With Virtue – A Look at Racism (Tor 445)

With God’s help

To my friends from the religious kibbutz

One Shabbat a few months ago, I touched glory. I finally felt what Shlomo Artzi feels after the third encore in Caesarea, filled with an enthusiastic, applauding audience. I spent Shabbat in Jerusalem with the members of the religious kibbutz to talk to them about the people of Segula, racism, and the relationship between the two. In the morning, I received an aliyah for the Torah, and after I finished and returned to the venue, I was greeted by excited cheers from all sides all the way to my seat. I understood that this was given to me by God for the moving and high-quality performance I presented of the piyoot "Bless the Blessed One." I felt that I had truly transcended this time, and it is no wonder that I considered going up again for the encore, but to my surprise it became clear to me that the aliyah after me was already filling the place, so I gave up (I do not understand the argument). Needless to say, his performance was weak and paled in comparison to the performance that your faithful servant gave there. As an alternative encore, I decided to dedicate a column to them that will present what I talked to them about there, and I hope that the column will be as popular as if I were a guest on the encore.

Around the same time (who said "private providence" and didn't get it?!), I was asked in the response here on the site about racism, and I promised a column about it. Although I have dealt with this more than once in the past (see the columns 10, 206 and more), but the overall picture I will present here will consolidate things into a systematic rule that empties the concept of racism of its content to the joy of all of us (or at least to the joy of my own heart).

Racism as I explained it to my daughterRacism and factual claims:

The concept of racism suffers from severe ambiguity, and its broad and careless use creates its own disparagement. Anything that someone doesn't like is "racism," while fashionable racism (the kind that is accepted by the Jewish people, due to the 'racism of low expectations') is not, of course. There are a lot of slogans and demagogy in the discourse on racism because the concept itself is very elusive, and as I will try to show here, it is highly doubtful whether it even has a defined content.

Let me start by saying that in the term racism as it is commonly used, race is not a fundamental issue. Race is one parameter, but to the same extent a similar attitude based on another parameter, such as gender, age, nationality, religion, skin color, height, the first letter of the name, shoe size, and so on, would also be called by this unflattering epithet. But for the sake of convention and for the sake of simplicity, I will also speak here mainly about racism and leave you with the necessary expansions.

I will start with a simple assumption, and I assume that it is universally agreed upon. Racism is a word with a negative connotation. We can speak of it as a purely descriptive word, but that is not the connotation that interests us here. When someone is accused of racism, it is a condemnation of them. I will add here that even if someone thinks that racism is not problematic, they must still agree that discussing it belongs to the ethical realm (just as an atheist who does not believe in God must first define what he does not believe in). If so, racism is a term that belongs to the ethical-ethical field. A neutral distinction between people, that is, a description of a difference in itself, whether true or false, is not racism. A false distinction between people or groups is a factual error, not a value error.

I suppose we can agree that the statement that blacks on average play basketball better than whites, or the statement that LeBron James plays (not on average) basketball better than me, a white person, are not racist statements. They are factual descriptions. But to the same extent, the statement that Reuven has a higher IQ than Simon, or that blacks on average have a higher IQ than white people, even if they are not true, are not racist statements. These are factual claims, except that this time it is a fact that is more significant in the eyes of many people (those who give more importance to IQ than to basketball ability). To the same extent, the statement that blacks on average are shorter, or dumber, than white people, is not a racist statement. These may be incorrect statements, but they are factual errors, and as such they cannot be considered racism.

Sometimes there is a value fallacy that leads to a false factual distinction. For example, you don't bother to get to know some group of "others" (another race), and yet you allow yourself to determine their general characteristics. The end product is a factual distinction (sometimes a failed one), but this was created from a value fallacy. And yet, if in the end you claim a factual distinction, then even if in my opinion you are wrong, there is no racism here. In other words, I will not argue against you that you are morally wrong, but that you are factually wrong. The arguments I will raise against you will not be labeling you as racist or dark, but factual arguments on the merits of the matter. It should be understood that mistakes are made for many reasons (stupidity, inattention, indifference, hatred, etc.), but when arguing about facts it is wrong and inappropriate to focus on the reasons for the mistake. Evidence must be presented against the proposed position and not accused of a value label (infidel, racist, evil, etc.).

Implication: The accepted definition of racism

Now you can see that the accepted definition of racism is problematic. For example, Yehuda Shenhav inHis article Provides the following definition:

Attribution of inferiority, to an individual or group, by using stereotypical traits and by framing the difference between groups in terms of an unchanging biological essence.

He then extends this to distinctions not based on biological-racial grounds.

Also inEncyclopedia of ideas, write similar things (this name is also cited under the name Shenhav):

Race is a concept that defines the differences between groups of people in terms of differences in biological and genetic development. Biological differences between races are the result of the frequency of occurrence of a dominant gene in a given race. Racism is an expression of actual and theoretical social practices that base attitudes towards other people on biological and cultural differences, perceived as deterministic and unchangeable foundations. Making the biological (skin color), social (country of origin) or cultural (eating habits) immutable (ivory and pigeon [2008]).

Racial differences exist, but treating their owners on the basis of these differences and perceiving them as essential, unchangeable foundations is racism. By this definition, racism is essentially essentialism. Shenhav and his colleagues believe that when you treat any characteristic as unchangeable, that is, essential, you are racist. I will come to the component of racist behavior later.

But the question of whether any characteristics are intrinsic, that is, modifiable or not, is a purely factual question. Again, even if someone is mistaken and thinks that these characteristics are unmodifiable and in fact the truth is that they are, then they are mistaken in the facts. As I explained above, a mistake is not racism. Furthermore, I do not know where the knights of the war on racism derive the confidence from that every such characteristic is truly modifiable. This is a factual assumption, and as such it also requires substantiation. The assertion that any claim about the essentiality of a trait is racism is a prima facie, and certainly unfounded, claim.

And in general, what does it mean that a characteristic is intrinsic and unchangeable? Does it mean that even brain surgery cannot change these characteristics? And what if there is a technique for lightening the skin, then now racism disappears because it turned out that black skin is not an intrinsic characteristic (i.e., it can be changed)?! That's really strange. Today there are techniques for changing sex (at least on the biological level, and I don't rule out the possibility of techniques for changing conscious and mental sex. This is certainly possible in principle, even if we're not quite there yet). In principle, it's also possible to transplant a human brain into a monkey, or to enhance brains with chips. Does this mean that the intellectual capacity of monkeys is not an intrinsic characteristic? Is the assertion that there is a difference between the intellectual capacity of humans and that of monkeys racism? And in general, is a characteristic like intelligence changeable or unchangeable?! In conventional terms, no. So any reference to someone's intelligence is racism?

Think of someone who tells blacks that they are mentally inferior, and therefore they must have brain surgery to improve their intellectual ability. I suppose they would say that he is strictly racist, certainly according to the accepted definitions, even though he is hung up on a trait that he himself admits can be changed (by surgery). After all, he himself is suggesting that an inferior race make a change! Or look at the fundamentalists who believe that sex reassignment surgery does not really change the sex but only the external (biological) appearance. They simply assume a different definition of sex. Here it is not even a mistake but just an argument about definitions. Can a wrong definition (even if we assume that there is such a thing as wrong definitions, and add the assumption that this specific definition is indeed wrong) be considered racism? This is very unlikely.

Is treating groups differently based on belief or religious affiliation legitimate? This is certainly a parameter that can be changed. A person can adopt a different belief or religious affiliation and change this characteristic of themselves. Is it because of this that it is permissible to discriminate between religious groups or treat them unequally? Shouldn't such treatment be labeled 'racism'?

Furthermore, when it comes to species and large groups, the characteristics suffer from inherent ambiguity. At most, one can speak of a distribution or an average of the trait in question in the group. Even if someone claims that whites are less intelligent than blacks, it is clear that in his opinion blacks can also be found with an IQ lower than that of any group of whites. At most, he is talking about an average. Can anyone say for sure that the average IQ of blacks and whites is the same? Where does this figure come from? Especially if one adopts the criticism of intelligence tests and IQ scores that is so fashionable among opponents of racism. If the tests themselves are not a measure, how can one know that the average is the same across all groups, species, and races?

Another example is physical abilities. I mentioned the innovative statement that blacks are better basketball players than whites from Hungary. Is this a racist statement? It seems to me that this is a simple fact and there is no problem in expressing it. And if someone says that Hungarians play better (a statement that is wrong on average), is he racist? Beyond that, of course, one can find good white players and bad black players, but on average it is difficult to doubt that blacks play better, and I doubt to what extent this can be fundamentally changed (unless we perform a comprehensive set of analyses on all whites). So now I will ask: is this an intrinsic characteristic, or is it modifiable? It depends on what one means when one talks about change and essentiality. In the conventional sense, one can argue that this is an intrinsic statement, and yet, it seems to me that it, like its opposite, are not racist statements.

Even if it were not factually true that blacks play better, what is wrong with such a statement? The same goes for a similar statement about differences in intelligence (I'm not going to mention it). These are factual claims, true or not. You can argue and bring evidence here or there, but what about racism?! I mentioned above that sometimes such a conclusion is reached because of a prejudice against blacks or whites, and then there is a whiff of racism here. But still, the bottom line is that there is an error of fact here (if any), and a factual statement, even if it is wrong, is not racism. In short, the principled claim against a racist is not that he is stupid (even if it is true), but that he is evil.

Interim conclusion

If it is a factual claim, it should be tested against facts and observations, not against values. Values are not supposed to dictate facts. Subordinating facts to values is a fallacy, very typical of the postmodern era that denies pure factuality (it was preceded by pragmatism, which has already been vilified here more than once). It seems to me that opponents of racism are no less, if not more, than racists themselves. Both sides prefer to see reality through eyes that match their values, and the argument/difference is at most whether these are positive values or not. Some are comfortable seeing the world as composed of different groups, while others are comfortable identifying between the groups or blurring the differences between them.

Both sides talk about seeing reality through value-based lenses (and probably see reality incorrectly), and therefore, in principle, both sides are wrong and misleading. Reality should not be subordinated to values (this is the naturalistic fallacy). Not because it is always wrong, since one of the two opposing statements is necessarily correct, but because values are not the prism through which it is correct to determine facts. It is not reasonable to identify racism, which is ethically flawed behavior, with perceptions or statements that refer to facts.

Racism on the Ethical Level: Profiling

We have seen that racism cannot be reduced to the factual level. A racist attitude or position belongs to the value level, meaning that it is a type of attitude toward certain groups or people and not just a factual view of differences between their characteristics (essential or not). Here we come to a second characteristic (also hinted at in Shenhav's definition): determining an attitude toward groups or people according to their (essential) characteristics. To be racist, in addition to the factual diagnosis, an attitude that is built on this diagnosis is also required. A statement that blacks are intellectually inferior to whites is not racism, but at most an incorrect statement (or not). But giving them discriminatory treatment based on this statement can be considered racism. This is what is called "profiling" today, that is, determining a profile of a group according to some (essential?) characteristics, and determining a different attitude toward the members of this group based on its collective profile.

But even here the road is not over. First, we must distinguish between justified and unjustified treatment. If the treatment given to a group is justified on the basis of its profile, there is no racism here. Adding only Jews to the minyan is not racism, because essentially only Jews join the minyan (in my personal opinion, only believing Jews join, and according to this there is not even a whiff of racism here, but even without that it should not be seen as racism). Accepting outstanding athletes to compete solely on the basis of their sporting skills is not racism. The reason for this is that their profile is relevant to the treatment in question.

Racism or discrimination

So what is racism anyway? Determining an attitude towards group X based on characteristic A, when characteristic A is irrelevant to the attitude in question. For example, I don't let black people into my club because they have a low IQ, even though the activities in the club do not require intellectual skills. Racism is when I don't let black people into the swimming pool, even though their skin color has nothing to do with the activities that take place there (see here andhere). But here too one can wonder what this has to do with racism. Think of a situation where I am not allowed into the swimming pool simply because they don't like me, or based on an arbitrary lottery (they decided that one in three people who come will not be able to enter, just for no reason). This is discrimination that is not based on profiling, and therefore it is certainly not racism but discrimination or exclusion.

Is there a difference between these two types of discrimination? There is, but it does not seem relevant on the ethical level. I see no difference between discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics (racism) and casual or arbitrary discrimination. In short, the problem with racism is not profiling, but discrimination and exclusion. My problem with someone who does not accept black people into a club or swimming pool is not his racism and his need for their characteristics, but that he discriminates against people without justification. Why does it matter whether the discrimination is based on profiling or on a lottery? Discrimination is discrimination, and it is bad regardless of its reasons. If so, talking about racism that can only refer to the ethical level seems completely irrelevant on the ethical level. There is no moral value in not being racist. The value is not to discriminate and to treat people equally.

At most, it can be said that racism on the factual level is a source that is bound to lead to unequal and discriminatory treatment. Experience shows that when there is profiling, it often leads to discriminatory treatment, but the ethical problem is the discriminatory treatment, not racism.

Attitude towards an individual within a group

There are situations where profiling is done for a group, and it is assumed that if it is correct then all members of the group are characterized in the same way (this is a problem of The Almighty in the army). For example, suppose we conducted a study and came to the conclusion that the IQ of a certain group is lower than others. As mentioned, this claim in itself is only a description and therefore does not contain racism in the ethical sense. Now we can ask what about the attitude towards this group? Ostensibly, in contexts where IQ is relevant, we can also treat the members of the group according to the factual findings that are valid about them (not admitting them to university, or to the 'Talpiot' track in the army).

The problem arises in relation to a particular member of the group who is not characterized in this way, that is, who belongs to the intelligent minority in that group. Such a person is entitled to be treated fairly according to his qualifications, regardless of the group he belongs to. Treatment of such a person based on group characteristics can be considered improper profiling, or racism. For example, what would we say about a teacher who gives a low grade to a student of Mizrahi origin simply because he is convinced that, on average, students of such origin are less successful (let's assume for the sake of discussion that this is factually true)? This is profiling at its worst.

But here too I will make two reservations:

1. There are situations where there is no escape and one must rely on profiling, due to a lack of the possibility or resources needed to provide individual treatment. For example, disqualifying an Arab MK from sitting on the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee (or subcommittees) can be justified if we do not have the tools to check his loyalty. The suspicion regarding the lack of loyalty of Arabs in security matters is well-founded and it is certainly justified to take it into account in relation to them. Of course, if we know of a particular person whose loyalty is clear - then of course there is no justification for this. But if we have no way to check or the check is very expensive and there is no practical possibility of doing it - then this is a completely legitimate decision and there is no racism in it.

The same is true for security checks of Arabs at the airport (in the US after 9/11, when strict checks began at airports, severe criticism arose about profiling. The fools wanted everyone to be checked equally. In Israel, such claims are raised from time to time as well). But at the airport, it is impossible to be satisfied with checking suspects because there is not always a way to know who is a suspect and we risk attacks that will not be prevented. On the other hand, checking Jews is foolish because there are no Jewish terrorists (at least with regard to hitting airplanes). The stubborn opposition to profiling in these contexts is a confusion of values, and it reflects political correctness in its worst form.

About the above inWikipedia Criticisms of the KBA diagnoses have been brought forward, all of which focus on the question of whether the parameters by which the KBA score is determined are relevant and whether they are biased. But the main criticism, which for some reason is not brought forward there, is completely different. Let's assume for the sake of discussion that these parameters are relevant and not biased on average. Let's assume that residents of development towns or people of Mizrahi origin are, on average, endowed with less talent or less education or less good leadership skills. Any reasonable person understands that in such large groups (Mizrahi, or residents of the periphery), whose members received a low KBA score simply because they are such, there are exceptional people. And aren't there talented and leadership-minded people who live in a development town or of Mizrahi origin? Every person deserves treatment that suits them specifically, regardless of their group profile. There is no justification for discussing a person's fate only according to the profile of the group to which they belong.

This criticism is very true, and it is not even politically correct. And yet, in light of what I have explained here, if it is very difficult to test individual suitability directly, there may be justification for using an index like the KBA. Furthermore, because it is about the fate of people (in our society, military service is the gateway to many things in the future), many resources must be invested to try and circumvent the need for the KBA (yes, to test skills individually). Indeed, a few months ago (August 2021) the IDF changed the parameters of the KBA.

2. Even if an individual is treated inappropriately because of collective profiling, and even where this is not justified (because they have exceptional characteristics), the ethical and moral problem in such a relationship is not racism but discrimination and exclusion (as I explained above). Therefore, such a situation also fails to establish a moral claim for racism. Although here we can see the meaning of racism as a foundation for discrimination. Profiling expresses a relationship with an individual within a collective, and therefore is an opening that calls for discrimination and unequal treatment of individuals within the group. As I explained above, even in such cases, racism is not an independent moral failing, but rather a relationship that may lead to moral failings.

Interim summary

The conclusion that emerges so far is that there is no moral or ethical flaw in racism. At most, it constitutes a mental infrastructure that may lead people to discrimination and exclusion, or inequality, and these are indeed moral flaws. Carrying the name of racism in vain stems from the sensitivity created by the Holocaust and the discrimination of blacks in the US (as well as Mizrahi Jews in Israel). Sometimes it is done innocently, but my feeling is that sometimes it is a deliberate manipulation, which tries to create a subconscious identification between discrimination and Nazism. Hence the widespread use of race terms, even though discrimination is problematic on any background (and even without any background at all. Arbitrary discrimination). This failure, beyond being a failure, is also a shot in the foot of the fight against discrimination (as often happens in the discourse of political correctness), because if the claim against me is that I am racist, it is enough for me to show that I am not racist to escape criticism. The relevant discussion should revolve around the question of whether I provide equal treatment and do not discriminate, and not the question of whether I am racist.

The conclusion is that racism needs to be removed from our DSM of negative values. There is and should be no such value. Blaming a person or an attitude for racism is an unhelpful, and in most cases even harmful, deception. There is no place for such a moral accusation, and its use is a mistake at best, and demagogic manipulation at worst.

Now I will try to demonstrate this briefly through several different contexts. I have dealt with most of them here in the past, and therefore I will need them here in summing up what is being said, in order to demonstrate the analysis made above. I will say right here that the last example (the essential claim about a noble people) is the only one that comes close to reflecting a value problem of racism, and even there it is at most a whiff of racism and not something really solid.

A. The Nazis

Well, you could have guessed that the first example would be Nazism. That's where it all starts. The fact that the Nazis were based on a racial theory does not mean that racism is wrong, or even that it is wrong. If the Jews were truly corrupt and harmful and greedy, etc., then would it have been permissible to exterminate them in extermination camps and crematoria? And if their racial theory is wrong, is the problem that they were wrong and held a false doctrine? The problem is what they did on the basis of this racial theory. There is no doubt that racial theory helped them to assimilate their doctrine and act according to it, but in the end, the moral problem of the Nazis was not racism, but that they were unjustified murderers. What was unusual about them was not their reliance on racism, but the systematicity, form, and scope of the act of extermination.

No one would have thought to prohibit characterizing groups by shoe size, even if the Nazis had chosen to murder by shoe size. I assume they also wouldn't have used the term "shoes" for anyone who discriminates against others on any basis (or without any basis). The Nazis also wore pants when they murdered and even used guns. So now it's forbidden to wear pants or use guns (for justified purposes)? Is now everyone who shoots a deer and kills it (completely wrong, of course) a Nazi, or perhaps a racist? The hysteria about the Nazis is understandable, but precisely because of it, drawing conclusions about everything that concerns them is deeply flawed.

B. The Haredi attitude towards Mizrahi

In a column 206 also here (For some reason I also remember a column about Emmanuel, and now I can't find it.) I spoke out about the discriminatory attitude of the Haredi towards Mizrahi. A clear example of this is the affair of the students at Emmanuel. One of the most famous is that the acceptance of Mizrahi students into "Ashkenazi" institutions in the Haredi sector (only there are Ashkenazi and Sephardic institutions) is problematic. Although it is usually justified on the basis of factual characteristics (television in the home, a different form of learning, a different tradition of jurisprudence, a different culture, different role models, and so on). One can like or dislike (mostly not) the division of institutions and communities in the Haredi world, but given this division, I see no particular problem with such relevant distinctions. An institution that chooses to educate its students on the fact that Rabbi Shach is the great one in the universe and everything else is a zero, or that educates on the Lithuanian ethos and voting for the Agudath Israel party and nothing else, without television and Western culture, Hasidic songs and not Mizrahi songs, and the like, is certainly expected and likely to refrain from accepting Mizrahi students. This is a completely factual distinction, and there is no trace of racism in it. The choice to see these parameters as important parameters that define the educational direction is of course strange to me and I do not like it, but it is at most stupidity and not racism.

It can of course be argued that if they had examined the students individually, they would have discovered that there are Mizrahi students who meet the relevant criteria (admire Rabbi Shach, listen to only Hasidic music and study Torah in the Lithuanian way), and that the decision based on the collective profile is problematic. But here too, the reservations I raised above must be taken into account. To what extent can one examine, what is the cost of failing, and so on. Furthermore, such institutions usually do accept Mizrahi students, but in smaller numbers, and this is actually an excellent indication that there is no racism there at all. After all, on average, these distinctions are correct, and therefore a substantive examination will yield results of a majority of Ashkenazi students, also for completely substantive and relevant reasons.

In significant parts of the Ashkenazi Haredi world, there are quite a few incorrect stereotypes about Mizrahi, and this is where we can see a problem. But it is a mistake and not a value lapse. Only if they adopt the stereotypes even though they know they are incorrect can we perhaps see this as a problem. But I don't think this is the usual case. The fact that they don't bother to check is laziness and mental fixation, but again, not racism. After all, even if there is unjustified discrimination in student admissions, the problem is discrimination and exclusion, not racism.

One might expect that they would introduce affirmative action in admissions to give Mizrahi students a chance to "advance" (in the terms accepted there. Even the Mizrahi students who so desperately want to be admitted to that institution probably believe that this is progress). But this is a demand that goes beyond the law, and certainly not complying with it is not racism. Just as a university that does not accept weak students just to give them a chance to advance is not accused of racism. The criterion of abilities is relevant in admissions to a university, and the criteria of Mizrahi/Ashkenazi are relevant in admissions to an Ashkenazi institution.

C. Psychometrics and university admissions

In a very similar way, one can talk about the claims regarding the university admissions cutoff, both for students and lecturers. They point to a minority of Mizrahi people in Israel (does that still exist?), blacks in the US, or women (?), but this very difference does not indicate racism or even discrimination. The difficulty in admitting to a university for weaker populations is a matter of concern. Although it is possible to demand an individual examination of each candidate and not to introduce group profiling, it seems to me that no institution really grants admission based on collective criteria. The differences are the result of the relevant policy (which can of course be criticized). Do we expect to introduce other criteria only to achieve artificial equality? If so, then the alternative criteria should be presented, and not be satisfied with pointing out the numerical difference. I recall an interview with a school principal in Tel Aviv that I heard many years ago on the radio. He was very proud of the fact that he had canceled the computer course at the school, because he saw that female students were weaker than male students in this area. And back to our subject, even if there is a problem with the admission criteria, it is not a question of Racism is a mistake. And the moral problem is discrimination, not racism or gender.

D. Torah study for women

Regarding women's study of Torah, there is an ongoing debate (is it still ongoing? I mean outside the 'Mount Moriah' sect). It is usually framed as whether women are less qualified to study Torah (their minds are light, their wisdom is in the field, etc.). Some cry and others cry, and the question of essentialism arises here (which we saw above is usually linked to the question of racism), since this is an argument that the female nature is innate and structured and cannot be changed. The debate is also usually conducted on a factual level. Women are offended by this distinction and men who are subject to political correctness are ashamed to say it and even convince themselves that it is not true. I have written more than once that, at least from the facts on the ground, it seems that women are not yet reaching high levels of scholarship. There may be many justified reasons for this, but this is the fact for now and anyone who denies it is simply burying their head in the sand (as the commandments of political correctness dictate). Anyone who dares to say such a thing is of course immediately caught in a catapult (from experience). In the best case scenario, they will deny the facts or explain to him in a good-natured manner that I actually know someone who is truly elite (according to the 'law of small numbers'). Others explain that this is racism, that is, they attack this claim on an ethical level. But in light of what I have explained so far, these discussions are irrelevant.

If this characterization is correct, then there is no gender bias here and no error, but rather a correct factual description. And even if it is incorrect, then there is an error here that may lead to discrimination. In any case, the question of essentiality is a question that lies on the factual level and must be discussed there (it is not easy to decide, of course, and it is even quite difficult to define the parties, etc.). And I have not yet mentioned the strange fact that anyone who claims that there is a difference in abilities between women and men is repeatedly asked to provide evidence for his statement, but the claim that there is no difference is perceived by men and women as something that is self-evident and does not require any proof. At most, they explain to you that there are circumstances that justify this (their exclusion at a young age, the inability to invest time and the lack of educational institutions in adulthood, etc.). But the fact that there are justified circumstances does not mean that women have the same abilities as men. At most, it can be argued that there is no evidence for the opposite claim. In these debates, the facts are blatantly and explicitly subordinated to agenda and ideology. But regardless of all this, the factual question has nothing to do with questions of values (racism).

In any case, even if there is a problem with these distinctions, it is clear that there is no claim here under the value clause of racism/genderism. At most, it is a mistake, and perhaps it leads to discrimination. I have already mentioned that the value claims that are made when dealing with the factual level are a shot in the foot of the struggle. This factual error (assuming it is an error) must be dealt with on the factual level and not dismissed as a fact claim on the basis of value claims. Reality is not subject to values (it was here before).

As someone who has been involved in Torah study for women for many years and who cares about it (but refuses to let desire and agendas overshadow his view of reality), I find these discussions silly and questionable how well both sides of the debate are defined. What does essential mean? What is considered unchangeable? Does brain surgery count or not? And despite everything, I definitely see a problem with excluding women from study, but this has nothing to do with claims about their abilities. I will now explain this on two levels.

The fundamental problem with this policy is not in the nature of the distinction (whether it is correct or not), but in the treatment of an individual person according to collective profiling. Even if we accept the assumption that in the collective profile women are on average weaker than men in their abilities in studying Torah, so what? We are talking about a huge group, about 50% of the world's population. Clearly, there are also those among them who are not weaker than all men, and I am sure that there are also quite a few among them who are superior in their learning abilities. So at least let these women study Torah. Here we can already smell a moral failure, but as mentioned, the failure is discrimination and exclusion, not essentialism and racism. Essentialism may lead to discrimination and exclusion, but the moral problem is discrimination, not essentialism. The question of essentialism is factual, and as such it must be examined directly on the factual level.

So far I have argued that there are talented women and therefore they should not be prevented from studying Torah. But my principled argument is much broader. Even if we assume that all women are less talented than men (there are no elite women at all), it is still not clear why they are prohibited from studying Torah? Is someone who is not talented in a certain field prohibited from engaging in it? If he wants to – that is his right. This is the main argument regarding women’s study of Torah, and it makes all discussions about profiling and the reliability of the factual distinctions that underlie the discussion unnecessary. It also sharpens the disconnect that must be made between the factual and the ethical levels.

E. With virtue

People rebel against statements that we are a special people, claiming that this is racism. They mean the statement in its essential interpretation, that is, the assumption that we are a people endowed with special qualities (special spirituality, etc., which is attributed toKhazari with its five steps). I personally think that there is no indication for this claim of fact, but in order to examine it, one must define the concept of a 'special people', a very difficult matter and, in my opinion, almost impossible (in the second book of my trilogy, I devoted Chapter 22 to this matter). But even without going into these difficulties, the claim that we are a special people in the essential sense must be examined on the factual level. If it is true, then there is no reason to claim it and there is no trace of racism here. If it is not true, then it is possible and necessary to argue about it, but this debate is on the factual level (to show that there is no difference in average behavior, etc.) and not on the value level. At most, it is a mistake, but it has nothing to do with a value failure. In my personal opinion, this is a kind of disconnection from reality. To my understanding, as I explained there, a special people means a people chosen by God and given a mission, and not a people with other essential qualities than other peoples and human beings.[1]

The conclusion is that profiling, even if it is spiritual, needs to be examined factually (whether it is true or not). Although the conclusions drawn from it (treating non-Jews differently, for example, dismissing their good deeds as if they did not truly come from kindness and morality) are the closest thing to a value-based failure of racism that I know of. This is the canonical example of value-based racism, and it is different from all the examples cited above. This is an impractical attitude that stems from racism, and therefore it cannot be mapped onto another value (such as discrimination or exclusion). But again, at its root this is a factual question, and therefore even if there is a problem here, it is not a problem of racism but of error. I definitely think that the difficulty in arguing about it (again from experience) stems from built-in racism. This racism causes people to see and interpret the facts in the world in a selective and biased way. When you bring them evidence of Gentiles doing good deeds and Jews doing bad deeds, and even if you bring statistics, they will reject you out of hand (for Jews it is intrinsic and for Gentiles it is an external aspect to them. The devil knows what is meant by that). But in the end, it is a wrong worldview and not a moral flaw. If they had reached these conclusions without their racist basis, there would still be a factual problem here and perhaps also a moral one, and that would be the very same problem. The racism in the background is not important for the moral discussion. Beyond that, if behavioral consequences are not derived from this observation, there is no real moral problem here (although there is a smell. Because a person's evidence and moral judgment are matters of value significance). And if unjustified behavioral consequences are derived from it, then again the problem is not racism but the consequences: discrimination, exclusion, or unequal treatment.

It seems to me that the attitude of many in the religious community towards Gentiles, without talking about the practical implications (inappropriate treatment of them) but only about the interpretation given to their character and motives, is the closest thing I can think of to the ethical failure of racism. It is a racist failure because here there is no discrimination on a practical level and no practical implications at all, therefore there is no other ethical problem here. Whoever nevertheless sees such an attitude as an ethical problem, it seems to me that this is the closest thing I can think of to an ethical flaw that can be called racism. But as mentioned, here too it is mainly a racist scent and less solid racism (in taste rather than substance).

[1] My argument is that this choice can also be arbitrary or based on cultural and value differences (Abraham educating his descendants to do righteousness and justice), and it is not necessary to depend on essential qualities. Such a choice, even if it is arbitrary, is not discrimination. Assuming that God must choose a certain people, then even if there is no difference between the peoples, the choice must be made (see, for example, Maharal Netzah Israel Chapter 11 onwards). And certainly as long as it does not give the chosen people privileges, there is no moral problem here.