On discrimination and racism against Haredim

With God’s help

First Source – 2010

On the Emmanuel Riots: High Court, Discrimination, and the Service of God

introduction

In recent days, what we call, for some reason, 'public discourse' has been dealing quite a bit with discrimination on the basis of sect in Emanuel, and in the Haredi public in general. The riots manage to cover almost all the relevant aspects of the discussion, so that, to the delight of all parties, it is mostly completely non-existent, except for the exchange of blows in various mediums. The following short passage is intended for readers who are willing to consider their position after reading and not cling to their a priori gut feelings and the emotions that are seething within them.

On discrimination and racism

Discrimination is treating a person differently for irrelevant, general, and/or incorrect reasons. For example, when a student is not accepted to a university because he or she is of Polish descent, this can have three different problems:

1. False: There is a hidden assumption here that Poles are stupider, or study less well, than others. The first argument is that this statement is not true at all.

2. Generalization: Even if the collective statement about all Poles was correct (and this is certainly possible on average for different groups, let's not kid ourselves), we still have a duty to examine the specific student himself, since he may belong to the upper and most talented deciles of Poles. The second argument is based on the fact that labeling a specific person in light of any group he belongs to is problematic. This is a generalization.

3. Irrelevant: A third argument is that origin, or IQ, are not at all relevant criteria for university admission.

The first two reasons are usually presented as an alternative explanation, so as not to fall into the trap of the third fallacy. We explain that it is not because of Polish origin, but because of a substantive reason (such as qualifications).

In the margins of my remarks, I will note here that it was not without reason that I used the term 'discrimination', and not the term 'racism'. In all the sentences above, the term 'Polish' could be replaced with more neutral terms, such as 'tendency to sleep', or 'weak in history', and nothing would change. Racism is nothing more than a particular case of discrimination, and its uniqueness is that those irrelevant reasons for the different/discriminatory treatment of a person are related to his race. The identification between any discrimination and racism reflects the fact that this labeling is very convenient for us, since in doing so we automatically won the argument (remember, racist = Nazi).

Now we will examine the situation in which the reasons for the different treatment are indeed relevant, correct, and not all-encompassing. In this case, even if they relate to origin, or race, or any other basis, this should not be seen as discrimination (and certainly not 'racism'). For example, when selecting candidates for an experiment that examines the genetics of Moroccans, rejecting those of Polish descent is not racism, since it was carried out based on a relevant criterion. If we examine the candidates for university on a substantive level, and it turns out that the percentage of Poles accepted is low, this should not be seen as discrimination (at most, affirmative action can be considered, but there is certainly no moral outrage here). This is the result of applying a relevant criterion.

We are beginning to see that in order to justify not accepting a candidate to a university, even assuming that talent is the relevant criterion for admission to a university, it is not enough to prove that the group of Poles is not talented. We must show that our specific candidate is also not talented enough. We certainly cannot reject him because of his origin, since this is an irrelevant admission condition.

And what about a club that is intended for Jewish members (for example, a synagogue, at least abroad)? These are people who like to socialize only with Jews. Here too, the club accepts people based on criteria relevant to its system, and therefore this should not be seen as discrimination. Is a Jewish school that does not accept Gentiles, or a religious school that does not accept secular people, discrimination?

If we come closer to the ethnic-racial-origin question: What would be the case for a club that is open only to Yiddish speakers? According to the above definition, this too should not be seen as discrimination, since it gathers people who enjoy Yiddish conversation and Yiddish culture, and accordingly they select the members of the club. Naturally, these will only be Ashkenazim, and yet this should not be seen as discrimination. Of course, if a fluently Yiddish-speaking Sephardic person appears who operates within Yiddish culture, they will have to accept him, but there would still be discrimination here.

And what about a club declared to be for Ashkenazim only? Here it seems more problematic, but it seems that here too this should not be seen as discrimination. A person's taste is their honor, whether we like it or not. Just as there is a club intended for Jews, those with a socialist, secular, capitalist, religious, New Age worldview, and so on, so there is a club for those with Ashkenazi culture. The fact that the uniqueness of the club is highly correlated with origin (or race) does not necessarily mean that there is discrimination here. It can be called 'racism', and it is certainly possible not to like it (and perhaps even to open a club for those who do not like that club), but there is no racial discrimination here.

There is no doubt that a club that decides to harm anyone who does not belong to it is wrong, and its actions are condemnable. But this is true even if the basis for membership in the club is not racial or ethnic, but also on any other basis. Therefore, our concern here is with discrimination or racism that is expressed in the very definition of the group, when there is no actual harm to other groups (except for not accepting members from them into the club).

The conclusion that emerges from this is that a person can say that he does not like the tendency of people to associate with others on the basis of origin or race, but that is their tendency. And assuming that they are, the criteria for admission to their club cannot be called racism.

It is important to clarify that the state can, of course, not financially support such clubs, as part of its policy to create integration, or to encourage mixing between groups. But this does not necessarily mean that there is a prohibited act here on a legal level, or perhaps not even on a moral level.

Who is an ultra-Orthodox person?

Now we will come to discrimination in Immanuel, and in Haredi society in general. I will first say that Haredi society and culture, as such, contain many more components than the Shulchan Aruch (or halakha in general). There are unique cultural, linguistic, and even ethical characteristics there. It is not for nothing that each Haredi group also distinguishes itself from other Haredi groups. Salonim Hasidim want to educate the child to pray in the Salonim style, as well as to completely accept the leadership of the Salonim Rebbe (who determines whether and for whom to vote, what to do, how to study, what to wear, where to live, what to celebrate and when, what to eat and with what kosher, etc.). Salonim Hasidim want to educate their students to the perception that the Rebbe is the representative of God on earth, and that his words are absolute truth, and that it is appropriate to listen to him and only him. They want the student to know all the stories of the Salonim Rebbes of their generations, and to be educated according to them as if they were absolute truth about perfect, majestic figures, to pray in the Hasidic style with Gretel and with socks of the "correct" color and length.

How can such a group accept a student, or a member, who does not behave according to these rules? What if there is an 'epikurs' there who takes upon himself the rulings and spiritual leadership of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef? What if this student disdains the Admorim of Slonim, and perhaps even enjoys claiming that there may be a problem with their leadership or spiritual character? Not to mention praying in the Sephardic style, or Sephardic halakhic customs. I am convinced that if there is a student from a Sephardic family who accepts upon himself all the rules of Slonim Hasidism, and who meets the requirements of the level, etc., he will be accepted into their institutions (at least if they are convinced of the credibility of his intentions). I assume that in practice there are also some Sephardic students in Slonim institutions, as well as in other Haredi institutions that I know of. A significant part of the leadership of Shas grew up in Ashkenazi institutions.

I would add that this issue is not unique to Slonim Hasidism. The Lithuanian group also wants to educate in Lithuanian pronunciation, in the Ashkenazi version of prayer, in the absolute acceptance of the teachings of Rabbi Elyashiv, in the Lithuanian form of study and jurisprudence, in Lithuanian exemplary figures from the past, etc. The same applies to any other Haredi group. What characterizes Harediism is its treatment of these aspects with some kind of sanctity and absoluteness. It is not without reason that the entire Haredi world (even those whose children do not want to be accepted, and some of those who will not be accepted, into Slonim institutions) is mobilized for the Slonim Hasidic war on Immanuel.

Let's look at two more examples. The State of Israel was founded by people who did not want to live with Gentiles, but with their own people. In this sense, every nation-state has a dimension of ethnic discrimination, and yet it seems to most of us to be legitimate discrimination, if at all. Will secular schools happily accept a mass of students who are followers of the Salonim? I promise you that they will prevent their entry even by force, if necessary. Furthermore, I assume that schools of the 'sort of Torah education' would also be very unhappy to accept a mass of followers of the Salonim, or simply Lithuanians, who would change the character of their school. Any institution that has a specific educational agenda is afraid of the change in character that would be created by mixing populations that do not operate in accordance with this agenda. It is a question of dosage and of assessing the depth of the difference between the populations in question.

Distinguishing between two levels of discussion

In light of what has been said so far, it seems that we must distinguish between two different levels of discussion:

1. One may not like this educational path, or more generally this way of worshipping God. One may rebel against the perception that sees importance in pronunciation, dress, culture and folklore, Torah knowledge, historical distortions about rabbis and rebbes as if they were solid facts, and so on.

2. And one can also argue that there is discrimination here, meaning treating a person according to irrelevant criteria.

The first claim is factual, as there is a debate here about the way of serving God, what is important and what is marginal in it. How do we treat those who think/act differently from us? But assuming that this is indeed the Haredi position and the Haredi way of serving God, their criteria cannot be considered discrimination. They sort their students and their brides/grooms according to indicators of pronunciation, style of dress, rabbinical leadership, gertal, pronunciation in prayer, etc. This is what they want to educate towards, and therefore they set corresponding acceptance criteria, and therefore they are also unwilling to accept students who they fear will 'spoil' their education.

From the above, it appears that the debate about discrimination at Emmanuel is being conducted on the wrong level. There is no discrimination here, but rather sorting based on criteria that are certainly relevant to the culture in question. In a Hasidic society, anyone who listens to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and not the local Rebbe is an educational danger. Anyone who prays in Sephardic pronunciation is an educational danger. Anyone who does not pray with a gertel/socks/beard of the appropriate color and length is an educational danger. And certainly anyone who uses language that is not accepted there raises a difficult educational problem. That is why they do not accept such members into their club, and I do not see discrimination here.

My real argument with them is on a completely different level. The relevant question for the discussion here is whether this is indeed the correct way to serve God? Are the gertel, the pronunciation, the ketaniyot on Passover, or even listening to the specific rabbinical leadership, such important and central criteria in serving God? Does anyone who acts/thinks differently than me (within certain limits) constitute such a critical educational danger? If so, then there is certainly no discrimination here, but rather a very relevant sorting. And if not, even then the problem is not discrimination, but rather the distorted criteria on which it is based. The argument is not about the relevance of the criteria, since relevance is a result of taste (in the case of the club), or of values (in the case of Haredi education). The argument is about the values from which these criteria are derived, that is, about the religious culture that establishes these criteria, and sees them as relevant criteria.

I certainly agree with the criticism of this corrupt and distorted religious culture and perception. But this is not an allegation of discrimination, but a debate about the form of worship of God. In this debate, the systems of government, and certainly secular systems or secular people, have no standing. Adding discrimination to this debate is an irrelevant diversion of it to convenient and demagogic places. Dealing with the question of the relevance of the criteria is conducted with irrelevant tools, and according to irrelevant standards.

It is important to clarify here that there are certainly justified rejections of students, and there are those that are acceptable even if not entirely justified. Regarding students who do not adhere to appropriate norms regarding the institution's policy (such as foul language, or a culture of speech, dress, or entertainment that is not appropriate for the nature of the institutions), the decision not to accept them can be accepted as reasonable. A person who is not willing to jeopardize the education of his children (at least according to his judgment) in order to empower other students does not deserve such unequivocal condemnation. If there are others who are willing or want greater openness and integration, and are also willing to take risks to do so, they are welcome. But that is not what we are talking about. The decision not to accept students into institutions for these reasons, even if they are of Spanish origin (there are undoubtedly quite a few who use the excuse of discrimination based on origin to attack justified rejections), is certainly acceptable. My concern here is solely with unjustified rejections, that is, based on the background of the gertal, skin color, rabbinical leadership, or the manner of pronunciation in prayer. My remarks above apply to these considerations.

And what is the role of the High Court in all this?

From here I will move on to the High Court's approach. The High Court is supposed to intervene where there is discrimination, that is, where criteria that are irrelevant to the purpose of the institution are used. The reason for the intervention is a violation of the principle of equality (this is the legal approach to discrimination). But in light of what has been described above, the discussion here is not related to the principle of equality, but to the correct way to worship God. The High Court cannot intervene in the question of 'discrimination' in Immanuel, because we must all agree that the High Court cannot determine what the correct way to worship God is. The question of whether to wear a gertel and in what color, as silly as it may sound, is not the concern of Edmund Levy, nor of Elyakim Rubinstein, or Dorit Beinisch. The question of whether to listen to the voice of the Rebbe of Slonim or Rabbi Ovadia, or not to the voice of either of them, is also not related to them. If anything, the High Court can determine that these institutions should not be funded according to any criteria established by law (if indeed they can legally substantiate this). But they cannot determine what the correct way to serve God is, or what the color and character of my club, or yours, will be. Therefore, the dependence on the principle of equality is also nothing more than demagogy.

What symbolizes the matter most of all is the statement in the ruling that the court does not accept the standards for modesty of Rabbi Wesner's court. This is a legal scandal. Tomorrow morning the court will not accept my standards for Sabbath observance, or for kosher, and will require the religious school to accept secular or gentile students, or perhaps the army to serve non-kosher food. It is impossible for the court to consider itself authorized to make binding determinations regarding standards that depend on beliefs and opinions, however strange they may seem to it, or to anyone else (including myself, of course).

The only exception is where these standards are set ad hoc, merely to cover up a desire for sectarian discrimination. But to show this, the court must be convinced that Rabbi Wesner's standards, which appear in his writings, and in the writings of many other poskim, as well as in the regulations of Haredi schools, long before the event before us, are not sincere. It must be convinced that the public does not follow them in everyday life, and therefore they are intended solely to cover up a desire to discriminate on irrelevant grounds. It seems to me that this is quite clear that this is not the case here. Suspicions about what is in the hearts of the administrators cannot form the basis for drawing such a firm conclusion about their insincerity. Therefore, the claim of discrimination, and inequality, is completely unjustified in this case.

At this point, it would be interesting to see the evidence (the only one in this judgment) that the judges present to indicate the existence of discrimination (1067/08, paragraph 13):

The existence of two "trends", which are allegedly separated only for religious reasons, but in fact one of the "trends" has a clear majority of girls from the "Ashkenazi" community and the rest are excluded from it, and the other, the "general" one, is almost entirely made up of "Sephardi" girls.

This numerical-factual argument assumes what is wanted, like similar numerical arguments often put forward by various minorities. After all, the administration claims that Sephardic students do not meet the criteria it sets (which are derived from the nature of the school, according to its theory), and therefore the numerical gap between the majors has been created. And what does the High Court of Justice say about this? That the fact is that the number of Sephardic students in the Hasidic major is small relative to the Ashkenazi students. What does this prove? Either the criteria are 'tailored' to create an Ashkenazi class, as the High Court claims, or that there really is a correlation (very surprising, of course) between Hasidic behavior and norms and Ashkenazi-Hasidic origin, as the administration claims. So where is the proof here? Is this factual justification unreasonable? Why would we expect? That distinct Hasidic tendencies would emerge specifically in the Sephardic population, more so than among the Hasidic followers of Slonim?

I will add that the conspiratorial assumption of the High Court judges, according to which the separation between Hasidim and others covers a desire for separation based on origin, implicitly conceals the assumption that Hasidim have no real desire to educate their students in a Hasidic education (since this is done only to exclude Sephardim). But here, there is an ignoring of unequivocal facts. Even in the humble Bnei Brak and Jerusalem, there is a separation between Hasidic and Lithuanian schools, two distinct Ashkenazi groups. Is there discrimination here on an ethnic basis too? Is this also not done because of the desire to educate Hasidic/Lithuanian? This is clear proof that this educational policy is authentic, and not just a fig leaf for ethnic discrimination. This of course does not mean that it is justified, but as we saw above, the claim of ethnic discrimination must prove that the criteria are not authentic and not that they are unjustified.

By the way, among the High Court judges themselves, throughout their generations, there is a very low representation of those of Mizrahi origin, much less than their representation in the Hasidic movement at Immanuel. The numerical proof cited above is no less valid in this context. Furthermore, I think every intelligent person would agree that the factual alternative, according to which the judicial skills of those of Mizrahi origin are lower than those of Ashkenazim, seems much less plausible than the factual justification of the school administration at Immanuel, according to which the Hasidic-Haredi tendency of those of Mizrahi origin is weaker than that of their fellow Hasidic Slonim. Is anyone surprised by this? Isn't it likely that this is indeed the case? So maybe we should stop financial support for the High Court on the grounds of discrimination?! Or should the members of the Judicial Appointments Committee be put in prison, and heavy fines imposed on them for every day this situation continues?! Let us recall that this is not a private club or school, but a state institution. We only have one High Court (and that's a good thing), and people of Eastern descent do not have the option to establish another High Court for themselves (not even with a dividing wall and different entrances). Therefore, this discrimination is seven times more severe and unjustified than in any other place or institution.

By the way, I myself know, sometimes firsthand and sometimes secondhand, quite a few cases of clear ethnic discrimination in the Haredi community. There is a seminar for teachers (aged thirty and over) that sets a maximum quota for students of Mizrahi origin (I know one from secondhand, and I assume there are others like that). There, it is impossible to talk about relevant criteria, since teachers aged thirty will not be "spoiled" by working with other teachers. Furthermore, in that seminar they really did not separate Lithuanian, Hasidic and other vegetables, but only set a quota for teachers of Sephardic origin. Another case, slightly less clear, is a yeshiva that sets quotas based on origin (as far as I know, this is accepted in most important Ashkenazi Haredi yeshivahs. I know this about a few of them personally), and does not accept students who meet the admission criteria, just because of their origin (i.e. when the number of students of Mizrahi origin exceeds the quota). Although in the second case it is possible to rely on the fact that they are willing to accept different students, but in a certain dose so as not to 'destroy' the character of the yeshiva, this usually does not seem like a convincing argument (it is also never explicitly presented to someone who is not a member of the yeshiva). These are all good examples, in which there was certainly room for the High Court to address it (even if not in the way it was done here), since these are much more obvious cases of sectarian discrimination based on irrelevant criteria. But with regard to Emmanuel's case, I did not see any real justification for the fact that this is discrimination on an irrelevant basis. On the contrary, there are several indications that the situation there is not like that. We will add and remind you that when a court claims the existence of discrimination, it must bring clear evidence of its existence, that is, to negate the substantive arguments, and show that they are presented ad hoc. To the best of my judgment, this was not done in Emmanuel's case (see above in the discussion on numerical evidence).

Summary: What would Grosjean Marx say about this?

The conclusion is that the relevant level of the debate is the public-religious, not the legal. If there is a group that discriminates against people for reasons that seem relevant to it, this does not harm the value of equality, but rather other values, religious and moral. I oppose the distinction between Sephardim and Ashkenazim, not because of discrimination, but because the differences are not really important as a measure of the worship of God. Therefore, this should not raise any legal problem. The correct way to deal with this is through a social process. Start with attempts at persuasion, and if these are unsuccessful, this group should be left to its own devices, with its culture and its way of worshiping God, however corrupt and distorted it may be in our eyes.

To paraphrase Grosjean Marx, I don't want to be a member of a club that doesn't want to accept me. On the other hand, that doesn't mean I should forcefully close this club or put its members in jail. It's better to open other, more successful clubs that will provide a suitable alternative, eliminating the dependent and incomprehensible need for rejected candidates to forcefully and legally join a club that doesn't want them.