Should a day of fasting be established in Halacha to commemorate the Holocaust? (Column 4)
With God’s help
Every year, the question arises as to why the Sages do not establish a fast day or a day of remembrance to commemorate the Holocaust. If they established a fast to commemorate the murder of Gedaliah ben Ahikam or the breaching of the walls during the siege of Jerusalem, it is reasonable to establish such a day to commemorate the Holocaust, which was an exceptional and catastrophic event at least to the same extent, and for us also much more current and touching. The answers usually revolve around the question of halachic authority and power. Some blame it on the fact that we do not have an authorized institution (Sanhedrin) that can establish a binding day for all of Israel. Others blame it on our smallness (the generational decline that is remembered for good). These excuses sound flimsy at best. If it is possible to establish Purim in Frankfurt or Casablanca, and if it is possible to ban legumes or smart phones or televisions, then there is probably sufficient authority and halachic power to create new laws when necessary.
Many see this as a halakhic aversion, and I think there is a considerable degree of justice in this. Indeed, there is a reluctance here to embrace the new, lest boundaries be breached. There is a fear of Reform or Zionism (in the next stage, they will begin to celebrate Independence Day for the "A" and "R"). But I want to offer a broader and different perspective on this question.
On Halakhic Imperialism
An essential component of the religious education of all of us is the totality of the law. It is supposed to encompass everything, the entire land is its glory and every vacant site is its own. Everything, and especially things of value, are supposed to pass the halakhic test and also belong to it. The other side of the coin is that it is impossible for there to be values or valuable actions that do not enter the law and form part of it.
For example, many are looking for the socio-economic statement of the Halacha. Is the Halacha social democratic, capitalist (hint: this is the closest answer) or communist? Newsweek publishes an article that passionately argues to what extent the Halacha is socialist, advocates distributive justice, capitalist, communist, and so on.
The common assumption of all these positions is that the halakha is certainly something of all of these. I would like to refute this common assumption here, and do so on two levels: a. I do not think that it is possible to extract from the halakha an unequivocal statement on these and similar issues. b. Nor is it necessary to do so. There is no reason for the halakha to have such a statement. I will now try to elaborate a little more.
A. Does the law have a clear ideological statement?
Halacha is a collection of many sayings that have developed over the generations, in many places and under different circumstances, and by different people. It does not always have coherence on a meta-halachaic level. As a borrowed example, we will take the rulings of Maimonides on the subject of the methods of preaching. Even if we assume that they have halachic consistency, they probably do not maintain meta-halachaic consistency. As is known, there is a dispute between the midrash of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael regarding the manner in which the Torah should be preached (for the Rish – general and specific, and for the R's – plural and minority. See Shavuot 26a and parallels). There are several issues that bring different halachic implications to this meta-halachaic dispute. Maimonides rules on several of these issues, and as I have already shown elsewhere, it becomes clear that sometimes he rules as a halachic opinion based on a general and specific discourse, and sometimes he rules as an opinion based on plurality and minority. He does not maintain meta-halachic consistency.
It seems to me that the halakha in general may have halakhic consistency (and this is also a slightly exaggerated statement in my opinion), but it does not seem to have meta-halakhic or ideological consistency, meaning that it expresses a systematic socio-economic mishna, communist, capitalist or otherwise. Different sources lead us to different conclusions, not all of them are binding, not all of them apply in every situation, there are different interpretations of many of them, and therefore it is impossible to derive a systematic mishna from them. Sometimes it is not even possible to derive a clear halakhic ruling, but certainly not a systematic meta-halakhic mishna.
It is important to understand that the problem is not the complexity, the multitude of sources, or any other difficulty in doing so. I argue that there probably is no such mishnah. Whoever extracts such a mishnah from the halakha, in my opinion, has deluded it, or at least is exercising controversial interpretive creativity. As an indication, I don't think I know anyone who deals with these issues who has substantially changed their ideological positions following a study of the halakha (except perhaps regarding a specific situation for which they find a clear halakhic statement). Such a discussion always goes like setting a target after shooting an arrow. A socialist will find his socialism in the Torah, and the same goes for a capitalist or anyone with another socio-economic mishnah. This raises a serious suspicion of intellectual dishonesty. People assume that the halakha must have an socio-economic position, they find such a position within themselves, and then they begin to exercise interpretive creativity that is not really convincing, selective citations of selective sources, and the like, in order to extract something solid from this anarchic mess.
I will add another question in the margins of my remarks: Suppose I were indeed able to extract from the halakha a systematic socio-economic ideological subtext, should that obligate me? The fact that any law is based on a certain socio-economic concept does not necessarily obligate me to adopt it. I can be obligated to implement these laws (if they are indeed binding) without adopting the concept underlying them. The implication is that if this concept has additional conclusions that are not stipulated in the halakha as binding – I do not feel obligated to them. At most, I can say that I too have a meta-halakhic inconsistency. I have already shown that I am in good company in this regard, haven't I?
It seems to me that even if the law has a will in these areas, the most honest statement I can make about it is that the law requires us to use common sense and act in a decent and logical manner. From now on, everyone will decide for themselves what is rational and what is logical and will formulate their own socio-economic perception. This perception is the will of the Torah and the law from it. But this is of course only on the first level, as long as we assume that the law does indeed have a will for us in such areas. Now we will move on to the second level.
B. Should the law have a clear ideological position?
Now we must ask ourselves why we even assume that halakha should have an ideological position on these questions? This halakhic imperialism is incomprehensible to me, and to the best of my judgment it does not hold water. There is no such position, nor should there be one. Not only because halakha happens not to deal with these questions, or because it is difficult to extract a position from it due to various difficulties (as above), but perhaps because it (= the halakhic collective?!) has also chosen (perhaps not consciously) not to deal with them or to decide on them. It does not see them as personal halakhic and therefore leaves them outside its purview.
I would like to offer an alternative thesis to the accepted one. We are all human beings, and part of the human group is Jewish. The Jew is first and foremost a human being and then a Jew, as Rabbi Titzro ztzukal said: "Nothing human is foreign to me" (ibid., ibid.). In parallel with this division between the two levels, the (Jewish!?) world of values can also be divided into two levels: 1. The universal level, which contains universal values on the one hand and individual values on the other. 2. The halachic level particular to Jews.
The first level contains values that do not need to be included in the halakhah. Some because they are binding on all people in the world, not just Jews (the universalists), and some because their existence must be voluntary and individual, and not in the same binding way for all of us as is required in the field of halakhah.
There is a well-known joke about the Rabbi from Ponivez who hung a flag on the roof of the Ponivez Yeshiva in Bnei Brak every Independence Day and did not say Tachanun, but he did not say Hillel. When asked about it, he said that he was a Zionist like Ben Gurion, and that Ben Gurion also did not say Hillel or Tachanun. Many Haredim that I have heard are very amused by this joke at the expense of the stupid and evil Zionists, but I think they did not delve into its meaning. The Rabbi intended to say that he was a secular Zionist, just like Ben Gurion. His Zionism is not a religious one, but a national value, and as such he is obligated to it even without entering into halachic law. Independence Day is a secular national holiday that the Rabbi from Ponivez celebrated, and he had no interest in giving it a religious character and anchoring it in halachic regulations.
Back to Holocaust Remembrance Day
Today, the Jewish people tend to remember the Holocaust in various ways, some of which are anchored in law and general social practice and some are individual. These ways seem to me to be completely sufficient, and I see no need or reason to anchor them in halakhic regulations, even if there were a body today that was authorized to do so. They belong to the first of the two levels described above, and there is no reason to move them to the second. Holocaust Remembrance Day is a national day that does not have a religious character, and there is nothing wrong with that. It does not lose its value, and it is not true that everything of value must be included in the halakhic or even religious framework.
In exactly the same way, on Independence Day, I certainly say Hallel as a thank you and praise to God, but I do not see it as a day with religious significance, and certainly not halakhically. Its significance is national, and I, as a secular Zionist (like the Rabbi of Ponivez and Ben-Gurion), join it on this basis alone. I do not say Hallel because the Chief Rabbinate has determined that Hallel must be said, and this is not only because of my well-known relationship with this institution. I say Hallel because I think it is right and good to do so. This is my way as a religious person to express my national position.
So what was in the past?
In the past, it was indeed customary to anchor every value and every moral obligation in the law. It was the Sages and the Beit Din who determined the days of fasting and joy and our festivals. But I think this is the result of an artificial situation in which there is no king in Israel. The author of the Ran's sermons speaks of two parallel systems of government, the king and the Beit Din. For some reason, in the sources of the Sages, we see almost no hint of the king's system. The Beit Din repair the roads on time (Mishnah in the MOK), meaning they were the Ministry of Transportation. They repair regulations and establish procedures, the voting rules in the community are determined in the law and appear in the Shulchan. They also, of course, distill the consent of an important person (=posek). But I think this is the result of the fact that the Toshba was formulated at a time when there was no king in Israel, and the authority of the secular-national government passed from the king to the Beit Din. Therefore, the presidents of the Sanhedrin were from the seed of the House of David, since they served de facto as kings. Since then, we have become accustomed to the fact that there is no secular national dimension and that everything belongs to the jurists and the court of law and our religious and halakhic dimension. Instead of the king determining our conduct beyond the law, the court of law inflicts beatings and punishments that are not lawful. This authority of the court of law is a reflection of the king's authority in the original government.
As part of that same issue, we have become accustomed to the fact that everything is Torah and everything is Halacha. That there is no ordinary human life, and certainly no values, outside Halacha. Everything is supposed to be conducted and determined by Poskim and rabbis. But today there is an opportunity to return to routine. The people of Israel have a secular national dimension in God's name (God's name is not about secularism but about the return of the secular dimension of all of our lives. Some have referred to this as our return to the stage of history). There is no reason to continue to adhere to the format we have become accustomed to due to various historical pathologies.
In conclusion, contrary to popular intuitions, the exile not only narrowed the scope of Halacha (although this also happened in certain ways) but also expanded it beyond what was appropriate in other areas. We need to return to routine and not worry hysterically about the status of Halacha by treating it and its areas imperialistically and letting it take over all the spaces of our lives under its wings. To paraphrase our Christian cousins, we should not go to the penalty: give Halacha what is hers, and the king (or person) what is his.
Joseph L.:
Don't you think that although it is not possible to find a systematic mishnah in the halakha as it was shaped over the generations, one can at least be found in the layer of the written Torah? I saw in your book God Plays Dice that you say that the Bible does not deal with moral values but with religious values. That is, according to your words (as best I understand it), all of Judaism, the written Torah and the oral Torah belong to the layer that comes out of the nomative life of man and fall into the category of "religion." And I ask what that category of "religion" is, what does it mean? Just something arbitrary without any logic for the person who observes it? And that everyone who believes that there is a point to the mitzvot doesn't say that they should be placed on a layer that is indeed normative and relevant to man/society/humanity? And that, for example, it is impossible to derive economic principles from the mitzvot of shemitah, as Jabotinsky did?
It seems that the process presented here should be continued a step further. In my opinion, the exile not only created an imperialism of religion, but it also created the category of religion, a layer that was absent from the Bible. The commandments were given for national benefit first and foremost, "to do so among the people." I think that the fasts that we observe now should also be treated exactly as you say we should treat Holocaust Remembrance Day today, on a national level.
I would appreciate your feedback.
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Rabbi:
Yosef Shalom.
It seems to me that first of all, factually, we cannot find it. The attempts that are being made are really unconvincing. It is important not to ignore reality and subordinate it to our desires (even if they are worthy and good). I think that even in the written Torah, which is quite amorphous. Of course, you will find universal values that everyone agrees on everywhere. But in my opinion, studying the Torah or Halacha will not change anything in the perceptions you have formed yourself (and it is also a fact in my opinion that people find what they want).
I agree that among the Sages, and perhaps even among the early ones, there was no distinction between morality and religion. In a certain sense, the exile created this distinction (and in general, the history of halakhic law is the creation of distinctions that did not exist before. The final chapter makes conceptualizations that are not in the Mishnah, and so on). But in my opinion, this is an expression of the fact that the world is progressing (and not regressing). Now we understand that there are two types of values, which many of our rabbis identified between them. The indication of this (which helps us to discern what they did not discern) is that we see today that it is possible to be moral even without religious commitment. So why think that religious commitment is intended for religious purposes? According to this perspective, it is unnecessary today.
Regarding the interpretation of religious goals, you assume that there are no values beyond moral values. This is an assumption for which I see no basis, and certainly not when looking at the Torah and Halacha. For a very large part of the things there, it seems to me that it is impossible to find a moral rationalization. So why assume that they are all intended for morality? In my opinion, here again there is a clinging to the desires of the heart and ignoring the facts.
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Joseph L.:
1. It is clear that according to biblical research, if the Bible is nothing more than different layers representing different schools of thought and worldviews, there is nothing to talk about. But if we do accept the revelation dimension of the Bible, I do think that it is possible to formulate or refine a certain position in light of a study of the verses. For example, the Bible's attitude towards monarchy is an issue that I think can definitely be discussed through a rigorous interpretive analysis. For example, I think that Maimonides, who saw the King's Judgment as a document appointing the king in Israel, ignored the simple meaning of the entire chapter there. We may not be able to convince the other person who is certain of his position (just as we probably did not convince Dawkins), but I certainly think that biblical study can lead to new insights into many issues. In general, my view is that there should be no contradiction between human morality and what is written in the Torah, such as Abraham's cry in response to the destruction of Sodom. Therefore, I think that the Bible alone is indeed not enough to create a moral perception from scratch, but it helps to do so.
2. I don't understand how the fact that it is possible to be moral without a religious commitment indicates that there are two categories. I am not claiming that only the religious are moral, but certainly that the purpose of the commandments belongs to the same category. The fact that we do not always succeed in understanding the purpose of the commandments does not require the adoption of a "religious" category. Sometimes we lack the historical context to understand what the commandment appeared against, but that does not mean that the moral purpose does not exist. Especially since you have not yet given me a positive definition of "religious value." At this point, I cannot assume that there is a "religious" category that I do not know what it is in order to "fill in the gaps."
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Rabbi:
1. There should be no contradiction, but the question is whether there is a possibility of innovation. Can a person discover from a study of the Bible a perception that is not acceptable to him and change that perception as a result of his study? In my opinion, this does not happen. Abarbanel, who abolished the monarchy, found his perception in the Bible, and Maimonides, who did not abolish it, found his perception. The same is true in our day.
It is clear that any study in any field, in any book or film, raises questions and can change perceptions. But the change will be made through an internal process and not by virtue of the authority of the Bible (since I found a different conclusion there, I force myself to change my position on some issue).
2. I don't have a definition of religious value. But as an example, I would say that the obligation on a priest's wife who was raped to separate from her husband does not seem to me to be an obligation for a moral purpose. Its purpose is to preserve the sanctity of the priesthood. This is a religious, not a moral purpose. Nor does the prohibition on eating pork seem to me to be a prohibition with a moral purpose. It is always possible to say that there is a moral purpose that we all do not understand. This is an empty statement, and I see no reason to think so.
My argument was that if the purpose of the commandments is moral, then the commandments are unnecessary (at least today). After all, the moral purpose can be achieved even without them (and for this I brought evidence from moral people who are not committed to the law). So what's the point of keeping the law? Be moral and that's enough.
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Joseph L.:
1. But today I can come and decide between the Rambam and Abarbanel dispute and determine that the Rambam's opinion seems far from simplifying the verses according to interpretive tools of biblical study. This of course does not mean that I will automatically impose it on myself, but as you taught us (as I understood it), according to the synthetic approach, there is no such thing as a change of position directly from arguments, but only from a process of rhetoric. Therefore, I think that examining the verses with the belief that it is an authoritative text can ultimately decide in favor of a change of perception.
2. Again, I don't understand why creating a category that has no definition is any less empty than my argument that we haven't achieved the full benefit of the commandments. "Religious value" doesn't mean anything to me at this point, it really seems like filling in the gaps. Regarding the question of why keep the commandments if you can be moral without the commandments. I think you can answer either that by the commandments you can be more moral, or that's what the Sages meant when they said "commandments are void for the future." I personally think that some of the commandments have truly fulfilled their historical function, such as slavery, and some are still waiting for their realization.
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Rabbi:
1. Then you decide. The question is why doesn't it convince those who think differently from you? That's why I'm skeptical about the ability to formulate a perception and values from the Bible and the halakhah. To you it seems like an absurdity, but it's clear to me that it's because you're not a monarchist. Talk to monarchists and you'll see that they use signs and wonders to present an opposite perception (which, contrary to what you write, I think has a place). But the king's question is a bad example, because the Torah explicitly addresses this. I'm talking about meta-halakhic and conceptual questions that are not explicitly stated. To the same extent, you could also show me that the Torah advocates belief in G-d.
After all, the fact is that it does not lead to changes in perception.
2. The fact that something has no definition does not mean that there is no point in talking about it (and not as positivists). The words of Rabbi Pirsig, in his book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, are well-known, about defining the concept of quality, and about how the (evil) Greeks fooled us with the idea that everything must be defined. If you think about it, I think you will come to the conclusion that you do not know how to define the concept of moral value either. No basic concept can be defined. I gave you an example of a religious value: the sanctity of the priesthood, the sanctity of the Temple, and so on.
You brought up the example of slavery, but you made life easy for yourself. I'm talking about most of the Torah and Halacha. They did not fulfill their function, but were never of moral value. So what were they for? You are making a theoretical statement that through the commandments one can become more moral. I see no indication of this. Neither in examining the commandments and their content (most of them have nothing to do with morality), nor in observing reality itself. Therefore, in my opinion, these are at most wishful thinking and not a sober view of reality.
Pine:
To the best of my knowledge, you see the establishment of the state as a natural event (without God's intervention). So, what is there to praise God for in this context?
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Rabbi:
Indeed, to my understanding, there is currently no involvement of God in history, not only in the establishment of the state (and even if there is, I have no way of knowing where and when this happens). Therefore, when something joyful happens (= a miracle?) it is just an opportunity to say Hallel as an acknowledgment of the creation of the world and my creation.
Shimon:
I was unable to understand, in your opinion, what exactly is the difference between the commitment to "Dina Demalchuta Dina" which was anchored and valid in Halacha even under the rule of the Gentiles in exile, and the situation today. Perhaps you mean that the above rule was only valid for property laws, while today, God willing, it can also be expanded to additional areas and universal values, etc.?
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Rabbi:
I didn't understand the question.
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Shimon Yerushalmi:
I will quote a passage from your words: "As part of that matter, we have become accustomed to the fact that everything is Torah and everything is Halacha. That there is no ordinary human life, and certainly no values, outside Halacha. Everything is supposed to be conducted and determined by Poskim and rabbis. But today there is an opportunity to return to routine. The people of Israel have a secular national dimension in God's sight (God's sight is not about secularism but about the return of the secular dimension of all of our lives. Some have referred to this as our return to the stage of history). There is no reason to continue to adhere to the format to which we have become accustomed due to various historical pathologies." And to this I ask: After all, Halacha also in the period when "because of our sins we were exiled from our land," even then we were under some kind of government whose decisions (which also stem from values outside Halacha) had Halacha validity, to the extent that it was included in the category of "Dina de Malchuta Dina," so what is the significant dimension that the Idna added?
I hope I have now made myself more clear.
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Rabbi:
I understand. But ruling under another people is annoying and undesirable for us. It is true that Dina Demalkhuta has halakhic validity, so what? Does that mean that it is good to live under the Kir"a Franz Josef? The joy is that we are back to managing our own lives, not that it has halakhic validity.
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Shimon Yerushalmi:
Thank you very much for clarifying things! May you receive the commandments and strength.
Ural:
If the fasts were just a national event, do you think they would survive? Can a ceremony held in a national area really replace a prayer said in every synagogue?
The Holocaust is an event of a much more powerful magnitude on the 10th of Tevet or the Gedaliah Fast. In my opinion, there is no doubt that the best way to pass it on to future generations is on a religious day of mourning, which is traditionally a fast day. How many of your (religious) acquaintances know King Jehu? And how many know Gedaliah ben Ahikam?
What to do? Jews remember things related to food well, whether it's a holiday or a fast. History has proven that it works much better. And the evidence is that none of the Jewish national holidays have survived (Megillat Taanit) except for the dates accepted in Halacha.
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Rabbi:
This is an instrumental argument. I am dealing with the question of whether the halakha requires or expects the establishment of such a day of remembrance. The question of what is more effective is different and should be discussed separately.
Regarding the second question, my opinion is that if they forget – they will forget. At some point, the events become distant and less relevant (I don’t think it’s really important today to remember Gedaliah or Jehu). Your words are based on a widespread perception that religion and halakha are supposed to serve national and human values in general. I disagree with that.
Adiel:
I have heard a lot about you since the days of your teaching in Yeruham from my friend Rabbi Uriel Eitam.
I eagerly read your article on the subject of establishing a fast on Holocaust Remembrance Day. I agree with the vast majority of what you said.
I heard many times from Rabbi Amital, z"l: "Not everything is Da'at Torah." "Not everything needs to be said about Da'at Torah," and more.
I was surprised by your words regarding the Hallel on Independence Day.
How is it possible to praise a miracle that occurred and say that it has no religious significance? Or did I not understand what you were saying?
I would be happy to explain.
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Rabbi:
Think about saying "Asher Yatzer" (to separate) after going to the bathroom. Does the acknowledgment to God for opening my vagina have a religious dimension? Does the breakfast I recite a blessing before and after have a religious dimension? For me, the state is like a bathroom or breakfast.
Regarding praise for a miracle, that's a different question. My view is that there are no miracles today (or at least there is no indication that there are), and in general there is no involvement of God in the world. When joyful events happen to us, such as the establishment of the state, it is a trigger to thank God for the creation of the world and our own creation. But I will expand on this, God willing (?) in a book I am currently writing on contemporary theology.
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Pine:
But do we have the authority to amend greetings on our own accord regarding Independence Day?
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Rabbi:
This should be discussed. At least according to certain methods (the Meiri), it is permissible to say Hallel for every miracle of salvation and confession, and then it seems that one should recite a blessing even without a special regulation. Just as one recites a blessing for eating an apple every time one eats and does not need to recite a blessing for every apple.
In any case, there is certainly no limit to praise without a blessing.
And there is a great deal of room for argument that there is no restriction even with a blessing. If Israel, after the miracle of Chanukah, had said Hallel with a blessing of their own accord without the guidance of the Sages, would there have been a problem with that? Some of the early ones also say blessings out of custom, and there is a discussion about the Hallel blessing itself in this matter. But I hesitate about this, and I will leave it at that.
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jewel:
It's hard for me to see "services" in the State of Israel.
The people of Israel returned to the land after 2000 years. It is a pity that the state was not established 20 years earlier….
Thanks to the state, there is a gathering of exiles. Independent rule has returned to the people of Israel. Expressions in the Sages are called "the days of the Messiah."
Praise is not just about a miracle but about salvation.
Regarding miracles.
A miracle is not just a breaking of the laws of nature, but a breaking of the laws of history or logic.
Where do we find another case where a people scattered to the ends of the earth returns to their land after 2000 years?
Settles it. Develops it. Gathering of exiles is done in it. What other example is there like this?
Isn't this what the prophets wished for in their vision?
After all, if 80 years ago they had told Mordechai from Morocco and Libish from Poland that their children and grandchildren would be together in the Land of Israel under the rule of the Jewish people and would establish families together, would they have said that this is like a service?
I'm surprised.
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Rabbi:
When I compared the State of Israel to services, I did not mean to say that the state is worthless or disgusting like services. I meant to say that the state is an (important) means for us, and nothing more. I am very happy that this means is at our disposal, and indeed it was not so for many years, and I still do not see it as having religious value. It is at most a national value. Indeed, the coming of the Messiah is also a promise like the giving of rain. The days of the Messiah also have no religious value, since it does not involve the fulfillment of a commandment, but at most a means that will allow us to fulfill more commandments (the Temple, etc.). Being rich is also a means that allows us to fulfill a commandment, and this does not make wealth have religious value. A state is essentially a means, and the fact that we have lacked it for a long time and we wanted it and suffered without it greatly confuses us (like a poor person who sees value in money because of his hardship).
There is widespread confusion regarding miracles. Any intervention by God in the world is a miracle. Intervention means that something was supposed to happen without intervention (according to the laws of nature) and God intervened and something else happened. This means a deviation from the laws of nature. That is, a miracle. There is no divine intervention in nature that is not a miracle.
The uniqueness of our return to the land is well known to me and I agree with it. Does this mean that there was a miracle here? I highly doubt it. This is an exceptional historical event.
I didn't understand the difference. God said He would send a prophet or He would send rain. We did a commandment, when will you decide that it won't rain? After a week? A month? A generation? How will you decide whether a commandment was done or not? How many commandments must be done? How many people? Everything here is not really refutable. It's more a question of general impression than of refutation. As I wrote, my conclusion that God does not intervene is not the result of an unequivocal refutation, but of an impression.
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jewel:
I now understand what you mean by "religious" and from this I understand the wording that the State of Israel and its establishment have no religious significance. I see the word "religious" as having a broader meaning and therefore, in the eyes of Kibbutz Galuyot, etc., it has great religious significance.
The same applies to the days of the Messiah, and I will not go into the issue here of whether it is clear that there will be a temple when the Messiah comes, it is not at all simple.
Regarding miracles, I agree that "the sun will rise tomorrow" is not a miracle. The realization of the laws of nature is not a miracle.
I completely agree with the position that nothing is a miracle, as some people like to say.
But the gathering of exiles and our return to the land after two thousand years, a phenomenon that has no parallel among other peoples, is not a natural phenomenon.
It is true that there is no crossing of the sea or "the sun in Gibeon Doom" here, but there is a phenomenon here that is not natural, unique in its kind and genre. Apparently, we disagree on this point as well.
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Rabbi:
We need to distinguish between two claims: 1. The establishment of the state and the gathering of the exiles were miracles. 2. Both of these have religious significance. There is no dependence in either direction. There can be a miracle that has no religious significance (like the opening of the vagina for someone who believes it is a miracle), and of course there can be a religious significance and it is not a miracle. I claim that there is no indication that this is a miracle (anomalies are not miracles), and also that there is no religious significance (I am a secular Zionist). As stated, one can disagree with each of these two claims separately or both together.
Furthermore, it is certainly possible that this country will become the growth of our salvation (Inshallah), and that a temple will be built in it and salvation will come through it. And yet it has no religious significance in my eyes. It is a secular platform made for secular purposes and from secular motivations. Such actions have no religious significance.
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jewel:
That is, does religious meaning, in your opinion, require religious intention?
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Rabbi:
An act of humans has religious significance only if it is done with religious intent (according to Leibowitz). Although mitzvot do not require intent, this is only the case with mitzvot (because of a contextual explanation such as stamma lishma). And in particular, as I demonstrated in the article (Betzohar, the Secularist's Failure in a Crime) that, according to all opinions, mitzvot require faith. The drying of marshes that is not done for the sake of heaven and for the sake of a mitzvah (the settlement of Israel) is devoid of religious value. It has national value.
This is of course only a necessary condition, but not sufficient. The act itself must have religious value, and this is defined only by the Torah. A person who stands on one leg for a religious reason that is in his heart has no religious value.
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jewel:
Maimonides, in the commentary on the book of Haggai, distinguishes between a person who acts "with his limbs" and a person who acts with intention and purpose.
It is clear what the high level is.
The question is, should we define as non-religious any act that a person does without intention? I agree in principle, but this is a mandatory study for many, many people in Israel. There is still some that makes it easy and valuable to work "not for its own sake"...
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Rabbi:
In my article on Ockham's Razor, I explained that acting not out of faith is not acting for its own sake. It is not a religious act at all. See Rambam, Soph. 8, Mahal' Melachim. One who believes and acts not out of intention, here one must distinguish between a commandment and what is not defined as a commandment. Studying merit is a beautiful thing, but it is not a tool for clarifying the truth. And see the commentators (Rambam and Rabbeinu Yonah and others) on the Mishnah in the Avots, "O judge all men with the weight of merit," who wrote that they only discuss this, which is reasonable, contrary to popular opinion. And I wrote about this in my article in Badad on Ockham's Razor.
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Jan:
Hello, Your Honor,
If the rabbi could elaborate on what he means by saying "religious value." That is, is a religious value solely the fulfillment of the mitzvah itself (a definition, which I respectfully excuse because I understand that he does not like it, Leibowitzian), is it anything that assists in the fulfillment of the mitzvahs that is done out of religious awareness, and beyond that: what is the NFP whether something is a religious value or not?
Thank you, and sorry if I'm bringing the Rabbi back to old, forgotten discussions.
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Rabbi:
Hello. Religious value means value within the framework of serving God. Religious value is not just a commandment, as serving God is broader than Halacha. Even before the Mishnah, it has religious value. Indeed, the condition that it be done for the sake of serving God is also required.
To the best of my judgment, the state has no religious value in any sense. The state is my/our need and not a value. I want to live among my people and in the Land of Israel, which is our historical homeland. That's all.
Regarding a state that is governed by religious law, one must discuss what value it has (since a state is always just an instrument for its citizens), but a state like ours has no religious value.
Regarding the NEPAM, I don't know what NEPAM you are looking for (except for the Kiddush of a woman). These are two completely different things: it is a necessity and it is a value. What is the NEPAM if something is beautiful or if it is good? These are simply two different things.
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Jan:
I meant to say, what is the meaning of a religious value beyond the definition you provided? What is supposed to be the difference between a mitzvah, or a religious value, and what helps me to fulfill it? Or did I not understand the rabbi's words and this is also a futile question, since this concept has no meaning beyond its definition? I think it is possible to explain the difference between good and beauty, even if not in words, and the negation between them. (For example: I don't think I will find someone who would give his life for beauty, while I would for good, due to the fact that beauty does not have a sufficiently important meaning, at least in my opinion).
PS You perceive the state (as I understand it) as something of national value only, and not as even helping to fulfill a mitzvot. (Although you say that what helps to fulfill a mitzvot is not necessarily considered a religious value.) According to your system, why really say Hallel? A trigger for acknowledging the creation of the world could also be if I received a raise in salary or another Harry Potter book was released, but no normal person would say Hallel about it. If the state really has only national value, and has no connection to the system of serving God, then if I were you, I would not see this as a good trigger for Hallel. Could the rabbi explain what he thinks and where the line is crossed?
Thank you, sorry and Happy New Year.
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Rabbi:
It's hard for me to have a discussion at such intervals.
A thing of religious value does not come to us from a mitzvah. On the contrary, a mitzvah is an example of a thing of religious value. But even a moral act has religious value and significance (since it is the fulfillment of God's will). On the other hand, fulfilling a need has no moral or religious value. A person wants a country just as he wants breakfast or a house. It is the fulfillment of a need, not a value. When a significant need in your life is fulfilled (like saving your life), this is an excellent reason to say Hallel. I don't see what is not understood here and what needs to be explained.
Does the state allow for religious values? Maybe so. But breakfast and a salary also allow for this.
Moses:
Following the above discussions, I would like to ask a number of questions that I believe are necessary both from the article and from the discussions that followed.
A. As I understand it, His Honor does not believe in providence in the sense of the Creator's intervention and the creation of 'miracles' such as the State of Israel, the gathering of exiles, etc., and even less so small 'miracles' that 'happen' to an individual, such as money 'falling' from an unexpected place to pay off the month, etc.
I asked, [according to a topic that you often present], regarding evolution, you wrote that atheists look at evolution within the laws, while you, as if standing on the sidelines and looking outside the laws, ask, 'Who created these laws?' And when you see that the law is structured in such a way that it leads to creation, you conclude that God created the law in such a way, that is, that God created the 'law of evolution.' So, also regarding miracles, it is true that from a 'superficial' and simple perspective, everything seems natural to us, and the course of the people of Israel over the generations has natural explanations, such as the establishment of the State of Israel. But if we look from the outside and ask who created this entire process and why this process is so similar to what the prophets and the Torah foretold, perhaps we can say that the Creator planned and directed this entire 'natural' process with a purpose, and looking outside the process and the natural laws within it, can give an image of providence? [This perspective can also be adopted regarding smaller miracles].
B. Another question, does this mean that you do not believe in the miracles written in the Torah and the Prophet, and which seem superficially to deny the laws of physics, such as: a staff that turns into a snake, bread that comes down from heaven, water that turns into blood, a chariot with horses that rises in a heavenly storm, and so on, which seem to a person outside the system like a collection of legends?
C. Additionally, what does this say about your belief in God's knowledge of human actions? Superficially, it seems that lack of foresight does not negate God's knowledge, but it seems that deep down, these two beliefs have implications for each other, Achmal. Therefore, the entire concept of 'reward and punishment' according to your system does not exist, and thus your words imply that the 'world to come' is a Sage belief that has no basis in the Torah [I definitely agree, but there is much clear basis in the prophets and scriptures]. Disbelief in this principle, which would echo Leibowitz's words, that the entire 'obligation' to perform the commandments is only because I took it upon myself to do so, is that what you mean? If so, I hope it is clear to you that not many will hesitate to join this religion. Why introduce yourself to an outdated and unupdated system of laws? [You also admit that many decrees and commandments have been useless for ages.] Why don't you 'accept' only part of that system of laws, only the relevant ones? What is wrong with the laws? State of Israel: Why should we burden the existing situation any further?
D. It sounds from your words that you believe in the concept of 'Torah from heaven' [within a certain limit, since I understood that you accept some of the claims of the critics of the Bible], and therefore it must be that you believe in the concept of 'prophecy'. And I asked, why don't you use the same logic here too [logical in my opinion, one must say], that anything that I don't see I have no reason to assume exists, since it has been nearly 2500 years since anyone has seen what prophecy is and how it is supposed to look, and you believe based on unserious prophecies that once existed [prophecy in the past was summed up in this process: Do good, it will be good, do evil, it will be evil, all the processes that came later do not deviate from the path of nature], so why not simply assume that there is no such thing as prophecy and that it is the imagination of people in the ancient world and just as it does not exist today, it did not exist in the past, and just as we once imagined that there were spirits and demons and spells and horoscopes and other beautiful legends, imagine that there was prophecy, in fact I am making your claims about your words, I have no reason Believe in a prophecy if a. I do not see that it exists today. b. I can explain all prophecies according to the way of nature. c. I have reasonable grounds to believe that people once did not have good discernment and invented that they were prophesying or imagined it.
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Rabbi:
A. First, I don't know what your honor believes or doesn't believe, I'm closer to what I believe (or don't). As for what I believe, I have no indication that any miracles occur in our world. Maybe there are some but I can't see them. This is not like my arguments about evolution, since there is an argument that forces the existence of a guiding hand (creation), whereas here it is only a possibility.
Beyond that, a miracle is defined as God's intervention in the world, meaning a change from its normal course. It means that the course according to the laws was supposed to be X and God changed it to Y. As long as I have a natural explanation for what is happening, I don't see why I assume there is intervention. And if it is about someone who causes the natural course of events, that's what I'm talking about. This is the creation of the laws.
B. In my book I will detail my approach to supernatural descriptions in the various sources. In general, it is certainly possible that in the past God intervened more (then there were miracles and there was prophecy). Today I see no indications of such involvement by God.
C. I didn't understand here. What does lack of involvement have to do with lack of supervision? There is passive supervision of human actions but no intervention (at least not frequently).
The commitment to Torah and mitzvah is not rooted in reward and punishment, but in the obligation to do what God commands. Maimonides already wrote in his book "Mahal Teshuvah" his opinion on workers who work for the hope of reward and fear of punishment. Perhaps this is why the beliefs about the Awvab were created. Perhaps they are true, but I don't know.
The question of ratings, who will join and who will not, is irrelevant to the issue of truth. The question is whether I am right and not whether I will be popular. I oppose white lies (telling the untruth in order to bring more people to serve God). If only because of Maimonides' parable of the elephant. Those who will join the work do so on the basis of a mistake, and therefore they are serving the wrong God, and their joining has little value.
What does this have to do with the laws of the State of Israel? And that whoever observes them fulfills his religious duty? Why didn't you talk about FIFA (International Football Association) rules?
D. This will also be explained in my book. Some of this is also discussed in my book Truth and Unstable (on the argument of a day). Here I will explain briefly. Although the laws of nature operate in the same way all the time, people change. And what they once thought they think today? And what they once did they do today? What they once wore they wear today? So why do you assume that the Holy One's behavior does not change? If I had to decide, I would compare him to humans rather than to inanimate nature. There is no reason to assume that he will behave the same all the time. So if he decided to slowly withdraw from the world, I do not see anything strange or incomprehensible in this. On the contrary, I even have a hypothesis as to why this happens. Like a child who, as he grows older, his father leaves him more and more alone and to conduct himself independently. So is God's attitude towards us. His departure is not the decline of generations as we are familiar with, but the rise (maturation) of generations. Today we can already understand that there is a leader for the capital even without miracles. We are philosophically skilled enough to understand that a world that operates according to fixed laws is much more indicative of a Creator than a capricious world. So now we no longer need miracles. At least if we behaved and thought like adults, as is expected of us. There are indeed others who think childishly, but they are probably expected to grow up.
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Pine:
Following on from this response, you said that "it is certainly possible that in the past the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened more." But there are verses in the Torah that speak of intervention for generations (and I gave rain for your land in its season, and I gave your rains in their season, etc.). How can it be said that the Holy One, blessed be He (who probably knew that He was going to cut off contact at some point) wrote promises to the "Persians" that He intended to stop keeping at some point? After all, if a parent promises his child candy in exchange for good behavior, even if the child grows up, the parent is expected to keep his promise, isn't that so? And if he wants to stop keeping it, at least he should explain why (that we grew up, etc.).
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Rabbi:
The Torah also speaks of prophets, prophecies, and miracles, and they too disappeared. The Temple and the sacrifices also disappeared. So did slavery, and so on and so forth. We have learned that sometimes the Torah speaks to the people of the time of the giving of the Torah, and there are changes that the Torah does not address. One can speculate as to why, but these are the facts.
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Pine:
Regarding prophets, prophecies, miracles, the Temple, sacrifices, slavery, etc., these are things that there is no promise of lasting for generations. There are only examples that they happened at some point, but why should we expect them to also be in the future? But regarding reward and punishment, God explicitly wrote in the Torah that there is a connection for generations between keeping a mitzvot and some kind of reward, so I have pretty good reason to expect that this connection will also exist in the future, and if we came to the conclusion that it does not exist, it poses a strong question about the truth of the Torah, doesn't it? The only explanation I can think of for this difficulty are statements like: "The reward of a mitzvah is here," and then we would have to remove the simple from verses like "And I will give you your rains in their season" and present them as a parable of reward in the world to come. But it is still difficult, because no scripture goes beyond the simple.
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Rabbi:
I didn't understand. The matter of prophecy involves several commandments. Aren't commandments supposed to be for generations? Part of the service of God is listening to the prophet and his spiritual leadership for us. It's not some coincidence that we had a prophet. The Torah promised this and even commanded us to try him and listen to his voice. The prophet is also part of the mechanism of going to war.
The promises that if we keep the commandments, we will be given rain, are interpreted by me as promises that deal with a period in which the rain depends on God. When it depends on Him, then it will be given as a result of keeping the commandments. Now He has decided to give it to us because we have grown up, and it is clear that from now on it is irrelevant. He is simply explaining to us His policy: when I give something, it is for the fulfillment of the commandments.
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Pine:
Regarding the prophet, it is written in the Book of Deuteronomy: "For a prophet shall arise among you." There is no promise here that he will arise. In other words, all the commandments related to testing a prophet are existential commandments - if a prophet arises, one must do this and that. Just as if one wears a garment with four flaps, one must tie a tzitzit to it. The commandment always stands, but it will not always be enforceable. But what is unique about the verses that speak of reward and punishment is that they contain a connection: if we do A - then God will do B. The connection itself is not conditioned by any circumstances. Ostensibly, the connection always exists. The moment we come to the conclusion that this connection does not exist, there is apparently a contradiction to the Torah. You could argue that not every claim that exists in the Torah is necessarily true for generations. But then we are forced to say that it is possible that the commandments themselves can also change.
Why don't we simply say that although this connection cannot be seen in reality, it exists in a hidden form (hiding face)?
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Rabbi:
You brought the verses that deal with a false prophet. The verses that deal with a prophet (Deuteronomy 28:11):
A prophet shall arise unto thee from thy brethren, like unto me, whom thy God shall raise up unto thee; according to all that thou inquired of them, whom thy God didst at Horeb in the day of the assembly, saying, I will not hearken any more to the voice of Jacob my God, nor see this great fire any more, neither shall I die: and Jacob said, Look unto me, they have done well in that which they spake: I will raise up unto them a prophet from the midst of thee. Their brother is like you, and I will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all that I command him. And it shall be that the man who will not listen to my words who speaks in my name, I myself will require it of him. But the prophet who presumes to speak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to speak, and who speaks in the name of other gods, that prophet shall die. And when you say, In your heart, how can you know the thing that the prophet has not spoken? The prophet who speaks in the name of the prophet will not be afraid, and the thing will not be, nor will it come to pass. The prophet who speaks in the name of the prophet will not be afraid, and the word that the prophet has not spoken will not be afraid.
By the way, the exact definition is not an existential mitzvah but a conditional positive mitzvah (like tzitzit). Almost every positive mitzvah is conditional. An existential mitzvah is a mitzvah that cannot be canceled, only fulfilled. These mitzvahs can be canceled (if the circumstances are met – one wears a garment with wings, and does not perform the mitzvah).
As for the last question, we can of course say that God is constantly intervening, but when we examine it, He rushes into a hole to confuse us. This sounds implausible to me. Every time I examine what happens in the world, there is a natural and ordinary explanation for things. The laws of nature work, and when we examine them in the laboratory, what we expect to happen happens. There is no reason to assume that there is such a strange game of hide-and-seek here. This is not proof, but a common sense consideration. When I see a moving body, my assumption is that a force acted on it, not that God decided to move it without force. Furthermore, I also assume that there are no bodies that move without force. This is the accepted scientific view, and it sounds completely reasonable and working to me.
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Pine:
These verses also do not specify when the prophet will be raised, or how often. In general, claims such as: God will do X are not refutable claims (since no time frame is specified for the claim). But claims such as: If X happens, then God will do Y are refutable, given that X happens and Y is measurable. So there are three options for dealing with the second claim. Either say that X did not really happen. Or say that Y is not measurable. Or say that the claim has been refuted. But if it has been refuted, it is not a simple question about the correctness of claims in the Torah in general.
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Rabbi:
Nothing here is scientifically refutable. How many commandments must be done for it to rain? How many people must do these commandments? How much rain will fall, and until when is it supposed to fall? It's about as refutable as the prophet thing.
As I wrote, my impression that God does not intervene is not the result of scientific refutation, but rather a general impression (it does not seem that He does). The fact is that in the situation we are in, I claim that God does not intervene and many believers think that He does. They think that when they do a mitzvot it rains and I think there is no connection. Your eyes see that the factual situation does not really constitute confirmation or refutation of anything here.
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Pine:
I understand that this cannot be scientifically refuted, but even a general impression is enough for me to refute it (not in the logical-mathematical sense of the word).
The difference between the matter of the prophet and the matter of the rains is that the connection between the commandments and the reward is supposed (by common sense) to be relatively immediate. In other words, if the people of Israel behave in accordance with the commandments, the response from God, blessed be He, logically speaking, would come within a reasonable period of time (say, within a few months and not after 700 years). But in the matter of the prophet, there is no reason why God, blessed be He, would not send one prophet once every 3,000 years. There is no conceivable "reasonable period of time" here.
What I'm trying to understand is how you bridge the contradiction between your perception and the clear message that emerges from the verses. You previously wrote an answer like this: "He simply explains to us his policy: when I give something, it is for the fulfillment of the commandments." I can accept that explanation. But even in your opinion, it is difficult to see why he states this policy if he does not implement it?
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Rabbi:
He puts it into practice. When he gives something, it is always in accordance with a commandment. Nowadays he does not give, in the past he did. Nowadays he does not send prophets, in the past he did. This is a policy that has changed (not the connection between giving and prayers, but the giving itself).
And beyond that, as I wrote to you, Pok Hezi, in the current situation, a debate has broken out on the question of whether he is intervening or not. So no one can claim that reality itself shows intervention, not even from considerations of impression and common sense. So regardless of me, you can ask what the purpose of this statement is. Apparently a general expression of opinion that is not supposed to be empirically discerned, and it teaches about the importance of the commandments. The importance of the commandments exists even today. The facts change, but the lesson is eternal.
kid:
Peace and blessings to Rabbi Michael,
Let's start with Mr. Cicero. If this is the meaning of Derech Eretz Kedama Le Torah, there is no innovation in it. If this is not the meaning, there is simply a kind of rebellion here [I have a personality besides being a slave to my God].
Because what does it really matter whether regulations are halakhic or political, other than the feeling that political laws are humanly rational and halakhic laws are just annoying and a shame,
Regarding the Rabbi of Ponivez, Tahnon is Halacha, as is not saying it. It is clear that he did not say Hillel because of Halacha, and Tahnon did not say it for the same reason in his opinion.
It is also clear that you are saying Hallelujah because they established the law in this way, as you would not say if it were not so.
Regarding the publicity of the lack of oversight in Israel, again, why does it help and to whom?
"An unanswered prayer" is something that surely brings the people of Israel very close to their God and connects them to their Creator.
And where do you get this from? And if you find it, why establish it as a single principle and deny the necessary innocent belief, because Leibowitz established it, and it helped him himself?
I cry over such provocations, you are a wise man, tell me about your opposite experience,
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Rabbi:
I don't argue with feelings. To each his own.
Even if, as you say, everything is halakha (which is not true), the question still remains what this halakha reflects. What assumptions are embedded in it?
Publishing the lack of oversight helps a lot to those who feel they are being worked on and therefore abandon the entire tradition. I meet dozens of them. Those who accept the accepted content will continue to flatter themselves with the usual messages. My feeling is that someone needs to provide a response to those who think straight. This is also a sector that is worth addressing. The very claim that the truth is not important but only the concern for the village idiots, and the policy of white lies not to publish the truth, is what causes us to lose our best sons and remain with those who eat these scumbags. This is my opposite experience. You asked, so I told.
As for clinging to ancient sources against the truth out of concerns like yours, I have no choice but to cite the Gemara in Yoma 7:2:
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Why is it called the name of the people of the great assembly – who restored the crown to its former glory? Moses said, “The great God is mighty and awesome,” and Jeremiah said: “Foreigners are enslaved in His temple, where are His terrors?” He did not say “terrible.” Daniel said: “Foreigners are enslaved by His sons, where are His mighty acts?” He did not say “mighty.” And he said, “On the contrary, this is the mighty act of His might, who conquers his passion, who gives long-suffering to the wicked. And these are His terrible acts – if it were not for the fear of the Holy One, blessed be He, how could one nation exist among the nations? And our Lord, you are my servant, the one who has made the law, the one who has made Moses a righteous man!” Rabbi Elazar said: “Because they know that the Holy One, blessed be He, is true, therefore they did not lie to Him.”
I usually justify my arguments and do not draw them from various sources, Leibovitz (with whom I agree on almost nothing) or anyone else. If you find similarities between them and Leibovitz, that is your decision, but it has nothing to do with the discussion itself. It is a shame that someone who preaches formulating worldviews according to the slogans of others accuses others of such an approach. The disqualifier is in his own right.
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kid:
Rabbi Michael Good week
That is, I don't think that providence and prayer are in the category of holy lies,
That's why I asked you this, where did you get it from?
I completely agree that people question or hesitate about telling the truth [and dozens of such people do not justify publicity in general and regarding private supervision and prayer in particular, while the vast majority of believers feel the eye watching and the private supervision that lies beneath everyone]
I do not at all think that private contemplation and prayer are part of the questions regarding telling the truth or its absence, nor are they among the things that require disclosure.
A] Because there is no need to say that this is so,
B] does not contribute in any way,
3] If God can help the innocent and does not do it, you are essentially accusing him by not standing for the blood of your neighbor [it is true that he is not your neighbor,] conceptually
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Rabbi:
Hello, Gadi.
You need to decide whether your claim is on the merits, that what I say is false, or whether you are claiming that I have to lie a "white lie" in order not to harm people's innocent faith.
I didn't blame God for anything. He could have created the world not to be governed by laws, but he decided (and probably had taste with him) to make it according to laws. And in general, do you think he couldn't have helped in the Holocaust or any other disaster? So why doesn't he help? Why do you think I blame him more than you? And did I just say that people suffer in the world?
But all of these things will be explained in detail in my book.
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kid:
I was pretty clear,
First of all, I haven't seen people like you claiming that there is no supervision at all,
I also don't think this is a white lie. If it is, then why not leave it as is?
Regarding laws, the so-called laws of creation that have not changed, meaning there was never any oversight, or laws with dates?
Regarding the Holocaust, etc., if everything is according to arithmetic, then indeed I don't know arithmetic, but that wouldn't contradict my belief that faith is easy and there is no burden.
If there is no account [of providence], it is difficult to return to the Dukhata,
You probably got it in good taste, okay?
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Rabbi:
1. And therefore?
2. I explained why not to keep it.
3. The laws of nature, which when they were unknown, God allowed Himself to deviate from more, and in our day, when they are better known, He apparently does not do so.
4. There was no problem and it did not lead anywhere. If you think everything that happens is justified (but you don't understand), then why are you making it difficult for me? After all, even if in my opinion everything is without supervision, what is happening is still exactly what should happen, so what is the problem with God, blessed be He, in my opinion? After all, no one suffers more than they deserve.
kid:
Hello Rabbi Michael
And so perhaps it is good that this is so. The problem is from the Torah, from the prophets, and from the scriptures. The excuse that it was only for an hour is that long-standing issues in the Talmud contradict the matter. The problem of trusting in the great sages will not be in question.
I explained very well why I left it,
The question is what does "it has a point" mean? Another logic? Or a plausible logic that we haven't yet come across.
The first is absurd. The second, if it is not related to reward and punishment in some way [is there reward and punishment?] If there is no account [providence] then probably not, so what is actually left... I am trying to come up with a hypothesis in my mind without success,
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Rabbi:
Hello Gadi. I think we've exhausted it.
kid:
Here I didn't feel like we were exhausted,
And I would be happy for some kind of response to this piece I wrote.
The question is what does "it has a point" mean? Another logic? Or a plausible logic that we haven't yet figured out?
The first is absurd. The second, if it is not related to reward and punishment in some way [is there reward and punishment?] If there is no account [providence] then probably not, so what is actually left... I am trying to come up with a hypothesis in my mind without success,
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Rabbi:
I'm not sure I understand what the words here refer to. I assume it speaks to the reason why God created the world to be governed by law. I can offer one reason, for example, that He wants us to be able to navigate the world. If it is not governed by law, you will not be able to predict what will happen in any situation and you will not be able to live.
Everything else you wrote is completely incomprehensible to me. But please, if there is nothing really new, we will end here. It was always my custom to answer every email, but this site requires a lot of my time, and a lot of it is a repetition of things that have been written and said.
forgiveness,
kid:
Rabbi Michael
Apparently there really is confusion between the emails here because I really didn't understand why you dismissed us when I didn't repeat myself even once.
I'll repost what you wrote and answer, here it is,
Rabbi Michal wrote,,,
1. Therefore? [This was in relation to a single opinion]
2. I explained why not to leave it. [Regarding supervision]
3. The laws of nature, which when they were unknown, God allowed Himself to deviate from them more, and in our day, when they are more well-known, He apparently does not do so. [A sentence I did not understand]
4. There was no problem and it did not lead anywhere. If you think everything that happens is justified (but you don't understand), then why are you making it difficult for me? After all, even if in my opinion everything is without supervision, what is happening is still exactly what should happen, so what is the problem with God, blessed be He, in my opinion? After all, no one suffers more than they deserve.
I answered,
1] So maybe it's good that it's like this, the problem is from the Bible, which says the opposite and says that there were only long-standing issues in the Talmud for a time and periods that contradict each other, the problem of practicing the great sages will not be in question,
2] I explained and will summarize the matter. I do not think that private providence and prayer are part of the questions and solutions regarding telling the truth or the lack thereof towards those dozens you said feel that they are being worked on in particular when there is no need to say that this is indeed the case.
3….
4] You wrote that perhaps God has a reason for His decision not to supervise, and this would not contradict the question of responsibility that applies to Him,
I asked, if its taste is something we don't know, logically speaking, it sounds absurd,
If the reason is something unfamiliar but plausible but not related to reward and punishment [and if there is no reckoning and providence then probably not] I don't see a side here,
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Rabbi:
You do repeat yourself.
1. I said it doesn't matter to me that no one says the same thing as me. Why do I need to give explanations?
2. And I explained why I did leave it. I said that I met many people for whom prayer and providence were exactly the issues. What was new here?
3. In the past, science was unknown and people did not know the laws of nature. Therefore, it is more reasonable and natural to deviate from them. Today we know them. For example, once they could think that rain falls because of a mitzvot. Today we know in advance how much rain will fall and when, and that it depends on the laws of meteorology and not on mitzvot.
4. I didn't understand where I wrote that God has a reason not to watch over us. I wrote that He doesn't watch over us. The reason? Apparently, we are already big children and don't need to be helped. But regardless of the theories, the factual question is, is it likely that He actually watches over us? In my opinion, no.
And again I write that we have exhausted ourselves.
——
kid:
Rabbi Michal wrote
But he decided (and probably his taste was with him) to do it according to the rules.
Probably because we're already big kids and don't need to be given a hand.
So this is the answer without standing for your neighbor's blood?? Big kids????
If this is the trend, then we have indeed exhausted ourselves, but I do not suspect you of spouting baseless statements, as I am often accused of here.
——
Rabbi:
Hello Gadi. You are once again repeating things that have already been discussed to the hilt.
I have already explained to you the lack of clarity in the "you will not stand" argument, which is equally directed at you.
I really don't like it, but as far as I'm concerned, we're done.
——
kid:
Hello Rabbi Michael,
His Honor knows how to read between the lines.
I replied, "In my case, it's about reward and punishment. I don't know how the account is kept."
But don't interfere when you're bleeding because you'll be hurt,...??
If you finished,,,,then cheers,,
jubilee:
Doesn't the Rabbi see the return of the people of Israel to their land after two thousand years of exile and immediately three years after the end of the Holocaust as an exception to nature? Shouldn't this be attributed to God's providence?
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Rabbi:
The return of the people of Israel to their land is indeed an exceptional event in historical terms, but history is a complex thing and there is no way to know whether there was divine intervention here. Overall, I think it is possible to understand this process well even without resorting to His involvement. Secular people see this process and their atheistic-scientific faith is not shaken.
Therefore, drawing conclusions from a "historical miracle" is a very dangerous and unconvincing thing. This is in contrast, perhaps, to a physical miracle.
Although there may be some weight to the fact that the prophets prophesied about the people's return to their land in advance, and in this sense there may be room to see this process as an indication of divine intervention. I don't know. I just know that even if this hadn't happened, almost no one would have put away their Bible (at most, they would have demanded the relevant verses and taken them out of context), and therefore it is difficult for me to attribute very high statistical weight to these prophecies. A thesis that does not stand the test of refutation is also not very impressive when it comes true (after all, there were prophecies that did not actually come true and no one was alarmed by this). What's more, these prophecies themselves took part in the process itself (thanks to them, we returned here). This is a prophecy that fulfilled itself, quite literally.
carrot:
It seems to me that Cicero should be said/written in Hebrew. Also, the quote from his name is attributed to Publius Terentius Aper.
——
carrot:
Oh, I didn't think it would be published immediately but would be sent to the site editor. You can delete this comment and the one before it.
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Rabbi:
Carrot peace.
It does indeed reach me, but my computer is barely responding. So I approved the posting and only now have I been able to send my own response. It is:
Why delete? Two comments that all our readers should learn from. I'm not sure about the first one. The name in Latin is Cicerro, and I don't see why the pronunciation of a name should be changed. If someone in the US is called David, should I call him David in Hebrew? I don't think so.
And I didn't understand at all why translate the Latin C into the Hebrew Kof (like Caesar instead of Caesar in the original).
Regarding the second, thank you very much. For years I thought it was Tsitserok. Now you are my rabbi, my champion and my informant.
I also sent your second response, but it was just for fun with logic. If you saw that the first one went straight to the site (that's what you thought), then you should have understood that the second one did too. As mentioned, I approved both of them for upload (that's how the software is built so that everything comes to me). I approve everything, except for inappropriate things (which, for now, there weren't any).
And finally,
We read in the Avos (P. Kiniain Torah, 3):
Whoever learns from his friend one chapter or one law or one verse or one word, even one letter, should be treated with respect, as we find in David, the king of Israel, who learned from Ahithophel only two things, and he called his master his master and his acquaintance, as it is said, "Psalms 55:14." And you are a man, according to the values of my master and my acquaintance, and are not things easy and serious. And what about David, the king of Israel, who learned from Ahithophel only two things, and his master his master and his acquaintance? Whoever learns from his friend one chapter or one law or one verse or one word, even one letter, all the more so should be treated with respect. And there is no honor but the Torah, as it is said, "Proverbs 3:35." The wise will inherit honor, "There is /Proverbs/ 28:10." And the innocent will inherit good, and there is no good but the Torah, as it is said, "There is /Proverbs/ 4:2." For I have given you a good lesson, my Torah, do not forsake it."
And also in the Bible 33:1:
Our rabbis taught: His rabbi who said – his rabbi who learned wisdom, and not his rabbi who learned reading and mishnah, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Most of his wisdom is from him. Rabbi Yossi says: Even if he did not enlighten his eyes except with one mishnah – that is his rabbi. Rava said: Like a merchant, Dasbern is a scum of the list.
And is it appropriate for a student to erase the words of his master and teacher?
🙂
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carrot:
Thank you very much for the somewhat exaggerated compliments :). Perhaps I will take a lesson from this to thank the rabbi dozens of times. Thank you very much for your lectures and publications that opened up many fields for me, and enriched my knowledge in many other fields. Thank you also for the fact that your words often taught me how to approach things correctly, and even in a healthy way (I do not mean the example of the lovely "contradiction" - it seems to me - about the rabbi, which I will call "the proof from chocolate". 🙂 ), broadened my perspective, and sometimes invented a vacation for my soul.
And precisely for this reason, I did not want to "instruct the halakhah" in front of the rabbi. And I suggested deleting it, since I thought that a correction in the body of the article would be enough if the rabbi saw fit, and the appearance of the response itself was of no importance. Also, as mentioned, I felt uncomfortable openly pointing out an error, if it was indeed an error.
To the best of my knowledge, the Latin pronunciation is actually Cicero (in contemporary English, perhaps thinkers pronounce it Cicero). The question from David does present a problem when it comes to a name whose origin is known but has been used differently by different cultures, and also raises a problem regarding the use of the name as a sequence of syllables or as a term that is used in a way that is arbitrary in its meaning. But it seems to me that the nickname Cicero, if indeed that is how it is known in Israel, is not dominant, and does not carry such a cultural burden that the use of Cicero would be incomprehensible to people or would deprive them of the meaning of the name. It also seems to me that in light of the accepted transcription rules today, the use of the form Cicero is being reduced.
Regarding the logical amusement, as someone who, as mentioned, also owes a great deal of my knowledge in the field of logic to the Rabbi, I hope I have learned enough so that I will not fail in such a trivial matter. I did assume that my second response would be published automatically, but I did not know of any other way to express my desire that the first one be deleted, except for the response to it, in which I stated that I did not believe that the mechanism was for immediate publication, as another reason for honoring the request that the message be deleted. I assumed that eventually those who are responsible for this would see them, and the deletion request mentioned recently.
And again, thank you very much.
——
Rabbi:
I learned from my late father (who studied Latin) that the original pronunciation was Citzer (and Citzer). Here, he is also my great and knowledgeable rabbi. 🙂
Mickey
You claim that even if you can deduce a broader ethical statement from a body of law, you are not bound by it.
I too held (and to some extent still hold) this view, and thus I do not feel bound by the echoes of ethnocentrism or chauvinism that arise from Judaism (moreover, I was - and to a certain extent still am - an interpretive minimalist and claim that there is no "value statement" in Halacha. There are only laws from which no statements arise at all - neither problematic nor positive; a somewhat analytical position).
But recently I have softened and I tend to recognize certain ethical statements that may be valid in halakhah (preventing interest-bearing loans, aspiring to monarchy, establishing the Temple, wanting all people in the world to submit to Judaism), and from there, acquaintances drew my attention to the fact that to a certain extent there is a drawback here in terms of intellectual honesty – if you think that God wants you to do something, even though He did not explicitly command it, why don't you do it (i.e. two things have changed – 1. I recognized that an outrageous ethical statement is being made, 2. I became convinced that statements from among the righteous are binding).
If the question were about me being a mere explanation, I would have kept quiet, but hadn't our rabbis, the heads of the yeshiva, already established that the will of God is binding in itself, even separately from the Torah - the obligation to listen to the words of the sages, as is known (Kobash 2, Divrei Sofrim 1:15 onwards), "Why did he call me a reason?" (when, ultimately, the reason is an estimate for clarifying the will of God).
In other words, after I admitted that God's will is a binding thing, they argued to me that the thought of the sages – at least in the discipline of "morality" (not in the sense of ethics, of course, but like the moral yeshivahs) – is also a binding thing, since just as they are experts in understanding the law and God's will that underlies it, so they are probably experts in understanding what God's will is (this is more relevant in the literature of the reasons for the commandments to the early rabbis than to the Tannaim and Amoraim, who apparently did not attempt to deduce a mishnah of thought, but in them too one finds value statements of one kind or another).
And now my soul asks – do you really have the right not to avoid fulfilling God's will as it is revealed to you from contemplating the Torah?
4 months ago
Michi
If I can deduce a moral statement from the Torah, it is certainly expected of me. It is God's will even if it is not actually Halacha.
But a moral statement from the Sages is not binding. In my opinion, the Sages are not experts (not as you wrote). The authority of the Sages does not stem from the fact that they are right, but from the fact that we have accepted their authority (see the example of the Rabbi of the Sages Memariam, and the Head of the Sanhedrin, P.D. Si' Y., and others). There are very good reasons for this, but it does not stem from the fact that they are experts. And now you will understand that we have accepted their authority on halakhic matters but not on meta-halakhic or moral matters. Only if they decided to introduce this into the halakhic (such as forcing the virtue of Sodom and the like) does it bind us. Of course, if we agree with their words, we will do so, but if not – there is no necessity to act in this way. On the contrary, there is a necessity to act in the opposite way precisely because the Hasbara has a binding status.
And what God's will requires is not from the yeshiva leaders who establish something, but from the Gemara and all the Rishonim, and the sayings are ancient. Although there are various errors in this too, and see my article here on the site about explanations: http://www.mikyab.com/single-post/2016/06/21/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A1%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%99
4 months ago
In the 22nd of Sivan, the 9th of
On the discussions among the rabbis on the subject of establishing a day to commemorate the Holocaust – see the articles by Rabbi Shmuel Katz, 'The Destruction and the Remembrance' and 'The First Holocaust Day', and the article by Rabbi Yeshayahu Steinberger, 'The Wound Before the Heal'. All three are on the website 'Mossaf Shabbat – Makor Rishon', and in my responses to the above articles.
Best regards, Shatz
peace
I apologize in advance. I am reading the content on this site for the first time and I do not know whether my questions or the answers to them appeared in the articles or in the questions of the commenters here.
1. If you think God has stopped interfering in what is happening in our world, you can explain basic concepts in Judaism in a nutshell, such as:
A. Supervision.
B. Reward and punishment - as it seems to me, the Maimonides (I am writing from memory and not from examining a book) claims that the natural course of the world is carried out as a result of the private behavior of the Jews, such as "I gave you your body in its time," etc.
2. Do you think that praying 3 times a day has become unnecessary because there is no one to talk to? Is all that remains a halakhic obligation that has been emptied of perhaps its main reason to ask for your needs from someone who can provide them?
3. Is it possible to forgo Rosh Hashanah, when all the people of the world pass before it as the sons of Meron?
4. Does His Honor believe, and I do not intend to compare, as you claim, those who believed that the Seven went to sleep? Or did he leave his world?
If the matter has already been discussed on the website, I would be happy to refer you to the relevant places if your time does not allow you to respond.
thanks
Hello.
You ask many broad questions and it is difficult to address them here. You can find all my mishnah on these and other topics in the new trilogy, and on these topics in the second book (No Man Has Dominion Over the Spirit). Beyond that, you can also search the site here and find many references to each of these questions.
1) Regarding the inconsistency in the rulings of Maimonides and his ilk, this has nothing to do with meta-halacha, but rather that the definition of the halacha is done with a certain method but its rulings are not necessarily related (perhaps one could even say that they are necessarily unrelated).
For example: "Rabbi Acha bar Hanina is known and known to those who said and it was the world that there is no one like him in the generation of Rabbi Meir, and why did they not establish a halakhah like him, that his companions could not stand by his final opinion that he says about a pure unclean person and shows him favor, about a pure unclean person and shows him favor." We see that even when the Sages knew that a wise (and probably right) Rabbi did not rule a halakhah like him.
Also on the same page (Eruvin 13:13) the reason why the halakha was ruled in the 25th century despite the fact that the B's were sharp-tongued, and this is because of their humility, and it does not seem to me that anyone thinks that humility necessarily always leads to the real truth (although many times it does, by the very fact of agreeing to discuss the dissenter's opinion, and thus matters become sharper and clearer).
In my opinion, the very fact that it is clear that the thinkers (unlike the rabbis...) of halakhah followed a clear and consistent path is because we found several of them who generally did not rule like them and only in a few cases did rule like them. In other words, there is no meaning to the statement that Rambam does not have meta-halakhic consistency, because there is meaning in ruling on meta-halakhah.
2) The Rabbi decided for some reason that a miracle is one that cannot happen without intervention. Where did you get this definition from??
The strangeness of such an opinion is that it is clear to anyone who has ever held a Bible in their hands that despite all the miracles there, they sinned, disobeyed, and rebelled (according to the Rabbi, miracles did occur in their time). And if we say that miracles are something that cannot occur, then it is as if we said that all those generations were a bunch of idiots (Don K.W. and what today, tens of thousands of people repent due to the "miracles" of babas and charlatans, and even more than that, there are religious people who do not sin for fear of punishments that they did not see in them. K.W. is the son of K.W., who in their time were not sinners).
I think that a miracle is a low statistical probability of happening, and therefore there is room for deniers (even in the time of the prophets) to claim that it is natural and not miraculous. Accordingly, in our generation, too, we have miracles. (I am aware of the problematic nature of this claim, since it turns out that with the advancement of science, things that once seemed miraculous due to their being considered unlikely are now known to have been obligatory. But there are still many things - such as the return of the people to their homeland - that will be defined as miraculous despite the natural possibility of their occurrence.)
3) The rabbi wrote, "But I don't think they delved into its meaning. The rabbi's intention was to say that he was a secular Zionist, just like Ben-Gurion."
We thank the rabbi for infusing humor and seriousness into his words. It softens the reading….
(I can't believe you believe that.)
I have expanded on everything you wrote here in various places.
1. I no longer remember what I'm talking about (what kind of inconsistency). But regarding the ruling of the Rabbis, I once brought it up as evidence that the halakha is not always the truth, but rather that there is a value in autonomy (to rule as I understand it even if in my opinion it is not the truth). Regarding the B'Sh and the G'D, the commentators disagreed on this. R. Caro in his Principles of the Gemara explains that their humility leads them to the truth (because they first considered the words of the B'Sh before formulating their own position). I have extended this to Toba as much as I have.
2. I extended this to Toba in the second book of the trilogy (and also here on the site in several places). There is no such animal as a miracle in the framework of nature. Whoever says this is simply confused.
3. I not only believe, but I am completely convinced. The rabbi from Ponivez was a strictly secular Zionist.
Maybe you're right that "halakha" has nothing to say about this, but what about the "Torah"?
After all, if capitalism is shown to be more efficient than socialism, then how is it possible that the Torah would not support this?
Even a sentence like "Her ways are pleasant ways" or something similar is enough to announce that the Torah has an opinion on this. What is that opinion? We may not know that, but apparently it certainly does.
I would be happy if the rabbi could explain to me: Even if there are indeed two types of Torah-Jewish and moral-human systems, then how does it work that we take something from the Jewish realm, in our case fasting or praise, and use it on the general moral plane, when apparently there it is like broken pottery, devoid of content and meaning.
I would also be happy if the Rabbi could refer me to more sources that show that there is room for a Jewish person to act according to "global morality," as we call it. I also saw in the newsletter sent with the newspaper "Makor Rishon" that you mention this issue, and it seems that it is on your mind.
Thank you in advance.
Do you mean it's a moral principle? I don't see a moral point in doing so.
I didn't understand the question. You offered to take it, not me.
What does Mekorot mean? Gemarat? From the Torah? Every place where it is said about a moral obligation, it refers to universal morality. There is no other morality. From "do what is right and good" to the last of the commentators/judicial authorities/thinkers.
What?
No, I meant it was a utilitarian principle, that one of them is more successful than the other.?
The rabbi said that one can fast as a human-moral form of remembering the fallen, and I wonder how one can take a religious principle like fasting and use it as a symbol for something human?
Yes, but perhaps doing what is right and good follows the commandments of the Torah, and in any case excludes other forms, and therefore this would only contradict the words of the Rabbi.?
I can't comment at such intervals. If you write after a long time, write exactly what the claim/question is.
Fasting is not a religious principle. Religion uses it and it is certainly possible to use it for symbolic ritual purposes. I don't understand what the question is here.
And you have done what is right and good, and it does not follow the commandments of the Torah, otherwise it is unnecessary. It goes beyond the law of the law.