Libet Experiments – Veto
In the SD
Hello Rabbi,
The Rabbi mentioned in the previous discussion that, to his knowledge, the new Libet experiments still showed that there is no RP that occurs before the veto imposed by the experimenters.
And even more than that, you wrote that in your opinion it is not possible in principle to distinguish RP before vetoing. You only mentioned the magic word “Achm”. Therefore, I thought it was important (and appropriate) to open a new question about this so that you could write your position on why RP cannot be distinguished before vetoing.
Because to some extent, if the studies fail to show absolute determinism prevailing in our brains at the neuron level (which probably won’t happen and certainly not in the near future), then with these words you managed to argue that it will never be possible to establish a fully deterministic approach based on brain research!
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- Philosophically. In my opinion, the veto is the result of a free decision (=not deterministic). Therefore, by definition, it should not be preceded by an RP that determines it.
- Scientifically. If there is an RP before it, it can be vetoed as well, and this veto will also require an RP, and so on.
- Scientifically. As far as I know, the veto is an unknown mechanism (its very existence is debated). Even those who claim that it exists say so based on the result (that there is RP and yet the person does not act accordingly). They do not point to veto neurons. In any case, it does not seem possible to locate an RP responsible for the veto, when the mechanism of the veto itself has not been located and is unknown.
- Definitionally. The veto is by definition a different kind of action than just a neural calculation. If it were part of the deterministic mechanism itself (i.e., powered by RP), then it cannot be called a veto. It was simply part of the calculation done in the brain that ultimately has an RP for the action. If we define a veto beyond RP, we mean an action that is not part of the calculation. Hence, the very definition of any action as a veto means that it is not a simple neural action. Note that this argument is not based on my philosophical view (as in section 1).
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Thank you very much for the answer.
I didn't have that much free time to answer until now.
1. I didn't understand, after all, when we come to examine this assumption itself – Does the veto also have an RP that precedes it, we have no reason to presuppose this assumption…
2. I agree that if RP occurs before the veto, then it will be possible to veto it as well. But we don't have the feeling that we are vetoing the veto. Therefore, in fact, it doesn't sound reasonable for us to claim this. After all, the will reflects our judgment, and if we didn't experience the feeling of vetoing the veto on the veto, why do we claim that we do so?
3. I agree. According to the studies, did people experience the awakening of the urge to move their hand and veto it, or did they not even feel it? Because it is implied from your words that they were not aware of the veto at all. So the only reason we assume this is because the result was RP and yet the person did not act accordingly.
4. As I understand it, what you wrote is a completely semantic wordplay. But it is not a fundamental reason to oppose the existence of the veto. As if then instead of a veto you would call it the “action of canceling RP”.
PS
A philosophical question occurred to me in general about the very existence of the RP. Why can't it be argued that the will, which is later in terms of time, was a cause of the RP event that occurred in terms of time before it.
After all, we have no reason to argue that the result precedes the cause. As we know, the soul is in terms of (and not really) a part of God from above.
Thank you very much, Shabbat Shalom
1. Obviously. That's why I wrote that it's a philosophical claim.
2. The veto is just an implementation of a decision. The feeling that is explained is of a decision. How it is actually carried out is another question.
3. True.
4. This is not semantics. The libertarian claim is that there is a veto, and that it is not part of the calculation. You won't find an RP for it anyway. Of course, what is written in 3 should also be added here, that the veto is an assumption to explain the decision and not a scientific finding.
These are words that I don't understand. I don't think you do either. Either way, if you accept a groundless proposal like this, the entire discussion is essentially null and void. Even without assuming a veto, you can always say that the RP does precede the decision, but it is the result and not the cause.
1. 3.4. Thanks
2. I didn't understand the argument, even if the veto is an application of a decision, how can it be said that in practice this is done by imposing a long regression of vetoes on the initial vetos with the RP? This does not sound reasonable at all.
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Regarding the thought I raised, this is not an unreasonable suggestion, because if so, how does the Rabbi accept that choice affects the knowledge that preceded the choice in time. And if not, then how does he rationalize the question of choice and knowledge. And whoever accepts this assumption, why shouldn't he accept that the soul, which is a simple and abstract spiritual thing, can affect back in time.
My argument is that there is not necessarily awareness of every stage of the calculation in the brain. There is a sense of decision. How is this actually done in the brain? That is a different question. It can be a very complex process. In general, many of our actions involve different areas of the brain at the same time. Therefore, there is no one-to-one correlation between a feeling and a brain action. Moreover, this entire chain can be done simultaneously, with the veto, if it is imposed, being only the result of such a calculation process. But all this is unnecessary chatter. I have already explained my principled position.
I did not understand the argument. I do not accept that God has foreknowledge of actions that depend on choice. Furthermore, in my opinion, anyone who does think so is confused. And Newcomb's paradox will prove it.
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