Notebooks on matters of faith

  1. At the request of many in the mail, companies are published here that deal with the basic infrastructure of faith.
  2. This is an initial version that is published at the request of many and more will undergo changes and updates.
  3. The plan is to publish them in the future.
  4. One to three notebooks deal with the three types of arguments in favor of the existence of God in the Kantian classification. Each notebook in a different type of argument. The fourth notebook raises another type of argument (which also originated in Kant). And the fifth deals with the transition from proving the existence of a philosophical God to a religious and halakhic commitment.
  5. The number 1 notebook may seem to many to be a philosophical nonsense with not very high persuasive power. I have nevertheless added it because it contains some important elements in the methodology of the discussion, and they are used by me later. Beyond that there is education for systematic thinking on these issues, and it is sorely lacking in our districts. The following three notebooks contain stronger arguments, and each also has a reliance on the previous notebooks.
  6. As I make clear there and have made it clear many times before, the goal is not to reach certainty. To the best of my knowledge, man has no possibility of attaining certainty in any realm, including not believing in the existence of God, and certainly not Mount Sinai status and anything else (perhaps except for this very principle: that nothing is certain, and in this, too). The goal is to come to the conclusion that these are completely reasonable and rational conclusions, and in my opinion make much more sense than the alternatives. Anyone looking for something beyond that, is a waste of time. That he will not read and that he will stop looking at all. If he found a way to reach such certainty he was probably wrong (for sure! 🙂).
  7. Formulation of a final worldview should be done after everyone's reading. There are questions that are answered in future notebooks (especially the question of how to move from a philosophical God to a religious commitment. In the fifth notebook I show that the gap is smaller than is usually thought).
  8. I would love any comment. Some of them will be entered as corrections / updates in future versions (comments can be sent directly to or in the comment system here on the website).
  9. As I have written many times, faith is not a package deal. In these notebooks I deal with the most basic infrastructure. As for the questions of what includes the commitment reached in the fifth notebook, what is obligatory and what is not, what is right and what is not, the extent to which the various traditions obligate us, in thought and law, are not answered here. Therefore do not expect discussions on specific issues such as authority and autonomy in halakhah, changes in halakhah, its updates to the present day, various thought principles, religious Zionism, redemption, the OT, Messiah, the virtue of Israel, providence, reduction, divinity and negative degrees, etc. To this I will dedicate two more books in Gaza that I am currently writing, and they will complete in Gaza the process of presenting a complete Jewish theological picture, as "thin" as possible, and up-to-date to the present day (sorry for the pretentiousness).

153 Thoughts on “Faithful Notebooks”

  1. Israel:
    Regarding the five notebooks:

    What prevents me from saying that since the departure of the prophecy there has been a divine regression upward. Or he decided for some reason to take a break or a vacation.

    As a rule, the prophets prophesy in terms of "Otto", soon, redemption and world correction will come, who read these prophecies 1500 years ago would not have imagined that the range would expand until 2016, that is, the possibility of a timeout or regression or prolonged hiding of several thousand Years ”- is not unreasonable.

    It is certainly possible to paint a reasonable situation as follows: Gd made a covenant with Israel to bring morality to mankind. He went on with prophets and revelations, letting humanity reach a certain "spiritual maturity", when he saw that we were on the right path morally - turned to treat (in quotes) the earth in a parallel universe. He is not interested in us for the next ten thousand seconds.

    Why am I supposed to be committed to another alliance for so many years of “zero response” from heaven?

    (Regarding Maimonides' method that the observance of the mitzvos should be because there was a status of Mount Sinai, it is not clear to me why the rabbi paints the entire halakhah as walking in one line with Maimonides. Theologies in the Mishnah Torah without evidence.)
    I agree with everything you have written, except for the conclusion. He probably did get away with his involvement here. But the mitzvos do not depend on his involvement (= response). Why hang it on each other?
    And that there is any indication that the purpose of the mitzvos is moral progress? Most of the commandments do not seem to be related to this. These are demands that are probably unrelated to the state of the world.
    2. For me Maimonides is only an illustration. I would say this I explained even without him writing it, and I would continue to advocate it even if there were some who would explicitly confront him about it. So it does not really matter to me if there are those who disagreed with him. I do not rule here laws according to different first methods. Why did Sabra call me she?
    1. Wonder, the rabbi says they do not seem related? Maimonides in particular shows how most of the mitzvos are related either to the departure of the pagans or to the holding of the hand of the weak in society. We have pretty much left the pagans in the last thousand years, and the weak - at least in Western society - are not hungry for bread. (By the way, why do I focus on Western society - because it is a society that is always interested in getting better)

    2. Equally I can be committed to observance of mitzvos because it strengthens my connection to the chain of generations and tradition
    1. I assume you are preparing for the flavors that Maimonides brings in the MON. Really does not convince me. If the goal was to help the weak and moral principles I would build a completely different halakhah.
    Nor does the connection to previous generations justify such a ramified and irrelevant system. For the sake of the connection to previous generations should I avoid NT Bar NT? Or for morality?

    I would sum up the discussion as follows:

    1) The rabbi sees the status of the covenant between Gd and Israel as currently constitutive. If it is neutralized - there is no point in keeping the mitzvos.
    2) Gd makes such a covenant with us, because He desires, not necessarily to raise us morally, the contribution of Judaism to the elimination of paganism and the strengthening of morality in the world is only a by-product.
    3) This is our unilateral letter of commitment and not an agreement. Gd can disappear or be "not involved" - and we are committed because we have committed.
    4) There is no essential value in keeping the mitzvos out of “volunteering” (because he does not feel committed to this ancient covenant) or out of respect for tradition.

    Why I was not convinced:

    1) There are a considerable number of mitzvot in which the essential and moral content can be seen, so there is a point in keeping these mitzvos at least even without the covenant (it is true that it is possible to "overlap" in the NT Bar-Net…)
    2) It is plausible to me that the final product (i.e .: a more moral person) gives us an indication of Gd's purpose.
    3) Out of countless places in the Bible means that God plans to be involved, there is no hint of "disappearance" on the order of thousands of years. In my opinion our commitment is subject to Gd’s commitment. (By the way, this is not a novelty of mine, the Gemara in Tractate Megillah did indeed understand the Bible in this way "hence the great awareness of Oriyta").
    4) There is considerable value in keeping the mitzvos out of volunteering or respect for tradition, the value of community. "Do not retire from the public."
    This conclusion is very flawed, both in the presentation of my arguments and in the counter-arguments.

    1) Indeed. Although I would correct this is not a covenant but our commitment to the Creator. The mutual dimension does not seem necessary to me.
    2) Absolutely not true. It has other purposes, not necessarily moral ones. But it is quite possible that he also had such goals. However, it is clear that this is not "because he wanted to", arbitrarily.
    3) See 1. But even if it is mutual, his side is not necessarily involved in the world. As I wrote to you, his commitment was not to interfere in the world.
    4) I was a facility that has no religious value, nor is there any intrinsic value. At least some of the commandments have a moral or other value (national identity?). But religious significance certainly does not exist when done for foreign motives (in dealing). For example, Shabbat observance of "Ahad Ha'am".

    Why I was not convinced:

    1) Indeed. Just as I wrote. So what are you not convinced of? In the thesis you put in my mouth?
    2) How do you think the product of the Torah is a more moral person? Where did this assumption come from? And from the fact that the indication fell, the conclusion also fell.
    3) This is not a disappearance for thousands of years, but a final disappearance. The world has improved and stands on its own two feet. Like a child whose parents stop giving him a hand. There is no disconnect between a great Modea and Oriyta and the hanging of the commitment in his involvement. Here I really did not understand what you are chess. Do you understand?
    4) Indeed, just as I corrected you in section 4 above.

    In conclusion, you put in the mouths of things that did not convince you, and then you partially repeated things I said and presented them as your claims. mozar. Another part is simply not true and even seems to me meaningless.
    The "great awareness" - at least according to Rashi's interpretation there, is that we have a good excuse (before God for the Day of Judgment) why we did not keep the commandments. We did not hold because the acceptance of the Torah was under threat (hanging and Yahav, armed lists).

    "Love of a miracle" during Purim - made our ancestors feel that there is an active involvement of Gd in the world and it prevents the Holocaust, there is reciprocity and therefore they agree to take upon themselves observance of mitzvos.

    Sorry the rabbi does not see a shred of connection but for me it is elementary.
    The excuse that receiving the Torah was under rape is indeed a good excuse. He cancels the contract. But why does this have to do with the question of God's involvement in the world.
    Even if I accept your interpretation (which may be possible but far from necessary) that Israel's excuse stemmed from a miracle done to them (i.e. it was done for a miracle and not just inspired by the miracle), still if you go with Sages on Purim with Israel confirm the contract with the crutch. The sages also say that this was possible only because there was a great deal of awareness in Sinai. After Purim it is no longer possible to cancel again. But all this midrash about its existence and acceptance is of course not a historical description but a legend. By the way, for me Purim was not a miracle at all.
    I do not go into the question of whether it is possible to cancel or not to cancel. According to my interpretation in the Gemara the source of authority is the mutual contract. It is true that this is a legend, and it is true that there was no miracle here, but the Mishnah and the Amoraim who discussed the issue saw Purim as a conference and intervention of Gd in this world (before the Megillah bless "who performed miracles", as well as sages who corrected "on miracles" in prayer). And again, a legend is not a halakhah but it is completely meta-halakhic, the legend can teach us about the theological view of sages. What to do, from their words means that without this intervention - there is no theological justification for a full commitment to observance of mitzvos.
    The notion that this is a contract has quite clear sources. The question is whether the contract is against God's involvement in the world (you will keep us and we will keep you) or not. And another question is whether without the contract there is no obligation. Without the contract there is no legal obligation but there may still be a material obligation (regardless of the obligation and signing of a contract). As such it is the social covenant that is brought as the basis for moral commitment. And that it is conceivable that moral obligation is a purely legal matter? When there is no contractual obligation, God may not be able to make claims, and it is still quite probable that going beyond His commandments is not the right thing to do.
    It is also clear that Chazal saw Purim as a conference, but this does not have a sufficient basis for this. I talked about my point of view on the matter. In addition, the hypothesis that according to Sages our commitment is against the miracle is your hypothesis. Possible but not really necessary.

    Unify a little more. After all, even if we follow the contractual concept, it is clear that the contract that God has signed with us is not in his interest. If he needs something he can get it on his own. So this signature is probably meant for us to act correctly for ourselves or for the world. It is therefore very likely that even if the contract does not bind us for one formal reason or another, it is still right to act in the way it requires of us. But if we do not do so - he has no claim against us by virtue of a contract. But he has a claim against us by virtue of it being the right thing to do.
    It is quite clear to me that it is "right" to act according to the Torah. I am not dealing with what is right but with commitment.

    I find myself thinking about what I would do in "edge cases", for example:

    Would I give up the soul?

    Can I accept the example of Maimonides that whoever does not believe in what he believed is in all the species and heretics?

    Was I not from the Sabbath to save Ahmad from whom the wave fell?

    These are all questions that depend on total commitment. I fail to derive commitment from "what is likely to be done right."

    I did not leave without a doubt
    First, I, too, did not go beyond doubt. There is nothing certain in the world, including faith of course. Therefore I also have no total commitment to anything, including halakhah. Everything must go through the crucible of criticism (I devoted my last book to this, true and unstable), and you can never be sure you were right. So what? This is the person and this is us. And yet, despite all this, we operate in all areas according to our best judgment and the best information we have. This is the situation here as well. Anyone who gives his life in the army is also not entirely sure that he is right and that it is true. But this is how he thinks and according to that he acts.
    You're right that in any case an end that goes beyond my level of commitment would not have been fulfilled. In many cases I also find a possible halakhic route that reconciles with my perceptions, but even if I did not find one I make decisions about my steps, and not anyone else (including Maimonides, and even Moses). For example, rescuing a gentile on Shabbat is a complete halakhic obligation in my opinion even in Dauriyta crafts. I wrote about it in the academies (at the end of my article: Is there an 'enlightened' foreign work?).
    The fact that Maimonides said something does not seem really important to me. So he thought so, and I disagree with him. In philosophical principles he was too dogmatic in my opinion, but he is the fruit of his time and the ancient form of Aristotelian thinking on which he was educated.
    So we actually got to semantics. What I call "true" and not commitment - the rabbi calls it "total commitment". Long live the little difference.

    I feel like I're back to the beginning of the circle.

    If I feel obligated (not totally of course…) by virtue of my probability and value decision in the face of “what is right” - why do I need Mount Sinai status?
    Indeed, we revolve around ourselves all the time, and again and again I have a feeling that you do not understand me (perhaps the problem with my explanation). We did not return to the beginning of the circle but have not yet left. There is not a shred of semantics here, and the identities you have written here are simply incorrect.

    I argue that the religious commitment is correct, but not total. The law of gravitation is also true but not total, since everything is supposed to stand the test of criticism. There is nothing certain. Why do you think these claims are identical to a claim that has no obligation or or even derives it? Long live the big difference.

    Need the Mount Sinai stand to tell you what's right. Would you know how to put on tefillin alone or redeem a donkey Peter? Where did these statements come from? What is the connection between them and everything that has been said so far?
    Tefillin and Peter Hamor are pieces of information of the Torah, the status of Mount Sinai and entering the covenant did not come to provide us with information but to establish a commitment.

    I will clarify my question: if all I need is a 99 percent commitment - I can establish this by respecting tradition and a desire to belong to the observant. Why is it necessary to establish the commitment to the revelation in Sinai?
    The revelation in Sinai aims first and foremost at the commandment. Without it we would not know what God is commanding. Moreover, without the revelation even if you wanted to belong there was nowhere to belong. Those ones you want to belong to, why are they doing all this? How does this process begin? In revelation. The name of Gd commands, and from this the commitment is created.
    As a rule, respect for tradition is not a commitment but your decision. It's like being moral because I like it or because I want to be like it. This is not moral behavior, not because of software but because of the motivations that create it. The same is true of religious commitment. This should be a form of slavery (see Rambam XNUMX: XNUMX). See about it in my fourth notebook.
    My basic argument:
    A. Mount Sinai status is presented (in various sources) as the status of signing a mutual contract.
    B. Assuming it is a mutual contract and it is signed under duress - it has no binding validity.
    third. Conclusion: Mount Sinai does not require observance.
    I now examine how the rabbi's answer is relevant to the binding force:

    You wrote (my comments in parentheses):
    “The revelation in Sinai aims first and foremost at the commandment. Without it we would not know what God is commanding. ” (Even if we know what he commanded - what is the binding attacker?)
    "Moreover, without the revelation even if you wanted to belong there was nowhere to belong." (So ​​what? Because it's helpful to me that I have where to belong does it have binding force?)
    “Those ones you want to belong to, why are they doing all this? How does this process begin? In revelation. The name of Gd commands, and from this the commitment is created. ” (good for them, excellent, they have certainty, their disruption to them. It still does not create a binding validity for me.)
    “As a rule, respect for tradition is not a commitment but your decision. It's like being moral because I like it or because I want to be like it. It is not moral behavior, not because of software but because of the motivations that create it. ” (After I have decided I have a certain commitment to my decision. We have already agreed that no commitment is total.)
    “The same goes for religious commitment. This should be a form of slavery (see Rambam XNUMX: XNUMX). (If acceptance is - we will receive, etc.)
    "See about it in my fourth notebook."
    As stated, we repeat ourselves over and over again and I also see contradictions (or changes of direction) in your arguments. I too will summarize my comments in relation to your summary, and if there is nothing new I suggest we end here.

    The fact that the contract was signed under duress is a sage legend. In my opinion it should not be taken too seriously (not because of Sages but because it is a legend). And if you still take it seriously (I do not know why exactly here you are devoutly clinging to Sages), continue with the repeated acceptance in Shushan that follows, according to Sages, the claim of the Moda is null and void.
    In general, if you demand a great deal of awareness about the contract, you can do so even without the coercive argument. You will be very aware that God has not fulfilled his obligation (so you claimed) and therefore the contract is void. This has nothing to do with coercion and much awareness. I did not understand why you suddenly switched to another claim. Anyway, my opinion on that I have already said (that he did not commit).
    I have explained back and forth that there is a binding validity to a divine commandment. Revelation is necessary so that we know what a commandment is and what the content of the commandment is. Why is this binding? Because of the same commitment to what the Creator commands me. If you do not get then to health, but what all this has to do with revelation and its meaning.

    I asked about joining out of respect for previous generations, I said it explains your joining and not their commitment. Without commitment there is no worship of Gd (like one of the people). So it's basically about wanting to join in on the nonsense your ancestors did. I do not argue about sentiments and feelings, that everyone will do the nonsense he wants to do. What I am claiming is that this is not a work of the name but a personal caprice (completely legitimate of course), and even more so that it certainly does not supersede the revelation (and that is what you have claimed).

    When you decide to do something out of respect for previous generations the problem is not that the commitment is not total but that it is not a religious commitment at all. When I decided I would like to eat an apple there was no obligation to eat apples. What is not clear about this? I have repeated this many times.

    This is not acceptance but a philosophical analysis, so there is no need to accept but to understand. If you see eating an apple because you like committed apples, I have a feeling it is not an argument but simply a lack of understanding of the concepts in question. The work of God and religious commitment is the doing of the mitzvos out of submission to the commandment. Whoever makes them as a hobby or for any other purpose does not keep the commandments. And it's not because of Maimonides, I would say that even if it were not written there. It's simple logic.

  2. The Hebrew Abram:
    First of all I must salute the writer for the courage and effort in writing this great manifesto. Naturally, such companies invite in-depth criticism, except that what the heart desires, etc. So this is my first impression at least:
    The first four notebooks are not really interesting, and suppose we get them as they are - there is a 'God'! (Plural, for some reason…) The fifth notebook is the main thing, of course, and for which the writer should respond briefly and at length:
    In short - go out and study biblical criticism (in depth) + anthropology (even superficial).
    In the long run - in the next comment…
    A) The notebooks are based on 'Western-philosophical' assumptions and completely ignore the reality that exists outside this narrow world, including:
    1. The need for belief in higher powers exists in every culture, and is fulfilled in it in a different way. Judaism is one of these incarnations.
    2. There is no uniqueness in Judaism - every culture (I intentionally do not use the term 'religion') is unique, and some claim ancient traditions from Judaism.
    3. There is no 'basic' moral element - the whole culture has its 'morality', some of which would not be accepted by us as morality at all.
    4. Human history (of the last millions of years) is replete with astonishingly extraordinary events, including the development of Homo sapiens itself - the survival of Judaism is at most one of them, and in terms of duration, Judaism at this stage is utterly negligible.
    5. Archaeological and anthropological findings prove that the human race exists far beyond the 'boundaries' outlined in the Torah - hence the Torah provides false information about human origin. is it possible?…

    B) The authors almost completely ignore the findings of biblical research (archaeological, literary, historical), and sometimes misinterpret things explicitly stated in the Bible, including:
    1. The biblical 'people' of Israel was not one people, but a collection of different 'tribes', with different beliefs and different versions of its history.
    2. The biblical 'people' of Israel was never monotheistic as required (part of) the Torah, and always worshiped many idols.
    3. The status of Mount Sinai is the most negligible event in the Bible, in relation to its obvious importance: it appears only in Ezekiel, Malachi and Nehemiah - all after the destruction.
    4. The story of the Torah scroll found in the days of Josiah does not mention even a hint that the book was given from God to Moses, and certainly not given at Mount Sinai.
    5. The story of the Exodus - much easier to claim for its histories - is also hidden in some aspects both in the Bible itself (how many years? How many came out? Who went out?), Both in its plausibility (number of people, duration) and in its histories (no findings, Incorrect dating, Egyptian rule in Canaan).
    The notebooks ignore the content of the revelation - arguing that logically it does not matter. The problem is that the content contains lies and contradictions, which is supposed to contradict the assumption of the Creator who desires to do good, and at least the assumption of the Creator who represents the truth. This is beyond the great wonder of how it is possible that the revelation actually included the content given in the Torah, which on every human scale is impossible for that period, at least in part.

    C) The authors deliberately neglect equally plausible alternatives, if not more, to the Jewish 'narrative':
    1. It is unlikely that a revelation to an entire people was lost - the only evidence of this is written sources, which have been corrected and rewritten over the years, as evidenced by the study of the text. There are several other historical examples of fabrication of revelation, and rather - because they are more unfounded, the fact that they have millions of believers (aka Mormons) indicates how convenient it is for a person to receive such testimonies.
    2. It is unlikely that they wrote history - the Bible itself deals with it (the Book of Chronicles), the 'external' (strictly Jewish!) Literature deals with it, and the sages deal with it - the 'official' history (which the authors take for granted) is The one that survived, not necessarily the 'real' one.
    3. It is unlikely that they succeeded in convincing an entire nation - due to a historical 'accident', the biblical people of Israel became extinct, and an opportunity was created for a relatively small group (Shavei Zion), led by an educated minority, to resurrect the people on a common history. Under those conditions, acceptance of the rewritten narrative was very reasonable, given the historical situation, the low intellectual level, the uncritical worldview and more. Contemporary ultra-Orthodox historiography (better: geography…), and to balance then also the 'official' Zionist historiography, can provide examples of historical rewritings that become before our eyes an unshakable truth taught in schools and passed on quickly to future generations.
    4. The influence of the Jewish people on the world is exceptional - on a relatively small part of the world, indeed. What about the rest? (Indians, Chinese, Africans [= a huge continent that is commonly referred to as another country…] and more and more). Did not Buddhism have much more influence? And is it fair to attribute to us the tremendous influence of Christianity as a 'variation' of Judaism, when to the same extent it can be argued that Judaism is a 'variation' of the Hamorbi laws for example?…

    Indeed, there is no doubt that in our narrow, ethnocentric and devoid of historical depth, the Jewish narrative is a successful narrative, and worth adopting (with obvious corrections, which have not yet been made) for those who desire the survival of the human race.
    I understand that it is difficult to detail in this medium, and certainly it is also difficult for me to address in detail all the points you have brought here. Still, I will try to touch on some of them briefly.
    For the brief review I will allow myself not to comment, ostrich because it only recommends me what to study. In the meantime I reserve the right to choose what to study and what to engage in. In particular that my trust in these areas is quite limited (but this of course can be the result of ignorance, because I really do not know too much about my iniquities. It is impossible to engage in all).
    Now for your remarks in the more detailed review. I will address the sections according to your numbering.
    1. The fact that there is a need for a belief in higher powers is not an appeal to the belief. On the contrary, it should be seen as an argument in favor of faith. Why is there such a need? What is the evolutionary difference to it?
    2. I disagree with you. I am unfamiliar with alternative traditions that run on a broad front and endure, especially if you attach the rest of the arguments I made in the fifth booklet. I explained there that the whole is stronger than the sum of its parts.
    3. I did not understand the talk of a "basic" moral foundation. Who talked about it, and why is it necessary? What is a basic moral foundation anyway?
    4. This development is not unusual. Evolution is constantly happening more and more. What's wrong with that? The survival of Judaism in my opinion is an unusual historical phenomenon in every sense (not necessarily a miracle. I clarified in the notebook). Denial of this is nothing but empty nonsense.
    5. Well, I will not go into these battered questions of Torah and science here. I do not underestimate them, but we have already ground them to a fine.

    1. It's a matter of definition. Different versions of history I'm not sure you can find there, but even if it does it does not really bother me. This complex in its shades is our tradition. Each tradition is divided into shades and hues, and the question is whether there is a unifying and common framework. I think there definitely is.
    2. Not true. He sinned in idolatry. It is like saying that there have always been Sabbath-breakers and therefore the people of Israel do not keep Shabbat and do not believe in Sabbath-keeping. If a prophet had come in our day proving us they would have hospitalized him. In the Bible they persecuted him because they understood that he was right.
    3. He shows up, and that's what matters.
    4. So what? Nor does he write what was in this book (putting on tefillin and banning the tendon). I have not brought evidence from this affair to the credibility of the tradition. The question was the opposite: Does finding a book undermine tradition. I claim not.
    5. I will not go into details here, but these are statements that I am not really convinced of. Beyond that, the details of the Exodus are not essential to the tradition I understand.
    6. Again statements in ignorance. It's hard for me to relate. In general, I have no problem with the claim that the Bible contains later components and therefore also contradictions.

    1. I talked about the combination of arguments. Each argument separately can certainly be rejected. I insisted on this in the fifth notebook. The Mormons by the way, as far as I know, are not talking about mass revelation.
    2. Who said they were unlikely to have written history? There is a difference between rewriting and distortion of details and absolute inventions. I talked about the difference between the base (there was a revelation and something was given in it) and all the details and pyrotechnics around it.
    3. The examples you gave on the right show that a lie does not last long. The ultra-Orthodox also discover at one point or another the distortions in the traditions they have invented. In such claims any historiography of any kind can be challenged. In your words about the aliyah from Babylon you are talking about an educated minority who immigrated, and in the same breath you are talking about a lack of criticism. To say that the people are extinct there seems to me somewhat exaggerated.
    4. The influence of the Jewish people on the world is exceptional on every scale. I do not see in the speculation that you have brought a real appeal here. I think no sane person denies this.

    In conclusion, your remarks here do not give me real motivation to realize your warm recommendations for in-depth study of the above areas. They seem very trending to me, and it is strange to me that by virtue of such trending arguments you see me as my trend.
    The Hebrew Abram:
    You are similar in my eyes to Ptolemy the astronomer, who felt so comfortable with the geocentric narrative that he bothered to invent intricate, "theological" rather than realistic mechanisms to reconcile with reality. Whatever.
    Regarding the fields of study - I write from my experience. A few years ago I would read such a notebook as a source of much loot. But when I noticed that some data was missing for the theological "equations", I decided to study the data a little more in depth, before I jumped to conclusions (by the way, Maimonides did not think like you, and bothered to study all the foreign writings, etc. - and doc!)

    By the way, without the following sentence, I would have been deaf and did not write my comments above:
    "And they will complete in Gaza the process of presenting a complete Jewish theological picture, as" thin "as possible, and up-to-date today (sorry for the pretentiousness)."
    Against this unbelievable pretension, of writing Jewish theology by a man whose fields of education are so narrow in relation to the size of the task, I had to respond even briefly and succinctly.

    Or briefly:
    "Too many people think they are thinking, when in fact they are just rearranging their prejudices" (William James)
    At this point I wish you all the best and great success.
    The words of Abram_Hebrew in response to the fifth notebook, represent a common way of thinking among non-believers. That is why I want to address these things in particular.

    A) The notebooks are based on 'Western-philosophical' assumptions and completely ignore the reality that exists outside this narrow world, including:
    1. “The need for belief in higher powers exists in every culture, and is fulfilled in it in a different way. Judaism is one of those incarnations. ” I wonder where this "need" plant came from. If you do not believe that the world is ancient, then this need has at least an important evolutionary significance. It is unlikely to combat this need before clarifying its usefulness.
    "There is no uniqueness in Judaism - every culture (I intentionally do not use the term 'religion') is unique, and some claim ancient traditions from Judaism." As for uniqueness - this requires in-depth research. Regarding antiquities - see link here There is not much meaning to the question of who is more ancient. What matters is who is more right and / or more successful.
    3. “There is no 'basic' moral element - the whole culture has its 'morality', some of which would not be accepted by us as morality at all. I do not agree at all. " Is found to admit, that every culture has some morality. Common to all morals are all codes of conduct with the same purpose. The controversy is only about the way. In addition, I think all morals begin not from death but from life. In addition, I think all morals require doing charity. And that's just the beginning. Once we are done, it should be added that everyone requires an explanation of the fact that in the neighboring society was considered immoral.
    "Human history (of the last millions of years) is replete with astonishingly extraordinary events, including the development of Homo sapiens itself - the survival of Judaism is at most one of them, and in terms of duration, Judaism at this stage is utterly negligible." If history is replete with exceptional events, then they are no longer exceptional. And in that sense placing Judaism as a non-exceptional but very interesting historical event makes perfect sense. And see below
    5. “Archaeological and anthropological findings prove that the human race exists far beyond the 'boundaries' outlined in the Torah - hence the Torah provides false information about human origin. Is it possible?

    B) The authors almost completely ignore the findings of biblical research (archaeological, literary, historical), and sometimes misinterpret things explicitly stated in the Bible, including:
    1. "The biblical 'people' of Israel was not one people, but a collection of different 'tribes', with different beliefs and different versions of its history." Is this supposed to be a scientific claim? This has already been answered before me.
    2. "The biblical 'people' of Israel was never monotheistic as required (part of) the Torah, and always worshiped many idols." The biblical people of Israel always believed in Gd (the Temple has always been the spiritual and main center of the capital, and even in times and places where the spiritual center was replaced by the golden calf - even then the calf was considered "These are your God Israel from the land of Egypt". "Great to you the virtues of Jerusalem" - Hoy says that replacing Jerusalem was not easy for them at all. All this except the fact that their idolatry was only intermittent - generation yes generation no. The Bible summed up with the biblical people of Israel his opinion regarding this mistake.
    "The status of Mount Sinai is the most negligible event in Israel, in relation to its obvious importance: it appears only in Ezekiel, Malachi and Nehemiah - all after the destruction." A. How many times has your mother told you how you were born? Varach is based on your blood. B. If so, will you explain to me what the significance of Mount Sinai status is? It says you will not kill? It is indeed an important thing, but why should it be repeated? If it had to be repeated, we would have a very serious problem. third. Equal in your mind, that between married couples, an occasional quarrel erupts and every time many say to each other: "Have you forgotten / the agreement of (a certain date, a certain place) where you gave / received a wedding ring from me"? To me it sounds too funny. If this does not sound funny to you, I'll love to hear why.
    "The story of the Torah scroll found in the days of Josiah does not mention even a hint that the book was given from God to Moses, and certainly not given at Mount Sinai."
    For May NFKM? And more, see above (in 3)
    5. The story of the Exodus - which is much easier to claim for its histories - is also hidden in some aspects both in the Bible itself (how many years? How many came out? Who came out?), Both in its probability (number of people, duration) and in its histories (no findings , Incorrect dating, Egyptian control of Canaan). ” Answer it before me. As for history - lack of findings is not evidence (we have not seen is not evidence), and besides - what findings did you want to have? Forgotten tools? This is a total of forty years. How many tools do one find from one people for such a time? And also - if the people of Israel were so successful in that generation in particular, and conducted themselves in all his words according to God in the hand of Moses, why would they forget in the desert all kinds of tools that would later be found by archaeologists?
    6. “The notebooks ignore the content of the revelation - arguing that logically it does not matter. The problem is that the content contains lies and contradictions, which is supposed to contradict the assumption of the Creator who desires to do good, and at least the assumption of the Creator who represents the truth. This is beyond the great wonder how it is possible that the revelation actually included the content given in the Torah, which on every human scale is impossible for that period, at least in part. ” The contradictions in the Torah are few, and they can also be found in these and other explanations, and the fact that we in our generation have difficulty understanding things in it, does not mean that in that generation they were indeed considered serious problems. And I do not mean things that depend on scientific knowledge, but on the way of thinking of every culture. What in today's culture is considered strange or incorrect, can in another culture be considered different even with the same knowledge. And as for scientific knowledge - what you seem to have hinted at - miracles are not "lies" or "contradictions", but a metaphysical explanation for possible phenomena. Whether the phenomena occurred as narrated or not - and whether the explanation for them is true or not - is another question, but not a question that is so easy to answer.
    C) The authors deliberately neglect equally plausible alternatives, if not more, to the Jewish 'narrative':
    "It is unlikely that a revelation to an entire people was lost - the only evidence of this is written sources" * (as if what, are there historical sources that are not written?), "Corrected and rewritten over the years, as the study of the text indicates. There are several other historical examples of fabrication of revelation, on the contrary - because they are more unfounded, the fact that they have millions of believers (aka Mormons) indicates how convenient it is for a person to receive such testimonies. " A. Nor did biblical critics argue that every chapter in the Bible was necessarily rewritten and edited several times. You must explain why you think the revelation to the people of Israel belongs to it. And even then - you have to prove that it is not necessarily original. B. As for further revelations - there were already clusters about it.
    2. It is unlikely that they wrote history - the Bible itself deals with it (the Book of Chronicles), the 'external' (strictly Jewish!) Literature deals with it, and the sages deal with it - the 'official' history (which the authors take for granted) She is the one who survived, not necessarily the 'real' one. " And where will you find the pure history? Do you have a "really" reliable source?
    3. "It is unlikely that they succeeded in convincing an entire nation - due to a historical 'accident', the biblical people of Israel became extinct. Is there evidence for this ?, and an opportunity was created for a relatively small group (Shavei Zion)." This is about four people. What interest do they have in accepting a new religion, detaching themselves from their culture and place, and believing in a formless and faceless God, becoming a persecuted and despised minority and building a temple under a real threat from the Jews of Judah living in the Land of Israel? Besides, large Jewish communities remained abroad, which continued to exist for a long time, and with the addition of the nomads - in fact, to this day., (Continued) "led by an educated minority, to resurrect the people on the basis of a common history." Do you mean that because a certain people had some history, an educated minority was able to persuade members of several different peoples regardless of it, to establish a people who would continue it with an anonymous, based on a "common" history? (To whom does she share exactly?) (Continued) "Under those conditions, the acceptance of the rewritten narrative was very reasonable, given the historical situation, the low intellectual level, the uncritical worldview and more." In those conditions it was also very strange and not acceptable to change family and nationality, and of course religion as well. And again, why should strangers to Judaism take on the narrative of another people? (Continued) "Contemporary ultra-Orthodox historiography (better: geography…), and to balance then also the 'official' Zionist historiography, can provide examples of historical inscriptions that become before our eyes an unshakable truth taught in schools and passed on quickly to future generations." The ultra-Orthodox history, however, was passed on only to a minority of people with a clear reference to the people of Israel (as well as to Zionism)
    4. “The influence of the Jewish people on the world is extraordinary - on a relatively small part of the world, indeed. What about the rest? (Indians, Chinese, Africans [= a huge continent that is commonly referred to as another country…] and more and more). Didn't Buddhism have much more influence? ” Well let's examine what level of education and economy did the Buddhists reach, and what level of education and economy did the believers of Christianity and their successors (including the secular. See below) reach? (Continued) "And is it fair to attribute to us the tremendous influence of Christianity as a 'variation' of Judaism, when equally it can be argued that Judaism is a 'variation' of Hamorbi laws for example?…" The words of Christianity have already been prophesied in the Bible What did God do to this land like that? And they said of them which had forsaken the covenant of the LORD God of their fathers, which they had made with them in bringing them out of the land of Egypt. And other gods will go and worship and worship them God who will not know and share with them. And may God also in this land bring upon it all the curse written in this book. And the LORD shall smite them upon the face of the earth with a great flame, and with a great noise, and shall cast them into another land this day.
    And is it fair to attribute all the cultural success of the 1500st century, to two hundred years devoid of religion? Let's check - we all agree that education is the mother of every culture. Well, if for over a thousand years - one book (the Bible) managed to unite masses of peoples and nations and cultures, under one flagship culture - and that is: the Torah of Moses, and not only that, but the continuation of this culture - the new Western culture - became a stone Fundamental in education, in culture - and in the development of the world, so much so that these peoples are actually the leaders in every field to this day, does not that mean that this is an education of great value? We'll see you replace Moshe Rabbeinu and offer an education book suitable for his contemporaries (you know what? We'll see you and a handful of your friends have been writing a book like the Bible for XNUMX years. We will see if you really have such a good book), which will remain a basic book of education for generations to come, and whose disciples will have a new spirit in the world, as it came from the disciples of the Bible. And suppose it is indeed possible to make such an experiment and succeed - so here Moses and his disciples did it and succeeded - would it be better in your eyes that Moses and his disciples would not have written any book of education, and would have left the people ignorant, with no ability to advance at all? That is, in the words of the unbelievers it is often said that the clergy were an educated minority and the masses followed it solely out of ignorance. Well, suppose the educated minority did not teach the masses its thoughts (and presumably the clergy believed, in some way in their own words. It is unlikely that they lived a double life), would the world have progressed until it reached what it is today? (Without going into the question of whether the world is perfect today. For that matter, I am content with the fact that the world is 'advanced'.) An education book is needed, the Hamorbi laws were a bit successful, the Torah of Moses was more successful and became the most successful education book. Do you have any complaints?

  3. Yishai:
    The claim that morality is not the goal because it is only a correction of society (p. 11) assumes that morality does not also include a duty of worship to God. Many thinkers have disagreed with this assumption, and ostensibly if morality is obligatory to thank those who have benefited us it is also obligatory to thank God (later in the author you criticize the argument that bases the duty of obedience on the duty of thanksgiving, but this is not the duty of obedience). So that there is no need for commandment or obedience at all), and one can of course think that the duty of worship is an axiom. It can be argued against this that our creation is not good for us, but I think most people prefer to be created. Beyond that, whoever believes that creation was a bad deed of God, it is not clear to me why he is committed to the morality created by that God. In addition, the argument for the merit of this goal is based on the personification of God, and if so one can also ask about the content of the commandments - is it likely that God created the world to put pieces of skin to the hand and head or to shake tree branches? One can of course say that we do not understand him, but then it is also possible that he created the world for morality only and we do not understand him.
    Regarding the argument that if there is a purpose it is reasonable to conclude that there should be a revelation (p. 12). As mentioned, many thinkers thought that the purpose of worship could be deduced alone. Although the details are unknown, the details are also unknown regarding morality. You assume that morality was not revealed in the Torah, and if so God left us alone to discover morality, and so He too can leave us alone to think how worthy it is to be thanked. In addition, one must ask what the revelation helps - if a tefillin needs to be put on a lot of use, what does it help me that there was a revelation following which I put on a Rashi tefillin? This is true of every revelation that requires interpretation, and since every revelation needs interpretation, it is true of every revelation. One could of course argue that revelation said that one should rely on the human mind, but for that we did not need revelation. In addition, speaking of Judaism, she says that for thousands of years there has been no revelation, which seems to contradict the argument that there should be a revelation. It could be argued that there was an unknown reason for the delay in the revelation, but if there are unknown reasons for the delay, then it is quite possible that the revelation was not yet there. That is, this argument can lead to a conclusion about revelation in finite time, but not that this time has come.
    On page 13 it is stated that if there was a revelation and it is binding the details no longer need reasoning. This is true if we have proven it absolutely. If we only brought evidence of the likelihood that there was a revelation, then it is possible that the specifications of the revelation would be the opposite evidence. Torah scholars think that from its content there is opposite evidence, and if so the discussion should be conducted of the weight of the evidence on each side. In addition, it should be mentioned that if the fact of revelation is based on personification (if he created he probably has a purpose), then apparently the content should also meet this rule as I wrote above.
    On page 22 after an analysis of what exactly is the revelation by Kierkegaard's ideas, the assumption suddenly comes that this is also the report on the children of Israel. Is this what has been in the tradition? I do not think so. What has happened is that there was a revelation and the perception of the revelation was certainly not similar. Tradition does say that they heard in their ears "vertical of the Lord" but not that they had an inexplicable certainty that it was God. According to Maimonides, for example, the matter is in the miracles that occurred that the possibility of a trick for them was ruled out. If so, in the 12th century there was no tradition that says there was a certain revelation to 600000 people, but rather a miracle happened to them. It will be interesting at all to examine when we find Kierkegaard's ideas, which seemingly are those that have been in the tradition from thousands of years ago. If these are ideas that are not in the scriptures it is difficult to attribute them to tradition.
    As for the evidence from the miracle. First, the discussion suddenly deviates from the revelation of a miracle and it is not entirely clear whether one is trying to prove the existence of a revelation or of a miracle. Second, a miracle seems to me very undefined. That is, it is easy to define it as an event that occurs not in accordance with the laws of nature, but the problem is that the laws of nature are unknown. When Thomson discovered that alpha particles return from the gold surface contrary to scientific theory he did not think it was a miracle, but formulated a new theory. In exactly the same way a scientist who observes the Red Sea will divide into two. Proof of the miracle is actually proof of the god of the gaps
    Code 2 on page 33 is puzzling. The monotheism in the Torah is indeed a novelty, but does the novelty prove anything? Innovation is indeed a unique point, but it is clear that we do not explain any innovation in Revelation. The question of why exactly then the idea came up is a difficult question just like the question about any other idea that came up at a particular time. Furthermore, there may be a connection between the assimilation and the content - it is possible that the assimilation was relatively good because the content was monotheistic. Perhaps because monotheism by nature has a tendency to take over. Perhaps because monotheism is true and therefore it is accepted by many.
    Point 3 on page 34 relies on a lack of familiarity with the world of Mesopotamian laws. To decide between the alternatives you need to know them!
    Point 4 there assumes that the alternative is a 'conspiracy', but it is a straw man. The alternative is developmental. In any case, the blessing in the sixth year is, of course, irrefutable, and it is almost impossible to find the claim that the seventh in the XNUMXth century spurs the non-existence of the blessing. This is especially true if the author did not think his stuff would ever come to a practical examination.
    The complex on pages 41-43 is presented as evidence of the metaphysical role of the people of Israel. Revelation is not to be proved here. Even if we assume that God was not discovered, then he created such a world in which a people will be created and a Torah will be created in him. The fact that something has a role does not mean that the same thing needs to be announced. For example, Judaism gives a role to foreign kings who harm the people of Israel without those kings knowing about it.
    The weakest point (to say the least) of the notebook is dealing with the alternative of natural assimilation of myth. Finally, having been convinced that revelation is possible, and that one should not accept the daily remarks that categorically disprove evidence, one must examine whether there really was a revelation, and specifically whether there was a revelation in Sinai. We have two main alternatives before us: tradition and research. The author does not present the prevailing claims in the study at all so of course she cannot deal with them. Of course this also means that the research evidence for his claims is not presented. Of course the discussion requires a book (not to mention books) on its own, but it is impossible to choose the possibility of revelation without examining the second possibility, especially since the people engaged in intensive study of these matters believe that the evidence shows that there was no Exodus and that the Torah was not connected by an author only. The evidence is both from the field of archeology and philology and they require an acquaintance with these fields and an in-depth knowledge of their relevant part.
    Thanks for your comments. It is difficult for me to extend so I will try to address briefly.
    1. I do not deal with what thinkers write. I write what I think. Placing pieces of leather on the head is probably done for some purpose I do not know what it is. But as for morality I have no idea what it is for. Therefore did not resemble each other.
    2. As stated, I am not dealing with what these or other thinkers have written. The human mind interprets revelation and it really does not supersede it. As a judge interprets the law and it does not override the legislature. The delay is not such a strong issue. God waited for the world to mature and reach a state that is commandable. There is an evolution of history. You assume an exaggerated temporary symmetry of the world (by the way, the law of conservation of energy in physics is derived from the symmetry of the world to the timeline). I did not try to give a prediction of when the revelation should be.
    3. Indeed true. Everyone will make their own considerations. I have already referred to your previous comments above.
    4. I did not understand what revelation is according to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard was just an example. He himself claimed something different from what I claim, as I explained in my remarks there. He talks about the logic of reasoning and I offer a logical explanation.
    5. Here it seems to me that there is a misunderstanding of my words. Revelation is attacked because it is a kind of miracle. The miracle argument of a day is usually directed against the traditional arguments of revelation. I do not remember bringing evidence from the miracle. I brought evidence from the revelation. The evidence from the revelation is not based on the fact that it is a miracle but on the fact that the Kabbalah was revealed and told us all sorts of things. It is the attack that refers to the revelation of a conference and therefore claims that the tradition about it is unacceptable. I talked about that.
    6. This difficulty joins the rest of the arguments to create the picture. Certainly not every innovation is based on revelation.
    7. I do not know the world of Mesopotamian laws, but what does that mean? If you find laws like these there, it means that they also originate in some ancient divine revelation or that I will find a reasonable explanation (interesting or substantive) for them. Here to the best of my understanding there is no such explanation.
    8. Points 3 and 4 are an argument from MMN. One talks about assimilation and the other about conspiracy. The fact that it is difficult to test is true, and yet there is no reason to assimilate testable claims and trust that the recipients will be quite innocent so as not to test.
    9. You use a metaphor in a somewhat reckless way. If Israel does not give these kings any role. He interprets their actions in a certain way. It is not like someone who wants to assign a role to someone else, how can he expect him to do so without notifying him ?!
    10. The study assumes that there was no revelation and does not reveal this. Indeed I do not present the allegations in detail as that is not my purpose. I present a general picture without going into various details. Such a discussion needs an essay in itself, and indeed I am not versed in that literature. Everyone will do their own tests. When I want to deal with the research claims I will indeed have to study it. And it's true that I have a fairly limited confidence in that research genre and that's one of the reasons I'm not knowledgeable and do not spend much time studying it. Whoever things do not satisfy him - let him be respected and learned and form a position. To the same extent I suppose various scholars have not dealt with philosophy and other things necessary to formulate a general position on the matter. Each one presents his perceptions and the sex and sex of you will come across aliyah.
    I will continue the discussion with only some of the points:
    1. The point is that I do not know what the purpose of putting on tefillin is as I do not know what the purpose of morality is. The point is that it is strange to me to say that God created the world for morality just as it is strange to me to say that he created it for laying tefillin (to be honest the possibility of morality seems more plausible to me - I can think he created the world for good and for that he must be moral , But I do not see any theory that explains why he wants us to put on tefillin).
    9. When I make a washing machine, I assign her a role without telling her about it. If God wanted a people to publish His name in the world, He needed a mechanism to do so and there is no need to tell about it. After all, the world heard about it not only from the Jews but also mainly from the Christians. It seems pretty clear to me that the rest had no revelation, but it is certainly plausible to me that this was planned by God. My suggestion really was not that the job was assigned to the people of Israel, but that it was his job without being assigned to him just like a washing machine.
    10. The study does assume that there was no revelation, but it does not make assumptions about other relevant questions (one can always blame someone for making assumptions, but I am talking about overt assumptions). When the study asks how many authors the Torah had, what its purpose was and at what period it was compiled he does ignore the possibility that it was given in Revelation at Sinai, but is willing in principle to accept that it was given by Moses at Sinai. His evidence tipped the scales that this was not the case. One can even take things for which there is no need to know the research like the contradictions in the Torah - if I had proof that the Torah was given in revelation, then I had no problem resolving the contradictions; But in an a priori examination I expect the divine revelation to be coherent. The fact that there are quite a few contradictions in the Torah is for me evidence that is not divine. So too in the archeological field, if in the Sinai desert millions of people have lived for 40 years, the mind suggests that there will be a significant find there. The fact that there is no such is evidence that the story of the Torah is not true. In order to choose a thesis that will explain the reality of the Torah, all the evidence must be examined, and the author examines only evidence in favor. This is a methodology of converts (you yourself mock the creationists [and also their rivals] who bring only supporting evidence) and not of those who try to find out the truth.
    1. I will repeat again what I wrote. The assumption that he created the world for morality is puzzling. The assumption that he created the world for tefillin (as a metaphor, since there are many more mitzvos) is just incomprehensible. There is a big difference between these two. Morality is seen on the surface as a means, so the claim that it is a goal is puzzling (to me). On the other hand, I do not understand tefillin at all, so any hypothesis about them seems equally problematic to me. There is a lack of understanding, but I do not see a question here. There is a difference between saying I do not understand (this is a question) and saying I do not understand (this is a question).
    9. This is gossip in ignorance. God created us as free-willed creatures (in my view. I am a libertarian), and apparently He wanted them to consider what to do. It was not enough for him in our programming in the right direction. In this we are different from washing machines. When you create creatures with discretion and free will you probably want them to choose the right path. You do not achieve this by programming but by instructions and commandments. You need to tell them what is being thrown at them and then let them do so at their discretion and decision.
    I really do not understand your discussion of Christians. They told the world about our revelation. And we told them. So what's the problem here? Beyond that, the revelation to us was not placenta to tell the whole world. The world does not have to put on tefillin. I also do not see in Senech what you assume God has decided or even known in advance that the Christians will be here, and that they will spread His revelation in the world.
    10 This discussion enters into the question of the authenticity of the Torah. I think in the booklet I wrote that I do not assume this in a sweeping way. It is certainly possible that she had late additions and perhaps edits as well. What matters to me is just that there was an interaction with God. What was the exact software I do not know and it is also not very important, and at least not necessary for discussion. Any part of the Torah that seems contradictory to you, for my part, will decide that it is too late. And that I wrote differently?
    The tradition that has come to me is the least bad way to carry out the tasks assigned to us in Sinai. I have no doubt that there were disruptions along the way and many mistakes were made in the Torah and certainly in the Torah. What came to me is not very similar to what was given there (see the interview I gave to Yair Sheleg in the portrait supplement of Makor Rishon, under the heading "The rabbi and his opposite", and I even got caught up in it later). But this is what came to me and my working assumption is that right now this is what I have to uphold as long as the disruption of any individual is not proven and then it can be abandoned. I have no better way of knowing what God wants from me, and of course he himself had to take that into account. If he gave only partially and did not want me to interpret it or add to it he would say or prevent this process that was only expected to happen.
    In one sentence I say that my commitment to a particular halakhah is not conditional on the assumption of its authenticity. By the way, this is a major reason why in the eyes of the study it is not very important for this discussion of principles (beyond the limited trust in these disciplines I mentioned earlier.
    I will detail these things in more detail in the next two books mentioned here on the website in the introduction to the notebooks. This notebook is only an opening for a theological discussion that will come in the next two books. There I will detail what I wrote to you here and much more.
    I wrote a comment on the site, and for some reason it was not picked up there and disappeared for me. I rewrite it.
    1. There is a difference between not understanding and understanding not. Morality is clearly seen as a means so the claim that it is the goal is puzzling and unreasonable. The claim that the audio commandments (like tefillin) are the goal is incomprehensible but not puzzling or unreasonable. I have no idea why the tefillin is needed at all, so why should I assume that they can not be the goal? But morality I do think I understand, and it does not seem to me a goal. You confuse the question of whether the thing itself is understandable or not (and here it is clear that morality is more understandable than tefillin) with the question of what is the probability that this thing, understood or not, is a goal and not a means (and here it is very likely that morality is not a goal. E gives it so I guess he has goals in the body).
    9. Your comparison is really weird. Man is a creature who has freedom of choice (in my opinion. I am a libertarian), and if God created such a creature then he probably did not think of programming him to do anything. After all, for a programmed object it was enough to create a deterministic machine. So we are supposed to carry out our actions for the sake of the goals imposed on us out of discretion and not out of programming. But now how do we know what to consider and where to go? The only likely and expected is that there will be a revelation in which things will be said. What about this and the washing machines ?!
    I don't really understand the gossip about Christians. First, you assume that God knew in advance that they would spread the revelation to the world. And where does that come from? Have you ever met him and he told you? I actually tend to think he did not know there would be any, and certainly did not know what they would do. These are actions done from human choices, and there is no reason to assume that God knew them before (it is impossible to know them in advance, if they are the result of free judgment). Second, the fact that Christians are spreading the revelation made to us only means that the mission has been accomplished. Indeed the revelation to us has done the work, even if through the Christians. What's wrong with that? Maimonides even writes this (that Christians and Muslims are means of spreading the monotheistic faith). And third, why do you assume that the task assigned to us is to spread the revelation or publish his name in the world? The task is to keep the commandments. The publication of his name was done by our ancestor Abraham even before Mount Sinai.
    10. Let me start by saying that you are entering here into the question of the credibility of the Torah. For me the commitment is not conditioned on authenticity. My purpose in this notebook is not to prove that the Torah was given at Sinai, but to claim that there was likely to be some interaction with Gd in which He assigned tasks to us. Ha and nothing more. If you come to the conclusion that there is a contradiction in the text (without the possibility of settlement of course) then you can definitely say that it is a late addition, a disruption and the like. And that I said something else? It is certainly reasonable in my eyes that the Torah as it came to us, and certainly will be changed over the generations, and there are often disruptions. By the way, this is a major reason why I do not attach much importance to research (beyond my limited trust in these disciplines, as I wrote to you earlier. I have no clear interest in which part of the Torah is late and which is not, because I do not assume and see no need to assume that everything is from Sinai. My commitment is to what has come to me, because it is the closest I can get to thinking about keeping the commandment from Sinai, even though it is clear to me that there are a lot of mistakes. I have no better way of knowing what was there. So I also maintain what is not authentic, unless I am convinced that it is a mistake, or something completely unreasonable.
    By the way, these things are planned to be detailed in the two books I mentioned on the opening page for notebooks on the site (as also appears in an interview conducted by Ami Yair Sheleg, for a portrait supplement of Makor Rishon, under the title "The rabbi and vice versa", and I was later abducted). This notebook does not address all of these issues.
    As for your methodological remark that things look like a repentant speech, I mean in the notebook there was no controversy or proving anything. I present the picture there as I see it, and why I think there is room and reasonableness for religious commitment. Discussion of all these arguments is beyond what the author was supposed to do. When a person presents his position he should not bring all that has been written and all the counter-arguments, but only those that are important for clarifying my position. To the best of my judgment, the position presented is reasonable and coherent and that was my aim here. That's enough for me.
    I continue with the BS method - decreasing and decreasing:
    1. I do not see why the fact that morality has a different purpose makes it a less good candidate for the creation of the world than something I do not know of another purpose for it. Anyway, even if we accept the claim, I can talk about the social order (the purpose of morality). You do not find a purpose for the social order (hence you assume that its purpose is the audio commandments), but it can be suggested that it is the purpose itself - why is it a less good candidate than putting on tefillin?
    It seems very strange to me to create a company in order for it to run itself. After all, she herself was created, so it is unlikely that she is the purpose of her own creation. Purpose is some deficiency whose fulfillment is the purpose of the action. But according to the conception you propose, do not create it and it will not go wrong. Going back to your favorite washing machine, do you think creating a machine so that it works as a standard is likely to be an end in itself?
    I thought you were convinced by the ontological evidence so there should be no lack of it. If the purpose of creation is to do good as I suggested earlier then it is the purpose itself.
    I did not understand the comment on the ontological evidence (by the way, does not completely convince me. See first notebook). Why does it come out that creation is an end in itself? What comes out of it is that Gd who is perfect must exist.
    If the purpose of creation is to do good, it does not seem to be really successful at it. Send Gd to the date b.
    The first remark was that if he has a perfect then he has no lack.
    There is a perfect is there that when it has a lack it creates what it takes to fill that lack. Creation is also part of his perfection.
    Direct a physical force on the beautiful difficulties that made it difficult for the rabbi. I think it helped to sharpen the claims that came up in the fifth notebook.

  4. Ariel 73:
    First of all, thank you for investing in this important project:
    1. The philosophical proof of the purpose of the world (p. 11) is anthropomorphic in my eyes: Is it clear that God thinks like human beings? Perhaps its purpose in our creation is the fragrance of methane gas that we provide? And even suppose the goal is morality (because we feel it is our goal) lest the very purpose is that we become good people = act according to our moral sense?
    2. With the evidence from modern history I agree. Both the history of the Jewish religion is strange and the history of the Jewish people. But alone they do not constitute proof.
    3. The evidence from biblical history (p. 33) does refute the conspiracy thesis, but only theses and professional skeptics on the Internet believe in this thesis. The thesis that can seriously deal with the thesis of revelation is the thesis of evolution. To describe it - the Jewish people were still with all peoples but over time they began to believe in monotheism (renewal but acceptable), it had various kinds of customs, as all ancient peoples have strange customs, one day it is claimed to originate in revelation to the prophets and after a few days It is claimed to have originated in the mass revelation.
    If so, proofs 2,3, 4 and XNUMX fall. (It should be noted that Kaufman rightly claims that the nature of the Israeli belief in uniqueness is not philosophical-theoretical but popular-revelation, and hence it seems that monotheism began in revelation, and it is still possible to speak of revelation to one man, who was swept away by the masses)
    Proof 1 is indeed strong.
    4. On proof 4 it should be added that it is not easy to place tests that there is no way to test them.
    Ariel Shalom.
    1. I have written that each of these claims can be rejected in different ways. But I'm talking about their combination. And in the Didan case, a tradition that God has revealed has come to me, and now I wonder if I should accept it. About that I said he was likely to accept it because he was likely to be discovered if he wanted anything from us. If such a tradition had not come then perhaps I would have thought of methane gas as a possible solution.
    All this on the assumption that methane gas is reasonable. But I have already written here in response to someone else that he created us electors, so it is likely that the purpose for which we were created is not methane gas but something to do with discretion and decisions. So he is likely to tell us what he wants so we can decide whether or not to do it.
    Regarding morality as a goal I wrote there.
    2. Indeed not alone. See above.
    3. I presented arguments against the conspiracy and also against the assimilation.
    4. I did not understand your comment on the tests that there is no way to test them.
    Ariel 73:
    1 a. (The position of the argument in relation to the question of our tradition and not a question of a general purpose) I accepted.
    1 b. I suppose your intention is that in our eyes the choice is central in defining our essence. The question is who said that what seems central to us is central to his eyes.
    3. On which page?
    4. I argued that placing tests does not constitute proof, because it makes a lot of sense for a forger to introduce such tests since it is clear to him that there is no way to actually test them. (KV in the assimilation thesis, according to which he himself believes that the tests work)
    5. And one counter-argument: All religions always claim that in the past there was a time when the gods walked the earth / talked to humans, and we are in the period of concealment. The motive for this claim may be that it is reality, but more likely it is because the past cannot be examined.
    Judaism is also included in the group of these religions.
    1 b. I do not think centrality here is important. The very fact that we received a choice from him, unlike all the other beings in the universe, means that he expects us to use it. Whether it is central or not. Now comes a tradition of revelation with commandments. What is more natural than to conclude that revelation has come to tell us what we should choose. It again joins the whole.
    3. See Chapter B and the beginning of P.O.
    Indeed, the introduction of tests that are difficult to examine is not a strong argument. And yet she joins, because there is always an option not to put in tests at all. And in particular there is a fear that people will try to test and abandon because the tests do not take place (as is happening today, and has happened in the past, for example with Elisha ben Aboyah, "Where is the longevity of this?").
    5. Maybe yes and maybe no. My contention is that even if it does not exist now there is no need to conclude that in the past it did not exist. This can change as part of the general change we see in relation to prophecy and providence and miracles.
    Ariel 73:
    1 b. Or is our unique role in our unique methane gas, different from that of all creatures? Or do we not have a unique role? (Assuming his thoughts are different from ours)
    In Chapter B I did not find a discussion of assimilation, in Chapter F I found two arguments: (pp. 3-42) a. Mass revelation is more difficult to assimilate. B. Judaism has a good system for passing on information - the Torah is not reserved for an elitist sect and our sages take its passing very seriously.
    A. Clearly it is more difficult than a singular revelation, the question of whether it is more difficult than any ancient legend about the beginning of a people assuming and it did not obligate them to anything, because the faith and commandments existed in some version.
    B. This has been the case for the last 2,000 years, but in the biblical age the Torah was in the hands of the priests, and we have no idea about their delivery system (and from the lack of information perhaps some evidence that it was not as meticulous as that of the Pharisees and Sages)
    4. There is a question here of the benefit in the majority of the innocent who will not try the test versus the risk in the minority who will try. As a liar it seemed to me that I would have preferred the benefit.
    5. I agree that the past may have been different, the question is whether there is no smell of falsehood here, given the fact that such claims are always made for a time that is almost impossible to test.
    It is best to comment later in the relevant thread. Otherwise it's hard for me to hold my head already.
    1 b. We have exhausted.
    3. I think I was wrong and referred you to the discussion of morality as a goal and not a means. Sorry, but I'm no longer holding my head from most parallel discussions here.
    For your question, see my remarks on joining the arguments (I have added a section on this in the new version of Note 5, when I use R. Chaim known for foolish marks).
    4. A matter of taste, and see again the matter of joining the arguments.
    5. Ibid.
    Ariel 73:
    I get the idea of ​​joining the arguments, what I am arguing in 3 and 4 is that these arguments do not deserve to be joined. (And in 5, that there are also counter-arguments that join the negative side of the equation)
    And I think they do deserve to join. This is a general impression and it is difficult to argue. Everyone will decide as he understands.

  5. Pine:
    Hello Rabbi,
    I read Booklet 5 on Holiday / Saturday and I have a few points to address / ask:
    On page 1 you quoted a source from the Rambam regarding Righteous Among the Nations. There is a well-known proofreading that should be at the end the words "but of their sages" instead of "and not of their sages."
    2. You wrote on page 5: "He who keeps all the mitzvos because he sees God as his God and is committed to him, but in his opinion the mitzvos are human intuition (his or others'), meaning he is an infidel at Mount Sinai, there is no religious value to his mitzvos", From this it follows that before the status of Mount Sinai it was not possible to be a religious person. But the words of R. Nissim Gaon are known in his introduction to the Shas:
    Page 3-29 (Issue of Finding the Torah in the Days of Josiah)
    3.1 You wrote: "If there really was forgetfulness here, what place is there for the nostrils and the anger and punishments that God imposes on Israel ?!"
    3.2 There is a known mechanism in the transmission of myths concerning mass revelation and is the use of the element of “forgetfulness” or “mass epidemic” or other inventions because of which tradition did not pass widely but through a single person who survived the difficult event or found a book etc. There is a famous lecture by Rabbi Lawrence Kalman that comparatively analyzes the revelation myths of the various religions and their cardableness (see link:, The whole lecture is relevant but in case you do not have time to watch, at 55:30 there is a section that demonstrates mass revelation with mass death coming immediately after it which eliminates the cardability of mass revelation). Seemingly, this case (finding the book in the days of Josiah) seems to undermine the cardability of the continuity of tradition in a manner similar to an event of mass death or oblivion of the narrative of mass revelation.
    3.3 You also wrote there: "In the verses it is described that their ancestors had not heard the voice of this book" and you wrote that this is evidence that they knew about the book and simply did not obey it. But it can be argued that Josiah wants to present matters in such a way that the patriarchs did not obey the book to bridge the gap between the fact that there is no tradition of observance by the patriarchs and the narrative that appears in the book (that the people of Israel were commanded to keep the commandments). That is, Josiah is supposedly lying about the patriarchs that they did not keep the commandments of the book on purpose, even though they really did not know about the commandments. This is how Josiah manages to establish the cardability of the continuity of tradition, excusing the obvious question that there is no existing tradition.
    3.4 You also wrote: "Why not throw the book in a purely heavy bin ?!". It can be argued in the answer that they did not throw in the trash for the same reason that they did not throw the Koran or the New Testament in the trash (i.e. if there is a charismatic leader and under certain circumstances, a large group can be persuaded in almost anything - see angles that rise new in the mornings).
    3.5 According to the commentary of Radak to the kings in chapter XNUMX verse XNUMX: It seems that the whole Torah has been forgotten (contrary to what you wrote that it is disobedience and not forgetfulness).
    3.6 A possible explanation I thought of for this issue is that although a Torah scroll was found, it was not mentioned that it contained sensational discoveries about the great miracles that God performed for the people of Israel in the past (Exodus and Mount Sinai) but only forgotten "new" commandments. That is, the frame story of the Exodus from Egypt and the status of Mount Sinai was not renewed here, but was probably known from before - and this is what is important to us when we examine the continuity of tradition (as you wrote on page 32).
    On page 4 you wrote that the other religions (except Christianity and Islam) do not present alternatives that have serious and credible reports of revelation. From what I know, the tradition of Hinduism is not so unfounded. They have a kind of oral Torah that was passed down from generation to generation for many years until it was transcribed. The Torah itself was received in revelations to individuals apparently.
    5. Regarding the section on “Additional Considerations”:
    5.1 In this section you detail about events that seem "supernatural" and that the hand of God was in them, and from which you can learn that the Jewish religion is correct. But in response to Eitan's question about prayer, you wrote: "Today it has changed, and providence has also disappeared (and doc. Has not become hidden, but does not exist)." How does it work out?
    5.2 I remember that your perception of the State of Israel is as a purely secular institution. How does this fit in with the move you are presenting that the renewal of nationalism, and the establishment of the state teach about a “supernatural” event from which one can learn about the correctness of the Jewish religion? After all, such a perception is supposed to lead a person to a line of thinking similar to Rabbi Aviner's line that the State of Israel is the throne of Gd in the world, etc.
    5.3 You wrote about the fulfillment of the vision of the prophets in the Return to Zion, but it can be argued on the other hand that there were many other prophecies that did not come true. It can also be argued that such prophecies tend to fulfill themselves (because the people strive to fulfill these prophecies).
    5.4 You wrote about the renewal of nationalism, language and the establishment of the state as an exceptional event, but it can be argued that there were many other states that arose in the 19th-20th century and that this was a period when many peoples tried to gain independence (known as the "Spring of Nations" period).
    5.5 It seems to me that it is appropriate to mention in this section also the Israeli wars, some of which seem to be events in which God intervened.
    On page 6 you wrote: "After we came to the conclusion that there is a God and that it is likely that he will be revealed and that there was indeed a revelation at Sinai and there we were given a Torah with some role in it." The highlighted part of the bottom line looks out of place. It is not possible that we have reached an intermediate conclusion that there was a revelation in Sinai, when this is exactly the conclusion that you are trying to establish (a kind of assumption sought).
    7. On page 37 you wrote: “It may even be argued that there is no right and wrong here, and every person and society should follow their tradition. But as stated, I do not belong to the postmodern discourse, and therefore I make a different claim here. " I think it can also not be argued in post-modern frustration that God can be revealed to different groups in humanity throughout history and require them to keep mitzvos in different versions. not like that?
    8. On pages 41-40 define a new term: “Ethical Facts”. This term answers the naturalistic failure and the gap between moral / religious facts and duties. But even this new term seems to ultimately rest on intuition and common sense. If so, why not bridge the above gap directly through intuition and common sense without going through the auxiliary term of “ethical facts”?
    9. On page 42 you wrote: “The picture I described, according to which there is a correlation between the habitat and the ideological product, can have only two interpretations: 1. Belief and heresy are both products of programming. We have no way of knowing who is right. 2. One of them is right and the other is wrong. The error is only a product of educational programming. " I can suggest a few more intermediate options that seem more reasonable to me: 3. Belief and heresy are both products of programming. But we still have a way of knowing who is right through independent and critical thinking. 4. Belief and heresy both are mostly products of programming. Each group has a minority that thinks independently and is able to decide on its own path.
    10. On page 46 and also on page 47 you brought the quote from Eruvin XNUMX: XNUMX: ”. I once heard an explanation that the use of the word comfortable and not the word good or better indicates that the creation of man involves leaving the comfort zone, just as marrying and starting a family involves leaving the comfort zone, but in the long run, it is better for a man created than not created. Only that there is inconvenience in it). This is at least a possible explanation. In this context, it is worth mentioning the statement in Tractate Brachot, page XNUMX: XNUMX: And also in Yerushalmi (Brachot A, E) Rabbi Yochanan said of the learner not to do that "he is comfortable if his placenta became over his face and never came out." This means that whoever learns in order to do, is actually comfortable with being created.
    11. On pages 50-51 you have brought up the total requirement of the Torah which reaches to the point of devotion. But this requirement seems absurd to me, because it is clear to everyone that a sufficient level of certainty can not be reached regarding the laws of surrender (for example, a person may ask himself whether the situation he is in does not require surrender at all, and even if necessary, whether the sages did not correctly judge these laws And even if so, lest Judaism be wrong, etc.). As an example, one can imagine a jihadist suicide on his way to an attack, and skeptical thoughts arise in his head about the charge in question. Would it not make more sense for him to examine more deeply the total commitment of jihad? In fact this examination will almost never yield a sufficient degree of certainty that it would make sense to sacrifice the soul for it. I mean I argue that it does not make sense to sacrifice the soul for ideas in which you have no very high level of certainty, and from this I argue that perhaps God understands that this is the case and therefore does not expect us to sacrifice the soul in such situations.
    12. On page 53 you wrote: "Even a little one buys his work in this way from the Torah, although usually the little one has no possibility of committing acts of property." But Maimonides in the Laws of the Lulav writes: “. How does it work out?

    General Comments:
    1. It seems to me that there is a lack of reference to the Karaites, Reforms, and Conservatives.
    2. I have some additional arguments that might be included in the booklet:
    2.1 The very fact that man, since the dawn of mankind, has engaged in all kinds of ritual works shows that man has a natural tendency to worship (which God probably introduced him to), and it is likely that God will want to use the "ritual function" he introduced us correctly by transmitting information about The correct form of worship.
    2.2 If the formation of a narrative of mass revelation is a natural occurrence that happened due to lies / distortions / grandmother's stories, a similar narrative would have been expected to be repeated throughout history, but since it has not been restored it can be concluded that there is an "unnatural" event. (In the spirit of the verse article:
    2.3 The existence of non-utilitarian mitzvos for society (if it is a conspiracy intended to constitute a kind of social convention, there is no reason to insert a lulav shake).
    2.4 Existence of biblical sayings that can be verified (in the conspiracy they try not to produce verification points) like a shemita: Pilgrimage: and no one will covet your land when you go up to see the face of the Lord your God three times a year.
    2.5 The religious innovation of the religion of Israel in relation to other religions at that time shows that it is real, because if it were not real, it is likely that its creators would have tried to resemble other religions (polytheistic, non-abstract God, etc.)

    I also wanted to attach two links to Rabbi Kalman's videos that might be referred to from the booklet:
    The first video deals with the course you established on pages 34-35 (additional considerations):
    The second video deals with the rational basis for the fact that a resident is also from heaven:
    Thanks for all the comments. This is not the type of material I am used to working with (“Values” seminar matters).
    I fixed as I will detail immediately, and I will send you the repaired file later.
    1. Indeed this is the more correct formula I use. I fixed.
    2. Indeed. But the imperative concept was born at Mount Sinai. This is the change in the work of God created there. Until Mount Sinai there was no keeping of mitzvos but doing good deeds (sages and not chassidim). Even the patriarchs who kept the Torah are not as mitzvos and doers and these were not mitzvos. The concept of 'religious person' in its modern sense did not yet exist. So everyone was a Christian (religious experiences and morals). It is true that even after Mt. This is not a mitzvah but a good deed. But good deeds must also be done. B. This is a mitzvah because there is a commandment (where?) To do what comes out of Sabra. I once thought in a way, today I am quite convinced of A.
    Page 3-29 (Issue of Finding the Torah in the Days of Josiah)
    3.1 Well, then from what your mind was forgotten and there was a previous tradition. The nasal cavity should be placed on the forgetful and not on their sons who no longer know anything.
    3.2 The question of whether this is more reasonable than adopting the traditional thesis. I did not claim certainty. If the people accepted the tradition that was a book and were forgotten, in my opinion it is more likely to adopt the tradition rather than the thesis of assimilation. It may hurt cardability, but it's not something absolute anyway.
    3.3 It can be said. But he who brings evidence from the Bible that there was no continuity in tradition cannot bring evidence from there. This is a possible interpretation as it was before we saw the affair of finding the book. My contention is that this affair does not change my relationship to tradition, whatever it may be.
    3.4 This is not similar to the Qur'an, since the tradition of the Qur'an or Christianity does not claim to have been a book and lost. My contention is that if I was told about a book that was lost and about a forgotten revelation, they had to throw it in the trash. The question of the charismatic leader is what is being discussed here. I can not deny it, but only show that it is not the preferred option, and that the affair of finding the book does not significantly strengthen it. Whoever accepts the option of a charismatic leader who sells lookouts will receive, and whoever does not. The affair here does not matter in this matter, if you accept it then you interpret it that way too, and if not - then no.
    3.5 Why do I owe something to the commentary of the Radak? By the way, even from his language it is not clear to me that this is about everything. These are all the bad deeds they did, but may have done more good deeds.
    3.6 indeed possible.
    4. As far as I know it is not a religion at all. This is a mystical method, and in principle I have no problem accepting it. Beyond that, I do not know of a tradition that speaks of mass revelation in Hinduism. Who was discovered? There are personal experiences of different enlightened people. But maybe I do not know enough.
    5. Regarding the section on “Additional Considerations”:
    5.1 Indeed. But once it was. Beyond that, even today there may be such events, but they have to be clearly noticeable to say that there is a divine appearance here. The presumption is that today events are done in a natural way. See more below.
    5.2 The question of whether or not it is a supernatural event (i.e. having divine involvement) is open to me. The motives of the founders of the state were secular (part of the spring of the peoples). And yet the occurrence of such an unusual event shows the uniqueness of the people who generate it and the tradition it carries with it. I clarified in two footnotes.
    5.3 Indeed it can be argued. So it is only an argument that joins the rest of the arguments. "It can be argued" is exactly the argument against which I have sharpened the meaning of the set of arguments in the face of examining each of them separately. The question of unfulfilled prophecies needs a more systematic examination. I did not do it (how many there were, and who they are, and whether it is clearly not realized or will not be realized).
    5.4 I wrote section 2 before I saw what you were saying here. See there. The anomalies are not the establishment of a state but an awakening after thousands of years of exile, the establishment of a language and institutions out of nothing, the grouping of exiles and merging into one Israeli society, and democracy and a proper regime. I clarified in two footnotes.
    5.5 Indeed. Although, I think most of them are not very unusual in terms of power relations (not even the War of Independence. See the books of the provocateur Uri Milstein).
    6. I corrected the wording. After a tradition of revelation in Sinai reached us, events reaffirm it.
    7. Indeed. I corrected for two claims.
    8. Because intuition and common sense can not bridge this gap alone. Suppose a person says he has an intuition that Australia has exactly one million inhabitants (assuming he has no knowledge). It has no meaning because it has no way of knowing how many residents there are. In order to have intuition, one must present a basis that allows one to believe it. The problem with the truth of an ethical claim such as "it is forbidden to murder" is not that we have no way of knowing whether it is true or not, but that the concept of truth is not applicable to it at all, because there is nothing to compare against. Therefore one must start with the fact that there is something to compare against, and only now can it be said that intuition makes that comparison.
    9. It is clear that "never" here does not mean in all people. No one disagrees that in both groups there are people who act this way and there are those who act differently.
    You mean p. 43. I have clarified there in a footnote.
    10. Unreasonable interpretation in my opinion. Comfortable means this is what he would want for all ranges. I did not open a full discussion on this, because it is a sideways deviation. The mimra was also brought in casually. Therefore I do not think it is worthwhile to add the Gemara in blessings.
    11. I agree psychologically rather than philosophically. Psychologically someone who is not completely convinced may not sacrifice the psyche. But factually in halakhah there is a demand for sacrifice, and it can only be based on a sufficient basis. The claim that perhaps God does not expect this sacrifice is a claim that I may make in the following books (New Light on Zion).
    12. You put me to the question of another opinion bestowed, in which the first were divided as to whether it was beneficial in the small from Dauriyta or from Durban. I have not gone into these details here, as it is enough for me to discuss the methods that it is not helpful from Dauriyta. What's more, there is also controversy as to whether the property of Durban is beneficial to Dauriyta (which can explain Maimonides even if a small one does not buy from Dauriyta at all).

    General Comments:
    1. I added a section at the end of the second part.
    2. I inserted at the end of chapter d.

  6. anonymous:
    It must be noted that I thank you very much in general for the intellectual and wide-ranging discussion and striving for truth

    And now I will discuss what you wrote in the notebook of faith:
    Innocent Faith: A Second Problem

    But beyond this obvious difficulty, from the description we have given above another question arises here. In what sense is this innocent believer really a believing person? Think of Reuven who was born in a Jewish home and believes in the Jewish tradition. In the opinion of Rabbi Paloni, the same Reuven, if he had opened the critical and philosophical literature, would have reached the wrong conclusions, and therefore he forbids it. Reuven, of course, hears in his voice, for he is a man who fears a lot of God, and adheres to the provisions of halakhah as easily as severely. Is Reuben a believing Jew? After all, if we analyze his current perception, he is an infidel, but he does not do what is necessary to reveal it. If the atheist Simon had made logical arguments of one kind or another, Reuben would have changed his mind and become an atheist. We have already seen that if Reuben is convinced of any logical argument, then it is clear that the conclusion of the argument was already with him unconsciously. If so, even before he heard the argument that would lead him to the conclusion that there is no God, he is actually an unconscious atheist. If so, even when we banned him from dealing with these issues we did not raise anything. The man is an atheist (covert, even of himself) observant. In light of the picture we have described above, it can be said that although he holds in his mind the idea of ​​“God exists,” but only in the first two senses of conceivability. In the third sense - no. The substantive content expressed in this sentence does not exist in his face, and therefore at least on the substantive level he is an atheist.

    From now on I will respond to what I have in mind in this:

    I think the problem you are presenting is one hundred percent true but it is conditional on one condition and it is only "If the atheist Simon had made some logical arguments to him, Reuben would have changed his perception and become an atheist".
    Even if it were painted that Reuben would not change his mind even after hearing the words of Simon you will agree with me that the whole problem you present here does not begin.
    But in this itself you can doubt whether it is possible for a person who has not clarified his religious position to be exposed to content that refutes it and will not be influenced by it?
    The answer depends - that is, there are people who do not belong to them and there are people who do.
    And it depends on the person's personality structure if the person is an emotional person in his essence once he holds a certain position and feels it in all the capillaries of his heart in such an emotional person type all intellectual rebuttals do not move him anything because in him the subjective experiential perception is dominant.
    But if the person is mental what you say is one hundred percent true.
    And do not think that I have renewed it in my mind. The main thing is already writing it.
    And clarifies that there are two types of faith a. Lack of knowledge that the encounter with knowing will weaken the belief This kind of belief for him is not a belief at all.
    The other sex is that he is innocent in the very essence of his personality structure and his faith will not be undermined in an encounter with a mental prankster.
    Interestingly I think that this kind of rare people today in the modern age landscape consumed them only in our Spanish brethren there are of this kind but once most of the world was so and so on.

    I would love to hear your response.
    The claim you made is logically problematic. Take the two groups you have defined: the first will change her belief in encountering atheistic arguments, and here you agree that even if she does not meet with the arguments she is still an encapsulated atheist. It is therefore clear that there is no point in banning her from encountering such arguments. But you added that there is another group that I ignore, that will not change its positions even if it meets with opposing arguments.
    And not her. You're right that the other group, which will not change its position even if it encounters conflicting arguments, does indeed believe it right now. I wrote this too. But that is precisely why I wrote that from what your mind is there is no point in forbidding them to study heretical arguments. This is true for both groups: the first group will be affected but it will not change its essence. And the second group will not be affected so why ban it on them. So there is no point in banning both groups.
    All the best,
    It is clear that I am with you regarding the first group and also agree with you with the principle that for this reason the exposure to education should not be prevented etc.

    What I just wanted was to say from what you said that there is only one option and that is the first group and there is no room for another and different type about which even if there is no reason to forbid them exposure but for the same reason there is no benefit

    And even if you supposedly mention that there is another type you do not give it a legitimate place you characterize it as a kind of naivety and so in that I think it is sinful to truth if we talk about belief in its full meaning this group and is legitimate in terms of Judaism not only in emotional schools but also in mental schools like I have the main points which for him are just fine I think you should emphasize this in your article

    Because it means that the only way to cling to God must go through the mind and it is not accurate at all as above.


    Agree with you regarding the condemnation of exposure to philosophical material and the futility of the prohibition of exposure.

    But I think we have been wronged for the kind of simple and innocent kind of belief for those who are such in the structure of their minds that they have been the majority of Judaism believers throughout the ages and we need to be extra careful when we turn millions of Jews throughout history into atheists and so on.

    (Even Maimonides, whose position was sharp regarding innocent faith, did not consider them atheists - unbelievers but clumsy believers who in truth do not mean that the problem is not in faith and not in the believer but in the object in which the person believes and so on.)

    I do agree with you about the present that for me all Ashkenazis today are in the power of atheists I mean explicitly also about the ultra-Orthodox and rather in a sense where it is stronger and all their coverage in a simple faith slogan dress are in life mocking Rash.

    But XNUMX about the situation today but not about history especially before the rise of the modern age.


    Haredi - a former follower and now tries to be a Chabad follower
    I now understand your claim. This is really not my intention. I have nothing against innocent faith, nor have my words been directed towards it.
    Following your comment I went back to Notebook 1 and saw that indeed things need clarification. I have inserted a clarifying clause in chapter thirteen (immediately after the clauses on the two problems in innocent faith). See the attachment here on page 45 (on the website we will upload the new version of this notebook shortly, but the name of the file pages is numbered differently).
    Thanks for your comment.
    Just a question of curiosity: I did not understand what a former follower who is trying to be a Chabad follower today means. If so, even today you are a follower, no? Or does Chabad not have a Hasidic name? Or is intercession not storks?
    I saw the important addition and YSK

    About me:

    Chassidim - the intention is not Chabad I come originally from the Viznitz Chassidut and today I try to be a Chabad Chassid and the intention that after I truly knew the way I try to adopt as much as I could but it is still not perfect so I can not lie and say about myself that I am a Chassid.

    By the way, in everything you write about what makes a person an atheist a believer, this is a topic that preoccupied me in my youth, first of all, because in my personal experience, even though I grew up in a Hasidic home for all intents and purposes, at 16 I found myself clearly an atheist.

    I have come a long way to faith and in the process I realize that all the faith of my sector both Hasidim and Lithuanians is a slogan without cover so I researched the matter in defining faith in Torah sources and realized that my feeling was right because what they define today faith not just meets logical criteria as you Brings you also not in the religious definitions of the matter and as you have well defined in the A. forums in my room there is a belief that is heresy etc.

    Later, I also formulated the matter, that is, the gap between the Torah definition and the concept of faith and the concept of faith as it is perceived today in the ultra-Orthodox public, which is not a battle but the same.

    By the way, the Ramak has already come up with this matter and then the old Rebbe clarified it in more depth

    If you want I can share it with you and I will also be happy to hear your opinion on it.
    If it's not long, I'd love to.
    in her

    B. matters of belief in God and B. ways to reach it

    Belief in God includes two things: a. The matter of faith itself b. The thing in which man believes is the reality of God.

    Apart from the issue of belief in God, it includes two such matters. Here, too, on the way to faith, there are two ways:
    A. Belief on the part of Kabbalah in tradition. B. Belief in interrogation.

    And as stated, in every way from these two ways, the two matters include the feeling of faith and the thing in which they believe - the reality of God.

    The matter of faith and B. the ways to reach it
    First, the meaning of the language of faith in general must be clarified. Here the Ramban writes in this and the following:
    And this means the word faith in the language of an existing thing that does not change and like a stake stuck in a strong faithful place.
    And so the owner of the principal and the above also defined:
    Belief in the thing is depicted in the thing as a strong painting until the mind can imagine its contradiction in any way even if it does not know through the amulets in it.
    That is, from a Torah point of view, the definition of faith in general is a sense of absolute certainty in a matter in which he believes a sense of confession should be so decisive that the mind does not assume the contradiction.

    In general the way to reach this feeling is in two ways:

    A. Belief in Kabbalah - we were handing over the matter of the reality of the Creator etc. from father to son from generation to generation from generation to generation and here in general the success of the sense of faith and certainty depends only on morality and the transmitter not the recipient and if the handover is

    Et al.

    That is, when the father is imbued with faith up to the validity of evidence in faith and passes the faith on to his sons as well, then with his son the belief is in the same validity of certainty as the actual evidence.
    The second way - is through logical research and we were when the mind will understand in its ways and its tools that it must be a creator, etc. and that A.A.

    In the end, from a Torah point of view, more than thinking about the way to reach the absolute sense of faith, it is more important that the sense of the truth is indeed absolute on every scale.

    The matter of painting the reality of God

    Other than the revelation of the power of foster care to the level of an unquestionable sense of truth not by an external factor and moreover also not by an internal mental factor of the person whose soul is not to be contradicted by this.

    There is another matter and it is a matter of drawing a matter of the reality of God, that is, what is the matter of the reality of God that we are required to believe in its existence. And it is to be known that necessarily the belief in Heath can not apply before we get to the faith. What will be painted and in any case before there is any drawing of anything in the matter of the Creator, there is no beginning here.

    And this is because since he does not seem to feel the flesh and the materials of the mountains, it is inevitable that in the painting the matter of his reality will be of some factor not by the five brothers of the fleshly senses.

    And here really there is a big difference between the belief on the part of the inquiry that then the drawing of the reality of the Creator is on the part of the power and mental light of the eyes of the spiritual mind by all the mental necessities regarding the content of the reality of God and the necessity of its existence. These will be clear and committed in the mind about their purpose until the mind can no longer have this true exchange rate under any circumstances

    However, if faith is next in Kabbalah and it is usually done at a time and age that the mind of the person is not active at all and what is more, the matter of an abstract mind is not transferable from one person to another.

    And from all this comes and goes necessarily that in the next belief in Kabbalah he can not be in an abstract spiritual painting in the painting of the reality of the Creator but it is by giving the Creator a physical painting by the simulating power that exists in every person even in a small baby who knows the reality It seems to itself that there is a Creator and constitutes and oversees here its essence is like any kind of reality that recognizes its physical senses only the difference is that all things see in the real sense while the Creator is a hidden god…

    It is found in the fact that knowing the painting of the reality of God there is a huge difference between the belief in inquiry that the painting is a spiritual painting and the next belief in acceptance that the painting in the Creator is awkward by the power that simulates having a body or body.

    The attack of the late Maimonides on simple faith

    After it is clarified that the next belief in Kabbalah is necessarily awkward and after the Jewish religion we are on the denial of the rains as a "because you have not seen any image" which is why Maimonides came out against all those who have simple faith without abstract mental recognition and the late Maimonides :

    "But he who thinks of God and often remembers without knowing but goes after just a certain imagination or another opinion he received from another is in my opinion with those who are outside the yard far from him does not really remember God because the same thing in his imagination does not fit at all but is found. In his imagination. "

    According to Maimonides, there is a very big problem here and that is that the painting that was painted in his imagination about the reality of God is simply "not suitable for what is found at all."

    Since God is not a body and not a figure in the body, otherwise man does not believe in the true Creator who exists, while in what he believes does not exist. Later Maimonides went one step further and stated that all the five trays were sex !!.

    And although his words are agreed upon by everyone in fact that God is not a body, etc. and it is not appropriate to think and imitate him as such, here is his ruling that all trays are sex.

    And his taste and reasoning with him is that many are better than him - Maimonides went by this method and fulfilled it to make them species.

    The magnitude of the Creator's fulfillment throughout history

    And since the vast majority of the people throughout all generations are not at the level of knowing the Creator spiritually, it is inevitable that their innate knowledge of the Creator is awkward as the best imagination imagined and there is no advice to escape fulfillment by believing in Kabbalah.

    And we were even after the ruling of Maimonides still nothing has changed in this area at all and mainly and as we have heard from the words of the last Kabbalists and the late Kabbalist Baal Hashomer Emunim HaKadmon:

    "Therefore I did not resent them in particular the hazel as I resented the Talmudic sages who in our time are the simplistic Talmudists do not know the magnitude of the exaltations of his divinity and differ from the rest of those who are."

    That is, even the disciples of the sages of his generation a few hundred years after Maimonides are still in the total submission of the painting of the Creator Heath.


    Faith is the image of the Creator's reality. A strong painting until the mind can imagine that the contradiction in the matter is not true. To the Creator.

    The confusion in the matter in our generation
    And here from all the above we have concluded that the abstraction from the fulfillment in the Creator cannot go along with the next simple belief in Kabbalah without learning the ways of abstraction in the research books.
    Although in this matter there is a great confusion and a huge disruption to our generation in the awe-inspiring and ultra-Orthodox public because how foolish want to hold the rope at its two ends we would also have faith in Kabbalah and be in the purpose of abstraction without thinking thoughts and studying research books.

    And they forgot about the words of the sages, 'You caught a lot and you did not catch'

    Because it does not apply only after there is a painting of something and since they have not brought to the students any ‘painting’ to the reality of the non-spiritual Creator because the inquiry is Babylon will see and not material that Babylon will find.

    And we were that because in fact since they have in their minds no painting for the reality of the Creator neither material nor spiritual it was found that he really is not according to their thought !!!. And in the language of God, this is called 'atheism'.

    And it is possible to suggest that the Creator's reality is with them as "found in unreality…"

    The right way in education in painting the Creator
    The correct mode of education is that at first the whole matter of faith will be yes in drawing a picture of a person with a body and material titles, and only then, when the person is sane, will he himself learn the matter of abstraction, etc.
    I also saw that the late Rebbe of Leibowitz et al.
    Today everyone admits - without disagreement - that the matter of materiality does not belong to the Creator, since, materiality and Creator are two opposites, and if someone interprets the readings "hand of God" "eyes of God" "and under his feet" etc. simply (who has a body ), The XNUMXth heresy in its unity Heath
    And the truth is that both - Maimonides and the Rabbi - are right in their words:
    Since a Jew must believe and know that "Elka is one, and not years, etc." The matter of unity (the one God), the seven species and heresies (the matter of the seventh). Therefore, Maimonides rules that "he who says ... that he is a body and has an image" - that the reality of the body, the shape of the body and the power of the body (which includes changes, etc.), is the opposite of true unity - is called "sex".
    And the Rabbi said that "how much greater and better than him went in this thought according to what they saw in the readings, etc." "The eyes of God" are simple (as one learns in a "room" with a small child) and to believe completely in one God, and since in their opinion this is not a contradiction to the oneness of God (although in fact they are wrong), they can not be called "sex."
    According to the law, it is impossible to take into account the thought and intention of man, for B.D. does not know what is being done in the heart of man, and he has no judge but what his eyes see, "man will see with the eyes", and in any case, a person The opposite of unity, the seventh in the fence of species; But, "God will see to the heart", and seeing that these things were said because of a mistake in a particular detail, and in the mind and thought of the person saying it is not in contradiction to his oneness, , As perceived in the physical mind, without having to bother with understanding abstract things - Shafir should say that the above will not be considered as "sex".
    Admittedly, after this matter (that the reality of a body is in conflict with the matter of unity) was clarified and explained according to reason,
    Those who are not sane, a small child, are not required to do anything about it, but those who have already grown up and become sane, must invest in the study of the Torah all the power of their intellect as far as their hand touches, according to our old Rabbi in the laws of Talmud Torah.
    Then the apology in the words of the Rabbi is canceled, and again there is no place for lilac "in this thought," since everyone knows that this is a contradiction in the matter of unity.
    From the words of the Rebbe, there are two things:
    A. Regarding the child - one should study the readings "Hand of God" "Eyes of God" simply and believe in the purpose of one God, and since in their opinion this is not a contradiction to the unity of God (although in fact they are wrong), they can not be called "sex" .
    B. Regarding the adult - since we have already grown up and become sane, he must invest in the study of the Torah all the power of his mind as far as his hand touches, according to the old Rabbi of the Talmud Torah .

    From what I have written, you will understand that even though we both think they are atheists, there is still a difference between me and you, because in your opinion the reason is because their position can be disproved and is not a lack of action.

    Whereas in my opinion it is also not inaction but they are such because they have never come close to the shadow of the not even innocent faith and therefore there is nothing to refute because there is nothing but empty and ragged hollow slogans.
    I have read and I agree with almost nothing.
    1. The basic thesis that belief in Kabbalah is necessarily in some painting and only a belief in inquiry can be abstract - these are prophetic words in my eyes and I do not know where these things came from. In any case, everything fell into place.
    2. I also do not agree that faith should be certain. Not only does it not have to it cannot be certain, an ostrich because in humans there is nothing certain on earth (perhaps other than that its body that there is nothing certain, and must be rejected). And in particular that every logical argument is based on assumptions, and which ones came from? Therefore, belief in the way of inquiry is not fundamentally different from belief in the way of acceptance or intuition (as I explained in the paragraph I added in the notebook). All can be abstract and all are uncertain.
    3. And another note, the Rab'ad brings many and great ones who have fulfilled, and therefore it is not possible to say that the words of Maimonides are agreed upon in the Qur'an (and the debate is only whether there are species in it).
    I will respond to your initial comment that is currently the most important because really defining it well is my thesis:

    The basic thesis that belief in Kabbalah is necessarily in some painting and only a belief in inquiry can be abstract - these are prophecies in my eyes and I do not know where these things came from. In any case, everything fell into place.

    I brought Maimonides' golden tongue and for that matter I will quote again and therefore this thesis in my eyes is not a prophecy:
    "But he who thinks of God and often remembers without knowing but goes after just a certain imagination or another opinion he received from another is in my opinion with those who are outside the yard far from him does not really remember God because the same thing in his imagination does not fit at all but is found. In his imagination. "

    I understand from his words that to remember God truly means clear knowledge and recognition of a painting that is appropriate for this finding and this he explicitly writes can not be when his reference to the reality of God is by an opinion he received from another.

    Of course, this can only be when the opinion is not received from another that it is a matter of the next belief in Kabbalah but is only by reaching the positive existence of the Supreme Power in his self-awareness by observing and deepening all the mental necessities presented in her research books and as it briefly The Torah and since this is what brought him into contact with God, then necessarily God is abstract as required by intellectual inquiry directly.

    If you understand his words in a different way I would love to hear.

    In more depth what I wrote that the painting that the person gives to the matter in his childhood is by virtue of the simulator and not by the mental power, then Maimonides says this explicitly in the Maka in the Mon, although not in the exact same language as I wrote et al [1]:

    “Because the masses will not see anything there is a real reality that is not a body but that it is in the body also found but its reality is lacking because it needs to the body
    But what is neither body nor body is in no way found in the beginning of human thoughts as long as in the thoughts of the imagination ”Akal.
    That is, for the masses of the people only a physical reality - a familiar mass in a thing that really exists and therefore everything that is spiritual is not in time and place is not a thing that exists in a real reality.
    And at the end of his remarks he explains the reason why this is the perception of the masses and that is that "at the beginning of human thoughts" is not defined as having only what is perceived in the physical senses.
    That is, the person in his childhood whose mental power is not developed cannot by nature recognize an abstract spiritual power.

    And here even though according to your understanding at first does not necessarily help me if you were to refute it logically and not only through you prove you do not have a sister because then I would understand where the gap in understanding between us is so that my response will be as accurate as possible.

    Waiting for your reply
    Maimonides does not write that when one receives from another it is necessarily a painting, but on the contrary: that the way to reach faith in God is not abstract is when one receives from another a distorted opinion. But if he gets a right opinion from another he can believe in an abstract God. But even if Maimonides had said that I would disagree with him. It seems baseless to me, and I see no need to refute it. There is no argument here, so what do you refute?
    And in the second passage he said that the perception of the masses is in a non-abstract God. It does not mean anything, because the masses are wrong because they are wrong, regardless of acceptance or inquiry.
    And in the second passage he said that the perception of the masses is in a non-abstract God. It does not mean anything, because the masses are wrong because they are wrong,

    I do not want to think that you read things in a hurry

    After all, he immediately writes later a substantive clarification in the grandmother's mistake of the crowd so that there is no need to guess this and so on "at the beginning of human thoughts"

    We were as I wrote of a mental being like man at the beginning of his development as his mental powers are captivated by the simulating power and fail to think independently detached from the materialistic childish conception.

    And it also clarifies the wrong masses that most people remain children mentally because the mind is a force that a certain level does not develop alone unless the person is tired of developing the same thing that most people do not and in return find it appropriate to develop other forces.

    Therefore also what you write later but if you get a correct opinion from another he can believe in an abstract God in my opinion there is no basis that an abstract opinion from the moral does not exempt the recipient from providing a proper and abundant tool that he should receive something impossible as Maimonides testifies From what grandfather is he wrong and lacks a matching tool and if he is such he will inevitably not be able to accept.

    Do you agree with me that a 5 year old child can not think with logical depth that an adult is adapted and how else do you think a 5 year old child and below that can get an idea that there is a reality that is not within time and place?

    Maimonides makes a logical argument Abstraction is a matter of mental process and as such it should meet the rules of mental development that the first rule is the release from the shackles of matter what does not exist in children and many people who function as children mentally
    I see no point in going back again. All my words are in place. Look at Maimonides again. And as stated, even if he had said otherwise, it does not matter to the Attorney General.
    Your remarks were an arbitrary "ruling" in my life.

    I repeat again I asked what is your positive perception regarding the perceptual capacity of a 3-year-old child regarding the abstraction of the Creator I would be happy if you would answer a reasoned answer again?

    If we want to take it to a more practical place or make the discussion my work I suggest epi 'make an attempt to go to a 3 year old boy and try to offer him the abstraction at an excellent and clear level of information and we will see how the reaction will be what do you think?
    Sometimes there are situations where the discussion comes to a dead end and there is no point in continuing it by email. It is about understanding a text (mine and Maimonides'). But at your request I will try again.
    You somehow identify a distinction between understanding a three-year-old child and mental inquiry with a distinction between acceptance and inquiry. And not her. A person who accepts that there is a G-d without questioning can certainly understand that it is an abstract G-d. He is not a three-year-old boy. By the way, quite the opposite: a researcher can reach rains. Therefore, this identification is unfounded. A three-year-old tends to accomplish things, but what about that and the distinction between inquiry and acceptance?
    What at all should I answer or refute. This is a false thesis because of itself. We have never heard anyone come up with a false thesis and then demand of the other not to be content with claiming that the thesis is not proof but to refute it positively. Here, I have a thesis: all fairies with three wings start with mm. Please refute this.
    And with regard to Maimonides as above. It's just not written there, and that's all. If this is an "overlapping" reading then what to do I read overlapping.
    All the best,

  7. Pine:
    Regarding what you wrote in the fifth notebook:
    "Others discuss the claim that if God created the world he was likely to have a purpose, and that morality alone is not sufficient to serve such a purpose, and therefore it is only expected that God will be revealed and give us His requirements and purposes."

    1. There is a hidden assumption here that the goal should be in the elective field (morality or halakhah). Why should she be in this particular field? One can think of a person who buys a goldfish for his home, all he wants from the fish is to observe its beauty (its beauty is not in the elective realm and can still be an external goal).

    2. Even if we say that the goal is in the elective field, why is morality alone not enough?

    3. Even if we say that morality alone is not enough, why does this lead to the conclusion that he is expected to be discovered and submit his demands? Perhaps there are other forms in which the demands and goals can be conveyed to us even without the direct revelation of God (for example, as the moral emotion is imprinted in man and he knows what is moral without being revealed what is moral, the "halakhic emotion" could also be imprinted on him. Without revealing to him what I went for. Another possibility for conveying his goals without revelation is by using a mental inquiry that God has instilled in human beings so that they themselves can come to an understanding of his requirements and goals).
    1. Indeed, my assumption is that the purpose needs a choice, since God has given us a choice and he probably expects us to use it. The feeling is that choice is the pinnacle of our abilities and skills and it is what sets us apart most of all.

    2. I think I explained why it is unlikely that morality is the goal. Morality allows for a reformed society, but a reformed society is a means for society to be able to do things. If God's purpose is for society to be corrected He could have made it so. He is therefore likely to have some value goals beyond morality.
    3. indeed he could have imprinted in us the feeling as to the other purposes, or to discover them in other forms. But he did not. We have no value emotion beyond the moral emotion, and mental inquiry to the best of my understanding also does not lead to anything beyond that. Therefore it is likely that there should be a revelation.
    Regarding 2, why do you assume that the purpose of morality is only to correct society (perhaps in addition God “plays” with seeing us tormented by moral dilemmas and “enjoys” seeing what we choose).

    Regarding any value goals beyond morality, one can argue about the same claim you made about morality, that Gd could have created the world so that the purpose of the non-moral value is already fulfilled (e.g. to create an instinct to put on a tefillin that works like the sexual instinct)
    Maybe. But the Torah that has been given to us does not say so. I talked there about the collection of considerations as a whole (not each of which stands on its own), so there is here a combination of tradition with the a priori consideration. If it is a Creator who is amusing us and that is it then anyway there is no point in the whole discussion. Even the logic we use is from him, so he is not necessarily reliable. By the way, if this itself we can understand then probably that is not the case (unless he enjoys further abusing us when we become aware of it).
    I understand the logic of the combination of considerations, but as for what you wrote: "But the Torah that was given to us says not so." As for a creator who plays with us I did not mean it in the evil sense of meaningless play or anything like that, one can replace the word play with the term “produces from it contentment” or something more subtle. In any case, even according to your method, to the best of my understanding, Gd derives some benefit from us. I'm just trying to make sense of the a priori consideration. You start by assuming that Gd has a purpose in creation, and that His purpose is probably related to freedom of choice. The first option that came to your mind is morality, but you rejected it because you said that ostensibly the purpose of morality seems to be only to correct society, and since a corrected society could be created in advance, that may not be the goal. From there you went on to understand that there should be a non-moral realm that is related to freedom of choice and can be God's goal in creation. But the halakhic sphere also falls into the same problems in which the moral sphere falls (it was possible to create a halakhically reformed society). It seems that the next obvious move is that the goal is probably related to the choice itself, and if Gd creates a pre-corrected society the goal will not be achieved, because human beings did not choose this company for themselves freely. Then ostensibly morality returns to being a valid possibility, and the a priori consideration falls. ——————————————————————————————
    I think this can be answered in several ways (which are quite reasonable). They all assume that morality in the ordinary sense is a consequential matter (to reach a corrected world). Deontological-Kantian morality can only come on the basis of belief in God (this is the evidence from morality in the fourth notebook).
    Here are some wordings:
    If morality is a means to a reformed society, then the need for things to be done by choice is not part of the correction itself. It is therefore likely that there are other goals for which choosing them is an independent benefit (beyond the goals themselves).
    And if you nevertheless say that even with regard to morality it can be said that there is value in choosing it (it is deontological and not teleological-consequential), then this value itself is the additional (religious) benefit. For choice in itself is certainly not part of the correction of society achieved by morality. If so, there is still another purpose here but it is related to morality itself.
    In other words: the additional value is the very obedience to the divine order (and obedience has meaning only if there is a choice whether to obey), whether it is with regard to a moral or other order. This brings us back to the column regarding halakhah and morality and the discussions that take place around it.
    3. The argument I wrote about morality, that it was possible to create a corrected world and obviate the need for morality, can indeed be said about other consequential values ​​as well. But perhaps the other values ​​are not of such a nature that one can create a world in which they will be superfluous. For example, if the goal is not the correction of the created world but the correction of something that was not created (in Gd Himself?). Here it can not be said that it will be corrected and then the values ​​will be superfluous. In essence, this means that his completion is us and our world (as such things were written by Rabbi Kook and Arizal at the beginning of the Tree of Life).
    4. Up to this point I have dealt with the argument that a corrected world could be created and thus morality redundant. But there is another complementary argument, which I think is the main one I raised there: it is unlikely to explain the creation of a human society whose purpose is its own correction. Do not create it at all (nor create it as corrected, as in the previous argument) and there will be no need to fix anything. Therefore morality does not seem to be the purpose of creation.
    If I understood you correctly, the possibility of deontological morality overturns the a priori consideration of giving Torah, because it is in fact a legitimate possibility for God's purpose in creation, and it requires a less "applicable" premise than the possibility of giving Torah (Oakham's razor). I understand it right?
    Not necessarily. I wrote that deontological morality itself needs the giving of Torah, or some other revelation. A deontological conception of morality sees it as something beyond social correction, and so it itself needs some divine order. While I have added that it may be possible to understand this from an inner feeling (understanding that there is value to deontological morality) without revelation (but not without God. This is the evidence from morality).
    But I further argued that morality even if it is deontological is meant to complement us, but that does not explain why we were created. It was possible not to create us and then our completion is not required.
    Regarding the last sentence you wrote. The reason for our creation can be the realization of the value of choosing the moral good. If we were not created, our completion would not have been required, but even the value of choosing the moral good would not have been realized.
    The question is who this value comes to serve. us? So back I argued. Unless you say that it is a complement of God Himself. I added a note in the notebook. I'll send you a revised version.
    Yes, I'm trying to argue that this is exactly God's completion. As the choice of halakhic value complements it. So I do not understand why a priori we would prefer the explanation that there should be a revelation. Unless you say that the purpose of creation should be something beyond choice (although any purpose beyond choice can be fulfilled in advance)

    By the way, it may help to include in the amendment the matter that the purpose of creation should be related to the elective field because it is the unique ability of human beings
    indeed. I just noted that deontological morality may also need revelation. The argument is as follows:
    The moral acts are intended to correct society even though they see it deontologically (see Fourth Note Part Three, Comparison to the Prisoner's Dilemma), and the choice of them seems intended to complete the voter himself (but this is not possible as an ultimate goal). If the choice is for the completion of Gd Himself (as I also added in the new version now), it is difficult to take it out of Sabra in ignorance. Therefore revelation is still needed. Without revelation we would treat morality as a teleological matter for our own benefit.
    If we imagine for a moment that we were conducting this discussion before the giving of the Torah, and during the discussion the question was asked: "What is the purpose of creation", the only answer that can come to mind is the choice of moral good (because it is the only area related to choice). Therefore, the obvious conclusion is that the "religious" act is the choice of the moral good. Once we have reached this conclusion, seemingly our worldview is complete even without revelation (and then ostensibly the a priori consideration falls). After the revelation, more "religious contents" were added, but even before the revelation, it was possible to be "religious."
    First, it should be remembered that even before the giving of the Torah people would speak to Gd (the first man, Noah, Abraham), and therefore there was a connection to it and instructions from it even earlier. The Torah describes that Abraham had already received prophecies about his seed (because a living thing would be your seed), and it is not inconceivable that he also received the information to which there would be a revelation.
    In any case, according to my method, the discussion that took place then would have led to conclusions that should have been a revelation and wondered why it had not yet taken place, and remained in the IAEA. We are already today after the revelation and therefore we do not have this ZA.
    And my answer to this question (at least from today's perspective, but in principle it was possible to understand it even then) is that revelation is indeed necessary, but it does not necessarily have to be made at the beginning of history. Revelation can also be a revelation to the whole human race or the Jewish people, and not necessarily to any individual. It can therefore be done at a certain moment on the historical axis, when before it people will have no revelation. And perhaps the goal of such a process is for the world to evolve on its own (especially at the moral and cultural level) until it reaches a stage that deserves revelation and then there will be a revelation and the world can reach its purpose (or perhaps more stages are expected).
    If I understood you correctly, the reason you argue that there should be a revelation is that it is difficult to extract from Sabra in ignorance the understanding that the choice of the moral good is the thing that completes God, but this Sabra is required in the pre-revelation world, Sounds like a possibility that is hard to imagine).
    I do not see why before revelation it is more likely that God can be completed. And that Abraham and the generations who met Gd did not understand his perfection? The judge of the whole country needs us to complete it?
    I did not say that before the revelation it is more likely that it can be completed. I meant that when we try to get into the head of the people who lived before the revelation, and imagine that we are conducting the same discussion that we are now conducting, during the discussion we are looking for the purpose of creation, and the obvious and obvious option is the choice of moral good. Of course there is another possibility that the purpose of creation has not yet been revealed to us, and God is supposed to tell us what it is in X years, but the second possibility is the one that is much more conceivable than the first (similarly one can think of a person who receives a riddle , Would the same person prefer to say that he is wrong and that data is missing for the purpose of solving the riddle?)
    Yes, I understood. But what conclusion do you draw from this argument? At most those people would have come to the wrong conclusion. What does this mean for me today?
    This argument contradicts what you previously claimed that "if the choice is intended to complete God Himself, it is difficult to get it out of Sabra in ignorance." That is why revelation is still needed. " I come to argue that it is actually quite simple to get it out of Sabra, so apparently no revelation is needed.
    And to that I replied that in my opinion it does not come out of Sabra, and if they had thought about it they would not have found a satisfactory answer or they would have been wrong and hit the truth by chance because of the urgency (double mistake). Therefore even if they had correct speculation it does not supersede the revelation.
    Moreover, even if your explanation is correct (and not a double mistake) revelation is still necessary, just as when there is a verse and we understand from Sabra the law that comes out of it, the verse is still not superfluous. Without it we would not have understood it.
    I could not understand the last move so much, maybe I should look into it more, but anyway, because this is an important issue in faith, it seems to me that a more detailed reasoning is needed here (probably there are some obvious points here for you, but worth writing them down)
    I will try to think about it again. Thanks.
    Further to this discussion, I thought of an idea that might solve the difficulty regarding the possibility of deontological morality as a single supreme value: if we think of human society as an elective entity in itself, it seems that the adoption of humanistic values ​​by this entity loses its value meaning. Functionality designed to bring about a more normal society (i.e. the entity as a whole adopts “egoistic” ideas just as a person who decides to maintain a healthy lifestyle is committing an act of egoism). Therefore, that entity has no possibility of being a value entity that realizes its ability to choose, unless it adopts a value that serves a purpose external to it. It does not seem to me that there is any other possibility for such a value other than a transcendental value that comes in revelation (hence the a priori revelation is required). As for the transcendental value, there it may already be conceivable that it is a deontological value (for any non-elective result could have been achieved by God exclusive to that collective entity). And perhaps from this it is conceivable that no matter what halakhic result society achieves, but the very choice of the right halakhic act for it, is a valuable act in itself (i.e. every religious society actually realizes its transcendental destiny, even Christian and Muslim societies and maybe even pagans!). It also connects to the idea that morality is the value of the individual towards society, and halakhah is the value of society towards God, and as such has a more collectivist character than morality. In general, without halakhic value, morality loses its meaning, since morality is intended to serve the halakhic value. I would love to hear your opinion on this idea.

    I wanted to add further to this idea, that perhaps through extrapolation, just as the moral value of the individual is a need of society, so it is possible that the halakhic value of society is a need of God (the secret of work - a high need)
    This is an interesting wording. But it can still be argued that when society as a whole acts egoistically it is morality (unlike with regard to the egoism of the individual). That is, it is not necessary that egoism is wrong, but only when it is the egoism of the individual within society.
    Your last comment can be cited as an example. The idea of ​​working a high need means that God acts selfishly, but in his status he is like a collective and therefore there is nothing wrong with that.
    I therefore tend to think that the wording I have brought (that means may not be goals) is more convincing.
    One can take your argument even further, and say that the individual is also a kind of "collective" (say of all the cells in his body) and therefore his egotistical conduct can also be value or moral. Or perhaps one can also think of a family that behaves selfishly towards society as a supreme value. It seems to me that a value must be something external to the application that implements it, otherwise it is necessary.
    With regard to the cells, this is certainly not relevant, since a cell is not run independently. The conduct of the cells is the conduct of the whole duplicate. Not to mention that the cell has no choice. We deal with the conduct of electors.
    As for the family, it is also different. If one behaves selfishly within the family when they are on a lonely island then this is indeed moral conduct. And in such a case really the family is the whole of humanity. But if they are not on a lonely island then their selfish conduct harms the rest of the cells in society and then there is a moral problem here. This is not what happens when you deal with all of humanity.

    1. Regarding Oren's first question:
      1. One can think of a person who buys a goldfish for his home, all he wants from the fish is to observe its beauty (its beauty is not in the elective realm and can still be an external goal).
      The rabbi's answer is that the purpose needs a choice, since God has given us a choice and he probably expects us to use it, a use related to choice.

      And as it appears in Note 5, towards the end of Chapter B, (the need for revelation):
      "We will now move one step further. Morality is rooted in us, and also the insight that it has validity and that it is binding is rooted in us. But where will the ultimate purpose for creation come from? The one outside us. How do we know what goal our Creator is setting for us? We will note again that this is a goal that is essentially above what can be extracted from observing our world, since it is the cause of its creation and is therefore necessarily outside it. This brings us to the next stage of the argument: it is reasonable to conclude from this that there must be some revelation that will make clear to us our goals and purposes as creatures, especially the goals beyond our duty to create a reformed society that is self-evident to us. This is the basis for which the revelation by which we are commanded in any religious mitzvos, beyond the moral duties, is but predictable.
      Of course this argument itself is flawed in personification, and there was room to reject it and say that God does not necessarily act the way humans do. And maybe he still just wants morals for some reason. ”

      In short: Since the Creator chose the possibility of creating a world with electors, what is the goal set for them by the Creator? It is reasonable to conclude from this that there should be a revelation, a.k.a.

      Your Honor, I have a question:
      Why is it likely that the Creator desired our work?
      Maybe the Creator likes to watch people choose the good and the bad alternately, warriors and killers, saviors and healers, creators and writers think and write articles?

      Even if our understanding is 'humanized':
      Some animals are required by man to bring him various benefits: work in the field, fast riding in the woods, sophisticated entertainment in the circus, and more.
      But, many animals are not required to do anything for the purpose: animals in the meadow, sophisticated bees in the hive, ants in the observation nest, goldfish in the aquarium, and more.

      The parties are given a seemingly equal probability, whether we were created in a choice that refined the work of God or not

    2. He needs our work, but who said that it is precisely in a particular work, but in everything that is done?
      And like animals, which sometimes do not interest the person what the cow will do, the main thing is that she grows up and eventually eats her meat, or he is only interested in watching the fish, and there is no particular purpose for the fish but to swim in circles for his enjoyment ..
      Maybe the Creator wants a total of us to swim in circles and use the power of choice for all our objects that interest us?

      The question has been occupying me continuously for two days now, I would like to thank you for the answer, and a huge thank you for all your writings and articles, KJV!

    3. I still do not get it. The fish that swims in circles does the will of Kono. And so do we. Is any such act necessary or could the result have been achieved in another way as well? Maimonides has already written about this in the teacher that there really are details in the mitzvos that are arbitrary (they had to be determined arbitrarily just to determine the halakhah).

    4. Sorry for the misunderstanding and the lack of information,
      Is it 'reasonable to conclude' that there should be some revelation that will make clear to us our goals and purposes as creatures,
      Or maybe our goal and purpose will reach their full realization without us fulfilling anything, and without fulfilling any mitzvah, and just acting as much as we desire and desire?

      Like the vegetative and inanimate in creation that reaches its purpose and purpose as a creature without doing anything, so also man has a choice.

    5. There really is a lack of information here. Tradition has told us that there was a revelation. Beyond that there is a reinforcement from Sabra to the necessity of revelation to tell us what is required of us. Theoretically it might have been said that we were required to be fish, but in practice this is not the case because there was a revelation. So what's the discussion here? And in particular that we are given the power to choose, and when there are no instructions there is nothing to choose from and no choice to make (see Fourth Notebook). We repeat ourselves over and over again.

  8. M':
    Hello Rabbi Avraham,

    In the last year I have read several of your books and writings (following God playing dice),
    Although I find myself not accepting 100% of the things (especially the halakhic approach) that are probably just quite innovative to me, I wait and really enjoy reading them.

    I have a few questions, most of them just a personal matter and one substantive.

    Just interesting: Are the books of faith that you have published going to come out as a book? When do you guess the theology books you write about often come out? At first it was about a single book later on about years and now even about a puddle. Can you sketch out what these books will look like? Did you mention that one of the books will contain a chapter on biblical criticism, can you summarize in just a few words what is your principled approach to answering this issue in the book: more minimal acceptance Cancellation and disregard of the findings following the premise of the critique (as I saw you mentioned briefly in the answer to one of the responses on the notebooks of faith)? Etc. Absolute acceptance and a statement that it does not contradict the belief (as an approach to evolution) etc. and as such one can ask - why did you stop writing in the IDF?

    More substantive question: In the fifth notebook you talk about the revelation you state that it is clear that it is a real revelation and it follows from this that you do not think it is a natural event that is interpreted incorrectly (like a volcanic eruption and the like), what is this assumption based on? Seemingly the answer to that in a notebook is pretty weak. Is it not really possible that a volcanic event made the people think it was a revelation and not it? (By the way, if there is a really good answer to this, this is a point that I think should be added to the notebook)

    Thank you and Shabbat Shalom,
    I do not of course have a problem with you not accepting things, but I think it is important to make sure that you consider them seriously and then reject them, and not just because of prejudices or concerns (which is against the norm). At the moment it seems to me that the notebooks will be published as a first book, followed by a book on Jewish thought (Providence, Miracles and Nature, reduction, the virtue of Israel, Zionism, etc.), and finally a book on Halacha and Meta Halacha (authority, changes, nature of rulings, etc.). In relation to criticism I am far from an expert so I dedicate one chapter to the matter just so that the picture is as complete as possible. My principled opinion is that there are probably later parts in the Torah, and that does not bother me very much. For me what is needed (as I wrote in the fifth notebook) is an interaction with God in Sinai. What software and what is given there is less important. I stopped at Ezekiel because I do not have time and the discussions are going in unnecessary directions. Why think of a volcanic event? All the pyrotechnics described there do not seem to me a historical description but a legendary one. That is why pyrotechnics is the least significant part for me. The people report that he is experiencing revelation and the voice of God is speaking to him. It has nothing to do with volcanic events.

  9. A':
    I read some of the notebooks - they are very interesting and it will take me a while to go through them very thoroughly - and I wanted to comment [maybe I will respond there later] to the response you received to the notebooks from "Abram the Hebrew" who owns the blog "Land of the Hebrews".

    The Hebrew Abram wrote to you arrogantly that you have a "mission" from him to engage in the study of the academic Bible and that without knowledge in the field all your method "falls" and does not even begin

    You wrote to him in a tone that seems apologetic that you did not engage in the field because it is impossible to engage in everything, etc.

    Although the study of the Bible is not a major occupation for me but because I had several courses in the history of Israel that dealt with biblical times and because out of personal interest I read and occasionally read articles and materials on the subject to get to know the matter etc. I can certainly formulate a position Contrary to the words of Abram the Hebrew, this is not really "her scream" and it is a full field of unsubstantiated hypotheses that are stated as absolute facts, hypotheses clearly built on agendas at a level that is very difficult to hide and the archaeological research that accompanies biblical research does not provide much established factual evidence.

    As with everything in this field, there are sometimes interesting and original and important insights, but most of it is what I wrote above, the questions that arise from it about faith and tradition are usually not as strong as they make them. To be honest, the issue still bothers people after dealing with it for decades

    I have not elaborated here on the reasons for the tenure I have set. I can happily take the opportunity to give examples if you wish.

    Abram the Hebrew is a biblical doctoral student who is "poisoned" on the subject that seems to him to be the gospel of the generation and he feels a real passion of mission to "spread the light" on the matter and he shows almost personal anger over those who are not interested or those who do not receive Deep emotionally in the field it is hard for him to see that there are those who are not interested in it or who are not as eager as he is

    That's the point so you have nothing to feel sorry for

    Hope I was saved
    Hello. In the meantime I read a bit about it (as part of writing the second book in the trilogy). I think you're overestimating this area (though I also think its importance is exaggerated). There is not bad evidence for division into certificates, but when it comes to the connection time of each certificate, I think the situation is much more speculative. Anyway, thanks for your comment.
    For nothing, I am always happy to help I do not think my contempt is excessive - I do not know what exactly you were impressed by what is called "certificate theory" but from my impression it is very unconvincing evidence, completely speculative and not to forget the "negligent editor" problem that makes this theory very difficult In general, in addition to the fact that her specific arguments are not as strong as I wrote, I do not claim that there is nothing in the field of biblical study that is worth referring to and clarifying - as in almost every field it consists of interesting and worthwhile things but also a little full of mambo jumbo. I was more preoccupied with the archeological interest in this field and questions such as how it is that such a large and resonant event ["then the Red Champions of Moab were terrified will hold a tremor, etc."] And I studied it as much as I could and developed an opinion on the subject and found an answer that would satisfy me and what I want to say is that I do not just underestimate and the fact that parts of biblical research since I saw interest in dealing with them and raised questions took my place [on the Exodus in archeology ] but II do not think this is such a difficult and challenging subject - even in things that have raised questions in my mind - and certainly not in something that in the words of Abram the Hebrew to you without which "everything does not begin" - as I wrote he is "poisoned" on the subject and greatly exaggerates its importance and challenge. Regarding 2 things I mentioned here about the Exodus in archeology and the fact that the field of biblical study is full of "opinions in research" that are not clearly free of ideological agendas I bring you here a link to an article worth reading most of the Exodus in archeology :
    interesting. Things are known. It's like in evolution that many are trending or actually liars.
    Indeed, an interesting example of how biblical research topics are discussed with much more ideological fervor than research is the debate over the Papyrus Epiphany. "Repentance" here in the land of "dialogue" etc. For them this papyrus is "as a source of much loot" compared to atheist organizations that will make every effort to prove that it is not a papyrus on the Ten Plagues and the Exodus sometimes it is just amusing to see it, do a Google search on this papyrus More than references to academic research, one finds references to the sites of converts and atheists who quarrel about it. What is this papyrus that has such a heated debate about it? :
    Familiar. I think it started with Valikovsky.
    Indeed, I think Volikovsky who started with this in general a lot of people and especially in the "dialogue" organizations and the like are enthusiastic about Volikovsky and his books very briefly say that his method needs great study and he makes far-reaching claims that one should be careful with the ancient Egyptian scholars. 500 years, etc. - and of course on the other hand not to disqualify them just because in the world of research it is considered a "red sheet" R. Berman in quite a few of the things he wrote in the article from the link I brought and in addition a few more things…. Indeed, what was mentioned in Rabbi Berman's article that he described one of the familiar ways of believers embarrassed to see the Exodus as not a historical but allegorical story and a story with a spiritual and non-documentary message is an option that is not acceptable to me at all and beautiful Rabbi Berman wrote - who also does not accept This way and all his article from there proceeds from the premise that this is a historical story that the Torah tells us - that the whole Torah is built on the fact that it is a real story [and I will add that not only religious consequences but even very real commandments related to the land of Egypt You shall not despise an Egyptian because you lived in his land ”] and according to him there and there is something to extend and so on
    Although his article is not without its problems. For example, the claim that 600,000 is a typological number (that a thousand is a unit and not necessarily a thousand details) is certainly not true. The Torah brings a detailed quorum of the tribes and sums it all up and reaches 600,000. The numbers of firstborns and Levites have already been treated in several places.

  10. M':
    I read most of the notebooks through the site and in my opinion any argument can be argued (although in general they are convincing - and in my opinion the argument from epistemology is the most convincing) but the totality of the arguments together certainly determines the weight (according to the evidence goes to the atheist).

    In this regard I have seen on the Internet a blog (unnamed) that has written to share (sharply) your conclusions. Apparently 'Abraham is playing with mistakes' - did you rest on his words somewhere?
    Agree that the argument is mostly from the whole. So I wrote in my words. The reactions are from stressed atheists and there really are none in them. I have written comments to all his and others' reviews, but the site my student set up a few years ago no longer exists. What I found is on the site.

  11. iodine:
    Hi Michi
    I am in the fifth notebook quoting

    It follows that he who keeps all the mitzvos because he sees God as his God and is committed to him, but in his opinion the mitzvos are human intuition (his or others'), i.e. he is an infidel at Mount Sinai, there is no religious value to his mitzvos. [1] [1] I will not go into the question here of what of the totality of the mitzvos is given in Sinai. I will deal with this in the next two books.
    But as stated these are the words of Maimonides why does it obligate me?
    And if there was no Mount Sinai status and the commandments that the children of Israel accepted were from Sabra (Sabra Dauriyta is not it?) Or in prophecy over the years is it not good enough?
    All of Maimonides' attempt to explain what was at Mount Sinai is an attempt at whether it fits what was (if there was) where Maimonides was from)
    As for Sabra Dauriyta, I have just written a comprehensive article on this subject. See the article page "On Beliefs and Their Meaning". Turns things out, Hasbra gives the content of the thing, and yet without a commandment there is no real Dauriyta mitzvah here (e.g. no punishments for it).
    Beyond that, Hasbra cannot create the principle that Sabra Dauriyta if without it there is no such thing as Dauriyta. After all, if everything is opinion and there is no exaggeration, then what is the meaning of the term "Sabra Dauriyta"?

    These words of Maimonides to me are a simple Sabra (and Sabra Dauriyta, as is well known). His words do not bind you. The truth binds you. Therefore I do not ask that they receive it by virtue of the authority of Maimonides but by virtue of the fact that this is the truth. A person is not made a mitzvah because he has decided that it is right to do so (I insisted on this in the fourth notebook. The existence of a source of validity for morality and the status of the commandment).

    In order for there to be a commandment here, a mitzvah is needed. Mitzvot that the people of Israel decide to keep just like that have no meaning of mitzvah. Who commanded? Who do you obey? It is at best a good deed (if any), but certainly not a mitzvah. This is what Maimonides writes that it has a value (from the sages of the nations of the world) but not a religious value (from their followers).

    If commandments were received by virtue of prophecy, this needs two aspects: 1. Who said that there is such a thing as prophecy, and that software is binding? After all, it is written in the Torah, but it itself was given in prophecy. 2. Who said that the Prophet really received from God and did not fantasize? It is not for nothing that the Torah gives us tests to test a prophet. Did this also itself (= the parshas of the prophecy in the Torah) come in the prophecy? Jesus and Muhammad were also prophets who brought mitzvos to their people.

    All this does not mean that all the details were given in Sinai, as I remarked there. But there must be a class with some interaction that constitutes the concept of commandment and mitzvah. Then come interpretations and extensions from Sabra or prophecy.

  12. Raz:
    Hello Rabbi,
    From a partial reading of the notebooks arose the discussion of concrete and potential collection. Beyond the fact that belief in the existence of concrete infinity is strange, do you have a convincing argument that such existence indeed is not possible?
    Are there any sources / philosophy books on the subject that you can give me?

    Concrete infinity leads to contradictions. The proof that he does not exist is by way of negation: the assumption of his existence leads to contradictions.
    You can of course ask whether such ontological proof is valid, since it hides that it is a logical matter we draw a conclusion about reality (that it does not exist).
    I think Yuval Steinitz commented on this in his books. But you will not find a better argument than the next to the absurd. If the possibility of logical arguments in this context is ruled out - there is no other way out.
    Once a concept is contradictory there is no point in talking about it. Do you have proof that there is no round triangle? There is no proof other than that if it is a triangle it is not round, and vice versa.
    Hi I did not explain myself properly. I accept the fact that if there is indeed a logical contradiction then a concrete infinity does not exist. My question is is there such a logical contradiction? In your notebooks I did not see a real contradiction but at most a "strangeness" created by the assumption that a concrete infinity exists (as for example in the example with the hotel with an infinity of rooms - I did not see a real contradiction there). What do you think is the most convincing argument that a concrete SS does not exist?
    This is a question that needs entry into mathematical issues (the problems and contradictions that arise in the careless definition of infinity in a non-potential but concrete way). I do not know what your knowledge is in the field, but you should look in the mathematical literature.
    Okay so that's what I'm looking for does not appear in notebooks. Anyway as far as I understand most of the mathematicians do accept the existence of a concrete infinity. In set theory when we talk about a group of numbers (infinite) we mean in the concrete sense no?
    I do not think you are right. In my opinion most mathematicians do not accept this. In Cantor's teachings it is about the infinities as concrete beings and this has been criticized. I think he does not define infinities but deals with the relationship between them and assumes that they exist. But when you try to define them, you run into contradictions or at least a vague compromise. On the philosophical level it is enough for us that the interpretation is vague to claim that there is no claim that contains infinity because of a real alternative proposal. As far as I understand, even in the group of numbers we are not talking about a concrete infinity, but about a number of organs that is greater than any known number (or: that every organ has a follower in the group). This is a potential definition.
    Okay in terms of the really accurate mathematical definitions I have no knowledge of the subject and you may be right.
    To me, however, one of the strongest rebuttals to the cosmological argument is made by accepting that the world has always existed or alternatively there has been an endless chain of great compensators. In any case the issue of concrete infinity enters into each of the arguments.
    Intuitively, however, I and many others have no problem accepting the existence of a concrete SS (after all, there is a serious current that accepts the existence of a concrete infinity).
    And another thing, this language is about some kind of "there" that exists for an infinite amount of time. It is not that at any moment there is a concrete infinite "there" but: there is a finite "there" only for an infinite period of time. Therefore, it can be said that all sorts of arguments that supposedly try to say that a concrete SS does not exist, are irrelevant because they talk about a "yes" that exists at a given moment and not about the infinite regression in time (the timeline for me is not "there" but only a mental concept ).

    I think any attempt to rely on the cosmological argument requires a real explanation for why a concrete infinity does not exist, otherwise it drops the claim. In my opinion at least.
    I'm sorry but I had to add another comment to make things clear:

    The claim that the world exists for infinity of time (whether through infinity of great compensators or that the world is ancient, etc.) is the main antithesis that the world was created by God! Most atheists will tell you that. So this is not some small crack but a significant hole that actually collapses the notebooks 2 and 3 you wrote because as I understand them they are based on the fact that the universe can not exist as time. So it surprised me that I did not see a serious reference to the subject in these notebooks. For example: Hilbert's hotel is irrelevant to me because it only shows a "strangeness" that seems to us and not a real logical contradiction.

    That is why it was important for me to remark that when it comes to such an important subject (whether there is a Creator for the world or not) and the very profound notebooks you have written, there must be an in-depth reference to this subject as well. After all, you are addressing an intellectual target audience that is not afraid to receive an in-depth mathematical / philosophical background, from reading your very clear and sharp articles, it is clear that you are the man with the appropriate knowledge and ability to enlighten us.

    Thank you goodnight
    Raz Shalom.
    I'm not an expert though I think I could explain more. But I think in a philosophical text it is impossible to get into mathematical formalism (and that requires real formalism). I therefore felt that it was enough for me to point out that the concept is not well defined and therefore cannot constitute a philosophical alternative. In other words, the burden of proof is on whoever offers the regression. You can not use a vague term and reject another proposal by virtue of it. As long as the concept is not clear to us it cannot be used even if theoretically it could exist in some other sense.
    By the way, even with regard to Cantor who is accused of referring to a concrete infinity, I am not sure that the accusation is true. He can talk about a hierarchy between potential concepts. But truth I am not an expert and it is difficult for me to set rivets on it.
    I think it's pretty clear that on a philosophical level the proposition of infinite regression is not an explanation but an escape from an explanation (in the sense of "turtles all the way down"). As a philosophical argument it suffices.
    As for the infinity of God, as far as I can remember I did refer to it. I'm not using a concrete infinity here. I can argue that it is greater than anything I can think of (or even that it is not infinite). I do not need it to be infinite in a concrete sense. But a regressive chain of explanations is by definition a concrete infinity.
    If you remember the specific sources you looked at and showed that the existence of a concrete SS is a contradiction, I would be happy to accept and look at them.

    Regarding the burden of proof: In my opinion, the burden of proof that such an SS does not exist is on those who claim that it does not exist and I will explain:

    1) The burden of proof is on those who make the least intuitive claim. When I think of a concrete SS in a simple way, the intuitive thought is that there is no reason why such a thing could not exist:
    A) The fact that most of the world held the view that the world was ancient and did not bother it that it assumes that the world exists for an infinite amount of time and this is an opinion that has ruled I think for about a thousand years.
    B) You too are constantly leaning on the mathematical formalism that is supposed to show that it does not exist. Which means that again, intuitively you also do not see that such an SS does not exist and you had to delve into the exact definitions and only then realize it (do not know with delving into yourself or you trust the mathematicians who delved).

    Therefore, I do not have to prove that such an SS exists, but you have to prove that it does not exist - because you are claiming something less intuitive, at least for the unbelieving person.

    2) Regardless of intuitive or not. I think that if there was no proof (nor refutation) that there is a Creator you would never have put on a kippah and prayed 3 prayers a day - you would not have been religious. That is, the basic situation in the absence of evidence is to be a secular person. I hope we agree on that.
    As a matter of principle I only managed to read the first 3 notebooks you wrote. The first notebook that talks about ontological vision is very problematic. I personally do not know if it is true or not, intuitively difficult to accept it and there is a side to assume that maybe someone will surpass some linguistic / mental failure. In any case, it is difficult to base this claim.
    And notebooks 2 and 3 are based on the assumption that a concrete SS does not exist!

    That is to say, note, every religious lifestyle you lead every second is based on the fact that in your opinion such an SS does not exist. Is it in your eyes a strong enough foundation for you to lean your lifestyle on? And so again, in my opinion in order to be whole with yourself that you are leading a rational lifestyle there must be a convincing argument that such an SS does not exist (or that the claim about an ancient world is contradictory) and not just some intuitive feeling.

    Enjoy chatting with you,
    Hello Raz.
    If your interest is on the philosophical level it is better to look for material on infinite regression that philosophers see as a failure. I just suggested that the basis for this view is the problematicity of the concreteness of infinity. An endless chain of explanations is an escape from an explanation and not an explanation. We just say there is an explanation and do not give it. This is a simple intuition so it is not worth getting into mathematical questions. Think about whether the egg preceded or the hen. Would you accept as an answer that there is an endless chain of egg-chicken-egg-chicken…? Alternatively, would you accept the turtle necklace as an answer? I do not think there is anyone who would see this as an answer. Or when you would ask me how the world was created I would answer you that there is an explanation, would it be satisfying? Infinite regression does no more than it does not give the explanation but only claims that somewhere it is asleep.

    For materials:
    There is what is called homunculus failure, which is also based on infinite regression:
    For details on the collection of failures in philosophy, see this book:

    Here is one primary source:
    And another one:
    And another one:

    As for the burden of proof, the physiological evidence is not based on the negation of infinite regression. This is one of the objections but it is unreasonable regardless of the failure. The formation of desert complexity is simply unexplained in endless regression. The simple explanation is that there was someone who created it.

    My religious lifestyle is not based on that but on the accumulation of evidence and tradition and the like. This is Hezi Lechatropi.
    During the discussion you wrote:
    "But a regressive chain of explanations is by definition a concrete infinity."
    This is in contrast to, for example, the group of natural numbers, which you regarded as a potential infinity.

    First of all, regarding the group of numbers - does not the very reference to it as a group assume that "everything in the group already exists" and thus constitutes a concrete infinity? If not - what does concrete infinity mean at all?

    As for the regressive chain of explanations - if this distinction has any meaning at all, then the chain looks much more "potential" than the set of natural numbers or certainly from God. After all, its whole meaning is that the fifth explanation has a sixth explanation, and the sixth explanation has a seventh explanation, and so on.

    And what is the alternative? It is easy to prove that either there is a circular explanation, or there is an endless chain of explanations, or there is something without an explanation. And I understand that none of these alternatives are particularly magical to a philosopher.

    And regarding the reference to a concrete infinity in the faculties of mathematics:
    As of the end of the sophomore year in the math degree, it seems to me that we have been dealing with almost nothing but concrete infinity. We treat the "final case" in almost every context as trivial and boring. And even if it is possible to somehow reduce our reference to a stock-infinity to "potential infinity", it seems strange when we refer to a non-stock infinity

    How can a physical worldview live without a concrete infinity of points in space? Is the sheet we live in somehow approaching the metric on a finite set of points?

    Sorry if I extended too long in the complaints. Math lovers do not like to be touched indefinitely…
    Hello construction.

    I think this is exactly the explanation why an intuitive group is a contradictory concept (leading to the Russell paradox and more). So I refer to the set of numbers not as a set whose definition is closed but as an open definition (a group that contains 1 and all its followers on and on, lit a free number appointed, but I did not talk about a closed set of all numbers). But in the explanatory chain if you present it potentially you did not give an explanation, you just said there is an explanation. To say that there is an explanation is not to explain. To explain you must concretely present all the links in the chain.

    I did not understand the alternative question you presented. My contention is that there is no alternative, so the only acceptable alternative is a final explanation (God).
    This is an ostrich because a circular explanation is not an explanation, and an infinite chain is a concrete infinity.

    I'm not a mathematician, but in my opinion treating Infinity as concrete is just Shigra Dlishna. You can always (and should) translate things into potential terms. In the latest version I uploaded to the Note 2 website I have already made a note that in my poverty and ignorance it seems to me that even Cantor's hierarchy can be translated as such (i.e. he is not necessarily talking about concrete infinity, but making a hierarchy between potential concepts. .

    Precisely in the physical conception it is quite clear that our space is not infinite (although in relation to the distinction between infinite and unlimited, etc.). Of course there is an infinity of points as in the segment (0,1), but again it is a model and not a concrete infinity (otherwise you could just ask why in this segment there is no concrete infinity of dots. I think here too the answer is that there is as large a number as you want).
    Hello Rabbi,
    Regarding endless regression, you wrote, "An endless chain of explanations is an escape from an explanation and not an explanation. We just say there is an explanation and do not give it.
    Is not an argument about concrete infinity as a solution also an escape from explanation? In the exam "This is an infinite page all the way down"

  13. Daniel:
    Hello Rabbi, Regarding endless regression, you wrote, "An endless chain of explanations is an escape from an explanation and not an explanation. We're just saying there's an explanation and not giving it up. ' In the exam "This is an infinite page all the way down"
    Hello Daniel, it's better to start a new thread.
    I argued in my words that there is no concrete infinity, so where in my words did you see a claim to concrete infinity as a solution?
    Beyond that, one has to divide between an infinite pillar and an infinite chain. An infinite page may be something undefined to the end (this is the problem of infinity at all), but in infinite regression of explanations (chain) there is another problem beyond the definitions of infinity, and that is that there is no presentation of explanation but only a statement that there is an explanation. Note that this problem is not only due to the fact that it is an infinity but that it is an infinity of vertebrae that are held together. This is not the case on an infinite page.

  14. A:
    Hello Rabbi, I read the proof from the moral (in the fourth notebook),
    If I understood correctly, only the external entity to the system can determine the definitions of good and evil therefore only God can do that.
    On the other hand, when sages encountered a changing reality, even a moral one, they interpreted the Torah according to it, such as an eye under a financial eye [and of course assume that the simplification of the Torah is an eye for an eye (at least if the pest cannot pay), which is quite reasonable].
    As long as no prophecy is claimed in their time, there seems to be a problem here (ostensibly ..).

    I will be happy for your answering,
    I remind you that the sermon on an eye for an eye is not based on a moral consideration (at least not only on him), but on an under-the-eye sentence. In this Gemara it is presented as a common law (perhaps a kind of Lammam. I think that is how Maimonides sees it) that no one has ever disagreed with it (even a RA that apparently explicitly disagrees with it). Therefore, even if it is a simplification of the Torah (and this is also what the appellants are about), the demand also has a binding status. It is not as material in the hand of the Creator to lead the Torah where I want (to what is moral in my eyes). But all this is only a note to complete the picture, and it is not necessary for our purposes.
    In my remarks there, I did not claim that the Torah must define what morality is and what moral guidance is in every situation, meaning that without it we would not know it. I'm far from thinking so. On the contrary, the Torah commands "and you did what is right and good" and does not specify what is right and good. Hence it also builds on the conscience within us. To know what is moral it is enough for us to exercise our conscience and common sense and we will know what is good. Usually it's not even that complicated. What I have argued is a completely different claim: that if there is no belief in God in the background, then our conscience is nothing but a tendency that is built into us and nothing else. If I believe in God, and I assume he enacts the morality inherent in me, then the moral guidelines I find within me (and not in the Torah) can take binding effect. God is a condition for morality to have binding force, but does not need it to know what morality is.
    See my website, column 15

  15. Moriah:
    Hello Reverend.

    As for the cosmological proof as formulated in the second notebook
    Assumption A: Anything we have experience with should have a reason (or cause).
    Assumption B: There are such things (the universe, us, or any other object).
    Conclusion: There should be a reason for the existence of these things. We will call it X1.

    Apparently it can be argued that Assumption A is wrong. The energy and matter of the whole universe have no reason. Basically all we have experience with is just mass and energy in all kinds of clothing so we are used to saying that mass and energy in a particular clothing is their cause it is mass and energy in the previous clothing, but basically it is not cause and effect it is mass and energy that changed clothing.
    I did not understand the claim. The mass and energy of the universe (= the singular point of the bang), what is their cause?
    It could be argued that for some reason they have no reason, but I think this is a very renewed claim, so the opposite assumption seems much more plausible.
    When we make generalizations there is always speculation and we can always say the opposite. Thus we assume that the laws of gravity we knew about our sphere also apply to the moon or other galaxies. But maybe not? After all, it is quite possible that it is only with us. But May? We make generalization, and whoever wants to qualify it has the burden of proof on him. Unless otherwise proven essays behave the same everywhere. The same is true of the causes of all mass and energy.
    If I understood correctly the cosmological argument is based on the assumption that "everything we have experience about should have a reason" and therefore we conclude that the universe also has a reason. Why assume that everything should have a reason? (Sorry if this sounds like a silly question to a rabbi, I'm trying to figure out a point that's not so clear to me).
    Greetings. The same can be said about the law of gravitation. Perhaps all the mass bodies that have fallen to the land to this day are just cases in ignorance, and in fact there is no law of gravitation. This is a very good question, and some important philosophers have already struggled with it (David Day for example). The assumption of causality is an assumption of rational and scientific thinking. Whoever does not accept it - it will be difficult to convince him that it is correct. But science is built on it and so is the rest of our thinking. Therefore one who assumes rational thinking should be persuaded by the cosmological argument. Those who are irrational can always deny the existence of Gd (and also the law of gravitation of course).
    good week. I mean we are based on the experience we have that everything has a reason, I want to challenge that (without contradicting the day). It just seems to us that everything has a reason but it is not accurate. I understand that physically all we have in the universe is mass and energy in all kinds of clothes, that is, a table is mass and energy in table clothes, wood is mass and energy in wood clothes. If so far this is more or less true, I proceed to the next step, from our experience we know that if there is a table it means there was a carpenter who wanted to build a table and trees and that is basically the reason for the table. But to call it a reason is inaccurate, the truth that the table was preceded by mass and energy in a different attire = carpenter and trees, who converted their attire to the table. That is, it is not that everything has a cause but that every mass and energy in clothing X preceded mass and energy in clothing Y.

    We cannot project from changing the shape of mass and energy to the existence of mass and energy itself.
    It is not just the transformation of mass and energy that has a cause. When a voice is heard behind you you assume there is a reason for it. Every event that takes place here has a reason. If any other particle or cuff is formed in front of your astonished eyes, assume that there was a reason for it. It is therefore likely that the formation of matter (mass and energy) also has a cause. There was a big bang, probably something made him. By the way, the bang is not the formation of matter but only its transformation. So if you want to think of the bang which is a normal change in the shape of the mass and the energy that was then contracted and started to swell.
    When a sound is heard behind me it is also just a change of mass and energy (as far as I understand, I am not a physicist.) If a particle or object is formed in front of my eyes then I will know that there was mass and energy here that changed their shape into a particle or current object. I accept that the assumption that everything has a reason is intuitive but I want to argue that it is wrong. If I understood correctly it is actually induction, everything we know has a reason then the world also has a reason. This assumption seems correct but it is not, we do not know that everything has a reason we just know that every mass and energy in some way preceded another mass and energy. So for the bang also the bang was a deformation of mass and energy. Thank you so much for the time the rabbi devotes to me.
    I do not quite understand where we are stuck. As I have explained it is clear that this is not about certainty but only about probability. The question is what is more likely in your eyes: that everything has a reason or not. Do you argue that it is more likely that there are no reasons for the formation of the universe? based on what? My logic is that formation has a greater necessity to have a cause than a transformation. The processes of change are less dramatic than the processes of formation. Alternatively, let's adopt for the purpose of the discussion your thesis, that things are more likely to have no cause for formation, so even for mass and energy changes it is not clear that there is always (if at all) a cause. After all, this is just an assumption of rational thinking, and it has no evidence of any kind. Therefore it can also be argued just as much as the broader assumption. So why do you assume that in transformations it is true that everything has a reason? And what about transformations on the moon or in other places and times? Why did you decide to stop the causal generalization precisely with transformations? I further added that even for your method that there is causality only to deformation, the bang was only a deformation and not a formation, and therefore the question also arises as to whether it had a cause and what it was. In other words, even the causal chain of deformation that leads up to us is infinite, unless one assumes that it has a beginning without a cause of its own. You can refer to the formation itself as the first transformation (as you have decided, quite arbitrarily, regarding the example I gave of a particle formed in front of your eyes, which is only a transformation and not a formation). I do not see a significant difference between them, and if at all then the formation needs more reason than the said change.
    The rabbi does not understand my intention. I will try again.
    Our intuition says that everything has a reason. Agrees. Now I want to test this intuition in cold logic. Seemingly this is an induction that we do naturally and even unconsciously. In our experience we have always seen that everything has a reason. I want to say; No, it's confusing it seems to be a reason but it's not a reason. There is no reason for anything. There is also no reason for changes in the shape of mass and energy. There is legitimacy, not reason. We know that X-shape mass and energy will always change to a Y-shape. That's why we call it a cause. I mean we know what's going on, we do not know why it's happening. So I think the word "cause" is confusing because it makes us think "why" when it comes to "what".
    When I ask a scientist what the reason is for putting water on a warming fire, I actually mean that he will detail to me what the physical process of warming the water is. After this analysis I did it turns out that cause = the previous form of mass and energy.

    We will then rephrase the assumption at the base of the cosmological argument, instead of "Assumption A: Everything we have experience about should have a reason (or cause)." We will be precise:
    Assumption A: Anything we have experience with should have a previous form of mass and energy.

    It seems to me that when we formulate Assumption A in this way, and as I have explained it is the exact wording, all evidence falls.

    Thank you
    I really do not agree.
    First, causality is not the result of learning from experience but a priori assumption, as Day showed. Observations never give you a causal relationship between events.
    Second, science, contrary to what many think, does deal with reasons and not just descriptions. Tali as an example the law of gravitation. His description would say that a body moves in some way when there is another X with a mass of M. It is the law of gravitation. But the theory of gravitation is not satisfied with the law of gravitation, that is, with the description of motion and circumstances, but also states that there is a force of gravity, that is, there is a physical that causes this motion. No one has seen this force, and yet every physicist believes it exists. And why? Because this movement must have a reason, and the force (or something that causes the force. In physical terminology: the "sources of charge" of the force) is the cause. Only for this reason can billions of dollars be invested in particle accelerators that seek gravitons (the particles that carry the force of gravity).
    Again, you can deny this and say that you do not believe in the existence of a gravitational force, but human intuition and rational and scientific thinking do assume that. Not only that, but these assumptions are usually realized (find the particles of force. In the electromagnetic field they have already found - the photons. In gravity not yet).
    The shape changes you are talking about describe a transition from one shape to another, i.e. a chain of situations. But science believes that these changes are caused by something that is out of the picture of these successive forms. There is some hand that changes from form A to form B (like the force in the example of gravity).
    In short, it is also about "why" and not just "what".
    Water warming is not just a description of a process, but involves theoretical entities that operate and generate this process.
    I think denying the assumption that everything has a reason and not just a description is a denial of one of the most agreed upon and universal assumptions that each of us has. It is usually the believers who try to explain to atheists that science is about "what" and the Torah or faith explain the "why". And not her. It's a mistake.
    If causality is an a priori assumption then indeed my contention is null and void. I'll do my homework. Regarding the force of gravity. What is science looking for? If I understood speaking, science is still looking for a more basic mass or energy that changes its shape to the force of gravity. Are the sources of charge not or mass or energy? The rabbi wrote, "I think that denying the assumption that everything has a reason and not just a description is a denial of one of the most agreed-upon and universal assumptions that exists in each of us." There are quite a few scientists who claim that the formation of the world has no reason, probably it is not so agreed and universal.
    The very assumption that there is a force of gravity and not just a law of gravity indicates causality rather than alterations in form. It is not any basic mass and energy. Assume there is such a force because otherwise things would not have been pleasant towards each other. The sources of charge are the masses themselves (they exert the gravitational force that attracts other masses). What I wrote that science is looking for is gravitons, which are the particles that conduct gravitational force. How come we have any at all? Almost no one denies this assumption, but want to qualify it in relation to the formation of the world. This is where the cosmological and physico-theological evidence comes in, which says that if there is an assumption of causality, it does not make sense to exclude something just like that.
    Can the rabbi give me an example of why science recognizes it as not mass or energy? I understood the power of gravity itself from the rabbi that science has not yet found. Thanks again for the time and patience.
    Science has found the power of gravity. By Newton's inference. What they are looking for is the gravitons that carry it. But "found" here does not mean seen with the eyes or a measure, but concluded. As stated, every cause is a result of inference and only inference. One never sees in the eyes a causal relationship between events. By your definition of "find" it is clear that you will not find a find of science that is not matter or energy. I have therefore given the example of the force of gravity which is not found in this sense but in the inferior sense. Incidentally, even energy (as a kind of entity) was not found but deduced from its existence. And in principle no matter, because just because we see it does not mean that there is something there. You can also stimulate the neurons in the brain so that you "see" what I want. All inferences and all common sense. Anyone who doubts this will not be left with anything. Please and happily.
    Following our correspondence on the principle of causality, someone told me that there is an experiment that contradicts the principle of causality. I could not understand the experiment because it is laden with complicated concepts (for me) in physics. The experiment is: Delayed choice quantum eraser I assume the rabbi is familiar with the experiment, does it really contradict the principle of causality?
    Do not know, but in quantum there are many appeals to the principle of causality. It appears there differently than in classical physics, etc.
    So why does this not overturn the cosmological argument based on the principle of causality?
    For two main reasons: 1. The principle of causality is still true in the macroscopic world. Quantum deals only with the micro. 2. Quantum theory also has causality, but it appears differently (there are quite a few disagreements on these matters). The principle of causality remains. And above all, the fact is that no one, including physicists, thinks that if something happened in his environment he happened for no reason.
    The second reason I accept. But I did not understand the first reason. If we say that in quantum - in the micro, there is no causality then there is no need for a reason for the universe because the universe started from a micro that does not need a cause and all other evolution of the universe already has a reason.
    In your opinion, the principle of causality should not exist in our world either, since in micro there is no causality and then also in macro (which is nothing but a collection of microbes) there should be no causality. The mistake lies in the transition from micro to macro. A macroscopic body is a collection of lots of small bodies (atoms or molecules). Even if each of the bodies behaves randomly, the large body acts deterministically (according to the law of large numbers), and thus the quantum effects are "spread" in the transition to our world, which is completely causal.

  16. Pine XNUMX:
    Hello Reverend,
    I have not yet read the booklets (oh I intend to do so).
    I wanted to ask, regarding the proof of the existence of a God who created the world (at the moment I am not talking about the giving of Torah).
    Over the years I have discussed this with myself and come up with evidence that to me is strong, and to me even at the level of certainty. I'm not a scientist, so maybe this will seem too simplistic to you, I would still love it if you would mind:
    The existence of human consciousness proves that there must be a dimension above or beyond material physics. That is, every living thing has this sense (which I do not know of a scientific definition) of "I". Within the material body there is someone.
    For example, if science succeeds in the future, in creating an exact replication of a person or animal, will that person be aware? The same person will be able to function completely like any other person, but will there be the same part of my consciousness? I just do not.
    Would it be permissible to murder that duplicate person? Sure. Because there is only a lump of meat there… it's like destroying a car or a computer.
    It seems to me that this consciousness is called a soul, and if there is a soul, then of course not everything is material here…

    2. How does science treat the possibility of infinity back in time?
    After all, we can always carry what was before X in the power of X, etc. years ago.
    Of necessity we will have to say that time began sometime… and this is what happened in the creation of the world.
    Him to created the material including time.

    3. How random evolution (the one that denies the Creator) gets along with:
    Male and female, the reproductive organs that fit? Did one mutation ever "decide" to split into two complementary types?
    Creation of organs of vision? The blind mutation knew about the existence of light, color, etc., and then began to produce visual organs?
    Same goes for all the senses, and all the other organs.
    In general, it is very difficult for me to understand the logic. With all the perfection of the species in the universe etc.
    There is much more logic that there was a deliberate evolution.

    Happy New Year
    Oren J.
    1. It is possible that when you duplicate a person a soul will enter into it. This is what happens when you fertilize an egg with sperm. You make a biological person and a soul enters into it. For your charged object, there are those who claim that our mind and mental dimension is a collective characteristic of the mind (emerging from the material whole) and not another kind of entity. See Freedom Science Books.
    2. See my second notebook on the site. Anyway, it's not really a science but more a philosophy.
    Intentional evolution is not evolution. Unless you mean guidance through the laws of nature. For the genealogical tree, see any book or site on evolution.

  17. A':
    Hello Rabbi
    I'm in the middle of reading your notebook on the subject of physico-theological proof, in a section that talks about evolution.
    1) What laws are you talking about that are responsible for the progress of evolution? And that they need an explanation for their very existence? Because natural selection is not a law of nature it is simply a mechanism. Once there is a reality and there is a level of adaptation to reality on the part of the creatures, the more appropriate will remain at the expense of the least. I do not see here any "law" that needs an explanation for its existence.
    2) I understand that looking at the chance of life being created versus the chance of not being created at all, it seems like there is no chance. But can it not be argued that the universe was created and destroyed countless times, and we are the successful case? That is, in one case within an infinity of attempts to which we were not exposed, all life and we too were created. Which eliminates the admiration of the low probability. Is this a valid claim?
    1. The laws of nature. Natural selection occurs entirely within the laws of physics and chemistry and biology. If they were others there would be no natural choice and there would be no living Christians. I think I explained it there.
    2. It can be argued, but here we claim that there have been countless different universes with different creatures that none of this we have ever met. So this is a simpler theory than the theory that assumes he was a creator? After all, this theory assumes the existence of countless different and strange creatures without us having ever seen any of them. Whereas here one assumes the existence of one creature which we have not seen. The argument of simplicity is decisive in favor of the second theory. Otherwise any successful or unreasonable case can be explained in this way (maybe there was a demon who did it).

  18. A':
    Hello Rabbi
    I read in one of your notebooks that randomness can only be found in the quantum dimension, but in the actual reality we know there is no randomness, and if there was not enough information we could calculate the result. If so, is it that it rained tomorrow is a predictable thing, as long as we had enough information? And my actions, too, are predictable? And what is the place of providence if everything is predictable in the real world?
    Thanks and happy holiday
    Indeed there is no place. In my estimation there is no supervision (except in the passive sense: tracking our actions). There may of course be sporadic interventions by God in what is going on here but the usual move is a world as is his custom.
    Just one more note. Even if there was randomness in the macroscopic world it would be contrary to providence. Providence is not random to define these concepts see Freedom Science Books.
    And does this have anything to do with chaos theory?
    No connection. Chaos is utterly deterministic. See a chapter on chaos in the books of the science of freedom.
    But if I have a choice, I can change the deterministic worldview, and produce different results. If so there is no world as its custom, but we are responsible for its future.
    of course. A world as it is practiced means: nature according to its laws and we have free will. A world as its custom does not necessarily mean determinism but only a lack of external involvement (Gd).
    Thanks. So what did you mean when you wrote "sporadic interventions by God in what is happening here". If the image is deterministic, then it can not be interfered with, can it? And is it possible to set an example?
    He created the laws of nature so he can either intervene to change or freeze. But in practice he does not seem to be doing so.
    And if the events are indeed deterministic, then so are my actions, so where is my choice expressed?
    No way? Nature is deterministic and man has freedom. Why is this related to it?
    The biology and chemistry in my brain are not deterministic? Do not require X and y actions that I will do?
    They are deterministic but if you are a libertan (like me) then you assume there is a mental factor that can affect them and start a chemical or physiological process on its own. See in detail in the books of the science of freedom.
    Happy Holidays
    1) The biology and chemistry in my brain are not deterministic? Do not require X and y actions that I will do? Or is there no connection between it and determinism?
    2) If so, do you not hope that your request "and give a blessing" will be useful? And do not you think that the affair of "and was if heard" is correct? Does that mean that there are practical consequences to our moral behavior? (And I mean rather the moral, meaning that if we become more moral the world will be better also physically, and not that if we become more moral then it will also have practical effects, such as cohesion in the people, and this will also lead to practical benefit…). And will the rebukes against the people, that if they do not keep the word of God, be banished from the land, are these also just speculations that happened by chance?
    I will be happy for your answering
    I have already written here that I do not expect, and indeed the requests in the prayers have lost some of their meaning. I can hope that maybe this time God will decide to intervene, but that usually does not happen.
    I explain the matter of the verses by changing God's leadership in reality. Once upon a time there was probably involvement, but as the prophecy disappeared and the miracles disappeared, so did his ongoing involvement disappear. See briefly as 95% d7% a9-% d7% 90% d7% 97% d7% a8-% d7% 90% d7% 9c% d7% 95% d7% 94% d7% 99% d7% 9d-% d7% 91% d7 % a2% d7% 95% d7% 9c% d7% 9d /
    In the book I am currently writing about current theology I will expand on this.
    thank you for the answer. So in your opinion, if today, compared to the past, let's say we are exiled from the land, or any other punishment that the individual will suffer, should not look for a moral reason that caused it and try to correct it, but look for a "natural" reason (if any) and treat it? And should no punishment be seen as "teaching a lesson" but as a result of the necessity of reality?
    Do you think that science's answers to the determinism of reality are absolute? Or is that what it looks like today? I doubt if there are any experiments that have been able to accurately predict the weather for example (even though I know there is the chaos effect in addition), or to accurately predict any other phenomenon.
    Clearly there are lacunae in science, and in complex phenomena there is no possibility of prediction. And yet as our understanding progresses we understand more and more (the range and quality of forecasting in the weather also improves greatly).
    Moreover, we also understand very well why it is not possible to predict in complex areas such as the weather, and it does not seem to be the hand of God. It's just complicated math. Complication is not the hand of God. As far as we understand today there is no unnatural involvement in what is happening in the world. If there was one, then the medical findings tested on Gentiles were not supposed to be applicable to Jews (at least observant ones) and so on.
    Building a theology on the lack of scientific knowledge (the so-called god of the gaps) is not my favorite. In this way, God is "pushed" into narrower and narrower corners as scientific knowledge advances. This is unlikely.
    As a rule, no scientific theory is certain, and I still have high confidence in the findings of science.
    If you see the progress of reality to the human stage as a pre-planned thing, if I understood correctly from what you said in the notebook about the physicological theological proof, that the constants are exactly the ones that caused all this to form. Does it not make sense to you that the end act in thought first is not only in man, but very far in the future? If you can see it up to the human stage, why not also see it up to the third house building stage for example? Then in fact it is also a kind of certain providence, that reality will roll over there whether we act this way or otherwise, it will reach a definite stage in reality in the future because it is pre-defined for it.
    This is possible for a particular point in time or for big goals (redemption, Messiah, etc.). But in everyday practice there is no hint of divine intervention. All according to the laws of nature.
    It is possible then that for great purposes like Messiah, no matter what we are chosen as human beings to do, we will always reach the same state of Messiah in the end. This, too, is a kind of providence, on history.
    Right. This is what I wrote.

  19. Isaac:
    From what you said in notebook 3:

    If the ray of light, or a quantum particle, behaves as if they are moving toward a goal and not for a reason, and in particular it is clear that they have no ability to decide to move or not to move for that purpose, one is asked to think there is another factor driving them and using them for its purposes. He wants the beam of light to move at the fastest trajectory, or for the particle to move in a way that minimizes the functionalities that control its trajectory.

    This may be what you mean and just did not imply to me from what you said, so I will phrase the question in my own words: we call quantum processes (specific to which of the self-vectors the complex wave function will collapse) as random, since (not only show a certain random distribution in multiple measurements but also) the wave function itself represents Probability of being found (as evidenced by a single particle experiment through 2 cracks). Still, this decision happens somehow. The fact that it responds to a certain distribution in multiple experiments (which in the above example differs from a Gaussian pair and shows a sink of wave interference) still does not change the fact that some mechanism collapses the wave function. The person who believes in providence would say that there is certainly an example here of a mechanism, the end of a thread, that the Creator has left within creation that allows for this intervention.

    My question or request is whether you can summarize your statement on the subject since I did not fully understand from reading what you said (in which you refer to it in a levy on one perception or another, and less directly).
    Hello Isaac, I refer to this in a slightly different context in the chapter on quantum in the books of the science of freedom. The name of the discussion is where the intervention of the human will in physics, but the logic is very similar. My contention is that quantum theory does not help us in this matter, because the intervention of a will, human or divine, makes the collapse something random. The distribution is dictated by the wave function, but if the human or divine will determines where it will collapse then this distribution is incorrect.
    And more generally, free choice (like divine intention) is a third mechanism: neither randomness nor determinism. And as for your question, there is nothing that "collapses" the wave function. It's a random process. This is at least the accepted perception, until they find an explanation through a theory of hidden variables.
    Hello and thanks for the answer.
    If I understood correctly, the problem with the collapse being determined by divine intervention is that then the process ceases to be random. However, to my understanding this randomness only expresses our inability to point out the mechanism and its suitability on the other hand for a particular distribution. It is true that this is not in the same sense as macroscopic processes (where the statistical nature is only because it is difficult for us to trace all the factors, so we are satisfied with a statistical moment or two, but the process itself is deterministic). At the quantum level indeed the wave itself represents the probability of being at a certain point. But how can the hypothesis that it is by virtue of a third party, as above, be sent in the absence of knowledge of the above-mentioned collapsing mechanism? In other words, if the reason we define the process as random is that the distribution of the superposition collapse of the wave functions to the self-vectors corresponds to a certain distribution - (combined with the macro here it really is not determined until the moment of collapse, and not only unknown to us) - why we are committed to semantics. But then it's not random ”? How can a possibility for a third party be rejected as aforesaid? And that the adaptation in multiple experiments to a certain distribution contradicts (so at least I understood what you said) the possibility of such a mechanism ?!

    I am of course not making a definite claim here, but from what you have said I at least understand that such an assumption would be (not only unproven but if really) contradictory to the findings, and I would be happy to understand why.
    Thank you,
    Isaac Bernstein
    Quantum theory describes the distribution of a crash to any of the situations in the superposition. If there is divine intervention then the collapse does not occur according to this distribution. Distribution describes a random process (unless there are hidden variables, then it's like the use of macroscopic statistics). After all, Gd intervenes according to His own considerations, that is, according to our actions and needs in managing the world. You do not suggest that these considerations completely coincide with the absolute value of the square of the wave function in the situation in question. In other words, at your suggestion we were supposed to find in an experiment that the wave function does not describe the results in a given set of experiments. Its statistical meaning was ruled out.
    Therefore, I do not accept the argument that I do not claim for certain but for such a possibility. If you accept quantum theory there is no such option. It is no different from intervening against the laws of gravity or other laws of nature.
    Thanks for the clarification, I understand your intent.
    However, for the substance of the matter, it seems to the attorney general that there is a logical leap forward here:
    1. Only because of his non-intervention at any possible point (in this case in the few experiments carried out and sufficient to confirm these distributions) can no local intervention be ruled out. Nor have I tried to argue that everywhere it changes the result in a way that deviates from the distribution described by the wave function square (the probability). All the more so for the method of his honor in the matter of providence according to which he expressly claims that he is not in every detail. Here, too, there is no denying that 99.9% of things God does indeed divide the collapse in a way that * divides * in a certain way, as if it were random, and in our eyes in the absence of the mechanism - there is no problem in describing it as such.

    2. I would like to argue that we do not even have to squeeze in and say that the distribution is only in 99.9% of cases (so in the lab we did not identify but when he was selected to intervene we would find an abnormality). After all, if the whole distribution of the character we call random is based on multiple measurements, it is easy to compensate from one over the other. Anyone can write a completely deterministic series of measurements and make sure that it is distributed randomly in terms of mean, variance and in fact up to whatever moment is chosen. How can you rule out (the possibility) of his intervention on the grounds of improbability that even after that the statistics will fit a particular distribution?

    I would love for your reference.
    Isaac Bernstein
    As I wrote, local intervention is certainly possible. And it does not need quantum theory. This is also true with respect to the law of gravitation or any other law. You could never say that our measurements only deal with cases where there was no intervention (which is the absolute majority). So what’s the point of getting into a quantum discussion for that? As stated, there is no difference between an intervention in quantum theory and an intervention in any other law of nature.
    Above all, do not see the result of the intervention (the percentage of healing in religious or worshipers and the like). So why even assume it exists?
    As for the question of why to assume that supervision exists, of course I am not trying to prove it from quantum rather than social statistics. Surveillance and intervention have quite a few explicit mentions in the written Torah ("All the disease that I put in Egypt I will not put on you because I am the Lord your doctor", "If in my constitutions you go… and I gave your rains in due time, etc.", and in fact any possible mention of reward and punishment) . If I am convinced that Torah is from heaven, then these references are the reason to believe that providence exists. And if you answer that maybe only in the past and today not, I also do not pretend to say that it is visible to us at every step: if we stick to the example that His Majesty gave on the subject of medicine, Maintaining the same percentage of patients despite the eating habits of a religious world - they are already an expression of providence (jokingly but the idea is understandable).
    In any case, I feel that it is less important for us to reach an agreement on this issue, since the dispute between us is, in my opinion, about the interpretation of the findings in the field and how they are treated - in terms of the validity of the findings and conclusions.

    On the other hand, I would be happy to linger and discuss your question as to why such an intervention needs quantum. Here is the clear answer to the above:
    1. A local change in the laws of gravity means that now in a certain place and time gravity is not proportional to the product of the masses and becomes a distance squared. On the other hand, the collapse of the superposition of a certain self-locator (in my assumption that it occurs by virtue of the intervention of the Creator) does not contradict any existing law that we know * does not currently have an understanding of this mechanism *. Of course in the absence of the need to assume (by virtue of the above) providence there is no reason to prefer a Creator intervention over randomness (although in the rest of reality we do not have a phenomenon without a cause). But if supervision is assumed (and you do not have to agree with me on its scope): Do you not agree that the assumption of intervention in the above collapse (about its causes we already have a lack of understanding (expressed for example in inherent ignorance when trying to measure, as stated in uncertainty) - Is a much more reasonable assumption than, for example, a local-temporary violation of gravitational laws? (In the sense that it does not contradict a theory but only an interpretation of the distribution factor, from "random for no reason" to "determined by the Creator")?

    Even in its simplicity by the way, in the sense of uniting in one explanation a physical mechanism of a miracle? In the words of Prof. Gutfreund from the Hebrew University (in a lecture on thermodynamics when I was a young student): "There is no physical prevention that the table will now fly up, the prevention is only statistical!". After all, such an intervention can unite under a simple mechanism and explain in one simple explanation a lot of miracles in Scripture. In your article you sent me published in "Lonely" you claim that preferring the simple explanation is not just a psychological tendency but far beyond, and even gave halakhic ambiguity (three times - strong) in the sense that even according to Torah it should be preferred.
    I would love for your reference!
    Shabbat Shalom,
    Isaac Bernstein
    1. Disagree. I have already explained that this is not a question of the mechanism but of the result. If quantum theory determines any distribution, then an intervention is an exception to the distribution determined by science. So we went back to a local intervention in the laws of nature that is possible regardless of quantum theory. Even if it is possible for the table to fly up it should happen at a completely nil chance, and any intervention will deviate from the distribution determined by quantum theory. And certainly if these are daily and non-exceptional interventions (and in anomalies we have already agreed that there is no point in discussing). What's more you introduce quantum phenomena into the macro world (this is also statistically possible but does not happen in practice).
    I repeat myself over and over, and I think it's exhausted.

  20. M':
    Hello Rabbi Michael,
    I came across an interesting review (and lecture) article on the witness argument. From what I have seen over the years the article has brought up arguments that recur whenever the witness' argument is debated. Some of the claims are not answered in the fifth notebook explicitly, which is a shame (although an intelligent person might be able to answer them by the tools in the notebook).
    They should be addressed in the notebooks themselves.
    The claims are as follows:
    1) There is really no continuous tradition for Jews, etc., etc. - answered in notebooks
    2) Even in other peoples of unclear, difficult and moral commandments and yet the people accepted them - a correct claim. Although it can be questioned. Not exciting.
    3) The Torah according to the Bible itself is not really an ancient document - a well-known claim of biblical criticism and some have touched on it in the notebook.
    4) There are mass discoveries in other peoples as well and even in our time (see entry - the "revelation" of Mary in Zeitun or folk tales of the Indian Indians, etc. On Zeitun see Wikipedia). An interesting and quite interesting argument in my opinion.
    In the case of the Indians and the like the claim is that there are mass revelation events that have been transplanted in the past, and many such (the stories are a bit delusional so I guess they were transplanted)
    In the case of Zeitun and the like it shows that people just tend to interpret all events in a religious connotation and then Mount Sinai status is perhaps a volcanic eruption that is interpreted as a meta-physical event. According to the Torah beyond the eruption of a volcano and God's speech about Moses it is not really clear what went on there. The version we know only appears at a much later stage. This statement can be argued but it cannot be refuted with a wave of the hand.
    In my opinion, these claims can be weakened:
    Zeitun and the like (events that really took place ..
    Day's Review. See light and retire as Mary. There is no reason to assume that "Maria" will be revealed at all or that she will be revealed without conveying any message, so one day the event falls. (Or it is at all “sacred” but it is a different divan….)
    - To say that the fact that the event in Zeitun is interpreted as "Maria" proves that people interpret an event according to what they are used to in their world. A Chinese event is interpreted as monotheistic, which was different from the rest of the world at the time, so it does not fall into this category.
    Mythical folk tales:
    - a day
    - to say that there are really no such founding traditions (as in the case of the Indians it is a story that told some story to someone in the 19th century and not an event that is really recognized by the people)
    - These are gods not out of nature and it is much easier to transplant because that is what was common in the world at that time
    - To claim that transplanting an event on the history of a people at a time when it was already formed as a people is actually what is not trivial. Putting an event on what happened before was with a much easier people. These are familiar claims of Rabbi Shrek. Not bad in my opinion. It may be worthwhile to have them in the notebook as part of the "combination of all the considerations". He has an article in the name of Torah from Heaven on his website that addresses the witness' argument. See there.
    + The whole claim (relevant to both).
    in brief. Recommends addressing these claims explicitly in the notebook. Even if they are completely stupid (and this statement can be argued…) they come up every time and you should have a serious written reference to them.
    So far so good.
    Side question - I saw that you were asked about "what if it really turns out that there is no free choice" (say) and you wrote that "reconsider your arguments". What it means? Is it possible to reach an atheistic conclusion if that happens?
    It seems to me that if you agreed to give up the "next world" free choice is a much more marginal matter and you can live with the arguments of R. Hissadai Karshaksh….
    All the best.
    Thanks for the stuff. I would love to link or refer to the article.

    As for the questions at the end of your speech.

    1. I may well come to any conclusion. I do not deny anything in advance, though there is no real necessity to infer atheism from determinism. Beyond that, there is a difficult question to what extent conclusions can be drawn in a deterministic world (since our judgment is also dictated).

    2. It is not a question of what one can live with but what is right and what is not. Rahak's arguments are completely wrong. If the world is deterministic then so is our attitude to it. Therefore, his proposals do not solve anything but express a lack of understanding (by the way, I think Sharvitsky in the article once pointed out a contradiction in this matter in the Book of the Light of God between the first and second half).

    Speaking of the difficulties I have with one conclusion or another, my freedom of will is the most fundamental and most important thing in my eyes. More than the existence of God and certainly more than God. As stated, without freedom of will even the conclusions about all these lose their meaning, and man in general becomes a kind of worthless and meaningless physical object.

  21. Y ':
    Hello Rabbi Michael,
    (Maybe I should say more already ..)
    I am in the middle of reading your fascinating article in the fifth notebook (p. 44). And two small notes:
    Regarding the reaction to the words of the philosopher David Day, you wrote at the end of the matter that it is easy to fall into it and prefer "probability over reasonableness, and computation according to thinking." From the presentation of things in your conclusion it can be understood that there is indeed a practical contradiction between the two in this matter, probability versus reasonableness, and computability versus thinking. But in my poverty I did not understand why, and that the probability that an entire people distorted an experience intentionally or not, and passed it on so accurately to the next generation to the point of readiness to surrender, and in addition to all the logical claims you yourself made there, Period, and many other claims that lower even more the probability of some distortion, so that I understand it becomes even smaller than the alternative that a miracle happened and there was a revelation, especially in light of your statement that revelation is not impossible but only rare.
    Bottom line, in my opinion the obvious conclusion should have been that even probabilistically and computationally the acceptance of Mount Sinai status based on the testimony over the generations is more probable. And not just intuitively and reasonably ..
    Maybe that was your intention, too. Or I may not understand the concept of probability and computation correctly. Correct me if I'm wrong.
    Secondly, your argument there about the need to say that there was a revelation if only for the sake of morality, is not sufficiently clarified and in my opinion there is room to expand on it for the average reader. Why is it not said that after we have come to the conclusion that the purpose of the world is for something external to the world, then this purpose is our choice in goodness and morality itself for its name. Which is indeed true even according to the Torah to the best of my understanding. And according to this seemingly secular claim, there is no need for revelation because it is understood in a seemingly human mind.
    Sorry for the length,
    I would love your response.
    1. This is what I called plausibility. After all, you can not quantify the chance of a miracle. You can only say that it is reasonable and not that its probability is such and such. In contrast, an event in which a people invents a tradition is a natural event that belongs to history. He also has examples. So there you can talk about probability. Hence it is a question of probability versus probability.
    2. The need for God for morality is explained in the fourth notebook in length. My assumption is that the notebooks are interdependent.
    Shabbat Shalom.
    Y ':
    Another small question, a name claim that theologically it is difficult to accept the claim of Christians and Muslims that Gd replaced us, because Gd does not change his mind, but seemingly from our parsha it is hidden from the verse "
    Good question.
    Indeed there is some appeal here to the argument, and yet such a dramatic change without telling us anything about it (except in a dubious revelation to one person) sounds unreasonable to me.
    I will add that the change also did not come as a result of any particular sin (at the time of the birth of Christ I do not think of a special sin that justifies such a change), this is in contrast to the generation of the flood where the reason for consolation can be seen. Although on second thought the birth of Jesus and the formation of Christianity takes place around the destruction of the house, and perhaps this is an indication of a change in the mind of God and the replacement of his apostles. Etc.

    See Samuel XNUMX: XNUMX: And also Israel shall never lie, nor be comforted, for there is no man to comfort:
    And also in Parashat Balak (in the wilderness XNUMX:XNUMX): No man shall be displeased, nor a son of man, and he shall be comforted, he said, and shall not do, nor speak;
    If so, the Torah itself indicates that he does not repeat it, and the verse in our parsha is Tza. In any case, one has to see something unequivocal to be convinced that it is indeed comforting.
    Y ':

    I saw a beautiful answer in Abarbanel to the apparent contradiction between the verses:

    First, he says that even in the book of Samuel itself there is such a contradiction between the verse you quoted above, and a verse that appears a few verses earlier, where God says to Samuel: "I was comforted because I made Saul king"

    The Abarbanel in Samuel suggests that the consolation of Gd is not on his own part but on the part of the recipients. And in both cases both in Genesis and in the words of El Shmuel these are people who have sinned and as a result of all Gd comforted for what he did as part of the results of free choice he gave in the world, but if it depended on him alone - he would not protest humanity in the flood and stop the kingdom of Saul.

    (He explains in Genesis that this is not due to a lack of knowledge, God forbid, but that Torah spoke as the language of human beings, and the change of deeds was perceived by human beings as consolation and remorse for the first act).

    On the other hand, the words of Samuel to Saul, "Eternal Israel will not lie" speak of God on his own part and his eternity that does not change his mind (such as continuing the reign of Saul and abolishing the reign of David as Saul wanted), because he has no God and conclusion On his own. And also in the words of Balaam, "No man shall lie down and be a man and be comforted" meaning that God will not just change his mind to bless the people of Israel by Balaam (unlike Balak thought that if he offered sacrifices before him he would change his mind and agree to curse Balaam).

    Are there any mistakes?
    I did not understand the answer. He is comforted or not. What does it mean to be comforted for us?
    Y ':
    The statement that God is not comforting refers only to a situation in which there is no defect on the part of man in his free choice.
    That is, man in his choice of evil can supposedly cause a change in God's decisions. But without it God will never change his mind. That's how I understood what he was saying.
    It might be likened to a person wanting to pour a glass of water to his friend, but the friend dropped the glass and broke it, then surely the person would not pour in the air. And to a distant observer he seems to have regretted merging. But the change did not come from him but from the recipient.
    This is actually similar to what the Maharal suggests in the introduction to the heroism of God regarding the miracles. These are laws pre-enacted in creation along with the laws of nature.
    Thus Abarbanel claims that Gd set fixed laws in advance and from which he does not move. But these laws themselves state that what happens to us depends on our actions. In fact, God's action depends on what is happening in the world. But in the world, everything is deterministic except for the choice of man, so basically what can change God's mind is only the choice of people. Thus God predetermined the law that if people sinned they should be destroyed (the generation of the flood and the voyage), and now the destruction depends on them and not on him. As they explain about answering a prayer, which is not a change in it but there is a fixed law that if a person prays he accepts and if not then not. And according to this the word "to be comforted" is borrowed, and in fact it is a result of our actions. God really never comforted.
    It is certainly possible, but from a freezer I see two problems here:
    1. Linguistic urgency. This is not called "comforting." It has been determined in advance that if we sin we have no right to exist. So why not put it this way: And the Lord saw that we had sinned, and had determined to destroy us. What was wrong with this simple wording that is less confusing. After all, human beings are meant to clarify things that are difficult for us to understand or illustrate to us (such as the hand of God and the like). Here there is no problem in understanding the truth (that the decision is a response to our actions and not consolation) and I do not see why such a language should be used. After all, such "comfort" also happens in humans. On the contrary, this manic language does not contribute to understanding but rather confuses us because it makes us think that he is comforted about his actions as human beings.
    2. Beyond that, precisely in our case this interpretation seems a bit problematic. After all, there was a first "remorse" for creating man (in light of his sins), and then remorse in the opposite direction for wanting to destroy them and a promise that he would not do so again. According to Abarbanel, he predetermined that if man sinned he had no right to exist and would be destroyed, and in addition he also predetermined that if he wanted to destroy them he would repent and not destroy them (otherwise there is remorse in his thoughts after the flood generation). It's a little weird.

  22. On the ontological evidence - after all, even after the hidden believer has understood the definition (even if it is simple and understandable to all), at most he can say that he now knows that the open believer's argument is valid.

    How is this supposed to lead him 'the opposite way' to faith? Ostensibly according to the above it is not in the power / function of logic.

    One, I am not talking about planting faith in one who does not have one, I realized that it is not by virtue of the logical argument, I wonder about the possibility of the logical argument to clarify the belief to the latent believer.
    It's like I'm claiming that as a covert Euclidean believer, after learning the geometry derivations (the logical part), I established for myself the intuitive Euclidean assumptions that lay within me (this is just Dodge). This direction of influence sounds strange, does not it?

  23. I read the fifth notebook (in great captivity I must note ..), it did establish the subject for me, but I do not yet understand how we deal with identical arguments in other religions, in an argument I had with some atheist he said there are religions (not so well known) Who also claim mass revelation .. So how do we substantiate the claim that only we really had the revelation?

    1. I can not deal with anonymous claims. Each such argument should be examined on its own merits. Is it an individual or a small group that claims to have been a mass revelation, or is it an established tradition over generations? How well established is it?
      Anyway, as I wrote in the notebook, this is really not an overwhelming argument, and should be attached to the extra angles.

  24. Reads the first notebook.
    Question about Descartes' cogito argument: What did he actually prove in it? "I think therefore I exist" is based on a factual observation that there is an "I" who thinks here (even if by chance he is the one dealing with the question). And in the combination of the pure logical (tauto) argument according to which "if there is a thinking entity then it exists" does indeed follow (in conjunction with the assumption that my understanding is nothing but an observation) - that indeed the thinker exists.
    While it is true that viewing in the visual sense is not required for this, and the existence of an independent intellect is sufficient, but again: the fact that there is an intelligent entity capable of understanding existence itself - why is it not an observation of the world? And so what has been proven here?

    1. Indeed true. See about this in the book by Ron Aharoni, the cat who is not there.
      But still there is some sting in this argument, because it somewhat blurs the distinction between thinking and recognizing. Doubting everything I think is also a thought that involves observation (that there are those who doubt). And in other words (see in Aharoni there), there are those who doubt and there are those whose existence is in doubt are the same. In fact, "I" plays here in two hats: the viewer and the observed.
      Schopenhauer has already insisted that in this case Kant's distinction between the faithful (the world itself) and the phenomenon (the world as it is perceived by us) is blurred. See Shalom Rosenberg's article The Rae and the Blind Crocodile within the collection "In the Light".

  25. I read the fifth notebook, as well as most of the rabbi's books.
    Interestingly, definitely a heroic attempt to justify the belief.
    But most of it seems to be missing from the notebook.
    There is a great deal of preoccupation with philosophical sub-issues most of which have been extensively discussed in previous books,
    Whereas preoccupation with Mount Sinai, or the other truths of the events described in the Torah is lacking.
    In fact, one has to deal with all the claims and revelations of the critics of the Bible & Co., and I think it would be difficult to impossible (the hobby of the rabbis is to take one silly thing someone said in academia and celebrate it).
    In the end it all stands on some not very strong claims, such as the fact that the status of Mount Sinai was revealed to many, included in a different line from the pagan reality at the time, and that the commandments are not reasonable acts that someone would want to impose on others, etc.
    There are the joining arguments, a special people of Israel, there is a lot of anti-Semitism, etc.
    These claims are not so strong.
    The number of Egyptians is completely unreasonable for several reasons. This joins an ancient tendency to exaggerate in numbers (example - the books of Josephus). Could not a family / clan / tribe invent for other families that God would be revealed to, and it gained momentum? It is enough to see the Midrashim on the Exodus that exaggerate more and more miracles to see in the tendency to exaggerate a common behavior.
    Indeed the gospel denying foreign work is an incredible breakthrough, but human beings have achieved many breakthroughs on their own. In general the power of the gospel can be explained by the fact that our people have endured and gained much attention and imitations on the one hand, and envy and hatred on the other.
    It is at most possible to develop one skeptical attitude or another towards the faith. Hence the adoption of various positions, such as the audacity to interpret that we are in the process of redemption and to draw conclusions from it in fact, are completely invalid.
    Even the negation of various phenomena like homosexuality, with no logical justification other than reliance on the Scriptures, is wrong.

  26. ami - I have to disagree with you. I also think there are other arguments that can be put into the fifth notebook and made more convincing, but I must admit that I find your argument irrelevant.

    1. No one evades biblical criticism. Simply in this specific context, your claim about biblical criticism is irrelevant in any way. The discussion is not whether Moses wrote the Torah we have or whether it is a combination of several versions of the original Torah or other texts have been added to it. Suppose for the purpose of the discussion that biblical criticism is indeed right and the Torah was written by several people (some disagree with this and other not-so-bad alternatives etc.) - what is the difference between this and the credibility of the basis of the biblical story? On the contrary, if 4 different sects of writers in the nation tell its story many common lines it only shows that indeed the people held a constitutive tradition of being a slave and this only adds to the credibility of the story. After this discussion one can argue whether the biblical critique is correct or not. There are indeed arguments here and there and this is a separate long discussion.

    2. * Usually * constitutive traditions of peoples (except those that occur in the beginning of history) have a core of truth (it is important to note that this story appears not only in the Torah - but is also incorporated in the words of the prophets, first and last, and in many Psalms. To the people and remind them how God brought them out of Egypt and treated them with dedicated care. They do not try to convince the people that it happened, but simply mention famous facts known to all. Therefore this story does not belong to a spiritual elite, The Bible is a competing birth story. There is no atmosphere of controversy against a different story that tries to deny the Exodus. There is no debate among the people between those who recognized the story - and those who denied. , To sin and punishment. The Bible did not try to hide the diversity, but to contain it. But the story of the Exodus is the story of the birth - the only and constitutive one!). Indeed, this is not always true but it is usually true (as far as I know).

    3. True, monotheism could have been invented, the problem that the claim does not say that in order to invent it needed revelation. The claim is that if you have a story that belongs to a genre of believable stories, and it contains a distinctly anti-mythical characteristic a not bad probability that it is true.

    4. Even if we accept your opinion that monotheism is not enough, what you say would be true if it were only a constitutive tradition and monotheism in the Torah. The problem is that the Torah contains innumerable anti-mythical conceptions that if it were a myth of not bad probability they would not appear:
    - We find a transcendent conception of God (i.e. God is not a natural entity like the sun or spirit)
    - We find a founding tradition of the people being slaves (the lowest class in antiquity) and not a mythical tradition of the heroism of the people
    - We find criticism of the leadership (Moses, Aaron) and the whole people (calf)
    - We find laws that are anti to all the usual laws in the ancient East (Capricorn in his mother's milk and more)
    - We find mass revelation, even if it is claimed that it can be forged, we do not find such in the Middle East and it is an * anti-mythical * act in the region.
    - We find * clues * (even if divided) archaeologists for the story (conquest, slavery of the sky, ancient ties between Egypt and Israel and more)
    - We find laws without difficult logic, indeed other nations also had difficult laws (sacrificing children) but precisely laws that hurt the pocket (Sabbath, slave, shemita) are rare
    - We find a god who is not allowed to be represented in a statue contrary to what people are used to
    *** The claim does not mean that it could not have been invented or transplanted (although it can also be argued). But if they had done that it would probably have evolved in a different direction. And a combination of a whole lot of anti-mythical muffins shows that there is a good chance that this is not a myth.

    So - you have a founding tradition that belongs to a genre of stories that are * usually * credible, transmitted by an entire people and not by individuals or a small tribe, the tradition contains countless anti-mythical muffins, it indicates something you have reason to believe exists, and there is reason to think Which may be expected to occur. The people that tradition produces have a special history, talent, influence, etc. And all this is already defined in Scripture as a central ethos of revelation. All of these * together * according to the notebooks are supposed to be "reasonable". Really, I do not see what is irrational in this?

    5. I will ask you simply - suppose the ancient Roman people had a constitutive tradition, agreed upon by all strata of the people, without a rival tradition, that 400 years ago the people fought a war against a people who were in conflict with it and the Romans * lost *. The above tradition is the basis for the entire Roman calendar, and for all lifestyles, and the results of the above war are what caused the people to change the whole way they live to this day - did she think that "if an entire nation was so sure it had a war, Not bad that she really was ”or thinks“ I guess it's a myth ”? In my opinion it is likely that you would have chosen the first option. If we did not find the deportation letter of the Jews of Spain - was your default assessment that this was a myth? Have you ever checked whether there are any ancient texts that attest to the story of the expulsion from Spain or the assumption that such a constitutive tradition passed down by the whole nation has a historical core? Perhaps, if you think there is a difference between this and the story of the Exodus it is only because you assume a priori that miracles are an unlikely thing. But then as a friend told me “if I see myself with another 100 rational people in different places in the world divine revelation I will assume I was under the influence of drugs because it just can not be”, it's just fixation.

    6. You assume that there really must be 600 people involved. Why? Maybe it's a story with a real basis (for example 600 families) in which the numbers are typologies? Why are the details important?

    7. In doubt you can always stay and that's fine, the question is what is more likely. If I have come to the conclusion that it is more likely that I should behave, indeed to conclude that we are certainly in the process of redemption would be a mistake since nothing is certain in any subject.

  27. The rabbi, in proving from morality you referred to the fact that abuchutsya should not affect emotion. But we see that tens of thousands of years ago the standards of morality were much lower, it hardly existed and also the emotion of people marching that today is disgusted with did not exist.
    If so, it seems that the whole moral emotion and morality has indeed undergone evolution in society over the years.
    I will rejoice in repentance.

  28. Hello Rabbi,
    First of all, thanks for publishing the notebooks.
    I have some questions about the fifth notebook:

    1. On the need for revelation: If we start from the premise that God is the 'first cause', he actually "programmed" human nature (the concepts of good and evil we built, our logic) when he created us. Perhaps what leads the world to its purpose is to cling to the good (as it has imprinted it in us) and to refrain from evil (as it has imprinted it in us), that is, to be a moral person and to act according to the intellect that is in us. We do not need revelation to tell us that this is His will for us, because the very fact that He created us with the moral values ​​as they are with us is revelation, and there is no need for further revelation.
    In addition, the ring of his will from us son is much smarter on his part. After all, everything that is written can be interpreted in countless different ways (as is often done in the Gemara - one reads a certain passage in bewilderment, while the other reads it as a commandment, etc.). Even in the direct speaking of God with us - revelation, it is possible to interpret what is said in different ways. In fact, a situation is created here that we will never fulfill His will in the purest and truest sense, because once it passes our filter things become subjective and this is our will God + our processing to Him, and not just the will of the pure God. This is in contrast to the assimilation of his will in us - this is clear to us and does not imply two faces. It can be argued that this will contradict free choice (assuming it exists) but it is not true that we can instill in us the will of God not necessarily to act according to it but as knowing that it is the right way and we are left with the choice how to act on these data.
    In fact my question in conciseness is: perhaps morality and common sense behavior are revelation and are the way to achieve purpose. Hence there is no need (and perhaps neither was nor will be) further revelation since the revelation was already in the creation of human nature ("God's image").

    2. On gratitude as the basis for the work of God: Even if it is said that our gratitude is not for the good abundance that God rains on us in the world (for this is not always the case) but for our very existence, there is still a question. After all, the only reason that can exist for us is God himself - that is, his lack, his will, etc. In fact, the only reason can be the egocentrism of God - the creation of an entire world with beings with feelings, thoughts, desires, just for himself. There is something very immoral about this that I understand to deny the need to acknowledge him for good. Even if it is argued that it is still necessary to acknowledge him for our very existence, the egotistical motives he acted on in the creation of the world and the egotistical motives that create his commandment and content (i.e. approaching the purpose for which the world was created, which must lie in God himself) deny the duty to act . If we throw the example on the parent-child relationship (as you did in the notebook): Parents who give birth to a child for their own personal enjoyment only and are commanded to do so for their own personal use only - in my opinion the child has no obligation to obey them. The only reason I can think of to keep the commandments is to fear God - because if we do not follow them we will be punished. (Another reason is because of identification with the content of the mitzvos but then it is not really observance of mitzvos because I would have kept them even without the commandment). If this is indeed the reason, then mitzvot such as the love of God, prayers of praise and thanksgiving to God, are mitzvot that I can not keep because I have nothing to love and praise him for. You can of course say that I thank him and love him for the good he is reciprocating with me right now but then:
    A. Once the good in this world stops pouring on me I will not be able to thank it and love it (for thanksgiving and love are for the moment and not for existence itself)
    B. It requires me to “forgive” God for being immoral in the very act of creation

    I would be happy if you could answer my questions.
    Thank you!

    1. Hello Nitzan.
      1. I explained in a notebook that morality is unlikely to be the purpose of creation. Morality is meant to build a healthy society, but the alternative is not to create a world and then there will be no society at all. So why create it ?!
      2. a. Even parents in most cases create their children because of their lack, and yet it is accepted that there is a duty of gratitude towards them. B. Who told you that purpose always stems from a lack? Even in humans, when I work for moral value it's not because I'm missing something. And in relation to Gd there is a really unnecessary discount here.
      As for love and reverence for God it is quite possible that in your situation you are raped and you will not be able to keep these commandments. So what? Even the temple we can not now build because we are forced.

  29. On the evidence from morality:
    If I understood correctly, the argument is not "why obey a moral order" but who even determined the moral order, so why not formulate "evidence from logic", "evidence from intuition"?
    These are all things that we accept as right, and we have not determined them, what is unique about morality?

  30. I think there is a difference, in the first part of the notebook the rabbi talks about the senses. The senses are very complex systems, which if not designed by a planner may have a failure.
    Morality, intuition, and logic are intellectual truths. Appealing to them is basically appealing to our mind (or mind). It can be argued that if the mind is the creation of evolution - who said it is valid. But this is "evidence from the mind." What does the rabbi mean by "evidence from morality"? What is unique about morality compared to other products of the mind?
    For the avoidance of doubt - I do not deal with semantics, and I do not care if they call this evidence by any name - I try to understand the principle.

    As for the book - if I may - I would suggest expanding the fifth notebook, in my opinion it is the most disturbing subject.

    Thank you.

  31. At the beginning of the fifth notebook, 3 options are raised regarding what was at stake before the creation of the world.
    1) Do not create
    2) Create us perfect without free choice
    3) Create us with imperfect free choice
    Is it not possible to believe that free choice is part of being perfect and according to this the world created meets option 2?

    1. Not sure I understood the question. Even if having a choice is part of perfection, it is not all perfection. It is clear that we are not perfect. At most you can say that the term “perfect without free choice” is an oxymoron and in fact there is no option 2. I am willing to accept that but it is mostly a matter of terminology. I mean in option 2 is that we will be perfect in all other respects except the question of choice (i.e. we will not have to improve).

  32. From the statement that the world is not perfect, one can come and say that there are certain deeds that need to be done to complete it (and these are the commandments). This statement seems (according to the language of writing in the booklet) that you conclude from the fact that we have free choice, if we have free choice and the possibility of getting better (or at least what we call getting better) then surely the world is not perfect. This inference does not seem necessary.
    My question is whether it can not equally be said that free choice is in itself wholeness. That is, no matter what is chosen or what is done, the "feature" of free choice is complete and it does not matter how we use it. Whether we use it to destroy (in our perception the word destroy) the world (burn the earth and return it to the state it was in 4.5 billion years ago) or we will use it to repair (in our perception the word to repair) it. How can it even be argued that what we call destroy or repair a sub in general? The opposite claim is equally true - the philosophical god created the world perfectly (with the laws of physics, with the nuclear forces, with the option to be created or free choice, with the option of free choice disappearing and more) and it does not matter what is done in it (the laws of physics will not succeed destroy).
    And in short - having shown that it is more rational to believe that God exists - what prevents me from saying that God is more like the "God of philosophers" i.e. "the first cause" and we, with our free will and our moral laws, are all derived from the same cause and our choices irrelevant?

    1. It can be said but it is unlikely. Simplicity of choice has value if used. If the world is perfect it is not a choice but a lottery (like the election in Switzerland I brought in an article on free will). Whether it is only possible to do evil or only to do good is not a choice and there is no point in it. Selection requires two options.
      What is the correction is not our definition but is given to us by Gd. Here I am just arguing that there should be such corrections.
      I did not understand your conclusion question, and in particular not its connection to the discussion so far.

    2. Cinderella,
      One can argue everything, the question of what is reasonable. It seems that the rabbi is trying to claim that it is not excessive to assume that there is indeed a purpose to creation and given that there is such a thing, it is not excessive for God to be revealed and claim what it is.
      Once you understand this, once you get information about revelation, and the traditions you are talking about is pretty strong there is no reason not to connect the parts of the necklace.

      D.A. in the matter of the God of philosophers this is inaccurate. Because cosmological evidence shows that there is a teleological ability for the first reason, and physico-theological evidence shows that it is probably a purposive ability. (Otherwise she herself needs a reason) There is a reason behind it anyway.
      I did not understand if you accept the evidence from morality, but if so then this evidence claims that the same entity of choice also wants something from human beings.

  33. I have not argued that there are no two options when a person chooses between what he defines as good and what he defines as evil, I just ask how it relates to the question of whether the world is perfect or not? (By the way, is the statement that "correction is a definition given to us by God" a premise or is it derived from some evidence?)
    My concluding question is related to a point I tried to make before - that choice is just another given in reality, like the laws of physics, and it does not indicate that creation is imperfect or that there is something that needs to be completed. Reality, the laws of physics, free choice, morality and more, are all part of the "perfect creation" derived from the existence of God (probably according to this there was not necessarily a "desire" in creation, and even if so - who said that desire is in any way related to our choices ?)
    Sorry I do not understand I will try to phrase my problem differently. The notebook looks like there is some jump - if there is a free choice then (jump) the world is not perfect and there is something to fix through the choice.
    I would love if you could explain to me exactly how these things depend (or are derived) from each other.

    1. If the world is perfect then there is only one option. There is only an option for evil and not for good. The correction should be given to us by God. This is a conclusion from my argument, and it recovers from the arguments about tradition (which he did give).
      I have explained here that if there is a choice it has meaning only if it is incumbent upon us to choose something. Otherwise it is a lottery and not a choice. Hence the world is not perfect, because otherwise there is no need to choose anything (and as stated above there is only an option of bad choice).

    2. Obviously. This is my method. But you suggested that there be a perfect world with a choice. What I am arguing is that it is not possible because if it is perfect then there is only a choice for evil and then there is no value to the choice.

  34. LK, dear
    You are more than welcome to contact me on my behalf. There is no need for adult nicknames such as Cinderella or Kofiko. It just looks ridiculous.
    You can put the emphasis in my words on the words "Can not be argued equally?" It is clear that everything can be argued and any claim is reasonable to some extent, but if there are 2 claims that can both be made equally (for example in case one claim is based on a positive X and the other is based on a negative X) - why should I choose one over the other?
    To Rabbi Michi, regarding the statement that if the world is perfect there is only an option for evil - it is based on the assumption that our choices affect the world for good or bad. Why should it be assumed? Is it not possible to say to the same extent that the very fact that there is a person's choice between several options (not "really" bad or good in terms of the world, but only in terms of our judgment) is in itself just a part of the whole world?

    1. I wrote that it can be said but it is unlikely. There is no reason to give a choice if it does not lead to any significant result, otherwise it is a lottery and not a choice. Choosing between good and good or between bad and bad is not a significant choice but a lottery. What's more, our eyes see that there is a bad and good world and that we have a choice between them, so I do not understand all this discussion.

    2. A. I thought Seidler was a nickname I did not know it was a last name. sry. I thought it was a customer of some cider drink or whatever they call it.
      B. Why do you open a new comment every time? Instead of commenting under the same thread.
      third. Towards what did you ask the question what is better to argue?

  35. To Rabbi Michi
    I'm just pretty skeptical about statements like "our seeing eyes" especially on good and bad issues (which can always be argued to be a matter of judgment in human eyes. After all, the laws of physics don't care if you killed a person or donated a kidney) but now I understand what you mean. Thanks.
    A. All is well
    B. For some reason the box in which I am supposed to write when I click on "respond" does not appear to me .. I think this is a problem for me, thank God there are no problems and bugs in the computer I am currently using
    third. I asked why it is more likely to assume that "world integrity" and "free choice" are related when it can be assumed that there is no connection.
    Thanks for the link, I will read.

    1. Seidler,
      You need to click "comment" at the beginning of the relevant thread (after the first message in it) and then the comment you will write in the box appears at the end.
      If the button disappears, press the tab until it appears. This is not a bug on your computer but on the site.

  36. Rabbi, I think there is a certain disconnect between the answers here. That lies in the hidden controversy of how to identify a perfect world.
    It seems from his words that we have no tools to identify whether the world before us is perfect or not. In any case, who said that the world needs to get better and that we will be rewarded, etc., etc. His understanding of whether the world is perfect seems like a question of whether the world before us is a final product that the Creator wanted. Or did he want us to get involved in fixing it.
    On the other hand, the rabbi simply sees that our world is not a perfect world. (As the first answer: 'It is clear that we are not perfect.')
    How does the rabbi recognize that our world is not perfect? Probably in light of his understanding that our world is the best world of all the worlds with the possible deterministic laws of nature. And from the fact that the rest of the evil was caused as a result of free choice.
    Also, in light of the question of why to assume that God will create a perfect world?

    The notebook reads:
    I will make an argument here אם .If God created the world it is reasonable to conclude that he had some purpose. …. Moreover, even if there is such a purpose, it is not clear why it is incumbent upon us. Why did God not create the world in such a way that this goal would be achieved automatically (to create us or the world to be perfect in the first place) and left it to us? The only possibility is that this goal is actually related to our decisions and choice, which means it is important that we make it from our free decision, and that (and only that) could not have been done without us. ”

    The rabbi makes two assumptions here -
    If there is a purpose then it is to create us or the world perfect in the first place.
    2. When the world is not perfect, the goal is set upon us to complete the world.
    But it is not clear why the rabbi thinks these assumptions are more plausible than their rejection. for example-
    1. Who said that the goal is the creation of a perfect world. Maybe it's the creation of the world as it is and that's it.
    2. Why the rabbi assumes that the goal is imposed on us because we have a choice.

    1. If you want to continue this discussion, you must first define what a perfect world is. To my definition a perfect world is perfect in terms that are acceptable to us. That is, there is no suffering in it and all creatures live a happy and good life. There may be other parameters that I do not know (some spiritual-religious parameters), but already in the initial parameters it is clear that our world is not perfect.

      This of course does not contradict in any way the fact that he may be the world closest to God's goals. It is simply impossible to create a perfect world (at least one that is based on strict rules), and it is the closest.

      If you suggest another setting please suggest it to me then I will try to address.

      For the second part:
      The term perfect in that part means perfect from the point of view of Gd (suitable for its purposes). It is a tautology, that if he is the creator of the world he will create it in the way he himself wants and for the purposes he wants.
      I assumed that the completion of the world rests on us due to the fact that we have been given a choice and probably God wants us to use it. And since a choice in essence is between good and evil or whole and incomplete, my assumption is that we have a task to do the good that is to approach perfection. This is a completely reasonable assumption in my eyes.

    2. Monday, good week,
      I am ready to accept for the purpose of the discussion that a perfect world is perfect in terms that are acceptable to us - in terms of happiness, feelings, etc. I would just love to know before me yes Do you link good deeds to the completion of the world? (Because this is what it looks like from the rest of your post).

      However, I have not seen an explicit reference to your two assumptions I asked about them.
      1. Why do you assume that the purpose of creation is to create a perfect reality?
      2. Who said that the world before us is not the most perfect world at the level possible - when Gd wanted to create a world that would operate according to the laws of nature and free choice. (As your well-known answer to the question of evil in the world)

    3. If we want to continue in this discussion, it is not enough to define what a perfect world is in our eyes (in terms that are acceptable to us), we need to define what a perfect world is in the eyes of God. After all, this is what the whole discussion revolves around. Whether the Creator created a perfect world in His eyes or not and expects us to complete it or not. One can probably give an answer that he certainly did not create anything perfect otherwise why should he create it? It's pretty purposeless he could not have created anything equally and it does not matter. But when I ask if the world is perfect in the eyes of the cause of creation, I am probably arguing in the background that there was no act of "desire" in creation but us and our reality, and our moral laws, and our ability to choose [even if you call it a lottery in case there is no good and evil (but everything is neutral) , It does not matter to me. Choice is the ability to decide between several different options. The fact that it receives "value" by choosing between good and evil does not seem to me to be related to the discussion, although I may well be wrong] and all the laws of reality as such are merely a derivative of "first cause" and there are no "right actions" (this is a necessary conclusion) . Of course, then the term "perfect world" also loses its meaning, it does not matter in terms of the cause of creation.
      In short - why can it not be argued that the world is merely a derivative of God and that we were created without "will" and therefore there is no meaning to the question of whether the world is perfect or not in terms of God?

    4. Disagree. There is no stopping him from creating a perfect world. On the contrary, it is expected to create a perfect world. Only because the creatures have a choice does the consideration arise that he probably wants the completion to be done by them.
      I really did not understand your bottom line. Are you suggesting we have no choice? So far we have assumed that there is. If you are a determinist this is a completely different discussion.
      I think I lost the thread of discussion.

    5. Rabbi First of all I want to thank you for your patience.
      Second, I will try to respond from now on as clearly as possible.

      In the last line when I wrote “we were created without“ will ”” I did not mean that we (humans) have no will and free choice, but that the act of creation was done without a special “will” on the part of God. And I raise the possibility that we are merely "derived" from its existence. Detail.
      When I say "God as the philosophers 'opinion" or "the first reason" I mean something similar to the philosophers' definition of the God as what appears partially (and in a non-modern way of course) in the Kuzari book (although there are some problems in defining them but these are not related to discussion). By definition, God is "the first cause" and we are derived from its existence [for example: according to Aristotle we are the 11th rotator of the first cause, after the verb (I make it clear that I do not think like him, I brought it as an example)] as the shadow of my hand was not created by "will Of my hand but its existence is derived from the existence of my hand.
      This theory does not claim that there is no God. But in the end it is inferred from her that there is no "commandment." The world (which is perfect / imperfect / neutral, the definition does not really matter in this case) in terms of God will not be good or bad according to our actions. It just exists. And no matter what creatures live in it and what they do in it.
      According to this theory, the concept of "commandment" is difficult.
      According to the second theory, that is, there was a "desire" in creation. 2 opinions were raised.
      A) The world was created voluntarily - perfect for God
      B) The world was created voluntarily - missing from God's point of view
      In your opinion, the very fact that we have free choice that receives "value" only when it chooses between good and evil, is an indication that the world is not perfect and it is our job through free choice to correct it in our good deeds. (Did I summarize your method correctly?)
      I would like to present here another method to understand the second theory, and I would be happy if you could just explain to me why this method is less rational than your method. I still do not believe in any of the methods. But for the purpose of introducing the second method I will call it "systematic".

      In my opinion, according to Sabra A.
      The world was created voluntarily - perfect from God's point of view (or in other words - without any need or possibility to pay off. In this case free choice is just another thing that exists in the world, like the laws of physics, like the strong nuclear force, like the weak nuclear force, like the laws of morality and all sorts of laws of nature. It can be said that it is just a law that "some living organism can choose between several possible options when certain conditions are met" (Regarding the laws of morality it can be said that there is a law Or "bad" to go their way or alternatively ignore them. After all, the law was created "(any living organism will have the ability to ignore the laws it feels in its heart when certain conditions are met"). And there is no choice that is really "good" or "bad" (good and evil are determined by our judgment only). The fact that the free choice for your perception receives "value" only when it is between what is "good in our perception" and what is "bad in our perception" does not really matter in this case. It is only in our perception. And that does not mean that the choice does not exist. As mentioned, the free choice feature is simply the ability to choose between several options. The fact that we call one option "better" than the other and thus give value to choosing it - it is only with us and in our judgment. But from the point of view of God there is no Nafka Mina.
      According to this method, the concept of "commandment" is difficult. Nor does it seem at all that "because the creatures have a choice, the consideration arises that he probably wants the completion to be done by them." As you wrote above

      In my opinion, according to Sabra B.
      The world was created voluntarily - lacking in terms of God (i.e. with the ability to improve in terms of God). But there is no reason to assume that there is any desire / need for the world to be more perfect, and even if there is such a desire / need there is no reason to assume that this role (to complete it) is incumbent upon us. And even if this role is indeed incumbent on us there is no reason to assume that we complete it through our free choice. After all, we have no idea what the universe lacks in terms of God and how to complete it. The assumption that we make up for this lack through specific good deeds is at the very least a disturbed assumption. The world exists in this way, and there is a capacity for it to improve but there is no obligation to do so, free choice is (as in the previous supposition) another of the created laws of nature, without any necessity that it can make up for the lack in the world. Of course in our eyes the choices still get value when they are between "good in our eyes" and "bad in our eyes" but that is only in our eyes. There will probably be an answer (not bad at all) “Everything that was created has a reason that it was created. And if free choice is created there is a reason for it "(of course it requires another premise -" everything created is a reason ". But this premise seems quite reasonable) but still from here to" need to use free choice specifically to fill in the gaps in creation "way Another long one. It can certainly be just as well that the very fact that we choose (and it does not matter what we choose and it does not matter between what we choose. Between good and good, between bad and bad, between good and bad, between neutral and neutral) is the reason there is free choice. And the very fact that we choose (and it does not matter what…) it completes the world in one way or another. And again, the fact that we give "value" or "meaning" to the choice in certain situations is only with us and in our judgment. (Referred to what you answered earlier: "There is no reason to give a choice if it does not lead to any significant result. A choice between good and good or between bad and bad is not a significant choice but a lottery." It is "significant" only in the eyes of human beings.)
      But from the point of view of God there is no Nafka Mina.

      Your explanation seems to be based on the assumption that existence is a very specific case (i.e., the correct theory is the second theory and the correct explanation is theory B). And also in it you assume at least 4 assumptions that do not seem necessary.
      1) There is a desire / need for the world to pay off
      2) The task of filling in the gaps rests with us
      3) We complete the world when we choose
      4) The choices that complement the world are the choices we define as "good" and "promote the world."

      To sum up: out of the 3 options (the world was not created willingly, created willingly but perfectly, created willingly but not perfectly) the chance that you are right is 1/3.
      Within the third option you seem to assume 4 assumptions to reach your conclusion. The odds do not seem so high that your conclusion is correct (but it is still possible).

      [It may be (but necessarily) that it all depends on the explanation of why "choosing between good and good or between bad and evil is not a significant choice but a lottery" as you hinted earlier, but why is this so? After all, whether I choose to eat chocolate or not to eat chocolate, there is not necessarily a choice between good and evil, but there is certainly a choice here.]

      I would love to know in detail how and why your explanation seems to you more reasonable than all the other options. And where did the need for these assumptions come from.

  37. Seidler (threads mixed here),

    The world is complex and the assumption is that the complex thing has a component. An ingredient does not mean a reason that produces it like a shadow next to it, because the hand does not make up the shadow but simply creates it. When there is complexity the assumption is that there is an intellect that has thought about it and wanted it. In other words, a blind and mechanical mechanism does not decrease entropy (increases complexity). In order for complexity to grow, there must be a planned and intelligent involvement (which invests information).
    Therefore this theory is clearly unreasonable in my eyes. We come to theory B, which was a desire for creation. A desire that produces a choice probably wants it used. If so, the way is important to him and not just the result (since he can create the result himself even without leaving us to choose). It is likely that if that reason wants something it will produce it and will not leave it to others to produce it. The assumption that the very thing we choose (it does not choose but grills) is the goal, is unlikely. First, because our choice is between good and evil, and we are required to use the choice to decide between good and evil and not just grill. This is the distinction I have made in the science of freedom between picking and choosing. Hence the claim that that choice is an end in itself is rejected. We may of course be governors thinking we are choosing and in fact we are grilling. But that's not likely. I do not assume I am wrong or living in illusion unless I have a good reason to think so. Of course you will add to this the revelation that tells us all this to glorify (that we are required to choose well).
    Therefore it seems more likely that the world was created missing and we are supposed to complete it.
    If so, in the meantime the conclusion is that the world was created missing and we are completing it. Hence it is clear that the intelligent creator wanted us to complete it and therefore gave us the freedom of will and choice. And again, these would mean that you have to spend for these processes. In the fifth notebook I insisted that the vertebrae in the argument complement each other. For the rest of your questions I answered in the previous section (they are exactly the same as there).

    Two main points on which the matter depends:
    1. As I have explained things depend on the assumption that choosing between good and good or between bad and bad is not a significant choice but a lottery. When you "choose to eat chocolate or not eat chocolate" there is no choice at all. It is picking and not choosing (see books above). If you want to argue that my distinction between good and evil is an illusion - you have a burden of proof. Like any other skeptic. This is the essence of the evidence from the morality in the HG of the fourth notebook.
    2. The rest of the arguments (especially the content of the revelation) also radiate the probabilities of this argument. It was explained in the fifth notebook that the whole in this matter is larger than the sum of its parts.

    1. One discount - desire indicates a disadvantage (those who want chocolate - lack chocolate)
      "Perfection" has no disadvantage in its very definition
      According to ontological evidence, God is the whole that is no more complete than it
      If so, God is "perfection."
      If so God has no disadvantage
      If so God has no desire
      If so there is no desire on the part of God for human beings to do certain deeds (and there was no desire in creation)
      The rabbi would love to know if there is a failure in this heating process. And if so where is he?
      [I had to believe the classic answer that "a will indicates a disadvantage only in human beings, but the will of God is fundamentally different from a will of human beings and the will of God does not indicate a disadvantage" but in the fifth notebook on page 10 you write that the obvious conclusion is that "Religiosity" is actually meant to correct God himself. (Does this not conflict with the ontological evidence?)]
      As for “a complex thing has a component” I was not entirely convinced for 2 reasons.
      A. If I take an intricate geometric shape made of glass - what will be created is a shadow that looks complex and rainbow colors around it (refracting sun rays, etc.). It therefore sounds plausible that the "shadow" of a thing is as complex and infinitely complicated as God would be in our universe.
      B. The world is "complex" only in our eyes. In reality itself the world simply exists. We are the ones who threw the laws of physics, the laws of evolution, in our eyes and perceptions, gave numbers to the forces that exist in it and more just so that we would understand it better. And in our not-so-great minds we perceive it as complex. All these complexities only represent the world in our eyes. In the world per se they do not exist. The universe simply exists. It can be said that "for him" he is not complex at all.

    2. First two failures:
      1. Will does not necessarily indicate a disadvantage (even in humans. A common mistake). For example a desire to get along with someone is not based on my disadvantage. In cases where it is based on it then there is no moral act here (because it is done for myself and not for others). See column 120 on altruistic acts. It seems to me that this is what Ramchal is referring to, who writes "the good nature to do good."
      2. Even if the desire indicates a disadvantage it is a momentary look. Gd can be whole, when His wholeness is that up to a certain stage there is no creation and from this stage there is creation, and this whole whole process is wholeness. Looking at his part is a momentary and not a reflective look. Especially with the training itself being seen as complete, then ostensibly there must be such a situation. See articles here:

      In the second question I dealt with the third notebook. There I explained why complexity is an objective matter. It has a mathematical index (entropy), and the laws of physics determine how complexity is created and conducted.

  38. Hello to the rabbi,
    I have read the fourth notebook in which you prove Gd from the observance of the laws of morality.
    I understood what you presented as a naturalistic failure. In it you claim that the right and wrong can not be deduced from facts. Therefore, there is an external source that is a kind of idea of ​​norms, that in this idea we can "watch" in the eyes that we could and conclude the things we deserve to do in the world. But I did not understand why the evidence from morality somehow proves Gd?
    After all, if objective moral laws are a necessity of reality, then in every possible world that is the same as ours - the moral laws in it were the same. In any case you can not deduce from their existence the existence of Gd.
    Because even if there is no G-d, the laws of morality still exist because they are a necessity of reality.
    So that it is not possible to deduce from the observance of the laws of morality to Gd. parable.

    1. I did not understand the question.
      Even if there is a moral idea why should I follow her instructions? Only if I perceive that it is binding. But if it is binding there is a source that gives it validity. It's God.
      Beyond that, if indeed our world is only material (which is usually the foundation for atheism), then there is no room at all for such an idea and such charges. Material does not require anything and does not require anything.

    2. The claim is very simple, the values ​​of morality are claims to which truth and false values ​​can be attached, they are true for every possible (identical) world. In any case, they are necessary in reality. If they are necessary in reality it cannot be that God will make them exist, because they exist even without Him. God has no influence over them.
      For the purpose of the discussion, the idea can be translated into an idea that contains ethical norms.
      So I did not understand how God can cause an idea to attack, if its source of attack is itself.

      Clearly this is a break with the naturalist and naturalist conception. As free choice constitutes such a contradiction. But both do not constitute evidence of Gd.

    3. I enjoyed the "parable" at the end.
      As a matter of fact, I really did not understand. Any claim that a true or false value can be attached to it is necessary? Have you necessarily eliminated the difference between truth and truth (tautology)? "What is the meaning of the wording? Every identical world is possible." Any correct claim for any identical world is possible. They exist in the world because Gd created him and them within him.

  39. If indeed the Creator wanted him to be worshiped in a certain way why should he do so through ‘revelation’ [- which is necessarily only towards those who have been revealed to him, and the whole world remains alive without purpose. And there is no understanding in this - why from God's point of view only some human beings will reach a supreme purpose and the rest will not], why did he not instill in us the right passions of worship and Torah law as he instilled in us the conscience and passion for mysticism and worship [- slave with generations], Him equally as he pleases.

    1. I have no idea. Offers to ask him. And if you're already talking, also ask him why he gave us a choice and did not choose for us, or make sure everything happens the way he wants instead of hanging everything on us. I wrote of course with irony, because these questions seem irrelevant to me. I have no way of knowing why he does something one way or another.
      If you will speculate, it seems that for some reason it is important to him that morality is done out of inner motivation and the commandments are clean out of submission to an order. See Maimonides in the sixth chapter of eight chapters that writes this in relation to the contradiction between the words of Chazal "Do not say it is impossible to eat pork but possible and possible" compared to the words of the philosophers who prefer the whole over the governor in his spirit.

  40. Peace.
    I have read the first two notebooks on the ontological argument and the cosmological argument and I would be happy to receive clarifications regarding both-
    Regarding the ontological argument - the atheist will claim that there is the greatest thing he can imagine, that is, to accept in his mind his reality, it is not God but something else (say the universe).
    He can imagine something beyond that (suppose we call it God) but only as an imagination that certainly does not materialize (for he is an infidel, that is, claims that there is no God). Even if we assume that he could have imagined that there is a realized God, since when do logical difficulties make imagination difficult ?!
    Similarly the skeptic will also say that any conception of Gd is only on the side of the doubter. The greatest thing he can imagine is God but this imagination is not translated into certainty that the mental necessity is lacking. If it can be translated into mental certainty - a spin. But if it cannot be translated into mental certainty, and so the skeptic believes, then the maximum is the imagination. Realization of the imagination is not possible because it lacks the intellectual certainty. Imagination of translating the imagination into mental certainty again leaves me as an imagination and then again there is no room for logical difficulties.
    2. Regarding the cosmological argument. As Kant wrote, the principle of causality applies only to something in the senses. The forces that give rise to the laws of physics, such as gravity, are not something that the senses seem to have no reason for. From what I understand from your words it can certainly be said that these forces are the "God", they have always existed and they are the cause of the world. What do atheists care about accepting this God? It does not seem to me that such a kind of God has anything to argue with.

    1. Does not tell the claims within the sections. There are several. I'll go in order.
      A. So the universe is God. The greatest being is defined as being God. As I recall, I made this claim in a notebook.
      B. There is no question about imagination. If he can imagine something greater (even if it cannot be realized), then God is not the greatest being imaginable. parable.
      third. You miss the whole sting of the argument. No one says that if one imagines then he exists. That's not the argument at all. It seems to me that you should read the argument more carefully.

      No problem, so do not argue. The first link in the chain is defined as God. But I explained that from the physiological theological point of view it appears that it is intelligent and willful.

    2. Thank you very much for your reference.
      1. The root of my difficulty with the ontological argument is in the blurring that there is between imagination and reason. I do not understand whether when Mr. Anselm writes "conceivable" he means imagination or intellect?
      Let's put it this way - let's say Anselm's villain is called Richard. The biggest thing Richard probably gets is X. He can imagine X + 1 (he can not even imagine X + 2) but by no means can he accept in his mind that this X + 1 is realized (ie exists in reality) , And may even have intellectual evidence that X + 1 may not be realized or at least unlikely to be realized. When he says "there is no God" he is of course referring to X + 1. Clearly he admits that X exists, there is no arguing about that.
      2. Then I will happily study the physiological-theological vision.

    3. Clarification - If the aforementioned Richard accepts the assumption that something that can be realized is always greater than something that cannot be realized, he will simply claim that in fact X is greater than X + 1 and yet the God he is deceiving is X + 1 and not the X he admits.

    4. 1. You switch between formulations. You mean X is the biggest thing imaginable and not the biggest one. Anselm's assumption is that everything imaginable can also be imagined as existing. That's all he needs. He has no assumption about the existence or certainty of anything (including God). These are the conclusions of the argument and not its assumptions.
      And from this you will understand that there is no difference between imagination and reason in this context, since he assumes nothing about the existence or non-existence of this object. He talks about the concept that exists in our imagination. When the imagination raises it in front of Richard he grasps the thing (= the concept) in the mind.
      I think your questions reflect the fact that you did not understand Anselm's argument. In short it goes like this:
      Definition: God is the greatest being imaginable (do not say anything about whether he exists or is certain).
      Assumption (for the purpose of the discussion, to negate it): God does not exist. But of course despite this it is conceivable (in light of the definition).
      Assumption: What is conceivable can be imagined as existing (again, there is no assumption here of its existence or certainty, only of an object in my imagination).
      Conclusion: Even if God does not exist, if he is conceivable, he himself can be conceived as existing (this is a concept of God existing, and it is not yet a claim that he really exists).
      Conclusion: God can be imagined as existing.
      Assumption: The concept of having exists is great The concept of having imaginary (does not exist).
      Conclusion: I imagined something greater than God.
      But this contradicts the definition at the beginning of the chain.
      Therefore the assumption that it does not exist should be rejected.

      2. Successfully

    5. Thanks again for the reply.

      The very assumption that everything imaginable can be imagined even as existing is what I do not understand or disagree with. I see this as an illegitimate transition between imagination and reason. I can imagine a lot of things that I know for sure or with a very high probability that they do not exist. If I imagine the X I think does not exist and try to translate it into the existing X I will feel like I am lying to myself. In the notebook I saw a reference to the assumption that something exists is greater than something that does not exist and an attempt to appeal it. This is actually an assumption that simply seems right to me. But assuming you are emphasizing now (that anything imaginable can be imagined as existing) I have not seen an explicit reference (maybe there was and did not go over it, please correct me if I am wrong).

      Another note - to the best of my poor understanding, the aforementioned God that Anselm is talking about is not the God that Ami believes in. Since when do we limit the essence of God to our capacity for perception ?! The sages of Israel speak of a God who is above all thought and imagination. If I am right in this claim is the ontological view relevant to the God of Israel?

    6. Even if you do not agree with the assumption, there is still no problem with the argument itself.
      It is not at all a question of whether you think it exists but only whether you can imagine it as existing. I can imagine a fairy that exists even though I know / think there are no fairies. There is no contradiction. If in the concept of fairy there was an internal contradiction it was something else, because then it in principle can not exist.
      I do not remember if I referred to it in the notebook (in the revised version in the book I do refer to it). Anyway, I do not see it as a special problem. What matters is only that there is a presumption here and therefore the argument is not purely ontological but has fundamentally assumptions.

      Definitely yes. Anselm did not limit it to our capacity for perception. He talked about the most complete thing I can think of. That does not mean I caught him or caught him completely. By the way, Christianity also understands God as something beyond perception.

    7. So here are some things I do not understand-
      1. If I do not agree with the assumption why is there no problem with the argument itself? How can I accept an argument based on assumptions that I do not accept?
      2. What is the difference between thinking he exists and can conceivably exist? In the notebook you wrote that the difference between conceivable and conceivable as existing is in the translation neurons. If I think there are no fairies how can I think of real fairies that exist?
      3. Even according to your method, there is a difference between thinking that he exists and can be imagined as existing - atheists who claim, for example, that an intelligent mind cannot create the world because through the formation of the world teaches irrationality. Most conceivable, but they can not imagine this power as existing because then there will be an internal contradiction.
      4. “The essence of faith is in the greatness of infinite wholeness. "Everything that goes into the heart is a completely null spark about what deserves to be presumed, and what deserves to be presumed does not arise at all in a kind of cancellation about what it really is." (Rabbi Kook, torments from soups) Do not Rabbi Kook's remarks here disprove the definition of God as the greatest imaginable being? If I understand correctly, Rabbi Kook says that the greatest thing imaginable is void compared to what is conceivable (= is it conceivable?) But also that it is nothing compared to the thing itself. If so, it is impossible to define God as something greater than conceivable / the greatest conceivable being, it is far beyond what is conceivable.

    8. So here are some things I do not understand-
      1. What I have written is that you think there is a problem with assumptions and not with argument. You of course do not agree with the conclusion but there is no point in discussing the argument.
      2. I did not understand what is not clear here. I can imagine an existing fairy or just imagining the concept of a fairy. I can not explain more than that. You are mixing here what I actually think and what I imagine.
      3. Even according to your method there is a difference between thinking that he exists and can conceivably exist - atheists who claim for example that it is not true. They can indeed imagine it as existing. They just do not think it is true. See previous section.
      4. I have already explained what I had to explain. I do not understand what is useful here one quote or another.

    9. 1. Fine.
      2. OK. Of course I would have been happy for a clearer explanation but since you have exhausted your ability to explain I will be content with that.
      3. a. If the atheist says that there is an internal contradiction in the concept of 'God' then you too are thankful that he can not imagine it as existing (according to what you wrote in the previous comment), then of course the claim falls.
      B. If the atheist says that there is no internal contradiction in the concept, in your opinion he can conceive of it as existing, even though he thinks it is not true. OK. Let us now proceed to the very argument - that God who exists is greater than God who exists only in the imagination and if so he imagined something greater than God and he came to an internal contradiction. But there is a problem - the aforementioned atheist thinks that God exists is something that is not true. In general he will accept that the concept of having exists is greater than the concept of imaginary having but it is said about correct concepts! The concept of having an 'existing that is not true' is not greater than an imaginary concept of that having. After all, the whole assumption that the concept of being exists is greater than the concept of imaginary being is based on the intuition that reality is an important dimension and a concept that includes it is greater than a concept that does not include it. But as for a concept that in my eyes is wrong there is no difference if you say that it exists only in the imagination or also in reality, it is simply not true. It's like double a million is no bigger than one double zero.
      4. I argued that in my eyes, the sages of Israel would not accept the definition of God as the greatest imaginable being, because in their view God is beyond what we are capable of imagining even in the most daring imagination. What you answered, if I understood correctly, is that there is no contradiction between this position of the sages of Israel and the definition according to Anselm because it also does not limit God to human perception, meaning it is conceivable that something beyond what is conceivable (sounds illogical to me I'm happy if you sharpen it for me or correct me on what I did not understand you correctly). Against this, I brought the words of Rabbi Kook who seem to correspond with Anselm's definition but reject it (my assumption is that Rabbi Kook represents the view of the sages of Israel on the subject. He actually sharpens what his predecessors claimed from the Zohar to Maimonides. I'm wrong).
      5. General question. In the Book of the Way of God, the Ramchal writes about the Holy Spirit: Do you disagree with these words of Ramchal?

    10. 3. a. The atheist does not say that there is an internal contradiction in the concept of 'God'. So why toy with claims he does not raise.
      B. Here, too, my explanatory ability has come to an end. You repeat the same thing and I explained as much as I can.
      4. A preface that does not really interest me what the "sages of Israel" say (whatever the meaning of this phrase may be). But I argued with a standing ovation. Nilan think of the greatest concept imaginable even without illustrating it to yourself concretely (= seeing it before the eyes of the imagination). As I think of the concept of a democratic state as an abstract concept without seeing it before my eyes. Precisely for this reason the words of Rabbi Kook do not exclude Anselm in any way I can think of. Rabbi Kook himself in this paragraph speaks of Gd. Does this contradict itself?
      5. If he means absolute certainty, absolutely yes. I think that when we talk about certainty, we usually mean certainty at a level that a person can reach (such as trust in the appearance of the eyes, which of course is also uncertain), which is never something absolute. But in many cases people do not understand this matter and therefore talk about certainty. In that case they are just wrong. But of course I have never had the Holy Spirit so I have no experience with this kind of people and their acquaintances.

    11. 4. It is not like a democracy. A democratic state is a concept whose definition is clear to us. To my understanding, in the eyes of the sages of Israel, there is no clear definition of the concept of 'God' and it is not possible to define it (its essence can only be discussed through negation). In any case, with regard to the ontological claim itself, it probably does not matter that it is seemingly possible to be satisfied with a definition by way of negation (it is clear that it is inconceivable that there is something greater than it). I am interested in what you wrote that you are not interested in what the 'sages of Israel' say, they are the ones who defined the mitzvos that you keep (unless you demand verses on your own and issue laws yourself). I guess you make some sort of division between the realms of halakhah and the realms of thought or something like that. I would be happy if you would refer me to an article or book that clarifies your method on the subject.
      5. One might understand that he means an absolute uncertainty (and then there really is no dispute) but from the context there it seems narrow. He describes at first the ordinary attainments (through the senses or the mind) and there he does not speak of certainty and only when he comes to the description of the rank of the Holy Spirit does he write that these are certain attainments. If this is indeed his intention you on the one hand write that you disagree with him but on the other hand you object that you have no acquaintance with such objections, i.e. you leave a possibility that this certainty may exist.
      6. Strong and blessed for the very raising of the notebooks by you and for the willingness to take any response seriously. You give an answer that I do not think exists anywhere else and it is really not self-evident. Thank you!

    12. good evening. I would be happy if you address the following two comments-
      1. The Cosmological Evidence- In the above correspondence we agreed that it can be said that the forces of physics are the god of this argument (gravity, strong force, etc.). I have since read a bit about the Big Bang and from what I understand by theory these forces ‘separated’ (that is to say were formed) in very early stages one after the other immediately after the moment of the eruption. If so, in fact God created / separated these forces, i.e. he is an ancient cause for them.
      2. Physical Theological Evidence - The universe as a whole is indeed arranged in a certain and special order, which ostensibly indicates a planner of order. Despite this, it is clear that the main argument is from what is happening here on earth. The organism in all its types and details is definitely an amazing and surprising thing that testifies to a super smart designer. However, the fact that this marvelous work reads only here and not on any other ball (at least as far as we know) ostensibly weakens the argument. If everything is divine planning why is this specialty so one-off? After all, the earth is worth billions upon billions in relation to the entire universe! Can it not be argued that the banality that exists in the rest of being actually indicates a lack of planning? Or in another direction, why does this all-too-sophisticated planner need a universe so vast and not so special (when compared to creation on Earth)? The question intensifies according to what you put in the fifth notebook that the purpose of creation is related to us… Why do we need all this?

    13. Greetings.
      I no longer remember what I wrote and what the discussion was about. Unfortunately it is difficult for me to continue discussions at such intervals (I deal with several more discussions at the same time). So I will only refer to the things you have written here per se.

      1. I'm sure I never said these powers are God. What I may have said is that if one sees them as applicable one can see in themselves the God of physico-theological or cosmological evidence. If these forces were created by there before then he will be the God of sight. This has no bearing on our argument. I'm talking about having the first one in the chain.

      2. I did not understand this question. First, there may be life elsewhere as well. It's true that so far we have not found any, and that exactly means that life does not develop just like that (the chance is very small). Either way, either life was created here because that's where this little chance came true, or God decided he wanted humans here and therefore planted roots here that would allow it.
      The claim that we are the goal of creation is not unequivocal in my eyes (by the way, they were divided on this from Rabbi Gabay - the author of 'Holy Work', and Maimonides in 'Teacher'). But even if it is true, as I have already written here several times (look for discussions on the question of evil) Gd probably wanted a world run according to fixed laws of nature. With this assumption, our formation requires a large universe because the laws of nature of our universe determine a small chance for such a process. That is, it is not necessary that the whole universe is necessary for us now. It was necessary for us to be created. Before you make it difficult for me (from all the power of God who could have created a simpler set of rules, look for the discussions about evil and read them).

    14. good evening.
      I certainly understand the argument that God wanted to create the world through simple sets of laws. It can be meaningful. It also explains why it took so long from the moment of creation to the present day (according to the Big Bang). Yet it does not fully explain why the whole universe is needed. Assuming that the purpose of the universe is us, then it was enough to create the same universe with the same laws only in a smaller amount that would be enough for the earth, sun, moon and a few more stars that we would have for signs and times and that's it. From what you say I understand that the reason God did not act this way is that the laws of nature he set give very little chance of such formation. The point I do not understand is what bothers God that the chances are small? Is it bound by the laws of statistics? If you say that God decided to create the world in a way that would also conform to the rules of statistical probability then you dropped all the physico-theological evidence (i.e. the one based on the specialty of praise and vegetation), then the earth on all organic systems is something that is statistically reasonable Not special. (I dug a lot in discussions about the question of evil as you asked but did not find anything relevant beyond the principle you wrote above that God wanted to create the world by fixed laws).

    15. These are not simple rules but hard rules. There may not be a set of rules at all that would do the same thing without the whole set. System size is not a calibrated parameter. Who told you that the same results could have been achieved in a smaller system?

    16. I do not know if this was possible but from reading (rather superficially, I do not deal with physics, chemistry and biology and do not always understand all the concepts) of some scientific articles and explanations about the formation of the world I did not see that the size of the universe was actually needed for its evolution at some point. I would love if you could give me some direction of explanation as to how the vast size of the universe could have contributed to its evolution as it is.

    17. It's hard for me to show you an example, but it's clearly true. You need to understand that the reduction you are talking about is not a contraction of the scale because it will not change the relationship between the unnecessary and the important things. Rather truncating part of reality (i.e. creating only our sphere without the environment). Even in the statistical sense, a certain size is needed to meet a rare effect. How many dice throws does it take to meet ten consecutive times of 5? You realize that this cannot be created in a chain of 20 throws.
      I think we are exhausted.

  41. 4. I am not interested in the sense that I do not see them as a source of authority. Their remarks do not bind me, and such quotations do not add to the discussion unless there is a new argument in them. The fact that someone says something has no meaning in my eyes. Only "something" has meaning.
    Indeed, in halakhah the situation is different because there the sages have formal authority (= even if they are not right, it is obligatory to listen to them). In the realms of thought this is not the case. It appears in several places on the site and one can try and search. I'm writing about it now in an unpublished trilogy (hopefully a few more months).

  42. Why is the only explanation for the match between man and the world to the surety that the match is correct?
    What's wrong with the evolutionary argument: a living creature that did not interpret the world correctly dies and therefore the only thing that survived is a living creature that interprets the world correctly

    1. As for how I would believe to answer that evolution can not be an explanation for knowing reality because it is itself something we know from reality I will answer that it is not true at all. Evolution can certainly be an a priori claim. And the claim “a blind and mechanical mechanism does not increase complexity” is a false claim. Detail:

      The idea of ​​evolution can be formulated as Richard Dawkins put it in his book The Selfish Garden:

      Darwin's 'most suitable survival' is actually a particular case of a more general law, the survival of the stable. The universe is populated with stable things. A stable thing is a collection of atoms, which lasts long enough, or is common enough, to be named. Soap bubbles tend to take a spherical shape because it is the most stable configuration for a thin membrane filled with gas. In the spacecraft, the water also reaches stability in a spherical shape. On the surface, however, where there is gravity, the stable surface of standing water will be horizontal and flat. Salt crystals tend to form cubes because it is the stable way to density sodium and chlorine ions together. In the sun, the simplest atoms - the hydrogen atoms - melt and form helium atoms because under conditions prevailing in the heart of the sun, the helium configuration is more stable. Other, more complex atoms are formed in stars throughout the universe, and they formed in the Big Bang, which according to the accepted theory now formed the universe. These are the sources of all the atoms in our world. Sometimes, when atoms meet, they bond to each other in a chemical reaction that creates molecules, and these will be more or less stable ”(Chapter 26, p. XNUMX).

      But from the general law of "survival of stability" mentioned above one can learn an even more general principle which I call the "principle of stability." I will begin to formulate the principle as follows:

      "After a certain amount of time, a chaotic system will come to be a stable system."

      We will take a given chaotic system, without rules or legality, everything happens in a completely random way for no reason. Countless options are created and extinct until among all the possible options the system comes to one option which is in a stable case, then it has switched between countless options and each one option is more or less stable or identical to its company and eventually the system, being random, reaches a more stable option. Preceded by it being very stable and perhaps even completely stable. There she "gets stuck." (Since the system is now stable - it will remain so unchanged. By definition) therefore any chaotic-random system will eventually reach stability. [If we compare it to throwing a cube it is like saying - "After a certain amount of throwing a cube, the cube will fall on the number 1". Although it is not necessary - after all, the cube can fall forever on all digits except 1, but for that to happen you definitely need a "miracle". So too in our case, the fact that a system will reach a stable form is almost inevitable.]

      An ontological evidence from language for the existence of stable edges in reality: The word "stable" is an adjective and all adjectives exist only "in relation" to something else. "Cold": Seawater is cold only in relation to the human body, in relation to ice it is warm. "Fast": Cheetah is fast compared to a zebra, but slow compared to a fighter jet. If so, we will try to define the relative title "stable" as follows: something more stable than its friend if it exists without change longer than its friend without falling apart. It can be noted that for every adjective there are “boundaries at the edges” that it can reach in physical reality. "Cold" and "hot", there is nothing colder in the universe than absolute zero and there can be nothing hotter in the universe than converting all the energy that exists in the universe to heat. "Fast" and "slow", there is nothing in relation to any body that moves faster than the speed of light or anything slower than the speed of zero. So it is with all adjectives. As for stability, it is even possible to define edges even without looking at reality and seeing from them: absolute stability - something that will exist without disintegration forever. And zero stability, or, substantial instability - something that will not remain even for a moment (we will get to that in the chapter "Energy"). And from the very fact that the term "stability" exists, and is an adjective, and edges can be defined for it - it exists
      Edges necessarily in our limited universe.

      If so, you can now move on to the next step in the law:

      "A group of chaotic systems will become a group of stable systems"

      A universe with many chaotic systems will eventually become a messy location, chaos, an "orderly" universe. System after system, part after part, will "get stuck" in a stable state and will not change. If we take 100 Schrödinger cats and wait long enough, eventually all the cats will be dead. The system will eventually reach stability. So too the things that exist in the universe will eventually be stable. No cat will surprise and come back to life. Similarly - no stable system will return to being chaotic. It is simply an extension of the previous law from a state of one to a state of many.

      If so you can now go through another step:

      "After a certain amount of time a set of stable systems will connect together to create a stable complex system"

      There are now all kinds of stable systems in the universe. These stability systems have an infinity of possible combinations (ie - the compositions) to connect with each other. Some of these combinations are more stable and some are less stable. Similar to the first part of the law - eventually some combination will be created that will be more stable than all the previous combinations and will be very stable. And as soon as systems join such a vehicle - they will "get stuck" in it. And so little by little more and more stable complexities will join and the universe will be filled with them.

      If so, the "principle of stability" is formulated in its final form as follows:

      “After a certain amount of time, a chaotic system will come to be a stable system. A group of chaotic systems will come to be a group of stable systems. A group of stable systems will come together to create a stable complex system. ”

      And so, from the initial state of a chaotic universe, chaos, we have reached almost inevitably (after a long time probably) a state of a universe in which there are stable and complex systems. Blind and random mechanism - increases complexity. The belief in the existence of evolution, then, is an a priori thing.

    2. There are some mistakes here. You have two essentials:
      1. It is really not true that every system will reach a stable state. There are systems that keep moving constantly between different situations. Not every system of laws evolves. On the contrary, the number of systems that reach a steady state is negligible compared to all the options. It seems to me that there are theorems in mathematics about this at least regarding certain types of systems. Have you mentioned the example of throwing a cube, then we will use it: If you roll a cube a huge number of times, will a permanent legality be created from any stage onwards? Definately not.
      2. You ignore the element of heredity. Without it there is no evolution. Heredity is not a law that can be deduced a priori.
      (By the way, evidence from language is just another kind of empirical observation. This is no longer an a priori thing.)

    3. 1. First I did not understand your comparison to the cube. Part of the definition of a stable thing is that it does not change but is "stuck" like that (by its very definition as stable) that is, it is enough that it reaches stability once out of millions of attempts and that is it. He will stay that way.
      And secondly even in the changing systems you are talking about there are ultimately more stable situations than each other. The system may not reach complete stability (which never falls apart) but this is not necessary for the sake of argument. Suffice it to take the thing the most stable shape the system can take and say that it is its state of stability and it survives the amount of time it is called "50 billion years". During this time in which it survives, more (smaller) stability will be created in the compositions between systems, 14 billion years will pass for them and here - we have reached humans. I think that means I exist and if I do exist I probably have some stability so I probably interpret at least some of the reality correctly otherwise I would not be stable.
      Third. Who here talked about a system of laws? In my opinion there are never laws but it all started in chaos and stability was created by their very definition (I definitely think we should check the option that things we call fundamental particles and laws of physics evolved in this way and I would love to hear your opinion as an expert). That in a world with laws will create stability and even absolute stability [if there is a law inherent in nature it means it is absolute and is expressed in some way. That is, there is an absolutely stable behavior]
      2. Heredity is only a derivative of the principle of stability. A thing with heritability will be more stable (will last longer) than a thing without heredity. It is enough that once a gene with a hereditary ability is created and that is it, it will eventually "take over" the world (the way it happened can also be seen in the book "The Selfish Garden")
      In addition I do not understand why what I call evidence from language is not a priori. The ontological evidence uses the word "integrity" and does not seem to bother anyone to call it ontological. So here too I point to the concept of "stability", (everything exists has a certain stability) explains what it is and shows that by definition there are limits (epistemic necessity without basic assumptions) and it follows that therefore there must be limits in reality [or the same limits as in definition or less . Because as stated the system can not necessarily reach absolute stability. (As you say in the first notebook that an epistemic necessity without a basic premise is also necessarily ontological)]

    4. Perhaps it is even possible to say that there is no such thing as a truly a priori claim, because every claim consists of language and only after looking at the meaning of the words do you construct a claim and so on.

    5. As I explained there is no basis for your assumption that world systems will reach a stable state. On the contrary, they usually will not come. Do not see what else is here to explain. Achieving temporary stability of hundreds of millions of years - life, after 14 billion years it is statistically unfounded (too short). When you roll a dice and get after a hundred rolls a thousand times in a row 6 you will not say that it is a temporarily stable condition that was received by chance. After thousands of billions of dumps maybe yes.
      There is no such thing as no rules. So what's going on anyway? Also something random has some distribution according to which it happens and these are the rules. Heredity is not an accidental product of stability. There is a mechanism there and it was created in some way (actually always was. Only life was created at some point).
      You speak out of mathematical and statistical misunderstanding, and it's hard for me to discuss that.

    6. From the rabbi's answer I'm afraid you may not have understood what I mean. When I say stable I am not talking about "neat" or "uniform". And you again equate to throwing a cube inaccurately. I'm not saying that after a thousand throws coming out of 6 I think 6 is a steady state. But after a number comes out - the cube can no longer be rolled. It is absolute stability. For example, if the number 1 comes out - it is no longer possible to roll the cube and the number "remains" 1 always.
      In throwing a cube several times eventually the number 1 will come out and the throws will stop. This is what happens when a physical thing reaches a "completely stable" state. (But for example if it is very stable but not completely the "cube" will be thrown again only after a year for that matter)
      And as for what you said about the amount of time that has passed it is not accurate at all because you look at it with human eyes.
      I will explain, let us take as an example the energy generated in the Big Bang. The energy can take all sorts of forms, some will "survive" no more than 4 plank times in their shape and then will return to being energy that takes shapes at random, and some will survive lots of plank times. The forms that "survive" more Planck times are more "stable." This. Now our fact as human beings Planck time seems “very short” time is that we are very stable and survive a lot of time.
      When I say without laws I mean for example the possibility that the "law" of gravity is not a "law" inherent in the universe but simply exists everywhere we see that particles that do not emit gravitational waves will not crystallize and in any case are unstable and disintegrate after a very short time. That of the existence of matter in general) but the only objects that continue to exist are objects that emit gravitational waves. (Cites the law of gravity as a physical example of stability. It is clear that quite a few difficulties were raised on this specific proposal but it was for the purpose of discussing an ideological proverb) Similarly the genes that allow heredity are more "stable" in the sense that only they can exist over time.
      Again I repeat. I do not assume at all that a system will necessarily reach a completely stable state. But in the system itself there must be more stable and less stable situations. I am not talking here about a system of series of numbers that do not contain a stability property (the number 1 is no more stable than the number 5) but about physical objects that have a stability property. And so every system has the "most stable shape it can take." And while it takes on this form more or less stable interactions can form with it and exist as a relatively “stable” complex (how long it will survive, etc.).
      Stability This relative word is present in every physical system.

    7. I fully understand what you are preparing for, and you are wrong. If a person rolls a dice and continues to do so indefinitely. Do you think at some point he will come to a toss that will always be on the same number? Or to impose under any legality? No. that's it.
      I think we've exhausted.

    8. You are absolutely right in what you say but it has nothing to do with what I say. Where does the concept of stability even fit into what you say? The number 6 is no more stable than the number 1, there is no ratio of stability in the cube. Examples from the mathematical world are not related to the discussion they do not contain any stability feature. I'm talking about a world where the title "more stable" or "less stable" exists.
      Unless you believe that our world does not contain more stable and less stable objects at all and the term “stable” is in our head by mistake I can not understand at all what the claim is here.
      Set stable

  43. Is there at all a situation where the cube (according to the parable) will stop?
    If it is laid non-stop, the meaning of the term "stability" is not that the cube will get stuck (since it is laid non-stop) but that the results obtained in it will indicate a certain legitimacy (like 1000 times 6 dodge).

    1. no no no. I was not talking about a cube in that sense at all. No non-stop tossing. Forget about this example is not a good example because there is no "more stable" and "less stable" ratio between the options.
      I was talking about a cube in the sense that eventually all possibilities are supposed to come out. So too in a random system the most stable option in the system should be created at some point.

  44. To Rabbi Michi
    Regarding the fifth notebook.
    Would the statement "I have a presumption that the commandment of God should be obeyed" would you say even if God was evil ("Nature is evil to evil" and created his world to do evil with his creatures, etc ...)?
    Or are you listening to God's command not on the part that he is "God" but on the part that you think he is "good"?

    1. Two comments:
      1. I may have had the same intuition to listen to, but at the same time there is an interest in not cooperating with evil. A conflict has arisen and must be resolved within it. Like obeying parents when they are bad.
      If good is part of the definition of God, then the question is not defined. There is no such thing as a bad god. There may be a bad world creator, but I'm not sure being a creator is enough to create commitment. Here we actually went back to section 2.

    2. Yes I meant the creator of a bad world. Do you define him as good and say that it is necessary to create a commitment not to simply say in other words that you obey him because he is good ?!
      So why not just say "I listen to God's commandment because I think it's so good to act" ?!

      Do you think that in principle there can be a mitzvah that causes suffering for the sake of causing suffering (does not cause suffering to bring good in the future, there is no light at the end of the tunnel, suffering for the sake of suffering)?
      If so - then in what sense is God's commandment good?
      If not - it means that the concepts of good and evil in your head (suffering = evil. Happiness = good) must be "synchronized" with the concepts of good and evil of God. So why not just say that the mitzvah god is himself (to some extent) the good concept that is in our head?

    3. No. The duty to hear his voice is because he is God, when being good is part of his definition (not because he is the Creator of the world). Beyond that, I said that there is a duty even if it is bad, but that there is a counter-duty not to cooperate with evil.
      And even if you were right your conclusion does not stem from assumptions. Even if there is no duty to obey him if he is not good, it is not right to recognize the duty to obey God well with a duty to do good. It's really not the same thing.
      I did not understand the second question. Clearly there is no commandment whose purpose is suffering for the sake of suffering. and hence?

    4. What does it mean because he is God? Because he created the world? So what?
      And why in a world where the Creator is evil would it be obligatory not to cooperate with evil? Where does this duty come from?

      And here is all my inference:
      If God is good it means His commandments are good deeds.
      If I am obligated to obey God, I am obligated to do good deeds.
      If he was bad and would command me bad deeds I would not perform them
      Conclusion: When I perform to those whose actions are good I perform them * because * they are good.
      So probably it's because of the duty to do good.

      Regarding the second question:
      The reason you think there can be no commandments that cause suffering for the sake of suffering is because by your definition God is good and suffering is bad and this is a contradiction. (I assume you are able to imagine that there is a mitzvah that causes happiness - for the sake of causing happiness)
      But this is a contradiction only if God also defines suffering as kneeling.
      This means that the feelings you define as containing good or bad - they also contain good or evil "in terms" of God.
      So why not just save and "unite" the data (the theory of the good God the mitzvah, and the fact that we define in our mind good and bad as God defines good and bad) and say that what we call "al mitzvah" is actually the concept of "good" that exists in our mind?

    5. I answered the previous questions and for some reason I do not see the answers here.

      I said it was not because he created the world but because he is God (which also includes his being good). See Rambam XNUMX: XNUMX.
      I did not understand the question of why not cooperate with evil. Because he's bad. While it is possible to gossip and say that when God is evil (which as I recall can not be) there is no source of moral charge and in any case there is no source of prohibition to cooperate with evil. But then maybe there is also no source to obey him. In short, a bad God is a different and probably also contradictory reality and there is no point in gossiping about it.

      Regarding your heating:
      If God is good it means His commandments are good deeds. Right.
      If I am obligated to obey God, I am obligated to do good deeds. Not true. I am committed because they are commanded but they are also good. The charge is because they are commanded and not just because they are good.
      If he was bad and would command me bad deeds I would not perform them. "God is bad" is an oxymoron.
      Conclusion: When I perform to those whose actions are good I perform them * because * they are good. Not true, as stated.
      So probably it's because of the duty to do good. Not true, and so on.

      Regarding your second question, I wrote that I can not understand the logic. If the stone is hard let's save and define the stone as a difficulty. In the fourth notebook I explained that there is no commitment to do good without an entity that underlies it. Therefore God's identification with the good itself leaves the good empty. Although incredibly economical, but a little pours the baby with the water.
      It also answers your clarifications that have now come up.

    6. Listen to God's commandment not because he is omnipotent, not because he is omniscient, not because he is the Creator and not because he is good but "because he is God"? I do not understand this sentence at all .. Does the concept of "God" exist in you as some axiom of something that must be listened to its command and you listen to God's command on the part of his "divinity" (what is it)? For me the concept does not exist .. (not such a rare phenomenon, it probably also did not exist in all those rabbis who tried to justify the work of God as gratitude).
      About myself I know that the reason I am listening to God's commandment is because I believe it will lead to “good” in the end. And if I did not think he was bringing about "good" I would not have kept the commandment. Given that I do not have in mind the concept of "deity" that you have I think this is the only approach I can take.

    7. You present this too ridiculous ignorance. It is clear that the concept of God also includes these characteristics (Creator, good, etc.), but he is probably not limited to just that. There are many concepts that are difficult to give an explicit definition (refer to Piersig's 'quality', in his book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance).
      In any case, the inference that conveys us to God for good and supersedes him as an object is unfounded regardless of all this. For my part you will define it as the essence of good, and still need such an object. This cannot be an abstraction in ignorance.
      By the way, in my eyes the commandment does not bring good but is the right thing. The identity between these two is not simple (a bit depends on the definition).

    8. What does "so true" mean? True to what happened? The concept of "right" needs (for the sake of) a purpose for which a person does an act. For example, in order to rob a bank without being caught, you have to put on a mask, plan through an entrance, plan through an escape, neutralize the guards. And all of these things are "bank robbery laws." Or "How to behave in order to rob a bank without being caught." That is, there is a right way to behave in order to reach a goal. (This view can also be seen in Jordan Peterson's first book, Maps of Meaning - An Architecture of Faith). With you, this is how it is right to behave - so that what happens?
      You can solve this and say that the mitzvos are "how to behave in order to be a servant of God" which is equivalent to the sentence "how right to worship God to be a servant of God" but this is a strange sentence to me, after all the question is what is the justification to be a servant of God. Again it probably goes back to the fact that you see value in being a servant of God on the part of the "deity" in him.

    9. Indeed true. But it is not unique to the work of God. So it is with morality. You do something to achieve some value (freedom, equality, benefit to others, etc.). But what are the values ​​themselves for? Always at the end of the explanation network you will have to stop and say "like this". To me, the work of God is a value, and therefore it does not need explanations outside of it. It's a bit like obeying parents. This too is not meant to benefit anyone. This is a duty incumbent upon us and this is it (although here I am touching on the matter of course, because your parents are my friends 🙂). I have already referred you to Maimonides the XNUMXth in Ps. A well-named name that denies any motive that is the basis of God's work.
      But it is strong that he did not command us just things, and there is probably some benefit from them. The benefit is not necessarily moral (benefit). There can be other benefits (= spiritual or religious values). Moreover, as I wrote in the fifth notebook, it is unlikely in my eyes that the purpose of the world is benefit, otherwise the world and human beings are scarce and then there will also be no need for benefit to anyone. It is therefore more likely in my eyes that the whole of creation is meant for something that is not a benefit to others, but that a creature should act in a way that benefits people (if society is healthy and good it will be able to achieve its spiritual destinies).

    10. I saw Maimonides there and it is clear to me that this is the conclusion every Orthodox should reach. I just do not believe her.
      Indeed the phenomenon of seeing value in something is not unique to the work of God and people can see value in a lot of things.
      But in my method I do not quite need it, the limbic system is the earliest part of the brain and is responsible for creating the feelings that we define as good or bad. In every person the concept of good and evil is imprinted on the body, the fact that these concepts exist in all cultures and in all languages ​​(and even the oldest) testifies to this. I do not need to create "value" out of nothing.
      [Regarding honoring parents I will also think that it is a “value” just because it makes the world a better place. But when my parents order me to do a bad deed I will not do it (for example when a person's father tells him to space Shabbat he will not keep it. In your opinion the reason is that there is a conflict of values ​​and the stronger value wins. Achieves a goal opposite to the original goal, makes the world a worse place instead of a better place so there is no point at all in listening to a parent in such a case)]

      Regarding the "benefit" - in what sense is it a benefit? If it is not for us (because it is a goal outside the world) and not "good" in our terms it would be more correct to use the gray word "result" rather than "benefit". And if we do not define those spiritual goals as "good" in our concepts, why should we aspire to them? In your opinion you will answer that we will aspire to them to be servants of God and again we have returned to the starting point.

    11. To illustrate this I use hand washing as an example:
      When I see a person washing his hands before eating. And I know he should not rinse with murky water (which is not fit for a dog to drink) - I see that the result is that the person's hands will be clean before he eats. If so you can even jump in and say that to some extent he does it so that he has clean hands before eating (this is at least one of the reasons for washing hands). Many studies have shown the health importance of hand washing before and after a meal (last water is mandatory?) So why not assume this is the reason for the mitzvah ?!
      But what happens in the case of soapy water versus puddle water?
      If you have 2 burdens:
      One is filled with water worthy of drinking a dog. But were taken from a puddle in the street and are quite dirty.
      The second is full of soapy water - which is not suitable for drinking a dog and is therefore halakhically forbidden.
      Here it is quite possible that this is a situation where if you observe the orthodox halakhah you may act completely contrary to the author's intention.

    12. This reaction is to Seidler (the new format is not yet clear to me).

      If you are talking about a limbic system there is no point in arguing and debating. You are not decisive in favor of morality or the observance of halakhah but simply prevent your tendencies. So what is the debate about?
      It seems to me that there is no point in continuing from here. You describe to me your limbic system, and I can at most describe to you mine. So what? And if I decide to drive contrary to the limbic cave I'm wrong? Why, because your limbic system creates abdominal pain in you?
      I guess you understand that there is no point in discussing.
      By the way, in my discussion of the categorical order (column 122) I showed why the limbic desire to do good does not necessarily bring about a better world. But it does not matter in our case, because he who is driven by a limbic system is not a dialogue partner in matters of morality.

    13. I brought up the limbic system as evidence that the concepts of "good" and "bad" are deeply ingrained in us. The fact that it is "only" in the minds of human beings does not mean that it is not "real" for us. It is clear that there is nothing to talk about with a person who would define suffering as "good" because that is how his limbic system dictates to him. And I certainly identify a "good deed" with an act that makes the world better in the sense that it increases the good feelings that exist in the world (more happiness, more joy, etc.) over the bad feelings that exist in the world (suffering, sadness, etc.) and in light of extensive surveys 99.9 A percentage of the world defines the same basic feelings as "good" (if you take a list of emotions and sort them by "good" and "bad" you can be pretty sure that the list will be the same for almost everyone) You can certainly think that you can talk to other people about "good" ”And“ bad ”. The basic controversy is just how to get there. Some will think that a capitalist society is happier and some will think that a socialist society is happier. None of the socialists will continue to see equality as he thinks equality causes suffering.

      So why can you not imagine that there are commandments that cause suffering for the sake of causing suffering - and that what does Len care that your limbic system makes you feel suffering ?!
      [Maybe even the meaning of "foreign work" is to define bad things as good - it should be eradicated anyway]

    14. It does not matter at all if the whole world defines good and evil the same. The question is whether these are principles or tendencies. Even if we all have tendencies (feelings, limbic reactions) there is still nothing to talk about. These are facts, and facts are morally neutral.
      It seems to me that we have exhausted.

  45. In honor of Mira Datra and the entire Kaddisha congregation, I wanted to ask a question regarding the belief in the Torah.
    At the core of the fifth notebook (Chapter IV) is the main confrontation you addressed is against David Day's skeptical questions.
    But for me personally, it does not bother to hear testimony about the existence of miracles as I am willing to accept evidence about the existence of aliens. Nor does the belief in Gd and His providence in His world bother me ..
    The main point that bothers me in the tradition is that the tradition elevates the people over the rest of the nations, and therefore it is precisely this bank whose credibility is harmed.
    As it is said in the Torah “you are sons of the Lord your God” and in many midrashim this idea was voiced even more emphatically as the world was created “for Israel who were called first” “if you accept the Torah” and many more.

    But my heart tells me that every nation would try to glorify its name in relation to the rest of the nations by creating its own positive myth that elevates it above the rest of the nations. Certainly by chance and she did come out of Egypt and was despised and humiliated there.
    As the Egyptians in the Israeli wars claimed at the very moment of the crisis that they reached as far as Tel Aviv.
    And just as a Jew is tormented, so he claims that God loved him "because when a man torments his son, the Lord your God, he will afflict him." Which is basically true that they came out of Egypt.
    So too the commandments written in the Torah express the connection they made to God as every nation in their time worked in a certain way to one of the gods in heaven.

    1. A completely marginal matter in my opinion. Indeed, I do not think there is a fundamental difference between Israel and the nations. The virtue of which the Torah speaks is a vocation and not a built-in attribute, and in this indeed the people of Israel are different from the other nations (only it is obligated in Halacha and in the worship of Gd). Of course there is a unique character for each nation, a product of its genetics and history and culture, and so is ours. I see no indication of anything beyond that.
      Therefore, the assumption that the people of Israel are considered superior in essence is incorrect in my opinion, and therefore I do not think it should be disturbed. To me this is a discourse designed primarily for internal needs.

  46. Hello Rabbi!
    After I finished reading the fifth notebook I was left confused about the normative obligation to keep the commandments.
    On the one hand, you argued in the fourth note that facts commanded by an outsider (God) have the ability to bind normatively, and the religious order must be obeyed as the moral order,
    On the other hand in the fifth notebook you generally spoke of a charge arising from a philosophical gratitude.

    1. Philosophical gratitude is the basis for a positive obedience to the commandment of the same factor (God). They are valid because he commanded, and it is the philosophical gratitude that compels me to obey. In Kant's I also explained in the fourth notebook a similar division: that morality is autonomous (the result of human decision) but its validity is because it is the will of God.

  47. Another thing that has not been clarified to me on this subject, is what the problem is with leaving the commandment of God as a fact. Contrary to morality I am not sure that there is a desirable religion other than the existing one, so even if the divine commandment is only a fact it can oblige (a kind of derivation of Scripture about me that I have nothing but its existence)

    1. The fact that someone commands does not create a charge to keep the commandment. You need to add here a presumption that there is a divine commandment, which is a normative presumption. Only now does the commandment generate a charge, because it is a commandment of an authority figure. Gratitude is the basis for this normative assumption (it is obligatory to keep Gd’s commandments because of ontological gratitude).

  48. Hello Rabbi Michi!
    I would love to explain the following paragraph from the second notebook:
    Assuming that shamans like our universe must have a cause, whether we accept the existence of God or not, there should be something that is the cause of our universe. Therefore even if we adopt the proposition of an infinite chain of explanations, we can define the infinity of the lower steps in a chain as one object, and call it God. All the turtles down are nothing but one big turtle. For example, it can be treated as the sum of an infinite column that gives us one finite factor.

    / I did not understand how you can define what is already a beautiful explanation that is nothing but a statement that "there is an explanation" as an explanation by defining an infinity of reasons as one object? /

    If we look at this endless chain of explanations, then it is this infinite object that underlies the existence of the universe, and is therefore our candidate to be God. In this we have actually proved the existence of an infinite object which is the cause of all that exists in reality, and that is God. And again it is enough for us that it is infinite in only potential meaning, for we do not place here anything positive about its infinity: all that lies beneath the first tortoise is one large tortoise (which may be described as the sum of infinite tadpoles that are getting smaller, but it is not really important as we saw in Achilles ). Our chain is finite, with a vertical base that is infinite in potential meaning.

    / I did not understand why ignoring the chain solves our problem with the concrete infinity./
    In what follows, some seem to have suggested an even simpler solution: simply put our own world into this definition, and identify the universe itself with God. This is actually Spinoza's pantheism, which will be discussed later.

    / I mean in the future will this possibility be rejected like pantheism? /

    I tried to address each time what I did not understand in the paragraph, anyway it was mostly made difficult for me because I did not understand who was interested just after we ruled out the possibility of infinite convergence of explanations, and seemingly ruled out the infinite regression.

  49. In order to deal with the problematic nature of infinite regression, in the face of the assumption that complex things are not created spontaneously, the rabbi excluded God from the complex things that need a component.
    I did not really understand why not just say about the universe itself that it is one of the complex things that do not need an element?

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