Nazism

This is if there was a local command:
If the Amalekites are still XYZ then they should indeed be killed. But if they have already repented then no.
But in the matter of Didan it doesn't matter if they are good or bad they should be killed. Even after 3000 years.

Isn't that right, Your Honor?

No one will kill them if they repent (as in the case of Hagar the Amalekite and the sons of Haman the Agagite who studied in Bnei Brak). Maimonides reiterates that they are even called to peace in war.

Today, no one will kill a Sabbath desecrator in front of witnesses and warning, the question is what the Torah commands.
Simply, according to the Rambam, if they did not complete it, then they all kill.

Moshe,
First of all, the discussion is about what is actually done. The Nazis actually killed.
Secondly, even on the level of the commandment, I claim that there is no halakhic obligation to kill an Amalekite who repented (left his Amalekiteness and Amalek). Where have you seen that not to be the case?
And as for Maimonides, in war we kill those who do not reconcile with us. What is the problem with that? What I brought from him is proof that there is no mandatory obligation to kill all Amalekites, otherwise what is the point of calling them to peace?! Either way, we must kill them all.

As far as I remember, there is someone who was punished for not killing the *sheep* of the Amalekites.
It also seems to me that the sheep were certainly not taken away from a person who repented.
After they did not reconcile with us, it is commanded to pursue every infant and baby, even if they repented, just as they pursue every sheep and goat, even though they have nothing to repent for.
This is the plainness of the verses, and the evidence is for the innovator.

So you think it's not true. This is a book of nonsense. The value of a sheep's life is not the same as the value of a human life. The sheep is punished for the sin of its owner, just as the property of a remote city is. And if its owner repents, his sheep will also be saved. [By the way, no one is punished for not killing the sheep, but for not killing all the Amalekites, including the sheep]
I have been accepted by my father's family that the burden of proof is on the one who makes the objection and not on the one who makes the excuse. In particular, the explanation is with the one who makes the excuse. And the one who wants to reject the explanation should be respectful and bring evidence instead of making the objection difficult.

They kill all the children. They have not sinned and do not need to repent.

As I explained, this is not killing for sin but rather eradicating evil and defending against it. A child who is educated in Amalekism will eventually grow up to be an Amalek. And again, if an Amalek were to be in a different culture, his fate would be different.

Well, it's not clear to me how a child can be educated to hate.

Good luck.

A baby (for the purpose of this matter) = a week old.
Note: Cash (not credit).

Sorry to repeat the discussion, but before we discuss who should be killed from a halakhic perspective, there is another problem, and that is - in my opinion of course - why should blood be shed? My intention is of course not to pity murderers, but the fact that there is a command to kill those who oppose the Jewish people is a bit disgusting.
And I do understand that the definition of Amalek and its first characteristic is opposition to the people of Israel and not killing, destruction, terror, etc. (If I'm wrong, I would be happy for the rabbi to point me to a source that will contradict me).
And as for the Jewish aspiration, it is indeed - as I understand it - to dominate the "good" in the world, and this good (which roughly includes the familiar moral values: compassion, charity, etc.) contradicts the Nazi understanding (which I believe originated with Nietzsche) that good is the value of survival, and compassion and charity are inferior values of the weak (I am completely simplifying for the sake of the question).
In short, from what I understand, we are like the Nazis but in reverse. And since I can't accept this, I ask what the difference is?
Thank you.

“The son of Noah was killed by a judge and by one without warning” (Sanhedrin 57:2, and Rambam Hilchot Melachim Ve Chalamot 9:14), not just Amalek. And according to some Rishonim even if he was unintentional, that is, not a “conscious offender”.
(You can read more details here https://www.yeshiva.org.il/wiki/index.php?title=%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%93%D7%99%D7%94_%D7%AA%D7%9C%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%AA:%D7%91%D7%9F_%D7%A0%D7%97)

There is no mitzvah to destroy Amalek, there is a mitzvah to force Amalek to accept the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah. Among the rest of the gentiles, there is no mitzvah to force them to accept the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah, and our attitude towards them is utilitarian - there is no lowering and no raising.

In short: The mitzvah of jihad or a crusade to accept the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah exists only against Amalek. Against the rest of the gentiles, there is no such mitzvah, but only in the Land of Israel, according to the words of the scribes (and Moses commanded from the mouth of the Holy Spirit, to force all the inhabitants of the world to accept every commandment commanded by Noah, and anyone who did not accept it, would be killed - and see in the Book of the Key and in Radb 7).

Moshe, a week-old child is not educated for anything, but if they educate him when he grows up a bit, then we can understand that we are already doomed to death. As stated, this is not a punishment. We are repeating ourselves.

David, I have never heard that the burden of proof is on the one who settles and not on the one who makes it difficult. You allow and make it difficult. Don't allow and don't make it difficult. And to your second question – I answered. This comparison is foolish.

Father,
So I have no part with those first ones. There is no punishment for those who make mistakes. Beyond that, the son of Noah in his day was a savage who was not bound by moral values (as the Meiri believes – who was not bound by the manners of the nations).

Rabbi, your response can be interpreted in several ways:
1. In light of the above moral argument, the Rabbi assumes that those Rishonim were mistaken in understanding the words of Chazal and that this is the controversy.
2. According to the above Rishonim (whose correctness must be proven factually), the Rabbi disagrees with Chazal in interpreting the Torah.
3. According to the Rishonim, the Rabbi thinks that there is a halakhic-moral conflict here, which is an intra-Torah conflict, and the Rabbi sides with the moral side in deciding.
4. According to the Rishonim, “Did not the Holy One, the Almighty, say to me, ‘We have not obeyed Him,’” in reference to the Rabbi’s response to the simple reading of Chazal’s words regarding the prohibition of reading in the books of Minot (‘This is not the God to whom I am bound.’)
Which one is correct?

Since the Rabbi mentioned the Meiri (who, as is known, delved into his method in the famous article), I would like to ask a question about him:
Gem’ Ketubot 15:2:
“If a baby is found thrown away, if most of the worshipers of the stars – worshipers of the stars’, if most of Israel – Israel, half upon half – Israel… if most of Israel – Israel. To whom does the halacha belong? Rav Papa said: To return his loss”.
According to the Meiri, who threw the baby away, and why is his judgment doubtful? After all, the question of whether to return a lost property to him does not depend on the identity of his parents (which is uncertain), but on his behavior (which is obvious to us), since a Gentile who is circumcised in religious ways is returned a lost property to him, as the Meiri wrote, and on the other hand, a Jew who works the Sabbath or publicly violates the Sabbath is not returned to him.
Does this mean that the Meiri's innovation is only when all Gentiles have become "enlightened" and that it does not depend on the behavior of each and every individual? Or is there another excuse?

Choose as you wish. If you bring any of them, I can discuss what they mean and what I disagree with.
Indeed, the Meiri's words are based on a change in the behavior of the reasonable Gentile and not of any individual person. This is what has changed, after all, righteous Gentiles have always been. There is a presumption that stems from the behavior of the reasonable Gentile and it determines the laws.
Beyond that, who said that the Gentile found is indeed behaving correctly? Maybe if he behaves correctly, then the issue really wasn't about him.

There are many rishonim, so I could quote, but that would make it very long, and I also don't know how useful it would be since most of them are almost devoid of detail. In any case, what I know is: Rashi Makot 9. D. Therefore (there are other similar sources in Rashi), Ritva there, Chinuchun Bem Mitzvah 26 and Meiri Makot 8:.
Besides, the Rambam ruled as a rabbi in the case that even in saying something is permissible, one is obligated because it is close to intentionality (and it is explained in Rishonim Makot 7: [adds Ramban and Ritva] that this is not a specific reason specifically for murder or for the prohibitions of the Bible, which are more reasoned/moral).
Moreover, even the chief dissenters (the Ramban in Plagues 9 and the Ramban in the Laws of Kings 51) admit that the son of Noah who killed Israel was also killed accidentally (the Ramban there and the Ramban in the Laws of Murder 54, who said so even about a resident alien), and only the Ramban in Sanhedrin 57 also disagrees on the third point.
In addition, in the Gemara in Sanhedrin 57, there is a strong meaning as Rashi and his followers, and the Ramban is overruled by this.

Regarding Meiri, it is interesting that the judgment of an individual whose behavior is known is determined according to the general presumption in the law, especially since Meiri's innovation is supposedly based on the fact that a gentile is lacking the foundation of the law, so it is difficult to see where he came up with this rule that the individual depends on the law at all and why even a gentile would not be reimbursed in the past.
I was referring to this - seemingly it is difficult to say that the sogiya speaks in such a way that the infant is not behaving correctly, and if so, even as a Jew it is forbidden to return a loss to him as explained in the Shulchan Shulchan S. Raso (according to עפז 27:), that those who worship idols and publicly desecrate the Sabbath, etc., are forbidden to return a loss to them as gentiles, and in the sogiya it is written that if he were a Jew they would return him. And perhaps it is possible to find a case where the above is neither a religious barrier nor considered a heretic/convert, but that sounds like a good idea.

Y
It doesn't matter. The attitude towards a Gentile who doesn't keep the 7 Noahide commandments is utilitarian. If there is a reason, they are killed and if not, no. That's the whole point. It doesn't mean we have an interest in killing the Gentiles, but we also have no particular interest in keeping them alive. With Amalek, there is an interest in forcing them to keep the 7 Noahide commandments but nothing more.

If we take Rashi as an example in the beatings you mentioned, he provides evidence that a wrongdoer does not need a warning. But then it can be explained that his intention was not an accident but rather a deliberate act that was not permitted (which halakhically has an accidental law, so this is a member of the Shalmatian family who needs a warning). And in general, I mean that if we accept the words of the Meiri, then all these laws were spoken among the ancient Gentiles, whose lives were of no value. The rest of the early ones think that this is the law of Gentiles in general up to the present day. And the meaning of this is that to them, a Gentile is like an animal. I do not accept this, at least not with regard to the Gentiles of today.

And the Maimonides’ method is that this is an accident in law and not in reality (he did not know that murder was forbidden, but he understood that it was murder). And a murderer is killed even when he made an error in law according to the law of a person destined for eternal life. And there is a good reason to mention the law of a person destined for eternal life here, why this law is applied to murder unlike in Israel. It seems that he meant that this was a type of intentional act.
In 1 Kings 11:
A son of Noah who made a mistake in one of his commandments is exempt from anything, except for a murderer who accidentally killed the blood-redemptionist, who is not put to death for it, and does not have a city of refuge, but their courts do not put him to death. What are things that are said to be accidental in one of the commandments and transgress without intention, such as a man who takes his friend's wife and thinks that she is his wife or is free, but if he knows that she is his friend's wife and does not know that she is forbidden to him, but it occurred to him that this thing is permissible for him, and likewise if he kills and does not know that killing is forbidden, then this is close to intentional and he is killed, and this will not be considered an error for them because he had the opportunity to learn and did not learn.

In 1 Kings 11: 11 Murderer P”H ”D:
A resident alien who killed an Israelite by mistake, even though he was by mistake, is killed, a person is doomed to life, and likewise a resident alien who killed a resident alien because it occurred to him that it was permissible to kill him, this is close to intentional and he is killed because he intended to kill him, and a gentile who killed a gentile by mistake, no cities of refuge accept him, as was said to the children of Israel.

And with regard to the Meiri, this is not necessarily a person whose behavior is known, but rather someone who does not have a clear status. His status is determined by presumption.

14,
The basic understanding was not about your words but about our Rabbi. In any case, I did not understand your intention – Are you claiming that even if a Gentile sins, we are not obligated to kill him, but only have the authority? Simply put, this is not true, that we are commanded by the law “and to eradicate evil from among you”, like anyone who has committed an act that requires death (this law applies to both humans and animals). And the Maimonides”s language is “he shall kill”. If that is not the point of the debate, then your words may be correct on a theoretical level, but the fact that on a practical level we are commanded to kill every gentile (it seems to me that it is very difficult to find a gentile who has not stolen since reaching adulthood [which according to the famous Hatz, is even before Bar Mitzvah, every single one for the winter months] nothing [they are killed for less than a penny]) may still create a difficulty.

Rabbi,
Your reading of Rashi is therefore not reasonable on a textual level for the answer (why does Rashi write “accidentally” and not simply quote the Gemara in Sanhedrin?), and especially when you add to this Rashi in Sanhedrin 45, where he rules (this is also one of the meanings of the Sugya) and in Sanhedrin 55, where he is similar to it (see Yad Rama, who explained his words). Especially since at this stage in the Sugya, Rashi’s interpretation is seemingly necessary, as is the case with the Ritva. And I have not found anyone in the Rishonim or the Aharonim who interprets Rashi’s words in a way that is not simplistic.

I understand that the rabbi disagrees with the Rishonim in interpreting the words of the sages and follows the path of the Meiri (whose system is of course a terrible and enormous innovation [we are talking about laws from the Torah!], seemingly without support from the Shas). But there is a fundamental question here that is more interesting to me: To what extent and why does the rabbi think it is reasonable to hold a certain halakhic opinion against formal halakhic simplicity solely on the strength of moral intuitions? Especially since we see that the simplicity of the halakhic in many places does not correspond to Western moral intuitions?

Does the rabbi want to posit the mishnah of a baby that is inside a person whose behavior is unknown to us? Of course, this is a good thing to do in closing the mishnah. Likewise, the Gemara explains that in the case of a half-hearted loss, no one is reimbursed, and if the entire reason is due to doubt in his alleged behavior, it should be decided that he will be able to recover the loss by claiming a right (apparently, the excuses regarding the famous question of the in-laws [that in every case of loss, he will recover by claiming a right without giving any indications] do not belong here, since it is known that he is the one who lost and there is a question whether halakhically he has such a right).

This is not Western morality but Jewish morality (and in general, there is no such thing as Western or Jewish morality. There is morality): there is no punishment without guilt and without malicious intent. I have no doubt that when a judge sits in court and judges a Gentile and is faced with the question of killing him, they will not do so. Such arguments can arise in a court that does not practically deal with these questions and raises arguments here and there. Thus, Dr. and Re. in the end of Damachot (if we were in the Sanhedrin, no one would ever be killed).
I put every baby. But when his behavior is known, perhaps the law is different. This certainly does not detract from a resident immigrant who, for some opinions, is lost.

Well, my argument with the rabbi about morality is much broader and cannot be entered into here…
(I take the position [from purely intellectual reasons to the best of my knowledge] that “morality” is not something that exists at all [what is it? After all, the Rabbi is well aware of the “naturalistic fallacy”, so we agree that it has nothing to do with material reality. It is a “system of norms”. What does this mean? In what sense does it exist? How can we know what is moral and what is not? And how are our feelings about morality an indication of something in the matter, even though we have no access to it? I am familiar with the usual things that the Rabbi writes in a concise manner on the subject and unfortunately I did not find in them an answer to these fundamental questions. If there is a specific place where the Rabbi writes about this in more detail, I would be happy to refer to it]. To the best of my knowledge, he does not have any definition that reflects the use of the word in a real way [if the Rabbi knows a sharp definition of the concept, I would be happy to refer to it, unfortunately I have never had the pleasure of encountering one. A circular definition such as "what is right to do" will not help me, of course, since the concept "right" and its counterparts suffer from the same problem. What there is is a collection of emotions, and talking about these matters is a mere expression of emotions or, alternatively, an analysis of a theoretical system of laws, the laws of which are legislated by emotion.)
I read the rabbi's post about Re'a and Re't. Here I also disagree on a practical level. I think that most Jewish judges would do this without hesitation (perhaps with a stab in the heart), if their hands were not tied. And the picture of there being conspirators nearby.
I didn't understand, are the laws of the Mishnah only valid for a baby whose behavior is unknown? That's called Bel'ez Okimata, and in our case it's a dekhush. This is a lapse, since a resident resident only practices during the jubilee, as is known, according to Maimonides, and also requires acceptance of a commandment in the presence of three people, and there is no need to say that in the Mishnah these conditions were not met.

I only forgot the main thing: that none of this matters. Even if morality is “true” and ”objective”, I still want to ask: What is the justification for establishing halakhic determinations on the basis of moral claims, considering that the rabbi declares at every opportunity that the halakhic does not necessarily reflect moral values? I will note that specifically here, the rabbi's moral claim is extremely simple, so that it must have been obvious to many of us who were the first - the obvious conclusion is that there is a fundamental disagreement here.

Regarding the debate about morality, I have nothing to add except what you will see in the fourth notebook and in the books Truth and Unstable. Defining the concept of morality is completely unimportant and unnecessary, just like defining any fundamental concept. Can you define the concept of ‘exists’? If not, are you giving up on existence and becoming an idealist? (Actually, what are you giving up?) Can you define the concept of quality (see Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance)? Definitions are needed for concepts that are not clear in themselves, and then we try to find a way to them through concepts that are familiar. Concepts that each of us encounters intimately do not need definitions. On the contrary, they serve us to define other concepts. And of course, there will always be a fundamental set of concepts that will be used to define other concepts and which we do not define ourselves. If you give them up, you have given up all your concepts (after all, they are all defined by them).

I have already explained that the rule of no punishment for an accident is a halakhic rule and not just a moral one.

Well, I think we have exhausted it.

The comparison is fundamentally absurd. There is no connection between the examples - the rabbi is talking about words that we use to describe reality, and therefore here it is justified to say that we encounter them. However, morality is an entirely illusory system with no connection to reality. The only thing we encounter is emotions. (This is, of course, the reason why there are complex moral conflicts - simply because the discussion is completely indefinite.)
There is no such halakhic rule, since it is against all the first principles (and there are additional examples such as conspiring witnesses).
Thank you.

Y
To the best of my knowledge, this is not about a gentile awaiting a court of law to be sentenced. What is at stake here is Judaism facing the court of reason (or morality as Rabbi Michi would put it) and against public opinion that claims the Torah's anti-humanity (Da'at Emet, Yossi Gurvitz, and others). Such debates are not new - the Gemara already tells us about an investigation conducted on behalf of the Roman Empire and about such and such debates - and since times have changed, questions arise that did not arise in the past. These questions are exposed to the public, as can be seen from the infiltration of these questions into news sites every day, and therefore they demand answers.

You could claim that you are merely obeying without exercising discretion, but as a scholar you know very well that you exercise discretion (even with regard to the question of whether an opinion is good or not) and therefore indirectly you admit to being a rational being who acts on the basis of reason and therefore you will not be able to escape the questions that arise (even if we do not prove to you at this time that the Torah recognizes reason).

Since these are questions of principle, I do not see how the position I propose is worse than others and therefore I will not refrain from presenting it here, and here is the gist of the matter:
A gentile who does not accept the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah is guilty, but this guilt alone does not justify his active punishment by hand, and therefore we end with the halakha that neither lowers nor raises. The gentile is guilty in that he did not accept the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah (and here we avoid the question of whether this is even possible, as you raised earlier), but this guilt is not sufficient to kill him. In order to kill him, we need a factor that will join: for example, an Amalekite identity, or an act he committed, or the shame that is caused to a Jew because of him. If these factors exist, we will kill him, if not, we will not. In short, our attitude towards him is utilitarian, if there is a reason to kill him, we will kill him, if not, we will not.

If that Gentile accepts the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah, we are commanded to revive him, and all the same reasons that previously qualified his killing as null and void include Amalekite identity. An Amalekite identity is not sufficient to kill a Gentile, it is also required that he not accept the seven commandments of the sons of Noah. In the Apanethdom, the Light writes with joy about a Gentile who was raped, if she has the law of a resident alien, she is not killed, since the obligation to revive her rejects the shame of the Jew. Our attitude towards her, then, is purposive - her very existence is required.

And what about the Amalekite child? Here, the answer is that he cannot be killed because it is still not clear that he accepted the seven commandments of the sons of Noah. Imagine a small immigrant who grew up without knowing that he was an immigrant and was accused of desecrating the Sabbath. Can a court of law try him before they announce that he is a small immigrant and ask him if he prefers to be a gentile or a Jew? Even if we assume that in the event that he chooses to be a Jew, he can be tried retroactively (something that is not clear to me at all), if he chooses to be a gentile, there is nothing to try him for, since he did not sin. Even in the matter of Didan, if the Amalekite child grows up and chooses to accept the Seven Commandments of the Children of Noah, how can he be killed? The fact that he has an Amalekite name is not sufficient to kill him, the law of the Amalekite must also apply to him, meaning that he chooses not to accept the Seven Commandments of the Children of Noah but the child does not have the knowledge not to accept them, so how can the law of the Amalekite be applied to him?

It is possible to extend this, but it seems to me that the things are clear.

1.D.,
First of all, I will clarify that my joining this discussion was in the interest of that Gentile. I saw a claim by the Rabbi in his answer that does not conform to the halakha (in part of the warning – for all opinions, in part of the mistake – for most of the early ones) and I wanted to comment on it. Therefore, my part in that discussion is over following the Rabbi's feeling that the discussion has been exhausted. If you want to have a discussion with me on the subject – with pleasure, but the question is not very clear to me, I would be happy if you could define it and then I could participate in the discussion. I am only stating that I do not have a comprehensive enough halachic knowledge to make general statements like you make (sometimes I have enough knowledge to negate them). In the meantime, I will only comment on a few things that ring in my ears:
The discussion that opens the post is not about “reason”. Our concern was to silence the feelings of the questioner's heart (which is not an action that I despise, but it must be separated from a sharply defined, theoretical discussion).
Who told you that I obey? You are right in your assumption, but my obedience is not derived from ”reason”. No action is derived from reason, reason is at most a tool that a person uses to realize his desires (which have nothing to do with reason).
“Discretion” regarding Talmudic-Halachic reasoning can only be done through “Talmudic intuition” which is developed through familiarity with the world of Talmud and Halacha. It is somewhat similar to an experienced chess player who sometimes plays based on intuition rather than on detailed calculation. “External”reasons that have an external source such as Western morality, etc. are irrelevant. If it is proven (or alternatively, a scholar I trust tells me) that there is a complete correspondence between the moral feelings of Western people and the halakha, then there will be something to discuss, but there is no such proof, and from my impression this is also generally true. Alternatively, various discussions can be discussed, such as: the reasons for the commandment to kill Amalek, whether there is an exception to the dimensions of the Holy One, etc. But the main thing is to define the discussion.
Regarding your question about the little stranger, I do not see a need at the moment why not. Please present a halakhic reasoning. Simply put, it depends of course on the scope of the halakha, which is a not-so-simple scholarly issue, and the simplicity is that until he protests, he is a Jew.
On what grounds do you doubt that he will not be judged retroactively?
Regarding Amalek. Apparently, your presentation of the halakha is very inaccurate. Simply put, the call for peace is to the “city” and not to each and every individual, as the verse says. And this is apparently proven from the act of Amalek in the doubt of Samuel, that as is known, Saul was commanded to kill even the child. All this terminology of “name of Amalek” and “law of Amalek” is not clear to me, its origin is simply that there is a condition in the mitzvah of calling for peace for the city.
I would also add that your words in the first response, “There is no mitzvah to destroy Amalek, there is a mitzvah to force Amalek to accept the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah,” are completely distorted. The call for peace is a condition in the mitzvah of life and, quite simply, there is no fulfillment of the mitzvah at all. I will also quote the language of the Maimonides [who is the halakhic source for calling for peace], which in the entire discussion here is presented in a very distorted way:
Rambam, Laws of Kings, Chapter 6, Halacha 1:
“One does not wage war with a person in the world until they call for peace, one for a war of authority and one for a war of commandment, as it is said that if you approach a city to fight against it and call for peace, if they fulfill and accept the seven commandments that were commanded the sons of Noah, they shall not kill a soul, and indeed they are a tax, as it is said that they shall be a tax for you and serve you, they accepted the tax for them and did not accept the slavery or they accepted the slavery and did not accept the tax, they are not listened to until they accept both, and the slavery they will accept is that they will be vile and lowly and will not raise their heads in Israel, but will be subdued under their hand, and they will not be appointed over Israel for anything in the world, and the tax they will accept is that they will be ready to serve the king with their bodies And their funds, such as the building of the walls, the strengthening of the fortresses, the building of the king's palace, and the like, as it is said, "And this is the matter of the tribute that King Solomon raised to build the house of the Lord, and his own house, and the whole city, and the wall of Jerusalem, and all the fortified cities that Solomon had, all the people who remained of the Amorites, and Solomon made them subject to tribute to this day. And of the children of Israel did Solomon not impose any tribute, because they were men of war, and his servants, and his ministers, and his captains, and the captains of his chariots and horsemen."
As you can see, the law in its original form is much less "humanistic and moral" than a mere compulsion to accept commandments.
In the margins, I will note that unfortunately I am not endowed with even a fraction of Rabbi Michai's talent for providing a quick and concise response, and therefore this may be somewhat incomplete (and my time is also limited)."

Correction: This is also *not* true at all.

Y
Ultimately, you do not disagree with my arguments. You admit that the fault of the Amalekites is not that they are Amalekites, but that they do not accept the Seven Commandments of the Children of Noah. An Amalekite who accepts the Seven Commandments of the Children of Noah becomes a resident alien and the obligation to revive him will postpone the law of reviving the Amalekite.
As for the law of unintentional killing, I think that Rabbi Michai interpreted the matter well (it is clear that according to Rashi, a rapist who kills will not be killed).
As for the small alien who grew up, I think I did not mention that he does not know that he is a small alien. It is clear that if he knows and does not protest, he is judged as a Jew.
As for the child, the Maimonides presents a different approach in the remote city, which he explains in a perplexed manner in light of the logic of a person's duty to his body, which also includes children (an argument equivalent to today's liberal argument of a woman's right to her body). One can argue about this, but it seems to me that the quote you gave me does not really refute my argument. The fact that in the case of war we generally call for peace does not negate the fact that in the individual case we are required to ask whether the Amalekite before us received the Seven Commandments of the Children of Noah or not, and in the case of a small child this question cannot be clarified until he grows up.

I don't disagree with your claims?? It's not clear to me what I did in the previous response except disagree with you, and as for what I didn't respond to, it's because I asked you for the discussion question, which you didn't bother to do. By the way, it's clear that the basis of their obligation is not the failure to accept a commandment but the fact that they are Amalekites. Are you also saying that the failure to accept slavery is the basis of their obligation?! By the way, look at my book that writes that if only some of them agree to peace, then they kill them all, and that's it.
Rabbi Michai Barashi's interpretation is completely unfounded and hidden from all the first and last, as I responded to him before (with some gentleness out of respect). Regarding the little hagar, you already mentioned this before.
The truth is that regarding an individual, I don't have the necessary halakhic knowledge nor the time to look into the issue. Simply put, your words are an innovation without a clear source and you have to prove it, especially in light of the book I mentioned in which we found that there is a drawing that an individual wants to complete and yet they kill him.
Unfortunately, I see that the discussion is taking up too much of my time, and since I don't expect it to contribute significantly to any of us due to the polarization in approaches and a certain lack of communication, I'm afraid I'll have to withdraw. I apologize. All the best.