The law of one who is strict with himself and does not eat what is annulled by the majority
Between the Delilah and the Bloody Megilla, life and peace to the great genius of the Grammada shone forth and appeared.
In what way did Mr. Debdik discuss in his last lesson the issue of a law that is strict on itself and does not accept what has been overturned by a majority?
Here is my understanding of the books and I found that Rabbi Teshuvot and HaNagatot brought Mr. Madin’s proof of ‘something that is permissible,’ and again rejected this evidence.
And the content of his words is that one should not be strict in annulment because it is permissible from the outset. And what they have made strict in the law of the Prophet is for the reason they found in it (so that they will not learn to be lenient and annul from the outset), and not because of any prohibitions in it.
(Z”l Rabbi M. Sternbuch: Question: A prohibition that is abrogated if it is permissible to eat it initially
In the opening verses of Teshuvah (Sus”i 116), he cites a dispute among the poskim about whether it is permissible to be strict about something that was abrogated by sixty, since the Sages permitted it as heresy, since the Lord and the “Torah of Hashem” disagreed on this, and apparently there is clear evidence from the principle of the law that something that is permissible is not abrogated, and Rashi interpreted in Bitza (3b): “Whatever you eat with prohibition, you eat with permission,” meaning that it is not advisable to eat something that was abrogated by a majority.
And in my opinion, it seems to be no evidence at all, even though something that has been annulled is permissible to eat for the first time, that is, since the Sages permitted it, we cannot be more wise than them, (the Gemara does not mention that there is a reason to be stricter, and the MDA taught this from the Torah of “the majority” or according to their acceptance, which does not give a reason here), but since the MMA does not annul a prohibition for the first time, and it is proven from the definition that the prohibition remains and only the law that it was permitted to eat, and in fact it was forbidden to allow the prohibition, but if it has already been annulled, the Sages said that the prohibition is allowed, and therefore in “a thing that has a permit” that without the law of annulment, the prohibition will expire after a time, the Sages forbade using the permission of annulment, so that they would not come to allow annulment for the first time, and Rashi’s intention, “until you eat it with permission,” meaning with the permission of the prohibition, “you eat it with permission,” meaning without the permission of the prohibition, and the reason for this is that it does not seem that annulment is a complete permission that it is permissible to do annulment for the first time, and in PZ7 Rashi does not interpret the reason only as the written law, but the Ahn says that in a place where they permitted after it was abrogated by a rabbi and not by a rabbi, there is no longer any reason for it, lest there is no longer any prohibition, and even though there is no Hasidic doctrine to make it stricter, and even though the words of Chazal are true that “the prohibition was permitted,” MM in dry in dry or in dry in its essence, since the prohibition remained in its meaning, even though it was permitted by a majority or by a sixty, there is room for making it stricter, but in the abrogation of a rabbi and not by a rabbi, which completely nullifies the prohibition, it must be said that there is no room for making it stricter, and especially this law (see Darkat, ibid., Teshuvot ve HaNhagat, vol. 2, sec. 10).
And God has another point, regarding the aggravation of something that is permitted by law.
Mr. S.L. Apparently there is no disadvantage in the actual aggravation, but there is no point in it, since the one who is exempt from the matter and does it is called a layman. Therefore, whatever there is in a matter that is reasonable to aggravate, even though the matter has been decided explicitly according to all the jurists to be permissible, there is room to aggravate it and prohibit it.
Not so, I think. It seems to me from the language of the poskim that they feared various concerns even in the 23rd. According to the article “All who are exempt from the matter and do it” in the Talmudic Encyclopedia, some saw it as an insult to the Torah that would make a person more strict than he was, or they feared that others would learn from it and believe that it is forbidden by law, and other concerns.
And from the author of the Maharsham (Barzan) Ka Atina, it is written that if a person eats a fourth meal on Shabbat, according to Rabbi Hidka, there is a concern about the possibility of a miscarriage, since it was ruled in the Gamma that it should not be burned.
Ultimately, it seems to me that the recent jurists feared the wisdom of the laymen, and forbade excessive independence, because of the seriousness that would eventually come to Kula, etc., etc.
But our Rabbi Kashi, who in every place where there is no s”l-”t
What I didn’t write, I said on the ‘Atharia Demer’ website, because for technical reasons I can’t write there, even though I eagerly read everything that is published.
And I will seal it with a double and multiplied blessing.
The Mohar”r”r, the author of Chay’ Ha-Rim and Shas Shlomo Teva and Pithka from Shmaya in Ilayn Yumia.
From the vapors of wine, I dare to approach the Holy One and allow myself to experience knowledge from afar and not as a teacher of instruction (I am a prisoner because I am a wine drinker), and this is the one who is in the hands of God.
The words of the Grand Rabbi Sternbuch are shocking, since according to this, the Sages were required to prohibit the rabbis from any prohibition that was repealed by a majority, for fear that they would come to repeal it from the outset. If they did not prohibit every repealed prohibition, there is no reason why we would be stricter in the Shilem, and is it this strictness that would prevent us from repealing it from the outset?! These are things that are invalid in the Machikat.
What’s more, most systems (except for the Rav) state that the cancellation of a prohibition from the beginning is from the rabbis, and the explanation of the Rabbinical Rabbi Sternbuch is a decree for a decree (to be stricter in the matter of the Shilam because of the cancellation of a prohibition from the beginning). And thirdly, he says that it is clear as a conclusion in the Kotcha that the language of Rashi Bitza above is that there is a postponed prohibition in a canceled prohibition, and not as the Rabbinical Rabbi emphasizes there, and it is simple. Therefore, I will stand on my guard and the change will not move from its place.
I will not refrain from adding in the margins of the paper a clarification to me that the exemption from speaking and doing is only stated here that there is no point in doing it, which is completely permitted. But when there is a reason for it, it is not said that we call it a layman. And would it occur to you that the stricter one should return a loss after the despair of the layman’s mind?
It is true that there are places where it has become more difficult not to act according to a method that has not been ruled upon by halakhah in order to maintain the validity of the halakhah ruling, such as the practice of saying “Kabash” instead of “Bah” does not change and it is advisable to pay the debt itself, etc., and these things are ancient. But this is not what we are dealing with here, since this is not a matter of disagreement but of an agreed halakhic voice (the repeal of prohibitions by a majority).
And certainly, if he is strict with himself but knows and declares that he is not a politician but a scoundrel, he will certainly be punished.
And I wrote,
The sages disagreed, did Nadav and Avihu die because they entered drunk, or because they taught the law before a rabbi? And he said, "This is it, this is it," meaning that from their wine came their teaching of the law. Therefore, my judgment is bitter for the sake of justice.
What was written in the rabbis' statements about the abolition of the prohibition is that it is not the rabbis' except for the Rabbi. Here we will not clarify who the rabbi is (and the Shacha on the website of the Sa'id Cha'at brought this opinion), and other authors have also elaborated on these matters (see also the Dirch there). But it seems to be the same as the two great jurists, namely the famous Jew (Tanina, Yom Kippur 45) and the Hatam Sofer (Chatam 222, and elsewhere) divided between the cancellation of wet with wet and dry with dry.
And the content of their words, here the rabbis did not argue whether the rabbis or the rabbis annulled the prohibition of the Da'u's, but rather the cancellation of wet with wet, that is, in mixing the prohibition with a permit, and the permit received a lesser taste than the prohibition. But the cancellation of dry with dry is certainly forbidden by the Torah. And the fact that dry with dry is in most cases forbidden by the Torah is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the prohibition of the Da'u's. Then how can you forget to throw food to a dog and to a stranger who is at your gates, and you give it to him and eat it? Isn't every one of us involved in a way that the prohibition is not recognized, and this is not the intention of the Torah, the language of the text. And since there is a need to weigh the various evidence, we will take the simple explanation that the cancellation of prohibitions is not given in the Torah from the outset, but as a duty, so that the majority will not lose for the sake of the few.
And let us return to our subject, regarding the words of Rabbi Sternbuch. What the Rabbi found difficult in his words was for the Sages to prohibit any cancellation by majority, lest it come to canceling from the outset. I do not understand what the objection is to him. In every cancellation by majority, there is a great reason to permit, namely the loss of money. (And the Sages do not generally prohibit anything that is explicitly permitted in the Torah). But in a matter that is permitted, where the loss is not great, the use of the Torah of revocation seems to people to be unnecessary, since there is no significant loss here. The Sages wanted to emphasize that the Torah of revocation is a retroactive permission, of no choice. After all, if you use it for a loss that is not really a loss, a loss that is permitted after a while, you are leading to disregarding the prohibitions, and it is possible that they will come to repeal them from the start.
He further elaborated on each ruling, simplifying Rashi's language, and concluded that there is no fear of being strict about something that has a reason (such as in the case of returning a loss after despair).
Here is what struck me about the severity of the Deshilam, is that I do not see it as a reason in itself. What is the motivation for prohibiting it? Even if the permission is deferred and not permitted, what do we gain from the harshness? After all, the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted, the Torah permitted it, so why withdraw?
Even in the case of restoring a loss after despair, I do not see a religious reason to be strict, but a moral reason. And I do not know the issue.
Therefore, I adopted the words of Rabbi Sternbuch. That is, I understood that the Sages were strict in the Shil, not necessarily out of fear that they would abolish prohibitions. But more generally. It is clear that abolishing prohibitions is a permission of retroactively (as stated above in the name of the rabbi that this is not the intention of the Torah). Using the tool of retroactively where it is not truly needed leads to disregarding the prohibitions, not necessarily to abolishing them from the start.
Therefore, it seems to me that even though Rashi was brief in his language, it must be said that this was his intention. That is, until you eat with the permission of retroactively, you will eat with the permission of initially. And the goal is so that you do not disregard the prohibitions.
Therefore, in a matter that has no permits, I do not understand the stricter. I do not understand what the motivation is to be strict. Is the stricter afraid of the foolishness of forbidden foods? (Yelhah 2). Is he afraid that his heart will be coarse in the prohibitions and come to disregard them? If so, then fine. But if he has no real reason to be strict, I do not understand why he should be strict. Refraining from eating prohibitions is part of obedience to a system of halakhic laws, and a prohibition that has been abrogated is not forbidden according to this system.
With many blessings
Even though I am too poor to fail in teaching like a wine drinker, I have taken courage and argued with the words of my master:
The Gemara and the Rishonim, which are from the rabbis. And where do we find a prohibition to cancel a prohibition? On the contrary, in the Torah there is also no source for the actual law of cancellation, and if there was a source for the fact that cancellation is forbidden from the beginning, it would certainly be a source for the actual law of cancellation (and not as the Rishonim who taught it were pushed aside by many to deviate).
And this will explain why the words of the 16th chapter (which are difficult on their own part) that the sages did not prohibit what the Torah explicitly permitted, since the Torah did not explicitly permit it (and after all, things that are simply permitted are certainly forbidden by the sages, such as choosing food from garbage and all the other prohibitions of the rabbis), do not belong here.
In any case, at least according to the Rishonim's view, which is the law of the rabbis, my difficulty did not arise for a long time from decree to decree. What is more, cancellation is only a deed, it is a deed from the rabbis. Therefore, we did not decree that a prohibition should be abolished from the outset. And since we have argued this according to the method of these Rishonim, there is no reason to say otherwise according to the method of the Rabbis. And simply.
Even if there is a reason to permit a regular annulment (because of a mistake, as I said in the lesson), we have ruled that a regular annulment is what we gain from a prohibition on a dishil? Will the Jews learn to abolish a prohibition from the outset from what they permitted annulment by reason of a mistake? After all, a dishil is a rare prohibition in the laws of annulments, and most people do not recognize it at all.
And what made it difficult was what one gains from the homura. I did not understand. One gains from not eating a prohibition. Even if the Torah permitted it retrospectively from the outset, it deserves to be made stricter. And the mouth that prohibited did not permit it except retrospectively and not from the outset. What else did Mr. Gopiya add more reasons as he was good at, to avoid foolishness of the heart and not to let a coarse heart think of easing prohibitions, etc.
I still don't understand why a moral reason to be stricter is preferable to a religious reason to be stricter? And especially since morality is also religious for me.
And in Rashi's language, of course, he urges.
And I wrote,
In honor of the Gaon Rabbi Michael Avraham Shalit”a.
Once again, I would like to thank you for the little quantity and great quality of the lesson last week. And with his permission, I will raise a brief point that surprised me.
You said that the question of whether to slaughter for the sick on Shabbat or feed him carrion is in no way related to the question of whether Shabbat is ‘permitted’ or ‘postponed’ according to Pico”n. After all, to the extent that it is possible to obtain meat for the sick without desecrating Shabbat, even if Shabbat is ‘permitted’it is impossible to desecrate it.
And it is strange to read, because the Rashba (Response 1917, cited in the book of Och Shekhar), linked these questions one to another. After him, all the later ones continued. And it is agreed that the Rabbis ruled that Shabbat was permitted, and therefore one must slaughter for the sick (Eicher 1917, 1918, 1919, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929 Or ‘rejected’ belongs only to the prohibition of Shabbat, which is the prohibition of Gebra, and not to the prohibition of Nabila, which is the prohibition of Haftza (see ’ Mechatza”sh there).
And especially his question why we are permitted to slaughter for the sick when there is meat that is slaughtered, even alongside Shabbat that is ‘permitted’ in Fiko”n. Here the explanation of the matter is not entirely consistent, but the order of things is as they say over impurity ‘permitted’ or ‘rejected’ in public (they will think of it as the words of the first rabbis):
Anything that can be done to a sick person without desecration and without any trouble at all, certainly it is forbidden to desecrate even a Shabbat that is ‘permitted’ (For example, a person who has kosher meat ready to eat in front of him.) As long as it is possible to treat a sick person without desecration only by going to great lengths, it is permissible to desecrate even a postponed Shabbat (this is proven by the Maimonides’ statement [which brings the temple] that one should bother looking for pure priests outside of Jerusalem even for a postponed impurity). All the issues of a postponed or permitted Shabbat are only with moderate effort, as a postponed Shabbat. One must bother, and it is permissible to bother. And the poskim considered that the prohibition of a shriveling is equal to a moderate trouble. (And the Bakhsh considered that it is equal to a great trouble and also to a delayed shrive. And the rabbinic prohibition is equal to a great trouble and also to a permitted shrive, according to the half-way point). I do not know the meaning of these things, but that is how the poskim think.
And here is a place for me to add a few words on the previous issue: It is not permissible to be strict and not to eat what has been abolished by the majority. And I hope I am not bothering his merit in this matter.
I spoke to a great man about this matter. He told me in detail that there is no reason to be strict. I asked him about the words of Rashi, “You will eat us with a prohibition.” He said to me, however, that the reason is clear that there is no reason to be strict, as the Rabbis say (in the end of the last chapter of the book of Rashi): “Not because of a lack of understanding, but because of the interpretation of the Scripture, as it is written (Exodus 23:2): “After many, one may turn one’s tongue against another’s tongue, and the prohibition will become a permit, and it is permissible to eat them even all together.” (And even those who divide and forbid eating together simply forbid from their rabbis). In other words, there is a mechanism that turns the prohibition into a permit. [When we find language, in the Rambam or another source, that apparently means this and that, but it is not understood from the content, and from the content we clearly understand in a different way, we should not adhere too closely to the language, but follow the understanding. (In the Torah of R. Gedaliah, p. 222)].
And when I insisted on simplifying Rashi's words, he said to me, "There is no clear source in the Gamma; for one does not abolish a prohibition from the beginning." (And as the Rav stressed in the last response, “And where do we find a prohibition to cancel a prohibition?”)
And now, for the latter, that a dry divination by a dry divination is forbidden from the Torah to the 10th (even for those who disagree on the Rav), the prohibition is simple, meaning, “Why did I read it, it is a divination,” and as the Hatam Sofer says, “a dry divination by a dry divination by a dry divination in a manner that is not recognized by the Torah, and this is not the intention of the Torah.” But it is not as if it were not said that the cancellation of a dry prohibition by a dry one is forbidden only by the rabbis, because the rabbis say that there is no prohibition for the Rishonim to cancel a prohibition, then there is no such prohibition in the general sense.
And it is necessary to teach him that there is a matter that has a permit and not a ban. That is, if they are strict and say that if you eat it with a prohibition, you eat it with permission, since they do not cancel a prohibition from the beginning, from the beginning there is no reason for the prohibition to be canceled. This is the source of the prohibition of cancellation from the beginning.
And we have added here, it must be said that the depth of the prohibition of eating is because of the thought of canceling a prohibition from the beginning, because when you rely on cancellation instead of eating it tomorrow without cancellation, then you are as if you are canceling a prohibition from the beginning. And this is what Rashi meant in his words, “Whatever you eat with a prohibition, you eat with permission,” and so on, according to Rabbi Sternbuch. I will briefly address a few points that the rabbi wrote:
A. According to Rabbi Sternbuch, it is a decree for a decree. – It seems that a claim can be dismissed by the rule that one does not make a decree for a decree. There are hundreds of places in the prohibitions that are like a decree for a decree.
B. Therefore, the motivation to be strict is because the Torah only permitted ‘in retrospect’ – I did not understand, and that something that is only permitted in retrospect cannot be completely permitted? ‘Retrospectively’ is not something that is only partially permitted, but something that is only permitted after the fact.
3. What was mentioned that there is a fear of stupidity – Here I mentioned this only in passing, but even that does not mean that there is room to actually consider these matters, there are excuses why there is no stupidity in something that has been abrogated by the majority (Chan”3 in the gloss on Leviticus 149, Bnei Issachar Adar 2:7).
I will also note that the latter discuss whether it is permissible to be strict and to withdraw from something that has been abrogated, and it follows from their words that there is no fault in the abrogation itself that should be withdrawn from. It is not a problem for those who forbade tightening and withdrawing (Rama 54, Torat Hashem 6217, and more), and certainly not for anyone to blame for the annulment. Rather, even those who permitted tightening (O'Ha 5616), included the issue of annulment in the majority with the other permits (Kli Shani), in which it is not appropriate to say that the permit is not absolute ('permission for a return') and allowed tightening in all of them because 'far from ugliness'.
I would appreciate a response.
Although I am dwelling on these matters, in micro-halachic terms, it is because of where I come from. But the thinking in the ’macro’ that the rabbi teaches, excites and enlightens me greatly. And I am attaching a very disturbing letter (from Rabbi Mendel Shafran, one of the most important dayanim in the Haredi community), as a kind of agreement on a file that tries to encourage the wearing of blue. The rabbi has dealt extensively with these issues, and I am sure he will have use for it, and maybe we will even turn it into an article on the site.
Shlomo Teva Lemar, from the honor of the wise sages of the ruling class.
Mar did not understand my words regarding permission and rejection. It has long been known that the first and last men did indeed intertwine the issues, and my words were not intended to explain the first men's words but to explain the essence of the matter.
The reasons for permission and rejection themselves have no nefm, as I explained. The nefm arises only because the first men decided that there is another reason for permission, which permits Shabbat even when there is no need for clarification. But to answer the questions, let's take a look, and this is according to my method, which invites me to formulate a position for myself even against our first rabbis.
After all, where does one come up with such a reason for permission that has no source and no reason, to permit Shabbat when there is no need for clarification? Some of the early writers wrote to Hadiya that the permission of Didhu stems only from the fear that they would be lazy in saving, and therefore they permitted everything. But this is not a permissive interpretation, but rather a permissive (permissive?) due to the fear of Piku”n (meaning that in the end everything is necessary for Piku”n, even if indirectly). And for this reason, this is the opinion of the early writers that you cited, who divided according to the level of difficulty. We have come to learn that the opinion of permissiveness in itself can only be applied to a place where the matter is necessary for saving, and simply.
See in the issue of Yuma all the explanations and sources cited there regarding the Shabbat permissiveness by Piku”n, and you will see that the permissiveness of the early writers cannot be derived from any of them (unless you add the fear of laziness in saving).
And regarding the dishil, the prohibition has become an allowance, meaning that the Torah permitted it as eating an allowance due to the fear. This is an expression on the literary path. And all these baseless slanders are useless, even the greatest of the great will say them.
And I am amazed at the wonderful things that Dr. Gedaliah brought from his language, for it is evidence to contradict. From his words, Talmud, that I am right and the rabbi is wrong. The understanding is certainly as I say, and from the language (like that of the chief) there is no need to argue against the explanation.
And with the prohibition of cancellation to begin with, it is not enough to have the source from the Gemara. The Gemara cannot innovate prohibitions, and in them the source is from the Torah from which the Gemara learned. And whoever believes that it is a Torah prohibition is one of the puzzled. The opinion of the Chastis only teaches that it is not appropriate to do so, but where can one learn a prohibition from this?
As for the explanation that everyone should go and abolish prohibitions, even if there is such an explanation, it is at most a rabbinical explanation. How can such an explanation be made a Torah prohibition? From this explanation, I would completely abolish the laws of abolishing prohibitions, which also have no source, as is known (and the first wrote that it is from ”following many to deviate”, and many, even good ones, have already exhausted themselves in explaining how this is learned from there – Harr”H and R”Sh Shekap and others. After all, even the majority of the Talmud, the Gemara of Holin, did not succeed in learning from there, with the exception of one lyshana in Rashi there in the conclusion of the case, so abolishing by majority is much further away than the majority law in the Beit D.).
And regarding decree for decree, I also knew that there are places where this is done (although the Rishonim already insisted on this, and as is known, the dispute between Maimonides and Torah scholars about burying in a grave is well known). But to say this without a source that a decree is a decree for decree on a prohibition that cancels a prohibition from the beginning is quite puzzling.
The word di’abd has two meanings: after the fact, or postponed and not permitted (and in both cases it means that initially it will not be done).
As for what the Aharonim wrote that there is no point in distancing oneself from a prohibition that has been canceled or that satisfies the rabbis, I mentioned this in my words. I will explain again that I did not intend to explain them, but rather my own method.
Rabbi Shafran’s words on Tekhelet are nonsense, with apologies. Although unfortunately this is a folly that many have fallen into (including Rabbi Soloveitchik and Rabbi Delia). Where did we find that the sages of our generation, who dare not even fix a day of joy or mourning that every community in every generation has allowed itself, suddenly allow themselves to cancel a Torah act without saying a word and without a flicker of concern. Indeed, everything is political, but if I were in his place, I would put a barrier in my mouth and remain silent in shame. Woe to that shame.
To Rabbi Michael, peace and blessings.
Regarding the possibility of disagreeing with the Rishonim:
A. In my opinion, it would have been appropriate to mention in the lesson that, according to the opinion of the Rashba and the agreement of all the poskim, the ruling on slaughtering a sick person on Shabbat depends on the question of whether Shabbat was permitted or postponed out of concern for life, and then to add that in your opinion this is wrong (unless you assume that everyone present knows that is the accepted opinion).
It seems to me that the lesson implied that there is no opinion linking the issues. And in my opinion, the opinion of the Rashba is important enough to at least mention.
B. You often quote the words of the Kassam in the Book of Laws of the Rabbis, who writes that the fact that we do not disagree with the Gemara is because we have accepted it as such. In your opinion, there is no obstacle to disagreeing with the Rishonim, since there is no such acceptance for them.
I did not understand your position on this matter. The judge does not establish a position but looks around and describes the reality: The reality is that over time, a hidden acceptance has taken root not to disagree with the Gemara. To the same extent, it can be said today that over time, the same acceptance has taken root not to disagree with the Rishonim.
As it seems to me, there is hardly a person today who feels committed to the Gemara and not to the Rishonim. There are those who are not committed to anything, and that is their right. But the group that felt committed, felt committed to the Gemara and the Rishonim, although there is of course a difference in the level of commitment (like the difference between commitment to the Bible, the Mishnah, and the Talmud). Therefore, the difference you posited between the authority of the Gemara and the authority of the Rishonim, is not clear to me.
C. According to my impression, at the basic level you are committed to the umbrella. In writing a comprehensive answer to a question (such as the answer to the question of contraception) you do not approach the verses of the Torah directly, nor even to the words of the Gemara. You accept the mediation of the former and the latter, get into their heads, and decide between the positions.
The same is true in shiurim. You do not decide from your own mind whether quantity is better than quality or vice versa, but delve into the words of the poskim.
So what happened with the question of desecrating the Sabbath for a sick person? Is this an ‘edge case’ where it is clear to you that everyone else's words are unfounded? Do their words have no basis, no shred of logic?
Regarding Rabbi Shafran's agreement. I know that his words are very problematic. It was important for me to raise and publish this letter, because in my opinion there is a step up in the concern about the slippery slope. Unlike in other places, here the concern is brought to the table, and does not hide behind other, apologetic reasons. Here, too, we are talking about the prohibition of being strict and putting on tekhel, and not about the prohibition of being lenient. And of course, we are talking about the prohibition of performing a positive commandment from the Torah. These words are also spoken by a well-known and respected rabbinical figure.
Another small thing. Following the words of many recent scholars, I examined the words of the Rabbi in the Yuma, and I saw that there is ample reason to assume that the Rabbi did not determine that it is better to slaughter a sick person than to feed him a carcass. It is possible that his words are merely a response to the Rabbi's words, which he explained to him that the prohibition of Shabbat is a more severe prohibition, and to this the Rabbi asks, who tells you that the prohibition of Shabbat is more severe because of its quality, or perhaps the prohibitions of carcasses are more severe because of their number?! In other words, the Rabbi claims that it is possible that both are equivalent. (Z”l: But N”l Dalgavi Khola does not have a slight prohibition of nabila from the prohibition of Shabbat, because the prohibition of lav and Shabbat is the prohibition of stoning, and this is more serious in nabila, since the eater passes lav on every olive and olive that is on Shabbat; and the rabbi hates many lavs, not a slight prohibition regarding one lav on Shabbat, and even on a faded gf, the prohibition of stoning is prohibited.) It seems that if the Rabbi really wanted to determine that quantity is better than quality, he should have added a few words to substantiate this assumption. Isn't that right?
Thank you very much for your comment.
Hello.
A. I was misunderstood again and the matter depends only on me. The Rashba was not wrong and I did not go against him. I claimed that the opinion of permission in itself has no nefah in comparison with the opinion of rejection. Indeed, the Rashba and its followers present another opinion that is also called permission, and it permits even what is not necessary for the purpose of the rite. I did not deal with this at all. It is true that I wrote to you that I think these things are puzzling, but that is not what I dealt with in the lesson. The subject of the lesson was not the Rashba or the halacha on Shabbat, but the relationship between the opinion of permission and the opinion of rejection as I defined them. And in my opinion, they were the same.
B. The commitment to the Rishonim also exists for me, but it is different from the commitment to the Gemara. If all the Rishonim agreed, I would indeed be very reluctant to disagree with them. But this is almost nonexistent. But nowadays people think that it is not even possible to decide between the opinions of the Rishonim and that one must follow the laws of spikut. And it is not.
Beyond that, there are achronim who disagree with the Rishonim and the Kabbalah is not so absolute. The Gra and the Chaf shared the Rishonim as a whole. But other achronim also disagree with them in certain cases.
Similarly, a commitment to the Shul was accepted, but its meaning is constantly disputed. The commitment is limited. I would translate respect, not commitment. Therefore, when things are puzzling, I do not feel obligated.
C. Indeed, as I wrote, I am also committed to the halakhic tradition (with the limitations I mentioned). But the lesson did not deal with the words of the Rishonim and the law of the sick. The lesson dealt with interpretations, and so on.
Regarding the Rabbi, this is how the achronim and the poskim understood his words. For this matter, it doesn't matter anymore because I'm not dealing with halacha but with interpretations. The Rabbi raised the point that quantity outweighs quality, and even if he is satisfied with the point he raised, I'm satisfied.
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