Halacha rulings and women's singing

I can offer Rabbi Michi's bot answer in the beta version:

*Clarification* – The answer is based on the online writings, articles and columns of Rabbi Dr. Michael (Michi) Avraham. There may be inaccuracies, so anyone who wishes to confirm every detail is asked to consult the original sources on his website.

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## A. “A voice in a woman’s private parts” – how the issue is structured

| Talmudic source | Context | What is said | Meaning of Rishonim |
| ————————— | ————– | —————————————————— | ———————————————————————————————————————— |
| **Berachot 24 A.A.** | Laws of Reciting Shema | “A Voice in a Woman’s Privates” – It is forbidden to *recite K”sh* when hearing a woman’s voice | Most of the Rishonim (Rif, Rosh, Rambam in “Responsa Peer Hador”) understand that the prohibition here is **limited to moments of K”sh and prayer**. |
| **Kiddushin עב (70) עב-עב** | Distances from cities | “It is forbidden to hear the sound of nakedness” – within the framework of the prohibitions of contemplation | Here the emphasis is on **sexual pleasure**: if the purpose of hearing is for pleasure – it is forbidden even outside of prayer. Rif and Rambam rule on this in the prohibitions of coming. |

### How did they arrive at the Shulchan Aruch?

* **O”C עה §3** – “It is forbidden to recite Kash against Kol Arva.” This is a direct continuation of the issue of blessings.
* **Ahaza 21 §1** – “It is forbidden to hear a naked voice” simply. This is the result of the issue in Kiddushin.

The double distinction (prayer time versus fear of pleasure) remains, except that the Shulchan Aruch – and thus most poskim in recent generations – have expanded the “fear of pleasure” to almost any situation of *singing* (as opposed to ordinary speech), out of reasonable concern that it involves an experience of pleasure.

### Fresh reading (Rabbi Michi's direction)

1. **Original context** – In the blessings, it is about the *concentration* of the reader; when there is no Shema recitation, there is no blanket prohibition.
2. **Dependence on pleasure** – In Kiddushin, the word “to enjoy” highlights that the prohibition is not the actual voice but the experience of stimulation. Therefore, singing that is not sexually stimulating (mixed choir, memorial service, etc.) does not automatically fall within the scope of the prohibition.
3. **The habituation factor (“habit” and the cultural context)** – If in a certain environment a woman’s voice is not arousing, it is difficult to see it as “shameful.” This is an approach that is already emerging among some of the great Acharonim, and Rabbi Michi emphasizes it.

In a column dealing with the compulsion to listen to female singers in the IDF, he writes that although he does not think there is a halakhic prohibition against hearing women sing, one should respect those who believe otherwise.

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## B. Am I (or you) obligated to the table?

### 1. **Substantive** versus **Formal** Authority

* Since the signing of the Talmud, there is no longer any *formal* authority to create prohibitions; subsequent poskim are merely **experts**, and their authority stems from the likelihood that they are right (“substantive authority”).
* Therefore, someone who has studied the issue in depth and comes to a reasoned conclusion that differs from the Shulchan Arutz Sheva, **does not commit an offense** if he acts differently – as long as he does not violate a binding community custom.

### 2. So why do most religious Zionist rabbis “cling” to the Shulchan Arbiter?

* **Sociality and Unity** – The Shulchan Aruch serves as a halachic “mother tongue”; a sweeping deviation could dismantle a public halachic fabric.
* **Epistemic humility** – Even a deep learner admits that there is a good chance that others have already considered his claims; basic conservatism reduces errors.
* **Public acceptance** – In many places, it is customary that the Shulchan Arba is the default, and therefore anyone who breaches a boundary must justify themselves thoroughly.

Rabbi Michi emphasizes that there is no “la tesur” here today; the obligation is the product of a **social contract** and not a formal law.

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## C. Practical conclusion to the example of women's poetry

* If I studied and found that the prohibition applies *only* when there is lustful contemplation – I am allowed to listen to a singer's concert, as long as it is clear to me that I am not enjoying myself sexually.
* And yet, when the community or the army contains people who fear the prohibition, there is room to consider solutions of mutual sensitivity – just as Rabbi Michi suggests: “Do not force them to listen, but do not forbid those who are willing either.”

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### Bottom line

The issues in blessings and kiddushin form two circles: the prohibition of prayer and the prohibition of pleasure. The Shulchan Aruch merged them extensively, but from a principled standpoint – and particularly according to Rabbi Avraham’s method – anyone who is knowledgeable about the matter, and thinks in a reasoned manner that the Shulchan Aruch expanded beyond the law, is entitled to rely on its understanding, out of responsibility, transparency, and respect for tradition and society.

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For the interested reader: A detailed study of the authoritative and methodological approach can be found in columns 280, 393, and 568 on the website *mikyab.net* – recommended.

Wow… with all the asterisks, it looks like connections from the 80s-90s with Einstein software for those who remember, or they were copied with a stencil, or on a home manual typewriter. Look on Google.