Refusal of an order.

Wow, what a barrage of questions. I will only answer on a principled level. First, there is no room here for general guidelines. Refusal by its very definition is a personal action that a soldier is supposed to make a decision about based on his own discretion. Therefore, my opinion on disengagement and all the considerations you raised is not important in this context, because what matters is the opinion of the soldier who is considering refusal. Therefore, the discussion is about a soldier who believes disengagement is problematic for the above reasons and is debating what to do. First, as a starting point, I think it is clear that in principle there are situations in which a soldier must refuse an order. Howe is supposed to weigh his considerations, and take into account that he may not know everything, and also of course examine the consequences of carrying out the order (how problematic it is in his opinion) and of refusing it (on undermining the structure of the army). But given that these conditions exist, he must refuse (it is a duty, moral of course, not legal, and not just a right). A view that does not recognize the right (and in my opinion: the duty) to refuse, what you described as “a soldier needs a lot of orders” if taken to the extreme, is poor and dangerous fascism. I have written here before that I would not want to go to war with soldiers who I know will never refuse my orders. That is a recipe for a robotic army capable of moral atrocities and stupid acts, and in fact it is a recipe for orders of poor military and moral quality (because a commander who knows he will never be refused will not hesitate to give any order that comes to his mind). The consideration that the majority of the public rejects the ordinance and the government is acting without authority is actually present at a fundamental level in two situations: 1. When the other conditions are not met (I agree with the ordinance but the majority of the public opposes), otherwise they refuse because of the other considerations. 2. When the other considerations exist but are not sufficient to justify refusal, and they want to add this consideration. But this consideration is very dangerous and I would be very hesitant to use it except perhaps in very extreme cases (this is compared to a conscientious objection based on another consideration than the ones you raised, which can be used more easily, although of course it also requires use sparingly). First, you don’t know whether the majority of the public really opposes (everyone is sure that the public is with them, our samples are biased according to our opinions according to our friends and environment. Beyond that, public opinion sometimes swings with the wind). Second, even if the majority of the public opposes, there is still reason to say that the government is allowed to act differently because of “things that are seen from there” (as Arik Sharon said). Note that in practice, the person who usually considers refusing is the same person who opposes the ordinance, but according to this consideration, even someone who supports disengagement should have refused because the majority of the public opposes it and therefore it is illegal. And vice versa, of course, for someone who opposes the ordinance but believes that the majority of the public agrees with it. This, of course, does not happen, and this means that we are very biased in these considerations. In conclusion, I will note that there is a difference between the considerations: if you refuse a conscientious objection, as opposed to a clearly illegal order, you must give the verdict (because in this case the order is legal but it goes against your conscience). The legitimacy to refuse in such a case is extralegal, and so on. But refusing from the latter consideration already concerns a clearly illegal order, because according to your legal theory, this is an order that is forbidden to be carried out, and not just that your conscience forbids you. It is not binding at all and giving it is a violation of the law. This is another reason why such a consideration is much more dangerous than the others. Here you are actually making a claim about the legal system in general and saying that everyone should refuse regardless of their views, and not just taking a personal step and giving the verdict as in a normal conscientious objection.