra that renew details in an existing mitzvah (such as the work of collecting on Shabbat) which are halacha of the Torah (because the general mitzvah is a command also with regard to its details), and sabra that establish renewed halacha (such as the blessings of the Nahannin), which are intermediate between the validity of the Torah and the validity of the rabbis. Since there is no command prohibiting them, they differ from the halacha of the regular Torah. But the sabra teaches that they have a substantial content as in the halacha of the regular Torah (and not like regulations and decrees which are pure commandments according to the words of theNatiyam, which are based on a clichéd argument, as the saying goes:Jacob's Return). Although we have seen that at least according to the Rambam's system, punishment is not given on the basis of reason, since in order to punish, a warning is given in the text itself. A sermon or reason, and not even the LBM, are not sufficient for this. But we have seen that the sufficiency of these laws is to a greater extent. I also noted that even thepenny And also thesuccessful, although there is a dispute among them regarding the law of doubt in such laws. An analysis of the Maimonides' method shows that it is probably a matter of substance, aspenny.

We also saw that, at least according to the Rambam, no punishment is given for an offense that is based on a belief. Thepenny It does not necessarily mean that the Hasbara is a complete Torah and that we are punished for it, since it speaks of the mitzvah to bless and not of offenses for which punishment is given, and it discusses the law of doubt and not the law of punishment. It is worth noting that this is precisely the approach of all ordinary legal systems. Even if a person does something that should not be done, something that the Hasbara strongly denies, he cannot be punished until there is a command, that is, a law, that prohibits it. This is the essence of a mandatory normative system. It demands obedience, not just proper behavior. A legal system speaks only within the framework of legislated commands and prohibitions. Common sense and logic that determine proper behavior are given to everyone and are not binding in themselves on the legal and halakhic level (although in the laws of heaven the situation is different, as we will see below).

Sermons of the Sages are based on Sabra

When we look at the sermons of the Sages, we discover that there cannot be a sermon that does not have a foundation of reason.[14] Take as an example the sermons of Debi R.A. on the pluralization of the word "at." When we look at a verse such as "Honor your father and your mother," the rule is that something from the word "at" must be included. How did the Sages (see Ketubah 101 and parallels) decide to specifically include one's father's wife, one's mother's husband, or one's older brother (who is pluralized by "va")? Why not include our neighbor David, the throne of honor? It is clear that determining what is pluralized in each case is based on the preacher's explanation. This explanation can be interpretive (what is most reasonable to include in the verse from textual-interpretive considerations) or substantive (from interpretive considerations: who is most right to honor). And yet it is the explanation that determines who is pluralized from the verse that is to be honored.

What would be the halakhic status of such a law? If the sermon indeed emphasizes the obligation to honor one's father's wife from the verse, then it can be seen as an interpretation of the verse. If so, it would be an obligation from the Torah, since the sermon reveals that the verse was intended for this. This is apparently how the Ramban understood the words of the Rambam in the second root. But according to the Rambam, the laws taught in the sermons are the words of the scribes because the sermon is an expanding and not revealing tool. In his view, there is no interpretation here and therefore this is not a law from the Torah.

This can be seen very clearly in the issue of Pesach 22:2 (and parallels):

And you said: You did not demand. As reported: Shimon the Ha-amsoni, and I told her Nehemiah the Ha-amsoni, used to demand all the verses in the Torah. When he reached the verse: Fear the Lord your God – he explained. His disciples said to him: Rabbi, what will be the result of all the verses you demanded? – He said to them: Just as I received a reward for demanding, so I receive a reward for giving up. Until Rabbi Akiva came and demanded: Fear the Lord your God – including the Torah scholars.

Shimon Ha-Amsoni used to require the words "at" in the Torah, but in the verse "You shall fear the Lord your God," he found nothing to require, and therefore he thought of giving up the rule that "at" is often used, until the Rabbi came and required including the 58th. Incidentally, we will note that from the context there it is clear that Shimon Ha-Amsoni did not accept the Rabbi's proposal, for the Gemara brings a disagreement about the conditions of whether or not "at" is required, and links it to the dispute between the Rabbi and Shimon Ha-Amsoni.

What bothered Shimon the Ha-Amsoni specifically with this verse? Why in the verse "Honor your father and your mother" was he willing to demand "Etin" to include his father's wife and his mother's husband? It is quite clear that here he did not find an explanation for what can be likened to God. How is it possible that there is someone we should fear as much as God? As a result, he thought of giving up the entire rule of multiple "Etin". The Rabbi told him that this rule is binding (perhaps from the LBM), and therefore we must in any case find what is closest (or least distant), and he suggests fearing the MTA. After all, it is the Hasbara that determines what to include (and according to Shimon the Ha-Amsoni, it also determines whether to include).

On the other hand, from here we also see the difference between a mere argument and an argument that guides us in the sermon. A mere argument would not lead us to the obligation to fear the Holy One, since as Shimon Ha-Amsoni argued, fear is only toward God, and no one is to be compared to Him. But since there is a sermonic rule (the quality of the sermon) that requires including "at," we are forced to find what is multiplied, even though we do not have a substantial argument for this. We do not have an argument that requires fearing the Holy One, but there is an argument that says that if someone is already multiplied, then the least unreasonable thing is to include the Holy One. This is a combination of interpretive and substantive reasoning, which ultimately reaffirms that the verse itself commands to fear the Holy Spirit. Therefore, for most Rishonim, this would be a halacha from the Torah, even though its foundation is ostensibly an interpretation. This is an interpretive/sermonistic reasoning that renews a detail in the mitzvah, and not an reasoning that establishes a new law. Indeed, we have seen that according to the Maimonides, the sermon is an expansive tool rather than a revealing one, and therefore, in his view, the sermon essentially establishes a new halacha, and hence it is clear why in his view it is a halacha from the words of the scribes. However, as I mentioned, this is not the case with most Rishonim.

Needless to say, in other sermons, such as sermons on the Gizah or the Klal and Pert, the exact same process occurs. The Gizah instructs us that when we find two similar words in two halachic contexts, we should compare these two contexts. But what should we compare them to? For example, when there is a Gizah between a slave and a woman (see Hagiga 4:1 and parallels), should we say that it is possible to enslave the woman like a slave? Or should we conclude that it is possible to have marital relations with the slave like a woman? The Sages do neither. Why? We must remember that even if there is a command to compare a slave and a woman, it is clear that the content of the comparison is based on the speaker's reasoning, and it is what determines what we conclude from this comparison. This is certainly true when we demand in the manner of "Don Minya and Minya and Oki in the Itra" (Yevamot 8:2 and parallels) and the like, and we will not dwell on this any further. The virtues of the sermon give us instruction on how to perform a midrash and what type of midrash, but it is always the explanation that determines its content and outcome.

Note: The role of the command in the work of God[15]

To conclude the chapter, I would like to consider here from another angle the centrality of the commandment in serving God and fulfilling His commandments. We have seen that the explanation indicates the essential benefit of the commandment (or the essential harm of transgression), but this in itself is not fully binding, and certainly does not constitute complete service to God. Service to God necessarily includes a dimension of responding to the commandment, and in fact this is the "burden of the commandment." The commandment is the essential part of serving God. A person can perform the acts of the commandment without a commandment, only from an explanation, but then he is not serving God but is simply doing the right thing.

• A Gentile who observes the seven commandments explains:

But it is requested to quote here the words of Maimonides, Chapter 11, Kings, who wrote:

Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to do them is one of the righteous among the nations of the world, and he has a share in the world to come, and he should accept them and do them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah, and we were informed by Moses our Rabbi that the sons of Noah were commanded to do them before, but if they did them out of a decision of reason, then he is not a resident alien and is not one of the righteous among the nations of the world, but rather one of their sages.

Maimonides distinguishes here between a person who does the commandments out of a conscious decision, who is wise but not pious. This could perhaps be translated as follows: he does indeed do the right thing (because his actions have a spiritual or social benefit), but he does not serve God, meaning that it has no religious value. Only someone who works out of obedience to a commandment has full religious value. This is the essence of the need for a verse beyond the interpretation.

• Even idolatry is not complete without receiving authority.

There is a reason to add here the halacha of the Rambam, "Illegal Worship," 3:56:[16]

The one who worships a god out of love, such as one who desires in this way because of her work, which was extremely beautiful, or who worships her out of fear of her lest she warn him, as her worshippers imagine that she is good and pleasing, if she accepts it from God, she is liable to stoning. If she worships her god through her work or in one of the four works out of love or fear, she is exempt.

The Rambam states here that idolatry is only work done out of acceptance of the idol's deity. If a person does his actions out of love or fear of an idol that will harm him if he does not bow down to it, this is not a complete act of worship.

The origin of this is the issue of Sanhedrin 6, where Abaye and Rava disagreed on this. Most of the Rishonim have difficulty with Rava's words that exempt such a person, since love and fear are the most fundamental motivations for religious work. Why does worshiping idols out of love and fear exempt from punishment? What could be more ritualistic than a worshipper of idols who directs his fundamental powers (love and fear) instead of to God, blessed be He, to an idol? Therefore, the prevailing interpretation in the Rishonim is as the Ravad says here, who writes: "And we interpret it from love of man and fear of man, and not from love of idol worship or fear of it." That is, Rava is talking about a z from love and fear of man and not from an idol. According to his opinion and the opinion of most of the Rishonim, a z from love and fear of an idol is a complete z.

According to the Rambam, religious work, whether it is for God or to distinguish it from an idol, is work that is based on acceptance of God. Work out of love or fear is not acceptance of God, since these are motivations that place the person at the center. I do things because of my feelings. In contrast, acceptance of God is an unconditional commitment. I do what God says, whether I love or fear Him or not. By the very fact that He is God, His commandments obligate me. Only such work is full religious work, both toward God and toward a foreign idol.

We see again the centrality of commitment in the service of God, and such commitment is created towards commandments. What distinguishes religious work is the unconditional compliance with the commandment. Therefore, the commandment is the essential part of the service of God, and as we have seen, at least according to the Rambam, without the commandment, the halakhah is not de-Torah.

• D. The prohibitions of giving to a child, and their obligation in the laws of heaven^[17]

introduction

So far we have seen that sabbarah does not have full halakhic status, and therefore even if it can be considered a crime or a mitzvah from the Torah, in any case we are probably not punished for offenses that are based on sabbarah. It seems that in the laws of heaven the situation is different. God, blessed be He, does expect us to fulfill the obligations of sabbarah, and even punishes such offenses. Now I will present some examples and evidence in this regard.

Obligation of minors in the mitzvot that the mind inclines to

Some recent scholars argue that there is a contradiction in a minor matter that commits a transgression. Regarding the following minor matter concerning the animal, we read in the Sanhedrin (45a):

The one who brings the animal and the memorial, and the woman who brings the animal – with stoning. If a man sins with an animal, what sin has she committed? Rather: Since a man has stumbled because of it, therefore the Scripture says, she shall be stoned. Another thing: There should not be an animal passing through the market, and they will say: This is the one that so-and-so was stoned because of it.

And there in the Gemara 55b:

Rav Yosef said, “Listen: She is three years and one day old… And if one of the fornications mentioned in the Torah comes upon her – she is punished, and she is exempt. One of all fornications – even an animal, and here it is, a palm tree – here it is, a mistake – here it is, and I say: she is punished! – Since she is a damsel – here it is, a mistake, here it is, and mercifully he pressed down a tree. A tree is a gift – let it be, an animal – not let it be.

The reasoning of a fault means that if a person fails because of it, she is killed. And disgrace is a concern for the honor of the one who committed a transgression. And here, the Gemara states regarding a small or large animal with which a man had intercourse that "a fault is a sin," so the man who commits a transgression, the action is defined as a transgression.

In contrast, in Yevamot Lo A.A., which discusses the law, no prohibition applies to a prohibition. We learned: "A stranger who served on Shabbat - such as when I offered two hairs on Shabbat, it became foreign to him and Shabbat was his mutual sacrifice." This is about a minor who is not a priest who entered the Temple and offered sacrifices on Shabbat. He violates two prohibitions: the offering of a stranger (who is not a priest), and the offering on Shabbat (desecration of Shabbat). If the minor brought two hairs in the middle of Shabbat, then the Shabbat prohibition and the prohibition of foreign hairs apply to him at once. Some later scholars clarify from this that before he brings two hairs, while he is a minor, there is no prohibition on him, and they complicate matters by considering the issue of mischief and disgrace in the Sanhedrin, where it seems that even a minor who has committed a transgression is prohibited.

Most of them propose to resolve the difficulty in the same style.[18] Their proposal is to distinguish between prohibitions that the children of Noah are also obligated to observe and prohibitions that only obligate Israel. According to them, all the commandments that the children of Noah are obligated to observe are clearly obligatory for the little Israelite, and therefore in the Sanhedrin issue that is being discussed about quartering an animal, the assumption is that the little one is also obligated to observe it. But in the issue of the Yevamot, the discussion is about prohibitions that only Jews are obligated to observe (Sabbath and the sacrifice of the Gentiles), and therefore the assumption is that the little one is not obligated to observe it.

There is a major halakhic innovation in these words: Contrary to the halakhic rule that all mitzvot are binding only on adults (Bnei Mitzvah), it follows that the laws that the Bnei Noah are bound by also bind minors. The reasoning presented for this is based on two assumptions:

• The words of theHatas (Chayvid, Teshuvot 67 and 144), according to which a Gentile's obligations begin from the age at which he understands his obligation and not from the age of halakhic maturity.
• The Gemara states in Sanhedrin 51:1, "Here is what the elders of Israel have said, and what the sons of Noah are forbidden," meaning that everything that the sons of Noah are forbidden to do, Israel is also forbidden to do.

From these two assumptions, the conclusion follows that if the children of Noah are obligated to have sex with an animal from the moment they understand the prohibition and their obligation towards it, then Israel cannot be less than the children of Noah. Therefore, even a young Jew, at least once he reaches the age of understanding, is forbidden to have relations with an animal.

From this consideration it follows that every commandment of the children of Noah has a basis in explanation, and therefore every mitzvah of explanation also obligates the children of Noah (see the words of Rabbi Nissim Gaon cited above). Israel is also commanded with such obligations starting from the age when the child understands his obligation, and not from the age of maturity (exactly as with the children of Noah). Only the halachic obligations that are based on a command in a verse are restricted to the age limits established by the Torah (two hairs or thirteen years of age).

Expansion of small positives in all Noahide commandments

In our book about Analysis of concepts We have argued that beyond the formal proof based on the comparison between Israel and the children of Noah, there is also a substantive claim here: within all of Israel, as it were, a child of Noah is also hidden, and therefore every Jew is also obligated to pay the obligations of a gentile (this is the meaning of the Gemara Sanhedrin 5:1, "Likha Mid'em," cited above). It is not possible for a child of Noah to be obligated to do something and Israel not to be obligated to do it, for in all of Israel there is a child of Noah, in the sense of "a total of two hundred mena."

But in light of what we have said here, we can expand and say this about all the commandments of the sons of Noah. Maimonides in Refaat 9:1-3 writes:

The first Adam was commanded about six things: about the Sabbath, about the blessing of God, about the shedding of blood, about incest, about theft, and about judgments, even though all of them are received by us from Moses our Lord, And the mind is inclined towards themOf all the words of the Torah, remember that these are the ones that were commanded…

Maimonides states that the commandments of the sons of Noah are obligatory, but the mind inclines towards them, meaning that there is also a reason underlying them. According to this, it is clear why among the sons of Noah they did not set an age limit for the obligation to perform the commandments, since in the commandments that are rooted in reason, what determines is the one who understands. Hence, even when we refer to a Jew, in the commandments that the sons of Noah are obligated to perform, there is no age threshold, since in the obligations that are grounded in reason, everyone who understands the reason underlying the obligation is obligated.

But there is no commandment for minors in these commandments either, and therefore it is quite clear that the intention is not that minors will be punished for them in the Law of Moses. It is about the fact that as minors they are violating a prohibition, and they will probably also be punished in the Law of Moses for this prohibition. But in the Law of Moses we do not find punishments for children under the age of a commandment. We have learned that prohibitions from the Bible do not require punishment in the Law of Moses, but they are prohibited and perhaps even require punishment in the Law of Moses.

Oath taking

Another clear example that can be given of this principle is the prohibition of swearing. Maimonides in the Book of Revelation claims and claims that God, writing:

My lords, do not swear an oath of Torah on the claim of a minor, but an oath of haste is sworn, and even if a minor is not keen on the matter of negotiations, he should swear an haste on his claim, so that he will not be taken from his money when he is minor and go away for free. And this is my opinion, and it is eternal righteousness. It is found that the minor who made a claim against the major, whether he admitted to some extent or absolved himself of all, whether he was there as a witness or not, then he has sworn an haste and cannot turn against the minor, who does not satisfy the minor at all, and even a simple ban does not accept it, since he does not know the penalty of the oath.

In principle, a minor is not a legal entity, but the Sages have established that a person swears an oath of allegiance on his claim so that no one will come to rob him. The reasoning at the end of the Rambam's words, "before he knows the penalty of the oath," is seemingly very puzzling, since a minor is not subject to punishment at all. On the contrary, the Rambam was saying that a minor who is wise should be even more careful about swearing because he knows that he is not subject to the penalty of an oath, since minors are not punished.

It seems that the Rambam assumes here that taking an oath is a social-moral obligation that is based on reason, and therefore it obligates every person, both the son of Noah and the child, even if he has not been commanded to do so. Therefore, the Rambam writes that although he is subject to the penalty of taking an oath (only according to the laws of heaven, of course), since he is a child, there is a concern that he does not know or understand its severity, and therefore he should not be made to swear.

It seems that this Maimonides' method has its origins in the words of his father's rabbi, Rabbi Migash. The words are written in relation to the question of whether an oath given in writing is binding. As is known, this is a matter of great controversy among the latter, and in the answer of theTiara stones Justice C. Shaw Skatov quotes the language of Rabbi Migash's response on this matter:

If he wrote an oath in his own handwriting and gave it to him to write, he is obligated to fulfill what he swore, even though he did not utter an oath from his mouth. If he does not fulfill it, his judgment is committed to heaven. But he cannot be held accountable for anything by a person, since he did not utter an oath from his mouth.

Rabbi Migash explains that a written oath is binding, but there is no punishment for it in the Jewish law, only in divine punishments. Immediately afterwards, theAbenz He explains things there as follows (ibid., sections 7-17):

16) And we see that the Malam chapter 10 [57] of the Kings is troubled by the oaths that preceded the giving of the Torah: Abraham and Isaac to Abimelech. Esau to Jacob. Eliezer to Abraham. After all, an oath is not one of the commandments that were commanded in Genesis. And I have even more difficulty with the oath on Mount Sinai, which is the foundation of receiving the Torah. And after all, those who did not receive the Torah were not commanded to swear. Moreover, even though there are ten commandments. The whole force of an oath is because a mitzvah does not begin with its word, and what is more important than this warning than other warnings in the Torah. And what does the force of an oath add to the warnings in the Torah, since the oath is not just a warning:

17) Therefore, it seems clear that the matter is clear. Certainly, one who swears to another. This is the decisive explanation that one is obligated to fulfill, and there is no warning for this, namely the oath of Abraham, Isaac, and Eliezer, and the Lord swearing to the Holy One. However, one who swears to himself that he will not do or will not do anything. There is no explanation for this. Because to whom are we obligated? If you say to the Holy One, the Holy One. From where does the Holy One desire this obligation or prohibition? For this, the Torah was required to command, "Do not begin with his word, whatever comes out of his mouth, do it." Therefore, the people of Mount Sinai who swore to the Holy One to fulfill His commandments were blessed. And this is from the explanation. However, the obligation from the explanation side is not mentioned in the Torah by any punishment at the hands of a person. From now on, the words of the Lord of hosts regarding oaths are blessed, for before the giving of the Torah, neither the expression of the lips nor "his word" is mentioned in the Torah. Therefore, there is no distinction between oral and written. Therefore, if someone swears to his friend in his handwriting and gives him his handwriting, he is obligated to fulfill it. However, there is no punishment for it at the hands of a person, since there is no such thing as a right or wrong, and we do not find any punishment for it at the hands of a person:

theAbenz Proves that the obligation to keep shavuot does not arise from the Torah's command, for there were shavuots before the giving of the Torah. Even upon receiving the Torah itself, Israel swore to keep it, and certainly the obligation to keep this oath did not arise from the Torah, which they only received at that time. This is a human-moral obligation that existed even before the command. The command adds a religious dimension to it (which mainly concerns obligations that are not towards someone else). Therefore, a written oath is binding, but not by virtue of Halacha. Therefore, a false oath spoken in writing is not punishable in the Law.

If so, Rabbi Migash is a source from which the Rambam could have learned that an oath is a moral obligation from the Sabra, and it certainly obligates the sons of Noah, the children of Ketun, and anyone who understands this Sabra. We also see here that the obligation regarding prohibitions that are based on the Sabra (without a command) is in the laws of Heaven only.

• the. Charges that originate from God's will

introduction

We have seen that the Gemara sees the sabbarah as an alternative source for the verse. We explained that the sabbarah is the source of the essential dimension of the mitzvah and the verse adds to it the imperative dimension. In this chapter I will describe another type of sabbarah that has a slightly different status: obligations that are the will of God, as distinct from obligations that are learned from essential sabbarahs.

God's will

elsewhere[19] I have distinguished between two types of sources of explanation: substantive explanation and the will of God. Substantive explanation is the subject of this article. These are explanations that clarify that certain actions have value and benefit and are therefore important to do, or harm and defect and therefore should not be done. So far we have dealt with the status of obligations that arise from such explanations. But there are also situations in which, although we do not understand what value there is in a thing, it is clear to us from explanation that it is the will of God. Here there is an obligation (not necessarily halakhic) to carry out the thing without a command but also without an explanation of understanding, but only because it is the will of God.

Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman b.Writers' Booklet Shalev (1913) writes:

And this is how we can interpret the meaning of the scripture in Jeremiah 19:5: "And they built the high places of Baal to burn their sons in the fire as burnt offerings to Baal, which I did not command, nor speak, nor offer up." My heart[20] And the translation of this means that you have not searched in my Torah and have not sent into the hands of my servants, nor have you sent before me, nor have you sent before me. Now, in this scripture it is explained that there are three parts of the Torah: a) which are called commandments. b) which are called words. c) which have neither commandments nor words, but only the will of God, and these are all the commandments of the rabbis, as above.

In my article there, I interpreted things a little differently than he did. According to our way, there are three categories in the service of God: the commandments, the unwritten obligations (sabra), and the will of God. I showed there that this is the case in the ratio of the separation of teruma (1/60 evil eye, 1/50 moderate eye, 1/40 good eye). At least according to the Rambam's method, it is clear that these ratios are maht, even though according to the main law of the Torah, one grain of wheat exempts the person from the obligation. And I explained there that it is the will of God that we separate more than one grain, and therefore there is an obligation from sabra, but the sabra does not mean that we understand why it is appropriate to do so. This is a different type of sabra, since we have interpretive or other indications that this is what God wants us to do. This is a sabra of the type of sabra of the will of God.

Source of the book 'Mesilat Yesharim'

In my article there I provided evidence and further explanation of the matter of God's will, we took it from there. Here I will only provide the source for this type of obligation from Yesharim Railway To Ramchal, in his commentary on the virtue of Hasidism (v. 18), who writes:

Here is the root of Hasidism, as the late Rabbis said: Blessed is the man who labors in the Torah and brings joy to his Creator. And the point is that the commandments imposed on all Israel are already known and their obligation is known to what extent it extends. Indeed, one who loves the Creator, blessed be his name, true love, will not strive and set out to exempt himself from what is already known from the obligation that is upon all Israel in general. Rather, it will happen to him as it would happen to a son who loves his father: if his father reveals his mind, even slightly openly, that he desires a certain thing, the son will already do as much as he can in that thing and in that deed. And even though his father only said it once and in a half-word, it is enough for that son to understand where his father's mind inclines him to do for him even what he did not say to him explicitly, since he will be able to judge for himself whether that thing will bring joy to his soul and will not wait for him to be commanded more explicitly, or for him to tell him another time. And here we see this thing with our own eyes that arises at all times and at all hours between every lover and lover, between a man and his wife, between a father and his son. In short, between everyone whose love is truly intense, so that he may not say, I am no longer commanded, it is enough for me to do what I was commanded in the parosh, but rather, from what was commanded, let him judge according to the mind of the commandment and strive to do for him what he can judge that will bring him pleasure. And here, as in this case, it will happen to the one who loves his Creator, also a faithful love, because he too is of the type of lovers, and the commandments that were commanded openly and publicly for the open mind alone will be enjoyed by him, knowing that this matter is inclined to his will and desire, blessed be his name, Then he will not say, "It is enough for me what is stated in the parosh," or "I will absolve myself of what is imposed on me in any case," but rather, he will say, "Since I have already found, I have seen that His will, blessed be He, inclines to this, it will be in my eyes to multiply this matter and expand it on all sides that I can discuss, that His will, blessed be He, desires, and this is what is called making the soul content with its Creator…"

It should be noted that the Ramchal is not speaking here about duties that are explained, but rather about duties towards God, blessed be He, whose foundation is not in a command but in the understanding that this is His will, and the performance is not because we understand that this is the correct behavior, but because we have understood that this is the will of God.

It is important to understand that this does not contradict our statements in the previous chapters. We saw there that without a command, the obligation is not a full halakhic obligation. In the laws of Heaven, one may be sued for such obligations, but there is no full halakhic prohibition in this and it certainly does not incur the penalties of the Jewish Law. In our statements here, too, we can see that fulfilling such obligations is part of the measure of chassidism and not part of the binding halacha. As we saw in the previous chapter, the question of chassidism is relevant primarily to the laws of Heaven and not to the halacha of the Torah in the sense discussed in the Jewish Law.

• and. The reasons for omitting the command in debts explained

introduction

We have seen that every commandment in the Torah also has an explanation. We have also seen that the explanation never takes the place of the verse, for if there is an explanation without a verse, then the mitzvah learned from it has only a substantive dimension without the dimension of the commandment. Such a mitzvah cannot be considered a mitzvah from the Torah in the full sense. This raises the question of why there are still obligations that the Scripture does not command and leaves them to explanation? In addition, the status of such obligations must be discussed. In this chapter, we will look at two possible types of explanation for the absence of the commandment, and at the end we will comment on the halakhic status of obligations of both types.

Basic duties and duties that are incidental to the Delta

The duties that we will deal with in this chapter are duties that arise from interpretation and there is no verse that commands them. However, in these cases, the absence of a verse does not stem from the fact that they are not fundamental and binding enough to enter the system of mitzvot from the Torah (a simple interpretation), but rather because they are too fundamental. Because of their fundamentality, it is not right to include such a duty as one of the 13 commandments, because if the Torah had commanded this, it would have diminished the matter and turned it into one regular mitzvah from the 13. The special status of this duty would have been harmed by its inclusion in the system of mitzvot, and therefore in such cases the Torah chose not to command it in a verse but to leave it to interpretation. Another type of duty is important to perform in an unexplained manner, that is, from our own motive and not in response to a command. In this type, the command would have impaired the fulfillment of the mitzvah, and therefore the Torah did not command it.

In this chapter, I will discuss these two types through four examples. At the end, I will comment on the halachic status of these two types of obligations, and from there I will also return to the blessing of Nehanin.

1. Correction of dimensions

Rabbi Chaim Vital at the beginning of his book Gates of Holiness Addresses the question of why the correction of manners was not included in the 133 commandments.[21] He replies that the obligation to correct one's manners is more fundamental than a mitzvah:

Here, the matter of virtues is imprinted in man in the lowly soul called "fundamental," which is comprised of four aspects, the inanimate and the vegetative and the animal and the verbal. For they too are composed of good and evil, and here in this soul the good and bad virtues depend, and they are the seat, foundation, and root of the higher intellectual soul, in which the 313 commandments of the Torah are accompanied, as mentioned above in the first chapter. And therefore, virtues are not among the 313 commandments, and indeed they are fundamental preparations for the 313 commandments in their existence or abrogation, since there is no power in the intellectual soul to fulfill the commandments through the 313 organs of the body except through the fundamental soul, which is connected to the body itself, in secret (Leviticus 17:14): "For the soul of all flesh is in its soul," and therefore the matter of bad virtues is much, much more difficult than the transgressions themselves.

In loose terms, it is said that according to the Mahrash, there is no point in commanding someone who does not understand this obligation himself. Correcting one's manners is the basis for being worthy of command, and therefore it is not right and impossible to command this. Commands address reformed people, and therefore it is impossible to command a person to be reformed.

Rabbi Kook in his letters goes one step further (The Ha'aretz letters (Chapter 1, page 177):

And know further that the vision of the forces developing for good and light from the power of the Torah, it goes in the campaign to the extent that it should stem from the power of law and justice, and to the extent that it should stem precisely from kindness of heart and internal agreement, without any oppression at all, not even moral distress. And this is the foundation that we always connect the covenant of the fathers with all the more fundamental things, and the covenant of the Land of Israel is connected to strengthen the inheritance of the fathers and the acceptance of the Torah. Indeed, the fathers kept the Torah from an internal and free awareness, and this advantage should not be lacking in a large part of moral reality, and this is the foundation of the hidden parts that emerge precisely as the standards of Hasidism and from within the Shoah, because if they had come as a necessary law, they would have blurred the established guidance to be a light for generations to come and to be a light for many Gentiles and peoples according to the very different virtues of their spirit, because the moral side that must be found as generosity and love of kindness must always have a certain weight according to the general positive moral value, like the value of free air compared to the buildings and cultural acts that fill it, which God does not leave a very large space for it, and what needs to be annexed according to the generosity of the spirit and the freedom of good will must be registered as the standards of Hasidism.

And it is impossible to imagine the magnitude of the loss that human civilization would suffer if these lofty standards were established in a positive manner, because only that which is more necessary for material and moral life in the present and harmful if weakened to take root in the future, enters with a warning and the great commandment and does. But that which penetrates the depths of goodness by standing and spreading as a dew of life for the future, its creator without harming its softness and absorbency, the entire purpose of future elevation, has deserved to be established as charity and loving kindness. This is the destiny of the "forward from the law of the law" that will greatly work for good at the time when the heart of stone that is in the Son of God will be transformed into a heart of flesh. Therefore, that part that remains forward from the law of God must remain in its standard, and everything that humanity will elevate will come out of the standards of Hasidism from the possession of the individual to the possession of the public, and will become the property of the whole nation, "and all your children will be the teachings of God."

We mentioned above the statement of Chazal that the one who commands and does the mitzvah is greater (see above for its explanation), even though simple intuition says that the one who does not command is greater. In his words here, Rav Kook claims that there are things for which this intuition is still correct, namely, in which the one who does not command and does the mitzvah is greater, such as moral correction. Therefore, the Torah intentionally left it outside the framework of the halakhic command, so that we could do it as one who does not command and does the mitzvah. The Torah chose not to command us about them in order to allow us to do them out of an understanding of their importance (mai'itaruta delta) and not out of an obligation and obedience to the command.[22]

The meaning of this is that in the correction of virtues, the Torah waived the dimension of obedience so that the essential dimension would not be harmed. In fact, if there were a commandment to correct virtues, it would destroy this spiritual and mental work, and therefore the Torah does not command it. Here, the Torah is content with the explanation that reveals to us the essential dimension and does not add the dimension of the commandment, but not because the commandment is not needed ("Why did he call me a reason"), but because a commandment would be detrimental to the fulfillment of the thing.

Improving one's manners belongs to the two types of duties we listed at the beginning of the chapter. The commandment was flawed in its fulfillment because the necessary correction is important, but improving one's manners is also a fundamental duty that is the basis for serving God in general.

2. The commandment of repentance

The Ramban, in his commentary on Deuteronomy (beginning of chapter 30), states that there is a mitzvah to repent.[23] This mitzvah is learned from the verse (ibid.): "And the Sabbath until the Lord your God." In contrast, the Rambam in the Laws of Repentance (57:55) writes that this verse is a promise from God that the end of Israel will repent. Does the Rambam's system also have a mitzvah to repent?

theposition (Mitzvah Shased) and other recent ones point to an apparent contradiction in the opinion of the Rambam on this matter.

onThe Book of Commandments (Mitzvah 37) Maimonides writes: "We are commanded to confess the sins and transgressions we have committed before God, may He be exalted, and to say them with repentance." There is no command here to make repentance. The matter of confession is mentioned here as a conditional mitzvah: if a person makes repentance, he must say confession with the performance of repentance (and all this with the offering of the sacrifice). But the actual performance of repentance is not presented here as a mitzvah. From this, theposition If a sinner does not repent, he is not punished for not repenting (he is only punished for the offense he committed).

In contrast to all this, in the list of commandments preceding the laws of repentance, Maimonides writes: "There is one positive commandment, and it is that the sinner turn from his sin before God and confess." From this it appears that the person who has sinned is commanded to turn from his evil deeds, and in addition to this, he is also commanded to confess. Here repentance is presented as a positive commandment, and it has two components: to repent and to confess.

In the explanation of the Maimonides' method, various directions were stated that the Anad does not raise a long way to this contradiction. We will propose another direction here, based on an understanding of the role of The Book of Commandments And understanding the point of the answer. We saw above that the Rambam includes in his list only those mitzvot that are explicitly commanded in the Torah. But mitzvot that are learned from a midrash, from a commentary, or from the LBM are not included in his list. Therefore, there may be obligations that are not mentioned in the Torah.The Book of Commandments Because there is no commandment for them, this does not mean that there is no obligation to do them.

Is there an explicit command in the Torah regarding the commandment of repentance? Above, we have already seen that according to Maimonides, the verse "and the Sabbath until the Lord your God" is a promise and not a command. And yet, inHolding hand Maimonides presents the obligation to make atonement as a complete obligation. The solution to this is that although there is an obligation, its source is interpretation and not scripture, and therefore it does not appear in thePolice officer Because according to him, without a commandment, it is not a duty from the Torah. On the other hand, inHolding hand Maimonides brings all of our halachic obligations, whether from the Torah, from midrash, from rabbinic or custom, and also from commentary, and therefore the obligation to make repentance also appears there.

We have learned that, at least according to Maimonides, the obligation to repent is based on reason. If there is indeed a channel that God created for us to return to and atone for our sins, then it is simply reason that we must use it (see the midrash that appears in the book of Resh. Gates of Repentance To the R.I., about the underground that is established in the prison, through which every prisoner is supposed to leave).

Therefore, repentance is not a mitzvah in the full halakhic sense, since we are not commanded to do so. On the other hand, it is certainly expected of us to do so based on reason. This seems to be the reason why in the book of Teshuvah, the Rambam is not satisfied with just detailing the law, but also describes the process of repentance, and extols the virtue of the one who repents (see ibid., 54-6, and more), and even discusses the free choice (in 55-6) that underlies the possibility and obligation to make a repentance. In the other collections of halakhic writings of the Rambam, we do not find this type of writing. It turns out that all of these are intended to convince us that one must make a repentance, and that it is important and possible to do so. The reason why the Rambam in his halakhic book tries to convince us to make a repentance (which he does not usually do with other commandments) is that there is no command in the Torah for repentance. Its foundation is reason, and yet we are expected to do so. Therefore, the Rambam must convince us and provide reasons why one must make a repentance.

Usually, the absence of commandments regarding halakhic obligations stems from the fact that they are not important enough to be included in the Halacha of the Torah. However, here in this chapter we are dealing with commandments for which the absence of a commandment stems precisely from their great importance and fundamentality. It turns out that there are commandments that are fundamental to the service of God, and this is precisely why the Torah is careful not to command us, so that we do so from our own understanding and not as a response to a commandment. Repentance is also an obligation that must be done out of ignorance, and a commandment would be detrimental to this, and therefore it belongs to the second type of obligation that we listed at the beginning of the chapter.[24]

3. The commandment of studying Torah

We learned in Tractate Minachot (Zet 12b):

Rabbi Ami: From the words of Rabbi Yossi (regarding the Bread of the Presence), we learn that even if a person does not change but one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he fulfills the mitzvah, he will not touch this Torah scroll from his mouth.

Rabbi Yochanan said on behalf of Rabbi Ben Yochi: Even if a person does not recite anything other than Kiryat Shema morning and evening – he will not be able to do so, and this matter is forbidden to be said before the people of the land. And Rava said: It is a mitzvah to be said before the people of the land.

A cousin of Rabbi Yishmael asked Rabbi Yishmael: For example, I, who have learned the entire Torah, what is the point of studying Jewish wisdom? This scripture was read to him: This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night. Go out and seek an hour that is neither day nor night, and study Jewish wisdom in it.

And Dr. Shmuel bar Nachmani, who said that Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani, Rabbi Yonatan: This verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw Joshua, for whom the words of the Torah were most dear to him, as it is said: And his servant Joshua the son of Nun, a young man, would not depart from the tabernacle. The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, are the words of the Torah so dear to you? This book of the Torah will not depart from your mouth.

Tana Debi Rabbi Yishmael: The words of the Torah are not obligatory upon you, and you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.

• The opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai was translated into law in the Laws of Oaths on the Issue of Vows, page 8a:

And Rav Gidel said, Rav said: He who says, "I will swear and change this chapter, I will change this tractate" - a great vow, a vow to the God of Israel. And is he not sworn and standing... Ha, kaml, since I am a priest of the soul in Kiryat Shema morning and evening, because he is a soldier who swears an oath upon her.

It is explained that in order to fulfill the obligation of the Talmud Torah mitzvah, it is sufficient for us to recite the Shema morning and evening, and anything beyond that is permissible and therefore subject to an oath. This is also how the commentator understood it, who wrote: Since one recites Kiryat Shema in the morning and evening, this is a mitzvah that is fulfilled and not violated. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochi in Tractate Minachot (page 272) says that whoever recites Kiryat Shema in the morning and evening, this is a mitzvah that is fulfilled and not violated.Rabbi Shem renewed that an oath applies to midrash obligations ("And you will memorize them" - so that the words of Torah will be sharpened in your mouth),[25] But he also agrees that fulfilling the mitzvah obligation from the Torah is sufficient in the morning and evening prayers.

This is very puzzling, since studying Torah is considered one of the most important commandments. In the Mishnah Reish Pa'ah we read: "And study Torah against all." And it is even more difficult to interpret the verse "And meditate on it day and night," and is it reasonable to interpret it to mean only morning and evening? Simply put, it is clear that the intention is to study all day and all night. And in general, according to this, it is not clear what the concept of "abolishing Torah" means? If there really is no obligation to study, then what are we being accused of when we talk about abolishing Torah?[26]? According to the Rabbi, this concept belongs at least among the obligations that are learned from the sermon ("and you have memorized them"), but according to the interpreter and the interpretation of the Gemara, it is very difficult.

If we return to the beginning of the issue in Menachot 112b, we see that the Rashbi is careful to empty the mitzvah of its content to the very end. If Rabbi Ami concludes from Rabbi Yossi's words that the morning and evening chapters are sufficient, Rabbi Yochanan, in the name of the Rashbi, claims that even that is not necessary. It is sufficient to recite the Kash, which in any case is commanded to be recited. We will now see the course of the issue in Menachot, which entirely revolves around the principle that sees Talmud Torah as a mitzvah from the understanding.

• Studying Torah Alone and the Commandment to Study Torah Alone

According to our suggestion here, Rashbi's intention is to say that studying Torah is not the same as the commandment to study Torah. From the perspective of the commandment to study Torah, it is sufficient to fulfill the obligation in the morning and evening prayers, but studying Torah should be done not because of the commandment but because of the understanding of the importance and thoroughness of the Torah. Therefore, he insists on emptying the commandment of its practical content, so that we fulfill it as one who is not a commandment but a doer and not by virtue of a commandment, as we saw in the previous sections regarding the improvement of morals and repentance.

This resolves the three difficulties that we raised above regarding the issue of vows. Indeed, studying Torah is against everyone, but this is studying the Torah and not the commandment to study Torah. From this, the verse "And meditate on it day and night" will also be explained, which essentially tells us two things: 1. The formal law that commands us to study morning and evening requires only the morning and evening readings. 2. Beyond this, there is an obligation to study day and night, but this is not because of the command. The first law is the content of the command in the verse, while the second is part of the instruction (it is meant to teach us a fact that this is the will of God and that is how it is appropriate to do the explanation). Now the meaning of the concept of "abrogation of Torah" that was not understood above is also clear. In truth, from the perspective of the formal obligation, there is no abrogation of Torah, since the morning and evening readings are sufficient. But from the perspective of the explanation, we must study as much as we can, and whoever does not do so commits abrogation of Torah. The punishment for abrogating the Torah is, of course, in heavenly law, and as we saw in Chapter 4 above, charges of slander without a command can incur a punishment in heavenly law.

• Continuing the issue as a kind of material

Now the rest of the Gemara's words there will also be understood. The first language states that "and this matter is forbidden to be said before the people of the land." On the surface, this is incomprehensible, for if this is indeed the truth, what is the concern if the people of the land do this? Of necessity, the Gemara's assumption is that the morning and evening shiksh is the boundary of the obligation from the mitzvah of the Torah, but it is clear from the Gemara that there is also an obligation from the explanation to study beyond this, and the concern is that the people of the land will not do this. Rava, on the other hand, says that "it is a mitzvah to be said before the people of the land." He apparently believes that this itself must be explained to the people of the land. He who learns only what he is obligated to do from the commandment in the Torah will remain with the people of the land. The study should be out of understanding and recognition of the importance of the Torah. According to our proposal, the debate between the lishnoth is solely about the tactics of behavior towards the people of the land, but both agree on the boundaries of the mitzvah and the obligation to study Torah.

Now to Ben Dama's question to Rabbi Yishmael. Years ago, a student asked me about a contradiction in this story. If Ben Dama did indeed learn the entire Torah, how come he doesn't know the answer to this question itself? Apparently, it is proven that he doesn't know the entire Torah. I answered him that Ben Dama learned everything he is required to in terms of the commandment to study Torah. What he asked was, is there a question of abrogating the Torah?

As we have seen, the abrogation of Torah only exists in relation to the obligation that goes beyond the formal obligation of the commandment to study Torah. If there is no obligation beyond the commandment, then there is no abrogation of Torah, and therefore there is no problem with studying Greek wisdom. To this, the Rabbi replied that there is an obligation to study day and night beyond the formal commandment, and therefore it is impossible to abrogate Torah even if one has studied and knows all of Torah. There is an obligation to study day and night. Ostensibly, the Rabbi disagrees with Rashbi, since Rashbi is content with studying morning and evening, while the Rabbi demands an actual day and night. But according to our view, there is no disagreement between them. Rashbi is speaking about the first part of the verse, the commandment, while the Rabbi is speaking about the second part (since Ben Dama, his nephew, only asked him about this part). If so, the Rabbi also agrees with the view presented at the beginning of the issue.

And this will clearly explain the continuation of the Gemara, which states and states in a calm manner: "And the flight of Dr. Shmuel bar Nachmani"That is, the words of Rabbi Yishmael disagree with the Mimra of Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani. And these things are puzzling, to say the least, since Rashban is an Amora, and why is he not criticized for being against the words of the Tannaim? Beyond that, the Rish disagrees with the Rishbai who appeared right before him in the Sugiya, and how can the Gemara ignore this Tannaim dispute and only refer to a dispute between the Rishbai and some Amora?

But according to our method, things are not difficult. We have seen that Rish does not disagree with Rashbi. But Rashban disagrees with both of them, and therefore the Gemara only mentions this disagreement. However, as we will immediately see, he disagrees with them only in the meaning of dorshim and not in halacha, and therefore the Gemara sees no difficulty in Amora disagreeing with Tannaim.[27]

Let us now look at the words of the Rashban: This verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing, etc. There are some expressions here that are not common in the Talmud. What is the difference between "obligation" and "mitzvah"? What does Rashban mean by new? We saw above that Rashban and Rish believe that Talmud Torah is not a formal obligation (=obligation) but rather an obligation from the understanding (=mitzvah). Now Rashban comes and disagrees with them. He claims that Talmud Torah is neither an obligation nor a mitzvah, but only a blessing that the blessed Joshua received from God. From this the Gemara learns that Rashban truly disagrees with the Tannaim before him who believed that this was a mitzvah, for he not only denies the concept of an obligation but also that of a mitzvah.

It seems that Rashban is the first in the Sugiya to disagree with the method that all his predecessors (Rabbi Ami, Riyocha and Rashbi, the two Lishnot and Rishon) agreed with. But now it seems that this is not the case. First, we must be careful with his words, because he is not saying that there is no such obligation, but only that the verse "La Yamosh" is not an obligation and not a mitzvah but a blessing. It seems, then, that he disagrees with his predecessors only in the interpretation of the verse and not in the actual law. Regarding the law, he also agrees with the opinion of all his predecessors in the Sugiya and agrees that Talmud Torah has two parts: 1. The obligation that is learned from the commandment, and for it it is sufficient to pray in the morning and evening. 2. The mitzvah – to study day and night. What he is arguing is only that we do not learn this from the verse "La Yamosh", since this verse is a blessing to Joshua. So where do these obligations come from? According to Rashban, this is probably a sabbarah without a verse (and perhaps from the very fact that the verse blesses Joshua we learn the importance of the Torah). It is now clear why the Gemara does not make it difficult for Rashban to agree with the conditions that he disagrees with, because there is no dispute here about the law, but only about the meaning of dorshim.

The issue ends with Rabbi Yishmael's Mimra: "The words of the Torah are not obligatory upon you, and you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them." Although Rashi interpreted this as being learned with kindness and not as a burden on us, according to our way, it can be interpreted as a direct continuation of the entire course of the issue: Rashi says that although studying Torah is not an obligation but a mitzvah, and ostensibly it is purely voluntary, he explains that in spite of this, you are not permitted to exempt yourself from it because there is a clear obligation to study day and night. This is exactly what needs to be taught to the people of the land so that they understand the great importance of studying Torah, and so on.

• Resolving the contradiction in the words of Rashbi

Congratulations to her: Our rabbis gave: And you gathered your grain, – what will you learn to say – since it is said: This book of the Torah will not fail from your mouth, can words be written as they are? You will learn to say: And you gathered your grain – the one who practices them according to the custom of the land, the words of Rabbi Yishmael; Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai says: Is it possible for a person to plow at the time of plowing, sow at the time of sowing, reap at the time of harvest, thresh at the time of threshing, and sow at the time of the wind, what will the Torah be about it? Rather: while the Israelites are doing the will of a place – their work is done by others…

On the issue of minchat, we saw that according to Rashbi, it is sufficient to study morning and evening, meaning that he is the one who makes it easier to study Talmud Torah, while Rishon is the one who makes it stricter to study day and night. In contrast, in this issue, they seem to switch sides: it is actually Rashbi who makes it stricter to study all the time and not even to go out to work, and it is Rishon who makes it easier. And there have been many interpretations of this in later times.[28]

But according to our method, there is no difficulty in this. We have seen that on the issue of minchat, the Rish and Rashbi do not disagree at all, the formal obligation of the Torah is to recite the morning and evening prayers, and anything beyond that is a mitzvah that is explained. On the issue of blessings, the discussion is within the limits of abrogating Torah, that is, it concerns only the mitzvah that is explained and not the formal obligation. And here there are "contradictory" opinions, that the Rish is allowed to abrogate Torah in order to make a living (at least retroactively), while the Rish is not permitted to abrogate Torah at all. But all of this concerns only the limits of the mitzvah and not the obligation (in this regard, the Rish is sufficient to recite the morning and evening prayers). I will recall what I explained above, that the Rish was careful in the issue of minchat to empty the mitzvah of Talmud Torah of its content only to say that the obligation that is explained is primary and important and cannot be ignored. If so, is it any wonder that here he is very strict about it?!

We have learned that the entire issue of offerings revolves around the idea that studying Torah is not a commandment from the 133 commandments. The obligation to study day and night is based on an understanding that explains what Torah is, and not on a commandment. The Torah was careful not to include this in a formal halachic framework so as not to reduce Torah study to just another mitzvah from the 133. We have learned, therefore, that Torah study is a fundamental obligation that is not included in an explicit commandment due to its importance and thoroughness.

[In a footnote, I will note that this understanding has implications for the law. For example, we saw above that obligations that are based on the Sabra are binding on everyone who understands the Sabra. If so, women (and probably also minors, once they understand) are certainly obligated to study Torah even though they are exempt from the commandment to study Torah. And this will explain what many commentators have found difficult about what is written inShulchan Arba'ah O.H. 34:44, that women recite the blessing of the Torah. And the Nokush are already confused there (see MGA, MB, position The mitzvah of Tel Sakah, etc.) After all, women are exempt from the mitzvah of studying Torah, and why should they bless her? And see there what you will.[29] They assume that the blessing of the Torah is the blessing of the commandments, but several poskim have already written that the blessing of the Torah is the blessing of praise.[30] But according to our path, the problem is that the main Talmud Torah is not at all obligatory by virtue of a commandment, but rather a mitzvah that explains (and this is why the blessing of the Torah is from the Torah, unlike the other blessings of the commandments that are prescribed by the rabbis). The blessing of the Torah was determined by the understanding of the importance of the Torah that we received (the blessing apparently came to teach this importance) and not by the mitzvah of studying the Torah itself. And we have already noted that by virtue of this understanding, women certainly also belong to and are obligated in studying the Torah, just like anyone who understands the importance of studying the Torah. In any case, it is clear why they are obligated to recite the blessing of the Torah.[31]]

A note on the commandment of settling in Israel according to Maimonides

Many have already questioned why Maimonides did not include the commandment to settle the Land of Israel in his list. And they have proven that even according to his system of law, there is such a commandment,[32] And these things are ancient. Some commentators have written that the omission of this commandment is based on the fourth root in which Maimonides states that commandments that include the entire Torah are not counted in the number of commandments.[33] They explain that in his view, the commandments of settling and conquering the Land of Israel are commandments that encompass the entire Torah, and therefore he did not include them in his list.

Simply put, these things cannot be said. First, in the fourth root, the Rambam does not speak at all about fundamental commandments, but rather about verses that command us to keep all the commandments, such as "And you shall keep all my commandments," or "Be holy" (which, according to the Rambam, is nothing more than a command to keep the commandments), and so on. The commandment to settle the land certainly includes something beyond the mere obligation to keep all the commandments.[34]

Although, according to our method here, it can be said in a similar way that the commandment to settle the Land of Israel is a fundamental obligation and therefore is not included in the list of commandments. Although this is not related to the fourth root, as we have seen here, this principle truly exists in the Mishnah of the Rambam and in the generality of his list of commandments. Why did the Rambam not dedicate a special root of its own to this principle? Perhaps because this is about obligations for which there is no verse commanding them, and it is a Pishita for the Rambam that they are not included in the list of commandments (we saw above that he stated in several roots that only obligations for which there is a verse commanding them are included in the list of commandments). What we have explained here is why the Torah itself did not include these fundamental obligations in the system of commandments. But the Rambam, at its roots, deals with the question of how to classify and list what the Torah did command (or at least it seems that it commanded).

All of this assumes that the commandment to settle in the Land of Israel is indeed so fundamental in the Rambam's teaching. I doubt whether this is indeed the case. There is no clear expression of this in the Rambam's writings (nor in his conduct in life, etc.). Therefore, it seems more likely that the Rambam did not list the commandment to settle in the Land because in his opinion it is a means of a mitzvah and not an actual mitzvah. One must settle in the Land in order to fulfill the mitzvahs that depend on it, but this is not a mitzvah in itself. In the tenth root, the Rambam states explicitly that means of a mitzvah are not counted as mitzvahs.[35]

A note on the balanced commandments

Rabbi Volva in his book The balanced commandments He brought seven commandments that the Sages said were equivalent to the entire Torah. On the surface, these things seem puzzling, even on a mathematical level. After all, if such a commandment is equivalent to all the rest, and among the rest there are six more commandments that are equally equivalent, how is such equivalence possible?

It turns out that at least some of these mitzvot do not mean equivalence in the simple sense (since that cannot be the case, and so on), but rather that they are perhaps fundamental obligations. Such a mitzvah is fundamental and constitutes a condition for fulfilling the mitzvot, and therefore cannot be included in the minyan as one of the regular mitzvot. It stands at the foundation of all the mitzvot, but is not necessarily equivalent to all of them in the simple sense.

Summary and Comment on the Halakhic Status of Fundamental Obligations and Reasons in General

An interesting question is what is the halakhic status of the fundamental obligations. In the chapters so far, we have seen that obligations without a command do not have full halakhic status. They are more relevant to the laws of Heaven or to the degree of Hasidism. But in obligations of the type presented here, there is perhaps room to say that since it would actually be appropriate to include them in the regular system of mitzvot if it were not harmful, then the fact that they do not have a formal command in the verse is only a technical reason. In this case, there is perhaps room to see these obligations as real halakhic obligations as if they had a command, since they are certainly no less than obligations that have commandments.

On the other hand, as we began at the beginning of the chapter, when the Torah leaves some obligation based solely on reason without a command, this requires an explanation. After all, every law requires a command in order to become a mitzvah from the Torah in its entirety. Hence, any law that establishes a new obligation based on reason that does not have a command probably has an explanation of the kind we saw here.

For example, the blessing of the Nahanin is a renewed obligation from the perspective that there is no commandment for it. We explained that according to thepenny There is an essence of the Torah here (and therefore they were able to make it more clear), but we explained that there is still no actual Torah mitzvah here because the command is missing. But now the difficulty arises as to why the Torah did not actually add a command for the blessings of enjoyment? After all, the greatness of the mitzvah is that it is the one who commands and does. It is likely that the reason for this is that the Torah thought that if there were a command for this, it would destroy the blessing. The Torah expects us to bless not because of the command, but because of the understanding that we owe gratitude to God for the food and various pleasures given to us in the Hereafter.

From what we have said here, it follows that all renewed obligations that are not subject to a commandment are of the type discussed in this chapter. At the beginning of the chapter, we presented two types of such commands:

1. Fundamental duties, such as improving one's morals and studying Torah (which are the basis for serving God). These are not a commandment because the Torah did not want to diminish them and turn them into a regular mitzvah from the 133rd century.
2. Obligations that are not necessarily fundamental, but must be performed without any reason, and a command could harm their fulfillment, and therefore there is no command for them (like a Teshuvah).[36]

In the first type, the explanation why the Torah did not command them is because of their fundamental nature, and therefore there may be room to say that we should see them as if there were a command here (the absence of a command is only technical). These may be actual Torah obligations, and so on. But in the second type, it is difficult to see these obligations as if there were a command, because this precisely destroys what the Torah wanted to achieve, because the Torah wanted us to fulfill these obligations as one who does not command and does. Therefore, it is likely that Type 2 does not have the status of mandatory laws like the laws for which there are explicit commands in the Torah. And the things are still tsalah.

• G. Current discussions

introduction

There are several issues that arise for halachic discussion, mainly in the light of new scientific developments, and naturally the decision on them is left to interpretation. New techniques such as surrogacy, in vitro fertilization, cloning, the use of stem cells, organ donation, determining the moment of death, and more, raise quite a few halachic questions, most of which do not have good sources in the Talmud and Poskim. Furthermore, even if there are such sources, many of them suffer from anachronism, that is, an interpretation of the sources in light of modern knowledge that certainly was not available to the Sages. It is reasonable to assume that with the advancement of science and technology, questions of this type will increase.

It is a common assumption that the solution to these questions should be found in the halakhic literature of its generations, while I am inclined to deny this. In my understanding, due to the gap in knowledge and reality, many of these sources are irrelevant to the discussion, and the rabbis of our time are supposed to decide on this as the sages of the Gemara and the Rishonim did in their time. Some of the rabbis who deal with these questions agree with this view, and some have commented on it explicitly.

For example, in the book Retz Katzvi by Rabbi Zvi Reizman, introductory chapters (Adar 2, 5776), p. 40, he writes:

I heard on behalf of the Grand Rabbi Auerbach and the Grand Rabbi Elyashiv that it is not possible to rule on this issue (of surrogacy), since there are no sources for this new matter and the decision is based solely on interpretation.

Another name from Rabbi Sternbuch's words:

For the issue of surrogacy is new and there are no sources from the Shas or the ancient poskim on this matter, and therefore we are forced to rule on such serious issues by explanation and by presenting evidence that is not decisive in the likeness of a child.

And the clearest on this matter is Rabbi Asher Weiss (ibid., p. 12):

For generations, halachic jurists have been discussing the question of egg donation… and there is a dispute about the matter… but they have not brought evidence for their words, but the court has no evidence, not even the appearance of evidence either way… In the end, there is no source to decide this great question, and we must necessarily decide this from the perspective of reason. … For the sorrow of a heart that is not yet full of tears, and as a finger in the light of reason.

Distinguishing between interpretive beliefs and substantive beliefs

In all these contexts, it is important to distinguish between interpretive and substantive beliefs. For example, when discussing the question of whether organs can be "harvested" from a person after brain death and before cardiac death, we must discuss whether in such a situation he is considered alive or dead. This boils down to determining what the moment of death is, whether it is brain death or cardiac death.[37] For this purpose, we must clarify what death is in terms of halakha, for example, whether it is the cessation of breathing or something else. The poskim cite various sources from the Sages for this. What is important for our purpose here is that determining the moment of death is an interpretive question, meaning that after we reach a conclusion, from one explanation or source or another, this will be the determining view regarding questions of murder and rescue. Murder is an explicit prohibition in Scripture, and so is the obligation to rescue. Therefore, clarifying the moment of death is only a clarification of a section of these commandments. As we have seen in the previous chapters, what yields such clarification is halakha from the Torah for all intents and purposes, since the individual who has been renewed falls under the general commandment (the prohibition of murder, etc.).

On the other hand, there are discussions on other topics where questions from a different category arise. For example, on the subject of cloning,[38] A debate arises over whether it is permissible to perform various genetic manipulations (cloning humans or animals is just one example). This is a debate that concerns the establishment of a renewed prohibition, and therefore this is not an interpretative debate.

I would point out that in addition, questions also arise about whether the clone is a human being at all, or what his family relationship is to his relatives, etc. This is of course an interpretation, since a person's prohibition against his relatives is an explicit command in the verse, and since this creature comes before us, we must decide whether it falls within the scope of a human being, and who his relatives are (if any).

Example: Prohibition of genetic manipulation

When dealing with the subject of genetic manipulation, it is customary to cite the words of the Gemara in Sanhedrin 38a:

Our rabbis gave us: To say the greatness of the King of Kings, the Holy One, blessed be He; that a man stamps several coins with one seal – and they all resemble each other, but the Holy One, blessed be He, stamps each person with the seal of the first Adam – and not one of them resembles his fellow. And why don't their faces resemble each other, so that a man doesn't see a nice apartment and a nice woman and say, "She's mine"... Rabbi Meir used to say: In three things a person differs from his fellow man: in voice, in appearance, and in knowledge. In voice and appearance – because of shame, and in knowledge – because of the thief and the thief.

This is, of course, a legendary saying and it is very difficult to derive a halakhic teaching from it. But it teaches us that it is not appropriate to produce human beings in a replicated serial production. Since in our day the practical possibility of doing so has been created, the question now also arises on a halakhic level. But it is clear that this is the establishment of a new prohibition and not an interpretation or addition of a detail to an existing prohibition. Therefore, even if we decide that it is indeed appropriate to prohibit this, it would be difficult to see such a prohibition as a regular Torah prohibition, and certainly not a prohibition that requires flogging.

Therefore, the options available to us, even if we are convinced that there is indeed a problem with something and it should be prohibited (not everyone agrees with this, and I am not sure about this either), are two: either prohibit the thing as a new prohibition with explanation, or amend a rabbinical regulation that prohibits it (if there is an authorized halakhic institution that can do this).

Genetic manipulation as an extension of the prison ban

Regarding the question of manipulations with animals or plants, many in these discussions cite the words of the Ramban regarding the conceptual level of the prohibition of hybrids (Leviticus 19:19):

Because the one who creates two species changes and denies the act of Genesis, as if he thinks that God, the Blessed One, did not fulfill all the needs in His world, and he wants to help in the creation of a world by adding creatures and species of animals to it.

This is on the conceptual level. But also on the practical level, we cite here the words of the Book of Education (Mitzvah Sab), which fears that such actions will lead to bad results, which is reminiscent of concerns that arise in these discussions today:

For God, blessed be He, placed at the beginning of creation every thing and thing of the world in nature to perform a good and righteous action for the benefit of the people of the world that He created. And He commanded each to act according to its kind, as it is written in Parashat Bereishit (1:12): "The grass of the field that sows seed after its kind, and the tree that bears fruit... after its kind"... And in the work of mixing, there are aspects that humans were not permitted to use, because God knows that the end of the action that comes to humans from those aspects is bad for them. Therefore, He forbids...

Of course, these are not actual halakhic sources either. Halacha prohibits hybrids, and this prohibition is well defined in halachic literature. The expansion here is primarily conceptual. It is true that there was room for a halachic expansion and to derive from the prohibition of hybrids a prohibition on genetic manipulations, but simply put, this is a requirement of a ta'ama dekra, and according to halakhic law, Rabbi Yehuda did not demand a ta'ama dekra.[39] Therefore, it seems that once again only the two aforementioned ways are open to us: either to prohibit it from being explained, or to amend a regulation that prohibits it from being rabbinical.

The halachic difference between the two options

What is the difference between a new prohibition from the interpretation and a renewed rabbinic regulation? Ostensibly, in both cases we need an authorized halachic institution (Sanhedrin) that can establish a binding prohibition. But as we will now see, this is not the case, and beyond that, even when there is a Sanhedrin, there still seems to be a difference between these two mechanisms.

We have seen that a prohibition of interpretation has a dimension from the Torah, but this is only the essence. There is no warning here, and therefore there will be no punishment for it. Even if the Sanhedrin were to establish such a prohibition, it would not entail punishment in the Torah, because there is no such thing as a law without a command and a warning in the Torah. On the other hand, it seems that its doubt will be serious, for as we have seen, a doubt from the Torah is serious because of the essential dimension and not because of the warning, and in prohibitions of interpretation there is an essential dimension (what is missing is only the command). We have often seen here that a doubt about a prohibition of interpretation is serious, like a doubt about a regular Torah prohibition.[40]

Furthermore, the rabbinic regulation requires the determination of an authoritative rabbinical court, but a prohibition from the Sabra exists and stands even without being determined. As we have seen, by the very fact that a person understands the Sabra, he is obligated and abides by this prohibition. We have seen that even minors and gentiles are obligated by the prohibitions that are based on the Sabra (although only in the laws of heaven). Of course, all of this depends on whether that person understands or agrees that the Sabra does indeed prohibit the matter. A person who does not accept or understands the essential Sabra will not be prohibited from doing something unless it has been determined by an authoritative rabbinical court (Sanhedrin), and then he is obligated by the law "do not deviate" (at least according to the Maimonides).[41].

Therefore, the prohibition from the explanation, which is the more severe, does not have formal halachic authority. Furthermore, even when there was a Sanhedrin, the matter was prohibited even before they would have determined it. In contrast, a rabbinic regulation requires an authorized rabbinic court to establish it, and without this there is no prohibition in the matter.

An interesting example of the relationship between derivation and explanation

BB House Lease Agreement S.A.B.: It is said, Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said: From the day the Temple was destroyed, it is a law that we decree upon ourselves not to eat meat or drink wine, but we do not decree upon the people, even though the majority of the people are able to abide by it; and from the day the kingdom of wickedness spread, which decrees evil and harsh decrees upon us, and abrogates the Torah and Mitzvot from it, and does not allow us to enter the week of the son, and I said to her: For Jesus the son, it is a law that we decree upon ourselves not to marry a wife and not to have sons, and the seed of Abraham our father was found to be all by itself, but let them rest in Israel, it is better that they should be wise and not be evildoers.

In the first case, the Gemara states that it was appropriate to decree that they should not eat meat or drink wine because of the destruction, and the reasoning is that a decree should not be issued on the public, even if the majority of the public can abide by it. In the second case of abrogation of the mitzvot, it was appropriate to decree not to have sons (which is abrogation of the positive mitzvot of fertility and reproduction in the afterlife), and the reasoning that the majority of the public cannot abide by it is no longer sufficient to stop the gezia, and the reasoning of "it is better that they be shoggin" is needed.

But the phrase "it would be better if they were mistaken" is appropriate where a prohibition exists and the public is unaware of it. But such a reasoning cannot explain why a prohibition is not corrected from the start. If it is not corrected, then there is no prohibition, and therefore the one who violates it is not mistaken. Ostensibly, the Gemara here implies that the prohibition to have children and to have children exists even without it being decreed by the Jewish High Court. The Gemara states that in such a case there is already a prohibition, and the Jewish High Court was only supposed to inform the public that it is now forbidden to have children and to have children, and not to decree the actual prohibition. And so the Gemara says that the Jewish High Court decided not to inform the public of the prohibition because "it would be better if they were mistaken."[42]

The only way to explain why there is actually already a prohibition against cows and sheep in such a situation is that there is an understanding here that in a situation where it is impossible to fulfill a Torah commandment, the commandment of "Pur" is nullified, and the Gemara assumes that in such a situation there is even a prohibition on the matter. Now, anyone who understands this should have stopped engaging in "Pur" even without the Rabbis establishing a prohibition on it and nullifying the commandment. Although there were some who did not do this, the Rabbis nevertheless did not publish the matter, and the Gemara explains this because "it is better that they should be shuggins."[43] We have learned that the cancellation of a deed and the prohibition of a sabbarah exist even without the determination of a rabbinic law. Anyone who understands and accepts the sabbarah is not supposed to observe a rabbinic law in such a situation.

[1] Jerusalem 1957. The book is dedicated to describing the teachings of Rabbi Yosef Razin, the Rogchober, and is divided into twenty chapters with explanations and examples of the types of explanations that appear in his writings. The book's introduction contains eight introductory chapters, the sixth of which is the chapter called "Sabra da'Oriyata." Anyone who wishes to classify the explanations into their types would do well to use this book by Rabbi Kosher.

[2] And see also Treasury House A simple rule that was extended in this, and inShdach The Sa system has the letter Seg and the Da system has the letter Ka and the letter Ah and with the omissions there.

[3] His words seemingly depend on the question of whether the active doubt of a blessing (which is learned from the explanation and therefore is active from the text) rejects the negative ("You shall not bear false witness"), and he sees this inShdach The Ain system expanded on this. And of course there is an assumption here that a blessing that is not needed is a prohibition from the Torah, but as is known, this assumption is disputed by the Rishonim, and others.

[4] There is perhaps a place to link this to the controversy between Tod'a 'Damer', Sukkah 3 a.a., and Ran Sukkah 3 a.a. in his pages, who disagreed on whether when a person fulfills the mitzvah not according to the limits established by the Sages (for example, eating in the Sukkah and eating inside the house) does he break the Torah or whether this also does not apply. See alsoposition The mitzvah is Suskab, and the words are ancient.

[5] Indeed, above Mina (24b in the pages of the Rif, cf. 'Gam' Kadesh Hilulolim') wrote that everything is from the rabbis, and Tsa.

[6] In any case, continuing his remarks there, he concludes that the blessings of the rabbis are an obligation of the rabbis to all the poskim: "And the opinion of the poskim is clearly explained in their words that there is no blessing of the rabbis that is from the Torah except the blessing of food, etc." Indeed, as we have seen, the disciples of Rabbeinu Yonah there apparently believed thatpenny The blessing of the Hananin is preceded by the Torah. If so, not all poskim agree as the Tzalah claims here. As we have explained, a distinction must be made between the form of the blessing and the actual obligation. It is necessary to comment on the Tzalah's words from the course of the Gemara in the blessings, since as we have seen, the Gemara itself apparently assumes that this is a matter of Torah law, both in its search for a source and in the form of presenting the law. And see ibid.successful who explained the entire course of the Gemara according to his method, and so on.

[7] Michael Avraham, What is the 'scriptural decree'? (A study of the law of conspiring witnesses), in a book Even Shlomo and Tzedek – 100th Jubilee of Shlomo Marcus, Yeruham 5771, p. 137.

[8] This should be discussed, since most of these laws really have no source and seem to be based on an explanation. It turns out that these are indeed explanations that were stated in relation to the halakhic obligation, but in the moral obligation, none of these have any place at all. If there were no halakhic command here, these explanations would have no place. See more about this division below.

[9] This topic is discussed in detail in the article Good measure On the eighth root. The article is to be published as part of a book on roots that is currently being edited. Most of the topics in this chapter are discussed in our articles on roots, all of which will also appear in this book (to be published by Tam and Mida Tova).

[10] See this at length in my book The Spirit of Justice, Part Two, and also in my article in the anniversary book of Rabbi Nachum Eliezer Rabinowitz, Ma'ale Adumim 577, and also in the article A Good Measure for Roots 9 and 2. Here I will only briefly review the main points concerning our matter, and those who desire evidence, reasoning, and examples will be taken from there.

[11] Although there are contradictions in his writings regarding this, and there in my book I suggested settlements for them.

[12] And also in my article, The Essence of a Guilty Sacrifice, sickle 15, Bar-Ilan University's Higher Institute of Torah, 2007, p. 1.

[13] And this is like the well-known method of theNatiyam C. Reld wrote that one who inadvertently violates a rabbinical prohibition does not need atonement. Even an act done unintentionally is not rebellion, since the doer did not know at all that there was a commandment that forbade it.

[14] For the first time, Rabbi Benny Clemenzon (Rosh Yeshiva Otniel) brought this issue to my attention in two of his articles: Qualities that the Torah requires, Galat I, 1959: Methods of Study, ibid. See also a criticism (with which I do not agree) in Yaakov Eitam's article, regarding the explanation of the standards required by the Torah, Galat 5, 1999, pp. 142-159.

[15] See my article on this, regarding the fall of a secular person into a crime, Noon 25, April 2007, p. 9. For a different angle on the matter, see the articles 'The Third Way', or: On 'Religious Zionism' without a hyphen, Noon 22, Tammuz 577, p. 131. A slightly different adaptation of this article appears in the book The third cart, Rabbi Zvi Shinover (editor), Nahalim Institute of Religious Studies 2006, p. 39.

[16] See on this in Nadav Shnerb's article, Reflections on Idolatry, entree 19, 2017, pp. 47-64.

[17] See the ninth chapter of the book on this, Analysis of concepts and situations in Talmudic thinking, Michael Avraham, Israel Belfer, Dov Gabbay and Uri Shield, College Publications, London 2014. This is the ninth book in the Talmudic Logic series.

[18] See Happy light, Prohibitions of Entry, 32nd ed., Yitzhak River H.B. C. F. S.B., W.Notes file Yevmoth C. Shed in the old edition, which he wrote in a slightly different way. On the other hand, the author Yoav's plot In S. A., this possibility is raised and rejected.

[19] See my article, Mitzvah, Sabra, and the Will of God, Noon 3, Elul 5777, p. 15.

[20] Compare Jeremiah 7:30; and Jeremiah 2:30. In both of these places the middle category ("I spoke") does not appear.

[21] It should be noted that the difficulty of the Rahva is very puzzling. After all, there is a specific mitzvah of adhering to the attributes of the Blessed One. Maimonides in Acts 8 writes:

And the eighth commandment is that we are commanded to imitate Him, He will exalt us according to our ability, and He said (Teb 28) and walk in His ways. And this commandment has already been doubled and said (Ekeb 10 and 11) to walk in all His ways, and it comes in this interpretation: What is the Holy One, blessed be He, called merciful, even you were merciful? What is the Holy One, blessed be He, called gracious, even you were gracious? What is the Holy One, blessed be He, called righteous, even you were righteous? What is the Holy One, blessed be He, called pious, even you were pious? And this is the language of the books (S. Ekeb). And this commandment has already been doubled in another language, saying (see 13) After the Lord your God you shall walk, and it also comes in this interpretation (Sotah 14 a) that we are commanded to imitate in the good deeds and important states in which God will be described as exalting on the side of the parable, exalting above all with great exaltation:

Ostensibly, there is a positive commandment here about correcting one's morals, and therefore it is not clear why the Rabbis (and other commentators who deal with this issue) assume that there is no such halakhic obligation? It is possible that they interpret this commandment as adhering to the ways of God, that is, as obligations regarding practical behavior. We must have mercy and forgive other people, and as the Rambam concludes, "to resemble God in good deeds." But correcting one's morals is a correction of one's morals and not a behavioral obligation (see M.O.N. Cha"a Supan"d and Cha"g Pan"d and Maharal"l Israel Roads Ch. 2, p. 111 and more. And see also the words of Maimonides inPolice officer (No, not 17). There is no formal halachic commandment on this, and perhaps that is the only reason why the Rabbis and other interpreters make their question difficult. And yet the matter is still unclear.

[22] There is a common yeshiva joke about a young man who began meeting women to find his match and rejected them all. The yeshiva supervisor sent him to work on his qualities and study morality for about a year, and told him that he would meet again afterwards. He did so and studied morality with great admiration and corrected his qualities, and then when he returned and met again he rejected all the candidates one by one. When the supervisor asked where his work on his qualities had gone, He replied in bewilderment: A year ago, when I was proud, none of them suited me, so now that I am already very humble, it is even easier for me that none of them suits me. I think that is how someone who worked on his qualities would look just because there is a mitzvah or a section inShulchan Arba'ah Which requires working on measurements.

[23] And so it is inHuman life, and inGates of Repentance In several places (where he writes that before the Feast of Tabernacles there is an additional mitzvah, reading 4: "Purify yourselves before the Lord").

[24] Perhaps there is room to see it as belonging to the first type, of fundamental duties.

[25] Indeed, he writes there to the Hadith that the laws taught in the Midrash are from the Torah, not from the Rambam, which we saw above.

[26] See Berakhot 5:1 and 22:1, Shabbat 22:2 and 3:3, Taanit 7:2 and Hagigiga 5:2, B.M. 5:2 and Ez 18:2, and Yerushalmi 7:1-5:7, 6.Adarn Formula in P.E. and P.A. and much more.

[27] We note several times that Amoraim disagree on conditions in the sense of demanding. For example, Shmuel disagrees on all conditions in the issue of Piku'n in Yoma here 1-2 regarding the source of the law that Piku'n rejects the Sabbath. This is also stated in Nichota, and the Gemara there even draws the same conclusion.

[28] See for example Hazel stone 1 Kings 3:55, Happy light Talmud Torah, Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12, Part 13, Part 14, Part 15, Part 16, Part 17, Part 18, Part 19, Part 20, Part 21, Part 22, Part 23, Part 24, Part 25, Part 26, Minchat Asher Exodus 24:2, and more.

[29] theMGA AndMB You might argue that they recite the blessing because they are involved in studying the laws that concern them. But this is puzzling, because the KJV says that women are exempt from studying Torah, and therefore what they learn about the laws that concern them is not within the scope of the commandment of studying Torah (otherwise women are actually obligated to study Torah). If so, it is still difficult to see why they would recite the blessing of the commandments over the commandment of studying Torah?

[30] See for example Responsorial Psalm from heaven C. Y., Shaga C. 24-25, position Tel Sek'ah Mitzvah, A vessel of desire Rish P. Hazinu, the Rabbi on the blessings of God, "And behold," and his student,Emek Bracha C. A, BAbraham's Word Cha "C" 16 S.K.A. and the words of the Rabbi who is the one asking there and more. See also a detailed discussion in my articles inGood measure Listen to P., 567.

[31] And this will explain why the Torah blessings were established apart from the great love that is explained in the Shas (see Blessings 11b, and in the Jerusalem Blessings 155) and in the Poskim, which is also considered a Torah blessing. According to our method, it seems to be said that the great love is a blessing of the commandment on Talmud Torah, since it is said before the KS, which is the fulfillment of the commandment on the commandment of Talmud Torah. But the three Torah blessings that were established in the morning were established on the second part of the commandment, that which is based on the explanation. Therefore, it is clear why these three blessings are also needed in addition to the great love.

[32] See Rambam, Shemita and Yuval, 4:27, Malachim, 5:59, Ishosot, 5:32, and Ebedim, 8:6 and 9.

[33] Yes, it is in the book. The sons' mother is happy. Page 15:

Debza justified the opinion of the Rambam, who did not list the commandment to settle the Land of Israel in the 33 commandments, even though it was a model for her that was from the Torah, and it is according to the rule rooted in the fourth root of the number of commandments, not to list commandments that include the entire Torah; therefore, since settling the Land of Israel is such a precious commandment that it is included in all the commandments, and includes the entire Torah, and all the determination of the feasts and the beginnings of the months, and all its commandments depend on it... and so all the living beings of the nation depend on it, therefore it is a comprehensive and not a particular commandment; therefore, it does not come into consideration as a commandment that came to think only of individual commandments.

And he wrote in the Responsa Will have a say Part 5, Section 7:

The Gaon Rabbi Chaim Pelaji explained in the Responsa Nismat Kol Chai (part of Yoreh Deah, section 4, page 7, 8b), that the Maitat believes that even the Rambam acknowledges the halakhic statement of the Ramban, and that whatever the Yeshiva Eretz Yisrael did not count as a mitzvah, is a positive mitzvah, because it is a mitzvah that encompasses several mitzvahs that depend on the land, and the Rambam already wrote in Sefer HaMetzot, section 4, that a mitzvah that encompasses a mitzvah cannot be counted in the number of mitzvahs. And this is the opinion of the Radbaz, part 3 (section 11)..

[34] Again, I saw that this was already mentioned in the response. Sons of sons, Ch. 2 C. 44, p.

[35] And see the response. Tsitz Eliezer Part 7, Chapter 48 – The Orchot of the Laws, Chapter 12, which explained as follows:

I will only mention in this regard what I saw in the Responsa Toldot Yaakov (by the author Shari Yaakov), Chahom 68, who emphasized the research that the Rambam omitted from his list of commandments the commandment of settling in Israel, which many poskim and mabar have spoken about, and similarly, they also omitted from his list the statement of the Rabbi Kook, z"l, because the Rambam already included for us in his roots, in roots 4-5, that one should not list commandments that include the entire Torah or many commandments, as if he were to say, "Do everything that I have commanded you." And for this reason, he did not include the commandment of settling in the Land of Israel among the positive commandments, because it is a commandment that includes many commandments together, as the rabbis said, "The Torah commanded to settle in the Land in order to fulfill its commandments." This mitzvah of settling in Israel is such a mitzvah by which many mitzvahs are performed and is therefore called a comprehensive mitzvah, and the Rambam did not include such a mitzvah in his list of mitzvahs..

He did indeed attach this to the fourth root, and explained that the commandment to settle in the land includes many commandments. In his view, this is not that this commandment is a foundation in the Torah, but rather that it includes several other commandments, and therefore should not be enumerated. This is not accurate, since in the fourth root he deals with commandments that include the entire Torah, and not with duplication (which the ninth root deals with). In our article on the fourth root, we explained that it is not a root of duplication at all. Beyond that, the commandment to settle in the land is not duplicated with the commandments dependent on the land, since it is a commandment to dwell in the land, and these are specific commandments that require the dweller in the land to do certain things. It seems more accurate to say that the commandment to settle in the land is a kosher mitzvah for the commandments dependent on the land, as we suggested above.

[36] In the correction of the etiquette, we saw that there are two reasons: according to the Maharashtrian, the commandment is not necessary because it is fundamental, and according to the Rabbis, the commandment was harmful.

[37] For the sake of discussion, I assume here the opinion of the poskim that this depends on determining the moment of death. I will only note that in my articles, organ donation, Areas 29, 5766, p. 329, I argued, contrary to the opinion of all the jurists, that the moment of death is not relevant to this decision, and so on. I will also note that in another article of mine, the expertise of the halachic jurist as an evaluator of reality, Noon 7, 576, p. 21, I explained that, contrary to the prevailing perception in our society, this determination is not reserved for professionals (such as doctors) but for those I called "value-based decision-makers," meaning arbiters or legislators.

[38] See, for example, the article by Rabbi Yigal Shafran, which appears in the collection, Genetic Cloning – A Halachic Perspective (Editor: Yoni Raziel). The article also appears online: http://98.131.138.124/articles/GC/cloning04.asp .

[39] Rabbi Shafran, in his aforementioned article, comments that perhaps this is the reason why, according to Maimonides (Heb. Melchim 16:6), breeding an animal or raising a male offspring of a different sex is such a fundamental prohibition that they also apply to the children of Noah. Although Ritva Kiddushin 33a disagrees with this, as do many of the poskim. See also HaZon Ish Kilaayim 1:1.

[40] I will mention what I explained above in the method ofpenny And the disciples of Rabbeinu Yonah, regarding the doubt of the blessing of the Nahannin, which is a lemma (with regard to its Torah dimension).

[41] According to the Ramban, does a renewed interpretation of the Great Law (i.e., an interpretation that establishes a new prohibition) require a ruling of "do not deviate," or is it like a rabbinic rule whose source of validity according to the Ramban is different (see more on this in my book The Spirit of Justice).

[42] It seems that the Rashbam felt the difficulty, and therefore wrote: And let there be no deviants - because they cannot stand it, they will annul it, and if they are found to be deviants, then they will not be cut off." But this is a pressing matter.

[43] From this comes a rather sad conclusion, that we are all descendants of the people of the lands of that generation. After all, the 18th century who understood the prohibition from the beginning did not have children and did not keep the commandments. And those who did deal with this were the people of the lands who were mistaken and the Bible did not correct their mistake. If so, the children of the next generation are all descendants of those people of the lands. And perhaps all of these sayings are not halakhic, but rather sayings of mourning for the destruction and exile, and they are not intended to say that one should really give up the commandments in such a situation and consume the seed of our forefather Abraham for generations (and thus they will never keep the commandments, even when he prospers). And yet our view from the Gemara, even if it is a messiah according to Tomah, still stands.