Autonomous thinking versus tradition and authority (column 304)

With God’s help

I'd like to end the exhausting series we've been through, so here's a concluding column that deals with a slightly different angle of the discussion.

A few days ago I was asked Should logical consideration be preferred over tradition (in light of the issue of Shabbat 63b). I answered that the question is not defined, because it depends on the source of the tradition, its reliability, and the strength of the explanation that stands against it. I wrote that this reminds me of the question of whether it is better to push through language or through explanation, which is also not well defined, and for the same reasons. The very name of the question is also to what extent this interpretation is pushed through language and how much better through explanation. The context of the question was probably my statements in the last columns about the fact that God does not know in advance what will be done (and other statements, especially those dealing with providence). I am occasionally accused of giving too much weight to reason and logical consideration over tradition. Do I give "too much weight"? Absolutely yes. But "too much", in my opinion, absolutely not.

I do not intend to enter here again into a fundamental discussion about authority regarding facts, and all the considerations that have already been exhausted here on the site. But to conclude last week's busy series, I thought (as I wrote at the end of the previous column) that there is room to resort to the question of tradition versus logical judgment, and this time in light of sources. Although sources are not really needed in such a matter (the need for sources in the question of the relationship to sources is problematic), I will do so as a "according to your opinion". My goal is to show that even someone who follows sources and "tradition" can come to prefer reason over tradition. The variety of sources that I will bring will of course not be exhaustive. It would be possible to bring several introductions that deal with this matter (even in relation to halacha, let alone in relation to intellectual issues), such as the introduction of theListen carefully, IntroductionLetters of Moses and more, but I won't do that here. In the past (e.g. here) I have also dealt with the status of precedents and sources in relation to halacha, and as is well known, in my opinion there is a great exaggeration in their status there as well, even though in the field of halacha, at least from a principled and conceptual point of view, there is room for definitions of (formal) authority, which does not exist in the intellectual field. But if this is the case in the field of halacha, then in the intellectual field the use of authoritative arguments is nothing more than an attempt to silence, and precisely for this reason it is very important in my opinion to dismantle them. The conformity in the name of which those who hold these positions speak leads us to grasp at baseless and illogical nonsense as if they were binding truths that came down to us directly from heaven and that must not be disputed. The entire "thinness" of my trilogy is directed against this harmful and stupid approach.

In this column I will focus on three interesting sources: the introduction by Rabbi Shimon ShkopStraight hair, a rule that is presented inMagen Abraham C. Keno and an interesting letter by Rabbi Avraham ben Maimonides, who also brings his father's opinion on the matter of authority and logic. For some reason, it seems to me that the first two sources have already been discussed here before, but so far I have not found them. In any case, due to their great likability and importance, I bring them here. The main point of the column is the citation of the sources that speak for themselves, and I accompany them with a brief explanation in the sense of "sufficient for the servants of God."

Starting point

Usually, the use of "tradition" as an argument in an argument reflects a lack of relevant reasoning and arguments, which logicians call the fallacy of appealing to authority (sometimes called, inaccurately, "the fallacy ofAd hominem",[1] And a few more "eds"). When your arguments run out, you turn to authority ("Even so-and-so or unknown people who are highly educated geniuses think like me!" and so on). The same goes for labels like 'heresy' ("It is heresy to say this against the opinion of all the great men of the generation," or "all the sages/wisdom of the generations," etc.), which I have also dealt with more than once. Needless to say, none of this really impresses me, and for many reasons. First, it is sometimes a matter of relying on people who have no proven ability in the field in question (in my opinion, the sages of the Talmud and its interpreters are not necessarily great scholars or have exceptional skill in philosophy, logic, science, and metaphysics). Second, traditions of thought are created in different and strange ways, and they have their own dynamics, how one position or another takes over the discourse or consciousness. Third, in many cases there is no tradition at all, and the expression "against tradition" or "against all the great men of the generation" simply expresses the opinion of the speaker (anyone who does not think like him, by definition, is not one of the great men of the generation and does not belong to the "tradition"). This may sound silly to you, but when you think about it a little, you will discover that these are claims that are made every day. Fourth, the dominant opinion (and sometimes it is not even that) is presented as binding despite the existence of other opinions, simply because there is no other reason. Fifth, in my opinion, even where there is perfect unanimity of opinion among all the thinkers, this does not mean that they are right. There is still room for logical consideration. It is a common saying that there is no authority in matters of fact and that one cannot be required to ignore one's own logic and judgment.

As I will explain later, I certainly give weight to the opinions of wise people, but this weight is not decisive. Furthermore, I give no less important weight to open discourse, and see no importance in concealment or conformity. Nor am I filled with terrible fears for those ordinary people who will follow my opinion and "fail, God forbid, in heresy," since I provide reasons and do not make binding determinations. The responsibility for one's positions remains with each of us. Beyond that, even those with the opinions that dominate the discourse are not afraid that all the fools will follow their opinion (and this also happens in practice). Nothing prevents them from publishing their positions (which are sometimes unfounded). Therefore, these arguments for silencing only motivate me to say things more strongly and sharply.

Introduction to 'Shaarei Yashar'

I assume that many of the site's readers don't need to preface their relationship withRabbi Shimon. He was a unique Jew. A scholar and Lithuanian Rosh Yeshiva in the most beautiful sense of the word (a fellow student of Rabbi Chaim of Brisk). Open and with an original and courageous mind, with the most impressive logical and philosophical intuitions (as far as I know, he had no philosophical education). I will note that there are several "dark spots" in his biography. He was a candidate to become Rosh Yeshiva of the 'Mercaz HaRav', although in the end this did not come to fruition.[2] What is less well-known is his tenure as Rosh Yeshiva of Rabbi Yitzhak Elchanan (Yeshiva University) in the US, for several months, until he was called by Rabbi Ozer to return to Europe. But don't tell anyone.

It seems to me that another prominent feature of Rabbi Shimon's personality and thought, which of course adds to my liking for him, was his lack of references and his lack of fear of expressing innovative and independent positions (and all this within the framework of a halakhic-scholarly discussion. Which makes me like him even more). This is the point I wanted to focus on here.

The things I will discuss are presented in his introduction to his main book. Straight hair, where he writes as follows:

And for the beginning of the training to be worthy of possessing the Torah, the Torah required special conditions, and the first condition was labor and achievement… Therefore, Moses our Lord found it appropriate that these tablets be broken and that efforts be made to receive other tablets, namely, that the first tablets were the work of God, like the body of the writing, as is explained in the Torah, and the last tablets were the work of man, as it is written, “He carved for you two tablets of stone.” And the matter of the tablets is something that establishes and maintains that there will be no letters floating in the air, and since they were the work of God, they would stand forever, but the second ones, which were the work of man, do not exist only under conditions and limitations. And the beginning of the reception of the Torah by Moses our Lord was a figure and a sign for all the children of Israel who received the Torah, that as the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses our Lord, “He carved for you two tablets of stone.” Likewise, he hinted to all the recipients of the Torah that every man of Israel should prepare tablets for himself, to write on them the word of God, and according to his preparation in preparing the tablets, so will his reception be…

It seems that his words here are based on the well-known Midrash Chazal, "And in his Torah he meditated day and night" – Torah Dilya (see Kiddushin 2b. Initially they understood that this was the Torah of God, but as a conclusion they interpreted the Torah of the sage who meditated on it).[3].

He then explains this further, writing thus:

And now I know that this book of mine will not be acceptable to everyone, because many students are not accustomed to thinking through the method of study, as through the method of study that surrounds and progresses in most of the matters discussed in this book, because there are many paths to Torah and each one finds a taste according to his habit, and moreover, most of the matters explained in it are matters that require study and understanding, and will not be grasped even by an understanding heart by looking at it in a vague way, and not every person wants to attribute the deficiency to himself due to the depth of the concept and the deficiency of the one who understands. And I heard a nice and acceptable thing on behalf of my brother-in-law, the late Rabbi Mohar Shlomo Zalman, in Rabbi Kalman Abel Metelz, where it is said in the Gemara BK (21) that in this matter he enjoyed and that there was no lack, Rabbi Chisda said to Maremi bar Hama and replied to him, "Go, serve me," Shekel Sudra volume 11, which is a first view of the question, and the aforementioned Rabbi explained that the matter is that in a matter that requires study and understanding, the essence of the matter depends on whether the student believes in the merit of the teacher, then if he does not understand at first, the deficiency will be imposed on himself, and he will add courage to touch himself and then he will understand at last, but if the words of the teacher are easy in his eyes and it is not worth his while to put in the effort to work on them, then if he does not accept the words with the first weight, he will be comforted or will nullify them in his heart and that is enough. Therefore, when Rami bar Hama knew the depth of the matter that he wanted to teach him, he did not want to teach him until it was clear to him that Rabbi Chisda is longing for To learn from him as a student of a rabbi, and therefore they did not learn this until he served as a student of a rabbi, and Dfacha.

He explains that you cannot learn from a rabbi if you do not place your initial trust in him before he even opens his mouth. Otherwise, everything you learn from him and do not understand at first glance will be rejected out of hand, and thus you will end up with only what you had in you at the beginning. Thus, you will not learn anything new from a rabbi. Learning from a rabbi means improving and changing perceptions, and this will not happen if the student does not have a priori trust in his rabbi. That is why Rami bar Hama was not willing to teach Rav Chisda before serving him.[4]

Continuing his remarks there, he brings up the other side of the coin:

And I think that only those who have read my words before seeing or hearing them will find a desire to ponder this book of mine and will consider it in their eyes to also deepen their study even if they do not understand them at first glance, and then they will accept my words in the name of God. But it is worth knowing and considering in my opinion what the late Rabbi Meir said in the celebration, page 15b, and Rabbi Meir, who is a complete Torah learner from his mouth, and did not Rabba bar bar Hanna say that Rabbi Yochanan said, "Why is it written that the lips of a priest should guard knowledge and Torah, they should seek from his mouth, because he is the angel of the Lord of hosts?" If the Rabbi resembles the angel of the Lord of hosts, they should seek Torah from his mouth, and if not, they should not seek Torah from him. And the Shas concludes that the question is not whether it is in the great or in the small, and it is worth understanding in the 7th chapter how Rabbi Yochanan concludes his words that his words are only in the small and not in the great, and that when we examine carefully what Rabbi Yochanan said, they should seek Torah from him, and he did not say, they should learn from him, that in truth he who learns from his fellow is not One learns from the mouth of the teacher, but rather listens and weighs with the balance of his mind, and he understands the matter, and this one does not learn from the mouth of the teacher, only from the mind of the teacher, and Torah from here is considered if he accepts the things as he heard them without criticism, and on this matter Rabbi Yochanan said that receiving Torah from here is not appropriate only if the rabbi resembles the angel of the Lord of hosts.

Even if you trust your rabbi, this does not exempt you from considering his words with a level of intelligence. Giving him trust is only intended to ensure that you examine things again and again before rejecting them. But if in the end you are not convinced, you should not accept the things even though it is a rabbi in whom you have great trust. It seems to me that this is the correct basis for the proper attitude towards tradition and its bearers: respect it and suspect it. A good source for these things can be found in the words ofMagen Abraham They are also very dear to me.

Source of the words of the 'Magen Avraham'

theMagen Abraham In Si' Kanu he brought a collection of many laws for which he could not find another suitable place. Among other things, he brings the following law there:

If one hears a law and it seems to him that the law is thus, it is permissible to say in the name of a great man, for he is a flaming fire from his own people [Eruvin, page 51 and Pesachim, page 122] and at the end of Tractate Kala Ita, whoever says something in the name of a wise man who has not finished it causes the Divine Presence to depart, etc. in the blessings of page 27, in the name of Bat 33 and 37.

Two Talmudic issues indicate that it is permissible to say a halakha in the name of a great person who did not say it, only so that they will accept it from him. Although he is content with this conclusion, the first aspect also needs to be understood.

And I have already commented here in the past (again, I did not find it now) that this is very puzzling. It seems that a person from the land can completely mislead his friend in halakhah just because he thinks so. How is it possible that halakhah allows a person to do such a false thing? I will also add another comment. We have found great anger towards falsifiers of halakhic sources, such as The Jerusalemite forgery on holy things and so on, even though ostensibly according to theMGA The counterfeiter acted completely legally. So why the anger?

In my opinion, there is no doubt that this (halachic?) teaching of theMGA I implicitly assume that even if someone hears a halakha in the name of a great person, they are not supposed to accept it. If there were an obligation to accept a halakha heard in the name of a great person, it is clear to me as a word that there was no permission to do such a thing. But now it is not clear why to say it in the name of a great person at all? If the halakha will not be accepted even if it is said in the name of a great person, then what is the purpose of this permission? And is it permissible to simply lie? It seems that this permission to lie is intended to allow me to convince the listener to seriously consider my words before he forms a position on them. According to my suggestion, this is a person who feels that his arguments are not being treated properly and are being rejected out of hand simply because he is being looked down upon. Such a person is allowed to state his claims in the name of a great person so that the listener will seriously consider the claims, and then decide whether to accept or reject them (after all, the assumption is that there is no obligation to accept anything said in the name of a great person).

Now we can also understand why the anger over the Jerusalem forger and his ilk arose. The Talmuds have a binding status, and the law written in the Talmud is obligatory to accept. If a person hears a law written in the Talmud, he must accept it, and therefore it is clear that in such a situation there is no permission to say something in the name of the Talmud so that they will accept it from it. In such a situation, the listener cannot consider the matter in his own mind, since he must accept it, and therefore it is clear that there is no permission to lie and tell him the matter in the name of the authoritative source.

This Talmudic teaching is a good source for Rabbi Shkop's position, according to which one should treat a great person with respect and seriously consider his words before forming a position, whether to accept or reject them, but at the same time, there is no obligation and even prohibition to accept words just because a great person said them. The bottom line is that my position should be determined solely by reasons and considerations, and not by the person (ad hominem).

Two reasons to be wary of appealing to authority

Two reasons can be offered for this: First, even an expert can be wrong. Second, there is a moral obligation to formulate positions autonomously (although this is mainly true of norms and less so of facts).

In this context, it is worth seeing the opening remarks of Gilad (the blog's owner) in the blog "Sharp Thinking", incolumn Which deals with appeal to authority:

We recently talked about Appeal to authority. We have mainly dealt with imaginary experts, or real experts who advise outside their field of expertise. Today we will move up a level and meet an expert who makes claims within the scope of his expertise. Even in such a case, it is important to use sharp thinking. Sometimes things really are beyond our education or intellectual abilities, but not always. Don't underestimate your abilities. Think, and ask questions.!

I recommend reading the entire column, it truly discusses an instructive example of a person spouting nonsense from a professor who supposedly has expertise and authority.

It is important to note here that the failure to appeal to authority is not a failure in the full sense, since the words of a person with professional authority are truly worthy of trust. I will not pass up the rare opportunity to agree with Rabbi Moshe Ratt, who insists on this. hereI will just point out that appealing to authority is still a failure, if we take authority as an argument that makes us give up examining things for themselves. This is exactly what we saw inMGA And in the introduction Time. Wise people deserve respect, but not unqualified trust. In this column, I deal with the fallacy of appealing to authority solely in this sense. Incidentally, Rabbi Rat in his article there directs his words to defending tradition against its attackers, and therefore focuses on the first part (appealing to authority and appealing to the majority – ad populum, are not failures). I think it is not without reason that he ignores the other side of the coin, namely that relying on the majority and authority as a substitute for arguments is definitely a fallacy. In my opinion, this is what some of his claims against me, that I go against tradition and various authorities, are based on (our essential debate on the issue of providence, if it were not for his failure to appeal to the majority and authority, would not have taken place at all, in my opinion. It was clear to him, too, that I was right).

A clear and concise expression of this autonomous approach can be found in the writings of Rabbi Avraham ben Maimonides, which we will now see.[5]

The letter of Rabbi Avraham ben Maimonides

In the introduction to the first volume of Ein Yaakov Several articles are presented that deal with the appropriate attitude towards the legends of the Sages. Among other things, a letter from Rabbi Avraham ben Maimonides (=Rav"m) is presented there,[6] And in it he presents an autonomist position like the one I have described so far.[7] I would now like to quote most of the first part of his remarks and accompany them with comments from me:

Know that you must know. Anyone who wants to present a known opinion, and to present it as a statement and accept its opinion without studying and understanding the matter of that opinion, whether it is true or not, that this is one of the bad opinions, and he is forbidden from the path of the Torah and also from the path of reason.

Accepting something just because someone else said it is forbidden logically (from the perspective of reason), which is quite clear, but the Rabbinate reiterates that it is also forbidden from the perspective of the Torah.

It is important to note that the term 'de'ot' in the Sages and Rambam is used in two meanings: views and virtues. For example, the laws of de'ot in the Rambam do not deal with correct views but with good virtues (the middle way). I assume that here too, when he writes "among the bad views," he means to say that this is a bad virtue. Note the reversal, which I believe is intentional, made in his words compared to the accepted perceptions: It is accepted to think that standing up for one's opinion and placing too much trust in one's own intelligence is a bad virtue (pride), while bowing down to the sages and accepting their opinion is a good virtue (humility and seeking the truth). But Rambam says here exactly the opposite: bowing down to authority is a bad virtue, and autonomy is a good virtue. The reason for this is that standing up for one's opinion does not necessarily express pride, but rather autonomy, and autonomy is an important Torah and moral value (see, for example, my articles on this in here andhere).

Now he explains the opening statement:

It is not from the path of reason – because it entails a deficit and deficiency in observing what is to be believed.

This is contrary to reason and logic because if you give too much trust to the things you are told, you do not delve into them and investigate them, and then you may not understand them properly. It is interesting that, contrary to what I would expect, the RAB does not base this on the reasoning we would expect: you will simply accept things that are not true as true.

But immediately afterwards he also brings this obvious argument:

And from the path of the Torah – because it deviates from the path of truth and deviates from the straight line.

It is interesting that from his perspective, this reasoning is the basis for the Torah prohibition, not for the prohibition based on reason. Accepting incorrect truths (after all, even a wise and highly skilled person in his field can make mistakes) as truth is a Torah prohibition, and the sin against reason is that even if this truth is true, if you adopt a policy of acceptance by virtue of appealing to authority, there is a chance that you will not understand things correctly.

The Rabbinate probably feels the reversal of events that he has made here, and therefore now cites Torah sources for the same prohibition:

God Almighty said (Leviticus 19:15) "You shall not respect the person of the poor, nor shall you honor the person of the great. In righteousness you shall judge your neighbor." And he said (Deuteronomy 1:17) "You shall not respect persons in judgment," etc.

Although these sources do not deal with the acceptance of opinions and views, it can be understood from them that the same problem exists in accepting views by virtue of authority. Note that these sources indicate that just as one should not accept an opinion simply because the person who said it is wise ("great"), so one should not reject an opinion simply because the person who said it is foolish ("poor"). The consideration should be relevant to the substance of the opinion and the argument itself ("You shall judge your fellow man with justice").

This is probably what he means in the following sentence:

And there is no difference between accepting that opinion and standing without evidence, or between believing what it says and showing respect to it and claiming that the truth is with it without a doubt, because he is a great man, "and trustworthy, and trustworthy, and trustworthy." (1 Kings 5:11)All of this is not evidence, but it is forbidden.

The other side of the comparison is missing here ("and there is no difference" between what and what?). From what I wrote above, I assume that his intention is that it is also forbidden to reject an opinion due to a lack of appreciation for the one who says it (as we saw above in the words of theMGA).

Now comes a radical conclusion:

And according to this introduction, we are not obligated, because of the greatness of the virtue and character of the Talmudic sages, to the completeness of their understanding in the interpretation of the Torah and its grammar, and the correctness of their statements in explaining its generalities and details, that we should rely on them and place our trust in all their statements in medicine, and in the wisdom of nature and nature. And to believe them as we believe them in the interpretation of the Torah, whose ultimate wisdom is in their hands and to whom it was entrusted for its instruction to mankind, as is stated in the matter of (Deuteronomy 17:11) "According to the Torah which is taught" etc.

He does not stop with the sages of the generations, but goes back to the Talmud. He claims that we are not allowed to accept the words of the sages of the Talmud just because they are wise men. The reasoning is that their wisdom in the field of Torah does not mean that they are right in other areas. But this is a surprising reasoning, since in light of what we saw above, he was supposed to say that even if they were wise in all areas, it would still be forbidden to accept their words just because of that. Furthermore, it is implied from his words that in the field of Torah where they are wise, we are supposed to accept their words.

It seems to me that it is worth being precise in his language. When he explains their authority in the Torah, he gives two different reasons: "That the purpose of its wisdom is in their hands and it was given to them to teach it to people." They are both great sages in this field (they have substantial authority) and they are also the authorized entity in the Torah (formal authority).[8] In light of the introduction, it seems that his main intention was the second reason, namely, formal authority. Without this, in his opinion, even in the Torah realm, it would not be appropriate to accept their opinion.

And truly, we found this to be the case in the words of theAs of today At the beginning of the second chapter of Halachot Memariam, he wrote:

And if you say, "If so, then I do not understand the Amorites, then in every argument, they are not allowed to say anything from the Mishnah or from the Baraita and the Tzal, please say that I am not Tanna." And if he does not say so, then it is his fault, and according to the words of our Rabbeinu, permission is given to them to disagree with the words of the Tannaites. And it can be said that from the day the Mishnah was signed, they held and accepted that later generations would not disagree with the first, and they did the same with the signing of the Gamma, which from the day it was signed, no one was allowed to disagree with it:

He does not justify this by saying that the conditions were greater (although this could of course be true), but by saying that we accepted their authority over us. See alsoThe above articles About authority and autonomy.

The Rabbi now continues and cites a source for his statement:[9]

You see, wise men, what regarding They say that we will not be able to understand their way of thinking, their speech, and their deeds. (Khulin Kad.) "By God, if Joshua ben Nun had said this, we would not have obeyed him." In other words, I would not have believed him, even though he was a prophet, since he did not have the ability to announce the matter intentionally through the means of explanation and negotiation and the ways in which the Talmud is taught. And this is enough evidence and example.

So far we have seen the principle learned from "Do not boast about the face of a great man." Now the Rabbi continues and applies "Do not carry the face of a poor man," which brings us to the other side of the coin:

And we will not argue with them any further, since we find them saying that the words of the remedies were not confirmed or fulfilled in the Gemara, and regarding the matter of the Stone of Resurrection, they said (Saturday Saturday) Which prevents the fallen from falling, which is not aligned, and so on, many other matters discussed in Chapter Eight, which runs in Tractate Shabbat. (small:) etc'…

Just as we should not accept the words of sages in areas where they have no authority simply because of their wisdom, we must not disregard their correct words simply because they were wrong about other things.

And from the Talmudic sages, Rabbah moves on to Aristotle (who was the greatest of philosophers, one level below prophecy, according to Maimonides), and in him too he presents the two sides that we have seen:

Likewise, we cannot argue with Aristotle and say: Since he is the master of the wise philosophers, and he established true miracles about the reality of the Creator, blessed be He, and the like, from the true things that came in miracles and struck the path of truth, because he indeed found the truth in the belief of the pre-existence of the world, and that the Creator, blessed be He, does not know the details, and the like. Nor can we refute him and say: Since he erred in his belief in these, because he erred in all his statements.

And the conclusion:

But we, and every wise and intelligent person, have to observe on Every opinion and every article, in a way that must be observed – and verified and upheld what is worthy of being upheld, and annulled what is worthy of being annulled, and refrained from passing judgment, in what has not been decided on one of the two opposites, said those who said it. When we see those z"l who said it (Yevamot Aw:) "If it is a law – we accept, and if it is a law – there is a response." And so they do in what has not been decided by one of the two parties, who establish it by their statement about it. (Saturday) "A draw," and they return to their knowledge that was confirmed by their saying in many places. (Tainan 20:) Rabbi Pluni retracted his words, "The House of Hillel returned to instruct according to the words of the House of Shammai." (Mishnah Idiyot 1:12)And greater than this in their confession and love through the law they said. (Nada 6th.) "Oki Rava spoke about it and preached and said: "The things I have said to you are wrong on my part." And these matters and the like should not be understood and observed because he was great in advice and wisdom, but rather because of the evidence and miracles that are upon them. And so said Abba Mori, the late, in Mori, and it is a clear matter and an easy matter in the eyes of anyone who is inclined above the desires of his body. (Morah Nebuchim 1:34).

And while we're on the subject of appealing to authority, we should note that at the end of his remarks here he mentions that the source of this approach is his father, Maimonides.

He concludes his remarks in this section, with an instructive question in Pesachim 32b (which was also interpreted in this way by Maimonides). Let us begin with the question and see what his remarks are directed towards. The Gemara cites two disputes between the sages of Israel and the sages of the nations:

Our rabbis say that the sages of Israel say that the wheel is fixed and the signs are recurring, and the sages of the nations of the world say that the wheel is recurring and the signs are fixed. Rabbi Tshuva said, in response to their words, "We have never found a chariot in the south and a scorpion in the north." Rav Acha bar Yaakov attacks her, and she is like a thorn in the side of a tree, and she is like a thorn in the side of a tree.

The first debate is over the question of whether the zodiac signs (= the stars) hang on the wheel and rotate with it (on its back), or whether it stands still and they rotate on their own. Rabbi brings evidence for the words of the Sages of Israel from the fact that there are stars that do not rotate, and therefore it is clear that the stars that do move do so independently. Here it is already worth noting that Rabbi does not reject the words of the Sages of the Nations simply because of what the speaker says, but rather brings evidence for his words. Immediately afterwards Rabbi rejects his view, meaning he leaves the opinion of the Sages of the Nations intact. We see from this that the discussion is conducted entirely on the merits of the matter, based on reasoning and arguments one way or the other, ignoring what the speaker says.

Now another argument is presented there:

The sages of Israel say that during the day the sun moves downward from the sky and at night it moves upward from the sky. And the sages of the nations of the world say that during the day the sun moves downward from the sky and at night it moves downward from the ground. Rabbi said, "And their words are seen from our words that springs are cool during the day and boiling at night."

Here the debate is about the question of the sun's path at night: does it pass under the earth (the Sages of the Nations) or above the firmament (the Sages of Israel). In this case, Rabbi brings evidence for the Sages of the Nations (the water in the springs heats up at night, which proves that the sun passes under them at night and heats them). For the purpose of the discussion, we will ignore the anachronism and the disconnected perceptions of physical and astronomical reality (the earth and the firmament are presented here as two thin surfaces one above the other), and the unfounded argument that Rabbi brings in favor of the conclusion of the Sages of the Nations (which we now know is the correct one). The course of the discussion proves the intellectual honesty with which it is conducted and should be conducted.

Now back to the RABM, who brings evidence for his method from here:

And I saw that I would bring here an article that the late Rabbis said, and I will explain it to you so that it may be established and accepted in your mind that their true love and confession of him, those who said it, said it. The late Rabbis said in the Gemara of Pesachim (party:) "Our rabbis taught: The sages of Israel say: The wheel is fixed and the signs of the zodiac are recurring, and the sages of the nations of the world say: The wheel is recurring and the signs of the zodiac are fixed. Etc. Rabbi said: Their words are seen as cool springs by day and boiling springs by night"... And when Rabbi heard these words, which were consequences of the introductions they had previously shared, the opinion of the sages of the nations of the world was decided by this view. He said: "Their words are seen as cool springs by day and boiling springs by night."

And here it is, with this evidence being weak and feeble, as you see. And now consider what was taught to us in this baraita, and how precious its significance is that they taught that Rabbi did not look at these opinions, but rather from the way of evidence, without paying attention to either the sages of Israel or the sages of the nations of the world. And he overruled the opinion of the sages of the nations of the world because of this evidence, which he thought was acceptable evidence, that by day there are cool springs and by night there are boiling springs… This is what he said, “their words are seen” is a word indicating the overruling… and they said, “The sages of the nations of the world prevailed over the sages of Israel.” And truly this master is called “Our Holy Rabbi.” (Shabbat Kiih:)For when a person casts away the lie from his face and upholds the truth and decides to accept it as true, and then changes his mind when it becomes clear to him that he has changed, there is no doubt that he is holy.

Rabbi himself is casually reprimanded by the Rabbi for the quality of his vision, but beyond that he is highly praised for the intellectual honesty he displayed in the discussion. It is possible that this entire anachronistic discussion gains importance only because of the moral and intellectual lesson that emerges from it (for there is no doubt that the astronomy learned from this is a real abrogation of Torah).[10]

Furthermore, a rabbi is given the title of 'holy' not for being just or for adhering to the commandments, but for acting with intellectual honesty and examining everything for its own sake. On the other side of the coin, the title that a rabbi receives for acting with intellectual honesty is not 'upright' or 'wise', but 'holy'. This is another expression of what we saw in the words of the Rabbi above, that intellectual honesty is an obligation from the Torah's perspective and not just from the perspective of reason. As mentioned, this lesson learned from the issue of Pesach is also taken from his father, the Maimonides (see M.O.N. (H.B., end of P.H.). Throughout this article, it seems that Rabbi A.M. is also expressing his father's opinion, and not just his own.

There is nothing better than to summarize this column with the concluding sentence of the RAB:

And now we learn that the sages of old do not examine opinions and do not consider them, but rather from the perspective of their truth and their evidence, not from the perspective of the one who says it, whoever it may be.

And then he was completely exhausted.

[1] Ad hominem is a fallacy of referring to the person speaking rather than the argument. Appeal to authority is a particular type (which has some justification. See below) of ad hominem.

[2] Opinions differ as to why this was not implemented. See, for example,Article by Shmarya Gershuni, in which he showed that it was Rabbi Kook who prevented this. See also the end of the above article. here.

[3] Compare also the well-known Midrash about Abraham our father, Genesis 14:1-15 The Life of Sarah, Parasha 6a, 25:1-26, and Joseph, and parallels.

[4] onPanel at the National Library I argued for another angle on this issue. I argued there that the demand from Rabbi Chisda that the Rambam be used was specifically stated in this issue, because there is a kind of "investigation" of the latter, and this would have seemed to the Talmudic sages who were not accustomed to it as something wonderful and profound that was difficult to grasp. Today our hearts are hardened by this because we have become accustomed to it. Here on the site I have brought time Another example of this is from Maimonides' "Wonderful Point" inInterpretation of the Mishnah In the Kiryat, who is enthusiastic about an innovation that can now be found in every Torah article by a reasonable scholar.

[5] I insisted on that inLesson 6: Halacha and Reality.

[6] From the beginning of his words there it appears that this is probably a preface to his book, Sufficient for God's servants, most of which has been lost to us.

[7] The text here is taken fromEdition of the letter This one on the site knowledge.

[8] Regarding the distinction between these two types of authority and their definition, I expanded on it in the last two books in the trilogy, and these things were also mentioned inColumn 280In short, formal authority for an institution or person means that his words must be accepted simply because he said them (even if they are wrong. Like the laws of the Knesset). Substantive authority is the authority of an expert that is based on the assumption that there is a reasonable chance that he is not wrong (like the authority of a doctor).

[9] This is of course a source of inspiration and not a source of authority, otherwise it would be inconsistent. That is exactly what I am doing in this column.

[10] It is interesting to compare it to the R.T. method (see Shas issue Here. The things are also presented inGrouped method Ketubot 13, 3rd "HaShibatani"), who wrote that although the evidence pointed in favor of the sages of the nations, it is clear that those who were right were the sages of Israel. He assumes that justice must be on the side of the sages of Israel, and acts in direct opposition to the intellectual honesty policy of Maimonides and Rabbinate. In his view, one must accept the words of the sages of Israel because they are certainly right in scientific fields as well.

It is a little difficult to understand why they must be right in their conclusion but can be wrong in their evidence. If they are free from error, then it is likely that their evidence must also be impeccable. One could perhaps say that the conclusion came to them through the tradition from Sinai and is therefore correct, and the evidence was presented from the path of reason and therefore can contain errors. If this is so, then even the Rabbis do not deviate from the path of the Rabbis and the Maimonides. It is not clear, however, from where he concluded that they had a tradition from Sinai about this (especially since it is now clear that they were wrong).