The price of tolerance

With God’s help

Opinions – 2013

introduction

The terms 'tolerance', 'pluralism', 'openness' and the like are very common in our world. There are many who identify with them, or at least see them as cousins of one degree or another. In this article I would like to discuss the polar differences between the meanings of these terms, and some of the implications of these distinctions. Although I will begin with a philosophical introduction, I do not intend to address here the extensive writing that exists on these topics, since my concern here is to express a position and not to review the subject. There is no theoretical novelty in my remarks here that has not been addressed before, but I believe that many nevertheless do not give their opinion on the practical implications of the matters.

Two more preliminary remarks. First, I would like to emphasize that I have no interest in semantics, and as far as I am concerned, the terminology can be changed according to the reader's taste. I use these terms only to clarify the differences between the concepts they indicate. Therefore, there is no point in arguing whether the term 'pluralism' indeed describes what I am putting under it. If the reader prefers, he can use the term 'unfolded universe', as long as it is clear to him that this is a different concept, and in fact the opposite, from what I describe here as 'tolerance'. Second, it is clear that a short article of this kind does not allow for proper philosophical resolution and precision, that is, an insistence on different shades and sub-shades of these phenomena and concepts. I define the concepts here in a rather crude way, which will suffice for my purposes.

Between tolerance and pluralism

My first argument is that tolerance is a value and pluralism is a philosophical worldview (actually a type of fact). Pluralism stands in contrast to monism. The pluralist believes that there is not just one truth, but rather a plurality of truths (even if they are contradictory). An extreme pluralist would say this in a sweeping manner: there is no possibility in any situation (except in a situation of logical inconsistency) to decide in favor of one truth over the others. Such a view reflects the philosophy of the one who advocates it, but there is no value in it, or in the view opposite to it (monism). Pluralism from the perspective of the pluralist (like monism from the perspective of the monist) is simply a fact: there is not (or: there is) only one truth. In contrast, tolerance is a value. The meaning of the concept of tolerance, as I will define it here, is that one should respect the different positions of others, and therefore one should not be forced to act or think differently from what one understands or wants. If pluralism concerns the concepts of truth and falsehood, tolerance speaks of what is forbidden and what is permitted, or what is proper and what is improper.

David Hume taught us that it is not possible to derive values (ought) from facts (is). Moore, following him, coined the term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ for such a derivation. Norms belong to a semantic field, or conceptual realm, different from that to which facts belong. Hence comes My second argument: Logically, tolerance cannot be placed above pluralism.

Still, on the surface it seems reasonable that if I advocate a pluralistic position then I am also expected to be tolerant. If I think that the other person is no less right than I am, I have no reason to impose on him the thinking or behavior that I live by. But there is a conceptual error here. Such behavior is not tolerance. I do not impose anything on him, but I do not necessarily advocate a value that should not be imposed on him. I do not impose it on him simply because I have no reason to do so. Hence, the fact that I do not impose it on him does not justify giving him moral credit for it. In order for me to earn the moral credit that a tolerant person deserves, I must have a reason to impose it, that is, the condition that I am a monist must be met. If I advocate truth A, and my friend who advocates truth B is, in my opinion, wrong, then if despite this I do not impose my position on him, it would be correct to say that I am acting according to the value of tolerance.

If so, we have arrived. To the third conclusion: Not only can tolerance not be placed on pluralism, these are two contradictory ideas: a pluralist cannot practice tolerance (in the moral-ethical sense).

The paradox of tolerance

Aviezer Ravitzky, in his article 'Tolerance',[1] There is a paradox inherent in the value of tolerance, which is nothing more than a generalization of the argument I made in the previous section. I will now describe it briefly (in a slightly different way from his).[2]

From the above it follows that tolerant behavior with value significance is possible only for a person with a monistic philosophical perspective. This begs the following question: If indeed, in my opinion, my friend is wrong, why shouldn't I correct the mistake and forcibly prevent the expected consequences of his wrong behavior?

One can think of several possible answers to this question. For example, I have no chance of influencing him (he is stronger than me). But such behavior is not entitled to moral credit. I do not coerce simply because I will not achieve my goal. This is just rationalism, but not necessarily moral behavior. Another answer is that I do not care about my friend. Such behavior, of course, is not entitled to moral credit. I do not coerce, and I see no need for it. A third answer is that I do not do it because I am afraid that when my friend becomes stronger, he will coerce me. But again, this is not tolerant behavior in the moral sense, since I am acting out of self-interested motives. Another answer is that my friend's wrong actions are not harmful (to himself, to me, or to others), and therefore I leave him in his error and do not intervene. But this is also not behavior with a value-meaning of tolerance, since here too I simply have no reason to intervene.

The conclusion from all that has been said so far is quite surprising: whenever there is a good reason not to coerce, it cannot be tolerance. Tolerance exists only when I have no reason not to coerce, and yet I do not coerce. In other words, we have arrived at To the fourth conclusion: In order for me to be considered tolerant in the moral-ethical sense, several conditions must be met: 1. I must be a monist and think that my friend is wrong. 2. I must think that his mistake is harmful. 3. I have the power to coerce him. 4. I am not afraid of his counter-actions. 5. I care very much about my friend's moral behavior.

But if all these conditions are truly met, then why really be tolerant? Why not coerce if all these conditions are met in a way that makes coercion the obvious step?

Tolerance and autonomy

The only way I see to establish the value of tolerance is the consideration of the autonomy of others. I do not impose on my friends despite all the conditions presented above, because I advocate the value that every person has the right to act as he understands, even if it is wrong and harmful. Why is this reasoning not as vulnerable to attack as all the previous ways I have proposed here? Because this is a question of value reasoning and not of reasoning that explains why there is no point or need to impose. Therefore, tolerance that is based on the consideration of the autonomy of others certainly deserves moral credit.

The similarities between tolerance and pluralism and its implications

On a phenomenological level, there is a great deal of similarity between tolerance and pluralism. Neither the tolerant nor the pluralist impose their opinions on others who hold positions different from their own. The difference between them is seemingly only theoretical, and concerns only the justification they give for this behavior: the tolerant (who is a monist) bases this on the autonomy of the other, while the pluralist bases it on the fact that his position has no priority over his friend's position (both are equally true, or worthy).

This phenomenological similarity leads many to identify, or at least not to distinguish, between these two positions. For example, Avi Sagi, in his book These and those,[3] He brings a collection of Torah sources that, in his opinion, express a pluralistic position (a pluralistic interpretation of the rule "These and these are the living words of God"). But to the best of my understanding, almost none of them (except, perhaps, Maharam Gabbay, author of Holy work) does not really express a pluralistic position. Most of them hold a tolerant position (according to my definitions here).[4]

Phenomenological differences between tolerance and pluralism

Is there still a practical-phenomenological difference between these two positions? I think we can point out at least two important differences here:[5]

• Openness. If the pluralist believes that there is no exclusive truth, then there is no point in searching for it. Hearing the other person's arguments loses much of its value, since the main importance of openness to others is the possibility of learning from them and thus getting closer to the truth. But getting closer to the truth is a concept drawn from the world of monism. The tolerant person, who is a monist in his philosophical outlook, is supposed to act with openness so that he can learn and get as close to the one truth as possible. If so, we have arrived at To the fifth claim: Openness is associated with monism, not pluralism.
• The radius of coercion. The pluralist who believes that logical consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for a legitimate position cannot criticize any other position (as long as it is logically consistent). In his view, there is no point in coercing anyone, whatever their position. In contrast, the tolerant does not coerce because of a balance between two forces: on the one hand, the mistake and the harm that may result from it. On the other hand, the right of the other to act autonomously. If the expected harm is very great, the tolerant will find himself forced to use coercion to prevent it. If I see a person about to commit suicide, or become addicted to hard drugs, there is certainly room to consider using coercive mechanisms. Furthermore, if the other person is not acting out of true autonomous discretion (such as a child, a fool, or a person who acts recklessly rather than out of discretion), even then there is no need to refrain from using coercion to direct him in the right direction. So, from the perspective of the tolerant person, there is some finite radius up to which his tolerance extends. From there on, his tolerance ends. This is in contrast to the pluralist. We saw here that this radius is determined according to two types of considerations: the intensity of the damage that the other's mistake is likely to cause, and the level of discretion that the other exercises.

"These and these are the words of the living God"[6]

To better understand the question of the radius of coercion, we will briefly refer here to the rule "These and these are the words of God, living" (Eruvin 13b; Gittin 6b). The Gemara in Eruvin says this:

Rabbi Abba said, Samuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel were divided. These say the halakha like us, and these say the halakha like us. A voice came out and said: These and these are the living words of God, and the halakha is like Beit Hillel. And since these and these are the living words of God, why did Beit Hillel deserve to establish halakha like them? Because they were comfortable and humble, and their words differed from the words of Beit Shammai. And what is more, they prioritize the words of Beit Shammai over their words. As we have said:

There is a statement here that both B"S and B"H are living words of God. The Gemara immediately senses that there is a difficulty with the continuation of the sentence: and the law is as follows. If both are right, then why is the law as follows? On the other hand, if the truth is as follows, then in what sense are both the living words of God.[7]

It is no wonder that some read this sentence in a pluralistic manner, and then the ruling of the halakhah reflects mainly technical considerations, and not because they are more just. Indeed, the Gemara itself explains that this is a type of educational consideration ("Because they were comfortable and easygoing... and no more than that they prioritize the words of the Bible over their own words").

But Rabbi Yosef Karo b.Rules of the Gemara His, offers an opposite, monistic interpretation: [8]

I wondered if the law was not according to their words, and if it was because of their many good qualities that they established a law like theirs? And perhaps one might say: Why did they deserve to always be guided by the truth, until, because they were the truth, they established a law like theirs.

He understands that the law was ruled by God because the truth is with them. Ostensibly, he is saying that they were granted divine help because of their good qualities. But perhaps it can be explained that the very fact that they are comfortable and humble and put God's words before their own is what helps them reach the truth. It is their openness and willingness to consider the opinion of the opponent that leads them to better decisions.

It is clear that according to the monistic reading of the rule "These and these are the words of the living God and the law is as follows," an explanation is required of how the words of the Bible are also the words of the living God. In my above article, I suggested that their reasons are real, as in any dispute between the two parties, in which each side certainly presents real reasons for its own system. In most cases, the argument is not about the reasons but about their weighing that leads to a decision. Here, there is an argument in which only one side is right (according to the monistic reading).

In this way, one can think of an argument about eating chocolate: Reuven says that it is worth eating chocolate because it is delicious. Shimon argues against him that it is not worth it because it makes you fat. Who is right? Both are right. Both arguments are certainly correct. The argument is not about the truth of the arguments, which are accepted by both sides. The argument is about their relative weight: whether health or taste is better. Here, according to the monist, there is only one truth.

This is the basis I proposed in that article for a tolerant (rather than pluralistic) reading of this rule. According to the tolerant view, there are several positions that are based on correct reasoning, but the relative weight of the reasoning of some of the parties may be wrong. Therefore, there is one halakhic truth, but there is still room for several legitimate positions, since they are based on real reasoning.

Here appears one of the above-mentioned indicators of the radius of coercion. Tolerance is relevant towards positions that are based on correct reasoning, if the error is only in the relative weight. The people of the land, that is, people whose reasoning indicates a lack of familiarity with the material, are not entitled to tolerant treatment. For example, we would not expect a physicist to listen patiently and tolerantly to the position of a person who has never studied physics and is unfamiliar with the material. This is one of the two indicators presented above as determining the radius of coercion: when the position is not formed out of serious consideration, it is outside the radius of coercion.

Tolerance is based on allowing a person to act in a way that is not halakhically correct. We do not force it on them, because there is value in their acting autonomously, even though they are wrong (and in fact committing a transgression). This means that halakhah is determined by weighing the value of truth and the value of autonomy, and as long as we do not stray too far from the truth – autonomy is preferable.[9] In this context, it is important to bring the words of the Maharal inThe Torah Path Patu who writes:

Because it is more appropriate and more correct for a judge to be based on the Talmud, and although it is felt that he will not follow the path of truth and will not rule the case for its truth, so that the teaching is according to the truth, in any case, a wise man should not only do what his intellect gives and understands from the Talmud. And when his understanding and wisdom mislead him, with all this he is loved by God, blessed be He, when he teaches according to what his intellect requires, and a judge should not only do what his eyes see. And he is better than someone who rules from a single work and does not know the meaning of the matter at all, who walks like a blind man on the road.

And perhaps it will be said, then, that in this generation, who are not versed in the Talmud and do not know how to pronounce Halacha, is it not certainly a difficult matter that the Torah has been forgotten and we are not worthy to pronounce Halacha? And all this is why no one repeats his Talmud to become versed and accustomed to his study.…

The surprising ruling of the author of 'Magen Avraham'

theMGA In the book of Keno, several laws are presented that do not have a specific place in theShulchan Arba'ahAmong other things, he cites the following halakha:

If one hears a law and it seems to him that the law is thus, it is permissible to say in the name of a great man, for he is a flaming fire from his own people [Eruvin, page 51 and Pesachim, page 122] and at the end of Tractate Kala Ita, whoever says something in the name of a wise man who has not finished it causes the Divine Presence to depart, etc. in the blessings of page 27, in the name of Bat 33 and 37.

If a person wants to convince his friend of some halakhah, he is permitted to lie to him and say this halakhah in the name of a great person so that it will be accepted. The origin of this halakhah is in the issues of Pesach and Erubin. Although it makes this difficult from the issue of blessings, where we see that this is forbidden. Furthermore, this very ruling is problematic, since it contains a lie, and even more so, there is a fear that the friend will stumble into the prohibition (if this halakhah is not truly correct). It seems that a pluralistic reading is required here, but on the surface, things seem extremely puzzling.

It seems to me that the interpretation required for this halakhic statement is completely different. We are talking about a friend who does not accept the words just because a great person said them. It is precisely such a person who is permitted to lie and tell him the words in the name of a great person. However, it is now unclear why he would do this at all, since he will not accept the words anyway? It is clear that we are talking about Reuven trying to convince Shimon that the halakhah is X, and Shimon does not attach importance to his considerations and reasoning (because he despises him). In such a situation, Reuven is permitted to say the words in the name of the arbiter of the generation, since when Shimon hears this, he will certainly consider it several times before formulating a position. Finally, he will formulate the position himself, but only after he has seriously considered all sides, just as the rabbis did when they considered the words of the rabbinic Jews before formulating a position.

If so, the fallacy of the prohibition certainly does not exist here. And yet, how is Reuven permitted to lie to Shimon? Simply because it was done for Shimon and for his benefit. This lie will lead him to make a better decision, as he will consider aspects that he had not taken into account before.

Halachic example

It is a common phenomenon that a significant portion of the discussion of meta-halakhic questions is conducted not from halakhic sources but from the writings of halakhic and Torah scholars on halakhic law (in books of thought, or in introductions to books of halakhic and commentary, etc.). There is a methodological flaw here, since in many cases there is a built-in gap between what halakhic scholars write about halakhic law and what they actually do. The same is true with respect to the discussion of the pluralism of halakhic law itself. How can this question be examined from halakhic sources? I discussed this in my aforementioned articles inThe kindHere I will give a particularly clear and interesting example, as it allows us to bring the question into the laboratory at high resolution. This is a halakhic test case, in which the pluralist, the tolerant monist, and the intolerant monist will each reach a different decision from their fellow.

Let's say Reuven believes that act X is permissible, and Shimon believes that it is forbidden. Is Reuven permitted to trip Shimon up in offense X? Surprisingly, it seems that pluralism here will be expressed precisely in a strict decision: the pluralist will prohibit this tripping up, since in his view the halakhic truth that binds Shimon is what he himself thinks. It does not matter that Reuven believes otherwise. In contrast, the monist will be lenient here, since in his view the truth is that X is permissible, and Shimon who believes that it is forbidden is simply mistaken. There is no reason not to trip him up in an act that is certainly permissible.

And here, we find such an example in the Babylonian tractate Sukkah, 10b:

I will say, the four divisions of a Sukkah are: Rav Nachman said: It is kosher, Rav Chisda and Ravba bar Rav Huna said: It is impermissible.

Rabbi Nachman believes that it is permissible to sit under those noyim, while Rav Chisda and Rav bar Rav Huna forbid it. Immediately afterwards, the following case is described:

Rav Chisda and Rav Bar Rav Huna caught the eye of a Reish Galuta, who had been sitting in a Sukkah, four palms apart, and was silent, and did not say anything to him or to me. He said to him: Is this generation, our rabbis, obeying it? They said to him: I am the one who has sent me a mitzvah, and I am exempt from the Sukkah.

Rav Nachman seated the two who disagreed with him in a Sukkah that was made four palms away from the thatch (which, according to them, is invalid). Apparently, there is an offense here of 'before the blind', since he fed them something forbidden according to their view!

Indeed, the Ritva in his commentary on the site comments on this:

Rav Chisda and Rav bar Rav Huna, I have found in my heart a Reish Galuta, who sang it in a Sukkah that was forbidden, four of whom were separated from it. Even though I did not know that the Lord (N"A: R"G) was his disciple or that he was the one who carried out the mitzvah, I sang it out of his mind and did not feel that he was a sinner for his sake, and he recited (N"A: and he did not recite) in a Sukkah that was invalid and that the blessings were not proper, and he was putting them as an obstacle before me. inspector.

Some say that if one feeds his fellow man what is permissible for him according to his opinion, there is no reason for this before the skin is not an obstacle, and even though he knows that his fellow man is forbidden to him according to his opinion and his fellow man is a teacher, the feeder was also worthy of the teaching and relies on his opinion to feed himself and others according to his opinion, and this is precisely because the prohibition is obvious to his fellow man and it is not reasonable for him not to eat, but because it is not obvious to his fellow man, and they say that it is permissible for him to eat his offspring, the father of the father of the father, from his own hands

He learns from this that a person who holds a certain thing for a permit is permitted to feed it to his companion who holds it for a prohibition, and there is no such thing as 'before the blind.' Ostensibly, this is a standard monistic position.

He adds, by virtue of the issue of Chulin 1:1b, that this is only true if the matter is obvious to the eater, "it is not permissible to eat it," but if the prohibition is not obvious, it is forbidden to feed it (unless he enlightens his eyes by doing so).[10]

The halachic situation created after the Ritva's reservation is unclear. Ostensibly, there is no innovation here, since in a situation where the prohibition is evident, the person eating can decide for himself whether he believes it is permissible or forbidden. In such a situation, there is no prohibition "before the blind" on the feeder, since the decision is the one eating. If so, this reservation apparently undermines the very innovation of the Ritva that there is no "before the blind" in such an act.

To understand this, let us compare the situation created here to the case of handing a glass of wine to a Nazirite, to which the Gemara (Ezra 6:1) applies the prohibition of "before the blind" from Torah. After handing the glass of wine to the Nazirite, he has the choice whether to drink, and he certainly knows that it is wine. If so, why does the one who offers it violate "before the blind"? The Nazirite is not blind in any sense. It is clear that even in such a situation, there is a prohibition of "before the blind." The fact that he knows and decides on his own to commit the offense does not neutralize the prohibition of "before the blind" from the one who offers it. Why, then, does the Ritva in our case make a distinction between a situation in which the one who failed knows and a situation in which he does not know?

It is clear that the Ritva believes that there is a difference between a situation in which Reuven offers Shimon a clear prohibition, and a situation in which Reuven offers Shimon something that he himself believes is permissible and only according to Shimon's system is forbidden. In the first case, there is a prohibition "before the blind," and in the second case there is not. How can this be understood? As we have seen, if there is a prohibition "before the blind," it does not depend on the information that the one who fails has. If there is no prohibition, there is again no dependence on such information. Furthermore, we have seen that monism leads to the permission to fail even if I do not reveal anything to the one who fails. Pluralism, on the other hand, leads to the decision that he should not fail even if he is told that it is a prohibition according to his system. Finally, there is a prohibition "before the blind."

We are forced to conclude that if the mishlef does not tell the mishlef that he is sitting under a sukkah that is not permissible according to his view, the value of the halakhic truth is not harmed, since the communist Ritva believes that in the mishlef's opinion the halakhic truth is that this is permissible. The obligation to listen to the situation is because the value of autonomy is harmed here. As we saw above, a person must act consciously and according to his own decisions and explanations. This is the only justification for allowing him to act incorrectly. If he does not know the circumstances and does not make a decision with full discretion, there is no autonomous action here, and there is no justification for allowing him to violate a prohibition. The Ritva's innovation is that if Reuven misleads Shimon by not acting based on his best judgment, there is also a prohibition in this (perhaps of 'before the blind', or perhaps another).

Let us summarize the situation described here. According to the pluralist picture, that halakhic truth is only according to a person's opinion, there was no room for allowing a fallacy of the kind that Rav Nachman made, even if the prohibition was obvious or he had revealed their ear. In contrast, according to the monist position, it seems that in any case (even when the prohibition was not obvious) he was permitted to fallacy his friends, since ultimately in his opinion the halakhic truth is that they did not transgress a prohibition. The complex ruling we have described here, which distinguishes between a situation in which the prohibition is obvious and a situation in which the prohibition is not obvious, can be well understood only from the tolerant position we have proposed here. According to this model, there is one halakhic truth that results from the correct weighing of all the reasons, and each person is supposed to act according to his best assessment of that truth. But in addition, there is the value of an autonomous decision, and therefore there is halakhic weight to a person's opinion even if it does not correspond to the truth. Even Rav Nachman, who thought his friends were wrong, must give weight to what he sees as their legitimate mistake, and he must not trip them up over it.

It is interesting to note that this is probably the reason why the Ritva used the language of the prohibition of placing "an obstacle before a wise man," in contrast to the language of the Torah, which speaks of a blind man. The reason for this is that he wanted to emphasize that the prohibition "before a blind man" also exists when a wise man is hindered, and here it is an exceptional case because it concerns a halachic dispute.

The Price of Tolerance: Religious-Secular Art as a Test Case

Years ago I met with a group from the Hartman Institute that was working on the Kinneret Covenant for Understanding between the religious and the secular. I argued to them that while no one asks me how to live, and perhaps that is a good thing, I myself would in no way be willing to sign such a covenant and legitimize a secular position. The reason for this is that I am a monist and not a pluralist, and therefore I believe there is one truth. Naturally, to the best of my judgment, this is my truth. Of course, I may be wrong, but as long as I am not convinced – this is my truth and I act according to it. Therefore, I also try as much as I can to influence others to behave correctly (and also to hear what they have to say in order to learn. This is the openness expected of a tolerant monist).

When asked why I think my view is necessarily more correct than that of others, and why I am unwilling to legitimize other interpretations of Judaism, I replied that as long as I am not convinced by arguments that I am wrong – this is my position. It is clear that there is a possibility that I am wrong, but this is no reason to give up my positions, or to decide in advance that even if I have a position, it is not superior to others.

But of course this argument is also true in relation to others. Furthermore, as we saw above, a monist can and should also be tolerant of other positions (even those he sees as wrong and even harmful). If so, it is still not clear why I am not willing to be tolerant and legitimize different positions? This lies in the indicators proposed above for determining the radius of tolerance.

In light of what we have seen, the duty of tolerance exists only when it comes to a person who has examined the arguments to the best of his ability and has reached a different conclusion than mine. In such a situation, as we saw in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the tolerant principle applies. It is the right, and even the duty, of everyone to act as he himself understands. And no less, it is my duty as a tolerant person (monist) to allow him to do so. But if it is a person who refuses to examine his position and hear my arguments in favor of my own position, I have no obligation to act tolerantly toward him. A person who does not exercise discretion is not entitled to tolerant treatment. I have already mentioned that this is similar to someone who is unwilling to study a certain field and sees no reason to express positions about it that differ from those that are customary. Such a person is not entitled to tolerant treatment, and I would demand that he go and study the material and then come up with a coherent position based on serious discretion.

This means that tolerance has a price, and whoever benefits from it must earn it honestly: he must examine the various reasons and sources, and arrive at his own coherent position. If he has done so, he is entitled to all legitimacy. But if he has not done so and yet demands legitimacy for his own way, then it is like a child expressing a firm position on some issue without examining it in depth. Such a position is the position of the rabbis (who did not consider the words of God before speaking), and as we know, there is no halakhah like them. As we saw above, they are both further from the truth and do not deserve tolerant consideration, because they have not paid its price.

When we apply this approach to religious-secular relations, it means that the secular or religious person is entitled to demand tolerance for his position only if he formulated it from a thorough examination and clarification to the best of his ability of the arguments in the various directions. If he did this and came to a different conclusion than me, he is indeed entitled to tolerant treatment. Just to clarify and clarify, the argument is completely symmetrical. The religious person is also not entitled to tolerant treatment from his secular friend if he has not seriously examined his claims to the best of his ability and formulated a position based on the overall picture.

It is important to clarify here that the demand for a systematic and in-depth examination does not include familiarity with the details of halakhah, or with the Bible and Talmud. The majority of the entire religious public is not fully familiar with them either. That is not what is at issue here. The price of tolerance that I am talking about here is not familiarity with the details of halakhah, but rather a systematic examination of the arguments for and against the faith, as well as for and against the halakhic tradition and its validity, and formulating a position based on familiarity with these arguments.[11]

When I want to examine factually whether the signatories of the treaty, or the secular public in general that is supposed to be represented by them, actually meet these requirements, the easiest thing to do is to demonstrate the ignorance of secular Israeli citizens about Judaism, which is well-known.[12] But for my purposes here, indicators that test knowledge of Judaism are not enough, since the price of tolerance is the systematic examination of the arguments for and against faith and tradition, not the details of halakha. This is of course difficult to measure, and as far as I know, it has not really been examined systematically. But I think I would not be far from the truth if I said that very few of the secular citizens of the State of Israel have made such a serious examination. The lack of knowledge, which is sometimes disgraceful, is some measure of this, even if not exclusive and unambiguous. From my experience in conversations with groups and individuals, I find that almost none of my interlocutors bothered to do so in a systematic and orderly manner. It is important to note that this is also true to a large extent for the religious citizens of the state, but they are not the ones I am talking about here.

If indeed the situation is that the majority of all citizens who are classified as secular did not bother to seriously examine the arguments when they came to formulate a position regarding their Judaism, then their demand for tolerant and respectful treatment on my part has no basis. A position that is formulated not from proper consideration of an issue does not deserve respect. My feeling was (and still is) that the Kinneret Convention and its like require me to legitimize the amaretz and the unwillingness to examine and formulate a Jewish position seriously. I see no moral justification for tolerance towards such (?) perceptions. As stated, this is similar to a person who proposes a different thesis in physics without having studied the fundamental principles of this science, and demands that I respect him. This is of course his right, but to the same extent it is my right not to respect him for it and not to give him legitimacy from my perspective (as much as he wants to. And the fact is that the signatories of the Convention are interested in this).

A different situation is when a secular person sits with me around a round table, I examine his words and he examines my words and the various sources, and in the end it turns out that he arrives at a consolidated position that is different from mine. In such a situation, it is clear to me as a tolerant person that he is entitled to all the respect and legitimacy in the world from my perspective. With such a person I will sign an art of legitimacy and mutual respect, and about him I will say "These and these are the words of the living God" (in the tolerant sense, not the pluralistic. In my opinion, he is wrong, but a legitimate mistake). A person who examines the arguments and reaches a conclusion that is different from mine in forms that are acceptable to him is certainly entitled to respectful and tolerant treatment from my side. I will emphasize that in my opinion it is not necessary for him to be an expert in philosophy or history, but rather that he should have sufficient familiarity (in his opinion) with the relevant fields, and that he should formulate a position in a manner and form that is satisfactory to him.

The demand to legitimize the amaretzot, that is, those who have not paid the price that entitles them to tolerant treatment, is not tolerance, but at most pluralism. If there is no truth, then there is nothing to listen to (see above regarding openness) and there is nothing to check. In a pluralistic world, every position (?) is legitimate, and therefore pluralism has no price. But, as I already wrote above, pluralism is a philosophical concept and not a value. Tolerance, which is a moral demand that is required of each of us, has a price, and those who demand tolerant treatment of their positions must pay it. To the best of my judgment, what underlies the demands for mutual respect in the Kinneret Treaty is a pluralistic concept. I do not share it, and therefore I find no justification for signing such a treaty.

To avoid any doubt, I will add two more clarifications:

• My decisive writing may give off a condescending scent. I am supposedly the arbiter and the ultimate judge of the truth and legitimacy of all the different positions around me. But this is a mistake. First, no one has to be interested in the question of whether I give them legitimacy or not. It is certainly possible that there are quite a few people for whom it is really not important, and this is certainly legitimate and reasonable. My argument here is solely towards those who do demand that I give them legitimacy, for example those who are trying to establish a treaty along the lines of the Kinneret Treaty. Here I insist on not signing until the conditions that justify such a signature are met. Second, this is about my decision, which determines how I relate to other positions. It is not about the absolute truth, about which there is certainly a possibility that I am wrong. Third, all the things written here are also said about me, and not only about others. I am also not entitled to legitimacy and tolerance from others if I have not examined their arguments and positions as best I can. The argument here is completely symmetrical, and addresses all sides, but naturally I present it from my side.
• It is clear that generalizations should not be made. Not all those sitting around the table in an agreement like the Kinneret Agreement, and not even all those sitting there who are supposed to represent them (all secularists) belong to the category of those who did not pay the price (i.e., did not examine properly). There are certainly those, religious and secular, who have formulated a position based on comprehensive consideration and adequate familiarity with the other positions. Among these, it is also appropriate to sign a treaty. My argument here is that the value of tolerance does not require signing such a general social treaty, which does not disqualify those who deserve respect and does not demand the price that is appropriate to demand from them.

Some comments on the question of coercion

So far I have dealt with the question of whether to sign a treaty of mutual respect and legitimacy. I have argued that when a position appears that has not been formulated in a balanced and responsible manner (the price of tolerance has not been paid), it does not deserve tolerant treatment. But tolerance also touches on the question of coercion. The other side of the coin is that intolerance can also be expressed in coercion. Does my statement mean that in a situation where the price of tolerance has not been paid, there is justification for forceful coercion? This question introduces us to several additional issues. Since my concern here is only to complete the picture and review the implications of the philosophical map laid out in the first part of the article, I will only hint here at a few basic lines of the issue of coercion, and the relationship between it and what has been said so far.

First, the more crude and severe my intervention in another person's conduct is, the greater the justification it requires. If I want to come and convince a person that his positions are incorrect, this is not intervention but a legitimate and appropriate step. The other person will only benefit from it. Clearly, such a step is justified without any price that the other person is supposed to bear. On the other hand, if I am considering signing a treaty of mutual respect with him, here he is already required to pay some price, that is, to formulate his position out of serious consideration. Whereas when I am considering whether to force him to change his behavior, here it is possible that even if he has not paid the price of tolerance, that is, even if he formulates a position in an unsystematic and inappropriate manner, there is still no justification for coercion. Coercion is a very drastic step. Of course, even within the world of coercion there are different levels: one can threaten him, beat him, deprive him of his freedoms, impose various social sanctions on him (such as withholding budgets), or enact laws to be enforced by the state's legal authorities. The more dramatic and invasive this step is, the stronger the justification it exudes. Not everything that justifies intolerance and the denial of legitimacy and respect also justifies coercion.

Second, being a monist does not mean that I am convinced that I am right. Pluralism means that, at least on the issue at hand, there is no one right and no one wrong. We are all equally right here. But monism does mean that in my opinion there is truth, there are those who are right and those who are wrong, but it does not necessarily mean that I have the truth. On the contrary, a proper measure of modesty requires taking into account the possibility that the truth is not in my possession, certainly not in its entirety, and certainly not at this moment. The monist usually believes in the conclusions he has reached. Despite modesty and the fear that he may be wrong, he follows his path faithfully. The monist understands that a person is not able to completely clarify different values and principles, but he thinks that he is still able to reach more or less reasonable conclusions, and he is willing and thinks that it is appropriate to trust them (as long as it is not proven otherwise). Modesty does not mean giving up monism in favor of pluralism. Modesty means that even if there is truth (monism), I am aware that it is not necessarily in my possession in its entirety at this moment. There is some chance that I am wrong. Therefore, even though in practice I will act according to the values and principles that seem right to me, and even though I will not treat with tolerance and respect other positions that have been formulated irresponsibly, I still cannot justify coercive measures against others.

This is another difference between intolerance and coercion. Intolerance is the failure to provide legitimacy or respect, but without coercion. In order for me not to treat someone who thinks or acts differently with respect, it is enough for me to believe that they have not formulated their position in the proper manner (even in their own way). But in order for me to forcefully impose on them, greater confidence in the rightness of my own way is required. Blatant coercion that is applied to too many values and principles indicates a lack of modesty. There are basic values that I am convinced are correct and therefore I am willing to forcefully impose on them, such as not to murder, not to betray the country, not to steal, not to sell drugs, and so on. There are values that I also believe in, but they are less basic or less self-evident, and therefore even if I believe in them, I will not allow myself to force others to act according to them.

Third, the issue of coercion forces us to examine the extent of its usefulness. It is possible that a person may behave correctly under coercion, but his behavior will still be devoid of moral or religious value. For example, if a person observes Shabbat or does not eat pork, or honors his parents, simply because he was forced to do so, there is certainly room to believe that his actions have no value, moral or religious. If so, there is no point or logic in forcing him to do so, since coercion will not achieve its goal.

Fourth, the question of coercion also brings us into a discussion about the social order, the role and status of the majority or the strong in society (tyranny of the majority, or tyranny of the strong), the fear of undermining freedom and a forceful takeover that will disintegrate basic human rights. One of these rights, as far as I understand it, is the right to behave and think in a foolish and unsystematic manner. This right does not mean that I have to respect such behavior, and therefore I will not be tolerant of it in the sense of signing a treaty, but it does mean that I do not have permission to intervene forcefully and change the behavior of others, no matter how foolish it may be.

How does all of this relate to coercion in the world of halakhic law? This is a serious issue that requires separate study and consideration.

[1] Inside the book Values and emotions, Asa Kasher and Aharon Namdar (eds.), Hoshen Lemishpat, Ramat-Gan 1994, p. 193.

[2] The details are detailed in the fourth chapter of my books. Two carts and a hot air balloon, Tam Publishing and Beit El Library, Jerusalem 2007. There I mentioned the event in Sde Boker that sharpened this problematic for me.

[3] Hillel Ben Chaim Library, Kibbutz Hameuchad, 2002 (fourth printing).

[4] See my articles on this, "Is Halacha Pluralistic?", The kind 41. There I also discussed the reasons (logical and meta-halakhic) why a pluralistic halakhic position is not possible, but at most a tolerant position.

[5] These two characteristics certainly describe the halakhic discourse, and this is another indication that the halakhic is tolerant and not pluralistic.

[6] See the above articles inThe kind.

[7] See the discussion in the introduction to the aforementioned book by Avi Sagi.

[8]  Inside a book Worldly life Rabbi Yeshua Halevi of Talmisan, published by Shmaryahu Portnoy, Tel Aviv, 1951, p. 11.

[9] See on this my articles "Autonomy and Authority in Halacha Ruling", Straighteners A, Hesder Yeshiva Yerucham 5772.

[10]  It was also cited in the Responsa of Mahalbach 6.22 in the name of the Lord, Aisha.

[11] I will give here two examples of additional contexts in which a similar fallacy appears.

• A common mistake is to think that a person who is not observant but is well-versed in the various Torah sources and laws (for example, various Datlshim) cannot be a captive infant. A person who studies and knows all of these sources in detail, but does so from the perspective of an anthropological researcher, that is, without awareness of the obligations involved, is a captive infant who is strictly from the strictest sense. This is not about knowledge, but about awareness of obligations.
• The same is true for conversion. The various conversion paths pride themselves on the intensity of their study. Some of them explain that converts on their path learn and know much more than has been customary in conversion processes in the various Jewish communities throughout history. This may certainly be true, but it is simply irrelevant to the discussion of conversion. The validity of conversion does not depend on the knowledge of the convert. It depends on whether the convert is aware of his religious and halakhic obligation, that is, on accepting the commandments. No one expects the convert to know what great scholars do not know. And is there a Jew who masters all the Torah sources in their details? It is clear that here too what is required of the convert is awareness of the obligation and acceptance of the burden of the commandments, and not familiarity with the halakhic details. This is the same mistake.

[12] Instead of citing surveys, I will refer here to the evidence in the article by Avraham Tirosh (lecturer of communications at Bar-Ilan University and winner of the 1983 Sokolov Prize for Journalism), "Jewish Education is Not Necessarily Religious," website nrg Dated 26.5.2010.

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On tolerance and pluralism

Response to Michael Avraham's article 'The Price of Tolerance', De'ut, issue 60, 2013.

Ephraim Yerachmiel

I read Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham's article very carefully, and I also read with great interest his book 'God Plays Dice.' I cannot shake the feeling that Avraham faithfully represents the neo-fundamentalist position founded by Rabbi Hirsch and according to the definitions of James Barr.[1] According to Barr, the classical fundamentalist believes that God created the world, the laws of nature, and rational man in six days about six thousand years ago. He also governs nature and history and also gave Moses or dictated to him the Torah, which is therefore divine. It follows from this that the laws of the Torah, the laws of nature, and the conclusions of human reason must be identical in principle, and that everything narrated in the Bible happened literally in space and time, and every scientific, physical, geographical, historical, etc. data written in it is the only truth, since a divine text is inerrant. Therefore, any apparent difficulty or contradiction between the principles of science and reason and the principles of revelation will be resolved according to revelation, and thus reason and science will be purified.

For the neo-fundamentalist, too, religious belief determines the theory. However, for him, the theory is not fixed but changes without consistency. As long as the rational-scientific statement is a hypothesis, the revelational principles will simply determine the truth. But as soon as the scientific statement has been proven logically or experimentally without refutation, the scale is reversed, and the revelational statement will be interpreted differently from its simplest form to suit science.[2]

Thus, Rabbi Hirsch states that the Torah is generally our standard for determining truth. However, we accept from science the proven fact that the Earth is not the center of the universe and that it is billions of years old without hesitation and interpret the story of creation in these respects in a way that is not as simple as it seems (as some today claim that the Big Bang is the creation of light). This is a stumbling block that even Maimonides failed to overcome when he decided that Aristotle's physics is the truth and interpreted the story of Genesis according to it. Rabbi Hirsch states that even if Darwinian theory is proven, we will not be afraid of it and will interpret the Torah in a way that suits it. The opposite is true, the theory of the evolution of species only strengthens the Torah's position regarding an omnipotent God who created a single molecule with the potential to evolve into all the diversity we see before us today.[3] Abraham's general position is very similar to this position.

In his article in question, Avraham tries to justify his position that he does not agree to sign a treaty between religious and secular people and to respect them by claiming that he is convinced of the religious position after in-depth study, while his opponents are superficial and refuse to deal with the issue in depth, and he sees no reason to sign a treaty with such people. According to him, his position towards them is a tolerant, monistic position that holds that there is only one truth. Although he thinks that the truth is with him, he would not impose his position on others even if he could and even though their position is harmful, since the tolerant position is ethical and recognizes the autonomy of the other and their right to be wrong. He distinguishes between this tolerance and pluralism, which is a philosophical concept that means belief in many truths even if they contradict each other, but there is no ethical basis behind it because the pluralist does not impose his position because he has no reason to do so and not out of preserving any value. The other person's position is as true as my own.

In my opinion, here too, Abraham's theory is determined by his religious belief and not the other way around. Abraham recognizes only one type of pluralism, and that is postmodern pluralism, which advocates many truths. Weren't there pluralists before our time? In my understanding, a pluralist can also believe that there is only one truth (or two, according to the double truth position[4]) and no more. What distinguishes him from the tolerant is not the number of truths but the degree of humility (which is, of course, a value). The religious pluralist recognizes that the positions of religion cannot be proven with his own reason (since Kant) and he is liable to err and it is possible that the secular liberal position is the only truth (or perhaps only both are true, even though they are contradictory and without a bridging illusion[5]). In contrast, the tolerant is (almost) certain that the truth is with him, but he recognizes the goodness in the autonomy of others.

In my opinion, this is an arrogant position that is not ethical (although Avraham of course denies that he is one), and its expression is the claim that most secular people do not think while most religious people do, or at least he thinks and has evidence that convinces him and his opponents do not think enough. If they thought or confronted him, he would convince them to believe that God writes or dictates books and constantly directs nature and human history. Does no one among his opponents think? I wonder!! It seems that Avraham himself senses the possibility of the existence of this position and towards the end of the article he truly presents such a modest position, but according to his initial incorrect definition of pluralism, he attributes it to the tolerant monist, because in his opinion a pluralist is only someone who believes in many truths.

I am not a philosopher, so I cannot analyze Abraham’s claim that the postmodern pluralist position is not ethical with pure logic. In my understanding, a philosophical view does not fall from the sky to a person, but rather he chooses it according to his ethical positions. Intuitively, it seems to me that a pluralist cannot be an egoist, a chauvinist, a racist, a nationalist, a fascist, or a fundamentalist – all of which are immoral positions in my opinion. In contrast, a monist can be any of these and claim to be ethical because he tolerates others out of respect for their autonomy. One can see David Hartman, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Eliezer Goldman, and Rabbi Soloveitchik as moral figures whose consciousness postmodern pluralism has infiltrated to one degree or another. Gili Zivan argued for this in detail in her book, and I hope I am not mistaken when I say that she and teacher Avi Sagi viewed this pluralism as a highly ethical position, and in my opinion even more ethical than monistic pluralism.[6]

After Abraham's theory falls, so do the phenomenological differences between tolerance and pluralism that he presents. His interpretation of various statements by the Sages and Poskim can also be controversial and is sometimes far from simple and is in the nature of a midrash on the words of the Sages. For example, his explanation of 'these and those are the words of the living God' proceeds from the assumption that this is a halachic truth. In my understanding, this position of Rabbi Abba in the name of Shmuel should be interpreted only according to the 'revealing position' - or according to Moshe Halbertal, the 'establishing' - of the Ramban and the Ran, according to which God gave Moses at Sinai all possible opinions regarding all halachic law and therefore all the words of the sages who disagree among them are the words of the living God, and their role is to reveal the truth that the Giver of the Torah at Sinai intended - or according to Halbertal, to establish the halachic truth that determines the text retroactively. The Holy Spirit assists them in this activity. This is a romantic mystical position that relies on the Bat Kol or the vision of Elijah or the Holy Spirit. Rabbi Yehoshua, Maimonides, and perhaps even the Geonimis would not agree to accept such a position or this rule of Samuel. In their opinion, there is only one halachic truth that was handed down to us at Sinai, and that is, 'there is no one to be a witness to the Bat Kol' and 'no prophet is permitted to innovate.' This is a rationalist position that relies on explanation and logic.[7]

[1] James Barr, Fundamentalism, Philadelphia 1978.

[2] On the fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalist according to Bar, see the books The Average Path: The Beginning of the Growth of Modern Religiosity, Jerusalem 2011, pp. 111-115.

[3] On this position of Hirsch, see ibid., pp. 277-290.

[4] On the position of the double truth, see ibid., pp. 339-330.

[5] On religious and secular truth, see Moshe Meir, Years Together, Jerusalem 2012.

[6] See G. Zivan, Religion Without Illusion, Jerusalem and Ramat Gan 2006, mainly pp. 56-58.

[7] On the dispute between the Ramban and his disciples and the Geonim and Maimonides regarding what was conveyed to Moses at Sinai, see Moshe Halbertal, On the Path of Truth. The Ramban and the Creation of Tradition, Jerusalem 1966, Chapter One, and in the aforementioned books, pp. 118-127.

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With God’s help

My response to Ephraim Hamiel's words.

As I read the words, I pinched myself to make sure that there was no mistake here. It was clarified to me that I had written and detailed my position on various subjects for free, in books and articles, and explained it well. Hamiel insists on not making use of any of this. He prefers to engage in the teachings of another Michael Abraham (probably from the time of the Istamim), a figment of his imagination.

Hamiel writes:

I am not a philosopher, so I cannot analyze with pure logic Abraham's claim that the postmodern pluralist position is not ethical.

Since he is unable to analyze my argument with pure logic, he uses non-pure logic, which, as we will see below, is a powerful tool of criticism. Beyond that, Hamiel uses another critical tool: he simply invents my positions out of thin air and then attacks them. This is real deconstruction. Derrida's lips are in the grave. This is not just another misinterpretation of my marginal argument. I rummaged through my words and found nothing (!) in them of anything he accuses me of. Below I will demonstrate the points.

Hamiel's response is divided into two parts, and I did not delve into the secret of their connection. In the first part, he deals with my interpretation of science and faith (in light of my book, God Plays Dice). In the second part, he deals with my words about pluralism and tolerance (in light of the article). The equal side of the two parts is that both attack positions that are unfamiliar to me.

The basis of the first part is the solemn declaration that I am a neo-fundamentalist, from the school of Rashar Hirsch. I am not very familiar with Rashar Hirsch's teachings, but I thought my position was based on what I know. I wondered, what am I being accused of? What is the nature of that terrible neo-fundamentalism? This is the explanation:

For the neo-fundamentalist, too, religious belief determines the theory. However, for him, the theory is not fixed but changes without consistency. As long as the rational-scientific statement is a hypothesis, the revelational principles will simply determine the truth. But as soon as the scientific statement has been proven logically or experimentally without refutation, the scale is reversed, and the revelational statement will be interpreted differently from its simplest form to suit science.

Well, I'm not really enthusiastic about this approach either. I mentally run through all my writings as the sons of Maron, and I can't find a source for this perception. The article doesn't deal with any of this at all, while in the book I actually show great faith in science, while consistently and systematically trying to separate it from faith and its contents. Where did this description of my Mishnah come from? Lachmiel Patronim. And I haven't even commented on errors such as logical proofs of scientific results ("without refutation"?...) and more.

I also don't really understand the claim that a rational-scientific statement is a "hypothesis." Is it meant to be an inaccurate statement? Or is it: incorrect? Is it a speculative and unfounded hypothesis? Or perhaps: an inconclusive statement? I agree with the latter, less so with the former. What does all this have to do with me? To Hamiel, solutions.

And here's another quote:

Thus, Rabbi Hirsch states that generally the Torah is our standard for determining truth. However, the proven fact that the Earth is not the center of the universe and that it is billions of years old is accepted by science without hesitation and we interpret the story of creation in these respects in a way that is not as simple as it seems (as some today claim that the Big Bang is the creation of light). This is a stumbling block that even Maimonides failed to overcome when he decided that Aristotle's physics is the truth and interpreted the story of Genesis according to it. Rabbi Hirsch states that even if the Darwinian theory is proven, we will not be afraid of it and will interpret the Torah in a way that suits it. The opposite is true, the theory of the evolution of species only strengthens the Torah's position regarding an omnipotent God who created a single molecule with the potential to evolve into all the diversity we see before us today. Abraham's general position is very similar to this position.

I must point out that my book does not deal at all with the biblical descriptions of creation, and the relationship between them and science. The book deals exclusively with belief in God in a philosophical sense. This stems from the fact that I think it is appropriate to separate these discussions. Where did he see my position on these questions? To Hamiel, solutions.

But since this topic has been raised, I must admit that I am ashamed that I did not understand Maimonides' "failure." Aren't interpretations that are not based on science likely to turn out to be wrong? Every interpretation contains insights that are the fruit of their time and place, and science is no different in this regard. What Hamiel is suggesting is to withdraw from biblical interpretation altogether for fear that we will be proven wrong. According to this crude logic, I think it would also be better to stop building airplanes or producing medicines, lest our physics, biology, and chemistry turn out to be wrong as science advances.

In the second part, Hamiel moves on to deal with the subject of tolerance and pluralism. Here we are offered two types of insights: a. Semantic. b. Classificatory.

There are phenomena that I call tolerance and in his opinion it is more appropriate to call them pluralism. I have already mentioned this in my article and wrote that I do not intend to make semantic claims. The terminology is defined there for the purpose of my discussion. If someone prefers to call what I define as pluralism, as tolerance, humility, or an open universe, shame on them, as long as they maintain consistency and clarity, which Hamiel is careful not to do. The humble type that constitutes Hamiel's alternative proposal for my pluralism is also discussed by me (although I called it tolerant, but that is just semantics and the like).

On a classification level, here I earn the honorable title of "condescending" (which probably characterizes "neo-fundamentalists" like me):

In my opinion, this is an arrogant, non-value-based position (although Avraham of course denies that he is one), and its expression is the claim that most secular people do not think while most religious people do, or at least he thinks and has evidence that convinces him and his opponents do not think enough. If they thought or confronted him, he would convince them to believe that God writes or dictates books and constantly directs nature and human history. Is there no one among his opponents who thinks? I wonder!!

Where in my words did he see the claim that most secular people don't think and most religious people do? Probably in the missing writings of Michael Istamai. In my opinion, both among the religious and the secular, the majority don't think, and there is no fundamental difference between them in this matter. It goes without saying that I definitely think that the religious are more right (this is my opinion, of course, since I am a believer). But I humbly take into account the possibility that I am wrong, as every person should do.

In Setma's missing writings, there is apparently also the claim that the evidence he has will surely convince his opponents. In contrast, what I wrote is that if my opponent listens to me and still isn't convinced, or if he convinces me (!), then I will certainly sign a pact of mutual respect with him.

And while we're on the subject, it's worth noting another innovation. As far as I know my Mishnah, God certainly does not manage history, and simply not nature either. But in the lost writings, Hamiel found a firm statement that God manages both nature and history "all the time."

I will not list here the myriad of problems that fill Hamiel's brief response. I have never encountered such a comment in my life, and I hope I never will…