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On the Estimates and Assumptions of Chazal in Our Day

שו”תCategory: Talmudic studyOn the Estimates and Assumptions of Chazal in Our Day
asked 9 years ago

Peace be upon Rabbi Michael Avraham
I don’t know if you addressed the following question in one of your articles.
On the subject of estimates and assumptions that Shazl treated not necessarily as defining reality but as relating to reality, I wondered why this claim could not also be extended to the definition of ‘torture’ and ‘joy’.

There is no joy except in meat and wine. Is this a determination or an estimate? (N.M. for the nine days and mourning)
Is the prohibition of wearing sandals (especially leather ones) a definition of torture or a practical demarcation of what the public ‘thinks’ about torture?
(The question is not practical)
There are of course many more examples.

By the way, I saw in one of the volumes of the Tummin (27 or 28 if I’m not mistaken) an article and a response to an article regarding ‘Tev Lemeit Tan Do’ that I heard you referring to.
Rabbi Soloveitchik is quoted as strongly opposing the attempt to give a socio-historical context to this assumption, and as expected as a halakhic scholar, he saw in the halakhic framework a formal definition based on the intricacies of the human soul that are independent of time and place.
Regards


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מיכי Staff answered 9 years ago
There are situations in which a rule or law was established for some reason and now the act is binding. Therefore, one does not require a reason to recite and does not follow the reason for the regulation. Do you think it is possible to accept the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven without reciting Shema, but in a different way? Or perhaps to remember the sky and the heavens without a tzitzit on one’s garment? Is it possible to bless the Blessed One in a different way? After all, the halacha instructs on actions and not on moral goals alone. Although, of course, at the foundation of practical duties are different moral goals. But estimates and assumptions are something else, since there it is clear that we are dealing with assessments of reality and not absolute determinations. It is clear that no one breaks in his time is an assessment of the situation and not a normative determination, and if reality changes, one should not decide in favor of the companion. Halacha also has such determinations (although the line is very thin. I will address this in the third book in the theology trilogy that I am currently writing), for example, things that are forbidden because of danger are forbidden because there is a danger. And when there is no danger, there is no point in preserving them. The permission to kill a lice on Shabbat is based on a factual perception, and from that the permission was invalid. and so on. Rabbi Soloveitchik’s words are well-known, and I personally do not believe that he himself thought so. This is part of the war against the Reform (in a distorted form, in my opinion). In any case, one way or another, it is clear that this is nonsense. The laws did not come down from Sinai, but were determined by the sages from observing their surroundings. And reality can change. There is such a tendency for a woman, but her choices change with the circumstances (and I do not rule out in principle that she can also pass away from the world completely. This does not contradict anything), and the poskim have already established this. And in general, there is no concept of authority over realistic determinations at all. Authority exists only in relation to norms (and more on that in the second book in the aforementioned trilogy). —————————————————————————————— Ural: I’m not sure I understand from this answer why they don’t follow the taste of the regulation? Chazal prescribed taking the last water because of the salt of Sodom. Why do they say that even though the taste is nullified, the regulation is not nullified? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Simply put, it is a question of authority. We do not have a rabbinic court that can annul a regulation, and something that is in the Minyan requires another Minyan to permit (and among the rabbis, a rabbinic court is needed that is superior in wisdom and Minyan. See Rambam, Ref. 2, Mahal’ Memariam and Kasam, ibid.). In essence, this is a law whose purpose is to strengthen and maintain the stability of the halakhic law. But this means that the regulation is essentially null and void by annulling its basis.
Although the name of the Gra is stated that regulations are not changed by canceling their reason for a fundamental reason, since they have hidden reasons. This is a very strange reasoning in my opinion, for several reasons: 1. In any interpretation, it can be argued that there may be another interpretation hidden from us. But we do not do this because no doubt excludes certainty. If we have a reasonable reason, why assume that it is not true and that there is another reason? 2. Even if there is a concern about hidden reasons, it is still at most a doubt. Either the reason we thought of is true or not. But if it is true, then the halakha is null and void, and therefore the law of spikit must be decided here. Therefore, it is not reasonable in my opinion that this is a fundamental law according to the Gra, but we have returned to questions of authority.
And after all, I will just add that in many places the poskim annul regulations that are meaningless for a variety of reasons (and certainly the salt of Sodom, which appears in the Shulchan Arbiter itself at the end of the sign, and the things are ancient). See my article here .

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