'The Third Way' or: On 'Religious Zionism' Without a Hyphen

Noon – 5765

By Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham

R.M. at the Higher Institute of Torah – Bar Ilan University

A. Opening

Due to the deep crisis that has befallen religious Zionism in recent years, many are trying to examine its path and its fundamental ideas. Still, it seems that the examination is not courageous enough, and does not really touch the root of the real problems. The bottom line is that the basic dogmas always remain the same.

In this article, I would like to argue that one of the roots of the problem is the very consideration of the Zionist-religious principle as a fundamental foundation of faith.

When the tenets of faith (such as the coming of the Messiah, the providence of God, etc.) are in crisis in the face of a harsh reality that is thrust upon those who believe in these principles, we are supposed to adhere to them at all costs and treat reality as a kind of test that we must endure. On the other hand, when an ideology, or an assessment of reality, that is not a tenet of faith, is in a similar conflict, we must courageously examine reality and ideology, and consider renouncing certain components contained in them.

B. Introduction: 'Religious Zionism' without a hyphen

The religious Zionist concept can be characterized mainly by the following parameters:

• A positive (usually moderate) attitude towards various innovations, the outside world, its culture and ideas.
• A positive attitude towards the state and the renewal of Jewish nationalism in the Land of Israel.

The first characteristic is indeed correlated with religious Zionism, but it is not the essential part of its character. There are religious Zionists who do not relate positively to various innovations and general education, and vice versa: there are anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox who relate positively to external ideas and concepts (a number of Torah scholars with a path to the land were such).

The national element is precisely the essential element of the religious Zionist outlook, and it is the one that is undergoing a crisis in the current period. Therefore, in what follows I will focus on examining the national element of religious Zionism, and will ignore its modern element.

The late Yosef Burg, one of the leaders of religious Zionism, in his sharp language, did a good job of expressing the ideological legacy of religious Zionism. He determined that it lies in the hyphen between the two words 'religious Zionism'. Rabbi Yaakov Ariel also writes in his article in 'Tzohar' 21, that within the framework of the circumscribed expression, and the ideology it expresses, both religiosity and Zionism change.

It can be said that here there are not two terms appearing side by side, as a 'neighborhood composition' (in the language of Rogchober), but rather it is a 'temporal composition' that melts these two expressions and creates a new element from them. There is no religious person here who is also a Zionist, but Zionism is part of religiosity itself.

And I, the little one, would like to offer a different ideological proposal, not necessarily a new one, which in my opinion has not been sufficiently examined by the religious leadership of our time. The weakness of the proposal is precisely Omission of the hyphenI'll try to refine it a little more.

As an introduction, I will bring here a well-known joke that is told in Bnei Brak in the name of the Rabbi of Ponivez, the Rabbi Kahaneman zt"l, that on Independence Day every year he neither said Tachanun nor said Hillel. When asked why he did this, he replied that he did not expect himself to be more deeply Zionist than Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion also does not say Hillel nor Tachanun in his Independence Day prayers...

It seems to me that behind this joke, which is usually perceived as wit at the expense of secularists and religious Zionists, there is a unique perception of Zionism, which the students of the Rabbi of Ponivez do not fully grasp. The Rabbi of Ponivez did not intend to joke at all, but to make a very serious claim (albeit, in a humorous way): it is possible to advocate secular Zionism while keeping the mitzvot.[1]He does not say Hallel, since he does not see the establishment of the state as an event with religious significance (in terms of redemption and the religious significance of the state's institutions), but he also does not say Tachanun, since this is a happy day on which a miracle was performed for the Jews in the Land of Israel, and for this we must thank God Almighty.[2].

On the religious map of the last hundred years, there have been two poles: Harediism, which opposes Zionism for religious reasons, and religious Zionism, which supports it for religious reasons. What is sorely lacking on the religious map, and especially on the map of religious leadership, is a middle way (= the third way): 'religious Zionism', without a hyphen. This is a Zionism whose motives and roots are not religious (in a sense that will be explained below), and together with it (in an almost 'neighborly' manner) appears a religiosity that is not at all that far from modern religiosity (religious Zionism), but which lacks the national dimension. The adherent of such an ideology can be called a 'religious Jew and a secular Zionist'.[3]

It seems to me that most Jews who are observant of the Torah and the mitzvot, both ultra-Orthodox and religious Zionists, actually advocate this middle approach. They want to be loyal and faithful citizens to the state, as every person has a duty to any country in which they live. Most of them also feel a commitment to this country because it has a great many Jewish residents, and we have a 'religious' commitment to them as individuals and as members of our people. However, it is difficult to find anyone (not from the rabbinical world) who still treats the president of the state as if he were sitting on the throne of God in the world, or the IDF uniforms as priestly vestments, and perhaps even the State of Israel in general as if it were something beyond a political-state instrument for its citizens, Jews and non-Jews alike.

For the sake of argument, the polarization between Harediism and 'hyphenated Zionism', and the lack of expressions for the third way, arose solely because the religious leadership is divided dichotomously between these two poles. It is difficult to find a rabbinical leader who would position this title as an alternative to the two hawkish poles. Hence, the ordinary Jew finds himself in a situation that pushes him to identify with something he does not have: if you are not Haredi, then you must be a religious Zionist, and if you are not a religious Zionist, then you must be Haredi.

However, as mentioned, this equation is incorrect. There is a middle way, the 'third way' that I presented: it is possible to be an observant Jew and at the same time a secular Zionist (= someone whose Zionism is of a 'secular' nature). We just have to recognize this and give it legitimacy.

C. Illusions in the face of the current situation

Religious Zionism has always seen itself as a kind of unifying bridge between poles in the people of Israel. Between the secular Zionist pole and the non-Zionist religious pole (Haredi).

Today, the situation is such that secular society sees religious Zionism as an esoteric, messianic faction, almost a mystical sect, and treats it in a very unsympathetic manner. In certain parts of the public, one can find an attitude of almost disgust towards it. In contrast, Harediism is beginning to be seen as more positive, a faction that deals with the spirit and does not advocate militant nationalism (as religious Zionism is portrayed). Although its contribution to society, the economy and security is small, in recent years these aspects seem forgivable.

It is very important to note here that this attitude does not characterize only a thin layer of universalist intellectuals (the media, artistic, legal and academic elites), as many of us tend to console ourselves with. As anyone who is even slightly involved in the general public knows, this is a view that is increasingly becoming the domain of a large audience that is expanding every day. The general public does not identify with ideas that appear to them as 'taking over' territories (even if they are from the Land of Israel), and with 'nationalism' and 'messianism' in the style of Gush Emunim. Even if there are temporary fluctuations in public opinion, due to missiles or attacks of one kind or another, we should not make the mistake of giving them too much significance. The general direction is sharp, clear, and very consistent.

Beyond that, we must not succumb to the comforting illusion that there is only fatigue and a desire for destruction and self-loss here. These are universal-moral ideas that are not willing to see territory and 'nationalism' as values that should be killed for, and are not willing to cooperate with a government in a foreign nation against its will.

These illusions lead the religious Zionist public to pathetic campaigns of momentum, which are intended to 'lift the people's spirits.' After each attack, it is convinced that "now everyone will understand that we were right all along." Although public opinion is influenced to a certain extent by attacks, or by missiles fired at us from Gaza, when a real decision is at stake regarding the continuation of the occupation versus the possibility of ending it (and certainly if there is also a peace agreement, regardless of how credible it is), we will immediately see the true balance of power in public opinion.

D. National consensus through a deep spiritual-religious infrastructure

All of the above does not mean that we should give up on the ideas that form the basis on which the roots of religious Zionism are founded. Rather, we must redirect these ideas as will be explained below.

Rabbi Kook perceived that the national awakening of his generation expressed a latent religious awakening. By this means, religious Zionism continues to fall into the illusion that it is possible to create coalitions (political and social) around the national common denominator. Time and again, religious Zionism receives slaps in the face from its secular national 'partners' (who usually themselves carry out the withdrawals and peace agreements, and 'surprise' us each time). This is a blind eye that religious Zionism willingly puts itself into.

For some reason, the leaders of religious Zionism do not draw the obvious conclusion that it is not possible to create a national consensus without a deep spiritual-religious foundation. This identification is not created from the national level, but rather the opposite, National identification is created from religious identification. Until this exists, there is no chance of creating a broad national front.

The identification between religious Zionism and nationalist ideas, which only deepens in light of the artificial persuasion operations in which we are engaged, prevents us from influencing religious levels. Today, everything is perceived as part of the political-political 'plots' of religious Zionism. Many citizens think that the desire to make them put on tefillin is also a means to resist retreats.

This is the solution to the deep rift that has been going through religious Zionism in recent years (Begin and Oslo, Sharon's disengagement, and the Amona events).

The fact that the State of Israel acts in ways that are not related to Judaism and the Torah, and to a large extent acts vigorously against the Torah, does not cause any crisis for us. The fact that Israeli children are being spiritually destroyed in our state education system, and that general and Jewish education in the State of Israel simply does not exist, does not lead to any crisis. On the other hand, the fact that the State of Israel does not act to conquer and hold onto all of the Land of Israel is perceived by religious Zionism as a theological catastrophe.

This is an amazing, even worrying phenomenon. Is possession and sovereignty over all of the Land of Israel equivalent to all of the commandments? Is belief in the religious significance of the state a core belief? Is it more important than issues of Shabbat, education, violence, social problems, and more?

The reason for this distortion lies in the dangerous illusion that national expressions have a hidden religious meaning. As if the religious dimension would be created on the basis of the national dimension. The religiosity of the state was integrated into its nationalism, and when that disappeared, the religious aspect also disappeared. If so, we were left without the religious value of Zionism and the state.

The deep reason for this process is described in my book, 'Two Carts and a Balloon,' where I insist that nationalism involves a 'chauvinistic' (synthetic, in the terms used there) philosophical concept, and therefore it cannot survive in a postmodern world. This is a deep process, whose roots lie deep down, and not in one political process or another. As I show there, secularism inevitably leads to a 'leftist' concept, and there is no historical accident here, or any kind of takeover. There is a deep debate here about faith, truth, and values, and not a banal picture of the just and brave versus the weary, the dominating and the dominated.

E. The Jewish people versus the individuals

There are two additional characteristics of religious Zionism, one rooted in the theological plane and the other in the tactical plane.

• On the theological level

 There is a major innovation in the worldview of religious Zionism, and that is the consideration of metaphysical analysis as part of the practical decision-making process. I will preface this by saying that the fact that someone believes that the State of Israel constitutes one stage or another in the redemption process does not necessarily lead to drawing practical conclusions. It was possible to believe this, and at the same time continue to act in a strictly Haredi manner, that is, to oppose this process and those who carry it out.

Traditionally, the Torah's approach to reality is based on a response to reality as it is observed with the eyes, and not to reality as it is analyzed with theological-metaphysical tools. Questions such as how to conduct the conversion processes (to facilitate them or not), whether to cooperate with secularists, how to relate to the state, its symbols and institutions, whether to support the permission to recognize the shemita, etc., are not necessarily derived from the question of what the establishment of the state means in the process of redemption. All of these are determined according to the boundaries of halakhic law and the assessment of real reality, as it is.

A sharp, to the point of blatant, example of this characteristic is found in the well-known story of the meeting between Rabbi Herzog and the Geraiz, zt"l, in which Rabbi Herzog tried to convince the Geraiz not to abandon Jerusalem, which was being attacked during the War of Independence. Rabbi Herzog used a reason based on the tradition that the Third Temple would not be destroyed. The Geraiz replied that he had a different tradition from his father (the Geraiz), that when fired upon, one should flee.

Rabbi Herzog bases his practical decisions on metaphysical considerations, while the Geriz, who expresses the accepted Jewish (and Haredi, today) attitude, is not willing to do so. He refers mainly to practical-realistic aspects.[4]

on. At the tactical level

A second characteristic of religious Zionism is the tactic of influence on a large scale, at the macro level. Religious Zionism has always believed in a form of global influence: through coalitions, religious legislation, settlement in all areas of the country, the public character of the Sabbath, etc. It has set itself goals that concern state institutions in general and public companies (such as Egged, El Al, etc.), rather than goals at the micro level. It has been less inclined to deal with the individual citizen and the influence he has (such as his conversion to the faith), or with his views and attitudes (which has been changing in recent years).

These two characteristics also play a part in the crisis. The macro tactic is met each time with stubborn refusal. The Supreme Court makes a decision to recognize non-Orthodox conversion, as is expected and completely understandable, and religious Zionism is surprised and shocked. The fact that these 'converts' (as well as outright gentiles) are entering Israeli society all the time, with or without the High Court, concerns us much less. The public character and the declarative level are what are truly important to us.

Religious coercion achieved almost none of its goals, as was clear to anyone with their eyes in their head. How much longer can we continue to demand from a large and large public to behave according to the dictates of a sector with which it does not identify at all, without making amends here? The country is becoming more and more non-Jewish, but this is not happening despite the coercion, but perhaps precisely because of it. In recent years, when coercion has greatly diminished, the attitude towards Judaism has indeed changed slightly.

How long can an entire public be forced to fight for territories and places that it does not even recognize as important, and still sees a moral and human injustice in holding them? The question of territories and occupation should also be discussed in terms of our duty to other Israeli citizens. Does it seem reasonable (and even moral) to force an entire public to continue fighting, and even to die, for goals that it does not believe in, even if no peace results from it, and we gain nothing from the concessions? The fact that a large majority of the public is no longer willing to fight for these goals is not taken into account by us at all.

How long can a 'Chief Rabbinate' be imposed on the Israeli public, one that will be elected through intrigue and religious politics, so that sometimes unworthy people are elected for irrelevant reasons, while at the same time demanding authority and status for itself over the entire public?

The reason for this problematic phenomenon lies in the two characteristics described above:

The state as an organ and as a collective body occupies our entire 'background.' We do not notice the citizens who make up this organ. We speak on behalf of the whole of Israel, and forget a little about the details. This is the influence of the second characteristic, the collectivist one. However, the first characteristic is not absent here either.

Religious Zionism sees the state as the embodiment of an idea, an external expression of deep metaphysical currents, and therefore it tends to ignore the concrete citizens who make it up. The chair of the president of the state is the chair of God in the world, even though the person who sits on it (and I'm not talking about the current president specifically) does not see himself as connected to it, and sometimes does not even recognize God and God. The Israel Defense Forces are sacred, despite the fact that almost none of those who serve in it feel this way. We know better than anyone what they themselves think and do, and what their meaning is. In fact, we do not see them at all. They are transparent, and through them we see the theological functions they fulfill for us. The duties and rights of the state and its institutions are derived from its metaphysical role, and not necessarily from its real-functional functioning, and its true image.

F. The state of all its citizens

The State of Israel has been a state of all its citizens for quite a few years now. There are several other, generally unrealized, appendages of Jewish uniqueness, but they are disappearing and disappearing.

Within religious Zionism, the war against the idea of a state of all its citizens is being waged with all vigor, when this war is no longer relevant. We are fighting against windmills, which have long since defeated us. In fact, in essence, the state has always been a state of all its citizens, but our blindness prevented us from seeing this. Everything expressed profound ideas and collective metaphysical movements for us. The fact that the details do not quite fit with the move did not really prevent us from seeing it.

Rabbis and thinkers have taken great pains to explain intensively how everything fits into the general process. How Rabbi Kook's vision is coming true, even though all of reality has taught us the exact opposite. For every deviation from the general process, an appropriate paragraph can be found in his writings (in the process of redemption there are ups and downs, and he already saw everything in advance), and therefore everything fits into place.

The Zionist-religious theory in many ways sees itself as an irrefutable theory. Almost a tautology. This is reminiscent of other ideological concepts, such as communism, in contrast, where they also showed that everything is found in the writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, and all of modern physics, or linguistics, is already found in them, and that what does not fit is an error in the eyes of the observer or the 'evil inclination'. There too, very sophisticated arguments were created to reconcile the detached ideology with the reluctant and complex reality.

We emphasize that if these were principles of faith, then the assessment of reality would not be supposed to change our attitude towards them. However, the hyphen of religious Zionism is not a principle of faith. It is a metaphysical and realistic assessment of reality that has been misled.

G. The Sane Alternative: Separation of Religion from State Institutions

Everything starts from the ground up. The State of Israel is the state of all its citizens, and must be seen as such. Torah Judaism is one sect within the state. Many of the state's citizens are Jewish (at least biologically), but the state as an organ is not.[5]

Several conclusions are derived from this. First, there is no prohibition on a non-Jewish sovereign body handing over territory from the Land of Israel to another non-Jewish sovereign body. There is no reason to expect from this body preferential treatment towards Halacha Judaism, or discrimination against other streams, Jewish and non-Jewish. This is an unrealistic expectation, and in fact also immoral (in terms of the principles of democracy). Although a state of coercion of the mitzvot would have been a place to try and stop this, the uncompromising demand from state institutions (and especially from the High Court of Justice), and the lack of understanding of their motives, stem from the illusion that they too see reality as we do. Let us recall again the 'surprise' and 'astonishment' that grip us every time this happens.

On the other hand, none of this prevents a positive attitude toward the state and its institutions. This does not mean that one should 'convert our religion' to the ultra-Orthodox. It is possible to have a secular and loyal attitude toward the state and its institutions, especially given the fact that many of its residents are Jewish, while at the same time not seeing it and its institutions as sacred and having direct religious significance.

There is, of course, a religious significance to the survival of Jews, just as there is a religious significance to eating for the sake of God, and to going to the toilet according to the law. However, this does not make eating or going to the toilet something sacred, nor does it make the state a political instrument for an entity that has holiness in it. There is a religious and moral value in civic loyalty to any civilized state, especially if many of its peoples are (potentially) Judaizing. However, this has nothing to do with holiness.[6]

We must return to focusing on the micro-impact, on the Jewish citizens of the country, and try to get them to come closer to the Torah-Jewish perspective. The impact on the public will not be achieved through legislation, nor through fragile political coalitions built on chicken legs. The Jews living in the country must be treated as individuals, and not as expressions of a theological-metaphysical movement. Our goals should be focused on the Jews and not on the country and its institutions. We must stop seeing metaphysics beneath every movement on the surface. And, by the way, I do not mean to say that metaphysical analysis is necessarily incorrect. My argument is that even if there is metaphysics (and I certainly believe there is one), it should not directly influence our practical decisions and our way of conducting ourselves.

The president of the state is a superfluous institution, nothing more. The prime minister is a practical necessity (someone is needed to manage affairs), nothing more. None of them is a king, nor does he come close to being one. At most, they are the 'seven best men in town.' In general, politicians are not anyone's leaders, and that's a good thing. Intellectuals should be considered the moral leaders. Politicians are officials, and they should be treated as such. Concepts drawn from the ancient world of monarchy, when applied to democratic institutions of government border on nationalism, and sound anachronistic and quite ridiculous.

The Jewish people today do not find any practical expression. They are not represented by any concrete institution, and the State of Israel is certainly not its exclusive expression. The State of Israel, if we understand it as such, is not prohibited from giving up territory to anyone. The State of Israel does not need to sell leaven, nor does it need to sell land on the seventh day. It is worth trying to convince its Jewish citizens to do so. This can only be done through a work of information and persuasion, and not through coercion. Marriages and divorces should also be done in ways that are visible to citizens, even if only for practical reasons: there is no chance of continuing to impose the opinion of the Torah on the majority of the public on these issues as well. Conversion is a matter of Halacha, not of the law and the state. On the other hand, the definition of Israeli citizenship is a matter of the Knesset, not of Halacha. If the dangerous and clearly incorrect identification of the terms 'Jewish' and 'Israeli' were to cease, the problems of conversion, and many other problems that accompany us, would disappear on their own. Although the public character of the state will no longer be Jewish, it is not Jewish in any case. What is important are the Jews, not the Jewish state. All of these questions, of course, also have halachic aspects, but there is no room here to elaborate on them.

Religion must be removed from under the rule of political institutions, and the Chief Rabbinate and other corrupt institutions that are elected by politicians, for extraneous reasons, and degrade the image of the Torah in the eyes of the public, both religious and secular, must be stopped. These institutions do far more harm than good. If the Torah and Halacha were non-institutional, they would have immeasurably greater moral power and validity than they have today. Today, the Torah is a political pole in the State of Israel. A kind of party (as is known, for this reason, Rabbi Kook himself was not willing to join any party). As such, its possibility of influencing and constituting a spiritual alternative is almost nonexistent. We have single-handedly contributed to the sterilization of the power and influence of the Torah, out of the illusion that it can be turned into the constitution of the state and imposed on its citizens. The late Yeshayahu Leibovitz relates that he once met with Ben-Gurion and the latter said to him, roughly as a quote from memory: "Leibovitz, I know you want to separate religion from state, but I will not let you do that, for I want to control the religious institutions and grab them by the throat." This is the situation today, and in our foolishness we are still fighting to perpetuate it.[7]

H. Summary - The Third Way

We have drawn a picture here of a delusional view of reality. This view tries to impose standards on the recalcitrant reality around us that it refuses to submit to. The religious-Zionist response to this recalcitrance is mainly creativity in explanations that reconcile the picture with our detached dogmas about it. For all these reasons, it seems to the INA very important to place on the map the third way, between Harediism and the circumscribed religious-Zionism: 'religious Zionism' without a hyphen. This means loyal and involved citizenship in the state, without aspirations of Judaizing the state as an organ, and certainly with aspirations to Judaize the citizens of the state as much as possible, through means of information and influence, but not coercion.

Even those who are not ready for such a path on a principled level must recognize reality. It will be forced upon us sooner or later, even if we refuse to acknowledge it. Therefore, at least on a tactical level, we must all face reality and recognize the facts as they are.

My appeal in this article is primarily to the rabbinical leadership of religious Zionism, since the root of the problem is in the dichotomy found among the religious leadership. As I have already mentioned, it seems to me that the majority of the public in the field has long been in the square described here. I mean both the ultra-Orthodox public and the religious Zionist public. The majority of the faithful of Israel, from all camps, have long been in the 'third path'. The problem is that the ordinary citizen usually does not define himself in this way, because the map placed before him by the religious leadership is dichotomous. It does not have a title that expresses another path. Any such attempt is presented as a kind of surrender, weakness of spirit, fatigue, impatience, etc. However, all of these are part of the same dangerous and destructive illusion that is leading us all to an inevitable crisis.

[1]    As is known, the Ponivez Yeshiva hung a flag on the roof every year on Independence Day (at least until the end of Rabbi Shach's life). Journalist Dov Ganchovsky told me that as a young man he himself sat with the Ponivez Rabbi on the roof of the yeshiva and guarded the flag from the rebellious students (he says he has a picture of them in this state).

[2]    I would like to point out that from such a perspective, it is also possible to arrive at the obligation to recite Hillel, without exception on Purim, Frankfurt, etc. (and this is indeed how I, the little one, practice). However, it is quite clear that this was the principled intention of the Rabbi of Ponebez. The halakhic question is not our concern here.

[3]    I have previously described my view in press interviews under this title. Later, I saw that this expression was cited in the name of the late Yeshayahu Leibovitz.

[4] See on this in the article by Rabbi Shevat, in the issue of 'Tzohar' 21. In note 38 there he cites this incident, and doubts its reliability and the doubts about the reliability of the story about the statement of the Gerizh, saying (in a paraphrase of the well-known story about the Chofetz Chaim) that in any case it is clear that this is not told about Rabbi Herzog.

[5]  The state has no 'mother', and therefore the criterion for its Jewishness is solely its culture, values, and way of conducting itself.

[6]    I do not wish to discuss here the sanctity of any political framework in general, even one that is conducted entirely on the basis of the Torah. Here I will only note that this is also an issue that requires thorough investigation.

[7]    It is known that the status of religion and its institutions in the United States is infinitely stronger than in countries where there is no sharp separation of religion and state. Admittedly, the French model is slightly different, and so is the situation there, and so on.