Halacha rulings on the Holocaust and their significance for generations

With God’s help

"On local opinion and public opinion"

"Moses received the Torah from Sinai and delivered it to Joshua, and Joshua to the elders..." We have accepted that the Torah was given to us by God, the Holy One, on Mount Sinai, and that no additions should be made to it ("Do not add") and no subtraction should be made from it. "This is the Torah, which shall not be changed." But immediately afterwards in Pirkei Avot we find several times: "He would say..." Halacha is not only handed down as it is from generation to generation, with the transmitters being, so to speak, a "hollow conduit," but also accumulates and is refined and expanded over time. The words of the sages of the generations that "would say" become part of the corpus of the oral Torah. Some of them join the Daorita component (the commentaries and sermons) and some of them join the Rabbinic component (the regulations, decrees, and customs). It is said through the medium of Tzachot that the Torah contains "local knowledge" that was given at Sinai, but it also contains "public knowledge" that accumulates over the generations.

But even "public opinion" is not a single piece. In a previous article[1] I have argued that even within it, two fundamental components must be distinguished: the theoretical, pure and eternal part, and the part that is local and temporal. The relationship between these two and its meaning, particularly during the Holocaust, is the subject of this article. My aim here is to argue that one of the important lessons that can be learned from an analysis of halakhic rulings during the Holocaust is that there is a great duty of caution on the posk, no matter how great, when it comes to deciding halakhic in a reality that is not immediately familiar to him. And this is even in situations less extreme than those that prevailed during the Holocaust.

To clarify things, I will first present the first part, which contains some necessary introductions. This will be followed by two more parts with examples, and I will conclude with a section that briefly summarizes what emerges from the discussion.

A. Two components of halakhic ruling

introduction

This part of the article deals with simple things on the one hand, but touches on the nature of the halakha on the other. It would have been appropriate to expand on them more, to cite sources and examples, and to explain. But here my purpose is only to offer an introduction that will give meaning to the examples that will be discussed later.

On "public opinion": Between the temporal and the eternal in Halacha

Every event that comes to the posek comes against the backdrop of its place and time, but the decision in it is made on the basis of the "public opinion" that has formed up to that moment, and at the same time this decision also joins the general halakhic corpus, that is, the "public opinion" that is passed on and forms part of the basis for other decisions in the future. And yet, there is also something in the specific halakhic decision that is very local, that depends on the specific circumstances of the case, and therefore it cannot be decided solely on the basis of a simple logical deduction from the existing halakhic corpus. As we will see, for the same reason it cannot join this corpus as it is and move forward with it.

This distinction can be demonstrated when looking at the similarities and differences between a reply in the Book of Responsorial Psalm and a theoretical halachic ruling (section 2).Shulchan Arba'ah or in Rambam). A ruling in a responsa is an answer to a specific question given to a specific situation, with all the complexities it entails. It discusses them in light of the principles of halakhah, but it also includes halakhic and meta-halakhic policy (which is sometimes only correct for the time being), consideration of the hardships of the questioner, an assessment of reality and what is required of it, and combinations of additional principles and aspects. In contrast, a general halakhic ruling as it appears in the book Psak NusachShulchan Arba'ah It is rather careful not to take into account the specific details. The fundamental halakhic law establishes a general principle: act X is permitted, prohibited, or obligatory. Its prohibition is from the Torah or from the rabbis. But it does not refer to any particular person (whether he is poor or rich), to the circumstances (what is the nature of the place and its inhabitants, and what are the constraints surrounding the case), and to other general halakhic principles that are involved in this discussion. The case law combines these two components, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between them.

Let us refine this distinction further. The Talmudic rule "A wise man who forbids, his friend is not permitted to permit" (Berakhot 63b and others) certainly does not apply to a ruling in a halakhic book. As with most published halakhic books, many books of rulings followed them that disagree on various points. This rule was stated only about a ruling specific to a specific case, that is, about a decision in the style of the Responsorial literature. The difference is that a ruling of the second type is stated about a specific case and determines its fate. A ruling in a halakhic book deals with general principles and not with specific cases, and about which there is certainly room for dispute.

The general ruling mainly contains the eternal and always binding component of the law, while the Responsa literature contains quite a bit of the second component, the one that depends on the circumstances. Of course, the distinction is not entirely clear. There are instructions in the Responsa books that do refer to times of need (although usually not specifically), great loss, and the like. On the other hand, it is clear that even from a reply in the Responsa book, general halachic principles and new interpretations and concepts can be derived. In other words, it also contains the pure part of the law, but ultimately one must be very careful when drawing halachic conclusions from it. Sometimes the circumstantial part also affects the fundamental interpretations, thus making it very difficult to compare one word with another.

Prof. Chaim Soloveitchik, in the second part of his book Law, Economics, and Self-Image – Pawnshopping in the Middle Ages, which deals with the rulings of our early rabbis in Ashkenazi and Spain on the subject of interest, makes an interesting and important observation. He points out that many rulings of the great rabbis of the Middle Ages were in direct conflict with the rulings of the Talmud. The reason for this was usually matters of time and place, constraints, hardships, and difficulties. In addition, there were also changes in reality that required fundamental adjustments to the Talmudic laws that were established in a different period and reality. But Soloveitchik argues there that of all the halachic work on the subject of interest that was created in the literature of the early rabbis, what entered theShulchan Arba'ah, and thus essentially joined the corpus of halakhic law handed down to future generations, was only what arose from the issues of the Talmud, or unfortunately reconciled with them. The rest remained in the Responsorial literature, and while it may be used by jurists and scholars in future generations, it does not constitute part of the pure corpus of halakhic law. This is the part of the circumstantial component, that is, that which depends on time and place and does not have eternal validity.

Facts are temporary and norms are eternal.

References by poskim in the Responsa join the halakhic corpus in another sense, and it by its very definition belongs to the purely eternal component of the halakhic law. A methodological lesson can be learned from them, and not a purely halakhic one. They teach how the poskim must take into account his time and place and the various constraints that appear in them. Thus, even if my circumstances are completely different, I can still see how one should take into account such and such circumstances in comparison with the eternal and principled component. This lesson can indeed be learned from the Responsa literature, and it is eternal in a certain sense.

For example, much of the scientific content that Maimonides brings to his books (see Reish Hal' Yesodei HaTorah and others. Most of them are taken, as is well known, from Aristotle) is already known today to be incorrect. Ostensibly, these parts of his teaching are unnecessary, but this is a mistake. We can still learn from them a methodological, meta-halakhic, and meta-conceptual lesson, how a Torah scholar can and should deal with new scientific knowledge that exists at his time (whatever that knowledge may be). Maimonides teaches us that solid scientific knowledge cannot be rejected out of hand, even in the face of bodies of tradition. He taught us the important lesson that sometimes a mishnah does move from its place. Sometimes the method is no less important than the content itself, and I think that today this is the main lesson from the first four chapters of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah. The same is true with regard to halakhic dealing with hardships and constraints, for even if they do not exist in my time and even if the laws that were passed then are no longer relevant to our day, I can still learn from the poskim and the responses in general how I should approach such problems and what place considerations of time and place have in the final halakhic ruling, even in my time.

In this sense too, the specific and temporary halakhic work that appears in the Responsa is part of the pure halakhic corpus. This is another part of it that joins the tradition of the generations. However, this part generally belongs more to the "Oral Torah" and its main concern is its use in preparation for rulings and less in the study of halakhic law itself. It is part of what is sometimes called "the fifth part of theShulchan Arba'ah".

This distinction can also be demonstrated in relation to halakhic discussions in the Talmud itself. For example, the Gemara in Pek Deva B (5a) establishes the presumption that a person does not repay within his time. Therefore, if Reuven demands that Shimon repay his debt before the time for repayment, Shimon is not being honest in claiming that he did repay, since a person does not repay before the time set for this has arrived. Now we ask: What will be the law in a place where the practice is that people do repay within the time (for various reasons, such as fear of interest inflation with a transaction permit, etc.)? It is clear that in such a situation the factual presumption no longer exists. Is the above-mentioned issue of B now of no value? Absolutely so. The Talmudic issue does not come to teach us about presumption as a psychological estimate in the person's soul. Such an estimate is a (psychological) fact, and facts are learned from observations and scientific (or psychological) research. Facts can also change with time and place. The Talmud's approach to facts is certainly subject to change. Torah is rooted in teaching, meaning that its concern is norms and not Facts. If so, the lesson we must learn from the issue in the Bible is not the factual lesson (that there is such a presumption), but the halakhic-normative lesson: that when there is any presumption, whatever it may be, it is useful for extracting money from the holder (like two witnesses, and not like the majority opinion). Which presumption exists in a particular place and time and which does not? This is a matter of fact that changes according to the circumstances and is not a body of Torah. Only the normative principle that a presumption extracts money is eternal, and therefore only that must be distilled from the issue and added to the halakhic tradition (the compound element) that passes on and is always correct. There are extreme situations in which norms may also change, but we will not deal with that here.

The meaning of ruling according to place and time

We will now approach our discussion, based on a brief study of the act of tying up Isaac. As is known, the Torah and the Sages refer to the experience of Abraham the patriarch as a model for generations, and therefore as a right that stands for his descendants forever. However, some commentators have criticized Abraham's conduct in relation to tying up Isaac.[2] I will not go into the sources and their analysis here, as my goal is only to demonstrate a general point for our purposes here.

The criticisms leveled at Abraham mainly concern the question of whether he should have compromised his moral principles because of the divine command, or whether he should have stood his ground. Some have argued that Abraham should have considered the possibility that the divine voice was merely an inner voice that was deceiving him. Especially when the content of the commandment is contrary to all the moral principles that God Himself expects of man, and in stark contrast to the promises that Abraham received ("For in Isaac shall your seed be called"). These criticisms assume that I, as a critic, fully understand the situation in which our forefather Abraham found himself, and that it is in fact similar in one way or another to the situation in which I myself find myself. And just as I can doubt things that seem true to me, so I feel about our forefather Abraham in relation to the divine commandment. This is despite the fact that the critics have probably never had the privilege of hearing the voice of God address them. How do they know that the certainty regarding such a voice is not complete? Where do they derive the possibility of casting doubt on it? For example, if I describe to a blind man a certain sight that I see, he can always claim that my eyes are deceiving me. I have no way of proving to him that this is not true. And yet, such criticism probably will not diminish my trust in the sight of my eyes. A person does not doubt what he sees, and the blind man who suggests that he cast such doubt is mistaken. Simply because he has never experienced the experience The evidence. Our forefather Abraham, who heard the voice of God speaking to him, probably had no doubt about it. He would not be able to explain this to his critics, but they too should understand that they do not know and have never experienced the situation and therefore cannot raise such criticism seriously.

In the same sense, a person who finds himself in certain circumstances is the only one who fully understands them. The circumstantial part of the law is reserved only for him. Criticisms and suggestions can deal mainly with its eternal part, with the general principles and their interpretation, but the meaning of the circumstances is reserved only for the one who is in it and experiences them directly. We will now describe another situation that illustrates this point. A young rabbi serves in a certain community and encounters a difficult problem. He goes to consult with his rabbi, who is older than him and lives in a completely different environment and society. In many cases, the older rabbi feels that the situation is not clear to him. He does not fully understand the meaning of things, and especially the meaning of the various decisions for the members of the young community. In such a situation, he chooses only to advise his student and not to decide for him. This is not just a desire to glorify the status of the young rabbi, but a sober recognition that the person being asked does not always understand the situation that the question deals with. In such a case, he must exercise great caution when coming to render a ruling, and it is preferable that this be done by a local rabbi who is well acquainted with the circumstances, even if his Torah level is lower. The older rabbi can suggest to him the principles and fundamental considerations that he should take into account, but the decision as to their weight and who prevails over whom is left solely to the local rabbi.

For example, let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that there is no inherent prohibition against listening to a woman singing, but only because of the stimulation it evokes. If so, then the question of whether it is permissible or forbidden to listen to a singer singing on the radio, or even in a performance, is a question that requires an understanding of the meaning of such a voice in a particular place and time, and for a particular type of audience. What does such singing evoke in listeners? Why do they come to hear it? To what extent does it have sexual and immodest connotations? And so on. A rabbi who has never experienced this and does not understand the significance of the things for the questioners will not always be able to make the decision for them. The same is true regarding the status of women in the community, and the community's conduct on these issues. The weight of the circumstantial component in these decisions is decisive, and therefore it is important that they be made by someone who is well-informed and familiar with the situation.

This is a reflection of those two parts of "public opinion" that we discussed above. The older rabbi is an expert in the eternal and principled component, but in ruling, it is no less important to understand the second component. And in this, there is an advantage precisely for someone who is in the circumstances and experiences them directly, even if his Torah knowledge is less. The knowledge can be transferred to him, but the direct understanding of the situation is very difficult for him to transfer to his rabbi. Therefore, it is better for the younger rabbi to make the decision.

I will note that in extreme cases where a discussion arises regarding a specific offense (see Nazir 21), the person who makes the decision is the layman present, and not a scholar or a prominent posek. This is a more extreme case where a decision is made depending on the circumstances, and it is not submitted to the greatest posek, and in this case it is not submitted to the posek at all but to an ordinary person. Even if a person comes and asks the posek, since these are extreme cases that are unfamiliar to him, sometimes he will not be allowed to give an answer and decide. In such extreme situations, sometimes it is better for the posek to only advise and not decide.

The uniqueness of the Holocaust

The Holocaust period and the halakhic work that was created during it clearly and clearly requires a distinction between these two components. On the one hand, the decision regarding a particular question in such a catastrophic time cannot be simply arrived at from the halakhic basis created in normal times. There is no escape from taking into account the constraints of time and place that have never been equaled. Therefore, these decisions were made by the people who were present at the time and place, and it is likely that in many cases they could not have been made by poskim who were not familiar with the situation. But to the same extent and for the same reason, these halakhic rulings also do not necessarily serve as a precedent for cases that will come in the future, since these will usually occur and be discussed under completely different circumstances. Although, as we saw above, methodological lessons can be learned from them. And sometimes these can illuminate the entire halakhic system in a different light that would not have been apparent to those who act and live under normal circumstances.

The question that arises here is how to distill from them the pure part that is worthy and can join the general halakhic corpus and be passed on in the tradition of generations. Which of these decisions is nevertheless of general validity? We must analyze the train of thought of the posek who made the decision, and try as much as possible to understand his considerations. In such cases, the posek does not always say what is underlying his rulings, and sometimes he himself may not be aware that he is involving considerations of the hardships of place and time or is implicitly basing himself on them.

In the following sections of the article, we will discuss two examples that will illustrate what has been said so far.

B. First example: Property laws in the Kovno ghetto[3]

introduction

The topic arose from a series of articles written by Rabbi Yitzhak Elchanan Gibraltar, and published in the Shabbat supplements of the newspaper. Yeted Neeman In 5763. The articles deal with his father, Rabbi Shraga Feibel Gibraltar, who was one of the greatest scholars of the ghetto, and after the Holocaust a rabbi in Italy. The author, Rabbi Y. A. Gibraltar, was a child in the ghetto at the time. The head of the community in the ghetto was Rabbi Avraham Dober Kahane Shapira, the author of Abraham's Word, zt"l. The historical situation and the dilemmas involved in it raise a discussion that touches on the roots of human life, the laws of property, and the worship of God in general. The series of articles was not halakhic but historical, but serious halakhic matters were raised in it. In the course of the discussions, a response was published that dealt with criticism of the laws of property, and after some time I wrote an article that rejected the criticism. The basis of my words was the rule "Do not judge your friend until you have reached his place," but this time in its literal sense. This is not a joke of honesty and teaching righteousness to the wrongdoers and sinners, but an argument about the truth itself. I mentioned there that I was writing these words as a candle for the souls of the saints of the Kovno Ghetto, headed by the gaon Baal DBA His soul departed in purity in the ghetto (Sunday, 23 Adar 1, 573).

First example

In Supplement F. to my Constitutions (5763), the case of the Jews of Yanova is told. The Lithuanian partisans murdered all the Jews of Yanova, except for about three hundred and fifty who remained alive. The rabbi of Yanova, Rabbi Nachum Ginzburg (husband Source Baruch), arrived in the Kovno ghetto, which itself was in terrible condition, and brought the partisans' demand for a ransom of one hundred thousand marks for the lives of the remaining Jews of Janowa. After being ransomed, the Jews of Janowa were to join the Kovno ghetto, which itself suffered from severe deprivation and hardship, thus of course placing a great burden on the survival of those already there.

The Judenrat administration refused with understandable arguments (their donors, the fact that they were redeeming more than their dues, and other risks, etc.). On the other hand, the Gaon Baal DBA, the rabbi of Kovna, ruled that there was an obligation to give the money. It must be understood that money there was life, literally. There was a situation of terrible hunger, and life was in danger at every moment. The owner of theDBA He himself likened this to the issue of B.M. 22 A., where R.A. and Ben Patura disagreed:

Two people were walking on a road, one of them holding a pitcher of water. If they drink, both will die, and if one of them drinks, they will reach the settlement. Ben Petura taught: It is better for both of them to drink and die, and for neither of them to see the death of their friend. Until the Rabbis came and taught: 'And the life of your brother is with you' – your life comes before the life of your friend.

In the case of Yanova, the money is likened to the water's edge, and therefore, according to the halakha of Daki'l, the seemingly obvious conclusion is that the money should not be given. However, despite this, the owner of theDBA He believed that this was a life in which everyone was under visible miracles at every moment, and in any case, God saved them only through miracles. In such a situation, the money should be handed over.

Here we can already see a consideration that is very difficult to accept from the halakhic perspective of someone outside the situation. DBA As someone who is present in the place and needs to make a specific decision, he decided that even though the halakha was ruled by the Rabbis, this halakha did not apply in those circumstances. Here too, the objective critic can claim against him that he acted against the halakha, and in fact lost souls from Israel because of a vague belief. And because we imagine that we did something?! But it seems that this claim is comparable to the same criticism we saw against Abraham's conduct in the Aqidah, or to the criticism of a blind man towards a wise man. Someone who is not familiar with the situation cannot understand and decide whether this halakha applied in those circumstances or not. There is a kind of Holy Spirit here (not in the transcendent sense, but as a vague metaphor)[4] Which is only given to those who are inside the situation.

On the other hand, this decision, due to the extreme and unique circumstances, cannot join the settled law and enter into theShulchan Arba'ahIt was true that there was room to try and make a halachic analysis of the author's consideration. DBA, and insert the conclusion as a clause in the ruling. For example, add toShulchan Arba'ah A halakhic clause that states that where the very existence depends on the miracle of this law changes. But it seems that the poskim are not inclined to do so, and leave things as they are for the time being (a bit like a crime per se, although here it is not reasonable to speak of a crime at all, but rather the opposite). The essence of the matter is this itself, that in a halakhic case of this type, the decision is not supposed to be found in the books of rulings and accepted by the great poskim, but by whoever is present on the spot, even if theDBA He was not one of the greatest of the arbiters.

We should add that the author relates there that the people of Kovno gave the pennies they had earned in a last-ditch effort to save the Jews of Janowa. They joined the Kovno ghetto (except for their rabbi, who was murdered by the same partisans immediately after collecting the money, 14), and some were saved and remained alive after the Holocaust, and even immigrated to Israel.

Three approaches to property law in the ghetto

In the supplement Nitzavim-Wilach, the author describes a debate that arose regarding the property of the murdered in the ghetto. Most of the public considered the property of the murdered to be worthless, like "a piece of the sea," even if the murdered had heirs outside the ghetto (if they had heirs inside the ghetto, the custom was to give it to them). This attitude is understandable, since you can't have a bigger "piece of the sea" than a situation in which there is an order from the Nazis to collect the property and register the inventory, while forbidding anyone from touching it, and whoever violates it is sentenced to death. Add to this the danger to lives from the terrible cold and hardship.

However, Rabbi Mordechai Pogramansky had a different approach to this. He refused to use a coat from this treasure, even at the risk of death. What is the justification for such a decision? On its face, it also directly contradicts "normal" halacha. The similarity to the previous decision is clear. Here too, different possibilities can be raised, but it turns out that they will not add up toShulchan Arba'ah itself, but will remain as special laws for their time and place.

Rabbi S.P. Gibraltar had a third approach. In his opinion, the concept of "private property" expires in the ghetto. No one has ownership of money, even money that was in their possession before the war. Here I will try to go into a more halakhic analysis of the matter, which will clarify the relationship between the temporary and eternal components of this ruling, and especially the light it sheds on the law in general that is not visible to eyes that are in normal life circumstances.

As mentioned, the article in which the statements are presented is not halakhic, and therefore it is not clear how careful it is in its accuracy in the halakhic reasoning for this approach. It contains several different formulations that are not necessarily identical:

1. A Jew in the ghetto, whom every Lithuanian child is allowed and even commanded to kill at any moment, is a "killer," and the dead have no ownership of wealth. Life in this state is not like a person being led to the gallows, since he can order the division of his property, and there is also a chance that the king will commute his sentence.[5]
2. In order to own money, you need a minimal way of life. If life is completely meaningless, there is no ownership of money, and money is meaningless.
3. Also appearing in the P. Pinchas issue 2004 (not necessarily in this context) is the consideration that it is forbidden to enjoy a miracle, not only from the money that was saved but also from life itself. This refers mainly to enjoying the money that remained in people's hands after the Holocaust.

As emerges from his words (mainly in the article in P. Nitzavim), Rabbi Gibraltar believed that anyone can take another's clothes or bread (the implications for the ruling in the Yanova case will be discussed below). However, the PIZ seemingly contradicts what appears in the aforementioned P. Pinchas issue in his name, that he believed that if there are relatives in the ghetto itself, no one is permitted to take the property. It is clear that this was the custom there, but it is not clear how this reconciles with the perception that there is no ownership there at all? It is clear from his words that this is not about the expropriation of property as a public regulation for the time being (Madin al-Fakar 14, etc.). The following wording also appears there: "According to his halakhic view, all ownership of property in the ghetto will be forfeited except for what is in his possession." Again, Hazin asserts that expropriation is a principle of the law, but it only applies to what is not in his possession.[6]

And in the issue of P. Pinchas, another consideration by Rabbi Gibraltar appears, that if someone stole money from his friend, it is as if he had murdered him, since the money there is the soul (this is the assumption at the basis of the parable of the two who walk in the desert. It is known what the author of Hazo"a (B.M. Likutim 32:22a, that although it is a question of protecting one's life, one is not permitted to steal the water from the other, because stealing it is considered murder.) This means that what is in Reuven's hand is forbidden for Shimon to take from him, but not according to the law of theft, but according to the law of murder. This also seems to be an explanation for the above distinction between what is in his hand and what is not in his hand (and will be explained below).

It is worth noting that Rabbi S.P. Gibraltar applied his concept even after the war and in Chumra. When people who owed him money from before the war came to him, he refused to accept it from them, claiming that in the ghetto there was expropriation of ownership of money, and all encumbrances against him were forfeited. Gifts, he added, he only accepts from the Lord of the Worlds…

Appeal "from outside"

In the supplement P. HaAzino (Rish 2004, issue 2), a letter was published that discussed the halachic points raised in the article, and throughout his remarks he outright rejects the halachic approach of Rabbi Sh. P. Gibraltar. The author (Rabbi Gibraltar Jr.), in his response in the issue of P. Pinchas, writes that someone who was not there cannot examine and judge these halachic claims. There are halachic beliefs that cannot be explained to someone who has not experienced the situation himself. Personal experience creates immediate feelings about the requirements of halachic in the situation in question, and especially in such an incomprehensible and unusual situation. Someone who does not understand and feel what a "gabra katla" situation is, and what the attitude and trust a person has in his finances and soul in such a situation, will not be able to judge. This is precisely our argument in the first part of this article. Appealing from the outside against such decisions is like criticizing the wise blind. It seems to me that the attitude towards these rulings should be as a kind of decision by the Holy Spirit that is given only to the one who is in the situation, and his words are testimony and not a regular halachic ruling. As stated, only someone who has experienced the things can rule on them. It is Torah that has been learned (and practiced) by the human race. The rabbi who wrote the above letter discusses the things as if they were spoken in the normal human situation, which it is not.

Although the claim about the inability to judge is correct (and one must read to understand to what extent), we are not exempt from trying to understand this unique testimony about that part of the Torah that was given only to those who were in that situation, in order to learn from them the eternal meanings. The discussion concerns the basics of the laws of the halakhic laws, and there is no room here to elaborate on it. Therefore, I will keep the discussion very brief and focus on what is required for our needs here. I will only offer my conclusion regarding the main points and foundations of the matter as I understand it.

Understandings are possible in the ruling of Rabbi Sh. P. Gibraltar

Let us first say that the writer himself says (P. Pinchas) that there is no clear source for his father's words from the rabbinic and poskim, but being in this terrible situation he felt this explanation to be correct. If so, it would seem that it would be difficult to place his words on a halakhic basis that belongs to the eternal and pure component of halakhic law. We must seek a new explanation from which this halakhic approach emerges.

In my original article, I proposed several simpler halachic options, in the form of investigations and tests of that "evidence," and I explained why it does not seem to be what he intended and also why each of them is probably incorrect. Among other things, I showed why the reasoning of "Gabra Katla" cannot be understood literally in these cases, and why this is not about despair (of life and of wealth). I also examined there the possibility that the wealth belongs to the Nazis under the law of wartime occupation, and I rejected that too. Another option that was rejected is the suggestion that the lack of possibility of using the wealth forfeits ownership of it. Here I will content myself with presenting my conclusion there (i.e. the more plausible explanation in my opinion).

Irrelevance of the concept of "ownership"

From Rabbi Gibraltar's words, it seems that his argument is that when there is no normal life, then ownership of property does not belong at all. In such a situation, the concept of "ownership" itself is irrelevant. One must distinguish carefully between this possibility and all the previous possibilities. Previously, we looked for an explanation that allows the personal wealth of a particular person in a particular situation (each person separately). We saw that even a person who is about to die without money is not a pauper. However, here the argument is that the concepts of ownership themselves do not exist in certain situations, and not just that a particular ownership has expired. The expiration of concrete ownership is the result of a situation in which the concepts of "ownership" are irrelevant. In situations such as the ghetto, concepts of ownership do not belong at all, and in any case, concrete ownership of property does not belong either. One could say that this is a "change in the law book" itself, and not a change in the status of this or that person. In fact, a majority of every part of the property is erased from theShulchan Arba'ah.

This explanation can be understood in two different ways, both of which may be correct (according to Rabbi Gibraltar's original intention, it seems more in the first direction, but the second could also be true):

1. It is understandable that the argument is about the concept of metaphysical ownership. When a person is not considered a living person in the usual way, even if he is not a real "gabra katla," then concepts of ownership do not apply to him. Indeed, it is not that his ownership of his property expires (as in the previous possibilities), but rather that the concept of ownership cannot be attributed to him. He is likened (only from a legal perspective, of course) to an animal, or more correctly – to a small animal (which is forbidden to kill, but is not a legal entity in matters of ownership). In such a situation, it is also impossible to transfer his property to his heirs, since his property expires even though he is not dead. In such a situation, there was no death, and therefore there is no law of inheritance.

This is not like going out to kill someone whose money is not a fortune, because there is an implicit assumption here that this is a place where no one has a life in the conventional sense. In such a place, concepts of ownership do not belong. Of course, we still need to try and define better what the criteria are that distinguish a life that constitutes a legal entity from a life that does not. In any case, if such a legal definition does exist, then it is likely that a person in the ghetto is a natural candidate to be included in these criteria.

And there is still certainly room to discuss why after the Holocaust, when that person returns to live as a human being, and to become a legal entity for all intents and purposes, the debts that arose before the Holocaust do not return. It is not clear why Rabbi Gibraltar claimed that these debts expired without return. One can raise sides to this here and there, and so on.

2. The previous option was personal. It dealt with the status of each of the ghetto residents. But it is also possible to understand Rabbi Gibraltar's argument on the social level. His argument is that in a situation where anyone can take the life or rob money from any of the ghetto residents, the concepts of ownership have no meaning. For example, a resident who goes out to be killed by robbers. He has no heirs, and he is about to die (not according to the law and honesty). In such a situation, according to the first direction, his property is a nobody, but according to the current direction – certainly not, since the general social situation around him is normal, and the problem is only his. We will explain this direction a little more.

As is known, the Gershish in the fifth chapter is numbered Gates of Honor, proves that the Torah's ownership laws are based on a legal layer, which is human-general, what he calls "the law of justice." Only after society defines the legal criteria for determining and applying ownership does the Torah come and apply the prohibition of "thou shalt not steal," and other prohibitions on money, to violations of ownership.[7]

In light of this argument, Rabbi Gibraltar's words can be understood as follows: When a society operates according to the rules of honesty and fairness and establishes certain laws for itself, then these laws can serve as a legal background for the Torah laws that depend on ownership, and in particular "You shall not steal." However, in a situation where a society operates improperly, its legal system has no meaning, and even if they define something they call "law," it has no meaning. This is just as according to Halacha, "Dina demalchuta" that is not decent has no validity, which some call "Dina dahmsnuta." Thus, the evil Nazi "law" is "Dina drochtiya" and certainly has no halakhic or legal validity (the source of these words is the Ramban's "Chapter 22:51-52", and many poskim have cited and expanded upon it). It is known that legal experts have already established this (who, in light of the claim of the Harash, their words are also relevant in this matter on the halakhic level), and determined at the Nuremberg trials that the Nazi law had no legal validity. They tried civilians and soldiers despite their claim that they obeyed the law. So, of course, the halakhic law would not give such a "law" a halakhic seal and attach to it the prohibition "thou shalt not steal." On the other hand, the Jewish community in the ghetto has no coercive power and therefore has no possibility of governing and being considered a government in its own right in such a catastrophic situation. A situation has been created here in which there is no valid legal system in the ghetto at all. According to the Harash, without a legal layer operating in the background, there are no concepts of ownership. This is another possible explanation for Rabbi Gibraltar's claim.

Clarifying the novelty of things

It is important to understand that there is a major innovation here, beyond the words of the rabbis themselves. The main argument in this interpretation is that the ownership laws of the Torah do not depend on an abstract and "correct" legal system that precedes the Torah, for if such a system exists, then the halakha does not depend on what actually happens. In my opinion, the rabbis attach "You shall not steal" to the system that actually operates in a particular place, as determined by the government in that place. Therefore, where there is no legal system that actually operates, even if the proper rules are known according to which such a system should operate, the ownership laws of the Torah will not apply.

This seems to depend on an apparent contradiction in the words of the Harash at the beginning of Sha'ar 5, and we will discuss it briefly here. Throughout the entire Sha'ar he cites evidence from the Shas and poskim for his Yesod, but at the beginning of Sha'ar 5 (in Barpa'a, and in Pb, dh. 'Nel'an'd') he presents two main theoretical reasons for his claim, and Z"l (Bpb ibid):

Just as the type of owner and the rights of the owner of property are a legal matter, even without the warning 'Thou shalt not steal', and as we explained above, it is in no way possible to say that the reason we attribute the object to Reuben is because Shimon is warned according to the Torah not to steal it from him. Rather, the matter is the opposite, that the prohibition of theft is after the matter is decided in the laws of the owners' boundaries.…

And even though at first glance it is puzzling, what necessity and obligation would a person have to do something without the command and warning of the Torah? But when we delve into the matter thoroughly, this matter must be understood. After all, the obligation and necessity to serve God and fulfill His will is also a matter of obligation and necessity according to the law of reason and cognition, just as it is an obligation and the enslavement of money is a legal obligation, which is obligated according to the ways of the owners.…

In these words of the Rabbi, two main arguments arise:

1. The prohibition "Thou shalt not steal" is a prohibition against violating ownership. However, for this prohibition to have any meaning, we must first define the concepts of ownership themselves. Only after defining these concepts can we say that someone who violates them also violates the prohibition "Thou shalt not steal" (in addition to the legal prohibition).[8]The Rabbinate rejects outright the possibility that the boundaries of ownership were conveyed together with the prohibition "do not steal," both on halachic evidence and from explanation. We have not found such a definition anywhere, and everything is determined according to the opinions of the sages, who assess this according to legal fairness.
2. The validity of the obligation to obey the legal system exists even without a command. The Gerash's reasoning for this is that the validity of the obligation to serve God in general is also not derived from a command (since the obligation to observe a certain system cannot be an exception to that system).[9]

The first of the two arguments can be satisfied with a theoretical legal system. That is, even if there is no legal system that actually operates, the prohibition of "thou shalt not steal" can be defined on the basis of some theoretical legal system, which is defined by considerations of universal legal logic. However, the second argument, according to which there is an obligation to obey this legal system, does not appear to exist without a system that actually operates. Is the theoretical legal system legally binding in the ghetto as well? In a turbulent, cruel, and bestial life as it was there, a legal system has no meaning, and there is no obligation to act according to it. If so, at the very least it appears that even if there is a theoretical universal legal system, in a situation of living in a ghetto there is no legal system that obliges us. Therefore, there is ample reason to say that the rules of halakha of ownership will not apply in such a situation.

To clarify the innovation on this point, it should be said that according to this proposal, where there is a Dina Demalkuta that actually applies with respect to the laws of property, it will also determine the boundaries of ownership with respect to the Torah's ownership laws. In other words, it is not the theoretical legal system that stands behind the prohibitions of "thou shalt not steal," but the real-actual system that actually applies (of course, if it complies with the basic rules of honesty). Admittedly, this itself requires elaboration, and probably depends on various disputes, etc.

In the original article, I expanded and refined things further, we took it from there.

Mammon as a 'Kithon'

I will now comment on what emerges from these suggestions regarding the law of two people who walk in the desert with a water bottle. As stated, the author ofDBA He began his remarks by comparing the case of Yanuba to two people walking in the desert with a water jug, but in the end he ruled the opposite of the Rabbis: the 'jug' must be given to save the Jews of Yanuba. As we have seen, Rabbi Gibraltar's opinion is that the 'jug' (= the money) does not belong to either of the two. Of course, this does not mean that it belongs to the Jews of Yanuba, but only that he has no ownership of it at all.

It should be noted that the issue discussed here was whether there is an obligation to give it away, or whether it is permissible at all, and not whether it is permissible for a Jew from Yanova to take it from a Jew from Kovna. Therefore, it is possible that the halakhic determination that the property is a pafkir is useful in the matter of whether it is permissible (but, of course, not obligatory) to give it away. For if the kiton belongs to Reuven, he is prohibited from giving it to Shimon, his previous refusals.[10] In other words, there is no justification here for the obligation to give the money, but there is a possible basis for permission to give it.

However, as we have seen, Rabbi Gibraltar believed that the wealth in a person's own hands, although not owned by him, is like his body (an organ on which the soul depends). Therefore, even if a person does not own the wealth, it seems that he would be forbidden to give it away, since a person is forbidden to lose his life in order to save the life of his friend.

According to the testimony of his son (P. Nitzavim), Rabbi Gibraltar himself interpreted the teaching of theDBA (Unlike Rabbi Pogramansky, who was careful not to benefit even from the property of the murdered), and the late:

However, the ruling of the guru of the generation, Maran Gra"d Shapira zt"l (=hDBA), although there is no ownership of property in the ghetto and everything is empty, there is another law: 'You shall not stand for the blood of your neighbor'. – Terrible and terrible. If you can save a life with your own soul and stay alive, you must risk your life and save.

Apparently, there is room to understand the ruling on a purely halakhic level (this is how the aforementioned appellant understood it, in P. Hazinu), and not as Rabbi Gibraltar did. Or because it is a question of doubt versus certainty, and the methods by which a person is permitted to put himself in doubt in order to save his friend. Or it is said that where the two Jews are in doubt about the fate of a third party (not from thirst, but from the Nazis and the Lithuanians), then there is no law of "your lives come first," since the lives of both of them probably will not be saved even if he keeps the kiton with him. Indeed, from the language of the article it is clear that Rabbi Gibraltar understood that this ruling is not the product of a halakhic consideration, but rather is based on the need to be entitled to miracles, which alone will save the ghetto Jews from death in such a situation (and otherwise it would not help them even if they kept the money in their hands). Here again, the circumstantial Holy Spirit enters, which stands in contrast to the criticism that is based on the eternal and fundamental component of halakhic law.

Halacha in "fire" situations

In this context, it is appropriate to cite here other similar rulings in the authority of the author.DBA (Issue P. of My Laws), who forbade everyone in the ghetto to eat legumes in the cold and hunger until death, and forbade eating horse meat only for yeshiva members (as a member of the Jewish community for the rest of the community) even when their lives were in danger. He claims that the community must demonstrate a member of the Jewish community in order to receive miracles, which alone will save them from their situation. The author's wordsDBA It was: "From the place where exemption ends, there the dedication of the soul begins." He said this, but he warned: "Do not lose the soul," and a hair's breadth distinguishes them. We will add here that, as is known, theDBA He himself decided, while he was ill, not to join his son in America, but to return to his community in Kovno, and he was also the only one in the ghetto who did not remove his beard, and was even willing to be killed for it. See his son's introduction to S. DBA holiday.

If we are honest, what this means is that in a situation where we are in tangible danger of death, the normal halakhic rules are invalid. Not only does the concept of "ownership" expire, but many other rules as well. As an illustration for those who are "on the outside," let us imagine a case in which a community lives in the midst of a literal fire ("the town is burning"). It is burning fiercely and consuming them every day and every moment. Even if there is some chance of salvation, is there any discussion of ownership of property in such a situation? Are the rules of precedence valid in the midst of the fire? It is quite clear that someone living in the midst of the fire will decide laws in ways that would not really be appropriate to write inShulchan Arba'ahAnd of course, these decisions will not seem reasonable to an arbiter who observes the situation from the outside.

It is worth recalling here the division of the Todu'ah 'Zarek', B.K. 17b,[11] They divided between a tool that is on its way to the ground, which is a manna from Tabira, since the power of destruction is already within it, and when an arrow is shot at the tool, here until the arrow hits the tool, the tool is considered intact.[12] The Jews in the ghetto are like a baby thrown from the roof (with a slight chance of being saved, in a completely miraculous event, and a greater chance that someone else will come and get them with a sword even before that). In the process of flying downwards, when the power of destruction is already within him and threatens to destroy him, does he calculate the laws of fate and fortune? The question facing the ghetto scholars was whether their situation was like that vessel waiting to be hit by an arrow, or whether they were already flying downwards and like a broken vessel, and only a miracle would save them. The gist of the things that emerge from the "testimony" of the author ofDBA (According to Rabbi Gibraltar's interpretation) is that they understood their situation in the second way, and therefore what matters here are considerations such as what to do in order to receive a miracle.[13]

On the other hand, halakhic and Torah considerations still exist and are still being made. After all, if the entire Torah is abrogated, then what place is there for considerations of the sanctification of God and miracles, etc.? It is clear that only some of the usual halakhic categories, such as people's financial rights and even considerations of fiqon, may be abrogated or changed, but broader Torah considerations are certainly being made. These are the words of the testimony.

Summary

So far, a possible analysis of the decisions of Rabbi Gibraltar and the author ofDBAThe situation in the ghetto is the maximum extreme of the gap that we described in the previous section, between a posk or even an ordinary person who is in some situation, and someone who observes it from the outside. This gap was not clear to the above-mentioned appellant, who did not understand that when the situation is so extreme and far from what he knows, he should treat things as evidence and not as an expression of a normal halachic position.

As we saw in the previous section, just as the decisions here were difficult to accept on the basis of the eternal component of the Torah, since they have critical weight for circumstances, time, and place, so it is also difficult to attach them to the law that is handed down to future generations. Following the brief analysis presented here, it was necessary to add toShulchan Arba'ah A section that deals with "fire" situations. It seems that eternal lessons can be distilled from this. And yet, it is completely understandable why no Posk would do so. The way of the Halacha is that decisions of this type remain as Toshabaf, or as the "fifth part of theShulchan Arba'ah"And are not determined as a fixed and binding halakhah for generations. One reason for this is that there are no objective criteria to assess when we are in such a situation. The meaning of these words is an acknowledgement that such a question is reserved solely for the poskim who are in the "burning". It depends essentially on the circumstances and meta-halakhic considerations, and less on the eternal principles of halakhah. In any case, it is clear that the question of what is right to do in such situations is reserved solely for them. There is no point in establishing eternal and universal rules and regulations here, and those standing on the outside can only accept the things as evidence and try to understand them in retrospect.

Still, looking at and analyzing them as a type of testimony contributes greatly to the posek who is supposed to deal with various situations, even if they are fundamentally different from the extreme situations we have described here (situations of "burning"). This is an example of the contribution of the temporary component of specific rulings, which joins the eternal component of the halakha on the methodological level, as described in the previous section. Here we can also see the most fundamental understandings of the laws of property that emerge from this testimony. In ordinary life circumstances, such insights are difficult to reach, despite their eternity.

C. Second example: Changing workplace due to a disability

introduction

In this section, we will examine a typical response by Rabbi Ephraim Asheri (also from the Kovno ghetto) in his Responsa fromDepths which deals entirely with halachic questions from hell. This is answer number 5, which deals with the possibility of changing jobs for jobs that involve offenses, in order to improve one's chances of survival. The wording of the answer is given in full at the end of the article, although we will not go into its details, in order to allow the reader to understand and examine these references.

The question

This is the questioner's language:

This is a reminder and I pour out my soul on it because in the days of the damned spies we had no resurrection and every day they would take over a thousand people out of the ghetto to make them work hard at the airport and to make them suffer in their suffering. And here he came before the disciples of Mr. Yaakov Y.D. and his soul with his question, since he had the opportunity to work in the kitchen instead of cooking the black soup that was made from beans that the Germans would distribute to the Jews along with one hundred grams of bread per day, but he was told that there he would be forced and obliged to work in the kitchen even on Shabbat. However, since by doing so he would be saved from the hard forced labor at the airport that consumed the soul and broke the body, perhaps there was also a sense of self-preservation in this, because since he would be saved from hard and exhausting work and would be able to eat and satisfy his hungry soul with black soup to the best of his ability, his soul and body would thereby become more resilient and would be able to withstand the general hunger that prevailed in the ghetto. He also asked if he was permitted to eat on Shabbat himself from the black soup that he cooked on Shabbat.

The question is whether it is permissible to change jobs to work that involves desecrating the Sabbath and violating the prohibition against enjoying a Sabbath act in order to improve one's chances of survival.

Here we can already see a serious difficulty in the matter. According to the halakhic law, enjoyment of Shabbat is a rabbinical prohibition. And would it even occur to us to have even the slightest doubt that this is permissible and proper in the first place? And would it even occur to us to enter into serious doubt about the halakhic law because of the prohibition of enjoyment of Shabbat? Even in Torah prohibitions such as cooking, it is difficult to understand what the doubt is at all. But the question regarding rabbinical prohibitions certainly speaks to me. The outside observer cannot understand this. And yet, the respondent begins a comprehensive halakhic discussion (it is presented in full in the appendix). The very way it is structured and the order in which it appears teaches us a great deal about its tendencies, and in fact also answers the difficulties we have raised here.

The process of repentance and the difficulties

From the reading it appears that Rabbi Asheri's response is divided into two parts (they have been marked by me in the language of the response in the appendix). The first deals with a halakhic discussion on the issue of enjoyment from Sabbath prohibitions, and the second offers an interpretation according to which even the prohibitions of cooking (cooking) in such a situation are nothing more than rabbinic prohibitions (he relies on the methods of the poskim that labor under duress done in order to be saved is a shalal). In the first part he presents at length the various methods of the poskim regarding the prohibition of enjoyment from a Sabbath act, and in the second part he expounds on the methods of the poskim who believe that salvation from duress is a shalal. He criticizes and excuses them according to the way of the Torah.

This whole discussion is quite puzzling, since we are dealing with a situation of "Pikun", and what is the place for all these poor grammars? It is clear that any prohibition, whether from the Torah or from the Rabbis (except for the three most serious ones), is permitted in the place of "Pikun".[14] The matter is even more puzzling in light of what Rabbi Ashrey himself writes at the end of the Teshuva, when he summarizes the oleh to the Dinah:

The understanding of the above is that it seems to me that the person questioned should be permitted to work in the kitchen on Shabbat, because either way, the damned devils will force him to work in forced labor at the airport on Shabbat. If so, what kind of work will be considered desecrating the Shabbat, whether in another job or in the kitchen? And wouldn't he either way not violate a Torah prohibition? Since he desecrates the Shabbat out of necessity, it is a work that does not require a body, and it is not prohibited except by the rabbis, and in the case of the rabbis, it is not prohibited because of the danger to life involved.

Therefore, it certainly seems that he is permitted to work in the work of cooking on Shabbat, since by doing so he will also have a little food to satisfy his soul. And there is no prohibition here for him to eat the black soup that he cooks on Shabbat. The whole point of this is that it is not forbidden to do something on Shabbat, since there is a sense of self-preservation in eating it. And all the more so that other Jews are permitted to eat this soup that he cooks on Shabbat for the above reason, because it is a great sense of self-preservation that he postpones Shabbat, because the strength of these poor people to endure has already completely failed and they are literally dying from hunger and deprivation. Therefore, it is certainly permissible for them to satisfy their hungry souls with this soup, even though it was cooked on Shabbat.

Well, if there is a situation here where Piku'n permits everything, then there is actually no NEP for the entire discussion conducted above. Why then conduct it? Why does it matter whether a Shabbat act is rabbinic or Torah, and whether it is a matter of Shatzlag or not (a difficult question in itself, and I agree), if in the end everything is permitted in a blanket manner by the law of Piku'n? In fact, what should have been written in this answer is one sentence: simply that everything is permitted without any doubt because of Piku'n or doubt of Piku'n. It does not seem necessary to add even a single word.

The meaning of things

First, we must note that the answers in the Responsorial Psalm From the depths They were written after the Holocaust and not at the time these decisions were made. However, according to Rabbi Asher, the writing only detailed and explained the decision-making process that took place in the midst of the inferno. Therefore, the above difficulties still exist, because even after the Holocaust, it was enough to write that everything is permitted in place of the Piku'n, and nothing more.

It could also be said that for someone living in hell, the limits of the fiqun change. After all, the level of risk that will be considered a fiqun is not fixed in halakhah. And if one lives in a situation where risk is a part of life, the limits of the fiqun become stricter, meaning that a higher risk is required in order to be considered a fiqun that postpones Shabbat. If so, then perhaps Rabbi Asher wanted to clarify whether there is indeed a fiqun here, and to examine whether it is possible to also permit a side that does not constitute a fiqun. But this is not apparent from his language either, since he is not at all concerned with clarifying this question, but with ordinary halakhic questions. Furthermore, we saw that in his conclusion he states that this is indeed a situation of fiqun and makes the entire answer unnecessary.

It seems that Rabbi Asheri is conducting this discussion for a completely different reason. Let us imagine that the answer was indeed given as we suggested above: everything is permitted because of the "Fiku" and nothing else. This means that within the "burning" no trace of theShulchan Arba'ah The whole thing. Halacha itself ceases to be relevant to the lives of Jews in the ghetto and labor camps. Such a situation seemed unbearable to Rabbi Asher. While it is true that everything is permitted by Halacha, he did not allow himself to write such a reply. Instead, he prepares a detailed reply on all the methods on the issues discussed, although he himself makes it clear at the end that this entire discussion is not at all relevant to the decision. The appearance of making halachic decisions was more important to him than the decision itself.

Such a consideration is also reserved only for the adjudicators who are in hell. It is possible that in the situation they are in, there will be a decision to surrender the soul even against the prohibitions of their rabbis, similar to the consideration of theDBA Not to violate even the laws or other rabbinic prohibitions in order to merit a miracle and salvation. In this matter, too, Rabbi Asheri could have thought that in the situation they find themselves, the permissions of the Piku'n do not apply, and to be strict and not allow violating the prohibitions of the rabbinic or Torah even in place of the Piku'n. Such a decision is also not subject to criticism from the outside, since whoever is standing there does not understand the situation at all. Of course, this cannot also be included in the strict component of the halakha that is passed on to future generations, since this is a decision that is considered an offense for its own sake (except this time, strictly and not strictly. Strictness is imposed where it is forbidden to be strict, and it is done for its own sake).

A slightly different possibility is that for someone living inside the "fire," this is normal life. He does not perceive this situation as exceptional and catastrophic as it seems to us who live outside. From his perspective, this is life, and applying the halakha to his life is a given. If we live our normal lives and treat them as a state of pikuach nefesh, the entire halakha is null and void. The perspective of someone living in such a situation is that this is life and all the normal halakha considerations must be applied to them. Only those who see such a situation as exceptional see it as a piku'n. For example, the poskim wrote that actions that ordinary people do, even if they involve danger, are permissible. For example, smoking a cigarette or driving on the road. Someone who lived in a different reality and had to express a position on driving or smoking might have prohibited it in raids, and not at all understand those who permit it. But we who live in the situation feel that ordinary people do not see this as an extraordinary danger, but rather a reasonable risk that people take on a regular basis. Therefore, from our perspective, this is not a piku'n situation. For those who lived daily in the Kovno ghetto, this situation is the usual situation, and therefore perhaps from their perspective, this is not automatically viewed as a situation of piku'n nefesh. There is still room for meticulous halakhic discussions, as we have seen. Although Rabbi Asheri also concluded that it is indeed a piku'n that permits these prohibitions, it can be said at least that from his perspective it was not self-evident. The usual halakhic discussion is not unreasonable and should be conducted.

D. The main lesson that emerges from our words

We began by distinguishing between "local knowledge" and "public knowledge." Within "public knowledge," that is, the Torah created by people in different times and places, we distinguished between two components: the eternal and the pure (which is also not entirely "local knowledge"), versus the circumstantial. We saw the differences and also the complex relationship between them. The circumstantial is intertwined with the eternal and vice versa, and it is still important to distinguish between them for several reasons: In extreme situations, the decision is left to those who live within them. Criticism is not possible, but at most a retrospective analysis. The circumstantial part does not join the halakhah that will be passed on, but it does contain components that do contribute to the pure halakhah. Parts in which a different halakhic interpretation is made, and parts that illuminate the methodological and meta-halakhic dimensions of the ruling that join our perception of halakhah. We have seen that the rule, "Do not judge your friend until you have reached his place," is not just a joke of honesty and teaching righteousness to those who err and sin, but an assertion of halakhic truth itself.

And from a more general and principled perspective, Rabbi Asher's example adds to what we saw in the previous section, and together they illustrate the dominance of the circumstantial component in decisions during the Holocaust, and the two sides of the coin described in the first section: on the one hand, the inability to derive the decision in such cases from the normal rules of halakhah. And on the other hand, the inability to attach these decisions to the evolving halakhic corpus that is passed on to future generations. The advantage of those who live within the situation versus the advantage of those whose Torah wisdom (in the pure component of halakhah) is greater.

Such rulings remain in the posak's toolbox, but only as oral Torah. They will not appear in any halakhic book of rulings, since as we saw in the first part, the validity of a book of rulings cannot depend on circumstances, time, and place. But a posak can learn a lot from a halakhic analysis that attempts to place the specific ruling on a basis that draws from the eternal component of the halakhic law. These cases reveal to us boundaries and boundaries that ordinary halakhic law does not address. In this sense, they have great theoretical and methodological value, and in extreme cases, they also have practical value.

It is important to understand that the important and current practical implications of our words concern less extreme cases. When a posek is faced with a situation that he has not experienced and does not understand its significance for those taking part in it, he must be very careful when deciding on a halakha for them. Naturally, he will do so from the general principles of halakha (its eternal, pure and unadulterated component), which is his art, but sometimes it will be difficult for him to correctly weigh the circumstantial components. The cautious posek should be aware of this and understand that he does not have the power to rule and dictate halakha for situations that are fundamentally different from his life's experience and circumstances. Just as a blind person cannot make claims against a sighted person who trusts his sense of sight, and just as a person who has not experienced a divine encounter cannot argue with Abraham our father why he did not doubt the authenticity of the divine command, so too should someone who is unfamiliar with any human situation not rule halakha regarding it. Therefore, an appeal, in the form described in the second part, to Rabbi Gibraltar's approach is also not of the essence.

Of course, in many cases, even someone who is not in the situation can understand it, get to the root of the problems, and decide a halakhah. None of us has experienced all types of experiences or knows all types of reality, and it is clear that I do not intend to claim that it is impossible to rule on a halakhah regarding any situation that we have not experienced ourselves. As long as there is sufficient similarity between the situations, that is enough. Here I am referring only to situations and questions that meet two conditions: 1. The situation in which the question arises is fundamentally different from the world of the posk. 2. The question is such that in order to answer it, direct familiarity with the reality and circumstances of the questioner(s) is necessary. Given these two conditions, the posk must ask himself whether he is at all qualified to decide the question, with all the Torah and halakhic knowledge he has.

Hearing about the Holocaust is not like mountains of life within it. Understanding modern and open society is not like mountains of life within it. Learning about God's command to our forefather Abraham is not like mountains of direct experience of such a command. Hence, even in the reality of our lives, which is usually not so extreme, there are still questions in which the posk must ensure that he has the necessary familiarity with the circumstances before he answers and decides. This is a very important and topical halakhic lesson that can be learned from a systematic view of halakhic rulings on the Holocaust.

Appendix: "From the Depths" C.E.

answer:[15]

A. In Holin, page 15, a.d., the law states that one who cooks on Shabbat accidentally will eat it; on purpose he will not eat it. The words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: One who cooks on Shabbat accidentally will eat it; on purpose he will not eat it for a lifetime. Rabbi Yochanan the Sandaler says: One who cooks on Shabbat accidentally will eat it for others and not for himself. One who cooks on Shabbat accidentally will eat it for a lifetime, neither for himself nor for others.

And the Rambam in the fifth chapter of the Laws of Shabbat, 33:23, ruled that an Israelite who did work on Shabbat, if he did it intentionally, is forbidden to enjoy that work forever, and the rest of Israel are permitted to enjoy it immediately in the Mishnah, as it is said, "And you shall keep the Shabbat, for it is holy to you; it is holy, and no deed of it is holy." How is it that an Israelite who cooked on Shabbat intentionally in the Mishnah may eat for others, but for himself he may not eat forever, and if he cooked by mistake in the Mishnah, he may eat for himself and for others immediately? The Rambam ruled in the sixth chapter.

But the column in the sign of the 18th century ruled in the name of Rabbi Baal HaTos, that if he accidentally cooks on Shabbat, it is permissible even for him, and if he intentionally cooks on Shabbat, it is prohibited for others, and in the evening, it is permissible for him as well. That is, he ruled according to the 19th century, and the Ramban ruled according to the words of the Rambam, and so the Geonim ruled. And in the Shulchan Aisha ruled similarly in the 19th century, in the 19th century, he wrote that if he cooks on Shabbat intentionally, it is prohibited for him forever, and for others, it is immediately permissible for the 19th century, and if he accidentally cooks on Shabbat, it is prohibited for others as well.

And here, all the Rabbis do not even mention prohibiting in order for him to do it, and this is not according to the opinion of Rashi z"l, who prohibits in order for him to do it, as it is written there in the Book of God that Rabbi Yehuda says that if he accidentally eats on the eve of Shabbat and not on Shabbat, and the Lord later said that if he accidentally eats on the eve of Shabbat, stoning is obligatory for him, regardless of whether it is an offense or not, and in their opinion, in order for him to do it without the benefit of the sin of the law.

And in the first chapter, page 1, page 1, it is said by Dr. Yochanan the Sandaler, as the father of Rabbi Chiya, the epitaph of the chief priest, "And you shall keep the Sabbath, for it is holy to you. What is holy is forbidden in eating, even the work of the Sabbath is forbidden in eating. What is holy is forbidden in enjoyment, even the work of the Sabbath is forbidden in enjoyment. May God bless you, yours. It is possible, even by mistake, to defile it. Death will be put to death intentionally. I told you, not by mistake. Plague in it. Rav Acha and Rabin, one said a work of the Sabbath from the Torah, and one said a work of the Sabbath from the Rabbis. 44 from the Torah, as they say, and from the Rabbis, they say, "Call it holy, it is holy, and its works are not holy, Aisha."

And here is the Ritva in the Ketubot, page 34, A.A., who wrote: And if Rabbi Yehuda said that he would not eat on purpose, that is, he would not eat, since he is the one who established the Sabbath act for the whole world, except Rabbi Yochanan the Shoemaker, in particular, it is reasonable to say that Dr. Yehuda was mistaken as Dr. Yehuda was mistaken and Dr. Yochanan the Shoemaker was mistaken as Dr. Yehuda was mistaken. And they said that the Sabbath act was a mistake, and Rav Acha and Rabina, and so there is a question in the Hadith, because Dr. Yochanan the Shoemaker said that he said the Sabbath act. And who is it that does not bring evidence from this that there is a halakha like him? This is what was said in the book of Dechulin, a rabbi who taught his student, Rabbi Yochanan, and he discussed the Pirka in Rabbi Yehuda, and who is a great rabbi to us to rule on the halakha. And because of this, because Rabbi Yochanan Eflig and his disciples, it is not acceptable for her, and because of the baraita above, Rabbi Yochanan Eflig and his disciples, it is not acceptable for her, and because of the need for the baraita above, Rabbi Yochanan Eztricha, a Pharisee. The reason is this. And the one who is a deplagi,

Although in the Haga Si' 18, Sk"b I saw that it was written and Z"l Dalami that it was cooked for him, so he is judged like himself, as stated in the Yorad Si' 19, 65. Regarding the matter of a past and abrogated prohibition, it is forbidden to him from the beginning, and for one who has abrogated it, here is a reason because of a kansa, and who is it from the words of the Bible there, which means that the people of Aksum are the ones who have heard that he should tell the Aksumites to cancel it, but here is it that God has to wait in order for him to do it when they cooked Aksumites and for Israel, they did not hear that no one sins, nor for him. In any case, it is clear from this that it is forbidden to cook on Shabbat for Israel, blood that was cooked for him, so he is judged like himself, as stated in the Maga, and so in the matter of the alleged Didan, it is forbidden to cook, and if he passes and cooks, the soup will be forbidden to Israel, since all the work of cooking in this kitchen is for the Jews who are in trouble and captivity in the ghetto enclosure.

on. However, in the book Rosh Yosef, in the chapter on Shabbat, page 12, it is written that if someone is raped, he must choose one thing: to desecrate Shabbat or to eat food that is forbidden from slaughter, he must choose to desecrate Shabbat. Desecrating Shabbat is rape and constitutes a work that does not require a sacrifice, and this is only from the rabbis. However, this is not the case. If he eats slaughter, he will break the prohibition of the Torah, since he enjoys eating it. And he also cites in Rosh Yosef that the Prophet disagrees with the words of the Torah, where they wrote that he works on Shabbat because of suffering, and the Prophet because of suffering, and the like. O work that does not require a sacrifice. And the Maharsha's Mishkan in the book of 2:19 says that the one who bends over to the heavens means a work that does not require a sacrifice.

And in light of the words of the aforementioned Rabbi Yosef, the Maharsham wrote in Orchot Chaim in the Shabbat 6th chapter, 1989, that it is right for Jewish military personnel that their work is from the rabbis, since they do it because of rape. He cited this from the words of the Maharika who wrote in Shoshar 117, Bahai Divmot, page 122, "A foreigner shall not be eaten by you, as you would eat a piece of meat on Shabbat, God's way, only the rabbinical prohibition of cooking this, since it was done so that the uncircumcised would not die, is a work that does not need a body." He also wrote there that the Shas said in the Sanhedrin, "To eat aspic and to eat the flesh of animals is a work that does not need a body." And also in the Responsa Beit Yitzchak, part 1989, who wrote for Be'er Amai, "This is a work that does not need a body."

Although it is apparent that one should be careful about this, it is stated in Yerushalmi P. B. Dehgigiga Halacha A. At the time of the decree that decreed that the Jews should desecrate the Sabbath, when the enemies were loading them with loads on the Sabbath, the Jews intended that there would be two people carrying one load so that they would not violate the Sabbath prohibition. Those who did work on the Sabbath were exempt, and even so, those who did work were exempt. This is from the Torah, but in any case it is forbidden by the rabbis to do so, as explained in the Shabbos section, page 3 and page 4. If so, what did the Jews gain by carrying one load for two people? In any case, they did so in order to escape the Torah prohibition, as stated in the P. M. and the 60's there.

And if it is a law for you to do a work that does not require a body when the Akkadians force him to violate the Sabbath, then it is difficult for the Akkadians to understand the meaning of the word. Were the Jews required to have two people carrying one load in order to be exempt from the prohibition of the Torah? Even if each person carries the load alone, he would not be violating the prohibition of the Torah. Since the Akkadians force him to do so, then a work that does not require a body is not prohibited by the Torah. And Akkadians wrote in the above-mentioned Yerushalmi that the Jews intended for two people to carry one load in order to be exempt from the prohibition of the Torah. And indeed, the law for a work that does not require a body also applies to the work of carrying, as explained in Shabbat, page 4, Ayish. And if so, it is apparently difficult for the above-mentioned Yerushalmi on this basis.

It is true that it is not possible to say that these Jews were able to do their work so that they would not transgress a prohibition from the Torah, as is the case with all the scholars, since in work that does not require physical labor, the Rabbis and the Rabbis are exempt from it, and the Rabbis say that it is obligatory. Similarly, there is a difference between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda in the years in which they did work on Shabbat, the Rabbis are required to do it and the Rabbis are exempted.

And if so, according to this Shafir, the words of the Yerushalmi in what he wrote that the Jews intended for two to carry one load, since they would thereby be exempt from the prohibition of the Torah, according to all the scholars, even if Rabbi Meir said that those who did work on Shabbat are obligated in any case to be exempt, because Rabbi Meir said that the Rabbis were exempt from work that does not require physical labor, and if so, since the Akmos force them to do the work on Shabbat, they are exempt from work that does not require physical labor, according to the above explanation. And even if the Rabbis decreed that work that does not require a body to be obligatory, they found a way to exempt them from all charges, since the Rabbis decreed that those who did work on Shabbat were exempt, and therefore they intentionally intended that there be two people carrying one load so that they would be exempt, according to the Dechulei Alma, whether the work that does not require a body to be exempt or the work that does not require a body to be obligatory and a duty.

And also in Maharik 323 and in Fama 323, 324, 325, and in Havat Yair 323, 325, I saw that they suggested that desecrating the Sabbath by rape is a work that does not require a body and is not prohibited except by the rabbis of the Aisha, and this rape that I am a majority of them considered was only the rape of the body that would force them to work the king's service. And even so, they suggested that it is not prohibited except by the rabbis because it is a work that does not require a body.

And if according to this in the case of Didan, that the damned scoundrels would force the Jews to work in all kinds of hard labor on Shabbat, and if they did not obey them, they would put them to death in all kinds of deaths and tortures, then surely this rape is a rape of death and surely these unfortunates should be permitted to desecrate Shabbat, because rape is, mercifully, a natural rape. And even more so, since there is actual rape of souls here. And greater than this, I saw in the Responsa Yad Shalom 67, which wrote that if it is coercion on behalf of the government to desecrate Shabbat, in violation of the Torah prohibition, the party must be permitted to do so by virtue of the Mishak of the Maharik 67. And if so, it is even more so that in the case of Didan, that rape is a rape of souls, who should be permitted to desecrate Shabbat.

The understanding of the above is that it seems to me that the person questioned should be permitted to work in the kitchen on Shabbat, because either way, the damned devils will force him to work in forced labor at the airport on Shabbat. If so, what kind of work will be considered desecrating the Shabbat, whether in another job or in the kitchen? And wouldn't he either way not violate a Torah prohibition? Since he desecrates the Shabbat out of necessity, it is a work that does not require a body, and it is not prohibited except by the rabbis, and in the case of the rabbis, it is not prohibited because of the danger to life involved.

Therefore, it certainly seems that he is permitted to work in the work of cooking on Shabbat, since by doing so he will also have a little food to satisfy his soul. And there is no prohibition here for him to eat the black soup that he cooks on Shabbat. The whole point of this is that it is not forbidden to do something on Shabbat, since there is a sense of self-preservation in eating it. And all the more so that other Jews are permitted to eat this soup that he cooks on Shabbat for the above reason, because it is a great sense of self-preservation that he postpones Shabbat, because the strength of these poor people to endure has already completely failed and they are literally dying from hunger and deprivation. Therefore, it is certainly permissible for them to satisfy their hungry souls with this soup, even though it was cooked on Shabbat.

And may the good Lord save us from errors and say to the destroyer, enough is enough, and bring us out of darkness into light and from slavery to redemption soon in our days, Amen.

[1] See my article, "Is Halacha a Hebrew Law?", entree 15, Marachsvan 577, p. 141.

[2] See, for example, Hana Kasher, "'How could God command us to do such an abomination?': A Critique of the Binding of Isaac According to Yosef Ibn-Kaspi", The Pen of Knowledge 1 5727, pp. 39-47; Shulamit Elitzur, Rabbi Elazar Bir Rabbi Clear, Torah Giving Day, Jerusalem 1979, pp. 67-74; Aviezer Ravitzky, "Introduction – The Binding and the Covenant: Abraham and His Sons in Jewish Thought", Abraham, the father of the faithful, his image in the mirror of Jewish thought throughout the generations, Ramat-Gan 2002, pp. 29-38.

The things presented in this section are based on my article, "What I forsake, God will not avenge, and what I anger, God will not be angry." Noon 20, Winter 2007, p. 9. Here the discussion is abbreviated and adapted to the topic of the current article.

[4] See Rabbi Margaliot's introduction toResponsorial Psalm from heaven Regarding the words of the Rabbi in the book of errors, which he wrote, that he ruled according to the Holy Spirit. And such incolumn Ohh Si' Mo on behalf of Rav Natronai Gaon regarding the regulation of one hundred blessings.

[5] There is a similar reference to the narrator, who is also a pauper. Although the author has already wondered about this Abenz Abba Zechariah 32:2, and the words are ancient.

[6] There also appears (in a later section) a question about whether there is a difference between a lien on a loan that has expired and a deposit. It is not clear from its language whether the intention is to provide whether, before the judgment, the deposit must be returned to the depositor (even though he is no longer its owner), or whether a deposit is also considered to be in his possession, and therefore he has ownership over it in principle.

[7] For a detailed, though not entirely accurate, discussion, see Avi Sagi's article, 'The Religious Mitzvah and the Legal System – A Chapter in the Halachic Thought of Rabbi Shimon Shekap', knowledge 35, 5755, pp. 99-114.

[8] His words clearly indicate that the legal level is not only a definition of ownership, as the background to the prohibition of 'thou shalt not steal,' but also has an independent normative meaning. Whoever violates it violates, in addition to the halakhic prohibition of 'thou shalt not steal,' also a legal prohibition. The implications of this point are found in the articles 'The Problem of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Whole and the Dilemma of the 'Defensive Wall'', Noon 14, Aviv 5763. There I pointed out that Rashi's approach in Bek 60:2, that a person is forbidden to save himself with his neighbor's money and pay, is necessarily based on such a view (and also in my remarks in Bar-Rag, where I noted that although all the Rishonim disagree with Rashi on this, a similar principled view clearly emerges from the statements of many of them).

[9] This is also known in the philosophy of law, where many have insisted that the duty to uphold the law cannot be included in the law, but rather that the law itself must be upheld?! See, for example, in Chaim Ganz's book, obedience and refusal, Kibbutz Hameuhad, Tel Aviv 1996 (see ibid. at the beginning of Chapter 1, p. 21). And see also in detail in my book (the fourth in the trilogy) Two carts and a hot air balloon), The Spirit of Justice In the first part.

[10] This is my assumption here, and it follows from the simple language of the text that in the 23rd century there is a prohibition against giving another person to drink. However, according to Shaykh HaTos, who disagrees with Rambam and believes that it is permissible to kill for other offenses (except for the three most serious ones), it seems that it would also be permissible here.

[11] And this is similar to the Ramban at the end of the booklet. Dina Degrami, which divided between when the harmful thing began its action and when it was caused.

[12] Although, as is known, inKZVAH Si' Sha'ts Ska'a believed that the Rosh disagreed with Thos' on this, and that it is not necessary, and that the words are ancient.

[13] It should be noted here that the Poskim disagree on whether it is permissible to commit a sin in order to be saved through a miracle. See this inIn the name of God Rabbi C. Kenna, S. B.-C. He cites evidence there that King David saved the world from the flood that destroyed it by erasing the name (see also B.A collection of Talmud commentaries (Makoto 11:1.) Although it should be rejected in light of what the commentators there differed about whether there was any prohibition in this at all.) And I also heard that there was an incident with the owner of theDesire of Solomon, who strictly forbade traveling to the Rebbe of Belz on Shabbat so that he could pray for a dangerously ill person, or give him an amulet (and I did not find one. See also The thousand is full., O.H. 318). Perhaps some may say that in the case of a discarded baby, when the power of death is already at work within it, it is not a matter of choice. The prohibition of committing a transgression in order to be saved by a miracle, for those who believe that there is a prohibition, is only when the world is acting as it is, but there is danger to some person. However, in a "fire", many Torah principles are violated, and the conduct is completely different. In this matter too, one should extend a word of caution, and so on.

[14] There was reason to argue that this was a time of destruction, but Rabbi Ashrey himself, at the end of his remarks, required permission from the law of the Pikuan (see immediately), and does not bring this up. Therefore, it is clear that he did not see this as a time of destruction that requires the surrender of one's life for every prohibition.

[15] The division into two sections is mine, to make it easier for the reader and to mark for him the relevant sections to which I referred in my remarks.