Invite a lecturer on Saturday

Hello Rabbi A.
It’s good to hear from Mr. I hope he is well and, as usual, he is encouraging soldiers to Torah and fear.

Regarding his question, I will write from a refrigerator.
A distinction must be made between a situation in which he does something in my opinion (such is the case with a deacon who does something in the opinion of his father in the Mishnah of Shabbat, p. 10 of all the writings) and a situation in which he considers such an act to be something that I myself do. And the Rambam, in a parallel and parallel manner, wrote that there is a prohibition against the suffah and a prohibition against the gedul, when the suffah is accidentally struck, the Torah prohibition is violated. And what the Rambam wrote there that the suffah is injured – this proves that in his opinion the prohibition is not against a blind person, but rather a prohibition against the suffah (since there are no whippings for the suffah).
Although the Mishnah Shabbat states that a non-Jew does it according to his own will, it seems to me that in our case, I and the one being asked do it clearly for me and my sake. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss whether the Rabbinic view of the 2nd rabbinic view is actually a sefiya in the hands or just a fallacy. According to the rabbinic view, it is not forbidden for a minor to extinguish something that is forbidden because he is doing it at the behest of his father. However, it is necessary to reject the opinion of the Rashba (R.P. Mi Shehachich), who explained that there this is a special law on Shabbat (his son’s shabita), and this means that according to his view, he is not obligated by the 2nd rabbinic view to ask someone to do something for him according to the sefiya law in other prohibitions (except Shabbat). And also for Shabbat, where he is not his son, since he does not have a sefiya law, which the Rashba does not prohibit and the Shab is prohibited. From this, it seems that the Rashba assumes that a statement/request is not a sefiya. However, for most poskim who understood the statement to extinguish according to the sefiya law, it seems that a request to do something for me is a caspiya.
The conclusion for the Torah prohibition is in this.
And I wrote it.
And I will seal with longing to see Mr.’s face soon.
Manai, Report 2011
Lod and the Galilee
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Asks:

thanks.
I wanted to find out your opinion and it turned out to be clear.
Although your evidence deserves further clarification.
The evidence from hybrids should be doubted because the reasons for this halakha in the Rambam are numerous, and their main focus is on the prohibition against hybrids (you shall not wear – you shall not wear; prohibition on the result, etc.; and perhaps one should add the argument for hybrid seeds that have a prohibition against them – and if one sees hybrids on their owner in the market, one should pluck them from him and do it.
So you copied the law of hybrids for the prohibition of Shabbat on the Sabbath.
And furthermore, it is not like the one who dresses the one who invites. It seems that according to the Rambam, if the one who dresses invites the one who wears to wear, the one who dresses will certainly not be punished (the one who did not dress merely invited), but only before a blind person (as in the case where the wearer intentionally wears).
And the evidence from the small, apart from what you yourself have qualified, is not similar to the large and the small, and it is simple.
Anyway, thanks for the clarification.

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Rabbi:
1. Maimonides himself applies this to additional prohibitions (the impurity of a priest and a Nazir, although there is a special teaching on Nazir, except for that). See the MCC in the Frankel edition there. This is how most of his commentators taught it (and in particular the Rosh, who wondered about its origin). Here we must add Rashi’s well-known words in Rish P. Matot regarding the one who stumbles his friend, he enters under him into punishment. This is certainly true of all prohibitions (after all, he is talking about a vow).
2. Regarding the similarity between a dresser and a guest, not Demi. Unless you are talking about a guest who will do something for him (= for the guest. Like a small person and a Gentile who come to put out a fire for me). Inviting someone to wear a halal garment himself is certainly not a sin in the hands. And especially someone who is not obligated to do so, and therefore there is a strong possibility that he is doing it for me and not because of his decision to sin. In my opinion, there is no difference between a small person and an adult in this matter, except that a small person always does what his father thinks and an adult usually does what he thinks himself. But if the case happens that an adult does, in my opinion, then again there will be a prohibition on me as in the case of a small person.
It is true that a stranger does something for his own good because he thinks he will gain something else from it. But if someone does something for me out of friendship, it is difficult to say that the gain from the friendship is considered doing something for his own good.

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Asks:

According to the best of my research – (I have not found anyone who interprets that the prohibition applies to the one who wears it because of obstacles or obstacles in the hands) the Rambam’s reasons are what I wrote above (special sermon).

And with regard to other cases (I trust your words that) there is a special sermon for each case.

And I return to asking, in your opinion, if the transgressor’s transgression is not a transgression (he is not obligated by the commandments) and the one who causes him to stumble does not commit a prohibition, why would a handshake be considered a prohibition (especially in light of your citation of Rashi’s words from Mishrat Matot)? Does one who feeds a Gentile a forbidden food (which the Gentile is not forbidden from doing) transgress a prohibition?

And you also say there is a distinction between a hand-made offering and a person who orders it. A person who orders it will only be considered a hand-made offering if he does it for the person who orders it. And where did you get this innovation from? Only from a small one – there is no example of this from a large one.
And to say that in a big way sometimes he does it for me and sometimes he doesn’t, and that sometimes he does it for me, he will consider it as if he did it himself – we are sorry to understand the first ones (a small law that he will consider as if he did it himself), and you are also adding a big law to us?
And from a realistic perspective, there is no doubt that those who invite him to lecture also have their own interests. In a small way, one could say that he is a failure to his father (and I think that is only in his son), in a big way, this is simply not true (in the picture of reality that I am familiar with).

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Rabbi:
Indeed, on second thought, an invitation to a lecture seems like a self-serving decision. In my opinion, we must discuss whether there is a prohibition against a Shabbat act in the work of an atheist (simply put, it seems to me that the ruling is no different from a Shabbat act committed by a forced laborer).
Regarding a gentile’s offering, it certainly is not like the one discussed. After all, a Jew, even if he is an atheist, is also, according to my system, obligated to perform the mitzvot, but he cannot fulfill his obligation. The gentile is exempt. It’s like tripping a cat (with a difference, of course).

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Asks:

I am a religious person, so I will offer you a doubt that is not in your opinion.
You mentioned the Sabbath incident.
Apparently, there is no Sabbath act here – there is no object that can be prohibited.
It is true that the early scholars (not according to the Ritva’s view) held that even when no change is made to an object, it is still prohibited from performing a Shabbat act (such as taking out or transporting an object).
But heni milia habezt? Can this also be said of a person. A person traveled on Shabbat – very serious. But would it be forbidden to enjoy it on Shabbat? There is an opinion (if the rabbinical Shabbat act comes to prevent motivation to do the most common Shabbat prohibitions in a person) – there is no halakhic anchor. Moreover, the enjoyment of the speaker is nothing but a sound, a sight, and a smell that do not exist…

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Rabbi:
I am familiar with the controversy, but I brought the NPF under the assumption that there is a prohibition of Shabbat deeds in the 23rd century. I will add that I do not see any logic in the method you mentioned, which states that there is no prohibition of Shabbat deeds in something that is not a hefza (the Mab brings this in the name of the kha), and to the same extent I do not see a difference between bringing a hefza (one who brings gifts outside the scope) and traveling to give a lecture. It is true that one must discuss whether this is enjoyment from the person who traveled, and he is the hefza who created the enjoyment, or whether there is no hefza here (below I will suggest that perhaps the lecture is the hefza that is enjoyed).
In any case, even if we take the second approach, it still seems to me like the transition between sanctifying a woman by giving her an object and sanctifying her by enjoying an act (dancing before me). The Idi and the Idi of pleasure are the same. Although the thing from which we enjoy is ostensibly different (here it is an object that has passed outside of the realm or from one authority to another, and here it is a lecture from a person who has traveled), I do not see a difference in interpretation.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that a lecture is not like pleasure that has no object and no substance. The lecture is an object (which, although it has no substance, is an object, and not like the honeyed eye and the smell of an apple in the Rambam, the Lord knows. All of these are attributes and not entities) that was made for me. Certainly, in the terminology of Rabbi of Brisk, it can be said that just as there is an object of prayer, there is an object of a lecture (such as in my article on the subject of intellectual property). It was created for me and I am not allowed to enjoy it. Now I think it is like enjoying television or radio broadcasts on Shabbat.