Exemption does not mean eating insects.

What is the Rabbi's opinion regarding the degree of rigor that should be exercised in this matter? Do you think it is possible to be more consistent on the subject than the standard required by most poskim?

As for the one who does not intend, this probably depends on the dispute between the Taz and Reka regarding the question of the Risha ruling, since if there is a worm in the fruit, then it is a psikh that you will eat it.
It is more likely that it is a methaka, so psikh is irrelevant. But here too it is not clear to me that it is really a methaka, since at least in certain species the fear of worms is known and people who are aware of it cannot say that I was not aware of it at all.
Indeed, it seems to me that the word "enjoyed" does not belong here at all. Both because there is no pleasure from worms and also because they are small and insignificant (the taste is null in sixty, and even if it is a creature regarding the taste, it does not matter. Enjoyment is a matter of fact).

I do not know what the standard required by most poskim is. I think that an initial examination is appropriate (because where it is possible to avoid it is advisable to do so. Especially if we take into account the sages' argument that forbidden foods dumb down the mind). But I definitely wouldn't get hysterical about this test. Certainly not with fruits that aren't known to be suitable for deworming.

Some people try to avoid eating things that are prone to insect infestation in kosher restaurants/hotels and when they are staying with religious people who probably haven't done a thorough inspection (these things are found in a lot of foods: lettuce, cabbage, dried figs, strawberries, parsley, cauliflower, broccoli, etc.). The question is whether this is the right approach, or excessive harshness.

This is good leadership, but in my opinion not necessary.

Does the Darchi Noam interpretation pertain to insects? That is, to prohibit eating certain fruits because they are tiny insects that ordinary people never get tired of eating, is it not the Darchi Noam interpretation to prohibit fruit from the world? By joining all the other interpretations to permit, the Dawi is invalid in most cases, and therefore the entire prohibition is from the rabbis, and the Dawi is doubtful in many ways, perhaps it is invalid in the mouth, or perhaps it is not found, because we did not find it, etc., etc.

There is a place for this, at least for some opinions. I am copying an excerpt from Wikipedia on the ways of pleasure:
There are[7] those who have written to permit the prohibition of trading on the new moon on the grounds of the ways of pleasure, that when the Temple existed, new moon grain was widespread and it was not the ways of pleasure that would not allow it to be traded. Rabbi Shmuel Wasner[8] wrote that prohibitions should not be permitted on the grounds of the “ways of pleasure”, when this is not explicitly stated in the Talmud. However, from the words of the Radb”7[9], the sage Zvi and others, it is clear that the reasoning of the ways of pleasure is considered a creative rule.[10]

Regarding what you wrote above:
“As for me, it is not intended, this probably depends on the dispute between the 16th and the 17th chapters regarding the question of the Risha's phasik, because if there is a worm inside the fruit, then it is a phasik to eat it.”

I thought about this issue again, and the idea came to me that after all, there is no phasik or question of phasik, because it is always possible to assume that with each bite the insect is somewhere else in the food, and then the certainty of the act of phasik is missing. That is, if we say I am walking in a field, and the chance of plucking grass with each step is, say, 50%, then walking one step is not considered phasik, but crossing a field of 100 steps has a side to it being considered phasik because there is a very high certainty that grass will be plucked. My argument is that even crossing a field of 100 steps is not It is a sin because each step in itself is not a sin, and therefore the whole is not a sin. Only in an act that cannot be divided into small portions, such as a chicken head cutlet, does a sin belong there. Since eating food can be divided into small portions and depending on whether a small portion contains an insect, there is no absolute certainty that there is an insect there, then eating the entire food is also not a sin. According to this, it seems that the main point of the law is that there is no obligation to inspect even a vegetable that is heavily infested with insects, such as lettuce, because it “does not intend” to eat insects. What do you think?

It is possible (it seems to depend on the issue of the two rabbis). But where there is no way to eat one bite of an apple, and eating the entire apple is seen as one act, there may be no room for this explanation. You are looking for permission to eat an apple and not to give a bite of an apple.
Perhaps this is the argument between the conditions regarding the respectability of Tamar (Shabbat 124b). The one who says that this is not psire probably understands that it is not necessary that a leaf be torn off every time a broom is passed. And the other perhaps claims that in general sweeping it is clear that it will be torn off.
If I am right in this, R. Shkup's brilliant view has failed. He proved from this (Sh. 1, Sh. 3:25) that doubting a Risha ruling is a matter of reality and not of knowledge (as a req. 1 against T. 6), since the Tanna who disagrees and says that it is a Risha ruling knows that his friend thinks otherwise. So if the matter is knowledge and not reality, then for the friend it is also permissible from his perspective. From this he proves that it is a matter of reality and not of knowledge.
But according to our approach here, there is a halakhic and not a factual debate (whether the leaf will necessarily fall or not). And indeed, according to T. 6, it is possible that this should be said, otherwise it is hidden from the Sena.
I expanded on this in Chapter 4 of Book 12 in the Talmudic Logic series (Obscure Logic in the Talmud).
And my opinion from this should still be discussed, whether sweeping the entire house is considered one act or is it worse than eating an apple.

What he wrote in parentheses (it seems to depend on the issue of two consecutive days) I will explain.
Regarding the transgressor of a prohibition in the Mamma on both sides of the doubt, it is written in Bisha 1:7 that the one who walks along the path and performs purification, and the one who is baptized and walks along the path of the other and performs purification, which is obligatory (and rejects the proof of the Farach walking along the two consecutive days one after the other and performs purification, which is obligatory, because impurity is a “reality” that distorts the law, and reality does not disappear when there is doubt, but only when there is a law that is more restrictive about the prohibitions, and therefore if the reality is certain in the Mamma then it certainly gives rise to the prohibitions).
This means that perhaps it is permissible to eat the apple with every bite, but he committed a transgression (he does not know how to give a נפקען but sniffs that it exists). And it seems that this is even without the method of the gershish that in every doubt about a prohibition, it is permitted by the Torah if the transgression is ”obligatory” (and then we are terribly pressed to explain to the Rambam in places where a doubt about a prohibition is explicitly permitted, such as Orla and Mazzer, to say that it is indeed permitted like any doubt about a prohibition, and if the transgression is ”obligatory”, and reason dictates not to eat, but the explicit permission comes to say that the decree of Scripture is that it is possible to eat and we do not have to be clever to do according to the commandments of reason. I have never been able to understand his opinion there).
The explanation of the apple as a single act (that is, regarding the prohibition, and not only regarding the consequences, such as ”obligatory” in performing purification) is a separate matter.

But maybe there's a majority of apples that don't have worms in them, and then that's a different matter.

Can my belief be used to make it easier to eat sushi at restaurants that contain nori seaweed that I understand is contaminated but difficult to test?
Here is an illustration of the contamination and difficulty:

It's hard for me to say. In general, there's room for lenience with such small worms even without your opinion, so maybe it can be added. If the seaweed is ground there, it's easier.

Why is there room for leniency with small worms? After all, wasn't the Torah given to the ministering angels?

The seaweed is not ground but rolled into thin sheets and then dried.

Yes. The explanation is that what is not ruled by Eina is not included in halakhic prohibitions. As mentioned, this should be discussed. In particular, here, as I understand it, with effort, it is possible to see them. But when you don't see, there is someone who is busy here (and in my opinion, it doesn't belong here to be busy with milk and nakedness because one doesn't feel the taste and there is no pleasure from it) or doesn't intend to, and they have already dealt with this (as mentioned, depending on the doubt of the Risha ruling).

Regarding what you wrote above that my explanation depends on the second law of the Bible or on the question of whether eating the apple is considered one act, I am more certain. Let's assume that the chance that there are insects in an apple is 50% per cm of apple. So in one bite, the probability is really uncertain (assuming that the bite is in the third of a cm). But even with regard to the entire apple, the probability is uncertain, let's say 95%. In such a situation, I argue that it is not a case of "unintentional" but rather "unintentional". That is, "unintentional" is defined as a situation in which there is complete certainty that it is impossible to do an act without committing an offense - such as cutting a chicken's head on Shabbat. But if there is even a small chance that an offense will not occur, that is enough to consider the act as "unintentional". Therefore, I think that regardless of the second law of the covenant, or the question of whether eating the apple is considered one act or not, it is still a case of "he does not intend".

I didn't understand. After all, we've already solved the question of doubting a comma. We're now discussing the method that doubting a comma is forbidden. Therefore, even if there is no certainty, if there are worms in the apple, it is doubting a comma. If you follow the method of the Taz, you don't need any justification. It's permitted and that's it.

My claim is that there is no doubt here or doubt here. This is a different situation of “does not intend”. Doubt here refers to a situation of doubt in the situation and not doubt in the resulting offense as a result of the action. For example: When I close a box that is doubtful whether or not there is a fly in it, there is no doubt about the question of whether closing the box will cause it to fly, because if there is a fly, there will certainly be a fly. The doubt is about the question of whether there is a fly here or not. Regarding pulling weeds on Shabbat or eating an apple with worms, there is doubt about the question of whether walking or biting will cause the offense of pulling or eating vermin. In other words, there is no doubt here about the background situation, but about the action itself whether it will result in an offense or not. Therefore, my claim is that regardless of all the disputes you mentioned, this is a situation of “does not intend” Which I do not know is permissible, as the Maimonides says:
Things that are permitted to be done on Shabbat, and at the time of their doing, it is possible that work will be done because of them, and it is possible that it will not be done - if we do not intend that work, then it is permissible.

[Note that a monk is prohibited from combing because of the risk of hair being pulled out. Although there is no doubt about the background situation, and not every single combing action will definitely cause hair to be pulled out.]

On the contrary, I looked at the face of the monk M.B.A. and saw there that it was a "he does not intend" and certainly not a "Psi". Correct me if I am wrong.

Oren,
If you're not sure there are insects in the apple, then it really doesn't mean it. What's the question? Why do you need the bite test?

What I meant was that although a certain vegetable (an apple for that matter) is presumed to be contaminated, this presumption is uncertain (say 99%). Only when there is complete certainty, as in the case of a chicken head cutlet that will die, is the act defined as psiri. But if there is a slight possibility that an offense will not occur, then it is a case of “not intending.” This also fits the Maimonides’ language that I cited above:

Things that are permitted to be done on Shabbat, and at the time of their doing, it is possible that work will be done because of them and it is possible that it will not be done – if we do not intend that work, then it is permissible.

I lost you.
If it is not certain that there is a worm in the apple, then according to Reka”a this is exactly the situation of doubting the Risha's clause (because if there is a worm in it, I will eat it for sure, except for your bisis argument). This is exactly the debate about whether there is a permission of the one who does not intend to eat such an apple. And that is why you raised the bisis argument, right? Doubting whether or not there is a worm in the apple is equivalent to doubting the Risha's clause and not doubting whether an act of prohibition would occur (if not for the bisis argument)..
Maybe I missed something, but I don't understand.

You're right, I was confused.

But there's still something unclear to me about the Gemara in Pesachim Ka: which says that the pleasure that comes to a person by force is considered not intentional and not a psish. After all, there's no doubt that a person will enjoy the smell of the idolatry in the market, so why isn't this defined as a psish Risha?

I am not currently in a suga. The Gemara itself deals with the connection between this and the dispute between R”Y and R”S. It seems to me that the focus is that there is no other way (it is impossible).

[Oren. I wrote from memory and I am not knowledgeable on the subject.
From the perspective of Rihta, it seems that Rabba in Nazir Mb. does not believe that R”sh agrees with Ps”r (but only in a later generation, Abaye and Rava. Therefore, Rabba established that all the scanning is intended to remove niymin from depletion).
But see Shabbat Fa: The halakha is as simple as a Mishnah and a Tanan Nazir who overlaps and misses but does not scan, and a commentator but does not scan with a comb, a Dudai who sings hair, and R”sh agrees with Psik Rishiya and does not die. But overlaps and misses several times that he does not sing, and when he sings something that he does not intend, it is permissible.]

[And a final invasion. Regarding smell, and again from memory because I am not sure and if I am mistaken, in Bat Tiha they disagreed whether smell is a verb. There are some nice things about this in the Chiddus of Gershish Nedarim and Devari Haran, where it seems to say that there is no Risha ruling on the enjoyment of smell, but only on food and nakedness.
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=40915&st=&pgnum=20%5D

Correct link:
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=40915&st=&pgnum=20

I searched Google a bit on the subject of the Risha clause in prohibitions that are not Shabbat prohibitions, such as prohibitions of enjoyment, and I saw this:

The Tosafot and the R”a write in the name of the R”a in tractate Shabbat that if it is inevitable that a person will benefit from the prohibition, this enjoyment should be prohibited to him, and he is forbidden to go to a place where he will necessarily benefit from the prohibition. The R”a also agrees with this, and explains that walking near a house of worship where incense is being burned for idolatry is not a “Risha clause” that would benefit from the prohibition, since he can hold his nose. Similarly, Rabbi Avraham ben Maimonides writes in his book Birkat Avraham (Siman 9) that it is not a “Risha clause” that would benefit from the smell, since it is possible for a wind to come and disperse the smell or for a bad smell to interfere with his good smell.

A different opinion is that of Maharam Halawa, who believes that when a person does not intend to enjoy the smell, this is not defined as a “pesik risyah” even though the smell enters his nose, because the pleasure of smell is real only when the person intends to enjoy it, but when he enjoys it without intention, it is not complete pleasure, and therefore it is not forbidden.

A different approach is taken by Riyaz (in his rulings), who believes that in the prohibitions of pleasure, the rule of “pesik risyah” is not stated at all, but rather it depends solely on the intention, that if one intends to enjoy it, it is forbidden, and if one does not intend to enjoy it, it is permissible even though it is a “pesik risyah”. Similarly, the Rabbi writes in Tractate Chulin (32 A.D. on the pages of the Riv) that with regard to pleasure, even on the faded back of the Rishya verse, he sees it. However, he qualifies this by saying that the pleasure of eating and entering into a prohibition must be prohibited by the Rishya verse, according to the rule that one who engages in milk and fornication is obligated.

According to the method of those who permit the Rishya verse, In the prohibitions of enjoyment, there is evidence from a mishna in Tractate Kilaim (59:5) in which we learned that the seller of prison clothes is permitted to wear them for the purpose of selling them if he does not intend to enjoy them, even though there it is ostensibly a “pesik rishya” that he will enjoy the garment, and the Gemara in Tractate Shabbat (29:2) posits this mishna as the method of Rabbi Shimon, which permits something that is not intended. However, the Tosafot in Tractate Shabbat (45:5) interpret that this is a reality that is not a “pesik rishya” in the matter of enjoyment, such as wearing other clothes under them, or wearing them on one’s shoulders.
———-

Apparently, according to this, there is room to be satisfied with whether a peik rishya belongs at all in the prohibitions of insects. In other words, there is a question of spiqa here. The first doubt is whether the Risha clause belongs to the prohibitions of insects, and the second doubt is whether the Halacha 17 states that a conditional clause is permissible as if it “does not intend.” According to this, it is apparently permissible to begin with, right?

It's about eating, and Riyaz also has a Psair in eating prohibitions.

He has a scepter forbidding eating only where he enjoys it (he who deals in milk and broth must indeed enjoy it), but above you wrote that insects do not belong, you thought "where he enjoys it" because there is no pleasure here or it is completely imperceptible.

According to this, the worm is void because it does not give taste. A creature is not void even though it does not give taste, and therefore there is a prohibition on eating in it. I do not think that he distinguishes between a prohibition on eating that contains pleasure and a prohibition on eating that does not contain it. If the worm is not void, then the pleasure is from the apple + the worm, and it is still a pleasure from a prohibition.

How does this fit with what you wrote above:
“Because you enjoy it seems to me to be out of place here at all. Both because there is no pleasure from worms and because they are small and insignificant (the taste is null in sixty, and even if it is a creature with respect to taste, it does not matter. Enjoyment is a matter of fact).”

Maimonides rules in Halachos of Prohibited Foods 14 Halachas 12:
The eater eats from forbidden foods through a shikhot or as if he is busy, even though he does not intend the body of the food, because he enjoys it, he is obligated as one who intends the very act of eating and the disposition that comes to him, for a person who is compelled by the prohibition of all prohibitions, whether he intended it to be forbidden or if he did not intend it to be permitted.

From Maimonides' words, “Because you enjoy it” it means that enjoyment is a necessary condition for being obligated to eat while busy.

As I think I wrote above, there is definitely a side to allow. But it is difficult for me to reach a decision like this. We need to settle on the matter.
In this discussion, I am raising sides and not making statements or rulings. I raised a side here, even if you do not enjoy a worm but it is not invalid in an apple, still since there is a prohibition on eating it, it is also considered enjoyment, and perhaps it even belongs to the opinion that one does enjoy (from the apple + worm). In particular, according to the Maimonides, who says that the prohibitions on eating are nothing more than another type of prohibition on enjoyment (eating is just an example of common enjoyment), it is difficult to accept that there are prohibitions on eating that are not considered prohibitions on enjoyment, and therefore it is reasonable to say that one does enjoy them.
Two laws before the law that the Maimonides cited speaks of not being obligated to eat unless one eats in the manner of enjoyment. So why are we obligated to eat a worm that is not invalid? (I speak as if I were referring to it.)