From your school, and from Leibovitz and his school

Hello Rabbi Michael.
1. Rabbi Michael, how did you claim in one of your articles that on the subject of beliefs and opinions in Judaism there is no absolute statement and there is no Maimonides, etc., statements that cannot be refuted, and even if they were, we would live by them even though we know that it is a mistake. (If I am wrong in presenting your position, I would be happy to be corrected.) Nevertheless, there are a number of things in Judaism in the area of ​​beliefs that there were no great Jews in Jewish thought who disagreed on, such as Torah from heaven, the reality of God, etc., so how does this fit with your position?
2. How does Leibowitz deal with the position that God hears prayer? After all, we also pray about it and it is part of the text. I also don’t know of a great Jewish thinker like Maimonides, etc., who claimed that God does not really hear prayer and that this is not a “pharmacy.”
3. Regardless of the previous question. How did Leibowitz say that there is no holiness in the Tabernacle, etc., when it is explicitly stated in the verses that God dwells there?
I would be happy if you would tell me your opinion on the following things that Rabbi Charlo wrote in one of the responsa on Leibowitz:
4. Prof. Leibowitz’s position in the area of ​​’pure lishma’ is incorrect for two main reasons. First, the entire Torah and even the words of Chazal are full of references to the pleasure of the mitzvot, to studying their merits (and it is difficult to understand how he sees himself as a Rabbinical scholar at all), and so on. Chazal instructed not to keep the mitzvot in order to receive a reward, but the main point of their content is not the positive consequences “for our good all the days.” A second reason is due to the fact that he himself did not solve the problem he presented with regard to ‘lishma’: after all, according to his theory, a person keeps the mitzvot only because of the will of God, but the very fact that a person wants to do the things that are in the will of God and he does what he wants to do already constitutes ‘not lishma’ according to Prof. Leibowitz’s own teaching. This paradox teaches that we must redefine ‘not lishma’. Years ago, Rabbi Lichtenstein raised a similar question in the field of marriage: Does a person have to fall in love with the ugliest, meanest, and stupidest girl in order for his love to be love for her sake? This question constitutes a model for redefining the concept of her sake and for the sake of Prof. Leibowitz’s idea as a single constitutive factor. Of course, the very foundation that Judaism has dimensions of bonding is true, and even I, the little one, have written quite a bit about it. However, totality is not true.
5. Leibowitz’s position in the field of history contradicts the entire Bible. Unlike the previous position, which is the basis for debate, this is an illegitimate position.
6. Regarding the principles of these areas – there is room for discussion, and even the Rabbi addressed this question in his article on the Principles. However, Prof. Leibowitz blurred the question of whether this is a ‘principle’ and whether it is true. Regarding the correctness of belief in the coming of the Messiah, I have no choice but to turn again to the Rambam.
Thanks in advance!