About Kola and Gumra

With God’s help

A book in honor of Rabbi Sperber – 2014

In the promotion of the moderator

When the editor of the book approached me with a request to write an article in honor of Rabbi Prof. Sperber upon his return to the Oyt, he added that he requested that his portrait be before me while I was writing. It seems to me that this portrait image is closely linked in the eyes of many to the concept of 'kola', and to the tangential (but certainly not overlapping) and no less charged concept of 'changes in Halacha' (or the adaptation of Halacha to the changing reality). As is well known, some people demand that these concepts be condemned, and others demand that they be praised. It seems to me that in this matter, my little ego agrees with Rabbi Prof. Sperber's principled position (even if not always out of agreement with the details), that the situation is more complex and less dichotomous than it is usually presented. Sometimes these concepts must be condemned and sometimes we must demand that they be praised, and the heart (and the Holy One) knows whether to bend or to bend.

In a previous article[1] I have taken preliminary steps on the issue of changes in halakha, and even there some have called for praise and some for condemnation. Anyone who reads my above articles will see that one of the main roots of the dichotomous and superficial approach to these concepts is the lack of a priori study and conceptual clarification. These are very necessary in order to determine a position on any question, and especially on such charged and important questions. In my above articles I proposed an initial systematic-conceptual clarification regarding changes in halakha, a concept that suffers from great ambiguity. It seems to me that this study sheds a different and more complex light on the dilemmas concerning such changes.

I now thought that this appeal constituted an opportunity (which I had been seeking for some time) to do the same with respect to the second concept, the 'kola', and to see where and why we should demand it one way or another. And as I did with the first, so I will do with the second. First, wisdom must be given a priori to define the concept of 'kola' itself, which is also not without ambiguities and ambiguities, and then to deal with questions concerning its application. At the end of my remarks, I will briefly return to the question of the connection between the decision on kola and halakhic change.

Due to the brevity of the material, I will not be able to cover this broad topic here, and therefore I will content myself with sketching a few initial outlines of its character. The sources cited here are not exhaustive, and should be seen as illustrative only.

introduction

In the traditional-halakhic world, the concept of 'kola' often evokes negative connotations. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that it has a place reserved for it in halakhic literature and in the actions of halakhic adjudicators. The negative connotation that accompanies an unfounded kola is not new in the world of halakhic (see Eruvin 6:2: "From the Voices of B"S and from the Voices of B"H - Evil"), but it has become much more intense following the socio-ideological changes that Jewish society has undergone in recent centuries. Criticism and demands for halakhic reforms (in various senses and from different angles) have aroused and continue to arouse a defensive instinct in the central halakhic establishment.

On the one hand, there is a feeling that the place of the kola is almost absent today in public halakhic discourse. There are many demands for leniency 'from below', but relatively little compliance 'from above'. But on the other hand, these same demands for change and leniency sometimes assume that the poskim can do with the halakhah as they please. The general impression that emerges from them is that almost all halakhic guidelines are nothing more than local whims of various poskim, and an unwillingness to follow the kola. This picture is no less distorted, and I think it is also based in part on the same conceptual ambiguity mentioned above.

This article attempts to contribute something to clarifying this loaded and vague concept, thereby dispelling some of the fog that surrounds some of the discussions about it.

A. What is cola?

introduction

The first question I would like to address is the very definition of the concept. What exactly is a 'kola'? Is a kola the ruling that is more convenient for the questioner, or for the posek (the one for which the lowest 'price' is paid)? How was this 'price' determined? For example, it is said of Rabbi Yekutiel Yehuda Halberstam, the previous Rebbe of Sanz-Klausenburg, who sat in the sukkah even when it rained (despite the exemption of 'regret'), since from his perspective it was more regrettable not to be in the sukkah on a holiday. If such a person were to doubt the rabbinic authority that he must go to the kola, is his kola the yeshiva in the sukkah or to get rid of the yeshiva? In contrast, the previous Lubavitcher Rebbe did not sleep in the sukkah on a holiday, on the grounds that sleeping in the sukkah with the surrounding light causes him grief. We see that there are Jews for whom comfort is precisely fulfilling the mitzvah, from their perspective, is going to the kola an obligation to fulfill the mitzvah or to get rid of it?

This question can be resolved by ignoring the opinions of these Rebbes for every person, and the concepts of 'kola' and 'humra' are determined according to the reasonable person, who certainly does not treat it this way. If we accept this, the question moves to the psychological level: Why does the reasonable person really see not sitting in the sukkah as kola and not as humra? But here I would like to address the question from the essential aspect: Why is it really kola? Why does the halakha itself see it this way? Is this just psychology, or is there a more essential definition here?

About voices that seem to be serious

To clarify matters, let us look at a passage from a story that is presented at the end of the first volume of the Brisk Haggadah, from Beit Levi (edited by M. M. Goerlitz), Jerusalem, 1983, 1984:

During one of Maran Baal Beit Halevi's visits to the city of Minsk, one of the city's wealthiest and most influential men, who was among the Maskilim sect, entered and suggested to him that the time had come for the great rabbis of the generation to try to ease the strict laws a little, and that through this, those who had strayed from the path of the Torah would surely come closer again.

The owner of the Halevi house smiled and revealed to the offeror the honorable offer, because in fact he himself is one of the rabbis who has for ages been very lenient in many laws…

"Like the merchants who do not immediately offer all their wares," replied the owner of the Levite's house, "I too will offer you seven examples, and these will testify to the rest of my goods"...:

• Some are strict in that the time for evening prayer is only until midnight and then it is impossible to pray. I have decided to be lenient, praying until the dawn pillar rises.
• There are those who are strict about tefillin, saying that one must be held in Hasidism in order to put them on. And I have decided that it is permissible for everyone to put them on.
• Some are strict about not saying piyyutim in the middle of prayer because of the interruption in prayer. I have decided to be lenient in that it is permissible to say them.
• Some are strict about not studying on the eve of Tisha B'Av, which happens to be on Shabbat. However, I have decided to be lenient, allowing even the basics of halacha to be studied.
• Some people are strict about not fasting on Rosh Hashanah. I decided to ease my restrictions.
• Some are strict about not driving for two days. I decided to make it easier by fasting for two days.
• There are strict ones who say that if one forgets to count the Omer one night, he cannot count it again with a blessing. And I have made it easy for him to count with a blessing.

We can only speculate on the reaction of that 'educated' to hearing these 'voices'. But here we are not concerned with the stories of 'educated people', but with the interesting halakhic angle that emerges here. In the halakhic context, we can ask why these are really not voices? Why is the feeling that arises in us one of irony, a joke, or a rejection of the straw? After all, the Baal Beit Halevi did indeed permit what others forbade. So why are these not voices? Or are they really real voices? It does not seem that there is only a problem of hostile 'educated people' here, since the author of the aforementioned Haggadah himself also brings the story as an anecdote. If these were ordinary voices, then what did he find in this story? Apparently, there is nothing here but a collection of voices, and nothing more.

Is the definition of kula related to a conflict of interest between us and the law?

The intuitive feeling is that we are supposedly standing 'opposite' the Halacha, and therefore the Halacha interest is always a matter of importance, and our interest (=comfort) is a Kola. Is this really the basis for the definition of Kola?

To understand that this is not the case, let us look at the laws of blessings. The rule in halakha is that in doubt about blessings, one should go to the kola (see Berachot 21:1, and in the poskim). Now we must ask ourselves what it means to make the blessing easier? Is the kola the one who can recite the blessing without hesitation, or is the kola the one who does not recite the blessing? Despite the disagreements on this matter, all poskim agree that the kola is not to recite the blessing. That is, if a person holds an apple in his hand and does not remember whether he blessed or not, he is prohibited from reciting the blessing. The Gemara attributes this to the rabbinic rule of doubt about the kola, meaning that this instruction is entitled to the title of 'kola.' Why is it really a kola? Apparently, it is a grave matter, since it prohibits us from doing something. Another possibility is that it would be permissible to recite the blessing, or that it is obligatory to recite the blessing. The obligation to recite the blessing is also a grave matter, since it obligates us to do something. Therefore, we would expect the kola to be here that it is permissible to recite the blessing but not obligatory. Apparently, this suggests that in the Gemara itself, not only in the 'evil wise men', the kola is not to perform the mitzvah. Hence, a kola, like Kola 7 of Baal Beit HaLevi It is indeed not Coke.

Further observation reveals that blessings are a more complex case, because if we were to permit a blessing, such a command would have the cost of a blessing that is not required, which is prohibited because "you shall not carry" (the poskim disagreed whether its prohibition is from the Torah, or whether it is a rabbinical prohibition and the verse is only a reference). If so, the rule that is doubtful of blessings to be lenient means that we are not obligated to bless, not that we are prohibited from blessing. Rather, a blessing that we are not obligated to bless is prohibited because "you shall not carry." If so, there is a caveat here in the law of blessings, but a caveat in the law of "you shall not carry." Indeed, some poskim hold that the prohibition of a blessing that is not required is not from the Torah, and therefore they permit a blessing in such a situation, since it is a doubtful rabbinical prohibition.[2]

The conclusion that emerges from this picture is that the decision to pronounce a blessing in doubt means that one must not pronounce a blessing, and not that one is forbidden to pronounce a blessing. The prohibition to pronounce a blessing is a graver and not a kola, it is the result of a graver in the law of "You shall not bear." This means that the decision to pronounce a kola opens up to us the most options, to pronounce a blessing or not to pronounce a blessing. Just because there is also a prohibition here on a blessing that is not necessary, the kola in the law of blessings leads to a prohibition on pronouncing a blessing. But this prohibition is not a direct result of the lenient decision, but rather a side effect of it. There is a kola in the law of blessings, and a graver in the law of "You shall not bear."[3]

Cola is the opening of the most options

We see that the definition of kola is not the most convenient solution for a person (=not to bless). Even for a person who is inclined to bless, the decision that one does not have to bless is kola. Why? Because the decision that does not require blessing opens up more options for us than the other two decisions, and therefore it is defined here as kola. Once the options are open, each person will decide between them according to his inclination. The Rebbe of Klausenburg would probably have blessed (if it were not for the prohibition "do not carry"), and other people who are less eager to fulfill the commandments would have foregone the blessing even if a blessing that is not required were permitted.

In conclusion, the definition of a lenient decision is a decision that allows for more halachic options, meaning that it imposes fewer restrictions on us. Whether it is options to comply or options not to comply. Opening options for performance is just as important as opening options for omission (= failure to act).

If we now return to the story of the Levite, surprisingly, our conclusion is that it is indeed a list of votes. In all these cases, it is crucial thatpermitted For a person to bless, or to pray, and not for him Must To do so. These are votes that enable performance and not omission, but as mentioned, these are also votes, since they open up options that would be prohibited in alternative jurisprudence. The reason why such votes are not popular with those who stand 'opposite' the halakha is that if there is indeed an option to fulfill the mitzvah, it is likely that God expects us (and perhaps even commands us) to do so. But as we saw in the context of the laws of blessings, here too this is a side effect, and not a direct consequence of the decision to vote.

In passing, we would like to note that a situation in which more options are open to us is indeed more comfortable for us, even on a psychological level. Not necessarily because we like not to perform a mitzvah, but because the absence of restrictions is indeed a kola on the objective level. This does not stem from the fact that we see ourselves as standing 'opposite' the halakhah, meaning that our interests are in conflict with its own. As we have seen, sometimes the options that open up actually allow us to perform a mitzvah, and yet it is a kola. The decision of what to do with the options that open up to us following the decision to kola is what reflects our spiritual inclination. But this belongs to the psychological sphere of the discussion. The classification of the decision itself as a kola is not related to this matter, and is entirely in the objective halakhic sphere.

Separation between two planes of reference

In light of the picture we have presented here, a distinction must be made between two levels of reference: 1. Presentation of the possible halakhic options. 2. Choosing between them. The naive perception of the ruling on the voice attributes it to the second level. According to this perception, the posak is supposed to choose for the questioner the step of "Mikel" (which is more convenient for him), and hence the bewilderment over the voices of the owner of the Levite House arises. However, in light of what we have said here, this is not the role of the posak. The posak is supposed to present to the questioner the full range of legitimate halakhic options, and it is the questioner who decides which one to choose. The characterization of the decision as a voice only concerns the first level of the discussion, and not the second. After the options have been presented, it is the questioner himself, the recipient of the halakhic ruling, who must choose between them. He does so according to his inclinations, his spiritual level, his inclinations, his convenience, or any other consideration. Here, the posak can at most serve as an advisor or a recommender. Choosing the easier/more convenient option is a matter for the questioner, and it does not mean a halachic decision for the vote.

In other words, the characterization of 'kola' does not refer to operative steps (which is what Level 2 deals with) but to norms (which is what Level 1 deals with). When we rule on the question of kola without a doubt, this does not mean that the operative step is the easiest (=not to bless), but rather that the norms do not apply (=there is no obligation to bless), and thus more options open up for the questioner. Kola is concerned with deciding whether a norm, whether it is true or not, is present in the situation in question. The absence of a norm (of either type) opens up more legitimate options, and is therefore considered a kola. Below we will see some additional implications of this conclusion.

B. Deciding to vote in times of need

To the very problem

There are halachic rules that teach us permission to go to the koula in situations of doubt. For example, a rabbinic doubt about the koula. But there are other situations in which poskim teach instructions to the koula, due to a time of stress or great need. Already in the Shas we find rulings such as "it is advisable for Rabbi Shimon to be trusted in times of stress" and more.[4]

Such a form of decision is very problematic on its face. If indeed the halakha instructs us to act in a way A, how can we instruct someone in a time of need to do B? Is it permissible to commit offenses in a time of need? For example, when a woman comes to the rabbi with a question about eating a slaughtered chicken, the rabbi sees that the woman is in a difficult financial situation and allows himself to be lenient and allow her to eat the chicken. Now the question arises: If he indeed holds that this is the gist of the law, he should have always permitted it for everyone. But if he holds the opinion that this chicken is eating, then we have not found that prohibitions on eating and eating prohibitions are permitted in a time of need. Why, then, does he allow himself to be lenient? There is an assumption here that the mere existence of another opinion, or another side (see below on the difference between these two), even though he does not hold the same opinion, allows him to be lenient in a time of need. This requires explanation.

Let's take another example from a Talmudic source. In the Babylonian Shabbat, 5:1, a dispute is brought up regarding the laws of the mukta:

And a rabbi like Rabbi Yehuda agreed with him? And they said to him, "What is the reason for the shaking of the shraga, the shruga, from my friends on Shabbat?" And he said to him, "My blood is pure." - I am in a time of distress. Then Rav Kahana and Rav Ashi said to the rabbi, "How did you go?" - He said to him, "Rabbi Shimon is such that one can rely on him in a time of distress."

There is a disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding the law of muktze. In this issue, it is stated that the Amora Rav ruled that muktze is prohibited. Now a question arises regarding a Hanukkah candle that is muktze: is it permissible to shake it in front of my 'friends' (= gentiles who have decreed that Israel should not light a Hanukkah candle). A Rav who rules as Rabbi Yehuda permits shaking the candle in front of my friends because of a time of need. Is the prohibition of muktze permitted in times of need? Rabbi Yehuda himself, who prohibits muktze, apparently does not permit this. However, a Rav allows himself to permit it, because it is better for a Rabbi to rely on him in times of need. The fact that there is a mitigating opinion allows him to act in times of need, even though he himself does not rule in such a way.

This picture raises the difficulty we described above. According to a Rabbi, who believes as Rabbi Yehuda does, there is a prohibition of a muktaza here. Why does the fact that there is a different opinion, that of R. Sh., allow him, even though he holds the opposite opinion, to be lenient in a time of need? Any other rabbinical prohibition, about which there is no dispute, would not be rejected in such a situation. So why, in the opinion of someone who believes that there is a rabbinical prohibition of a muktaza, is the situation here not like a regular rabbinical prohibition? On the other hand, if R. Sh.'s opinion is also correct, then why don't we always rule like him?

The Rema controversy and those who disagree with it

In the Responsa of Mahary Mintz, Kraka, 1842, 15th century, he writes:

As for the question of the tax on the Sabbath = after the Sabbath = the rich know that the rich are better off than the poor on the Sabbath and the poor all the days of the year. And sometimes you will find a genius who prohibits something against his opinion for some reason or reason, but his opinion is inclined to be a complete permit. So if a matter comes to him and the questioner is poor, or if he is poor and close to the Sabbath, even if he is rich, the honor of the Sabbath is judged by the poor and he permits him, and from the rabbinical tradition it is customary to tell them the reason for this is because of his poverty and for this because of the honor of the Sabbath, so that they will not be surprised that sometimes he prohibits and sometimes he permits.

The Rema, who is known for several voices cited in his books of rulings,[5] He quotes the words of Maharishi Mintz in the introduction to his book, Torat Hatat, Piatrakov, 1954, and writes as follows:

And here I will excuse myself with one thing that the reader will not suspect, and that is that sometimes I wrote to make it easier for a great loss or for a poor person in an important matter or in honor of Shabbat, and that is because in those places it seemed to me that there was complete permission according to the law, only that the latter, the late, made the matter more severe. Therefore, I wrote that where it is not possible, the matter should be placed on its own judgment. And so we find in Kamai and Tarai Da'badi Hi. And Mahar"i Mintz wrote in his response, 6:15, that all weekdays and the rich on Shabbat eves are equal, and from the rabbinical tradition it is customary to tell them that the reason is one because of the poor and the other because of the honor of Shabbat, so that they will not be surprised that sometimes I forbid and sometimes I permit.

The Rema and the Rabbi Mintz explain that the exemptions in times of distress and poverty, or on Shabbat eve out of respect for Shabbat (even for the wealthy), are only permitted in cases where they are permitted according to the principle of the law, but for some reason they were accustomed to be stricter.

It follows from this that there is no room for a halakhic ruling in the place of necessity that is prohibited by law. Only here is it permitted by the principle of the law, but it is customary to be strict, where there is room for leniency in times of urgency or due to great necessity. It seems that this is a new system in halakhic law, and it seems that most poskim do not accept it.

It is important to understand that according to the Rema's approach, when we see a statement such as "It is fitting for a Rabbi to rely on him in times of stress," we should actually conclude that the law is according to the Rabbi, but that there is a side reason to proceed more strictly according to the method of Rabbi Yehuda. A responsible book of rulings was supposed to bring the opinion of the Rabbi into the law in such a case, and write that a person with a soul should take it more seriously (when possible). However, a study of the issues and poskim shows that this is generally not the case. The aforementioned Shabbat issue writes in the commentary that Rabbi Poske likes Rabbi Yehuda, but he leniently refers to the Rabbi in times of stress (because of my friends). This is also how Rashi writes there in the commentary: "In times of stress – danger, but not in times of stress – forbidden."[6]

In such issues, there can be three possible rulings: one can rule as Rabbi Yehuda and comment that in times of need there is room for leniency. One can rule as Rabbi Yehuda without any additional comment (this is indeed what the poskim do in the issue of Shabbat 5:1).[7] And we can rule as Rabbi R., and comment that it is appropriate to be stricter as Rabbi Yehuda (this is what we would expect from his friends regarding the Rema's approach).

Although in the issue of Berakhot 9:1 we find a different example. The Gemara there discusses whether it is possible to recite the Kash of an Arabic prayer near the dawn (after the dawn pillar has risen):

Here I thought that Rabbi Acha bar Hanina said, "Rabbi Shimon ben Yochi says on behalf of Rabbi Akiva: The times when a person recites the Shema twice a day, once before sunrise and once after sunrise, and fulfills his obligation, one of the day and one of the night." This is a real question! You said that a person recites the Shema twice a day, but before sunrise it is morning, and I say: He fulfills his obligation, one of the day and one of the night, but it is night! No, it is always morning, and if it is night, then it is night - so that a woman does not fish at that hour. Rabbi Acha bar Rabbi Hanina said, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The law is according to Rabbi Shimon who said on behalf of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Zira said: Provided that he does not say, "We lay down." For it was said by Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef: Rabbi Acha bar Rabbi Hanina, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said, not in the sense of Itamar, but in the sense of Itamar. This is a pair of rabbis who were drunk in the eloquence of the words of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, with whom Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Rabbi Shimon is worthy of being relied upon in times of need.

There is a saying here by the Rashbi in the name of the Rabbi that one can recite the Kash of the evening prayer before sunrise (without lying down, because this is not the time to go to bed). Then Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef comes along and claims that the words of Rabbi Acha bar Hanina were spoken implicitly, that it is a good idea for a Rabbi to rely on in times of need.

Things are very difficult, because in the issue of Shabbat we saw that the statement "It is fitting that the Rabbis should be relied upon in times of distress" means that there is no halakha like it except in times of distress. Ostensibly, from the issue of blessings, it is proven to the Hadith, as stated by Mahari Mintz and the Rema, that when we make concessions in times of distress, it is based on the fact that this is the halakha from the main point of view.

A look at the poskim on this issue shows that they brought the halacha here as a halacha for a time of need. But one should pay attention to the wording of Maimonides, Halacha 1:1, who wrote:

One who recites the Shema of the evening prayer after the dawn pillar has risen before sunrise has not fulfilled his obligation unless he was forced, such as drunk or sick, and the like. A forced person who recites at this time does not say, "We have laid down."

Whoever recites the Ka'sh of an Arabic prayer after the dawn prayer has not fulfilled his obligation. In other words, the halacha is certainly not like the Rashi, but in times of need there is room for leniency like that.[8] This is a view that is in direct opposition to the opinion of the Rema cited above, according to which one should not be lenient where this is not the main rule.

Also in the Shulchan Orach, the Si' Rella HaD quoted the words of Maimonides. But in the Mt. B., the same Sakal wrote:

It did not come out, etc. – If the Torah was recited while you were lying down until dawn, because some people still fished for it, because it was not possible to do so, the Sages nullified the commandments of the Lord from him because he was so late and did not fulfill his obligation by reciting it again:

He sees this as a fine imposed by the Sages. That is, from the principle of the law, it is truly the time of the Qash of the evening prayer, and therefore there is room for leniency in times of stress. And what he did not do was only because the Sages fined someone who recites at such a time outside of times of stress. So, we returned to the words of the Rema above, that indeed leniency should be imposed during times of stress only where this is permitted from the principle of the law. Here too, it is permitted from the principle of the law to recite the Qash of the evening prayer after the dawn pillar, and what he did not do was only because of a fine imposed by the Sages. The leniency imposed by the Rashi during times of stress teaches that the same rule would indeed apply even outside of times of stress (if not for the fine).

In conclusion, the Rema and the Rabbi Mintz present a rather rigid thesis regarding vocalizations during times of stress. Only where the principle of the law permits it and what we are stricter about is for some side reason, is there room for vocalizations during times of stress. Where the act is prohibited by the principle of the law, it will also be prohibited during times of stress. We noted that in the Sugiyot and Rambam and other Rishonim (and also in the words of the Rema himself) this does not seem to be the case. For example, in the Sugiyot of Shabbat Ma'a, it seems that vocalization during times of stress is against the principle of the law.

As an anecdote that illustrates the other side of the coin, we will cite here a well-known story about the Rabbi of Brisk (= the Rabbi of Brisk), who was known to be a very strict rabbi (as was the custom of the House of Brisk), and he was seen drinking water outside the Sukkah. As is well known, in the Shulchan Aruch (O'Haq, 33:12) it appears that one who fears God will be strict and will not even drink water outside the Sukkah. When asked to explain this, he replied that he was not one of the strict rabbis at all. All he does is so that there is no concern that he has not fulfilled his obligation according to some halakhic opinion. But he does not consider himself to be of the appropriate level to do an act that is generally defined as a grave act. Here we see the mirror image of the Rema: the Rema was lenient only where it is permitted by law, and the Rabbi of Brisk was strict only where there is a system that it is forbidden by law. He did not practice a grave act that is pure grave act.

The attitude towards the laws of spiky: spiky dervish

The Rema's approach resolves the puzzle presented above. There we asked: If this is the gist of the law, why does the fact that there is a mitigating opinion change our approach? For someone who rules as Rabbi Yehuda, there is a muktesha prohibition, and ordinary rabbinical prohibitions are not rejected in the face of a friend's concern. So why does the fact that there is a dissenting opinion allow us to be lenient in times of stress? According to the Rema, it really doesn't matter at all. Only if we rule as Rabbi Yehuda primarily, is there room for lenience like him in times of stress. Someone who rules as Rabbi Yehuda has no possibility of lenienting like Rabbi Yehuda, even in times of stress.

But as we have seen, in this issue and among the jurists, a different picture emerges. According to them, the mere fact that there is opinion B allows even someone who rules according to opinion A to leniently in times of need. This is not similar to a situation where there is no other opinion, in which case the prohibition would not be rejected even in times of need.

Of necessity, there is a perception here that the existence of different opinions undermines the strength of our hold on our opinion. If I rule like Rabbi Yehuda that there is a muktza, but there is an opinion of R. S. that there is no muktza, then in my opinion too, the prohibition of a muktza is easier and there is room for leniency. It is important to understand that this is not about the laws of spikot. It is not correct to say that where there are two opinions, I am in doubt, because if this were the case, we would have to follow the laws of spikot: in the rabbinate for the Kula and in the Torah for the Chumara.[9] I have no doubt, as I have my own position on the issue at hand, and yet I am allowed to make concessions in times of need.

To address this question, we must delve into the basics of halakhic rulings and their implications, and there is no room here to dwell on this. Here we will only offer an initial direction that allows us to understand this problematic picture. The posak to whom the question comes says to the questioner: Indeed, this is my opinion, but you could have asked another posak whose opinion is different, and you are allowed to rely on his opinion. If so, at least in times of stress, it is the posak's duty to reveal to the questioner that there are also opinions other than his. According to this proposal, the decision to vote is not his decision, but rather an evasion of the decision and reliance on the opinion of another posak. It is possible that this could be regarded as the questioner's decision, and not the posak's.

Similarly, we found the following in Rabbi Shaz Auerbach, Responsa Minchat Shlomo, Jerusalem, 1986, Ch. 344, where he discusses the purchase of Shebiit fruit from a grocer who relies on the "sales permit":

Even the KTS in the Hayyid 67 A.A.G., who knew nothing of the Mebit, referred to his words and even added some evidence to them and wrote that he practices prohibition in some way, either because he is a person who practices prohibition, or because he adheres to the system of those who prohibit, it is permissible for him to give his share to someone who practices permission, and there is no reason for this to be done in front of a person, and no reason for him to be an accomplice to those who commit a crime, since his friend also knows that there are prohibitions, but he practices as one who permits. And I also conclude from the KTS in the 25th chapter that the one who gives it believes that it is certainly forbidden, and in his opinion, the one who permits is only mistaken, even though he is a minister. And the KTS who cites from the Sha'am that he wrote in the 7th chapter of the 12 (He who practices the rest, and there is no restriction in this, nor any pre-emption) and wrote, "Since we see that the hour has been postponed from the beginning, we will stand by our words, which the Lord has enlightened and revealed to us in this matter," etc. And it is explained in the Talmud that it permits even when the Torah prohibits it. Aisha, and according to the opinion of the rabbis, which is only from the rabbis, it is possible that the Sha'am, which is in the book of the Law of Moses, to be stricter, is only with regard to smoking on the Sabbath, according to those who forbid it, because it is not equal for every soul, it is forbidden from the Torah, but according to the rabbis, it is possible that the example is that the late Moshe D'Shri agrees.

He writes that even in a Torah prohibition, where there are two opinions, the stricter is permitted to give something that is forbidden in his opinion to the one who follows the opinion of the lenient. In other words, this is not a matter of the laws of spikot, because in the laws of spikot we would have to be stricter. This is a matter of departing from my position and recognizing that there are other opinions.

Up to this point, his discussion has dealt with the leadership of an individual. Now he continues and adds an implication regarding the attitude of jurists:

And I think that the one who comes to ask is two sages, one forbidding and one permitting, since it is not at all that the scribes followed Michael, as stated in the Book of Common Prayer, 77, page 7, a. It appears that even if the forbidder stands and shouts like a hawk at the one who permits that he is wrong, if the one who permits is also a sage who has reached a teaching, it seems that if, after the debate between the forbidder and the permitter is over, the questioner returns again and asks them how I should behave, it appears that the forbidder also has to tell him that it is not at all that the scribes followed Michael.

Apparently, this is exactly as we said. However, here he says this only with regard to rabbinical law, and it means that this is not the case in Torah law. For some reason, it seems that here he treats this situation as doubtful, and this is not as we suggested above. However, it seems that this is true only for his own system. However, according to the same line of thought, it seems that the KTS itself, who himself states that his opinion was different, would have instructed the ruling sage to present to the questioner also the position of one who permits even in a Torah prohibition. And these are our words above. It is possible that the author of the Menashash followed the path of the Rema, who took the view that one should not be lenient where, in my opinion, the principle of the law is that the matter is prohibited. However, the KTS apparently followed the second path, and his opinion is that one should be lenient even here, where my opinion is to prohibit from the law.

Although all of this deals with rulings in normal situations, and not necessarily in times of stress, and this is the innovation of the Manash. But we can certainly learn from this that at least in times of stress it is possible to treat in this way, and this is the basis for the possibility of leniency where there is a dispute.

Meaning: What is 'cola'?

It should be noted that this picture is a direct result of the separation of the levels of discussion that we discussed in the first chapter. We saw there that a decision to the voice is a presentation of a broader set of options to the questioner. We also saw that the choice between them is the matter of the questioner, and not of the arbiter (who can only recommend what to choose). Here too, we see that in times of stress, the arbiter is tasked with presenting the questioner with the full range of options, and leaving the choice to him. Furthermore, this is the meaning of a decision to the voice. In times of stress, opinions that the arbiter does not agree with can also be seen as legitimate opinions, and therefore the number of legitimate options open here increases. We emphasize that the ruling on the kollah allows the questioner who so desires (such as the Levitical House, or the Rebbe of Klausenburg) to be stricter, and not necessarily more lenient. As we have seen, a ruling on the kollah is a presentation of more possible options, whether the additional options are lenient or stricter. The choice between them is not the matter of the posk but of the questioner, and it is not related to the question of deciding on the kollah.

The relationship to the laws of solvency: ordinary solvency

So far we have dealt with the spiqa darbuwata, that is, a situation in which there are two opinions. But there is also room to wonder about the decision to vote in a time of need in a situation where there is no disagreement among the poskim, but I myself am in doubt, halakhically or factually.

Apparently, there was a place to learn this from the Koch: if a posek is permitted to be lenient when he himself is not in doubt (in a spikah darbuvata), then the Koch is permitted to be lenient in times of need when he himself is in doubt (even in a doubt from the Torah, which in principle the law required him to be strict about).

On the other hand, according to the Rema and his party, the ability to lenient is only where it is possible from the principle of the law. But in a doubt from the Torah, there is no possibility from the principle of the law to lenient, since we are obligated to go to the extreme. Furthermore, even according to the other opinions regarding the Kola, which allow lenient even where it is prohibited from the principle of the law, in light of what we have said above, the possibility of lenient is based on departing and opening the stage to another opinion. But when there is no rabbi with a different position, the obligation to decide falls on him, and therefore here, seemingly, there is no room for lenienting in a doubt from the Torah.

But in halakhic literature we find quite a few voices in these types of doubtful situations. For example, when the Rema makes it permissible to sleep on Sukkot inside one's home (see Si' Terlat 52) or to light a Hanukkah candle inside one's home (see Si' Tera'a 57-8), he is not relying on the existence of extenuating opinions, but rather is teaching halakhic in times of need because of aspects he himself has that make it permissible.[10]

This can be explained as follows: When we are in doubt, we are subject to the rules of decision that are intended for situations of doubt, such as the rule that in Torah one must be stricter and in Darban one can go to the koola.[11] And what if we find another way to decide a question? In such a situation, we are not in doubt at all, and in any case we are not obligated to act according to the rules of decision in spikot. The story of Rabbi Yehonatan Eybshitz is well-known, in which the priest asked him why we Jews do not act like Christians, since we are the majority, and it is written in the Torah, "follow the majority to incline"? Rabbi Yehonatan answers that the obligation to follow the majority is a rule of decision in spikot, and therefore it is valid only for those who are in a state of doubt. Those who are not in a state of doubt are not obligated to act according to the rules of decision in spikot.[12]

To illustrate the distinction between the rules of conduct in doubt and the rules of sedition, let us take an example in the opposite direction. There is an Amoraic system that states that the rabbis are correct (see Yevamot 32 and parallels). According to this system, presumption is useful even in a situation where two groups of witnesses are in conflict. Rabbi A. B. Wasserman, in his book Kovetz Shiurim, Tel Aviv, 1964, 22:88, asks why presumption is useful in a situation where even two witnesses would not be useful (after all, there are about a hundred)? He answers that presumption is not evidence but a rule of decision in situations of doubt. According to this system, presumption is a state of absolute doubt. In such a situation, two witnesses cannot add anything, since two witnesses are additional evidence, and in evidence we have accepted that presumption is a state of doubt. But presumption is not evidence but a rule that instructs us how to act in situations of doubt, and therefore if presumption is a state of doubt, then in that case too we must follow presumption.[13]

Now we can ask, what is the nature of the rule that in times of stress, one can be relieved in a situation of doubt? Is it a rule of conduct, or a rule of resolution (and perhaps it is a third type: a rule that is 'as if it were resolved'). If in times of stress, one is permitted to go to the right, meaning that all options are legitimate, then now we are not in doubt, since we have no doubt which option is correct. In such a situation, all options are correct. Therefore, here the rules of conduct in situations of doubt do not apply. We have learned that at least if we perceive differently from the opinion of the Rema, meaning that we allow relief in situations of doubt because we recognize both ways as legitimate rulings, then there is room for relief in situations of doubt. The reason for this is that when both ways are legitimate, this is not a situation of doubt, but a situation of "servant as master servant and servant as master servant" (see Shavuot 44b, and Berechot 27a, and in the aforementioned articles in Meishrim), and therefore the rule of doubt from the Torah to the grave does not apply here. After the doubt has been resolved, there is no need to act according to the laws of spikot.

And what does the Rema think? It is possible that here he agrees with the opinion of those who disagree with him, and he also agrees that the rule of going to the koula should be viewed as a general rule as if it were a slander. In his opinion, this rule does not allow one to act against the principle of the law, but where there is doubt about the principle of the law, it is possible that he too would agree that in times of need it is permissible to go to the koula.

A note on the binary nature of Halacha

The entire discussion thus far has assumed a binary view of Halacha, according to which every act is either forbidden or permitted, and there are no intermediate situations. But it is certainly possible to think of a different model of Halacha determination, and for the sake of brevity here I will only comment on it.

There is room to see the halakha as composed of different considerations for each side, and the decision is a decision on how to weigh these reasons against each other. There are nine reasons for being pure and nine for being impure, and ultimately the posk is supposed to decide which of them prevails.

For example, in recent Shabbat laws, a distinction is made between two types of ‘return’ prohibitions. There is a prohibition against picking food from waste, which is a rabbinical prohibition. It is understandable that the reason for the prohibition is the fear that one might pick waste from food. However, there is also room to understand that such an act contains certain dimensions of the work of a reaper, which, while not strong enough to prohibit it from the Torah, there is room to expand the work of a reaper and prohibit it from the rabbinical. According to this view, picking food from waste is 70% of picking from the Torah, and therefore it does not exceed the threshold of a Torah prohibition, but the rabbis expand and lower the threshold of the harvest prohibition, and include within it also picking food from waste. In contrast, the prohibition against riding a horse lest it tear a zmora, is a renewed rabbinical prohibition. There is no room to see here an expansion by the rabbinical (or lowering of the threshold) of the work of a reaper, since there is no form of work of a harvest here. This is certainly a renewed prohibition, and not a 70% of harvesting.

We have learned that various actions are not always examined according to a binary scale, forbidden or permitted. Some of them may be on a continuum between 0 and 1, and the threshold must be determined beyond which the thing is forbidden by the Torah. Below which it is sometimes forbidden by the rabbis.[14]

Accordingly, when the Rema writes that he is lenient only in acts that are permitted by law, it is possible that he intended to say this also regarding ordinary doubt (and not only in spikka darbuwata). His argument is that the votes are legitimate only in situations in which the act is prohibited due to some dimensions of prohibition that it contains, which are not sufficient to exceed the threshold of prohibition on the pure halakhic level. Therefore, initially, one should be strict, but in times of urgency, there is room for lenience.

This reasoning is also valid for ordinary spikahs, and not only for spikah darbuwata. The possibility of leniency does not require the existence of other opinions, but is sufficient for the existence of additional parties to leniency. It is possible that even in situations of spikah darbuwata (a situation in which other opinions exist), the permission to leniency is based on the fact that the existence of a dispute is an indication of the existence of parties to leniency in this prohibition (i.e., that it is not an unambiguous prohibition).

This topic is of course very broad, and despite its clear connection to the subject under discussion, it requires a discussion of its own, and for that reason.

C. Ambiguous situations: Coke versus a minimum price consideration

introduction

In this chapter, I would like to briefly discuss ambiguous situations, that is, situations in which it is difficult to define what instruction will be considered a serious matter, and what is a slur.

Pathological situations: asymmetry between cola and substance

The first example is found in the issue of Ketuvot 15:2, where we find a discussion about the majority in the case of an abandoned baby:

In person: He found a baby thrown away, if most of the idolaters - idolaters, if most of Israel - Israel, half upon half - Israel;

The Gemara states that in a situation where a baby is abandoned and its origin is unknown, its status is determined by the environment in which it is found: if there is a majority of Israel – it is considered Israel, and if there is a majority of Gentiles – it is considered a Gentile. If there is half on half – it is in a state of doubt, and one must go to the humara in the Torah. Later in the issue, we discuss various nec's, which are decided according to the rules of spikkot (for the kola in the rabbinate and the humara in the Torah). A question may arise here as to what one should do regarding Talmud Torah, or observing Shabbat? In both of these obligations, there is a situation in which a Jew is obligated (and not only permitted) to do them, and a Gentile is prohibited (and not only not obligated). Therefore, regarding these two questions, there is no solution at all that is either kola or humara, since every halachic decision has a halachic price. There is no 'sure' decision here, which can be seen as 'humara'.

What gives rise to the difficulty here? It is generally accepted to think that a solution to a homura is a solution without a halakhic cost. For example, in the matter of reviving him, either there is an obligation to revive him (on Shabbat) or there is not. In this case, a decision to a homura means that there is an obligation to revive him. Such a decision is a homura because there is no halakhic cost to it (at most, we revived someone to whom we did not owe it). But in a situation where each of the two possible decisions involves a prohibition (=halakhic cost) if we are wrong, it is difficult to define what is kula and what is homura.

In a certain sense, the question of blessings is also like this: on the one hand, there is an obligation to recite the blessing of the blessed. On the other hand, there is a prohibition to recite a blessing that is not needed. Therefore, every decision has a price: if we recite – perhaps we have recited a blessing that is not needed, and if we do not recite – perhaps we have enjoyed this world without a blessing. We saw there that the decision is to the voice, and it is made as follows: in terms of the obligation to recite, it is a rabbinical obligation, and therefore we decide to the voice. This does not mean that we decide not to recite, but that we decide that both ways are legitimate (as we have seen, the voice is the absence of a norm, or the opening of the greatest number of options). However, in terms of the prohibition of “not carrying,” if it is a Torah prohibition, we decide to the grave, that is, not to recite. Only the combination of these two instructions together creates the final halachic decision. In this case, since it is a rabbinical obligation and a Torah prohibition, the decision is not to recite. The final decision is neither kula nor homra, since it concerns the question of what to do in practice, whereas kula and homra deal with the existence or non-existence of norms, and not with the practical decision. The final decision on the practical level is a combination of two decisions on the normative level: kula (in blessings) with homra (in "do not carry").

And what about the case of a discarded baby? There, there is a prohibition on a Gentile to observe Shabbat, and there is a prohibition on a Jew not to observe Shabbat. These are two Torah prohibitions, and therefore there is a conflict here that has no simple solution in the laws of spikot. And yet, according to our definitions, the situation is different from what one might think. The decision to reject is actually defined, even in this situation. We saw that the decision to reject means that both options are legitimate, and this will be true here as well.[15] The decision to go to Humra is not defined unambiguously here, since going to Humra from the perspective of both sides leads us to contradictory results.

Therefore, the conclusion from our discussion is that the kula and the humara are not always complementary decisions. We see here that there are cases in which the kula state is well defined, and only the humara state is not defined.

It is true that when we separate the discussions, and deal with each prohibition separately, the severity is also well defined. In terms of the prohibition of observing Shabbat for the Gentiles, the instruction for severity is not to observe Shabbat. In terms of the obligation to observe Shabbat for the Jews, the instruction for severity is to observe Shabbat. The problem is only in combining the two prohibitions in the same situation. However, as we saw above, in such a discussion it is incorrect to speak of Kola and Ghodra, since Kola and Ghodra refer to prohibitions (=norms) and not to operative decisions. Even in these cases, the severity is well defined in relation to each of the two prohibitions, and only in relation to the operative instruction regarding the situation as a whole is it not defined. The conclusion is that Ghodra and Kola are always defined unambiguously in relation to the halachic norm (prohibition or obligation). Ambiguity is a characteristic of situations to which we must apply several halachic norms together. Ambiguity characterizes reality, not the halachic law.

'It's better to sit back and do nothing'

What do you do in such situations anyway? Apparently, the obvious solution to these situations is to 'sit back and do nothing'. The source of this is the issue of Eruvin 101, which also deals with a situation in which there is a conflict of norms of the same type:

Rav Huna Beria Rabbi Yehoshua said: As a condition, those given in one gift that were mixed in the giving of one gift – they shall be given in one gift. Giving four in giving four – they shall be given in giving four, giving four in one gift, Rabbi Eliezer says: They shall be given in giving four. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall be given in one gift. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Indeed, he transgresses the commandment, “Do not subtract!” – Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Indeed, he transgresses the commandment, “Do not add!” – Rabbi Eliezer said: They did not say it except when it is himself. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: It was not said, “Do not subtract,” except when it is himself. And Rabbi Yehoshua said: When you gave – you transgressed the commandment, “Do not add,” and you did an act with your own hands, when you did not give – you transgressed the commandment, “Do not subtract,” and you did an act with your own hands. To Rabbi Eliezer, who said, “Get up and do,” it is better – here is the one who will come down. To Rabbi Yehoshua, who said, “Sit down and do not do,” it is better – here is the one who will come down. – It is not a dilemma, – Up to this point Rabbi Eliezer did not say, “It is better to stand up and do it” – but rather to perform a mitzvah, but here it is not to perform a mitzvah – it is not so much that it is not lowered. And here it is, up to this point Rabbi Yehoshua did not say, “It is better to sit down and do not do it” – but rather to perform a sin, but here it is not to perform a sin – it is not so much that it is lowered.

Without going into the details of the discussion, the dispute is what to do in a situation where there are two conflicting norms, both of which are from Torah. For Rabbi Yehoshua, Sho'at is preferable, and for Rabbi Ko'a, the decision is preferable. From the course of the Gemara it appears that generally the solution is Sho'at is preferable, but in Rabbi Ko'a's opinion here there are special reasons to deviate from this (because he violates 'You shall not defile,' which is like a violation of Ko'a). In any case, according to the halachah, the Maimonides rules that Rabbi Yehoshua gives one gift, meaning that here too Sho'at is preferable. We can learn from this that in a situation where there are two conflicting norms, and there is no difference between the parties, the decision is Sho'at is preferable.

Therefore, even in the case of a discarded baby, it seems that the decision should be that he will not learn Torah or keep Shabbat.[16] Some have called such a decision a decision for the sake of rigor, but as we have seen, this is a mistake. This decision also has a halakhic cost (on the Jewish side), and yet it is the halakhic solution.

Why is this really the solution? From a certain point of view, even inaction that is negative is a lower price than negative action. Therefore, the solution of the Sho'at is better is nothing more than a solution of minimal cost. While this is not a step to the grave by definition, it is a different method of deciding in favor of the step with the minimal cost.

Decisions of minimal price: Sho'at, going to the Chumara, and 'the whole Mishnah has its hand on the bottom'

The question of the minimum price is very deeply intertwined with the question of the 'kola'. The reason for this is that in many cases poskim decide to go to the humara because of considerations of the minimum price, and therefore they choose the decision of the Sho'at as preferable. In light of what we have said here, these decisions should be examined in further detail. To clarify matters, I will briefly examine here two examples that I have discussed in more detail elsewhere.

• Separating Siamese twins.[17] There are cases in which two babies are born who are connected to each other in different ways, and have a common internal organ (such as a heart). In many cases, the medical assessment is that if they are not separated, they will die within a short time. When this organ can be attributed to one of them, the decision of most poskim is to perform separation surgery, and save the owner of the organ. But in symmetrical cases, when the organ cannot be clearly attributed to one of them, the agreement of all poskim is that the separation surgery should not be performed, and in my opinion, the background to this decision lies in the concept of a better Shoah.

In my article, I argued that when we examine the cost of the two options, we must take into account not only the question of whether I violated the prohibition of murder, but also the result, that is, whether I saved a life. The poskim assume that choosing the option of not performing a dissection is a decision of minimal cost, since such a decision certainly saves us from the prohibition of murder. But for the ijtad, the opposite decision is actually a decision of minimal cost, since in the test of the result we lose only one life, not two.

• Organ donation.[18] In another article, I argued for the obligation to donate organs to save others, even before the formal moment of death. There too, the feeling is that the prohibition on donating organs before the moment of death is for fear of committing the crime of losing one's own consciousness. There too, I argued that the price should be seen on the other side, failure to save a life. Therefore, the decision to permit organ donation is precisely a decision on a minimum price in this case.

The meaning of this is that the decision of Sho'at does not always mean being passive. Its deeper meaning is a decision that chooses the side with the lowest halakhic/moral cost. Some readers of the two articles above have reacted as if they contain a special Kola, but as we have seen, this is actually a different type of decision to the grave. Like the story about Rabbi Chaim of Brisk, who came to him a woman whose son had been taken to the Russian army and who feared for his life (spiritual and physical). Rabbi Chaim ordered her to go on Shabbat to try to save him from military service. When asked why he was easing the laws of Shabbat, he replied that he was tightening the laws of Pikuach Nefesh.

We are once again witnessing that the characteristics of kola and homra relate to norms and not to situations. Rabbi Chaim was stricter in relation to the norm of Picun and stricter in relation to the norm of Shabbat. Kola and homra are characteristics of decisions in relation to norms. In relation to the operative decision of what to do in practice in the situation in question, it is not possible to define kola or homra situations at all. This was also a decision of minimum price.

In summary, decision rules of the 'minimum price' type refer to practical situations, while decision rules for the 'lowest price' or 'highest price' refer to norms. The two types of reference and decision complement each other, as each of them refers to one of the two levels defined above.

This picture sheds additional light on renewed halakhic rulings, which many see as lenient rulings. Sometimes it is not about cola, but about a minimum price. The perception that there is cola here is fueled by a partial perception of reality and halakhic law. When all considerations are taken into account, this is the ruling with the minimum halakhic/moral price, and in a certain sense it can actually be seen as a harsh ruling.

Back to the question of changes

I opened with the connection between the question of the Kola and the Ghumra and the question of changes in Halacha. If we now return from the issue of the Kola back to the issue of changes, we can see the same picture there. Instead of the rule "Sit and do not do better", its cousin is invoked, the rule "Every Mishnah has its hand on the bottom."[19] This is the basis for the tendency to oppose any change, and the imposition of the burden of proof on those who demand change. On the other hand, as we saw with the rule that the "Sho'at is better", the analysis is also parallel in this rule. This rule applies only when change and non-change have the same price. But in cases where there is a heavy price for non-change, anyone who does not change has the lower hand. Questions of halakhic law and a renewed reality, such as the status of women, which Rabbi Sferber addressed in several contexts, give rise to these dilemmas. Often, the renewed decisions are classified as "kola", and the Mishnah is seen as having the lower hand. But sometimes this attitude stems from ignoring the costs of a decision that appears to be "strict", which actually turns it into kola. Halachic stagnation also has heavy costs, and it is only an illusion to think that stagnation is a "safe" solution, that is, the solution with the minimum price. It can be said that stagnation has a kola side, and not just a harsh one.

In the halakhic tradition, it was accepted that if a law is seen to be lax in public, the solution was to make a reservation, that is, a harsher one. Since harsher is not truly forbidden, but rather a tactical approach, it is important to examine its effectiveness on a tactical level (whether it works or not). It turns out that in our time, in many cases, this approach does not work. The main reason for this is the public accessibility of halakhic information, in such a way that anyone who desires it sees that harsher is not anchored in the halakhic sources. When people see that the halakhic instructions they receive are not anchored in the sources, or at least are not necessary, they lose trust in the giver of the instructions, and thus may end up committing offenses in things that are completely forbidden. In our language, we can describe this as follows: they were not presented with all the legitimate options, and in light of our definitions above, this means that the posk resorted to harsher ones.

The meaning of these words is that our attitude towards changes in halakha itself must undergo a change in light of reality. This is a second-order change, as it speaks of a change in our attitude towards changes in halakha. The question of legitimate change is discussed in my aforementioned articles, and I will not go into it here.

Summary

The picture that emerges from our words is that when we come to discuss the question of cola and humara, it is important to separate two levels of discussion: the question of presenting the legitimate options that face us, and the question of choosing between them.

In the first chapter, we saw that the concept of 'kola' is mistakenly perceived as a decision that is more convenient for the questioner, that is, as referring to the second level. We argued there that the more accurate definition is that a decision to kola refers to the first level. Its meaning is opening up more legitimate options to the questioner (or determining that there is no norm that applies to the situation in question). We also saw that questions regarding the second level (which of the options to choose) are not left to the arbiter but to the questioner. The arbiter's decision to kola refers only to the first level, that is, to presenting more legitimate options.

In our discussion, we discussed several additional implications of this distinction: In the first chapter, we saw that there are voices that appear to be harsh, but are really voices. We also saw in the second chapter that there are opinions according to which when one comes before a posek, he must present all opinions. We concluded from them that at least in times of pressure, the posek must present more options as legitimate (since he is stepping away from the decision-making seat and presenting the entirety of existing positions). Presenting all existing opinions (including the harsh ones) as legitimate options is the decision for the voice. We also saw that the picture presented here shows that the one who is harsh in a rabbinical doubt is not a layman. In the third chapter, we saw that this implies that in certain situations the symmetry between the voice and the harsh is broken (the position of the voice is clear, but the position of the harsh is not unambiguous).

At the end of our discussion, we discussed the relationship between going to the humara and the kola, and parallel decision guidelines, such as "the whole Mishnah is on the lower one," and "the Sh'u't is better." We saw that these are basically decisions of minimum price, but they generally refer to the second level of discussion (the practical choice), while the decisions to the humara (which is also a decision of minimum price) or the kola refer to the first, normative level (the negation of the legitimacy of some of the options).

In order to comment on the question of changes in halakhic law in light of the changing reality, and on their identification with approaches that are decisive for the voice. The picture that emerges from all of the above is that it is not right to instinctively fear change, nor is it right to identify the lack of change (the Shulchan Arbiter is better, the entire Mishnah is on the lower one) as a minimum price, or as a hardship. Sometimes the minimum price is actually to act, to change, and to ease, and thus to thaw the halakhic gloom that so plagues many today, and with no small degree of justice. It seems to me that these things are quite consistent with Rabbi Prof. Sperber's approach, to the extent that I have managed to get to know them, and perhaps in my words here I have been able to shed some light on the fundamental concept behind this approach.

[1] M. Avraham, 'Is there 'enlightened' idolatry?', Akademo 19 (Tammuz 567) 65-86.

[2] See Rabbi A. Danzig, Neshat Adam, 1918, Clal 5 C. A, in the opinion of Toss R. H. 33. Also see Rabbi Y. Yoshua, Peni Yehoshua, Or Hochma, Jerusalem (1918), Berakhot 12 A. Also see Rabbi Yoshua Volk Katz, Derisha, Jerusalem Institute (1918), Orach Chaim C. 29 A. Although there are also those who believe that this is a rabbinical prohibition and yet forbid it, on the grounds that it is a more severe rabbinical prohibition. See Rabbi Yisrael Meir HaCohen, Shaar HaTzion ((Inside Mishnah Berurah), and Geshel, Jerusalem (Teshnu), 1961, 1962. Also, the Netziv, HaEmek Sha'ala, Vilna (1961), 1962,

[3] And this explains the puzzling language of the Rishonim, on the issue of the blessing of confession (the Gomel), in Berakhot 45b. The Gemara there is debating whether the blessing should be said before ten, of whom two are Tahsih, or before twelve, of whom two are Tahsih. And here, in the Tod "Vaima": "And I served him with a heavy heart, and even with the ten of my rabbis." And in the Tod "Rashon" there it is written: "And because it is not easy for them to be heavy in their eyes, they will be punished."

And in the latter there are those who wonder how the hawtrah is defined here. For example, Rabbi Y. Landa, tzaddik, Jerusalem (5755), ibid., writes:

And I am a mother of ten and three rabbis, etc. And I have served for a homrah and even for ten rabbis, etc. And I did not know where to interpret the intention of the text, as if it were a homrah and to bless without the rabbis, is it not in doubt that the blessings are for the kolala and not from the korakas, you will not be able to bear… And it seems that this is the intention of the Rosh and the Torah, from the korakas and from the korakas, and it seems difficult what a homrah is for him, is it not that he does not bless, and even the correct ruling is that he does not bless with korakas, because the korakas are read as all the poskim doubt the blessings are for the korakas.

See there who explained that one should divide a discussion on the obligation to recite the blessing, and a discussion on the obligation to seek an audience of twelve people, and left the matter to the Tza'a. However, according to our path, the intention of the Torah is to be stricter in the laws of blessings (therefore it requires reciting the blessing even at ten), and the Rosh is stricter in the laws of "you shall not bear" (therefore it prohibits reciting the blessing when there are not twelve). Any such horma offers fewer options in terms of the norm in question (either "you shall not bear" or the obligation to recite the blessing), and therefore it is defined as horma.

[4] See Berakhot 9:1, Shabbat 4:1, and Gitin 19:1. And also regarding Rabbi Elazar in Iruvin 40:1, and regarding Rabbi Eliezer in Nida 6:2 and 9:2.

[5] The Rema permitted several things out of respect for humanity. For example, to sanctify on Shabbat (Responsorial Psalm, 128), and for a kidney patient whose feet are swollen to pray with the congregation in the synagogue, wearing kashmiri and tefillin (Responsorial Psalm, 128), and more. We also found permits for him to sleep outside the sukkah due to danger (O'Haq, 129), to extinguish a fire on Shabbat due to danger (O'Haq, 129), to wear shoes on 1st of Av for someone who comes among the Gentiles (Dm. O'Haq, 129), to light a Hanukkah candle inside the house due to danger (O'Haq, 129). To trade with non-Jews on the day of Idum (Yod., 129). To drink wine alone (Responsorial Psalm, 129). It is permissible to read the KS against the hair of women who are accustomed to going outside to fast (O'H., 11:2). There are also two well-known opinions in the laws of treifot (Yod., 11:37 and 11:9), on which the BH disagrees, and from which the difference between Ashkenazim and Sephardim arises regarding the issue of 'part' meat. See on all of these in the book by Rabbi Dr. Asher Ziv, Rabbenu Moshe Isserlish, expanded edition published by Yeshiva University, New York (1972).

[6] It is difficult to assume that "forbidden" is interpreted here as "deserving of stricter treatment," and in fact, Rabbi Yehuda believes in the principle of the law as Rabbi Yehuda. As stated, the Gemara itself also says that he believes as Rabbi Yehuda.

[7] This does not mean that in their opinion one should not be lenient even in times of distress. It is possible that they view the principle of kula in times of distress as a general principle, not specific to this particular case, meaning that in all rabbinic halakha (at least where there is a dissenting opinion) it is permissible to be lenient in times of distress.

[8] And in the Ksam there he stressed the matter, but according to him, this is also the position of the Rashi himself. In other words, the Rashi himself believes that he did not fulfill his duty unless there was a time of urgency. So for our purposes, this is still a good example. See also the Hib and Ksam there.

[9] And where there are two opinions, this is a spiqa dadina (or darbuwata), and there, even in situations of doubt, it is not clear that one can always be lenient. Furthermore, one must follow the presumption and the other rules of doubt.

[10] The assumption is that these are situations of doubt, since he does not write that someone who does not do this is a layman. In other words, he does not state unequivocally that this is the halacha, but only says that it is permissible to act in this way in times of need.

[11] It is important to note. The difference between a rabbinic doubt and a Torah doubt is not in the question of what the recommended decision is, whether to leniently or strictly. The main difference is that in Torah there is one recommended decision (=duty to worsen), and in Darbanan not (=Given To make it easier. Or No need To make it worse). In other words: The main difference is not expressed in the words 'ease' and 'make it worse', but in the words 'must' and 'allowed'.

The obvious conclusion is that the Durbanan doubt Given Go to the polls, but don't Must To do so. As we concluded above, going to the Kola is only to present more halakhic options, and it is not supposed to be about choosing one of them. Another implication derived from this is that the one who is stricter in a rabbinical doubt is not a layman, and is not considered exempt from doing so. He is permitted to be more lenient but he is not obligated to do so (there is no obligation to be strict, but it is certainly permissible to be strict).

[12] I discussed this point at length in my article, 'Autonomy and Authority in Halacha Ruling', Meishram I (5762) 79-124.

[13] The author of Kush Shem also explains in light of this principle the rule that most and those closest to him follow the majority (see B. B. 24a). He proves that following the majority is a clear rule, meaning that it is a rule that raises doubt. And now that we are not in a state of doubt, the rule of following the closest cannot apply, since following the closest is a rule of conduct in situations of doubt (which we learn from the parsha of the severed cart, when it is not known which city the murderer came from. See the issue of B. B. there).

[14] See an interesting example and view of this concept from the issue of the 'city of gold', in D. Weil's article, 'The Logic of Completion of the Sages and the Greek Logic', Logic 1 (5749) 102-124.

I will note here that such a picture of the law is related to what is known in philosophy as the 'paradox of the heap.' See briefly on this in my article, 'The Expertise of the Halacha Ruler as an Evaluator of Reality,' Tzohar 7 (Summer 2006) 21-33.

[15] Let's clarify things further. According to Maimonides, the obligation to be strict in the spiky is only from the rabbis, the rule from the Torah is a doubt from the Torah to the letter. According to him, in the situation of a baby in a divided environment, both options are legitimate from the Torah, and the 'baby' (when he grows up) can choose between them himself.

[16] It can be argued that the prohibitions are not of equal strength (the obligation for a Jew to observe Shabbat is stronger than the prohibition for a Gentile to do so). I am using this case only as an example, and therefore will not go into a more detailed discussion.

[17] See more detail on this in my article, 'Separation of Siamese Twins', Tecumin 27 (5767) 144-156.

[18] See more detail on this in the articles 'Organ Donation', Tecumin 29 (567) 329-339.

[19] This is, of course, a borrowed expression. In its original form (see Mishnah B.M. Av.A. and parallels) it expresses a monetary law rather than a meta-halachic approach. I use it here as an expression of a common meta-halachic concept, for which this formulation is the common way to describe it.