On Mitzvot and Parts of Mitzvot – A Study of the Essence of Concepts in Halacha and in General

Advances – 2008

introduction

The roots of the commandments formulated and defined by Maimonides inThe Book of Commandments A unique and very rare text is presented, in which a major halakhic scholar presents a reflexive picture of his methodological and meta-halakhic assumptions. In each of Maimonides' roots, a philosophical principle can be seen, and in almost all of them it is not just a meta-halakhic principle, but a principle that concerns issues in general philosophy.[1] In this article, I will attempt to offer a philosophical foundation for understanding the dispute between the Maimonides and the Ramban over the root of the eleventh chapter, which concerns parts of the commandments, and I will seek to derive from their halachic (or meta-halachic) positions philosophical conclusions concerning the nature of halachic concepts in particular and the nature of concepts in general. Specifically, we will address the question of whether the halachic concept is "is," or an idea, with some kind of existence, or whether a concept is nothing more than a purely linguistic agreement.

Introduction: A Brief Look at the Roots of Maimonides

The starting point for these matters is the disagreement between Maimonides and Ramban on the root of the eleventh chapter. The Book of CommandmentsAnd therefore I will first say a few words about the fourteen roots of Maimonides. Although these are a very unique and rare text, in which a major halachic scholar reflects on his method of work,[2] To the best of my knowledge, little systematic work has been done in an attempt to understand these roots in depth.[3] A study of them reveals several philosophical questions, both in relation to the philosophy of Halacha and in relation to philosophy in general. In this article I will present one of these questions.

Maimonides' halakhic work was done in an almost deductive manner. In order to write the The strong hand, which is the only comprehensive halachic codex ever written,[4] He needed a framework to help him sort and organize this comprehensive and complex material, and to ensure that he did not forget or omit anything. Maimonides chose the Minyan of the Mitzvot as a framework. He scanned the written Torah and all the literature of the Sages and the Ge'onim that was under his control, in order to extract from it the 313 Mitzvot.[5] He sorted and arranged these commandments by topic, and these were the basis of his monumental book. The strong hand.

However, as every scholar knows, extracting and defining the 313 commandments from the entirety of halakhic literature are extremely difficult tasks, involving several methodological assumptions. Until the time of Maimonides, the number of commandments was strictly controlled by the author's enumerator. Great Laws (hereinafter: in the Haggai), and all the enumerators of the commandments (at least those that were known to the Rambam) followed him. In his introduction toThe Book of Commandments Maimonides treats this with great criticism, and even mocks those who followed the Ha-Hag, "as if the intellects stood by this man's opinion."[6] Despite the ridicule, Maimonides had to substantiate his revolutionary claims regarding the number of commandments, as they stood in opposition to the mainstream approach that had prevailed until his day.

For this reason, Maimonides found it appropriate to write fourteen roots, in which he includes the principles according to which he decided how to sort and classify the commandments. The roots are divided into several types: there are roots that deal with the halakhic status of the laws as the basis for their categorization or non-categorization (for example, the first and second roots); there are roots that deal with dualities (for example, the sixth and ninth roots); there are roots that deal with the question of what a commandment is (for example, the fifth root), and there are roots that deal with parts of a commandment that should not be listed separately but rather as a whole.

The root we are dealing with here (root 11), as well as the root that follows it, belongs to the roots that deal with parts of a mitzvot. What emerges from both of them is that parts of a mitzvot should not be enumerated independently, but rather all the parts should be grouped together and included in the count of mitzvot as one mitzvot.

A. The Rambam and Ramban's Method in Shoresh 11[7]

In Root 11, Maimonides establishes the principle:

That the parts of the mitzvah should not be enumerated individually, as if they were part of a single mitzvah when the sum of them is one mitzvah.

The example that the Rambam himself gives is the four species. We are commanded to take all four, and if one is missing, we have not fulfilled the obligation of the mitzvah. Therefore, the Rambam claims that the mitzvahs to take the lulav, arava, hadas, and etrog should not be listed separately, but rather that one comprehensive mitzvah of taking the four species should be listed, within which the four species will appear as individuals (see Asa Kast 2).The Book of Commandments).

In his words, the Rambam examines the implications of the halachic question of whether the parts of a mitzvah inhibit each other, with regard to the rule discussed in this root. Ostensibly, these are two sides of the same coin: if parts of a mitzvah inhibit each other, we must count them as one mitzvah, and if there is no inhibition, then there are two mitzvahs here. Indeed, the four species of the lulav inhibit each other, as do the showbread and the frankincense that goes with it. The same is true in the purification of a leper (Asa Ki) and his removal. In all these cases, the Rambam states, there is no doubt that these are parts of one mitzvah, for they inhibit each other.

The explanation that the Rambam gives for this matter is that the desired purpose is not realized unless all the parts are fulfilled. Therefore, it is clear that all these parts form one whole. And what about the cases in which the parts do not inhibit each other? The Rambam writes that there is a subtle element at the foundation of this root, and that is that the criterion for examining the question of whether we are dealing with one mitzvah or two different mitzvahs is one-sided: if the parts inhibit each other, then we are dealing with different parts of one mitzvah. However, if they do not inhibit each other, we should not necessarily conclude that we are dealing with two mitzvahs. In such cases, sometimes the parts will be counted as one mitzvah and sometimes as separate mitzvahs.

The two main examples around which the early scholars argue are given in Mishnah Minachot (36:2):

The blue does not hinder the white, and the white does not hinder the blue. The prayer of the hand does not hinder the prayer of the head, and the prayer of the head does not hinder the prayer of the hand.

And here, according to the Rambam, the commandment of tzitzit, with its two components, is counted as one mitzvah (see 2The Book of Commandments, Acts 12-13), although the white does not inhibit the blue and the blue does not inhibit the white. On the other hand, he lists the tefillin as two separate commandments (Acts 12-13).

Maimonides cites evidence for his words from the Mikhilta of Rabbi Yishmael:

It is possible that they are two commandments, a blue commandment and a white commandment. The Talmud says, "And it shall be for you a tzitzit." It is one commandment and not two commandments.

At the end of the root, Maimonides explains things as follows:

Now it has already been explained to you that even the parts that do not hinder each other sometimes will be one mitzvah when the matter is one. Because the meaning of the tzitzit is so that you may remember. If so, the whole thing that requires remembrance will be counted as one mitzvah. Now, we are not left to look at the number of mitzvot to say whether they hinder or do not hinder, but rather to the matter alone, whether it is one matter or many matters.

The Maimonides explains here that the criterion is whether there is a "single issue," meaning a single goal and purpose. In the Maimonides' opinion, the Midrash of Chazal in the Mekhilta teaches us that these two parts serve one idea, and therefore, although they do not inhibit each other, they are parts of one whole.[8] This common idea is probably the remembrance of the commandments: "That you may remember and do all my commandments and be holy to none other than yourselves" (this is also how the Ramban explains it in his interpretations). Apparently, according to the Rambam, this is the intention of the Torah itself, when it says: "And you shall have a tzitzit." The blue and the white join into one whole called 'tzitzit.'

As stated, the Ramban, in his interpretation of this root, agrees with the fundamental principle in the words of the Rambam. He also accepts that it is not the delay that is the criterion, but rather the question of whether the matter of the parts is one. However, he challenges the Rambam with his statements regarding the commandment of tefillin, since although tefillin of the hand do not delay that of the head and vice versa, it is nevertheless clear that their matter is one:

And if we look at their meaning, then the tefillin are considered more than one thing, since everything that is written in this is written in this, and the meaning in them is one, "so that the law of the Lord may be in our mouths," a measure against the heart and the mind, the abodes of thought.

If so, the Ramban himself agrees in principle with the Maimonides' view that even parts that do not hinder each other, if their subject matter is the same, are counted as one mitzvah.

The Maimonides' words indicate that there is probably no common idea between the hand and head tefillin, and therefore they are counted as two mitzvot in his opinion. Here is the place to clarify the issue of the common idea between the parts of a mitzvah. Even if the two actions are intended to achieve a similar goal, this does not make them one mitzvah. Sitting in the Sukkah and eating matzah are both reminders of the Exodus from Egypt, and yet it is clear that there are two mitzvahs here. Parts of a mitzvah are counted as one mitzvah only when the goal toward which they are directed is achieved when all of them are combined. Thus he himself writes:

And likewise, if it becomes clear to you that the desired purpose will not be achieved in one of those parts, it would be explained that their collection is the matter in question… And likewise, his purity (of the leper) will not be achieved except in everything that he mentions from birds, a cedar tree, two worms, and shaving, and then his purity will be achieved.

The Maimonides' method of tefillin can also be explained by the fact that the prayer of the hand is against the heart (instinct and emotion) and the prayer of the head is against the mind (thought and faith). Even if these two goals are similar, the Maimonides apparently believes that since neither needs the other, the commandment of tefillin is considered two commandments. In contrast, with the tzitzit, remembering the commandments is optimally achieved only through the combination of blue and white.[9] Therefore, tzitzit is counted as one mitzvah.

In any case, the definition of things on a general logical level still requires explanation: What is the difference between parts of a mitzvah that do not inhibit each other but have a common idea (such as tzitzit), and between two parts that inhibit each other (such as the four species)? If indeed in both cases it is a single mitzvah, then why are there cases in which the parts inhibit each other and there are cases in which they do not? And as for the third case, in which there are two parts of a mitzvah that do not inhibit each other and also do not have a common idea (such as tefillin according to the Maimonides), why does the possibility even arise for discussion that two such parts belong to a single mitzvah?

B. Three types of relationship between the parts of the mitzvah and the whole: three first methods

There may be three possible types of relationship between the whole mitzvah and its parts:

1. Each part has an independent, valuable existence and the parts do not join at all into a complete whole.
2. The existence of each part is valuable, but only the joining of all the parts together constitutes the complete whole of the mitzvah.
3. No single part has value in itself, and the value of the mitzvah is created only when all of them are fulfilled together.

In case 1, it is clear that one part does not hinder the other, and it also does not hinder the fulfillment of the entire mitzvah (since there is no overarching mitzvah that unites them). Ostensibly, these are not parts of one mitzvah at all, but rather two different mitzvahs. In case 3, it is clear that the absence of one part hinders the entire mitzvah, and therefore there is no point in doing the second part alone (since its entire purpose is the fulfillment of the overall mitzvah).

In case 2, we can say that one part hinders the fulfillment of the entire mitzvah, but it does not hinder the second part. In such a case, there is a point in doing the second part alone, even if we do not obtain the benefit that arises from the entire mitzvah. Although this case can also occur in two ways:

2a. When one part is maintained, there is an existence of that part itself, but not of the whole.

2b. There is a lack of fulfillment of the entire mitzvah here.[10]

Parts of a mitzvah that inhibit each other are certainly parts of one overall mitzvah. This is case 3. Parts of a mitzvah that do not inhibit each other, according to the Maimonides’ position, can sometimes be counted as one mitzvah, and sometimes as two. The difference lies in the question of whether the fact that the second part can be observed without the first is based on the fact that its existence has independent value (case 2a) – in which case they are counted as two mitzvahs, or whether there is an incomplete observance of the whole (case 2b) – in which case there is one mitzvah.

This is the difference between tzitzit and tefillin: in both cases the parts do not inhibit each other, meaning they certainly do not belong to the third type of relation. However, according to the Rambam, in tzitzit, the white and the blue join into a whole, and therefore when the mitzvah is fulfilled only with white, or only with blue, there is a partial fulfillment of the entire mitzvah of tzitzit. Therefore, the mitzvah of tzitzit is one comprehensive mitzvah even though the parts do not inhibit each other. Regarding tefillin, the Rambam proved from the language of the aforementioned midrash that the two parts do not join into one whole, and therefore these are two different mitzvahs.[11]

It seems that in the verses themselves we can see this (Numbers 15:3-4):

Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, "Make for them tassels on the corners of their garments throughout their generations, and put a fringe of thread on the tassel of the tassel."

The tzitzit is called this even before it is covered with blue. A thread of blue is also covered with the tzitzit of the white one, meaning that it is an addition. The entire complex is also called 'tzitzit' (the next verse: "And you shall have a tzitzit"). The conclusion is that the white alone is considered a tzitzit (therefore its existence is a missing fulfillment of the overall tzitzit commandment, and not just of the white one), but the tzitzit is also the complex. A parallel structure in the verses does not exist in the parsha of tefillin (the term tefillin is not a biblical term at all).

It was found that there are three main methods in the Rishonim in understanding the relationship between the parts of the mitzvah and the whole: Maimonides believes that both the question of 'delay' and the question of joining the whole (the distinction between 2a and 2b) are relevant to the number of mitzvot. The Ramban believes that only the 'delay' is relevant (he does not distinguish between 2a and 2b). Whereas the Ha-Hag believes that the blue and white of the tzitzit also count as one mitzvah, as do the tefillin of the hand and head. The Ramban explains that for the Ha-Hag, the 'delay' is apparently not a relevant parameter to the number of mitzvot, and only the question of the parts' generalization into one matter (the difference between 2a and 2b) is relevant from his perspective.[12]

C. Note: Why parts of a mitzvah that do not inhibit and do not include are not two mitzvahs

Up until now we have almost ignored the existence of Category No. 1, since this category describes two different mitzvot, and not parts of one mitzvah. Is there a difference between it and Category 2a? In other words: why does Category 2a belong to the discussion of parts of a mitzvah? Why don't we simply say here that these are two different mitzvahs? More concretely: are tefillin two parts of a mitzvah that for technical reasons are considered separate, or are they two different mitzvahs that have no connection?

From the words of Rabbi Avraham in his aforementioned response to Rabbi Daniel the Babylonian, it is clearly implied that these are parts of one mitzvah. This is also implied by the words of Maimonides himself. For this reason alone, Maimonides was troubled at all by the question of why they should not be counted as parts of one mitzvah.

It is possible that the explanation for the two tefillin being parts of one mitzvah (even though they are counted as two mitzvahs and do not inhibit each other) relates to the Ramban's argument presented above. Although the two tefillin each function separately (one to assimilate the mitzvahs into the heart and the other to assimilate them into the mind), both are intended to achieve similar goals that join together. Each of the parts is not dependent on the other, but both together have the meaning of a whole. According to the Ramban, this is enough to define them as one mitzvah. According to the Rambam, they are indeed counted as two mitzvahs, but he still believes that these are two independent parts of a mitzvah, and not two mitzvahs, and therefore he also refers to the mitzvah of tefillin in his words on this root.

Another possible implication of viewing the tefillin as independent parts of the mitzvah (2a) and not as two separate mitzvahs (1) could be regarding the disagreement of the Rishonim over the question of whether the tefillin do not inhibit each other even when both are in his hands and yet he puts on only one.[13]

D. Conventionalism and essentialism in relation to concepts[14]

We have discussed several types of relationships between the parts of the commandment and its generality, and we have seen how this relationship is expressed in the number of commandments according to the various Rishonim methods. Now we must move on and clarify the logical foundations of this picture. Our proposal is that the foundation of things lies in the logical relation to concepts and theoretical 'objects'. Therefore, we will begin here with a brief philosophical discussion, and then we will return to the Rishonim controversies presented above.

The pair of terms 'substance' and 'incident' have two meanings, both of which are mutually related, and both concern the subject under discussion: A. The 'substance' is the thing itself, the entity. And the 'incident' is what happens to it, or is attached to it. These are its characteristics or properties. B. The distinction is made between different properties, or characteristics, of the substance: there are properties that are 'essentially' to it, that is, its essential properties, and there are properties that are attached to it accidentally, and then they are 'incidents' for it.

When we talk about 'entity' and 'case' with regard to concepts (and not with regard to objects), there is a feeling that only the second sense can be relevant. This feeling is based on the assumption that concepts have no entity. They are not existing things. According to this assumption, concepts are fictitious creatures, which are created by agreement between people. This is the conventionalist (schematic) view of concepts. According to this view, a concept is a collection of characteristics that have been given a common linguistic term by agreement among speakers in a community that describes the entire whole.[15]

For example, let's take the concept of 'democratic state.' According to conventionalism, this concept has no entity, and is created by the consent of people. Although there are democratic states in the world, their democracy is not a real entity. It is a feature of them, but it is not an entity in itself. Of course, this concept has characteristics (attributes), which are divided into essential and accidental. For example, the characteristic that the name of the state begins with the letter Y is accidental, and in contrast, the characteristics of the system of government practiced in it, such as the election of all citizens to the governmental institutions, seem essential to it. A state whose name begins with a different letter would still be democratic, and in contrast, if there are no elections to the governmental institutions, it would not be considered one.

A definition of a concept will contain only its essential properties, not its accidental ones. These are the necessary conditions for the establishment of the concept. There is no point in introducing accidental elements into the definition, since even in the absence of these, it is still the same concept.

According to the conventionalist account, it seems that it is impossible to change the definition of a concept, since such a change of an essential property means transforming the original concept into a different concept. A different definition indicates a different concept. Conventionalism also seems to not allow for debate about the meaning of concepts. Anyone who defines the concept in question differently is simply dealing with a different concept. The debate becomes purely semantic.

However, there is a strong sense that definitions of concepts can and do change, and even be debated. Over time, concepts can take on a different character than they once had. It is also quite possible that the same concepts will be referred to in different ways in different places.

For example, 'morality' requires different, and sometimes even opposite, actions in different societies and at different times. Some will say that morality requires aborting a sick fetus, while others will strongly oppose this and claim that it is murder. The same is true for homosexual relations and more.

Is there a debate here about the meaning and characteristics of the concept of 'morality,' or are we simply dealing with two different concepts? It turns out that if the concept of 'morality' were just a collection of characteristics and nothing more, then there would be no room for debate. It was clear to both sides that they were dealing with different concepts, and the confusion arose from their coincidental use of the same linguistic term to describe them. However, as mentioned, there is a strong intuition that this debate is real, and it revolves around the meaning of that concept itself. How can we explain this? What is there in a concept beyond its characteristics and properties?

To explain this, we must assume that the concept of ‘morality’ has a self. There is an entity (or idea) called ‘morality’, and the debate revolves around its characteristics: from one perspective it appears one way, from another it appears differently. But both sides are arguing about the same concept, and so the debate is substantive, not semantic.

This is actually a Platonic approach. According to this approach, there is a world of ideas, in which there are abstract ideas, such as horseness, or redness, kindness, the triangular shape, and so on. The concrete horse that exists in our world is the expression of the idea of horseness that exists in the world of ideas. The idea is by its very nature perfect, but the concrete horse can sometimes appear incomplete. When the horse is crippled, or deformed, or simply imperfect, we will still continue to refer to it as a horse. The reason for this is that the idea of horseness is indeed perfect, but its appearance in concrete objects can sometimes be incomplete. In these situations, it is said that some of the characteristics of the idea do not appear fully in the concrete object.

If so, this intuition hides behind it a position that is not conventionalist, but essentialist (essentialist). The conventionalist believes that the collection of characteristics is what constitutes the concept. In contrast, the essentialist holds that the concept also has an essence, some essential background, which the collection of characteristics only tries to describe, but does not constitute it. The concept exists even before its characteristics, and beyond them (and perhaps even without them). In other words: the concept is what is described by these characteristics, and not the collection of characteristics itself.[16]

We have seen that conventionalism does not allow us to see concepts with different characteristics as different expressions of the same concept (since the concept is the sum of all its characteristics). Essentialism, on the other hand, leads us to the conclusion that even the absence of a characteristic, even an essential characteristic, can still describe the same concept in different circumstances. The identity of the new concept with its predecessor can be maintained despite the change in characteristics (if its 'bones', or 'substance', are preserved), since the characteristics are not the constitutive element of the concept, but something that is merely appended to it.

E. Essentialism and Conventionalism in Halacha

Now let us return to the meta-halakhic discussion we conducted above, and examine it in the light of what has just been said. We have seen that the initial tendency of all the Rishonim is to say that when two characteristics of a mitzvah do not inhibit each other, they are probably two different mitzvahs (case 1). The reason for this is that we tend to think that each part of a mitzvah is essential, and therefore if it is missing, it is not the same mitzvah. It follows that if any part of a mitzvah does not inhibit its companion, then they are necessarily separate mitzvahs.

The logical basis for this is apparently a concept of halakhic conventionalism. A mitzvah is not a real entity, but a theoretical concept, which is nothing more than a collection of its parts, and therefore when we subtract any part of them, then the mitzvah in question does not exist at all. For example, a tzitzit is a combination of blue and white. According to the conventionalist concept, there are indeed concrete objects called 'tzitzit', but the concept (or idea) 'tzitzit' itself has no substance. It is nothing more than a complex that is prepared by a certain combination of tying threads of blue and white in the manner defined by the Torah in the section of tzitzit. If we only tie blue or only white to the hem of the garment, then we are not talking about tzitzit in the halakhic sense, since its comprehensive definition does not hold. And if, nevertheless, the halakhic law states that tying only white is possible, then the conclusion is that white is a mitzvah separate from blue.

But as we have already seen in the verses themselves, putting white alone, without blue, on a garment entitles it to the title of 'tsitzit.' Not only is there a statement here that there is value in the commandment of white without blue, but there is also a statement here that white alone is also a tsitzit. This reference inevitably leads us to an essentialist view, according to which the concept of 'tsitzit' denotes some entity (a Platonic idea). Now there is room to discuss whether white alone is also a (missing) appearance of the same concept, or whether because the appearance is so different it is clear that it is no longer the same concept. If so, at least with respect to the commandment of tsitzit, it seems that the conventionalist picture is incorrect. For this reason, the first three that we discussed count white and blue together as one mitzvah, even though they do not inhibit each other.

In contrast, the concept of 'tefillin', as stated, does not appear in the Bible. The Ramban and the Ha-Hag also see tefillin as one comprehensive entity (and they also rely on a biblical allusion, according to which both serve the same purpose: "That the law of the Lord may be in your mouth"), and therefore they count them as one mitzvah. According to the Rambam, in contrast, they are counted as two mitzvahs.[17]

F. The attitude to the question of nominalism-realism

Here is the place to comment on the attitude towards another issue that has already been discussed in meta-halakhic literature.[18] Many have already distinguished between nominalism and realism of halakhah. According to the nominalist approach, halakhah does not refer to or reflect reality (according to this approach, mixing, for example, is not an expression of the existence of any realistic buffering, but a fictitious halakhic construction). The realist approach, on the other hand, sees mixing, or impurity, as types of (spiritual) realities that create halakhic phenomena (rejection – in relation to impurity, or buffering – in relation to mixing).

Many link the question of nominalism-realism to the question of the reasons for the commandments. If indeed the perception is realistic, then the realistic plane behind the law is the reason for the law itself. For example, nominalism sees the laws of impurity as laws that are established by the Torah, and that they have no meaning beyond the commandments and the laws of impurity and purity. In contrast, according to realists, behind the concepts of impurity stands a flawed reality that must be distanced from, which is why the laws of impurity were created.

Thus, the distinction between nominalism and realism lies outside the halakhic sphere, since it deals with meta-halakhic and the reasons for the commandments. In contrast, the distinction we have made here lies entirely within the halakhic world. We are dealing with the meaning of halakhic concepts in themselves, and not with their relationship to external reality. Our question is whether a halakhic concept exists as some Platonic idea, or whether it is nothing more than a combination of attributes and definitions.

We will refine this distinction by examining the commandment of the tzitzit. After the commandment about the white and the blue, the verse again states: "And you shall have a tzitzit." At first glance, this is a rather strange formulation. This formulation suggests that the term 'tzitzit' has long been familiar to us, and the Torah only commands us to do the mitzvah in a specific way, this way and no other, as if it were saying: This shall be your tzitzit, and not other ways that you could think of. If the content of these verses were itself the definition of the concept of 'tzitzit,' then this verse would be unnecessary, since the characteristics (four threads, white and blue, tied to the four corners of the garment) establish the concept of tzitzit and not just direct it. What is the point of saying that this combination shall be our tzitzit, if this is nothing more than a definition with a purely semantic meaning?

The obvious conclusion is that the Torah here does not invent and create the concept of 'tsitzit', but rather commands us to a certain way of performing a familiar action, or creating a familiar object. For example, according to Ibn Ezra's commentary on Atar, 'tsitzit' means a distinctive sign, a kind of miracle and a flag, like 'tsitzit of the head.' Therefore, according to Ibn Ezra, the Torah commands us that the combination defined in these verses is the one that we will have as a tsitzit, that is, as a symbol, and not any other combination.

Ostensibly, we are returning here to the realm of the ta'am din (tema dekra), but precisely in the context of the mitzvah of tzitzit it is easy to see that this is not accurate. As is known, the mitzvah of tzitzit is not a positive mitzvah but a conditional mitzvah,[19] That is, only when wearing a four-winged garment should one wear a tzitzit. Without this garment, there is no obligation to symbolize and distinguish ourselves. Furthermore, from the main point of view, there is no obligation at all to wear a four-winged garment. Therefore, the Torah does not impose on us an obligation to symbolize and mark ourselves with the tzitzit. It only defines that the collection of these components is the symbol (the tzitzit), and if one wears a four-winged garment, then it is obligatory for us to mark ourselves in this way and not otherwise.

In this sense, the question we have asked here is not related to the Tema Dekra, but rather is an intra-halakhic question (which does not concern the relationship between the Halacha and the world outside of it). We are defining the Halachaic concept of 'tzitzit', and not its relationship to an idea or fact that is outside of the Halacha (i.e., to the everyday concept of 'tzitzit'). The claim that the tzitzit is not a collection of its components but rather contains something beyond them, is not directed at the Tema Dekra, but at defining the Halacha from within itself.

In other words: "And you shall have a tzitzit" establishes a relationship between the tzitzit commandment and the everyday concept of tzitzit (symbol). Our accuracy in the fact that even the white one is called a 'tzitzit' deals with another level: the definition of the halachic concept of 'tzitzit'.

In analytical philosophy, a distinction is accepted between constitutive and regulatory systems of law.[20] A constitutive set of rules is a collection of rules that define the domain in question, and hence, anyone who does not act according to these rules is not acting in that domain. For example, the rules of chess define the game of chess. Anyone who plays according to other rules is simply not playing chess but a different game. In contrast, a directed set of rules is a collection of rules that direct activity in an existing domain (but do not establish it). For example, traffic laws do not establish the domain of driving, or walking on public property, but only direct them. Someone who does not act according to traffic laws is indeed breaking the law, but it is correct to say that he is still engaged in driving.

Inspired by this philosophical terminology, we can say that the halakhic definition of the tzitzit does not establish the concept of 'tzitzit', but rather directs it. Whoever does not make tzitzit in the manner defined by the Torah will still engage in the making of tzitzit or its use in the everyday sense (since he still expresses himself through some miracle and tzitzit), but he will not do so correctly. These claims all belong to the nominalist-realist axis, and not to the axis of the reasons for the commandments.

On the intra-halakhic level that we are dealing with (which concerns the question of conventionalism-essentialism), it is said that there are two partial levels of 'incorrect' tzitzit:

• Wearing white without a blue thread is a missing existence, which is still a 'tzitzit' in the halakhic sense.
• Wearing something else (without white and without blue. Or a tassel with fewer threads, or without a knot). This is a 'tzitzit' in the everyday sense, but not a 'tzitzit mitzvah' in the halakhic sense.

Despite the distinction we have presented so far, it is perhaps possible to see a connection between these two levels: if indeed any mitzvah is intentional and not constitutive, then it has a parallel in the world of everyday concepts. In parallel with the halakhic 'tzitzi' there is an everyday 'tzitzi'. In such a situation, it is more likely that the halakhic concept is not the collection of its components but an expression of the everyday concept in the halakhic plane. The everyday concept 'symbol' finds halakhic expression in the tzitzi. In other words, from here it is easier to understand the claim that the halakhic concept 'tzitzi' exists beyond the sum of its components (its halakhic characteristics). This is the halakhic symbol, and its halakhic characteristics are only its attributes. Of course, the opposite is not true: even mitzvahs that have no parallel in the everyday world can have an essentialist nature. In such a case, the halakhic concept would not have an everyday parallel.

Many of the commandments are intuitively perceived by us as prescriptive, and further examination reveals that they are nevertheless intentional. In the next chapter, we will briefly look at another example that will clarify the relationship between the questions and the conclusion regarding halakhic essentialism.

G. Another example: Kiddushin and Girushin

There are cases where an approach to the commandment as a foundational one is required, such as in the laws of marriage. It seems that the Torah concept of marriage is a foundational concept. Anyone who has not done it according to its law is simply not married.[21] But all of this is true in the halakhic sense. The fact that the halakhic rules are prohibitive does not mean that they are constitutive in the everyday sense. It is possible that a man who did not sanctify a woman did indeed marry her, but this does not exist in the halakhic sense and on the level. He is married to her on the realistic level, which is not as the Torah intended. This is perhaps what Maimonides means at the beginning of the Laws of Marriage, when he describes the marriages as they were before the giving of the Torah, and refers to the halakhic marriages as a second level above them.

As stated above, we can conclude from this that an act is also not the collection of components that characterize it (two witnesses, a statement, worth a penny, a wedding, etc.), but rather there is a concept of 'acts' that all of these are characteristics of. The implication is that sometimes an act will have meaning even if it is done incompletely.

The concept of divorce also clearly appears to be a constitutive concept, due to the fact that it is not simply a mitzvah, but rather a halakhic procedure. Whoever wishes to divorce his wife finds himself bound by a defined and precise halakhic procedure. Whoever does not act according to the procedure that appears in the Torah commandments (written and oral) is not a transgressor. He simply did not divorce his wife. Ostensibly, this is precisely the characteristic of a constitutive and undirected law, as we saw above.

Despite the above description, this picture is not so simple.The Education Book, a mitzvah of takkat, 'He who wishes to divorce his wife, may divorce her by a decree,' is written at the end of the words as follows:

And if he transgresses this and divorces his wife and does not write her a divorce decree according to the Torah commandments and according to the matter that our sages, may their memory be blessed, have interpreted this act, and his punishment is very great, since she is judged as a man's wife and he holds her as a divorced woman, and the punishment for a man's wife is known to be one of the more serious offenses in the Torah.

There is a very surprising statement in these words. A husband who divorces his wife in a way that does not apply to divorce commits a crime. We would expect that such a person would not be classified as a criminal, but rather that the law would determine that divorce does not apply in this case, and the wife is still his wife. Education Writes that not only is the divorce invalid, but this person is a criminal.

One might think that the problem lies in the situation created, where a woman is held to be single even though she really is not. Such a situation can lead to transgressions. But it seems clear that this is not the intention. Education, since this is not a crime in itself, but rather a problem that is inherent in the situation that has arisen. In another version, it is said that according to this explanation, such an act may indeed lead to a problem, but it cannot in itself be considered a crime. In the clearest form, it is said that a crime of this type cannot be called an ‘act of nullification’, as expressed by the author Education, and certainly not an actual annulment of a divorce.

Therefore, it seems that you intended Education It is to say that divorce is not a concept that the law establishes. The Torah only directs divorce. The interpretation of these words is that to dismiss a woman does not mean to give her a divorce certificate, but as is accepted in everyday language (and as was customary before the giving of the Torah, see Reish Hilchot Ishut by Maimonides) – to remove her from his home. When a man unlawfully dismisses a woman, it is not correct to say that no divorce was performed here. A divorce was performed here, after all, she left his home, but this divorce was not performed as directed by the Torah.

A husband writes about this. Education Whoever unlawfully divorces his wife has nullified the act of divorce. The conclusion is that the commandment of divorce is indeed a commandment, and not just a procedure. The commandment is that when a man wants to divorce his wife, he must completely free her and allow her to return to the market through a get. If so, the Torah directs divorce and does not establish it.

Now we will go on to say, as an example of what we noted above, that if there is indeed an everyday concept that is equivalent to the halakhic concept, it is reasonable to continue to argue that even from a halakhic perspective, divorce is an idea that is not just the sum of its characteristics. The implication is that there are missing or disabled manifestations of the idea of divorce, and this time at the halakhic level.

Indeed, we certainly find such appearances, and we will briefly address them. It can be shown that when a man dismisses his wife in the everyday sense, that is, removes her from his home, even if he did not give her the divorce decree, this also has halakhic implications. It is not to say that nothing is done here, but rather that there is a situation here of a 'disabled' (partial) divorce.

When a man sets his eyes on his wife to divorce her, he is forbidden to come to her again (see Gittin 20:1, and Nedim 20:2). Likewise, he has no share in her marital assets (see Gittin 17:2–18:1). The Ra'an (on the Rif in Gittin 8:1) and the Ramban (ibid.) raised the possibility that he is also not obligated to pay a fine. These three are rabbinical implications, but the Rashbam expanded on this (Bava Batra Kemo, 2:2, where it says 'she fell on her', and also the author of Wisdom Duration(Parashat Behalotach) who wrote that from this point on he is also not entitled to her inheritance. And the Rashash, in the issue of Baba Batra, added that he is also not obligated to bury her (since she is no longer a 'remnant'). In the Gemara Gitin La, 2b it is explained that a priest who marries a divorced woman is disqualified from working, but from the moment he sets his eyes on the divorced woman (although there one must vow to divorce her) he returns and becomes kasher.[22]

These are all examples of divorces that are carried out without most of the halakhically required conditions, and yet the woman is expelled from many aspects (some of them from Torah). If so, we discover that the concept of divorce is also not just the sum of its characteristics. There are 'disabled' manifestations of the idea of divorce. If a man has expelled a woman with an invalid get, or has removed her from his home without a get at all, she is partially expelled.

This is another example of the connection between the two levels we discussed above: from the realism of the concept of divorce we arrive at its essentialism.

Summary

We began our discussion by analyzing the words of the Maimonides and the Rishonim in Shoresh 11. At the beginning of the discussion, it seemed that two parts of a mitzvah that do not inhibit each other should be considered two different mitzvahs. However, surprisingly, we saw that all the Rishonim were willing to accept a situation in which there are different parts of a mitzvah that do not inhibit each other, and yet they are parts of one mitzvah. We explained this by saying that the existence of each part is a missing existence of the entire mitzvah, in contrast to other situations of parts of a mitzvah that do not inhibit each other, in which the existence of each part has an independent value (a value that is not the same as the value of the overall mitzvah).

We have seen that the initial intuition implied conceptual conventionalism, while the view of the Rishonim apparently hides behind it an essentialist assumption regarding halakhic concepts, and perhaps with regard to concepts in general. As we have seen, the view that a halakhic concept reflects some abstract idea, and that the characteristics only describe it and do not establish it, makes it possible to understand a disabled, or missing, appearance of this idea.

At the end of our discussion, we discussed the connection between the question we were discussing (essentialism-conventionalism) and the question of realism-nominalism. The second question deals primarily with the relationship between halakhah and reality, while the first is an intra-halakhic question. Nevertheless, we saw a possible connection between these two questions, and even demonstrated it in divorce law. If there is indeed an everyday concept that is parallel to the halakhic concept (realism), it is likely that the halakhic concept is not just the sum of its components, but is an idea that exists in itself. Such an idea also has an existence beyond its components, and therefore it can appear (albeit partially, or disabled) when some of them are missing.

[1]        Another example can be seen in my two articles onNoon: 'The Logical Status of the Ways of Discourse', Tzohar 12, Tishrei 5763, pp. 9-22. and 'Induction and Analogy in Halacha', Noon 15, Summer 2013, pp. 23-34.

[2]        See a note on this in Hanina Ben Menachem's article, 'Individuation of Laws and the Book of Mitzvot in the Rambam', Yearbook of Jewish Law, 14-15 (1988-1989), p. 95, at the beginning of Chapter 7.

[3]        With a few exceptions (such as the article mentioned in the previous note, and also the above, 'The Secret of the Foundation of Morality and the Secret of the Torah'), Israeli Law, 22 [5763], p. 177), the vast majority of research and traditional literature dealing with roots concerns the first and second roots, because they have direct halachic implications. For a review of the literature on this subject, see my article in the anniversary book of Rabbi Prof. Nachum Rabinowitz, which is due to be published in the coming year.

[4]        Perhaps with the exception of the 'Aruch Shulchan', which is the only other posak that organized all areas of halakhic law into its fields in a format similar to a codex.

[5]        This number originates from a saying of Rabbi Shmlai, Makot 23:2. Although some Rishonim doubted it (see a review in Rabbi Baruch Brenner's article, 'The Attitude of the Harlabag to the Way of the Maimonides in the Counting of the Commandments', Elevators(Also appears on the Da'at website.)

[6]        It should be noted that except for one place (in the root of Yad, and incidentally also in the root of G), B.H. is not mentioned by name in the roots, but rather as "there is one of our companions who erred in this" and so on. As is known, opinions differ on the identity of B.H., and so on.

[7]         The Ramban's interpretations of this root were printed in the Frankel edition, and in the regular editions they appear (with omissions and distortions) as a continuation of the interpretations of the root ת.

[8]        Rabbi Avraham ben Rambam (hereinafter: Rabbi Avraham), in the answer to the book Miracle work (which is printed at the end of Frankl's edition)The Book of Commandments Maimonides, however, strongly restricts this criterion, since if we go too far, we could end up with a very small number of mitzvot with different purposes.

[9]        Although it can be achieved in a less optimal way with one of them, neither of them hinders the other.

[10]     The second formulation seems more plausible, since in the first formulation we are very close to returning to case 1.

[11]     Rabbi Avraham, in his aforementioned response, writes: "Indeed, they said four commandments in the lulav, and it is known that they are parts of a mitzvah, and the difference between this and their saying in tefillin is two commandments, because the four species in the lulav inhibit each other, and if a way is found to include three of them and the fourth is avoided, it does not exist since a mitzvah is found in them at all. Therefore, the blessing cannot be given only to all of them together, and tefillin are not like that... And consider their statement in tefillin, 'Whoever has two mitzvahs, one mitzvah is not to be performed,' and such a thing should not be said in the lulav, but the ruling is the opposite..."

According to him, the division in the commandment of tefillin is not rooted only in the terminology of the midrash, which calls them "two commandments." The Rambam deduces this from the entire formulation of the Gemara that he cited there: "Where did you get two commandments, one of which is a commandment not to serve?" If there was an incomplete fulfillment of the whole, then there is no room for the Gemara to wonder how we could come up with the idea of not fulfilling one part in the absence of the other. From this, the Rambam proves that the Gemara understood the commandment of tefillin in such a way that the two tefillin do not inhibit each other, not in the sense of 2b, but rather like 2a (and perhaps 1).

[12]       Although, if it were not for the words of the Ramban, it would certainly be possible to learn that the Haggai is like the Rambam, but unlike the Rambam, in his opinion the tefillin are also generalized to one matter. See also Avraham Peintoch, Pikudei Yesharim: Commentaries on the Book of Mitzvot by Maimonides, Jerusalem 1992, on the root 11.

[13]       See Beit Yosef End of sign 22, 6Arm light A sign of a tika in the name of Rabbi Simcha, and in the commentary of Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla on The Book of Commandments for the RSAG, do the 6th. And compare the Rambam's language regarding tefillin (Chapter 4, Halacha 4), where it is clear that in his opinion they do not hinder each other in any case, to his language regarding tzitzit (Chapter 1, Halacha 4), where it seems that they do hinder if indeed both are in his hand.

[14]       For more on this distinction, see my book Two carts and a hot air balloon, Bethel 5762, in the second gate.

[15]       The analytic philosopher Saul Kripke, in his book Names and Necessity (Translated from English by Avishai Raveh, Tel Aviv 1994), metaphorically calls this the 'tableau' of a concept.

[16]       See my articles on this in 'What is a disease?' Noon B, Winter 2006, pp. 71-88. There, as well as in the aforementioned books, one can see examples.

[17]       Although Chapter 3 above is mainly dedicated to showing that this still does not preclude applying an essentialist view to tefillin as well, and saying that they are nevertheless parts of the same mitzvah, in terms of the number of mitzvot they are counted as two.

[18]       The first to apply the basic distinction between these approaches in relation to halakhah is attributed to Yohanan Silman in several articles. For sources and further discussion, see also Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun's article, 'The Quest for Truth versus Halakhic Formalism', Amichai Berholz (ed.), Country, religion and state, Jerusalem 5762, p. 195 (especially in note 2). See also David Haneska's article, 'On the Legal Reality in the Mishnah of Maimonides', Chinese, Tsev (5783), p. 28 (he also links this discussion to the dispute between Maimonides and Ramban in Shoresh Hashani).

[19]       A conditional mitzvah is different from a substantive mitzvah (as opposed to a positive mitzvah). A substantive mitzvah is a mitzvah whose observance is voluntary, while a conditional mitzvah is a mandatory mitzvah, except that the obligation is only in certain circumstances that are not necessarily present. The mitzvah of studying Torah, beyond the morning and evening chapters, is considered by many to be a substantive mitzvah. So is the mitzvah of charity beyond a third of a shekel a year (see Rambam, Mishneh Torah(Laws of Gifts of the Poor, 7:5). However, the mitzvah of tzitzit is a binding mitzvah, if the condition is met that we are wearing a garment with four wings.

[20]       See more about this in my book Human as hay, Kfar Hasidim 2008, pp. 374 ff.

[21]       For example, in a temple, for one person, which is not according to the Halacha requirement.

[22]      In general, it can be said that this is in fact a return to the state of engagement (these are precisely the halakhic implications that distinguish between engagement and marriage). Just as in the construction of a marriage the process consists of two stages: kiddushin (engagement) and marriage, so too the process of dissolution is done in two stages: removal from his house (return to her father's house as in the case of engagement), and then her complete release. Usually this is done all at once through the get, but here we see a case where the stages are separate. To do this partially, is a transfer thatEducation Talking about her.