Halacha and Rationale
*question:*
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Hello Dr. Michael Avraham,
I have studied your statements regarding the authority of halakhic law and morality, in particular your claim (such as in your book *God Plays Dice*, p. 273 ff.) that autonomous moral judgment can sometimes stand above halakhic duty, or at least challenge it—and that a clear moral duty will prevail over an incomprehensible halakhic mitzvah, in the name of rationality and conscience.
It is difficult here to reconcile your words with substantial (and sufficiently authoritative) sources in the tradition:
A. Rambam, at the end of Hilchot Meila (58:8), writes that one should not ponder the reasons for the mitzvot, and even those that seem to have no reason are "the king's decree," which should not be canceled or relaxed. This means that even if his words seem immoral, this is not a reason to reject them.
2. Ramban (Leviticus 19:2) writes that "be holy" means going beyond what reason requires, and submitting to the spirit of the Torah, even in things that are not understood.
C. In the well-known Book of the Holy Spirit (Kiddushin 31:1), it is told about a child of a gift who does not violate the commandment to honor his father — even when it seems to contradict a consideration of great benefit.
D. – Rashi (Numbers 19:2) “This is the law of the Torah” – since Satan and the nations of the world tempt Israel to say: ‘What is this commandment and what is the point of it?’ Therefore, He wrote a law in it – it is a decree from before me, you have no permission to ponder it. Solomon also said about this parsha, “I said, ‘I am wise,’ but it is far from me” (Ecclesiastes 7:23).
Isn't there a danger in your approach to subjective motivation that would lead to the rejection of any halakhic law in the name of "private conscience"? And isn't this – albeit unintentionally – a complete mixing of partial and relative human judgment with the word of God?
How would you reconcile the contradiction between your approach and the idea that the Torah is absolute truth even when it is beyond our understanding?
Does your argument show that you are not at all subject to the words of anyone (and this is the very paradox of citing sources - as I do - which are part of the claim that you are not subject to them..)
With respect and appreciation,
Moshe Jami
What you are quoting from my words is unfamiliar to me. I do not think that a moral obligation necessarily overrides a halakhic obligation (I did not understand what difference it makes whether it is understood or not. I am not sure that there are any halakhic obligations that are understood). What I am arguing is that in sufficiently extreme cases, it is possible for a halakhic obligation to prevail. I further argue that the decision as to which overrides is not left to halakhic law but to the individual himself, since this is a non-moral dilemma.
A. These words of Maimonides do not touch on my claims in any way. Also because he himself writes explicitly in many places that all the commandments have reasons and, in his opinion, they can usually be understood. But even without this, the fact that they have no reason does not mean that they are not rejected.
B. What does this have to do with it? Walking according to the 'spirit of the Torah' is an expectation of the Torah, just like explicit commandments. And like them, it too can be rejected in the face of moral principle.
C. One example proves something? What else is there when it comes to a mitzvah versus profit? What does this have to do with a mitzvah versus morality?
D. Again, you have given one example of a mitzvah that is a constitution. And you will learn from the college that in most mitzvahs the situation is different.
In short, none of these sources touch on my words. If you would like to learn more about my approach to the relationship between halakha and morality, you can search here on the website and in the series of lessons I have given. I have dealt with all of this in great detail in many places.
Even if there is a danger, this is the truth. Dangers do not determine what the truth is. After you understand what the truth is, you can think about how to deal with dangers. I also don't see a danger here, because anyone can also not observe the halacha at all if they want to. Those who want to observe the halacha and don't look for excuses will reject the halacha only in extreme cases, and that is indeed what is appropriate to do. So what danger did you see here? On the contrary, in the existing approach, the danger is that people will not observe the moral commandment because they believe that the halacha always prevails. I don't understand why they always see the danger on the side I'm talking about and not on the opposite side. Why is a halachic danger more important than a moral danger?
I don't know what the idea is that the Torah is absolute truth, whether it is higher or lower than our understanding (what is the connection between the two). The Torah is absolute truth and morality is also absolute truth. The question is what do we do when there are conflicts between them. When a Pikuan rejects Shabbat, does that mean that one of them is not absolute truth? What is the connection?
In short, this question is riddled with conceptual confusion, which is why all the sources cited are irrelevant to the discussion.
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