On the question of knowledge and choice

B.E.
On the question of knowledge and choice, Maimonides resolves the question according to the accepted explanation (in his method) that his knowledge is not like our knowledge, even though there is a logical contradiction here.
Although the Rambam himself agrees that there are divine prohibitions (as does Rabbi Elbo – such as whether God can create another God).
In addition, on the subject of negating the titles, it appears that nothing can be said about God (although negation advances me, as Rabbi Elbo writes),
So, if I can’t say anything about God (descriptions and not His essence), what prevents me from remaining silent and saying nothing or reaching all sorts of conclusions (such as God doesn’t know what will happen because there is a logical contradiction here), if I assume that I am unable to grasp the divine logic because I live in a space of a different logic that is imprinted in me a priori, then we will simply remain silent and say nothing, but simply know Him not as we know Him?
Or on the other hand, if I reconcile the questions here, am I saying something because, in my starting assumption, I am saying that God is bound by my logic?