Proving Judaism as ‘reasonableness’

Thank you.
My response between the lines:
Best regards.
I hope and assume that they are doing well there without me (what about the one who got along with me? ).
​Seriously – if there is no really good reason (political, let's say), I think the Torah would benefit from participating in the discussions again.
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To your question, I will answer on two levels:
1. Even if it is impossible to give one's life from such a perspective, this does not change the fact that a person cannot be convinced of anything with complete certainty. At most, you can argue that that person is in trouble. Furthermore, in my opinion, no person is convinced of something with certainty unless he understands his limitations. Even if he has a sense of conviction, he is mistaken in it, and if he gives one's life only because of the sense of conviction, he is simply making a mistake. I once wrote a post in which I explained that although the Hasid Yavetz (during the period of the Spanish Expulsion) spoke in praise of the common people who gave their lives and did not convert, contrary to the Torah, who found themselves permits, I am against idealization Of ignorance and ignorance. If wisdom creates problems, then you should face the problems and not try to be stupid.
<strong>​I have no problem with this statement, but if you are not sure – be religious to a certain extent. Be religious to yourself, do not do anything that affects those around you in the name of something you are not ‘closed’ to. And as far as I am concerned, that person with a ‘sense of conviction’ is indeed wrong, but I can understand his dedication (according to his error) more than a person who gives up his life for a reasonableness.</strong>
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2. I do not agree that only certainty can justify sacrificing his life. I do not think that a soldier in the army who gives up his life is convinced with absolute certainty that he is right (and if so – then again he is naive). A person who understands that these are his limitations, and that his truth is never certain, functions within this uncertainty. If it is very reasonable in my opinion, I am willing to give up my life for him. Even a persecutor's law in which you see Reuven chasing Shimon cannot know with absolute certainty that this is indeed the case and that there is no part of the situation that is hidden from your eyes. And yet you have to make decisions.
<strong>​What does it mean to “function within uncertainty”? Then function in a limited way, as befits uncertainty! Make decisions, but if possible, these decisions will be reserved and devoid of far-reaching consequences.</strong>
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In other words, there are two options here: A. He is persecuting and I must kill him. B. He is not persecuting and it is forbidden to kill him. Option A has a 90% chance and the second has a 10% chance. Why decide that the blood of the persecutor is redder than that of the pursued, after all, if you save the persecutor because of doubt, you are taking a 90% risk that the pursued will die. The same is true of any moral dilemma involving the sacrifice of one's life. For example, incest or incest, for which I must give my life. Again, there are two options, each of which conflicts between two very important values, and therefore the more likely option is the correct basis for the decision even if there is no certainty.
I wouldn't say 'more likely', but as long as you're not sure - sit back and don't do it. You can't take an active initiative when you're not sure of the rightness of the path (perhaps the train dilemma belongs here).
It's true that this is only on a theoretical level, that even if I'm not sure, I can advocate for the obligation to give my life or kill. Of course, on a practical level, a person who is aware that there is no certainty in anything will have a harder time realizing his values ​​in practice. But this is just a practical problem and must be dealt with on its own. Which brings us back to point 1 (that truth does not depend on the problems that arise from it).
I agree that truth does not depend on problems, but it is a problem that can be solved so that it fits the truth: 'Sit back ‘And don’t do it’ as a postmodern way of life in an age of doubt.</strong>
This reminds me of claims that arose after the assassination of Rabin when they addressed the religious public and said: You see where religious faith leads. To this I replied to the critics: And do you expect me to abandon my faith because of this? The fact is that I believe, and if this creates a problem of extremism, it must be dealt with. But problems and considerations of consequence do not determine the truth (I abhor philosophical pragmatism that subordinates the true to the useful and the desired result).
<strong>​Agree. Although, when he openly announces what is truth and what is pragmatism, I am willing to accept.</strong>

Hello.

As for the forum, I did not resign, but the one who resigned (like that before the Lord. Although I did not maintain it, even he would have resigned and cried) because of the harm done to the Chief Rabbinate and my failure to respond to the demand to apologize (in my opinion, they should apologize to the public for their very existence and functioning). I completely understand the considerations and have no reservations, but I do not agree with them.

I will now briefly address your comments.
It seems to me that the root of all the comments is your disagreement with my words regarding a decision under conditions of uncertainty. You claim that a better lie should be maintained. It was precisely in response to this claim that I explained my words through the example of the persecutor and what surrounds it. I will now try to elaborate more.
A. To answer, you are mistaken in the error of the postmodernists (whom you mentioned in your words) who identify uncertainty with doubt. In halacha, doubt is only a balanced doubt (50-50). If there is a balanced doubt, it is not a doubt and we follow the majority (and I am absolutely certain, and I am). The rule that there is no doubt takes away from me is also said about situations of doubt and certainly not about situations of uncertainty. Even when there are two witnesses, we do not have complete certainty, and no one thinks of not taking money or taking something out of one's possession (in the prohibition, this is done even according to one witness, according to most opinions. Although some disagree that taking something out of one's possession is like something in private, and money is a matter of discretion). Although the majority disagreed about whether one takes money out or not, Rav and Shmuel, however, do not concern us either. It is not about a superior shoa’t there but about spending from a holder (in the case of the Dakhli, the Khushli will certainly spend by virtue of a majority). What is more, according to many Rishonim and Achtarim, they do spend money by virtue of a majority according to Halacha (as evidenced by the majority in the Beit Beit Beit Beit Beit, as in Toss Sanhedrin 3), and the majority of the Ridiya is special in that they do not follow the majority (Rash Shekap argued that there is really no real majority there. And this seems simple to me in reasoning).

B. I tried to illustrate this with the law of a pursuer: would you also say that a superior shoa’t there and allow the pursuer to kill the pursued? My argument is that in every case of a dilemma there is a clash of two important values (after all, if there were a majority, you would also agree that he would reject Pico’n). For example, to give up a life for the prohibition of sexual intercourse or incest, there is a conflict between the value of life and incest or incest. Therefore, the same consideration as in the law of persecutor exists there as well. Although there is room for the consideration that my action requires a positive reason (this is the source of the belief that falsehood is preferable), and therefore a significant majority is required to act, but certainly certainty is not required.
Therefore, I will definitely also do things that affect those around me if I believe that justice is with me.

C. I asked you according to your own opinion: When you have a slight doubt, will you not kill the persecutor? Or will you not give up a life in the army? Or will you serve in the army? Do you think that falsehood is preferable? If so, then really how do you yourself explain what you asked me? I assume that it is impossible for a person to have complete certainty about anything.
In short, you have not clarified what you are claiming as an alternative to my method: that there is a possibility of certainty? Or do you really think it is appropriate to act equivocally in all these dilemmas?

D. As for the troll's dilemma, there is a distinction between several different cases. First, there is not a situation of doubt there, but rather certainty, but one must decide between two possibilities (in other words: it is a sfiqa dedina and not a doubt in reality). Furthermore, there is a distinction between a situation in which I either do something or do something and a dilemma between an act and an omission. And also regarding a dilemma between an act and an omission, many will tell you that there is no difference in explanation and what determines is the minimum price. In halakhah, this is probably not true (although I am not entirely sure of this, and I am), but you are asking me a meta-halakhic question (how should I relate to halakhah) and not an intra-halakhic question. In this, the explanation, not the halakhah, determines.

E. And in conclusion, I will reiterate that all these considerations neither raise nor lower the question of how you can be certain. Therefore, I do not understand why you can understand the dedication of the innocent who, in his error, is certain of his path and sacrifices a life or kills. I understand him and he is still stupid. I also understand the worker of the law who believes in his path, so I will work too? In short, I asked in section C what alternative you propose?

By the way, even in halacha, people follow the majority in souls. For example, in the Beid that discusses the laws of souls, a majority of 12 against 10 suffices. This is a significant doubt and they do not adopt a policy of shouat. And so in the Hegel supervision on Shabbat and more (I elaborated on this at the end of volume 1 and much more, how is it possible that monut is worse than souls. And I have already added and the first ones made it difficult).

Shalom Rabbi,

Thank you very much for clarifying the difference between doubt and uncertainty, very important.
As for the legal system, in the end you have to decide and therefore go by the majority of probabilities or the majority of opinions, this is acceptable to me.
Public systems are pragmatic in nature and not necessarily committed to absolute truth (even to Dido).
There is also a grain of truth in this because both parties accept this system of considerations, reasonableness. And every condition that exists in finance.

Hence your question: What is my alternative?
Answer: I don't have one. But you yourself stated above a principle that I also received from my masters: the fact that you have no alternative does not purify the default.
As a philosopher, I expect you to do what is right in your eyes, even if it makes your life look bad.
Are you not sure? Don't take anything from anyone without their consent, don't kill anyone, be a ‘pacifist’ An anime that only works in the field of writing and not in the field of power.
I am not writing this cynically, but seriously – let's be true to our intellect.

I apologize for not writing long, I am better at speaking than writing, (perhaps) unfortunately.

That's exactly why I asked you what your alternative is. I meant to ask not how you arrive at certainty but whether you really think in practice that we should be completely faithful to the halakha. After all, you also agree that there is no certainty, and in your opinion, uncertainty requires compromises (which I do not agree with). So what do you think: either you have an alternative to arriving at certainty (which I do not see) or you have to embellish yourself with what you asked me.
All the best,