Cancellation and modification of regulations today

With God’s help

2011

Michai Avraham

introduction

Halacha does not allow for the repeal of regulations and decrees, and for some opinions, it is impossible to do so even when the reason is no longer valid. In our generation, it seems that quite a few laws have accumulated that require refreshing, and the absence of a Jewish law, as well as the assumption of generational decline (that we are younger than our predecessors), prevent the possibility of touching on them. This creates a situation in which these regulations are not only unnecessary and irrelevant, but they are harmful. They cause desecration of the Name, interfere with the identification of those who are committed to the law with the halakhic framework, and lead to disdain for the law in general. The feeling is that the number of these problematic laws is beginning to threaten the halakhic structure as a whole. This discontent creates an undermining of the system as a whole, and therefore it is precisely the desire to be stricter, that is, to act in favor of the halakhic system and its existence, that requires its change and refreshing.

I will give here just a few examples, out of many others: Second Sabbath. Shaving in the Sabbath. Washing in the Sabbath. Months of separation. Circumcision due to the wearing of marks on Shabbat, and on and on.

The first part of the article reviews the general picture that emerges from the Sugiyot and my first interpretations of them in relation to the principles underlying the discussion. In the second part of the article, I deal with authoritative precedents (mainly the authors of the Toss, the Rosh, and the Maimonides). The last part is very short. It contains specific arguments, divisions, and mechanisms that are difficult to prove from the Sugiyot and the first, but the poskim used them when necessary, mainly to anchor problematic customs that had already become established in the public. For the sake of the law, these are arguments that we can also add to our knowledge, so that we do not deviate from these poskim who acted out of responsiveness to needs and not necessarily out of an interpretation of the Sugiyot. With respect to the needs of our generation, Yiftach in his generation is like Samuel in his generation, and you are only a judge in your day. Therefore, for the sake of the law, this should be the situation with us as well, and we should not shy away from using arguments where necessary, even if it seems 'politically' like breaking a fence. As I will argue, the conservative instinct leads to equally serious breaches of the fence, apart from the very deviation from the truth and the aversion that is bad in itself.

The first and second parts mainly concern authoritative and binding sources (Mishnah, Gemara and the great rabbis). There I cite the sources and quote and elaborate more (although all of this has been heavily censored due to the length that has come out of my keyboard). In contrast, in the last part (mainly in the summary) I hardly cite the sources, since to the best of my understanding they do not have much significance in terms of authority. When a sage (especially from the latter) says something from his own interpretation, I can do the same. Therefore, the things were cited only to show part of the scope of possibilities and precedents. In the second and third parts I make extensive use of Rabbi Neriah Gotal's book, The Variation of Nature in Halacha. In the last chapter there, and especially in the notes, many sources are cited on this subject, which is vast and the number of interpretations and divisions in it is almost endless.

I will note that despite the layout of the possibilities in his book, Rabbi Gotal's basic approach is very conservative, and as usual, after he shows that almost anything can be done, he writes severe warnings not to make any use of it except under conditions that will not be realized in our day and age.

A. Sources and initial principles

introduction

In this section, I will review the basic principles of the issue. In the Shas issues, I will mainly deal with the issue of the egg and the issue of the AZ, which are the two main issues. There are several other issues that come up in passing, and I will not touch on them here.

A matter of principle regarding the prohibition of eggs in the name of God

In the issue of the egg, the law of the egg is discussed in the two 19 days of the month of Reh. The law of the egg depends on the question of whether the two days of the month of Reh are one holy day or two. The question of whether the two days of the month of Reh are one holy day or two has changed throughout history.

In principle, the problem does not arise, since witnesses were accepted all day long, even from the mincha and up. Therefore, the day the witnesses came is the Yot and the second is a Sabbath. In such a situation, the egg is permitted as on any regular Yot.
Once it happened that the witnesses were late in arriving and the Levites got lost in the song, and then the sages of that generation ruled that they should not receive witnesses after the offering, and if they did not arrive by then, they would celebrate two days of good tidings as one holy day. In such a situation, the egg is forbidden.
In the next stage, the house was destroyed and the purpose of the ordinance was abolished, and then the Supreme Court abolished the ordinance and restored the law that witnesses are accepted all day long.
Now the question arose as to what the law of the egg was. And the Amoraim were divided on this:

Rabba said: From the time of the establishment of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai and onwards, an egg is permissible. Our teaching: After the destruction of the Temple, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai established that they should receive the testimony of the new moon all day long.

And Rav Yosef said: Even Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai and later established that an egg is forbidden. What is the reason? It is a thing that is included in the Minyan, and every thing that is included in the Minyan must be permitted by another Minyan.

Here appears the principle that if something is prohibited by a minyan (=BiD), it cannot be permitted without another minyan sitting on it.

At the end of the issue there appears a discussion regarding the relationship between the question of testimony and the question of the egg:

And if it is said: "Our mother is an egg," Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai arose and said, "Because our mother is a testimony, and our egg is not our mother." Abaye said to him: "I will put an egg in the number, who is it? An egg in testimony is like a piece of cloth, I will remove testimony, I will remove an egg, I will remove testimony, I will remove an egg."

In other words, the court of the Rivaz was included in the testimony, but they did not permit the egg. If there was no minyan that permitted a previous regulation or decree, then the prohibition remains in effect even if its purpose is null and void. And even those who believe that the Rivaz permitted the egg, it is because they were also included in the egg and not only in the testimony.

And my father there believes:

Abaye said to him: "I will put an egg in the number, who am I? An egg in the testimony of a man hanging from a tree, I will remove testimony, I will remove an egg, I will remove testimony, I will remove an egg."

In other words, an egg was not prohibited by a special minyan, but rather by way of testimony, and therefore it does not require a separate permit.

The bottom line is that if something is prohibited by a minyan, another minyan is required to permit it. It is possible to discuss the ruling on a thing whose prohibition is a consequence of another decree, whether or not a special minyan is required for it to be permitted, and so on.

Source of law and scope of a matter

Rabbi Yosef himself seeks a source for this principle here:

Rav Yosef said: Where did Amina come from?

And Rashi explains:

From the one who believed it – everything that is forbidden in one Minyan must be permitted by another Minyan, and even if something happens that you can instruct a permit for, and say: The regulation from the first Minyan does not stand, because here – even the most forbidden thing is forbidden until it is explicitly permitted by the assembly of the Sages.

That is, according to Rashi, the discussion of our issue is only about a situation in which the circumstances of the original regulation have changed, and there is room for permission. The question is why we need a different minyan to permit it and why the prohibition is not automatically abolished without the need for a different minyan.

This means that if the circumstances have not changed, then it is universally agreed that without another minyan, the regulation cannot be revoked. Furthermore, it is possible that even if there is another minyan, they will not be able to revoke it as long as its justification exists (unless they are great in wisdom and minyan). See below).

It seems that the essence of the matter is that changing a regulation when the circumstances have not changed is a dispute with the amending court, and therefore it is required that the latter be greater in wisdom and number. But a change when the circumstances have changed does not involve a dispute with the amendments, but rather the adaptation of their law to the new reality. Here there is no dispute with the amending court, and therefore only formal authority is required, that is, a competent court.

Now the Gemara cites a source for this principle:

– As it is written in +Deuteronomy 5:1-2, he said to them, “Return to your tents,” and he says: +Exodus 19:1-3, “They will go up to the mountain during the winter.”

And it is narrated: The vineyard of Rebai was one day’s journey to Jerusalem, and this is its boundary: Eilat from the south, Akrabat from the north, Lod from the west, and Jordan from the east. And it was narrated that Ula and Itima Rabbah bar bar Hana said: Rabbi Yochanan: What is the point? – To decorate the markets of Jerusalem with fruit. And it is narrated: Rabbi Eliezer had a vineyard of Rebai in the east of Lod, next to the village of Tebi, and he wanted to give it away to the poor. His disciples said to him: Rabbi! Your friends have already counted you and allowed it. Who are your friends – Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai. Why – We counted, did we not count – No.

The second section is just another example of the law of a thing that is counted. In the first section, several sources for this law appear, and now the Gemara explains them and the need for each of them:

What do I say? – He said: Since it is written +Exodus 19+ they were prepared for three days not to approach a woman – +Deuteronomy 5+ He said to them, “Return to your tents, why should I?” Listen to the following: Every thing in the Mnin needs to be permitted by another Mnin. And Tima: For the Mitzvot is a response – Listen to the following +Exodus 19+ during the Yabel they will go up to the mountain, since it is written +Exodus 34+ also the flock and the herd shall not graze in front of that mountain, why should I? Listen to the following: Something in the Mnin needs to be permitted by another Mnin.

The first source is the prohibition against approaching a woman for three days, and since a special permit was required, we see that a minyan is required to permit it. And if it is said that the need to permit is only in order to command a retributive mitzvah (this is how Rashi interpreted it here), another verse is cited here that permits the animals to return to grazing on the mountain, and from this we learn the law of the matter in the minyan.

Was this ruling stated only regarding the laws of the Torah? Or perhaps only regarding the laws of the rabbis? The Gemara says about this immediately afterwards:

And if it is said: "He is a millet" - in the Dauraita, but not in the Durbanan - then hear: "Kerem Rabi'ah."

We see that this law is stated both in terms of the laws of the Torah and the laws of the rabbis. This is what the baraita on the markets of Jerusalem came to teach. Furthermore, we see here that this principle is clearer in terms of the laws of the Torah than in terms of the laws of the rabbis, even though it is stated in terms of both types.

What is the difference between the laws of the Torah and the laws of the rabbis? The laws of the Torah are the interpretation of the sages of the Torah (through interpretation or sermon). The laws of the rabbis are the product of legislation. Therefore, there is room to divide the laws of the Torah and the rabbis: in interpretation, one cannot dispute the interpretation of the predecessors, but the legislation is automatically nullified when the reason is nullified. However, it is explained that the opposite is true: in interpretation, if I interpret differently, then the previous interpretation was never correct, and therefore I do not nullify any law, but only clarify that it was never valid. Therefore, there is no obstacle to disagreeing with the ancient commentators even without a minyan. But going against ancient legislation is a change in the law, and therefore this requires another minyan that changes what the previous minyan determined. Below, it appears that the Rambam does indeed make the division in this direction.

And indeed Rashi here interprets:

This is what is meant by the Law – in the prohibition that came from the mouth of the great One, we were forced to hear permission from Him, but according to the number of rabbis – not in their view, it is a law in the Law, but rather an exception.

This means that the term 'Daorita' does not refer to Daorita as opposed to the rabbis, but to God as opposed to the sages (=humans).

However, it should be noted that God, blessed be He, is here dealing with legislation and not interpretation. In other words, what He does to the laws of the Torah is what the Sages do to the laws of the rabbis. Therefore, it can be said that God was here only in relation to legislation, a different minyan is needed to permit it, but the legislation of the Sages (because the authority of the Sages is less than that of God) or their interpretation (because a disagreement in interpretation does not require a minyan, or is greater in wisdom and minyan) do not require a different minyan to permit it. And the conclusion is that everything needs something that is within the minyan.

We will also note that on the surface it appears from the issue that the law of a thing that is a minyan is the law of the Torah, even when it deals with the laws of the rabbis. It has its source in the Torah, and there is no hint here that this is a reference.

Great Bible in Wisdom and Minyan: The Attitude to the Issue of the Book of Numbers

In the issue of egg, it is not mentioned what minyan is required to permit something that is within the minyan. Is this only a rabbi with great wisdom and minyan, or any authorized rabbi? Indeed, in the Mishnah, Ediyot Pa'a 45, we find:

And why are the words of an individual mentioned among the majority, since there is no law except according to the words of the majority, if a court sees the words of an individual and trusts in him, then no court can nullify the words of his fellow court until he is greater than him in wisdom and in what number. He was greater than him in wisdom but not in what number, but not in wisdom, he cannot nullify his words until he is greater than him in wisdom and in what number:

What is great in wisdom is clear. But what is great in number is not clear. Some have explained that it is the number of sages who sit in the synagogue (with the students, since the synagogue itself is always composed of seventy elders), or the number of sages of the generation who agreed, or the number of years of the head of the synagogue (see Anzit, vol. 6, p. 550 et seq.).

And here, in the issue of egg, Rashi writes about the first source:

Shema Mina – since it is forbidden by the Holy One – is a sign for the guardianship of the body in the Hadith, and the same is true for everything in the Manin.

It seems from this that Rashi wants to teach that an authority similar to the one that forbade is required (in this case – God Himself). But the question of greatness is not discussed in our issue, but in the issue of Ezra. The Mishnah Ezra 33b states:

Matin'. And these things of idolaters are forbidden, and their prohibition is not a prohibition of enjoyment: milk that an idolater milks, and no Israelite sees it, and their flour and oil. Rabbi and his court permitted the oil.

That is, oil was initially forbidden for consumption, not for enjoyment, and the Rabbis and their court permitted it.

And the Gemara there is a verse:

And their oil. Oil – Rav said: Daniel decreed it, and Samuel said: The anointing of unclean vessels is forbidden. I am all alone, do I eat the pure things of Nin? Rather, the anointing of forbidden vessels is forbidden.

There is a dispute here as to whether the prohibition is a Danielic regulation, or whether it refers to the oil of forbidden vessels (and the interpretation: "Their discharge that they emit and sweat is an oily prohibition that they have swallowed").

Now Shmuel challenges Rabbi:

El Shmuel to the Rabbi: According to my friend, the slander of forbidden vessels is forbidden, that is, I came to Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta and said, Rabbi Shimlai demanded in the court: That which – Rabbi Yehuda and his court counted against him and permitted him, Kasavar: Giving reason for a defect is permitted; but according to you, you said that Daniel decreed against him, Daniel decreed, and Rabbi Yehuda the president and annulled it? And he added: No one can annul the words of his fellow Rabbi – but he is greater than us in wisdom and in number!

The question is, if Daniel decreed the prohibition, how did Rabbi come and annul it, since in our view the rabbi is greater in wisdom and minyan? It should be noted that here too the rabbi who annulled had a minyan, and the question is only because he was not greater in wisdom and minyan than the rabbi who amended it. In other words, this issue does not deal with the necessity of a minyan, like the issue of a beitza, but with the question of what minyan is needed.

It should also be noted that according to Shmuel himself, since it is a name for forbidden vessels, it was not difficult for Rabbi to disagree. Why not? Ostensibly, it is because it is a bi'd that is not greater than Rabbi's bi'd (because it is not Daniel). But simply, it is because when there is a halachic dispute, whether a nal'd is forbidden or permitted, there is no question of greatness in wisdom and minyan. Only in the regulations is there a requirement that the bi'd be greater in wisdom and minyan, according to the Maimonides' method, which we will see below.

Now the Gemara answers:

AL: Did you say that I am a Lodi? I am a Lodi. AL: I will send it to him, Iksif.

And Rashi explains:

Lodi – I despise you right away.

In other words, Rabbi Shimlai of Lod was disdainful of the words of the sages, and therefore he believed that Rabbi abrogated the Daniel rule.

It is difficult to understand this literally, since Rabbi Shimlai was dependent on his rabbi and his court. And it seems that their intention is to say that Rabbi Shimlai was disdainful of the words of the Sages, meaning that he believed that it was possible to abrogate the words of the previous Rabbis even if they were not greater than him in wisdom and minyan. In other words, there was no disdain here, but a halakhic position. However, those who did not believe as he did, called it disdainful of the words of the Sages. In fact, Rabbi Shimlai refers to the fact that the ruling of the rabbis is like the law of the Torah (and no more), and this is what the rabbi rejects.[1]

In any case, it is not clear in the Gemara what Rav answered Shmuel? And it seems that he did indeed send it to the Rebbe, and Rabbi Aksif, meaning he did not know that this was required by the verse in Daniel, or that regulations in a small book should not be canceled. See Rashi and R.A. here, which shows that the Rebbe truly has no answer, and according to the halachah it is probably not canceled.

And it immediately appears that the Rabbi himself, regarding the Torah, allows himself to demand something different from the Rabbi:

Rav said: If they did not ask, did I not ask them? And it is written: +Daniel 1+ And Daniel set upon his heart that he would not be redeemed by the king's fat and the wine of his banquets, in the two banquets of which the scripture speaks, one a banquet of wine and one a banquet of oil. Rav held: He commanded his heart there and all Israel, and Samuel held: He did not command his heart there and all Israel.

In other words, a rabbi allowed himself to demand something different from a rabbi, and therefore the difficulty for Shmuel was his midrash. Once again, we see that interpretation is different from legislation. Although this is not about the laws of the Torah, but about matters of Kabbalah, it is about the interpretation of matters of Kabbalah, and therefore a change in this does not require the greatness of the Mishnah. Only legislation requires a difference in the greatness of the courts. In other words, the distinction is not between the laws of the Torah and the laws of the rabbis, but between legislation and interpretation.

Interim summary: The relationship between Bitza and Az issues

In the issue of "Az", the discussion is about which "bi'd" is required to cancel the words of another "bi'd". There, it is about great wisdom and minyan, etc. In the issue of "Bitza", none of this is mentioned. Ostensibly, the two issues contradict each other.

This can be easily resolved if we note that in the case of a beitza, we are dealing with a decree that has been nullified, whereas in the case of a z'at, we are dealing with the annulment of decrees in general, even if their merits are not nullified. Therefore, a simple option arises here to resolve the contradiction: annulling a regulation that has been nullified does not require a high court in wisdom and minyan, but a minyan in the main. In contrast, annulling a regulation that has not been nullified requires a high court in wisdom and minyan.

And so indeed we find in the Ritva cited in the Shtamk Bitza there:

Because the evidence of the witness is not the witness. And the meaning of this verse is that the witness is the witness, and it is valid and it is not established, for no court of law can annul the words of another court of law unless it is greater than it in wisdom and authority. And it must be said that the reason and the law of the law are annulled by themselves, but what is written requires the permission of the court of law, and therefore in every court of law, it is important, and even though it is not as great as the first, it is not important to annul it, as Gabi Kerem Rebbe Dr. Eliezer said:

He is precise about the minyan that would be beneficial in dissolving an egg. And the difficulty is how it would be beneficial, since there is a requirement that it be great in wisdom and minyan? And since the reason is null, it does not need to be great in wisdom and minyan.

And so it is in Meir Bitzah 5:1:

Anything that is forbidden in the Minyan of the R"l in the group of Sages who agreed on this matter in a situation, even though the same Sabba by which they forbade it has already passed, and the estimate of knowledge is that even they would not forbid the matter now, nevertheless it cannot be permitted except in another Minyan, both of which are of the same kind and are less than it. But something that was forbidden in the Minyan and the same Sabba by which it was forbidden did not pass, and now they want to repeal it, they cannot repeal it, even though they were greater than that Minyan who forbade it in wisdom and in the Minyan:

But their words contradict the Maimonides' method in the second volume of the book of Miriam 1-2:

A. A great judge who demanded in one of the courts according to what seemed to them to be the law and ruled on a law, and another judge stood behind them and saw another reason to contradict him, then this contradicts and rules according to what seemed to him, as it was said to the judge who will be in those days, "You are not obligated to follow except the court that is in your court."

B. A court that has issued a decree or established a rule and established a custom and has spread the matter throughout Israel, and another court has followed them and sought to annul the words of the first and to uproot that regulation and that decree and that custom, cannot do so unless it is greater than the first in wisdom and in number. He may be greater in wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, he cannot annul his words, even if the reason for which the first issued or established them is null and void. The latter cannot annul them unless they are greater than them, and they will be greater than them in number. Since every court and court of seventy-one is, this is from the number of the sages of the generation who agreed and accepted what the great court said and did not disagree with it.

This means that the Rambam states that even if the reason for the regulation is invalid, in order to invalidate it, a great scholar is required in wisdom and minyan, and not the aforementioned Ritva and the Meiri.

And in truth, the Rabbid on a website achieves this:

/The attainment of the Rabada/ will be great in wisdom, etc. A. The decoration of the markets of Jerusalem with fruits is a matter of dispute that the first ones established, and Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai abolished it after its destruction because the reason for the first ones was abolished and it was not as great as the first ones.

He believes, as Ritva, that if the reason for the regulation is invalid, it can be invalidated by any minyan, and it does not have to be greater than the first.

It seems that the Rambam understands that the issues in Bitza and Az complement each other, one dealing with the need for a minyan and the other with the question of what minyan. And the Ritva believes that the issues deal with different subjects: Bitza deals with a ruling that has been invalidated, and the issue in Az deals with a ruling that has not been invalidated.

Above, we explained the reason for the division according to the Ritva method: When the reason is nullified, the later bi'd does not contradict the earlier bi'd, and therefore it does not need to be greater than it. And the Rambam apparently sees this requirement as a special requirement that came to strengthen the status of bi'd, and not as a fundamental rule.

And indeed, we see from the Rambam's language cited here that he distinguishes between the laws of the Torah and the laws of the rabbis: In the laws of the Torah, there is no need for a greater judge to change them, but in the laws of the rabbis there is such a need. It seems that in his view, this is not a substantive law but rather a strengthening of the status of the sages. In terms of substantive law, we would demand a greater judge in the laws of the Torah as well, since after all, the latter disagree with the former.

Who is the Great Judge? Milkud 22

The Rabbi in his above-mentioned conclusion challenges the Rambam to decorating the markets of Jerusalem with fruit, which the early ones established and when the reason was removed, the Rivaz abolished. He proves from this that when the reason was removed, there is no need for a great Rabbi in wisdom and minyan. What would the Rambam answer to this?

To understand this, it is important to note that on the face of it, the approach of the Rav is a trap. There is a law that a greater by-law can abrogate the words of an earlier by-law. If we assume that every later by-law is necessarily smaller than its predecessors, this halacha is empty of content. There will never be a situation where a later by-law will be greater. The assumption that the descent of generations is an overarching principle turns the rule of abrogating regulations into a dead letter in halacha. If there is such a halacha, we must conclude that it is incorrect to assume that the later by-law is always smaller than its predecessors. It is possible that the later by-law will be greater.

Now we can understand that this is precisely what the Rambam would answer the Rabbad's question. He would simply say that Rivaz was greater than his predecessors (Shu'ar Sh'akk HaKs'am, ibid., and so is the Chats's Bitza 5a). The Rabbad in his conclusion assumes that Rivaz was smaller, and it is not clear what the basis for this assumption is. If he assumes that the later is necessarily smaller than the earlier, the question of abrogating the regulations is a dead letter. Therefore, he insists that when the reason is nullified, there is no need for a greater B'id, and only then can regulations be abrogated. And yet it follows that a regulation whose reason is not nullified at all cannot be abrogated (because a greater B'id is needed, but a later B'id is always smaller). According to his view, the law of abrogating regulations is stated only in regulations whose reason is nullified. However, then the principle of greatness in wisdom and minyan is merely hypothetical. This is what the Rambam does not accept.

It turns out that Maimonides' substance is his voice. On the one hand, he is strict, even when the reason is nullified, a great rabbinic wisdom and minyan is required, but this is where his voice comes from: that there are situations in which this nullification is possible even when the reason is not nullified, when the rabbinic rabbinic is indeed greater than its predecessors.

Laws of the Torah and Rabbis

We have seen that the Rambam understands that the demand for a greater rabbinical council was only stated in terms of the abrogation of rabbinical regulations. In Torah law, a minyan is required (as the language of the rabbinical council implies), but it is not required to be greater in wisdom.

What is the root of the difference? On the surface, it seems that abrogation belongs only in the regulations and not in the parashos or in the Darshav of Torah law, since the commentary has not determined that anything is abrogated. It only holds that this is what the Torah intends. So if a later judge believes that this is not the intention of the Torah, he is not abrogating anything. It is true that he disagrees with the previous judge in understanding the law of the Torah, but he does not abrogate the act of the judge.

The implication is that while a minyan is required (not necessarily a larger one), it is only because there is a minyan. In a generation in which there is no Yad, the sages of the generation may be considered a relevant minyan. The reason is that there is no annulment of a Yad, which is a formal act, but only an interpretation of the Torah. Interpreting the Torah does not require formal authority, but only to verify that this is indeed what the Torah intends.

Furthermore, what is the ruling in Torah law (products of interpretation and sermon) when the reason is nullified? It seems that in Torah law this question does not arise at all (it is not for nothing that Maimonides does not mention in the Ha-Hayyat the case where the reason is nullified). If the reason has changed, then the Torah law is automatically nullified, since the Torah itself did not intend to require this of us. The nullification of the reason is relevant only to the regulations of the Sages. For example, in simple terms, the laws of trepit were determined by the Sages as an assessment for various situations in which death is expected within 12 months (the Maimonides is an exception in this regard). What happens if scientific knowledge or technological means in our time reveal to us that this is not a correct assessment? It seems that in this situation there is no reason to change the law, since this is a factual assessment. If an animal is not expected to die within 12 months, it is not the trepit that the Torah spoke of. We have not nullified any law here, and therefore no great wisdom and minyan are required, and perhaps no minyan is required at all to change this.

Although the Chazo"a renewed the issue of two thousand years of Torah establishing laws that are void of their meaning, this is an unlikely innovation and has no source.

Attitude to the demand of the cause of death

This raises the question of the requirement of a ta'ma dakra. There is an interesting parallel between the abrogation of regulations that are void of meaning and the requirement of a ta'ma dakra. In both cases, we are making a purposive interpretation of a given law, and drawing practical conclusions from it (its change). The Torah does not require a ta'ma dakra, and the rabbis do not abrogate regulations even if their meaning is void (unless there is a greater reason).

It was said that in the Torah it is impossible to change the halacha even if the reason is null, since there is a requirement of a taema dekra here. But this is not reasonable, since the boundaries of the halakhah are not the halacha itself. The halacha is that an animal that is about to die within twelve months is a taema. In other words, the Torah did not establish a halacha that we require a taema, but rather it established the general halacha and we establish its boundaries. We have no idea why such animals are forbidden to eat, and therefore there is no requirement of a taema dekra here. This is establishing a boundary and not a reason, and this is certainly done in the Torah.

In similar cases, it is reasonable to do this also with regard to the regulations of the rabbis. There are regulations in which the main point of the law is the reason and not the regulation itself. For example, the three months of distinction. Was the regulation to wait three months, and its reason was to distinguish between the first and second sperm? Or was the regulation to distinguish between the first and second sperm, and the application (=the boundary) was to wait three months. The second option allows us to change this today even without a minyan and without a gedolah, because it is not a change at all.

It should also be noted from the words of the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Community of Jerusalem, who wrote that where the reason is obvious, one demands a reason for reading and draws legal conclusions from it. Therefore, even in the regulations of the Sages, there is room to say that when the reason is obvious, there is room to demand a reason for reading and change the behavior according to the circumstances and eliminate the reason.

Rabbi Shech writes thus in the commentary of the Rosh himself, in the reply to the general question in Si' 8:

It does not belong to his image to do something that is forbidden by the Minyan, that it is not permitted except by a rabbi who is greater than him in wisdom and Minyan, since the reason for the prohibition is known, and if the reason is nullified, the prohibition is nullified anyway…

And also in the glosses of R. P. Susi R. K. G., which was cited by the Rabbi Yod Si' Ketu, the author of 'Cheeses'.

Although in the Responsa Torat Chesed, O.H., 17, he elaborated on this entire issue, and there in the sek. 5, he stated that we do not have the power that the early ones had to determine when the reason for the regulation is clear. And so does Rabbi Yisraeli on the right-hand page of sek. 23, sek. 4. And I, the rabbi, did not understand why.

Two additions on the issue of 7: a generalization throughout Israel, and the uniqueness of the decree of 18 Devar

The continuation of the issue in the book raises several more important points that we will only comment on: A. Eighteen-day decrees are exceptional and cannot be repealed in any way. B. The requirement and significance of the spread of the regulation throughout Israel (in the Gemara it means that this is a requirement only for the actual validity of the regulation, and not for the ability to repeal it).

Regarding A, there is only room for an important methodological comment: Who is it that established that the decree of the Eighth Commandment cannot be revoked? The Gemara says that it is because its prohibition has been extended throughout all of Israel. On the other hand, we have already mentioned that the expansion is presented in the Gemara as a condition for the very validity of the regulation and not for the ability to revoke it. Therefore, it seems that the expansion is only the reason for the law (= why they determined that there should be no dispute about the Eighth Commandment) and not the basis for it (= the authority to determine such a thing). So what is the law itself based on? It may be the result of the assessment that God and the Holy Spirit are greater than anyone who will come after them (but this seems like a prophecy, and it is unclear how this can be done). Or perhaps it is the acceptance of the whole of Israel that has eternal validity. However, the whole of Israel can also go back on this and revoke it. Moreover, it seems that this is itself a special regulation, but then it seems that it is possible to revoke it itself (according to the limits of revoking regulations).

This comment is important, as a similar mechanism arises with respect to the annulment of regulations in general. Can the Idna Court annul any of the rules for annulment of regulations? Here it is appropriate to mention the words of the Rabbi in his book Lenabuchi Hador, where he insists that the Idna Court can annul laws that do not require a reason for recitation, and then require a reason for recitation. Below we will see that annulment of a regulation when it annuls its reason is very similar to requiring a reason for recitation.

Regarding B, it seems that the Rishonim disagreed on whether expansion prevents the possibility of annulment, or only makes annulment difficult. In Todd's "Vehtanan," 7th ed., they argued regarding Prozbol:

And the one who is not able to do so – is mentioned in the chapter of the messenger (Gittin to him: And there is no other) over Prozbol, who said that Samuel, "Is Prozbol a lawless one? He is not able to do so, he

The problem is that there is no type of regulation whose repeal requires a high court in wisdom and in number. Thos' answers:

And he said that for the sake of simplicity alone, he would not permit it if there were no other reason than that the majority of the people could not stand it, but the Prozbol was not simple because the majority of the people could stand it.

Toss again in the Gemara in "Z" there appear two different criteria: 1. It is clear throughout Israel. 2. That the public can abide by it. When both are not met, then it can be annulled, even in a small court. But Prozbol did not clear, and yet the public could abide by it. In such a situation, it cannot be annulled except in a large court. And if both conditions are met, it cannot be annulled in any court (this is the situation in the regulations of 18 Devar).

Thos then rejects this possibility:

It's hard to say, but it's not easy, because it's the distance between the two.

Now he offers another explanation:

Therefore, it seems that Dudai Prozbol has explained and explained to you that even if a great one is able to annul a matter, he certainly said that if Elijah comes and says that they do not hear, and just as the reason is explained in the Jerusalem Bible because it was established in their souls, so Rabbi Rabbi Elchanan explained from the version of the books that he found in old books, saying that the one who said Rav Meshershaya, what is the reason? It means that from there begins the excuse, and the "P. Deshmaatein and Rabbi Yehuda Nasiya Yehieli Mishri" and that there is no court of justice. And even if he is great, he cannot annul a matter in the Bible, and there was no need to explain the reason, because it is simple. And secondly, the one who said Rav Meshershaya, what is the reason? Since it is established, and therefore in the great book, no one can annul, and the great one is not established, therefore even if they stood in their souls, a small one can annul, and they relied on the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that they should not be cut off. And therefore, even in the small book, it was permitted, but certainly other things, even if they were established, a great book can annul, and therefore According to Prozbol, Shmuel said, "I will direct the soldiers of Mahalal, and even though he disbanded and went to Jerusalem, the first chapter of the Sabbath, Rabbi Bun said, Rav Yehuda, in the name of Shmuel, 56:1, except for 18 words, but 18 words, even a great thing, does not cancel it, because they had in their souls an interpretation of what they thrust a sword into in the Beit Midrash."

In other words, the decree of a single thing is outside the framework of the laws of annulment of regulations, and it may not be annulled in any way (at least what has been annulled from it, with the exception of oil and the like). But ordinary regulations can be annulled even if they have been annulled, but then in their view a greater court is required in wisdom and in number. And when the reason has changed, then apparently it is possible in any court (as we saw in Meiri and Ritva on the issue of eggs). And even if it has not been annulled, it seems that a small court is sufficient (or that a court is not needed at all).

And it seems that the Rambam and the Rabbah in the second volume of the book of the Magi also disagreed on the dispute between the arguments of the Torah:

A court of law that has issued a decree or established a rule and established a custom and spread the matter throughout Israel, and another court of law has followed them and sought to annul the words of the first and to uproot that regulation and that decree and that custom, cannot do so unless it is greater than the first in wisdom and in number. He may be greater in wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, he cannot annul his words, even if the reason for which the first issued the decree or established it is null and void. The latter cannot annul it unless they are greater than them, and they will be greater than them in number. Since every court of law and court of seventy-one is one, this is from the number of the sages of the generation who agreed and accepted what the great court said and did not disagree with it.

+/The attainment of the R'Avad/ 24:14, who issued a decree, etc., until he was greater than the first in wisdom and in number. 11:14, and not even Elijah and his court, since he spread their prohibition throughout Israel, is appropriate in 27:15.

Maimonides believes that expansion does not prevent abrogation, and the Rabbis believe that expansion cannot be abrogated at all. In other words, Maimonides is like the second letter of Thos.

B. Precedents and Authoritative Opinions

Mahzi as a victim, blasphemy and damage

In our time, due to the large number of cases of laws that appear to be unenforceable, the law that ancient regulations and decrees should not be repealed leads to a situation of blasphemy. For example, the strict observance of legumes (which are not even a regulation or decree but a fear of the unknown) is a terrible blasphemy. When a large number of irrelevant decrees and regulations are added to this, the entire law becomes irrelevant and becomes unenforceable and unenforceable in the world. Is there an additional reason in such situations for the repeal of the law?

It seems that there is room to distinguish between two situations in which a court of appeals comes to annul a regulation: A. He sees that there is no reason for its existence (the reason is void, or more generally, the reason was incorrect). B. He sees that its existence is harmful. In the first case, he can annul the regulation according to the usual annulment limits. But in the second case, he does not annul the regulation but rather amends a new regulation over it, which prohibits its observance. Here, there is no longer a dispute with the previous court of appeals, but rather a regulation over it.

It is important to understand that the discussion here is only in the Rambam's method. According to the Rabbad, in such a situation there is no obstacle to canceling the previous regulation, since when the reason is nullified, any Rabbi can cancel the regulation. But the Rambam requires a Rabbi who is great in wisdom and minyan, and then there is room to distinguish between a situation where the reason is nullified (then there is no reason to uphold the regulation) and a situation where the regulation is found to be harmful (then there is a positive reason not to uphold it).

The explanation for this is that just as any rabbinical court can amend a regulation that is ostensibly against the Torah (at least in the Shostakovich tradition), the laws of the rabbis will not be more valid than the laws of the Torah. And if the rabbinical court finds it appropriate, he will amend it so as not to enforce the previous regulation. Here he is not repealing the previous regulation, but rather amending a new regulation so as not to enforce the previous regulation, and so on. It seems from the explanation that in such a situation, even according to the Rambam, it is not required that the rabbinical court that repeals be great in wisdom and quorum, but it is required that he have the authority to amend regulations for his generation (since the repeal is itself a regulation).

And indeed, some poskim wrote that when the continued observance of the regulation results in harm, it should be annulled. For example, the Rashal in Yeshivah Bek K. P. 7 regarding the regulations of Joshua, where he explains that a person who dies in a mitzvah does not buy his place and must be taken to the cemetery to be buried there for fear that the Gentiles will strip him and disrespect him. Indeed, he is speaking of a situation in which the reason for the regulation itself requires its change, and not harm in the slightest. He also wrote in Lechem Shaamim Ya'avetz Ma'ash P. 5 42 (see Rabbi Gotal, notes 554-555).

And indeed we find this explicitly in the Rambam, 2nd chapter of the commentary on the 4th chapter:

And a court may overturn even these things for the time being, even though it is smaller than the first, so that these decrees are not more severe than the words of the Torah itself, for every court may overturn even the words of the Torah, as a court that sees fit to strengthen the religion and to make a reservation so that the people do not transgress the words of the Torah, prepares and punishes them unlawfully, but does not establish the matter for generations and says that the law is thus, and likewise if they see fit to abolish a positive commandment or to transgress a negative commandment in order to bring many back to the religion or to save many of Israel from stumbling in other matters, they do according to what the time requires, just as a doctor cuts off a person's hand or foot so that he may live a full life, so a court may instruct at times to transgress some commandments for the time being so that [all] may be observed, as the early sages said: One Sabbath was violated on him so that he may keep many Sabbaths.

His words seem puzzling, since his own system in the previous halakha (Habakkuk 2-3) is that the words of the sages are more severe than the rules of the Torah, since the rules of the rabbis are only overturned by a great rabbinic council with wisdom and a minyan. So what is the place for this kokh?

Of course, his intention is as we have said: the annulment of a regulation is a special mechanism, since we are uprooting a halakhah. This requires a great rabbinic wisdom and minyan. But if we want to correct and uproot these things for the time being, then it is no worse than the laws of the Torah, in which even this can be done. It is important to understand that in the laws of the Torah, the uprooting is certainly not because the sages disagree with the Torah, but rather the uprooting is an additional regulation that abrogates (for the time being, or in a final judgment) the law of the Torah. Therefore, even in the regulations of the rabbis, there is room to distinguish between the annulment and the amendment of an additional regulation that abrogates or freezes/suspenses the previous one.

And so indeed we find there in the Torah regarding the prohibitions of the Torah:

Since it is up to a court to rule and prohibit something that is permitted and its prohibition will stand for generations, and it is also up to them to permit Torah prohibitions for the time being. What is this that the Torah warned against adding to it or subtracting from it, not to add to the words of the Torah or subtract from them, and to establish the matter forever in a matter that is from the Torah, whether in the written Torah or the oral Torah? How is it that it is written in the Torah that a kid shall not be cooked in its mother's milk? From hearsay, they learned that what is written forbids cooking and eating meat in milk, whether the meat of an animal or the meat of a living creature, but the meat of a bird is permitted in milk from the Torah? If a court comes and permits the meat of a living creature in milk, then that is a deduction, and if it prohibits the meat of a bird and says that it includes the goat and it is prohibited from the Torah, then that is an addition. But if it says that the meat of a bird is permitted from the Torah and we prohibit it and inform the people that it is a decree that does not follow from the matter that it is obligatory, and they say that the bird is permitted because it is not interpreted that way. The animal is permitted, after all, it was not interpreted. And another came to say that even the meat of an animal is permitted except for the goat, and another came to say that even the meat of the goat is permitted. In the case of the milk of a cow or a sheep, it is not said except its mother, which is its species. And another came to say that even in the case of the milk of a goat, which is not its mother, it is permissible not to say except its mother. Therefore, all meat with milk is forbidden, even poultry meat. This does not add anything but creates a restriction to the Torah, and so on.

+/The attainment of the R'Av'd/ Since there is a L'B'd to decree and forbid, etc. A. All of these will carry the spirit that everything that was decreed and forbade to restrict and preserve the Torah has no basis in it, you will not add to it, even if they established it for generations and made it a fallacy of the Torah and authorized it for reading, as they forgot in some of the rabbis' doctrines and read the reference in a book, and if it is subtracted according to the need of a time, such as Elijah on Mount Carmel, even this is a matter of Torah. It is a time to do for the Lord. They have violated your Torah, and you will not find an additional prohibition except in positive mitzvot such as lulav and tefillin and tzitzit and the like, whether for a time or for generations, whether it was established in a matter of Torah or not.+

From this comes the conclusion that if a regulation is amended to not comply with a regulation (and not repealed), it should be temporary (and with a statement that this is not a repeal but an addition), since the original regulation is still in effect. A regulation not to comply with permanently is essentially a de facto repeal. It is true that any BID in any generation can repeal the regulations again, so that de facto they are completely repealed (although this is still pending at the decision of each BID in each generation).

It should also be noted here that according to the law, the Sages only remove a thing from the Torah during the Shostakovich or the Kocha for a specific time, like Elijah on Mount Carmel (see Rabbi Benedrim 72b, who says that according to the rules, removal during the Kocha is also possible for a specific time). And here, in certain cases, we find in the first chapters the authority of the Sages to remove a thing from the Torah even during the Kocha and forever. It is clear that such a step is taken in situations where there is a critical need, and it is seen that the Sages can deviate from the formal rules that allow them to remove only during the Shostakovich or the Kocha for a specific time. If so, even in our time there is room to do so if the time requires it.

I will not dwell on this subject here, and will only refer to a few relevant sources. See BK Kiz 17a (ruled by Rambam 58 of the Havval 58) It is permissible to kill the one who has committed the crime of money. And see Tamim Da'im's response to Rav Da'id Si' Reg, and what the Rabbi of the Elder brought there. And the Rabbi of the Old Testament in Tud'ah 'Mat'ot, Yevamot 5a, wrote that when it is reasonable, it is also possible to remove the person from the house:

And this is not an uprooting of anything from the Torah, since it is similar to what is considered reasonable to believe, as I will explain in Lakman Perkin (Pt. 9b), that in a matter that has some merit and authority, one would not consider uprooting anything from the Torah.

And see also Todah 'Kiyon', sam pt ab, and Todah 'Vahay', Nazir 34 ab, and Todah 'Amer', ez 13 ab, and Todah 'Vahotam', Berakhot 16 ab, and Todah 'Shober', BM 20 ab.

When the original regulation overturned a Torah prohibition

When the original regulation displaces Torah law, the abrogation of the later rabbinate restores Torah law to its place. In such a situation, there is room to regard the second displacement as setting a time limit for the suspension made by the first rabbinate. After all, what the sages do is only displace Torah law for the time being, and in such a situation, the later rabbinate can say that time has passed and Torah law returns to its place.

Furthermore, in such a situation, there is a basic value that will be uprooted, since we are not fulfilling a requirement of the Torah. Therefore, it is sufficient for us to fulfill minimal conditions in order to restore the obligation from the Torah to its place. For example, regarding blowing the shofar, reading the Megillah, and taking a lulav on Shabbat. All of these are complete halakhic obligations that have been abolished due to fringe considerations. Is there no reason to say that restoring them to their place when the original purpose of these regulations has been abolished does not require a great jurisprudence and minyan?

In the issue of the egg, the claim is that this is a commandment over the mitzvah of repentance. But this claim is puzzling, since there are mitzvahs of repentance in the Torah, and why would they need an additional commandment over that? Therefore, in simple terms, it seems that the second commandment was to cancel the previous regulation. So what is the reason for the postponement that it might be only because of the mitzvah of repentance? Perhaps it can be explained (not as a Rashi) that there was a decree that because of the mitzvah of repentance, the previous regulation can be canceled, and without there being a mitzvah in this regard, it cannot be canceled at all, not even in a different minyan.

This means that even if the purpose of the regulation is nullified, there is a side that says that it would not be possible to nullify the regulation at all, except where the regulation nullifies a mitzvah from the Lord (such as blowing the shofar in the name of God that occurs on Shabbat).

And this perhaps explains why the Rav in his interpretation of the Book of Miriam makes it difficult because the Rivz abolished the regulation to decorate the markets of Jerusalem with fruit, and did not make it difficult by virtue of the very abolition of the regulation of accepting witnesses after the offering. According to our way, it is correct, since the abrogation of the Rivz made it possible to accept witnesses who came after the offering, and thus we returned to Torah law. Therefore, it was clear to the Rav that even the Rambam would not demand a great rabbi with wisdom and minyan.

In a matter made to be reserved

Maimonides, in the second part of the book of Numbers 53, writes:

What are things meant by things that were not forbidden in order to make a reservation for the Torah, except as for other Torah laws, but things that a court of law saw fit to rule and forbid to make a reservation if their prohibition was widespread throughout [Israel], no other great court of law can uproot and allow it, even if it were greater than the first.

It appears from his words that if the original regulation was to make a reservation to the Torah and extend its prohibition to all of Israel (like 18 Devar), then it cannot be uprooted in any way. This seems to be how he understood the issue of the AZ regarding the decree of 18 Devar.

And in the Gehemiy there is a writing that originates from the decree of the 18th commandment in the matter of the 7th commandment. In other words, the Rambam understands that the decree of the 18th commandment was something special, but it is not the decree itself that is unique, but rather the type of decrees that are there for the sake of qualification.

Now, we must discuss what is not included in the definition of a decree because of a restriction. There are the seven rabbinic commandments (those that the Ramban brings in the first root of the word as a defense of the Ha-Hag). But beyond that, a second Yot of the second of the Ha-Hag or a second Yot of Galyot in our issue is a decree that, according to Rabbi Yosef, requires a great Yod in wisdom and minyan to permit. And apparently this is a restriction, since the reason is lest the matter return to its ruin (that the Temple be rebuilt). And perhaps such a thing is not a restriction, since there is no immediate concern here but rather a long-term policy. Beyond that, as we saw in the previous lessons, additional considerations are involved here, such as a remembrance of the Temple, etc.

It seems that freezing or suspending the original law when it brings harm is also possible in this case, since there is no displacement here, but rather a regulation on a second level whose purpose is also to make a reservation and preserve the Torah. Then the rabbinic law would not be more severe than a Torah law that has been displaced (even in the case of the Kabbalah) in such cases. This is the Kabbalah that the Rambam himself makes in the Hadith, as I mentioned above.

When the taste is mentioned in the language of the regulation

Some of the poskim wrote that if there is a rabbinic rule in which the reason is mentioned in the text of the regulation, there is room to follow its reason. For example, reading by candlelight is mentioned in a baraita (although not in the mishnah) for fear that it will lead to deviation. Therefore, some have explained that the Rabbis nevertheless thought of reading by candlelight even though the sages forbade it. It should be noted that even in the end he does not change his mind about the decision to read, but only realizes that the assessment that he would not end up with deviation was wrong. But in principle, if this assessment was indeed correct, that is, if it is truly clear to him that he would not end up with deviation, he is indeed permitted to read. We see that when the reason is explicitly written in the text of the regulation, it is permissible to interpret it in a purposeful manner.

Canceling the taste when the time is set in advance

The source cited in the issue of egg from "Return to Your Tents" is very puzzling. After all, the prohibition was originally for only three days, and why is a special permit required after three days? Here it does not even resemble a change of circumstances (abrogation of reason), but at most a situation in which the prohibiting circumstances were defined in the language of the regulation (such as "Do not call by the light of the lamp lest it be tilted").

Rashi, on the issue of Sanhedrin 52b, writes:

For everything in the Minnin – it was not repeated at Sinai except because they were forbidden to use it three days before the giving of the Torah, and after three days it was necessary to allow them, and even on the back of the dammila it is implied that the fear that three days were a day and yet they had passed, Ashme'inan called for everything that is forbidden in the Minnin a court of law, even though they set a time for the matter, it is necessary to appoint another time to allow it when the time has passed.

Although in the Toda "Lekhel", there, they wrote:

For everything in the Minyan – P.E. Everything that is forbidden in the Minyan, even if they set a time for it, must be permitted by another Minyan when the time has passed.

And again (repeat) and the word "Do not approach a woman" (Exodus 19) did not have a time limit, and it is not written (there) that they were ready for three days, meaning to receive the Torah on the third day. But what is fixed for a time will pass and time will pass and it is permissible.

That is, with regard to a fixed time, the necessity of a different minyan is a disagreement between the two interpretations, but with regard to a change in circumstances, there is certainly a minyan to permit it.

And these things are repeated in the Tod "Kol", on the issue of eggs:

Everything that is forbidden by one reason must be permitted by another reason – some would like to say that from here on, those prohibitions that are made for a time until Pesach or until another time when the time comes, it is necessary to permit the prohibition even though that time has passed. This is because God Almighty forbade them from using it for the giving of the Torah, and in any case, they knew that after three days the Torah would be given, and yet He permitted them.

And it is not here that there is no time that is called "be ready for three days" etc. (Exodus 19) invite yourselves to the matter that will be at the end of three days. If it is written, "be ready for three days" without the "three days" clause, I would prove that it is valid because it is necessary to permit the use of a thing, it is necessary to permit the prohibition, and if it is not written, it is heard that the use of a thing should be permitted because it is written, "Do not approach a woman" etc., it is heard worldwide, because it was forbidden to them before the giving of the Torah for three days. But prohibitions that are imposed for a time, because the time has passed anyway, and there is no need for a permit.

Here too, Thos concludes that a prohibition for a fixed period of time was self-evident. The Hadera was forbidden for a thousand years. And indeed, when the time came, there was a polemic as to whether it was self-evident or not. According to the law, it was decided that it would continue if it was not counted and permitted. And the simple explanation is that the Haggai himself did this for a period of time only to allow a future rabbi to reexamine the situation, and not fundamentally. This is different from the three days at Mount Sinai.

And in the words of Mayeri Bitza, he wrote:

There are some of the sages who teach this even in the agreements, prohibitions, and oaths of the congregation, even though they were interpreted for a year or two, since they did not stipulate in the law that from that time onward they would be permitted, they needed to be permitted from where, according to the law of the giving of the Torah, even though it limited the time for their purification and told them to be ready for three days, it was necessary to return and say, “Return to your tents”… and if so, even in the agreements of the congregation, yes.

However, it is clear that the commentators wrote that whatever they interpret as time is as if they were saying in the interpretation that it will be permissible from that time onward, not better than a vow and oath for a time that does not require another permit, and even though the Torah interpreted it as three days, and yet it was necessary to say, "Return to you," etc. In this case, it was closer to saying three days before the giving of the Torah, and we had to discuss it, especially after its giving, until they complete the confession, and even though the language is sufficient in that it said for three days, meaning that you will be ready for that day to sanctify yourselves from then onward, but whatever cannot be specified in the word "time" is completely permissible, and so it seems to me:

He hangs this on the interpretive question, and therefore if they stipulated in the interpretation it must exist only for a fixed time. But if they did not stipulate, we are not sure that this is their intention. And he concludes that whatever there is no doubt about the speech must be completely permissible. Although this is all regarding a fixed time, he does not divide it in this way regarding the reason.

He also writes further on:

And even in the matter of public consent, I would be inclined to be lenient and say that all public regulations are made for a temporary purpose, and despite their silence, the common sense estimate is that whenever something is renewed until there is a need for another consent, they will annul the first one, even within the time limit, and we do not need those greater than them to root out the regulation from which it was enacted.

And from the MM they are required to count the number of the rabbi of the city's elders and their status, and if there was a boycott or oath there, they are required to inquire about it.

And I further say that even what is forbidden in the Minyan of the Sages and a reason that we need to allow for the Minyan is precisely because it did not occur to those who forbid it that that reason be invalid, such as the one we mentioned in Kerem Revi, which did not occur to them that the Temple would be destroyed and the reason would be invalid. But things that are forbidden in the Minyan because of a reason that is worthy of being invalidated in the opinion of those who forbid it are as if they were established in the Parush until that reason is exceeded and permitted without permission from the Minyan, but it cannot be relied upon in practice.

Here he says that when there is a reason that the organizers thought of in advance, it is like setting a time limit, and no minyan is needed to cancel it (not only does it not need to be greater than the first, but no minyan is needed at all).

It should be noted that he does not say that when the reason is invalid, the regulation is invalid without a quorum, but only if the adjusters themselves could have thought of these new circumstances. The essence of the matter is the formal concept, that something that is in the quorum never requires another quorum to permit. And when the first judge thought about the new circumstances, it can be assumed that he himself did not amend them, and in any case it was as if they themselves had canceled the regulation. But when he himself could not have thought about it, even if in practice if they had thought about it they would have exempted us from this law, it is of no use and in their case another quorum (like despair without knowledge, which in law is not despair).

The Meiri continues:

And from the M.M., all of us are silent and have stipulated that whoever wishes to cancel may cancel, even if it has not passed a conversion, and even those who are less than them can cancel it, and despite the fact that this does not require a remedy, it was stated in the explanation on the first day of a small month.

Once again, we see that everything depends on the estimate of the adjusters' minds, but not an estimate of their minds in the abstract, but rather a real permit in practice. It is not enough for us to estimate that they would cancel, but they must actually cancel (as in the law of unconscious despair).

Now he goes on and says:

And it seems to me that there is no law stated in the law of a thing except in what they established through necessity, but what they established on the basis of what they took out of their understanding in the interpretation of the matter, and it seems to the latter that it is not so on the basis of another strong thing, like what the former said can be annulled, and it is what Rabban Gamliel and his court said there, which is different from the Torah in the interpretation:

At the end of his remarks, he makes the Rambam's distinction between the sages' interpretation of the Torah (although he also speaks of a regulation based on interpretation - such as Hanukkah candles, etc.), which anyone can revoke, and the regulations of the sages, which are considered greater in wisdom and number. This is the distinction between interpretation and legislation that we saw above.

The hidden flavors method

Some have understood that the regulation should not be annulled even by annulling its reason, because it is possible that the reason is unknown to us. This is known from the Gra. And see Hatas in his innovations on the issue of eggs, which he quoted from the Rosh:

And further, it is clear that the reason is known and clear to all the people, as they interpreted the time for the Hadith. Then, when the known reason is nullified, the regulation is nullified, and for the man of the D"S"L, when the time has passed, there is no reason from where, according to the rule of the Han, when the reason is nullified, there is no reason from where, and this is the opinion of the Rosh, the same as in the 19th century, and Rashi and his support, there is another D"D, in the same way as in the past tense.

We see that he is suspending the matter by saying that the reason is unknown, and when the reason is known, such as when the reason for the regulation is stated in the body of the words, it can be annulled when the reason is annulled (similar to the words of the aforementioned Toss Rosh in the Book of Mormon, who wrote that where the reason is self-evident, the doctrine of the reason is read).

It is very clear that according to this, a regulation for a fixed period of time is automatically void at the end of the period, since it is completely clear there that this is what the original BID intended.

Does this align with the words of the Rosh that we saw, according to which when the reason for a regulation is clear, it is automatically null and void? Perhaps so. Only if the reason is not clear can we speak of hidden reasons. But this is not reasonable, since even if there is a clear reason, it is possible to assume that there are hidden reasons. Alternatively, if the reason is not clear, then there is no need to reach for hidden reasons, since there is no understanding of the reason at all. Therefore, simply put, it seems that this method is inconsistent with the words of the Rosh.

In any case, it seems that this method does not face a situation where the prior regulation brings harm. The concern that there may be hidden reasons is a matter of doubt, and no doubt excludes certainty.

Cases and mechanisms of repeal of regulations: the law of my members

In the issue of Bitza 6a, we find that it is permissible to deal with the needs of the deceased on the second day of Yom Kippur, and even with side needs, such as cutting a myrtle to place by the deceased's bed in his honor. The Gemara there says that now that there are friends, everything is forbidden. And Rashi explains there:

Here are my friends – a wicked nation that existed during the Persian era, and forced the Israelites to do their work, and on a good day they would be repelled by them by telling them: It is a good day, and if they see them burying their dead – they would force them to do the work.

And in the Torah, "Vahaidana" there, they wrote:

And indeed, here are my friends who are concerned – Pharisees who are forced by Israel to do work and when it is the 19th, they are placed there, and if they were to see that their dead are being buried, they are forced to do work and it is said that at this time, there is no friend who is permitted, and it cannot be said that there is a need for another reason to permit the practice. This reason is because of a fear and a transgression. The fear is a transgression of the reason, and the Lord said about the waters of the exiled people, lest a snake drink from them, and now that there are no snakes among us, it is clear that we drink from them even from the beginning, despite the fact that it is something that the Lord and the Prophets would have prohibited.

Thos says that the Idna no longer has any friends, and therefore the permission has returned to its place. Thos continues that there is no need for another minyan to permit because the reason for the regulation that prohibited it has been nullified. He continues and says that the HaN regarding open water, when there are no snakes, can be drunk from it even in the first place, despite it being a minyan thing.

Things are difficult, because the entire discussion regarding a different minyan to permit is about a regulation whose reason for amending is invalid. So how does Thos say here that an obvious regulation (not in the minyan) can be annulled because its reason is invalid?

It can be explained that Thos sees the prohibition against the members as something that is not prohibited in the Minyan, but rather they simply practiced it as a prohibition due to the danger. And if it is not prohibited in the Minyan, it is certainly not Minyan for them to permit it. But this is not the case either, for Thos brings an example from the revealed waters, and there he explicitly says that it is a thing that is in the Minyan, and yet when its cause is null, it is null.

And indeed, in the wording of the Rosh here, Si' 5, this seems to be the explanation:

Rabin said, and the Idna said, "Here are my friends, my friends, my friends." And at this time, it is not forbidden on this basis, since my friends, my friends, are just as careful not to reveal it, since there are no snakes, it is clear. And the Idna was not a thing that was mentioned in the Laws of Menin and Rav Alpas Nami, but Rabbenu Tam, z"l, was stricter on the matter, and even Rabbi HaRashid ruled in Rabbenu's favor.

He says in the commentary that this is not a matter of minyan, and therefore it should be permitted even without another minyan. Perhaps the Rosh is following his view here that when the reason is clear, there is no need for a minyan to annul the regulation. But, as mentioned, in the Toss, they wrote in the commentary that it is.

And it is possible that the intention of the Toss is to say that in these cases the reason for the regulation appeared in the wording of the Hadith, and in the 23rd century when the reason is nullified, it is automatically nullified (like reading by the light of the candle, lest it be lit, and so on).

In other words: the regulation was to fear my friends, and not to prohibit treating the dead. In any case, there is no prohibition against treating the dead, but there is only an obligation to fear my friends. And this is similar to what can be said about the reason for reading, that at least the one who demands the reason for reading sees the reason itself as a prohibition, and not the prohibiting command, such as "He shall not multiply wives for him, nor shall his heart turn away." There the Tannaim (Sanhedrin 21) disagreed on whether the prohibition was for multiplying wives or for turning away the heart. And there too, because the reason for the command appeared in its formulation in the Torah. The question is when do we say that the regulation is the prohibition itself and when do we say that the regulation is the reason. The boundary is not clear. We can always say that what they prohibited is the reason and not the regulation, and turn the reason into a barrier.

Although the plain language of the Toss indicates a different direction: There is a difference between a casual situation in which the purpose of the regulation has been abolished, and a situation in which everything has changed and the purpose of the regulation no longer applies. If there is a place where there is no concern that the candle has been tilted, this is a case of abolishing the purpose. But in a place where one no longer works with a candle that can be tilted, this is a situation in which there is no longer a regulation, and no minyan is required at all to abolish it.

In other words: if it is clear that the regulation is not general but was amended for a specific place and time, then it is automatically invalid.

And in the Gemara 77:2-3, we find:

Rav Yehuda, who sent a sacrifice to Abidran on the day of the festival, said: We know that there is no place for idolatry.

Rabbi Yehuda sent a gift to a certain gentile (named Avidarna) on the day of Idam, and explained this by knowing him to be a non-Jewish worshiper.

And the Rabbi there brought in the name of the Toss (also brought in Farah Rasi Katz):

And I found that they wrote in the Tosafot that it is not proper to forbid anything, because it is necessary to permit it from another number, since it is doubtful that it is permissible and that it is not permissible to permit it from another number, since it is permissible to permit those who have a reason for the prohibition from the beginning, even though it has been annulled now. But those who have never had a reason for prohibition, they recited without another number.

And if they want to say so, it is certainly not a sound that God would allow, for the rabbis did not prohibit from the beginning (the regulation) giving and carrying with idolaters without any divisions for idolatry, but we simply do not have it, and this matter requires study:

He explains that a minyan is needed if we want to permit something that was originally forbidden and then its purpose was lost. But when there is a situation that was not originally forbidden, there is no minyan to permit it. The argument is that in principle it was not forbidden to give gifts to a gentile who does not practice the tzaddik. Only if they had forbidden all gentiles, and then the gentiles would have stopped practicing tzaddik, would we have needed a minyan to permit it. This principle is very similar to what we saw above in the Toss regarding my friend.

Although the Rabbi himself disagrees with the Torah, since the Torah established a blanket principle, he says that it is possible that the sages (R. Yehuda) specifically stated here that they forbade only Gentiles, according to the tradition. In other words, he believes that a blanket principle cannot be learned from this.

But Thos apparently formulates this as a sweeping principle and not as a local explanation. And indeed, in the KN here in the sek. we find that he brings these words of Thos, and through them explains the words of my friend Thos. Thus he writes:

In any case, the KN also explains the words of our Tos according to this, which they intended to say that the regulation was originally only in places where there are members, but in other places they left the permission to engage in the ritual as it is. Therefore, in places where there are no members (not in Babylon), there is no need for a minyan. But according to this, in places where there were members, even if there are now no members, it is not permitted without a minyan.

We should note that the Pharisee there indicates that this is the method of the Torah in other places, such as Barish 77, which explain that we are with them during the days of the Jews. And so is the wine of the Gentiles at this time because they are not circumcised. And from this he also explains the Torah with us that in the revelation of the names of the Lord, it was not primarily a regulation in a place where there are no snakes.

Additional sources

We find other places where similar permissions are stated, and in each of them it is necessary to discuss which of the mechanisms was used for the permission. For example, in Tud "Makom", Pesachim 51, they wrote:

Where they practiced - Ori in the name of Riva, who interpreted in Yerushalmi May Shana Pesach Arabs from the rest of the 19th because the time of Pesach is from midnight onwards and even an individual who said Hathamam on the rest of the days of the year on the day that he brings a sacrifice is prohibited in work and is forbidden, then the whole day will be forbidden, just as an individual who brings a sacrifice and interprets Hathamam because it is necessary to offer a sacrifice from the morning, but Pesach cannot be offered until after midnight, as Danfka did among the Arabs and is forbidden, then a sacrifice is always for all Israel and a sacrifice every day will be forbidden every day in work, and from the second that I always that the Torah excluded from the rule as it is written, "And you shall gather your grain, and if all Israel sit and are idle, who will gather grain for them?" and this means that Hathamam is forbidden from the Torah, and it seems that even at this time, since the sacrifice is forbidden, then it is forbidden forever.

Thos says that the prohibition against performing work at midnight remains even when no sacrifice is made. Here it is prohibited because the prohibition was stated for all Israel, but now there is no house. Therefore, here a minyan is required to nullify it.

We find a similar principle in the law of asking and demanding in the laws of Passover, in the Book of Zechariah 5b, the Todah "Vahtanan" wrote:

And the Tanan asks about the laws of Passover – and even though even now there is no sacrifice, they ask about the laws of Passover before the 30th day of the 40th day. The main regulation on the sacrifice was established as stated by Te'ama in the Book of Passover (page 6), for a prophet stands on the first Passover and warns about a second Passover.

Here too, it is similar to the prohibition against doing crafts.

In both of these cases, the regulation was basically amended for all of Israel, but the reason has already been nullified, but it was not basically amended for a part of the public, and therefore it does not apply here to repeal it without a minyan. Why does the above principle not apply here, that when the reason is completely nullified, there is no need for a minyan? Perhaps these principles disagree with those principles. Perhaps here the reason is not completely nullified, after all, the Temple will soon be rebuilt and the sacrifices will return.

And so we find in the Toda, "And you were," in Blessings 55b, which wrote regarding the last waters:

And you were holy, this last water – precisely for those who were accustomed to washing their hands after the meal because of the salt of Sodom. But we, who do not have the salt of Sodom among us and are not accustomed to washing after the meal, do not wash our hands after the meal. And who are the people who are accustomed to washing their hands after the meal? Surely, washing our hands prevents them from blessing the blessing of food, and they need to wash their hands first in the המזה.

Here too, the regulation was primarily amended for places where there is Sodomite salt (the Pharisee explains that this is in the vicinity of Sodom), but not in other places.

In the Totudah Hada, 7:31, they discussed the question of the reasons for the prohibition on non-Gentile cheese, and their assumption is that without the reason, the prohibition does not exist. They also wrote there regarding snakes:

And we, who do not have snakes, do not feel any obvious reason and do not say that a thing is from which one and must be permitted from another, because it is certain that when they forbade it at first, they did not forbid it except in the place where snakes are mentioned, as I will explain to you in the book of the Apocrypha (page 75: 45 of the Apocrypha).

And also in Todd's Lapoki, 77:2:

And Rashbam and the Rabbis further interpreted in the name of Rashi what is written in the reply of the Geonim that at this time there is no prohibition of enjoyment in the contact of a worshipper of idols with wine, because the worshippers of idols of today are not accustomed to worshipping idols and are considered as ignorant of the nature of worshipping idols and their worship, and they are as God as a newborn baby, and for this reason we trust to collect the wine of the worshippers of idols in our debts, and on this matter the Rabbi sent him to the Rabbis, "Do you have in mind your thoughts and I will not let you and I will not let you and I will not let you touch a worshipper of idols with wine, even in drinking?" Your brother Rabbi Shmuel ruled in the name of your father Rabbi Shlomo, "The worshippers of idols at this time are not considered as important as a newborn baby, and you rule in a newborn baby, as Samuel said to him, "Do not make wine offering, even in drinking." And the Rabbis replied to him, "The student who wrote was frightened to rule, and God forbid, that it did not occur to him, but surely he was like a rabbi in my prohibition regarding Shmuel and a newborn baby making wine offering." To forbid drinking and idolaters at this time is certainly like a newborn baby, as Rabbi Shlomo ruled. And there is also no halacha, as Samuel did with slaves who were circumcised and not baptized, to require a new twelfth month to settle down, as in the baraita of the Mishnah, according to the Lishna, which says, "It is pure, the dekeil is clean, because the dekeil is like a rabbi in that he is a detainee." And it was also the custom of the Ashkenazim that slaves touch wine after they were circumcised and immediately baptized.

And at the end of the text there we found:

And since they decreed the idolater's sacrifice, it was a matter that was necessary from another source to permit it, and since they did not decree it except for those who sacrificed, and since they were not willing to worship idols, it is necessary to rely on permission and evidence for the matter from the Prophet (PBUH) (Lakman, s.a.). So the Lord sent a sacrifice to the Lord on the day of Idu, saying, "There is no place for me in the gentiles to worship idols." And yet, a model of negotiation on the day of Idu was a matter that was necessary from another source to permit it, so that they would not be exhausted and admit that it certainly began. They did not decree it on them, who is the question of whether they are just, or whether they are permitted in enjoyment? Since they decreed on just, they are because of their daughters. And does this reason also apply now? And since they decreed just, they are forbidden in enjoyment more than they are because they are common to worship idols, but now they have annulled the sacrifice because they do not know the nature of idol worship, it is enough to be their cap and their cap or as the cap of worshipers. Stars prohibit drinking, not pleasure, and whoever is strict will receive a blessing.

In other words, here too, permission is granted due to a change in circumstances, even though it seems that here in principle they did not intend to grant permission to anyone.

The Pharach remains in the Tza'a on our Tos' that permitted only because of a change in circumstances, but it seems that this is the Tos' method in other places. And it seems that in all these places the boundary is according to the Rana, and not according to the Tos' that the Rana brought, that there are places where the boundary of the prohibition was primarily based on the reason and not just because there was a prohibition because of the reason, and therefore in all these places the Zil Batr Te'ma is valid. It is true that the Tza'a is unclear how one can decide when to follow the reason and when not.

And this is the intention of the Tod'ah of 'Shibta', Yoma Az 2b, who wrote:

Because of Shabbat – Parshi, an evil spirit, the rule on the hands that have not been washed in the morning, and the R.T. interprets that without giving a baby a piece of bread, it is permissible to wash his hands in the morning on Yom Kippur, without detracting from dirtiness with mud and feces, as they say, if he washes as usual and is not afraid, and there is no one more dirty with mud and feces than one who has not washed his hands in the morning, who is not permitted to touch his mouth, nose, ears, and eyes, as it says in the eighth chapter of Sheretsim (Shabbat, page 11): “A hand to the mouth shall be cut off,” etc. Because of Bat Melech and Shabbat, another matter is that the rule on food is when he comes to give a piece of bread to a baby who is four or five years old and chokes him if he does not wash his hands at that time, even though he has already taken a piece of bread, and what is the world? We are not careful about this now, since that evil spirit does not exist in those kingdoms, just as we are not careful about revelation and couples.

Indeed, in the Toda "Tanan", below 3a, they wrote:

There is no one who cultivates and no one who dances – a Pharisee who may repair a musical instrument, and who, according to them, were the rabbis of their time who were skilled in making musical instruments that belonged to the sector, but according to them, we are not skilled in making musical instruments that do not belong to the sector.

Here it is really not clear why Thos explains that the regulation's limit was not to reach the point of repairing musical instruments. Here, simply, this is the reason for the regulation and not a limit. Or perhaps there is a limit of letting them rest in Israel, that if we have seen that the public does not comply with the regulation, we assume that this expresses the fact that the regulation's limit does not belong now.

And perhaps, in a place where circumstances have changed, the barrier of relaxation and resumption nullifies the regulation, since when circumstances change, the previous relaxation is not sufficient, after all, it is like a new prohibition, and a new prohibition has a new relaxation. Therefore, in the Torah, it is truly consistent to only permit following a custom that has become widespread to relax regulations, and not to instruct to relax them from the outset. It is generally understood that this is because the Torah only comes to protect in retrospect those who relax, but according to us, it can be said that the public's custom is a fundamental reason to permit, and without it there is no permit.

And perhaps the definition we saw above applies here, of permanent change that does not repeat, and when the taste is completely nullified globally, there is no need for a minyan.

Rabbi Gotal, in his book Shinu'i Tiba'im bi Halacha, relies on additional sources, which provide another argument that from the beginning they stipulated that the regulation could be revoked. Although in most places there is no evidence that they did so from the beginning, and it seems that this is apologetics after the fact (see there, especially in note 543).

A note on Maimonides' method

The Rambam does not make light of all the things that the Torah says. He forbids drinking from the grave (Rotesh Pi'a 56) and requires fresh water (Berachot Po'a 52), and forbids cheese from the Akkadians (Ma'achas 53:13), and dancing (Hal' Shabbat 52:4). It seems that he disagrees with the Torah's method throughout.

It is possible that the custom of lenience did not spread among him, and in any case, it should not be lenient. Although originally the demand was for it to spread throughout all of Israel, since they were scattered from Babylon, each community is a community in itself, and therefore the demand for expansion applies to each community separately.

And regarding my friends, the Maimonides himself did not bring this up either, and wrote in the rabbinical commentary (Heb. Yot 1:23) that Yot is a law in the matter of a dead person. And it seems that he learned that there is no rule here to prohibit from my friends, but rather they feared my friends and therefore they practiced a prohibition against them. And when there is no rule, it is not in their Minyan to permit it. This is similar to the reasoning we saw in the Baran that here they did not prohibit the burial of the dead at all, but rather required fear of my friends. Although the Maimonides may have it easier, since it is not at all a matter of Minyan (and in the Torah we specify that it does count as Minyan), meaning that they did not even require it. It was a custom of the rabbinic and that is it.

C. Specific Beliefs, Divisions, and Mechanisms

Summary

In this section, I will summarize what emerged from all our discussions regarding possible ways of change. Within these discussions, I will incorporate additional mechanisms and divisions that we find in the poskim, which are usually based on interpretation and not on Talmudic issues. As stated, I see no need to go into detail about them because these are just tools in the toolbox that can be used according to our understanding. There is no binding authority here.

Possible mechanisms of change

If we abandon the assumption of generational decline, perhaps we can say that in our time it is possible for a rabbi to be greater than his predecessors (depending on the consent of the general public, as a kind of renewal of the ordination of the Rambam). And perhaps this is greater in number but not in wisdom.
If the continuation of the regulation is harmful, it should be repealed, if the mistake is corrected, it should be corrected. And in our time, when we have seen that the damage is even more evident and leads to blasphemy, there is certainly more room to relax the demands for repealing regulations.
When the reason is nullified, there is room to consider the public custom of a law that has not been repeated and simplified.
The Rabbi in the Lenbuch of the Generation: A rabbinate can cancel the principle of a matter that a minyan needs another minyan to permit on its own (especially if it is from the rabbinate: Return to your tents, in which case according to the Rambam there is no need for a large rabbinate).
When the reason for the regulation is clear, or is stated within it, it can be canceled. Like the Rosh's comment regarding the requirement of a reason for reading and the Rosh's response that we cited.
When the reason is globally invalid and no longer belongs, or is primarily limited to a certain place and time, or to a certain form of behavior that no longer exists, as in those cases of Thos.
When the facilities initially stipulated that it would be possible to cancel, there is no reason to cancel. Although it is not clear how this can be known.
Many regulations were not originally amended by the Minyan, and there is no reason to repeal them, and many have already argued for this (see Rabbi Gotal, note 552). Furthermore, the Malbim wrote (Ertzot Chaim, 1999, HaMeir Laerz, Sekma) that even when we do not know that the regulation was amended by the Minyan, which is true of many of the regulations, it can be relaxed and repealed (and see more sources in Rabbi Gotal, ibid., note 553).
There are many differences between different types of regulations (see Rabbi Gotal, p. Relag, and in the notes there).
Regarding the change made to the homura, the Ya'avetz wrote (Lechem Sha'im, 5:42) that it certainly needs to be made. In our cases too, there are situations in which the change can be seen as a change to the homura (after all, we make the change for the sake of the Torah and not for ourselves. See my unpublished article that discusses the question of what a 'homura' is).
It should be noted that we did not discuss this: if there is a change in our understanding of reality, such as scientific progress, perhaps no annulment is required at all, since it has been determined retrospectively that this was essentially a mistake (on the other hand, in matters of science we are in a greater position than our predecessors). This is actually the subject that the last chapter of Rabbi Gotal's book deals with. Sages usually present the mistakes of the sages of previous generations (including the sages of the Talmud) as natural changes. In fact, a significant number of them themselves were aware that this was fictitious and done only out of respect and awe, but Rabbi Gotal insists that this is not the case (in a correspondence I had with him about this).
Here I completely disagree with him. For example, when there is a fictitious 'natural variation' (= a scientific error of previous generations), as opposed to a truly changed currency (this can also happen), there is room to say that the regulation is automatically void.

I will add that on such a subject the Daorita is certainly much easier than the Rabbis. If there is an interpretation of the Torah that is scientifically incorrect in our opinion (such as worms born from the filth, various predations, etc.), then it is clear that this is not the intention of the Torah. Even if the sages can make scientific mistakes, God certainly does not make mistakes in understanding the reality that He created and governs. Therefore, in this case it is clear that the original interpretation was fundamentally mistaken, and in any case it is automatically invalid. For the rabbinic, this is invalid even without the need for a minyan (but perhaps with an agreement that would verify that this is indeed the correct conclusion on the scientific level, and that it is relevant to the halakhic discussion).

ending

There is no need to mention what Rabbi Gotal wrote at the end of his book, citing numerous sources, that in order to repeal a regulation, a gathering of sages and discretion are required to ensure that no boundaries are breached. On the other hand, it should be remembered that failure to take action on these issues due to various concerns leads to no less serious breaches of boundaries.

In the end, we saw that the scope of possibilities is vast. Even when there is no Jewish consensus at all, it is possible to create a consensus 'from below', since the need to change is no less pressing than the need to preserve. This is not only an obligation towards the public but towards the Torah and God Himself. It is an obligation towards the truth, not to base a significant part of our lives on untrue and untrue practices that lead to confusion and disillusionment and make our Torah a sham. Therefore, we will judge and preserve only one need without giving our attention to the other. You are nothing but a wise man in your day.

[1] And perhaps there is disdain for the sages here, in that he placed Rabbi on the same level as Daniel, and therefore believed that Rabbi was permitted to change Daniel's ruling.