Vegetarianism and Halacha
Hello Rabbi,
I’ve seen you write about vegetarianism a few times. Most of the answers I’ve seen have been about the suffering that animals go through. I want to touch on the point of actually eating them.
What is the moral permissibility of this? Why do you think we are not obligated not to kill them for our own food cravings?
Another question: Let’s assume that morality does indeed prohibit this. And let’s assume that the Torah tells us to kill animals for eating. Can we conclude that the Torah took the moral calculus and nevertheless commanded eating, or that from a legal Torah perspective we must eat, but morally we must not eat, and the Torah (more precisely: God) leaves it open, and then it is possible that God wants us to follow the moral consideration? In short, when does the Torah rule the last word (despite morality) and when does it only rule as a legal body and then the person (and the intention of the Rabbi) will take the moral step?
Thank you!
The very act of eating them is permitted in the Torah and therefore cannot be prohibited. I agree that whoever does not eat them is a virtue.
Regarding the conflict with morality, I have distinguished several times between accidental and essential conflict. There are commandments whose conflict with morality is essential, such as the obligation for a priest to separate from his wife who was raped. Here there is a built-in conflict with morality. In such a situation, if the Torah said to separate – it is likely that it took the moral aspect into account. One can argue about interpretation (whether and how this comes from the Torah, but I am only dealing here with principles). But Pikuach Nefesh and Shabbat are accidental conflicts. Observing Shabbat does not inherently involve risking life, and preserving life does not inherently involve desecrating Shabbat. There is a solution to be sought. And in the context of halacha and morality, sometimes there is no solution and one has to live both things together: two aspects, halacha and morality, whose practical implications are opposed. This is not a contradiction in principle and one can live with it (and make practical decisions as in any value conflict).
In such a situation, I would definitely reduce eating animals as much as possible, and reduce the Torah commandment to the interpretive minimum possible. With the exception of sacrifices, it seems to me that everything else can be reduced.
My question is essentially this. Maybe she said to separate on the religious level, but morality remains, and perhaps God wants us to focus on morality, and what is written in the Torah is only on the religious level.
And therefore? I didn't understand. Give an example.
The implication is that the priest will not separate, because on a moral level it is immoral. And the entire Torah instruction to separate is on a religious level alone.
The Torah's instruction is to separate. And since the contradiction is essential and not accidental, it is likely that the Torah took both aspects into account.
In your opinion, isn't the Torah on the religious level? The teaching is also only on this aspect. And not in the general calculation of the two levels (religious and moral)?
Gal, if when the Torah commanded them to separate, it was only on the religious level (over which the moral one prevails), why did it even command it?
If God were to command you to do an immoral act, would you refuse and explain to him that he is only commanding you on a religious level and therefore you are exempt from carrying out his instructions? That is very limiting for him. I assume that it seems ridiculous to you too, and that is exactly the case with the priest's wife.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
