Conservatism and innovation

1996

A.

When the little prince arrived[1] To the star of the lantern-lighter, the prince greeted him with due respect: "Good morning. Why did you turn off your flashlight?" "That's the order," replied the flashlight. "Good morning." "What's the order?" "To turn off my flashlight. Good evening." And he turned it on again. "But why did you turn it on again?" "That's the order," replied the flashlight. "I don't understand," said the little prince. "There's nothing to understand here," said the flashlight, "an order is an order. Good morning." And he turned off his flashlight. Then he wiped his forehead with a checkered earthen handkerchief. "I have a terrible job. It used to be a reasonable job. I would turn it off in the morning and turn it on in the evening. The rest of the day I could rest, and the rest of the night I could sleep..." "And has the order changed since then?" "The order hasn't changed," said the flashlight. "That's exactly the trouble! Every year the planet rotates on its axis faster and the order has not changed!" "And then?" "So now, when it makes a turn in a minute, I don't have even a single second of rest. Every minute, I turn it on and off!" "That's really funny! Your day lasts one minute!" "That's not funny at all," said the lantern-lighter, we've been standing there talking for a month." "A month?" "Yes. Thirty minutes. Thirty days! Good evening." He turned on the lantern again. The little prince looked at him and he liked it, this lantern-lighter who followed the instructions so faithfully. He remembered the sunsets that he himself had asked to see on his planet and for this purpose he would always move his chair. And he wanted to help his friend: "You know... I can tell you how you can rest whenever you want..." "I always want to," said the lantern-lighter. Because a person can be both faithful and lazy. And the little prince added: “Your planet is so small that you can go around it in three steps. You just have to walk slowly and always be in the sunlight. When you want to rest, just walk... and the day will last as long as you want.” “That doesn’t help me much,” said the lantern-lighter. “What I love in life is sleeping.” “It’s a shame,” said the little prince. “It’s a shame,” said the lantern-lighter. “Good morning.” And he turned off the lantern. “This man, everyone else would have despised him,” said the little prince to himself as he continued his journey: “The king, the tyrant, the drunkard, the businessman. And yet, to me, he is the only one who is not ridiculous. Perhaps because he is not concerned with himself, but with something else.” And he sighed sadly and thought further: “This man is the only one I could have made friends with. But his planet is really too small. There is no room for years in it…”

This long quote, from the well-known children's book, presents with astonishing clarity many characteristics of the conservative type:

1. He is not willing to change from the instructions given to him even if the conditions in which he operates have changed (the star is rotating faster).
2. He is very diligent and precise in carrying out these instructions.
3. This diligence does not contradict a lazy character and sometimes it even stems from it (unwillingness to examine the basic assumptions).
4. Many of the others despised him.
5. There is actually a lot to appreciate about him, contrary to the conventional attitude toward him, because he is not concerned only with himself, unlike all the rational ones (the king, the proud, the drunkard, and the businessman).

And finally,

6. There is no room for years on his planet, it is too small. The conservative does not accept approaches other than his own.

The lantern-lighter is a conservative, whom the Little Prince tries to convince to reconsider his course of action in light of changing circumstances. The problem of conservatism versus innovation accompanies almost every ideological/religious movement in its attempt to deal with changing circumstances. Zionism, Judaism (as a religion and a nation), Christianity, communism, etc. These days, the debate between Orthodox Jews and conservative and even secular Reform Jews is becoming more topical in our circles, regarding the question of who represents the continuation of Jewish tradition? Who is the Mishna and who is the Akebi? Arguments such as 'halakha has always adapted itself to reality', and in any case, 'he who advocates the approach that the halakhah should not be changed is the true innovator', are heard all the time. These claims are also mixed with claims about the real irrelevance of some of the halakhah, even though they ostensibly belong to two different categories of reference to the halakhah. Such a public debate, by its very nature, does not deal with the real problems and differences between approaches. Before shaping a worldview regarding these questions, one must clarify as thoroughly as possible the basic terms used in the debate, regardless of the concrete problem being discussed.

In the following pages I will attempt to characterize and analyze the various approaches to ideological or other systems of laws/rules, and examine the assumptions underlying the basic approaches: conservatism versus innovation or change. This is, in my opinion, the first step in clarifying questions such as that of reference to Jewish tradition. The next step in this clarification should be an empirical examination of Jewish halakhic history, and the application of the abstract categories presented in these pages. This step obviously goes beyond the framework of the a priori philosophical discussion, and therefore has no place here. The relevance of the current discussion to current problems serves me here only as a motivation for conducting it. This article does not discuss at all the specific example of the system of laws of Jewish halakhic law.

To conclude the introduction, I will add another important note. In the discussion that follows, I will occasionally use expressions that sound like a personality characterization of the types (conservative and innovative) themselves, but this is not the case. I do not intend to deal at all with the psychological layers of conservative or innovative behavior, but only with the philosophical characterizations of these types of thinking and attitude.

on.

I will begin the discussion with a simple model. A group of people was given a list of instructions that they and their children should follow throughout their lives. Over the years of activity, the circumstances in which the members of this group operate have changed, and as a result, two subgroups have developed that represent different approaches to the set of instructions: the conservative group, and the innovative group. I will now try to characterize the difference between them. The first formulation that comes to mind:

Version A: Conservatives are those who continue to follow previous instructions even in changed circumstances, while reformers adapt the instructions to the new circumstances.

Let's take an example to illustrate the above situation.[2] Two people are walking in the desert wearing swimsuits, just as their ancestors have always walked. After years, they arrive in a very cold area. Man A continues to walk in a swimsuit, while Man B changes his clothes to warm clothing according to the new weather conditions. On the surface, the association with the above characteristics is simple and clear: Man A is conservative and Man B is a reformer. However, a slightly more careful examination of the situation reveals that things are not so simple. Man A's claim is that he is continuing the path of his ancestors regardless of the changing circumstances, because they wore swimsuits, he also wears a swimsuit. However, Man B can argue against him that he is indeed the conservative one, because his ancestors walked with clothing appropriate to the weather in which they operated, and he too walks with warm clothing instead of cold.

And there is a well-known Hasidic story about Rabbi Noah Malkovich, who took over the leadership in place of his father, Rabbi Mordechai, and his disciples saw that he practiced several things that were not like his father. And when they asked him about this, he replied, "I practice exactly like my father. Why didn't he imitate others? I too do the same."[3]

This dilemma is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's discussion of following a rule. In the above discussion, Wittgenstein asks[4]: Someone who promises, every day, "I'll come visit you tomorrow" - does he say the same thing every day, or something different every day?

If we return to our acquaintances who walk around in swimsuits, and the abandoned debate between them on the subject of who deserves to be called a conservative, it seems to me that the natural tendency is to say that A is the conservative after all. If I try to translate this classification into a more general characteristic, I will obtain a different formulation than the previous one for the difference between these two types:

Version B: The conservative is the one who interprets the instructions literally, while the reformist is the one who allows himself interpretive freedom. This interpretation is supported by thinking about the logic or values underlying the instructions.

This formulation recalls Wittgenstein's words in his aforementioned discussion:[5] We merely read the lips of the community and act, and do not seek any further guidance.That is, the conservative is the one whoreally' acts according to the rule, and not someone who needs further interpretation, which can certainly be attributed to his own system of thought, and not to that of the rule's formulator. An action of the type of the reformist, according to Deutgenstein, cannot at all be defined as an action according to this rule.[6]

Version B seemingly assumes that the above-mentioned pair had a text (written or oral) detailing the instructions, in this case: 'You must go dressed in swimsuits.' If so, it is clear that A's interpretation is the one that is more appropriate to the plainness of the text of the instructions.

If the pair does not have any such text, but only the custom of their ancestors in their possession, the decision between the two claimants to the crown of conservatism depends on the interpretation of the customs of the ancestors. A claims that their ancestors acted this way because they were instructed to always wear a swimsuit, while B claims that the instructions were to wear clothing appropriate to the weather. In such a case, it would seem that it would not be possible to use B's version to characterize the two types, since there is no written version at all, and it is not possible to give it an interpretation. However, the actions of the ancestors can be interpreted in both ways. In such a case, if the original version of the instructions was truly as B's interpretation, then it would seem that he is the conservative.

However, here there is room to argue that even if the instructions were to wear clothing appropriate to the weather, there is no justification for saying that A is a reformer. After all, in the above wording, the reformer gives a different interpretation to the instructions based on the logic underlying them. It is very difficult to say that A is giving an interpretation to the instructions that state: 'One must wear clothing appropriate to the weather,' and understands that the value underlying them is that one must wear a swimsuit in all weather conditions, since there is no logic whatsoever in such an interpretation.

Here it seems that the characteristic of conservatism or innovation depends on the interpretation of the data in the group's possession and not on the original instructions themselves. If the data are only the facts that the fathers went with a swimsuit, then the conservative will conclude that the instructions were probably to always go with a swimsuit, while the innovator will argue that the instructions were to go with clothing that is appropriate for the conditions. The above analysis shows that B's method, which perceives the instructions as a statement that 'one must go in clothing appropriate to the weather', has no appropriate classification for A's approach. He is not conservative, of course, but he is also not an innovator (at least according to the definitions in B's version). On the other hand, if the instructions are as A perceives them, i.e.: 'one must go with a swimsuit', then B's classification as a reformer is reasonable. It seems that in such a situation, the reasonable person would say that A is the one who appears to be conservative and B is the innovator. This statement is nothing more than an image of the principle of interpretation known as the principle of grace, and this is due to the fact that the opposite statement complicates our attempt to understand and define A.

The above classification, which is based on the principle of kindness, seems misleading. It is not possible to classify B as a reformer, simply because if he were classified as a conservative, we would have no appropriate classification for A. The correct diagnosis here is that the two are incommensurable, and each must be evaluated within its own interpretive context. It is not necessary that in every interpretive context there be the possibility of a rational characterization of all the other approaches. This point raises the problem that determining which of the above individuals is a conservative and which is a reformer is also dependent on interpretation. And if so, the categorical system that determines this matter is that of the interpreter who looks at them from the side and tries to characterize them.

If we still try to discuss the problem objectively,[7] It seems that almost every commentator would say that both of these types are conservatives, each in his own way. Such an interpretation deviates from Wittgenstein's strict requirements for those who act according to a rule, as interpreted above. Here we will say that there is indeed a disagreement between them regarding the nature of the instructions they should act upon, whether they are constitutive or directive, that is, whether the instruction is the concrete practical imperative, or the value underlying it. But subject to the assumption of each of them that he is indeed right in his interpretation, both adhere to the instructions they received from their ancestors and strive to live by them.

Even in the first case, where the group has the text of the instructions, it is still difficult to explain why one interpretation is more faithful to it than its companion. And if the loyalty of the two interpretations is similar, then there is again an inconvenience in defining A as conservative and B as mishna.

The obvious conclusion is that the two types we have presented so far are both conservative: one Founding Conservative, who perceives the rule in his hand as constitutive, and the other, who perceives the rules as directed towards the values underlying them, is Conservative in mind.

Here it is appropriate to note that I do not intend to claim that the founding conservative acts irrationally because he carries out the instructions without understanding the logic or values underlying them. Even A., who apparently acts without any connection to the logic underlying the instructions, is usually motivated by a logical motive. This motive can be trust in the one giving the instructions, and a belief that there is logic in the instructions even if he does not follow them to the end.[8]In any case, it is a clear characteristic of the conservative that he does not fully understand the logic behind the instructions, otherwise he would have no reason not to deviate from them when circumstances require it.[9].

It seems, then, that we have not yet identified the true reformer. Apparently, the only option left to us now is to define the true reformer as one who denies the ultimate duty to obey the instructions received by previous generations. If so, we would formulate:

Version 3: The conservative (of its various types) is one who strives to obey the instructions as his ancestors received them (in his own interpretation), and the reformist is one who does not at all acknowledge the obligation to obey these instructions.

It is immediately evident that this version is also deficient. The reformist also has some affinity with the precepts, and does not recommend abandoning them altogether. Otherwise, he would simply leave the group that obeys them, and not recommend reforms in the system of precepts. The type described in the latter version as a reformer is more correct to call ransom.

To summarize, we have defined three groups with different forms of reference to the system of instructions: the group with the constitutive conservative reference that upholds the rules as they are, the directed conservative group that upholds the rules while providing a non-"fossilized" value interpretation, and the group of infidels that have no interest in upholding the instructions at all.

The problem that remains before us now is that this theoretical division into three groups does not exhaust all the types known to us from reality. There is a reformist orientation that we have not yet defined. The reformist type wants, in certain ways, to maintain an affinity with the old provisions, but takes for itself the right and freedom not to preserve them in full. Characterizing this group seems quite difficult. The division into three presented above seems to cover the entire possible space of interpretations.

It seems that it is still possible to propose another option for formulating the difference between the reformist and the conservative:

Version 4: The reformist is conservative regarding some of the instructions and an infidel regarding others, while the conservative treats the entire set of instructions similarly.

This also does not seem to be an exhaustive definition of this type, since for a system that includes a single provision, there is no such possible approach at all. Or, to put it another way, for every single provision in the system, the reformist is either conservative or infidel. In addition, according to this proposal, the nature of the amendments that this type can propose must be specified. Are proposals to add provisions possible for such a system? If so, what will be the status of these additional provisions. Will the attitude towards them be conservative or infidel? Are proposals to remove provisions or change them[10], are what characterize reform? And if so, what kind of provisions? A change in provisions of the kind for which this model of the reformist is conservative is out of the question. Of the kind for which he is an infidel, he has no reason to remove them (just as the infidel himself has no such reason). Another possibility that should be examined is that removing those claims in which he is an infidel, that is, cleansing the system of irrelevant provisions, is itself the essence of reform. And this is in contrast to the complete infidel, who has no reason at all to engage with the system of provisions since he does not believe in it at all.

According to this option, the reformist is a partial conservative. That is, he is a complete conservative, but the system of instructions he adheres to is different from that of the previous conservative. This does not sound like a fundamental difference in approach. In addition, there is room to examine the origin and validity of the instructions, and how it is possible to delete some of them and leave others. That is, generally a set of instructions is binding as a whole, otherwise it would not be a set of instructions but a combination of individual instructions. With respect to each instruction separately, there is the above argument that does not allow a third category. It is clear, then, that the current definition of the reformist requires a fabric of mutually related instructions. Such a picture does not allow for the deletion of parts of it for someone who accepts it as a whole. After all, such a system is logically equivalent to a system with one instruction, regarding which we have already shown that only one of two approaches is possible: conservatism (on the issue) and heresy. And if we say that someone who erases parts of the system does not perceive it as an inseparable fabric, then this is again only a coincidental difference in the interpretation of the system of instructions, and not a real difference in the approach to it. We should also note that even with regard to what remains of the system of instructions, compliance with it stems from the reformer's decision, and not from his complete subordination to the instructions.[11] Such an approach suggests that the reformist's conservatism is also a conservatism that is difficult to define in our previous terms.

 

third.

To understand the origin of the relationships described in the previous chapter, we will try to examine the examples given above to see what the assumptions on which they arise may be.

When the marchers reach the cold region, B can justify changing his clothes by saying that this was actually the intention of the one giving the instructions, or alternatively by saying that there is no need to obey him at all. As long as we were walking in the desert, there was no reason to deviate from these instructions because they were in line with common sense, but now that they cause discomfort, we can simply unburden ourselves. The Happy Prince, in the passage quoted above, did not intend to argue that there is no need to turn on lanterns at night, but only that it is an action that requires great effort in the current situation (when the star rotates at a much faster rate). An examination of the roots of such an approach can suggest that it is in fact the same approach as that of the infidel, which assumes at its core that there was no reason to follow the instructions in the first place, and indeed we did not follow them. Walking in a swimsuit or turning on the lanterns was our choice and not obedience to any external authority.[12]

On the other hand, it is possible that this is indeed a new approach, which claims that there is a significant value to obedience, but that it is not ultimate. Obedience still requires examination as to whether its benefit is equal to its harm. The harm is also measured within the framework of some system that is also acceptable to that person. In other words, the assessment of obedience to instructions is no longer done within the framework of binary logic (must or not obey – conservatism or heresy), but within the framework of multi-valued logic, or fuzzy logic. If so, we have finally arrived at an acceptable definition of the difference between the conservative and the reformist:

The text of the fifth verse: The conservative (of its types) is someone who relates to the system of instructions in an ultimate way, while a reformist is someone who gives a value that is not absolute to this system.

According to this formulation, then, contrary to our previous argument, it is conceivable to have a reformist approach even to a set of instructions that includes only one instruction. For example, the instruction to turn on headlights only at night can be received in one of four forms of reference: absolute obedience – a constitutive conservative, obedience according to relevant circumstances – a deliberate conservative, obedience provided the price is not too high – a reformist, and disobedience – an infidel.

Although the lantern-lighter cannot be classified as a reformist and certainly not as a heretic, he can certainly be called a deliberate conservative. That is, the cost of fulfilling the commandment (the effort) is completely irrelevant to him, but it is possible that if at some point there is no night in his star, he too will stop engaging in fulfilling this commandment, and perceive it as irrelevant.

In light of all that has been said above in defining the reformist approach, we will now try to wonder about the origin of conservatism itself. We usually tend to think that the institutional conservative does not understand the full logic underlying the system of instructions in his hands. In contrast, the intentional conservative thinks that he does understand it correctly, and therefore allows himself to interpret the instructions according to changing situations and in light of the logic underlying them. Unlike the reformist, both types of conservatives give ultimate value to the system of instructions in their hands, and therefore do not tend to change them. It seems on the surface (and especially in the religious context) that they are motivated by faith in the ability and intentions of the one giving the instructions. For this reason, the institutional conservative carries out these instructions even without understanding their value. The intentional conservative thinks that he understands the intention of the one giving the instructions, and therefore allows himself excessive interpretive freedom, but he is also not inclined to follow them at all.

However, it is also possible to present a different view of a conservative. This type thinks that the system of instructions he has is a basic system of values that does not need reasoning, and cannot be reasoned. On the contrary, this system is itself the value standard by which all different actions and situations are measured. In Kantian terminology, this is a transcendental system of man.[13] This is a somewhat surprising characterization of a conservative. According to this characterization, there is no need for a person who gives the instructions, and complete trust in him, as the conservative was presented in the previous view. This change in the definition of a conservative is like Kant's Copernican revolution.

If we examine by what criteria the infidel rejects the system of instructions, or alternatively by what principles the principles are interpreted according to the intentional conservative, it appears that they are using a previous value system in light of which this system is interpreted or judged. This argument shows, in fact, that these are also constitutive conservatives, but they are using a different constitutive system. This system is not the system of instructions in question, but another one that they consider to be prior to it. The constitutive system from his point of view is the value system by which he also judges the current system.

When a person operates within the framework of such a basic system, there is a tendency to interpret other systems by reducing them to the constitutive system. For example, someone who believes in the validity of natural morality will often tend to interpret religious laws in a way that is consistent with the rules of natural morality. It is therefore found that someone who has a clear constitutive system, but at the same time feels committed to another system, will have a tendency to deliberately interpret the less basic system, in such a way that acting according to it will not contradict the rules of the basic system.

It can be thought, then, that every person is a founding conservative, but their founding system is not the same as that of other people. Some of those founding conservatives will tend to deliberately interpret less basic systems, and reject (deny) those systems that cannot be reduced to such a reduction.[14] In this case, it is clear that the discussion about whether a person is a conservative (of its types) or a heretic should be conducted at the level of a given system of instructions. In fact, the discussion is about the question of what is the position of this system in relation to other principles in the mental system of the person in question. If it is the most basic, then it is determined that this person is a founding conservative in relation to this system, and if it is not, then the path to being a deliberate conservative is open to him. If this system does not exist at all in his mental system, then he is a heretic.

The conclusion of the above is that the discussion of conservatism is not, as it may seem at first glance, a characterization of a person, but rather a characterization of his attitude towards the system of instructions. Ostensibly, then, it seems that the discussion of a person's conservatism can be reduced to a discussion of whether the system in question is constitutive, intentional, or irrelevant to him.

Despite all of the above, it is common to describe different people as more conservative than others. The title conservative is considered to describe people and not just systems of rules. As I noted at the end of the introduction, I do not intend to go into a description of the overall nature of the conservative, but only to say that the concept of conservatism generally appears as a characteristic of a person's relationship to the system. In contrast, the discussion of whether a system of rules is constitutive or intentional is seen more as a discussion of the system itself. It is true that even there it is difficult to separate the discussion from the intentions of the person formulating/giving the rules and the person acting according to them, since they are ultimately the ones who decide on the validity and meaning of the system of rules. The degree of conservatism of a person in relation to a particular system is in fact a description of his or her position in his or her overall value system. From this distinction it is clear why the titles intentional or constitutive conservative have equivalent titles in the classification of systems of laws as constitutive or intentional, while the description of a person as an infidel or a reformist has no such equivalent at all. A description of a set of instructions as irrelevant or as not absolute is not a description of the system but of the person's attitude towards it.

To summarize, there are two types of legal systems: constitutive and intentional. There are four types of attitude towards systems of instructions: conservative, constitutive and intentional, reformist, and heretical. These designations characterize people's attitude towards a particular system, and not a general characterization of their personality. The discussion regarding someone's affiliation with one of these groups is not separated from the discussion regarding the nature of the system itself, but the subject of the discussion in this case is the person himself and his attitude towards the system of instructions. This attitude is derived from the position of this system within the framework of the person's overall value world.

D.

The analysis in the previous chapter raises several pointed questions. The location of the various systems within the overall value framework is seen as something that is not in the person's decision, but as a given that precedes all of his judgments. The judgments themselves are merely applications to particular cases of the principles that are innate in advance. Is such a view consistent with approaches that are not deterministic? Another question, and perhaps this is another aspect of the same question, is how does the reformist view fit into this entire structure? Is a reformist (i.e. contingent, according to the definition above) reference to a system of instructions possible only when this system is irrelevant in terms of the person's entire given value hierarchy? Furthermore, are a person's value judgments really made in the form of a hierarchical axiomatic system as described here? Is it possible in any way to change the system inherent in a person himself? How, according to such a description, is it possible for a person's attitude to change from a conservative attitude to an infidel or reformist attitude? If such a transition occurs, as is usually the case, was the previous classification of this person's attitude to the system of instructions an illusion?

The above structure describes the conservative approach to a system of instructions, as the highest position of this system in the scale of human values. A conservative approach is essentially the perception of this system of instructions as transcendental. It seems clear that this is a subjective transcendental system, which varies from person to person. Such a perception is contrary to Kant, and to various transcendental arguments that followed him, which assume for granted the units of transcendental concepts and rules.[15]

In accepted arguments in ethics and aesthetics, the concept of "value" is presented as a transcendental concept. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who himself is known to hold such an ethical view, cites two quotes that represent such a position, one from Pascal and the other from Maimonides.[16] Usually (as in Leibowitz there) the argument is presented as arising from the consent of all humanity, and in any case this is not the transcendental pluralism for which I argue here. But I do not see why thinkers who advocate ethical relativism cannot also agree to such a transcendental argument even if the result is not necessarily uniformity in values.

The origin and validity of a value system is a subject that has been debated by many and has no place here. We remain here at the analytical level of the discussion, without delving into metaphysics, epistemology, and perhaps even psychology, as is necessary to address the above questions. At such a level, it can be said that an argument that can be described in this context as a second-order transcendental argument should lead us to the conclusion regarding the autonomous ability of man to organize the hierarchy of his value systems/instructions freely. This organization process is not done axiomatically on the basis of a previous value system, otherwise the question would return to the manner in which the highest place of this previous system in the hierarchy was determined. This point of free will also allows him to relate contingently to some of the laws and to be a reformist or an infidel. The assertion that this process itself is not done through a system of laws also removes the basis for the question regarding the possibility of changing the basic system. It can be said without contradiction that such a change is possible, if it is also done in a non-algorithmic manner, like the initial arrangement.[17] My goal in this article was only to define the various approaches to rule systems, not to explore where they arise from. Addressing these questions involves recourse to fields such as those mentioned above, and goes far beyond the scope of this article.

[1] The Little Prince, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Am Oved Publishing, translated by Ilana Hammerman, 1995

[2] My thanks to Amnon Levav from Jerusalem who brought up this example in one of our many discussions.

[3] See, for example, the collection "The Treasure of Hasidism" from "The Hidden Light" by Martin Buber, the Cultural Section of the Department of Education and Culture in the Diaspora of the World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem 1983, p. 11.

[4] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by Edna Ullman-Margalit, Hoch Magnes, 1995. See sections 185-242. The example is taken from section 226.

[5] Wittgenstein in section 228 ibid.

[6] There is certainly room for further discussion of the relationship between this formulation and Wittgenstein's formulation, and one can also disagree with the interpretation I have put forward in the body of the text. It is not my intention here to clarify his doctrine, and for the clarification of the issue of conservatism and innovation, what has been written is sufficient for me.

[7] 'Objective' here means detached from the perceptions of the two parties being characterized.

[8] The claim of action without any motive at all does not seem plausible even when describing the manner of action of A (the founding conservative).

[9] There may be a pathological case in which the conservative understands the logic of the instructions, but in any case does not see circumstances that contradict this logic. In such a case, the conservative is in fact a degenerate case of an innovator, who, even when he does not encounter circumstances that require change, is not inclined to amend the instructions.

[10] In the simple view, changing a provision is not a basic action. Such an action is equivalent to removing the provision and adding another in its place. Therefore, the arguments against changing are composed of arguments against removing and adding.

[11] For this reason, in Jewish tradition, anyone who erases a single letter from the Torah is an apostate (a heretic). The reason for this is that the other principles (letters) he leaves behind already have the meaning of autonomous activity and not of obedience to a set of instructions. Whoever can erase one instruction clearly assumes that he can decide with regard to all the instructions who to distance and who to bring closer.

[12] For example, someone who argues that it is worth continuing to wear a swimsuit in order to maintain a uniform appearance in the group is clearly fundamentally a type of infidel, but that adopting the set of instructions serves his own purposes, and therefore he recommends continuing to "obey" them. A good example of this argument is Ahad Ha'am's perception of religion as the national "glue." The classification of concrete types and their comparison with the theoretical types described and defined here is a matter for a separate discussion that should, I hope, be held later, as noted at the beginning of the article.

[13] The fact that this transcendental system is subjective, contrary to the Kantian view, will be discussed in the next chapter.

[14] This, of course, is in addition to their rejection of systems that do not seem binding to them at all, even if they do not contradict their basic system.

[15] For a challenge to the assumption of transcendental arguments about the unities of such systems, see, for example, 'The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions', Monist, LI (1967), No. 3, 14. , and also

'Transcendental Tendencies in Recent Philosophy', Journal of Philosophy, LXIII (1966), no. 19..

[16] In his book 'Faith, History and Values', Akademon Publishing House 1982, in the last article.

[17] Regarding the change of a basic system of thought, see S. Kerner's discussion, 'Categorical Change and Philosophical Argument', Proceedings of the Israel National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 4, Issue 8, 2007. The above discussion is not exhaustive at all, and in my opinion is flawed by several careless arguments. His claim there that categorical change is not possible 'from within' but is possible 'from without' requires a prior definition of the relative status of the two categorical systems, and whether, when there is an overlap between such systems, they can still be defined each as a system in itself and yet still be called different. Such a situation contradicts his own definition of a categorical system, but there is no room here to elaborate. In my opinion, his error lies in the very concept underlying his argument, that a change in a categorical system also takes place within the framework of such a system, subject to the formal definition given by him there (although he also agrees there that it is unlikely that an explicit description of this system can be given that would allow for the prediction of a categorical change before it occurs). As I argue here, such a change cannot be formally described within a system of this type, neither 'internal' nor 'external'. This is what I have called in the body of my speech "the second-order transcendental argument."