On the good commandments that time has given
Hello Rabbi!
Is the exemption of women from the time-honored commandments substantive, or technical? Is the rule true by chance, or is there something intrinsic in the fact that these commandments do not apply to women?
The conclusion of the issue in Kiddushin regarding positive commandments that are time-limited is –
Most of the Tanim learned the construction of the Av from Tefillin.
Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yehuda learn from scriptures that they do not teach.
The studies work great, except for the basic question – why divide the Torah into mitzvot that are time-bound and mitzvot that are not?
What seemingly aggravates the question is the first opening of the issue, which states that this is a rule that one should learn from.
So the following comes out –
We invented a concept that will help us categorize the mitzvot. A concept that does not appear in the Torah, but at least it streamlines the division of the mitzvot.
But the truth is that he does not do this either, since from the rule we have included, one cannot conclude about other mitzvot!
If the rule were an ironclad rule, then I would say – even if we don’t know why the Torah is divided this way, it is a division that works. Since it is true everywhere, it is useful enough to justify a new concept. Since the rule is not true in many cases, one must wonder why the Sages included the rule.
For this reason, this leads to the conclusion that the rule is essentially correct. Women are exempt from positive commandments that time has decreed. And we do not learn from the generalizations, because the rule is not intended to tell me which private commandments women are exempt from and which they are obligated to, because the rule does not do that. Because the rule is intended to tell me something essential (about these commandments, about women, about something in between…. I don’t know what, but something).
As the Rabbi sees it, from now on I’m a bit stuck.
I know that the rabbi has a theory of the relationship between the circle (which is in the mitzvot that repeat themselves, and thus defines the mitzvot that time dictates) and the line.
Does it mean to him that a woman does not need the repeated test points (assuming I remember correctly that we are returning to the same point, the same mitzvah, the same holiday, hoping that this time it is the same but a little higher)? Is it actually possible to forgo birthdays for our wives (something that can save people a lot of money and problems with home security)?
Or is the process regarding the exemption of women different?
Does the rabbi have any sources or writings on the matter?
Thank you very much!
As for the act of the zag, I don’t remember writing about the matter directly. But I have dealt with the meaning of rules (including that of the act of the zag) here and there (I wrote about it directly to a good extent, listen). I will write here from scratch.
A. The rules of halakha in general must be discussed. Are they rules that are retrospective (that describe the collection of facts-decisions that were reached independently of them) – the facts create the rules, or a priori rules – the rules determined the facts. The Rabbi in the Kosh proves with regard to the rules in Eruvin 28 that they are a priori, since the Gemara there teaches in the Kosh that if a halakha is like Rabbi Yosei versus a Rabbi and a halakha is like Rabbi Yosei against a Rabbi, then it is necessarily like Rabbi Yosei versus a Rabbi (transitivity). From this it is clear that these rules are not a case of mere fact but of essence. This of course does not mean that this is the case with all rules.
For example, the ruling of Rabbi Bar Mi’el Kagam seems like a rule that is retrospective, since there are exceptions to the rule (as you wrote). But even this is not necessary, because there may be specific reasons to deviate from an a priori rule. For example, in five of Yael Kagam’s six disputes, retroactive application is discussed, and therefore perhaps specifically here Abaye is right because it is one principle. In the Maseh-e-Zag there is also an explanation for at least some of the exceptions (for example, the women’s congregation is obligated because it is a public and not a private mitzvah, and everyone who belongs to the public is obligated by it. I have elaborated on this at length).
And more generally, even if there are rules that are not de facto collections of rulings but substantive rules (that determine the rulings), it is possible to deviate from them, because there are sub-rules that say to deviate. In general, the Sages are very dismissive of rules (we do not learn from them even where it is said except. “This is the rule”/”the equal side” for the Ituy of May?). Does this mean that the rules are only de facto collections? Not necessarily. But beyond the rule there is common sense.
Bottom line, I’m not sure the distinction between the two options is so dichotomous. The rules of language also seem to be de facto rules, since they all have exceptions. And yet, at least for some of them, there is a sense that they are not entirely arbitrary and random. That means there is some logic or purpose, but there are sub-rules that sometimes qualify it.
on. Now let’s get back to our subject. The very invention of Chazal to divide between the ZAG and the non-ZAG seems to require an explanation. It could be one of two things: 1. Tradition from Sinai. 2. There is a priori logic to this. Abu Darham, who explained that women are exempt from any interference with the ZAG, understood that this was an a priori explanation. And yet there are exceptions who reject this explanation, and this is not contradictory. On the other hand, it is quite clear from the course of the issue in Kiddushin that this was a rule that was already known and the discussion only sought to justify it (or find a source for it) retrospectively (Deresh Somekh). All kinds of studies are presented there, all of which have one conclusion. Therefore, it seems that the game is “addicted.” This actually suggests the option of tradition (although one should reject according to the Netziv in the beginning of HaEmek, who wrote that according to Maimonides, this is a non-Sinai tradition whose source has been lost to us, and for Rashi, it is the LBM. If so, the hon. 21).
And truly, for the sake of argument, Abu Darham’s words are very puzzling, both on their own (is this argument strong enough to exempt women from so many commandments? I have much better arguments to exempt all kinds of people from all kinds of commandments), and on the grounds that he requires a reason for reading (although some of the sermons certainly have a reason for reading, since the preacher himself was based on a reason for reading. Only in the verses he did not require it, and so on).
I hope I may have helped in some way.
Good luck,
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