What happened at two conservative conferences in our city (column 217)

With God’s help

Usually, in the Shabbat supplement of Makor Rishon, you can find advertisements for conferences on topics such as geography and Land of Israel science experts talking about pottery growing in the southern Judean Desert during the Middle Mamluk period. So for me, it was refreshing to discover an advertisement there for a conference held on Thursday, May 16, that deals with conservatism, right? The First Israeli Conservatism Conference (The location of which is kept secret in this ad, probably because of the evil eye.) At the same time, I was informed of another conference taking place on the same day, to the chagrin of conservative women, which deals withWomen in the Torah world, in memory of Rabbi Lichtenstein.[1] On second thought, perhaps there is no reason to worry that conservatives will not participate in the second conference, and vice versa. Both conferences have provoked in me sad reflections that mainly concern conservatism, and I thought I would share them with you.

A moral story: The frogs and the milk jug

There is a well-known folk parable about two frogs in a jug of milk, andThis is his language.:

Two frogs fell into a jug of milk. The sides of the jug were smooth and impossible to climb on. The frogs tried with all their might to jump out of the jug, but to no avail. The jug was too high and the milk was too deep. One of the frogs gave up, and after a short time she stopped trying… and drowned. But the other frog didn’t give up – she pushed desperately with her hands and feet to keep her head above the milk and not drown. Over and over again she tried to jump out and jump out. Then… wonder of wonders… slowly a solid lump of butter began to form under her feet stirring the milk. With one jump, the frog jumped out of the jug.

You probably won't be surprised that I have the opposite connotation when I hear this story. As far as I'm concerned, there's one frog that just climbs up and swims up, but the other one tries to fight the milk with all her might and doesn't let the milk overwhelm her. She pushes desperately with her hands and feet and slowly the milk curdles into butter. Our hardworking frog, of course, gets stuck inside and dies.

For me, this inverted parable reflects a situation where a person creates problems for himself where they don't really exist, and this complicates his search for solutions, which in itself kills him. And now back to our conferences.

First Conference: Women in the World of Torah

I understand that the questions that will be addressed in the third session of the seminar are mainly the function of the spiritual teacher and her integration with the community rabbi. I will provide background for those who are not sufficiently familiar with their sins. In recent years, there has been a criminal tendency in some modern religious communities to integrate women into the role of rabbis (not as wives of the rabbi but as rabbis themselves). But what can we do when our tradition does not view this favorably. As a solution to this matter, a new concept has been invented: Maharat (=halakhic, spiritual Torah leader), in which a woman can also serve. This is a brilliant solution, since there is no problem appointing women to it because this role does not appear inTable set (That is why there is no problem in appointing women as kosher judges, supreme judges, prime ministers, and no one is talking or whining except for a few oddballs from the ultra-conservative wing.) And from this you will understand that there is already a Maharat yeshiva in the US that ordains Maharatism. This idea, of course, arouses strong opposition in the Orthodox leadership (hence they may end up defining a woman as a rabbi, mercifully, to save her. It is not for nothing that our crystal-eyed rabbis protested against them. And as they observed in their holy spirit, indeed It's almost happening. acting).

Okay, so for now we have defined a Maharat (and for the rabbi: a Maharit, to make it clear that she is a woman. After all, a man can also be a spiritual and Torah halachic leader. Equality, right?!). In the next stage, a discussion begins on the integration of a Maharit with a rabbi in the community (see the list of questions above). How will the roles be divided, what will she do and what will his/her duties be, etc. Only one option is not raised in the questions for discussion: that the Maharit should not be a rabbi but a rabbi without a rabbi by her side. This option does not even come up for theoretical discussion, although the "daring" option that a Maharit is nothing more than a rabbi in disguise does arise (just be careful that Rabbi Yosef Karo will not notice this, may God bless him).

The particularly amusing thing about this situation is that everyone knows why a bride is entering the chuppa. Everyone understands that all these guys would like a woman to be able to serve as a rabbi, and it is also clear to everyone that this is the right thing to do. And since these are rabbis and scholars, I allow myself to assume that most of them also understand that there is no halachic impediment to this, except for conservatism that has no real basis (and here we are already touching on the second conference, but I will keep you in suspense). But at the same time, it is clear to everyone that it is impossible to put things on the table. Why? This is probably a combination of conservative instincts with confusion between them and the halacha, and of course the "political" problems (it will not be accepted, it is too early, etc.). After all, the starting point is that the halacha of Moses from Sinai is in our hands that a woman is disqualified from the rabbinate, and therefore they are looking for indirect ways. Now they have found the brilliant detour: Maharitism. But the roundabout ways create problems of properly combining this role with the role of the rabbi in the community (after all, if there is no rabbi in the community but only a Maharit, then there must also be a rabbi). And here we are, the day of the study on women's leadership in the world of Torah, which is conducting discussions aimed at solving this non-existent problem.

This whole thing is ostensibly conducted in an atmosphere of openness and liberalism, or religious innovation, an approach that finally gives women a place in spiritual leadership. But in fact, there is a farce here that is taking place entirely on conservative grounds. In other words, this is a discussion on the sociology of a conservative society: how it reconciles what it considers right (that a woman should do whatever she wants and can) with what is actually customary (that a woman cannot be a rabbi) even though it clearly has no point and no validity (because there is no halachic prohibition against a woman being a rabbi. See below). So they create funny titles and concepts out of thin air, like "maharatit." And now a learned discussion can begin about the combination between her and the rabbi, blah blah blah. A discussion that was entirely created out of the absurd constraints that they themselves do not believe in. One-sided one-sided...

Are you starting to see the frog and the butter? Instead of swimming and rising straight to the top (i.e. doing what everyone thinks is right and proper, appointing a woman as rabbi), these guys are getting bogged down in imaginary problems that they themselves have created, thereby churning the milk into butter and choking on it. This forces them to engage in pointless discussions that have nothing to do with halacha. How exactly will they determine the division of tasks there? Are there any hints in halacha about a woman's role as a community leader? This is a tico advice on how to appoint a woman as rabbi without revealing it to Rabbi Yosef Karo. To that end, the new term must be defined by the Maharat, and applied in reality without stepping on anyone's warts. Now I will explain it a little more.

Is there any obstacle to appointing a woman as a rabbi?

In the background of things stands the question of what on earth is the problem here. The question of Talmud Torah for women is probably already behind us. Everyone understands that women can and perhaps should study Torah, each according to her virtue and dignity. Therefore, that is not what the discussion is about. Ostensibly, the question of power to women (giving positions that involve authority) is what is on the agenda. But doesn't it seem a bit strange, not to say delusional and disconnected, when there are women prime ministers, ministers, and supreme judges (including the president of the Supreme Court), to discuss giving the supreme authoritative position of rabbi of the "Achvat Moshe" community in the synagogue in Kfar Etrog to a woman? I have not heard any rabbinical and halachic discussions about giving positions such as supreme judge or sara to women, but the role of a rabbi, a selahat mahrit, of a community, requires in-depth and learned conferences and discussions.

These discussions are similar to the discussions that took place over the Kaddish of the Orphan. My articles on first and second order jurisprudence I started "scholarly" discussions that dealt with the Kaddish of an orphan. I pointed out there that these are discussions that are structured in a very strange way. No one defines what halachic problem they are coming to address, and for good reason. There is no such problem. One could talk about a woman's voice being a pubic hair, or about modesty. But in relation to the norms accepted in our mixed communities where women take part in every area of life and in the community, these discussions seem completely disconnected and unfounded. We are already long past the question of a woman's voice, especially in this context (to the extent that there is such a problem in the synagogue at all). Questions of modesty in a woman's appearance in public are at best a bad joke in our circumstances. And yet in the discussion various sources are brought here and there, evidence and inaccuracies from the tongues of jurists for and against, when in fact there is no problem at all to address it. Once again, people are drowning in butter that they themselves, in their own rescue efforts, have whipped up.

I explained there that a structured halachic discussion should begin with an analysis of the question and identifying the halachic components related to it: commandments and prohibitions from the Torah, regulations or decrees of rabbis, or customs and halachic policies. After laying out the basic map, a discussion should be opened on each of the sections and its application to us, and finally, the outcome of all that has been said regarding the question should be summarized and concluded with a halachic ruling. It is impossible to begin a discussion by citing sources here and there when there are no halachic sections at issue. This is similar to discussing the question of whether it is permissible to watch birds in Agmon Hula, and to bring evidence from the precise words of the poskim who saw birds in various places. The most fundamental foundation is missing here: what are the halachic sections at issue? What even needs to be discussed? As I wrote there, if I were to write a reply to an orphan kaddish, it would be formulated something like this: It is permissible, because there is no reason to prohibit it (non ishio). Then perhaps one can talk about social meanings, recommend or object, but that is really not a halakhic matter. Such detached halakhic answers can only appear when one approaches halakhic law in the second order, that is, one relies on sources without analyzing things from their foundation.

Everything that is not forbidden is permitted.

In the legal world it is accepted "The principle of legality", according to which, for the citizen, everything that is not forbidden is permitted (and for the authorities, the opposite). This is also the situation in Halacha: everything that is not forbidden is permitted. The burden of proof and discussion is on the one who claims the existence of a prohibition. He must explain by virtue of which articles he claims this. Only after articles are raised to prohibit, if at all, is there room to begin discussing whether to permit.

This is exactly the situation with regard to a woman serving as a community rabbi. We can discuss women's Torah study, but that is already behind us. Even handing over roles of authority to women is already well behind us. So what exactly are we discussing here? What is the problem with a woman (who is worthy of it in terms of personality and knowledge) serving as a community rabbi? But with us, even in the most liberal communities (except for one, among those I know), this is completely out of the question. The most liberal communities are discussing the question of how to combine the role of rabbi with the role of rabbi, and in fact how to square the circle, when the option of appointing a rabbi is not even on the agenda. This is the result of second-order halachic thinking: it is accepted that one does not appoint and we do not have the sources that allow one to be appointed, and that is it. But there is no problem at all, so why do we need sources? It is really not interesting.

Disproportion

It is interesting to note that Prof. David the White, one of the most well-known Talmudic scholars, resigned from the Conservative movement on this basis. I have always wondered how he was willing to swallow everything there, and it was precisely a banal issue like appointing women as rabbis that broke him. Now I saw inWikipedia There was actually a similar criticism against him (see note 1):

Moderate organizations such as "Ada" rejected Livni, arguing that he and his supporters did not express opposition to issues such as allowing driving on Shabbat or effectively abolishing many marriage laws, but rather withdrew on a borderline issue such as women's ordination..

This reminds me of the well-known story about theLion's roar He arrived at a community to serve as a rabbi, and asked for the community book (this is the place where all the customs practiced there are written down). They brought him the book and he began to copy the Ten Commandments into it. When they asked him about the reason for this, he explained that he was trying to ensure that people would be as careful about the Ten Commandments as they were about who would say Kaddish and when.

There are quite a few serious problems in religious society, in halakhic law and in the Torah worldview. There is secularization on a worrying scale, and there are also halakhic questions and difficult hardships. It seems strange to me to devote a session to discussing combining the role of a Maharit with that of a community rabbi. I'm sorry, but it sounds crazy to me. It is possible that this disconnect is one of the reasons for some of the problems I listed.

The Conservative Conference

Here I come to the first Israeli conservatism conference. When I saw the title, my initial reaction was one of ridicule. I don't know, but there is something stale and repulsive to me about conservatism as a principled approach. It seems strange to me to hold a conference whose goal is to promote an anachronistic matter, that is, to move towards the past. But on second thought, I thought that innovation is actually just as much of a value to me.

A person who adopts a position based on practical considerations, and it happens to be conservative (conforms to what was in the past) is not a conservative. Likewise, someone who adopts a new position based on practical considerations is not an innovator. Conservatism and innovation as an ideology are concerned with adopting conservative or innovative positions because they are such. What is called conservatism today (economic and social right) is nothing more than a collection of positions that correspond to what was in the past, but the reasoning for them is not necessarily conservative. It can be argued that these positions are correct or more reasonable in themselves. But as mentioned, this is not conservatism. Conservatism is arguing in their favor just because that is how it was in the past. But this is precisely where the problem lies.

A person is supposed to form a position according to what he sees. When I am faced with two options for action, or two ideological paths that I have to choose between, what I am supposed to do is think and decide which one is preferable in my opinion, be it conservative or innovative. Hence, both the conservative and the innovative are actually using irrelevant considerations to form positions. One chooses the conservative path because it is conservative and the other chooses the innovative path because it is innovative. The equal side of both is that they do not consider the relevant considerations.

I think I once wrote here that a halachic judge is not supposed to be conservative, nor is he innovative or original. He must determine the halachic law according to his best understanding and according to what he thinks is right. If he determines a halachic position because it is conservative or because it is innovative, he is being promoted in his position. This does not mean that there is no conservative or innovative judge. Of course there is. My argument is that this consideration should not play a part in the halachic decision itself. Scholars will come, study the rulings of that judge, and determine whether he is conservative or innovative. That is their role, but it has nothing to do with his own considerations.

The arguments for conservatism are usually based on social stability and the fact that the wisdom accumulated over generations is probably superior to new ideas. But no one can seriously argue that these are sufficient criteria for adopting any position. At most, if I am in doubt, they can advise me on these grounds to remain conservative.

In my book True and unstable I defined fundamentalism as a concept that does not put itself to the test of critical thinking. A person who adopts a position not because of reasons for the substance of the matter but because of its general nature and its relationship to other positions is also a type of fundamentalist. He adopts conservatism or innovation simply because they are such, just as the Muslim fundamentalist adopts the position of the caliph, the New Ageist that of the alien (who communicates with him), the Hasidic the position of his Rebbe, and so on, and all this just because the caliph/Rebbe/Alien said so, without putting it to the test of critical thinking.

Is there an argument here?

In light of all that has been said so far, I actually assume that among the supporters of conservatism who participated in the conference there are no people who advocate adopting concepts simply because they fit what was in the past (I will call this fundamentalist conservatism). The ones I know there are sober people, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the term conservatism appears there in its sober sense. Sober conservatism comes to express the negation of another concept: the preference for the new and the disdain for the old just because it is old. The sober conservative's goal is not to recommend the unimportant adoption of positions, but mainly to oppose ideological innovation, that is, the automatic disdain for the old. He argues that it is worth examining the existing position as well and not necessarily adopting a new position. The old is not always stupid, he argues against the innovators.

If you see the Conference program You will see that this is a collection of issues that are not necessarily related. From this, it seems that the conclusion is that this is indeed fundamentalist conservatism, since there is no reason in principle that a certain person who believes in the ideas of a market economy would necessarily also oppose postmodernism and champion a national and conservative culture. Only a person who clings to what was because it was so in the past, adopts all these positions in one package deal. But as mentioned, from my acquaintance with the individuals who are working, it is more likely to me that these are people who have reached conclusions on the various issues for practical reasons, but that in the end they all found themselves in a situation where the position they see is the position that was in the past, and thus a The Conservative Movement As mentioned, I assumed that this was a sober conservatism (which is actually not really conservatism).

If we examine the other side of the coin, we will see that the situation is similar there too. I do not know an intelligent person who advocates innovation for its own sake, that is, that the very novelty of a position is reason enough for him to adopt it. This is fundamentalist innovation that lacks logic. A sober innovator will tell you that his goal is to challenge conservative fixed thinking. He seeks to get people to consider new ways, and not always stick to the old. He will argue that conclusions should be formulated in light of practical considerations and not be deterred by something new. But our sober conservative should also agree with this.

So, conservatism and fundamentalist innovation can fight each other. But these are two rather silly positions, and therefore it is not really interesting to deal with them. In contrast, conservatism and sober innovation essentially say the same thing, only in opposite words. Both propose examining each position on its own merits and not settling on the old or the new, exactly what my little ego would also suggest. So now I wonder what the purpose of the first Israeli conservatism conference is: If this is indeed sober conservatism, as I assume, then there is no fundamental difference between it and sober innovation. I find it difficult to assume that the purpose of the conference is to say that in cases where we have no considerations to prefer an innovative or conservative position (=an intellectual or value tie) we should adopt a conservative position. Such cases are quite rare, if at all, and it is not really worth devoting a conference to them.

The obvious conclusion is that the goal of the conference is to present sober conservatism as an alternative to innovation. But sober innovation is almost the same position as sober conservatism. Therefore, it seems that the conference is intended to oppose unsober (fundamentalist) innovation. This is a conference whose purpose is to argue that it is worth considering the old positions and not automatically prefer the new ones. But to the same extent, when the first Israeli Innovation Conference is held, I assume that it will present the opposite picture: its goal will be to fight against unsober conservatism and present a sober innovative position. In other words, it will want to call on us to consider new positions and not stick to the old. But as I explained, these two positions are identical.

Either way, the conclusion is that one must be sober, meaning that one must seriously and substantively consider all options, and not succumb to irrelevant a priori dictates, both innovative and conservative, meaning that one must not be a fundamentalist. It seems to me that there is no great innovation here (our sages have already said about this: It is better to be young, healthy, beautiful, rich and wise, than old, sick, ugly, poor and stupid). But that does not help me understand why such a conference should be held under the title of conservatism (or innovation). If one wants to hold such a conference, sober conservatives and innovators can get together and hold a conference in favor of sobriety and substantive consideration and against uncritical fundamentalism. I am completely in favor, although I must say that this also sounds a bit trivial. Of course, one can take various examples and point out various failures in thinking about them, and offer sober alternatives, ancient or new. Either way, I see no point in a conference on conservatism.

For some reason, the conference on conservatism evokes the same feelings in me as the discussion about combining Maharatiism with a rabbi in the spiritual leadership of a community. Not only because both reflect a strange conservatism (clinging to the old just because it's old), but mainly because on second thought it's clear that both are raising a non-existent problem, both invent a term (Maharati, or conservatism) to evade it, and then both hold a conference to offer advice on how to solve it (what to do with the modernist scoundrels, or how to combine Maharati with the rabbi). These discussions are nothing more than a butter churn. What is there to discuss? Just sit up and do what you all believe in.

[1] Not to leave the issue incomplete, I will comment on the nickname "Ra"l" that is increasingly being used in our regions. In my humble opinion, I do not understand what is wrong with "Rabbi Lichtenstein". If it were not for the demi-stephina of the Holy Spirit, whose students decided to immortalize him with the initials Ra"l, apparently in the hope of granting him a place in the pantheon of rumor-mongers, he would not have been inferior to Rabbi Shagar, the Ra-N, the Rashba and the Maimonides (although some may say that for Rabbi Shagar this abbreviation was the family name that he himself used). Forgive me for the pettiness, but I really do not like tricks like this. Rabbi Lichtenstein was an impressive enough personality even without doing tricks for him in public relations. This reminds me of those who insist on calling any rabbi the title "Rabbi" (Rabbi Kook, Rabbi Soloveitchik, Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky, etc.) without adding his name, to emphasize that each reader/listener must understand that this is the rabbi (Rashtava"G) and no one else. Again, ultra-Orthodox PR tricks.