Response to the Rabbi’s comment in the book “Science of Freedom”
Peace and blessings,
In the book “Scientific Freedom” on page 78, in the first interlude, the Rabbi brings the Maimonides’ question in the Law of Teshuvah (6:5) about “they enslaved them and tormented them” and “and this people rose up and committed fornication” [and his answer]. The Rabbi comments in note 37 that there is apparently a confusion here between the ability to predict and objective determination, that is, seemingly “what is written in the Torah is that God knew that this would happen, but it does not say that He decreed it upon them” [and on the question of knowledge and choice, the Maimonides already answered at the end of the previous chapter (ibid. 5:5) that there is no contradiction between God’s knowledge and choice, but that we do not know God’s knowledge]. The Rabbi replies that the Maimonides apparently understood that it was indeed a decree.
In my opinion, it is difficult to understand the text in this way, and it is not clear what caused the Rambam to understand it this way. In particular, regarding “and this people arose and committed fornication,” how could I possibly say that this is a decree, and why would he decree that Israel commit fornication? This is merely a statement. Not a decree.
But the Rabbi’s question in the commentary is not difficult at all. On the contrary, it is indeed a question of knowledge only and not of decree. The point is that in both cases it is not just a question of knowledge [of God Himself] but of a message [to flesh and blood]. The moment God shares His knowledge with someone , even without “determining,” but that what God knows – someone else knows – at that moment the matter exceeds the limits of God’s knowledge and in this itself it inevitably becomes a decree = contradicting choice. Because it is no longer possible to answer that we do not attain it, etc.
I will elaborate on the matter, I am currently only addressing the problem of knowledge and choice [therefore ignoring the fact that this is a collective, which is really what Maimonides is expounding, I am only explaining why he must expound in this way]:
If God tells Moses that He [God] knows that the people will commit fornication, it is no longer possible to reconcile this knowledge with the people’s choice. For if Moses knows what will happen in the future, and knows for sure that the people will commit fornication – the people have no choice, because with the knowledge of flesh and blood, there is no excuse for the Rambam (ibid. 5:5) that we do not attain it. If Moses’ knowledge is not true, and there is a possibility that the people will not commit fornication – it is found that God told Moses a lie / God did not know the future, and this is impossible.
In fact, paying attention to the words of the Maimonides, he himself says that this is a matter of knowledge/announcement and not a decree, and even incorporates in his response what he already said that God’s knowledge does not contradict choice:
“…and the Creator did not announce anything except the custom of the world, etc., because He announced to Moses that there would be wicked people in Israel, etc., and likewise the Egyptians, etc., announced that the end of his seed would be enslaved in a land not theirs, and we have already said that man has no power to know, as God, blessed be He, knows, things that will happen.”
If the issue here is a decree, then after having already answered that there is no decree here about individuals, why does Maimonides need to add “and we have already said” that God’s knowledge does not contradict choice? Who now spoke about the problem of knowledge and what it has to do with the subject at hand? On the other hand – if this answers the question, then why was all the chatter about the collective necessary?
But as mentioned, all that is at issue here is knowledge, not a decree. However, a decree becomes a decree. Therefore, first the Maimonides excuses the part of the message, and then “closes the corner” and says that in the first place the problem was only with the message and not with the knowledge itself.
In other words, the precision of the Maimonides’ language in his justification shows that he distinguishes between what God informed [to Moses] and what he knows [for himself]. Moses only informed the custom of the world, only about the collective, in any case there is no contradiction to the choice since this is a statement only about the collective. But Maimonides knows that God’s knowledge for Himself cannot be justified in this way, because God for Himself also knows the future of the individuals – therefore he adds that after you have solved the problem of what Moses knows, what God knows is not a problem at all, as he already answered in the previous chapter.
Regards
Nathaniel
Hello.
There is no difference between knowledge of God that remains with Him and knowledge that is conveyed to humans. In both cases, it negates the ability to choose. This is the truth. Whether Maimonides thought so or not is a less important question for me.
I didn't understand. The entire discussion in the comment there was about the opinion of the Rambam. The Rabbi asked about the Rambam's failure to distinguish between knowledge and decree in the question of the Egyptians and the people, to which the Rabbi could also answer that the Rambam believed that there was no distinction between them and that this was not the truth, but the Rabbi writes there “the Rambam apparently understood that..” etc. So if we talk about what the
Rambam understood and meant, and why the Rambam asked why this people stood up and fornicated– So the Maimonides explicitly states that knowing God does not contradict choice, and he wrote this in his response on this matter itself, as I quoted, but it is not possible to say so about a message to others, and therefore, from the perspective of the Maimonides, a message to others is a mishnah, and I say that this is what lies at the basis of the Maimonides' question, "Why did this people become a harlot?"
I understand. And I say that for me it doesn't really matter what Maimonides thought, and therefore I won't go into this matter here.
Incidentally, distinguishing between knowledge and decree is not like distinguishing between knowledge that is conveyed and knowledge that is kept by him. To the same extent, it can be explained that he understood “this people rose up and committed fornication” as a decree. But as mentioned, the issue is not important in my opinion.
I'm sorry, but I don't understand. I'm talking about a comment in the book in which the Rabbi does deal with the words of Maimonides, in the book the subject was important to the Rabbi and the Rabbi dealt with it, and discussed it in the comment. I bought the book and I'm reading it now and I have a response to what the Rabbi wrote there. The Rabbi tells me that it doesn't matter what Maimonides thought, and therefore the Rabbi doesn't go into this matter here. Where would I ask about the comment in the book if not here? I can't talk to the book.
Nathaniel, I think the light is happy to say the same as you, when he disagrees with the Rabbi on a website.
See here (including in the comments):
https://mikyab.net/שות/שעלאת-בעינין-ידיעה-וביהע/
Indeed! Thank you very much! This is exactly what the light says in two words (on the attainment of the Rabbi that knowledge of God is not obligatory): “Knowledge of the prophets is obligatory,” and nothing more.
Following your words and the O’sh, I now looked at the Rabbi there and saw in his words the distinction I made in my question to Rav Michi between the two cases, that of the Egyptians and that of “the people rose and fornicated,” and I argued that there is no logic or reason to think that this is a decree and that it is simply a matter of knowledge. Thus we see that the Rabbi in the place where “the people rose and fornicated” answers that it is a decree and not a matter of knowledge, and that he elaborates on the Egyptians in another context.
Really, in his opinion, the Rambam's question is that he understood that in both cases it is a derivation, how did the Rambam understand what the Rambam himself writes at the end of his answer that 'we have already said' that knowledge of God is not necessary, what does knowledge have to do with this question [and perhaps because even if we solved the problem of derivation, a question on the part of knowledge will remain, therefore the Rambam mentions that there is no such question in any case].
I have now seen and will note that the Lehem Mishnah also teaches that in both cases it is a question of knowledge and not of derivation, and says that the Rambam is actually asking the question of knowledge here again [and not a new question on the part of derivation], and this is what the Rambam wrote at the end that knowledge of God is not necessary. You are not forcing, and Maimonides only said that in the case of a collective there is an additional answer, etc. [When I myself do not understand anything of his words, I only mentioned it for our purposes].
Thanks again
Nathaniel
According to the Maimonides, there is certainly a difference. After all, knowledge of God is not knowledge in the ordinary sense and precisely for that reason is not obligatory (what the meaning of this knowledge is, that is another question), whereas knowledge of man is knowledge in the ordinary and familiar sense and therefore is also obligatory (assuming it is certain knowledge).
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
