Choice and condemnation
Hello. I am a determinist, and following my determinism I have come to the conclusion (quite obvious in my opinion) that no one can be morally condemned, because no one really chose to sin, etc. (punishment is just a means to prevent another crime). I wondered if a person who believes in free will could come to a similar conclusion. I am not talking about moral condemnation of the type of “he did what is objectively wrong,” etc., but of the more emotionally charged type, such as a person who hates Hitler because of what he did. My question is this: Does a person who hates Hitler because of what he did, and believes in free will, necessarily think that if he had reached the same “topological balance” (according to your analogy) that Hitler was in when he made his important decisions, he would have chosen differently from Hitler? Where does such confidence come from? After all, he wasn’t in such an experience… A reasonable (and polite) stance for a libertarian seems to me to be to say “I might have done the same thing in his place, so I don’t condemn him (in an emotionally charged sense).” What do you think?
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Of course, from your perspective, he could have acted differently, I'm not trying to change your mind about that. My point is that you don't know whether in a situation where you would be in such an experience as Hitler had, you would act differently. In the topography analogy, for example, you could say that doing the moral thing for Hitler is like climbing a high mountain, the question is why are you so sure that if you were in his place, you would have the mental strength to climb the mountain? I'll just clarify the condemnation I meant. I'm not talking about condemning an act (act X is bad), but about condemning a person (person X is bad). Why would you condemn him if it's not clear to you that his situation (in the topographical balance he is in, in his experience) would have acted differently?
The rest of your questions are not really related to the question (and I'm pretty sure we've already talked about them several times), but I'll answer them anyway.
Indeed, that “bad feeling in the stomach” I call condemnation (in the body of the question I called it hatred for a person because he is bad). So what about the conclusion being forced upon me? Why does the fact that the conclusion was forced upon someone have any relevance to its truth value? I can force you to believe the truth or a lie, and you (in your opinion) can choose to believe the truth or a lie, so what is the choice allowed?
On second thought, I don't think you think a person can choose what to believe anyway. No one chooses their intuitions. So it becomes even less clear where you see the hypnotist being allowed to choose.
I don't know if it is or not. But if I behave like him, I too will be evil. Why does that prevent Manny from judging Hitler? In my opinion, someone in such a situation shouldn't murder millions. If you claim that he was forced to do so, we're back to determinism again.
Of course, you can fear that you are an undiscovered evil. I don't really understand what that has to do with judgment.
If when you talk about condemnation you mean a bad feeling in your stomach, then we're not talking about the same thing. Regarding feelings, you should consult a psychologist or take a pill, and not provoke a philosophical discussion.
If the conclusion was forced upon you, you have no indication that it is true, because the reason you think so is only because you are forced to think it. It is possible, of course, that by chance you are forced to think the truth, but you have no way of knowing that.
This discussion mixes up levels of discussion and confuses concepts (perhaps because the system that forces you is not particularly successful), and I don't really see any point in it.
I don't think you understood my point, but I'll leave it at that (because there really isn't much point in it). I'll only respond to the point at the end.
If the conclusion was forced upon me, meaning I was forced to think it was true, then I have no choice but to think it is true. But again, I didn't understand how your case is different from mine? Did you choose to have a certain intuition? No? So why do you believe it represents truth?
I didn't choose intuition. This is what seems right to me and therefore this is what I think. If I am forced (meaning I thought I was not forced is wrong) then it really doesn't mean much. But at least according to my theory that I am not forced, the conclusion is that this is probably the truth (in my opinion). But whoever thinks that he is forced to his conclusions, then according to his theory he cannot know anything about the truth.
I don't understand, what do you mean you're not forced? After all, you're saying you didn't choose what seemed right to you, so if you didn't choose it, what is it if not coercion?
“I chose intuitions” It sounds arbitrary. That's why I wrote that I made a judgment call and that's what seemed right to me.
See here: <a href="https://mikyab.net/%D7%9E%D7%94%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%A6%D7%99%D7%94-%D7% A2%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A9-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%93/" rel="nofollow">https://mikyab.net/%D7%9E%D7%94%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%A6%D7%99%D7% 94-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A9-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%95 %D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%93/</a>
What I mean to say is that it is clear that a person has intuitions that he did not decide on, such as in the field of values (I did not decide that murder is bad and helping others is good). This is forced upon me and is part of the topographical outline in which I operate. But I have the ability to criticize these intuitions. On the value level: determine what comes from instinct and what comes from values. On the intellectual level (judgment): whether an intuition is true or not (or: what is the truth in light of the totality of intuitions). The initial feeling can mislead me, and therefore I criticize it before I formulate a decision. This is judgment. Sometimes there are considerations here and there and I have to decide who prevails. The system that is forced upon us does not go directly to the position that is formed, but there is another stage of control and judgment, in which I decide whether it is true or not. This is a stage that is not forced upon me and is not mechanical, just like in the field of values.
When I say that claim X is true, it is itself a claim. The criticizing system confirms that claim X, which at first glance seems true to me, is indeed true (in my eyes). In my opinion, this is done in two stages: I am supposed to be convinced of claim X (which is forced upon me. A mechanical calculation) and then confirm that it is true (which is judgment).
This does not mean that in my opinion it is not possible to be wrong, of course. There may be situations in which in reality X is not true even though I have decided that it is. But this statement means that this (X) is my current position (and not just what I feel at the moment).
I will return again, you can of course deny and claim that the criticizing mechanism is also forced upon me, or ask how I decide whether an intuition is correct or not? Isn't this part of the calculation (it is simply done in two stages)? This is a skeptical question that reflects your deterministic position. You may be right, but my argument is that it is not, and therefore at least in my opinion I have judgment and there is justification for the trust I give the system.
In any case, here we are back to the discussion of determinism. If you assume for the sake of our discussion my libertarian position and ask something about it and within it, then you cannot in the same discussion criticize me from a deterministic point of view. That is the meaning of libertanism, whether you accept it or not. You can deny its existence, but you cannot have both.
If I understand correctly, the reason you even think that (free) judgment is necessary to arrive at the truth is so that you know that your opinion really came from you. I don't think that's true. The fact that your opinions stem from your intuitions is certainly enough for me, whether there is a stage of choice somewhere or not. I don't need to invent a deeper source where my opinions stem from deep within my soul, or anything like that.
It seems to me that there is a kind of battle here between this argument of yours and intellectual honesty. Because it seems to any intellectually honest person that you can't choose what to believe (and that at no point in any argument can you choose what seems reasonable to you, but only apply this knowledge, which has already existed in your intuition since the days of Genesis). Imagine some guy reading God Playing Dice, and saying “Wow! What a brilliant book! It really seems clearer than ever that God exists!” Does it seem reasonable to you that by the end of the book he will decide that he still chooses not to believe in God (without a good argument)? Would you call him an intellectually honest person?
I don't think that skepticism about your opinion necessarily reflects a deterministic position. Here, let's say my opinion is yours, even if I believed in free choice I don't think I would believe that it enters anywhere in the process of arriving at the truth. At each stage of the process you point to what seems most intuitively reasonable to you (assuming you are honest of course), and you will always point to what seemed more reasonable to you in the first place. In your terminology, you will always point to what the ididitskyist view shows you. I can't choose whether to see a tree in front of me or an elephant, can I?
Not to make sure that my opinion came from me (what is “me” anyway?), but to make sure that it is correct. Even if it came from outside, if it is correct, I will adopt it.
Apparently we see honesty differently. I have a clear feeling that I have a judgment that determines what is true. For example, in my book, it certainly does. A person can say that he has no answer to these arguments but something seems unlikely to him and continue not to believe. I have met many of them, and some of them were honest in my opinion.
I am currently writing a post about the matter, and perhaps it will be explained more there.
Okay, so for some reason you see importance in that that verification being free. For me it is not, and it seems perfectly satisfactory to me to believe what seems reasonable to me, even if the conclusion was completely forced upon me.
I do not mean the case where something seems unreasonable to him, but the case where all your arguments seem reasonable and correct to him, and it seems very, very likely that there is a God. In my opinion, if such a person says that he does not believe in God after all, he is probably lying (to himself or to me). But that is exactly what you are asking the determinist to do: my intuitions tell me strongly and clearly that I am forced to believe what I believe, and you are asking me for some reason to give them up, because your conception of the path to truth is different from mine? So it seems that you are either asking me to do the impossible (change my intuitions), or to lie. I am not convinced.
And I think I'll try to rephrase what I asked in the first post. If you think you've answered it, you don't need to answer again, maybe it's more for the sake of those reading from the sidelines. I'll just clarify that I'm writing this from the perspective of someone who does believe in free choice (even though I don't).
I think you can agree that the topographic outline of a person who chooses to rape someone, or abuse a cat, or do other monstrous things, is very different from yours. The temptation for a person who goes on a rampage is much greater than the temptation for you to rape (correct me if I'm wrong). Now, of course you also have “mountains” in life that you have to climb, like the mountain of participating in laps for example, but no one will call you a bad person if you don't participate in laps. My point is that even from a libertarian perspective, such a conversation can take place:
Reuven: Did you hear the news? So-and-so raped and abused eighty girls, what a despicable, horrible, repulsive person!
Shimon: I think he deserves more pity than condemnation. Think about it: How many people you know have to deal with such strong and terrible impulses as he must have had? Have you dealt with such an impulse? Does a person choose the trials that come their way? That so-and-so had bad luck, and a great trial came his way, and he failed in it just as we all fail in our attempts in life.. (etc.)
I will clarify again that both Reuven and Shimon believe in free choice.
The reason I bother with this question, by the way, is that for some reason I find comfort and gentleness in the thought that no one is truly despicable and evil. Maybe it's just me. It may really have more to do with psychology than philosophy as you said, but for some reason labeling a person as ”evil” seems quite philosophical to me. I don't know
If the conclusion was forced upon you, then you were also forced to think that it is reasonable. It is just a lack of understanding.
I have given various examples of something that seems reasonable and yet I decide not to adopt it. There is no point in going back and forth.
I am not asking the determinist for anything. I have no expectations from him and I see no point in talking to him (as I wrote to you at the beginning). I did not ask you to give up anything, I was just claiming that if you are a determinist and yet accept your conclusions, then you are wrong. It is permissible to be wrong, and I am not asking you not to be wrong. I am just stating that you are wrong. That is all.
In fact, if you are convinced that the intuitions forced upon you are correct (which is of course nonsense), then in my opinion, you only mean to say that this conviction itself is the result of your act of control. Otherwise, talking about "convincing that the conclusions forced upon you are correct" is meaningless. It is repeating the same thing twice. They are forced upon you and that is it. What is "persuasion", if not the act of your controlling these intuitions?
Well, I think we've exhausted it.
As for your second statement, I completely agree with such a conversation within a libertarian framework, and there is not the slightest doubt in it about the ability to judge. These are just arguments for leniency in punishment (or guilt), and that's all.
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