About the public debate on conversion

With God’s help

First Source – 2008

Reflections on Shlomo Fisher's article ('Emet Hashalom', P. Hakat)

introduction

In recent weeks, there has been a public debate, both in the religious world and beyond, about conversion. There are several strands to this debate, some of which appear in Shlomo Fisher's article. Despite the ocean of words that have been poured out on these questions, in my opinion, a real discussion on the important points has not yet begun (!).

Therefore, even though it seems as if the topic has already reached saturation, and perhaps precisely because of this mistake, I would like to briefly sketch a schematic and initial map of the discussion here, and be content with that. It seems that presenting such a map is enough to understand the absurdity of the way the discussion has been conducted so far.

introduction

The latest affair began with a ruling by the Rabbinical Court in Ashkelon, where Rabbi Attiya decided to invalidate the conversion of a couple who came before him for a divorce, and in the course of his remarks he even expanded the scope and invalidated the conduct of the entire conversion system headed by Rabbi Druckman. The matter takes on added importance due to the fact that almost all conversions in recent years have been made within this framework.

In an appeal filed with the Supreme Rabbinical Court, the judges of the court surprised and upheld Rabbi Atiya's ruling, and even reinforced it with additional allegations, some of which were directed at the system headed by Rabbi Druckman and its conduct, and some at Rabbi Druckman and the judges themselves. They used extremely harsh expressions, which are generally not acceptable in rabbinical rulings, and even invalidated all the thousands of conversions that have been made in this system in recent years. The conduct of the entire case raises serious questions regarding proper procedure and a matter-of-fact approach.

Following these rulings, a serious controversy arose, in which religious-Zionist ideology is increasingly taking center stage. According to my impression, the majority of the public sees the controversy as a political debate in the guise of halakhic law, that is, as an irrelevant discussion.

Some starting points

When discussing these issues, several important assumptions should be emphasized:

1. Ideological disagreement can certainly be expressed in various halachic rulings (and not just regarding the Hallel and/or blessing on Independence Day). There is nothing wrong with that, and it does not mean that the disagreement is irrelevant, or not for the sake of God.

2. Even if there are exceptions to the procedure and the way of expression, this does not necessarily mean that the side that adopts them is not halakhically based. It is possible to criticize him for his methods of conduct, and at the same time agree with the content. On the other hand, although the writer accepts "and God will seek the persecuted," we are also commanded "and the poor shall not boast in his enemy." If someone is persecuted and suffers, this does not necessarily make him righteous. The fact that "we were offended," or "he started it," does not exempt us from addressing the problems and relevant arguments.

3. The sharpness and extremeness of the argument does not necessarily indicate improper motives. Sometimes Ritcha Da'Oriyata leads dayanim or rabbis to express themselves in sharp ways, because they are anxious about the fate of the halakha (as they perceive it). This does not necessarily indicate hatred, or improper motives. Of course, this argument does not justify improper conduct, but only focuses the discussion about it, and puts it in the proper proportion.[1]

4. When the discussion raises several independent questions, the discussion should be broken down and conducted separately on each of them. The conclusion should be drawn only at the end. A trend-setting (public or halakhic) discussion, which is conducted in the shadow of conclusions, is usually shallow and not relevant. Assuming what is sought has a notable advantage, as it always leads to the desired conclusion, but it is still not the recommended way to systematically and in-depthly clarify the issue.

The discussion axes

I will now outline only a few of the main points of discussion on the subject. Due to the brevity of the platform, I will only detail a little within each section. My main goal, of course, is not to discuss all of these, but mainly to show the quantity and diversity of the questions, and even more so the lack of interdependence between them.

The main points of the discussion are the following:

A. Is the conversion policy of Rabbi Druckman's system appropriate? This axis is supposed to include a principled-halakhic discussion (including halakhic policy: what is appropriate to do, mainly in terms of the requirements for receiving mitzvot), and then a factual examination (what is actually done). I am not aware of any serious discussion on these issues.

B. Even if we conclude that the conversion was not done properly, should the conversion be invalidated retroactively? There are discussions here in the language of Maimonides and the Poskim, and others. The main discussion is in relation to the question of "things in the heart" regarding the acceptance of a commandment (can evaluating intentions nullify statements?), and the manner of ascertaining the intention of the convert. I will note that completely unfounded arguments are sometimes raised here, and they do not merit serious discussion since they fit the ideological agenda that we wish to criticize. I will address this in another Torah-rabbinical forum.

C. Even if the conversion before us is disqualified, should the disqualification be expanded to all conversions in the system in a sweeping manner, and under what conditions? Here, two grounds for disqualification arose in the Pesahd: the conversion process (mainly in relation to receiving the commandments), and the disqualification of the judges before whom the conversion was conducted. Each of these involves questions of legal and halakhic hearing procedure, and of authority, etc. All of this involves clarifying the not-so-simple questions of "before a blind man" and more.

D. Is there a place where one court, and in particular the Supreme Court, can disqualify the judges of other courts? Ostensibly, at least legally, this is the role of a Supreme Court. What is a judge in a Supreme Court supposed to do who sees a judge in another court who has violated his opinion? Should he remain silent? The question of whether he acted correctly, and whether this is indeed the case here (I am personally convinced that it is not), is a different question, of course.

E. Who even determines the halakhah in this case? Does the Supreme Court have halakhic authority over the ruling of another court? In my opinion, there is no doubt that it does not. Legally, this is a different opera (and it is also certainly not unambiguous).

F. Do the various rulings have a halakhic meaning, or is it only a legal meaning (since in the State of Israel Judaism is still determined by halakhic law, more or less)? In other words: do all converts whose conversions are invalidated become halakhically gentiles, or is it only the state that is supposed to not recognize them as Jews (which has almost no legal basis)?

G. Is there a limit on the ways in which judges can express themselves, even in the event of a dispute? It seems that there is. But if it is not a dispute but a condemnation of judges who are taking over the conversion of the Jewish people (at least in the opinion of those judges), then it is their duty to warn the court with the severity they believe is necessary.

H. Is the Supreme Court's conduct appropriate (taking cases against the opinion of Rabbi Amar, the president of the court, publishing a ruling without hearing either party, taking a position in advance, etc.). I think there is no dispute that it is not. Again, not halachically but mainly legally and administratively.

9. Can Rabbi Druckman's approach, even if it is possible from a purely halakhic point of view (see section A), prevail over the conversion policy of the Jewish people and the State of Israel, without establishing broad consensus among the rabbis? It must be remembered that conversion is essentially a public act, the acceptance of the convert into the Jewish people. It is reasonable to demand that this be done with broad consensus, regardless of our personal opinion on the matter. See more on this in the next section.

J. In light of the previous section, what is the opinion of the various rabbis who responded to the various issues? Do all of those who publicly rejoiced at the humiliation of Torah scholars (mainly from the Zionist-religious wing) necessarily agree with Rabbi Druckman's halakhic path? I have no doubt that they do not. As far as I understand, most of them oppose his halakhic path, and it is not for nothing that the announcers focus on the honor of Rabbi Druckman and ignore the essential questions. I will comment that in my opinion what they are doing is not good, since in doing so they are allowing a marginal path to take center stage in the field of conversion. Perhaps this is why some of those who care are making harsh statements. Without this, it seems that no one would have woken up to discuss the matter.

11. Is all of this related to an ultra-Orthodox or religious Zionist worldview, and how? See the previous section on this, and the conclusions are self-evident. I will comment that in my personal opinion there is such a connection, and it is expressed here in a particularly interesting way. But I will elaborate on this in a later place.

12. Is all of this related to a fundamental understanding of Halacha, and does it in itself necessarily constitute an expression of religious Zionism or Harediism? I personally think so, but the fact is that some of those involved in the debate themselves do not think so. See section 10.

13. What should I do (as a rabbi and adjudicator, or as an ordinary citizen)? In recent weeks, I have heard quite a few public statements and rants and 'learned' opinions from people who are not completely versed in the halakhic material, nor in the topics of discussion (for example, at a conference held at Bar-Ilan University on this topic, they used the guise of an apparently Torah-academic discussion to engage in one-sided and biased ideological preaching. Opinions are also written in the press by laypeople who say nonsense and no one opens their mouths and whines). The ideological, biased 'kosher' given to various positions allows people to express completely unfounded positions for irrelevant reasons, and to win thunderous applause and wall-to-wall agreement. Bias seriously and blatantly paralyzes criticism.

I will add that these are just a few of the points of the discussion in very general terms. The concrete questions for discussion are much more numerous. For example, in the framework of the halakhic discussion on the invalidation of retroactive conversion (section B), several arguments arise, as well as several pieces of evidence here and there. It should be emphasized that even these individual questions are not independent. My opinion on evidence A may be different than on evidence B. Indeed, in the end, a bottom-line decision must be made, but the subject of my remarks here is the form and nature of the discussion itself.

The conclusion that emerges without too much study is that these are dozens of questions, most of which are unrelated to each other. For some reason, my impression is that, at least from a public perspective, the division regarding all the questions is sweeping: If you are 'for us', then you must answer 'yes' to all of them, and if you are 'against us', then you must answer 'no' (choose the side, and the affiliation, as you understand it). All of this is independent of the arguments that are put forward in favor of the 'right' side, and their nature and quality (which are questionable in many cases). What determines is only the ideological affiliation, and nothing more.

I have no objection to blunt statements (quite the contrary. See also the footnote above). But when they constitute a substitute for substantive discussion, and even neutralize it, then the real debate that exists on the various issues, and which is very important to conduct, is not discussed at all, and that is a shame.

This applies to both the rabbinical debate (is there even such a debate?) and the public debate. In my humble opinion, both are conducted in a disgraceful manner, with a lack of intellectual honesty and shallowness (and in fact, are almost not conducted at all).

Michael Abraham

[1] A note concerning both sections 2-3: The dispute between Hillel and Shammai is described in the Mishnah as a dispute for the sake of God, and the Yerushalmi describes that their disciples came to kill each other. In contrast, the dispute between Korah and his group, which is described there in the Mishnah as an anti-thesis, was ostensibly conducted in a calm and relaxed manner, and with criticism based on substantive arguments. Therefore, politeness and the manner of conduct are not the sole parameters for evaluating disputes.