Faith and Science – Part 4
With God’s help
Is the physico-theological evidence a scientific consideration?
Another Look at the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or Causality
Before I continue, I will address some misunderstandings that have arisen regarding the principle of causality, or sufficient reason. We have seen that this is the basis on which the physico-theological argument is built. I will only address here two claims that appeared in thread 1 of the talkbacks to the third column. I have already answered them there, and here I will only provide a summary.
Assaf from Haifa claimed: "The assumption [of scientific rationality] is not 'physical phenomena must have a cause (they do not happen by themselves)', but rather: 'systems in nature operate according to certain laws'..."
In my opinion, Assaf is wrong in that he is mixing up two different concepts: The law of gravity is a mathematical description of physical events. But The force of gravity It is He who causes these events. Our physicist cousins do not merely assume the correctness of Law of Gravity but also the existence of Gravity forceThey assume this even before they have watched it. This is another indication that this is an a priori assumption of rational thinking.
Dan of the MTA claimed that science does not assume the existence of causes, but at most hypothesizes their existence and searches for them. But in my opinion, Dan is factually wrong. I invite readers to conduct an experiment. Tell a scientist who is engaged in the study of some phenomena that he is essentially wasting his time, since these phenomena just happen on their own, without any reason. According to Dan, the scientist should answer: "You may be right, my dear friend, but let's check and see if perhaps, surprisingly, we will find some reason after all." In contrast, I argue that an ordinary scientist would say something along the lines of: "Don't confuse my mind with your mystical delusions. Nothing in the world happens without a reason."
I think that's how rational, scientific thinking works. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we assume that things happen because someone or something causes them. Except for esoteric cases in quantum theory (where it's also unclear whether there really is no cause), the facts are that we always attribute events and things to causes.
Furthermore, as I briefly mentioned in the previous column, we do not find the causes but automatically assume their existence (since any connection that seems causal to us can be interpreted, as Hume suggested, as a temporal trace and nothing more). We see this as a causal connection because of the a priori assumption of our rational thinking, that things do not usually happen without a reason. Let me remind you again that I am not talking about certainty here but about probability.
Interim summary
In our discussion so far, we have seen a similarity between belief in G-d as a conclusion of physico-theological evidence and a scientific law. In both cases, these are statements of fact derived from explanations of the position on the unknown, and therefore they are not certain. Despite the similarity, belief in G-d is not a scientific claim. I will now try to explain why, and then I will discuss the question of whether this is important.
Positivism: A Subversion of Scientism
A common objection to the physico-theological argument is that the conclusion that there is a God who created and governs the world is not a scientific claim. Despite the similarities outlined above, I completely agree with this. But let us examine the arguments given for this:
- First, the appellant claims, this is not the result of empirical observation. But here, of course, the question arises as to what he considers to be the result of observation? I have already mentioned that Kant himself noted that the physico-theological evidence is based on observations of the world (which show its complexity and coherence).
- Perhaps the appellant intends to ask how we move from observations in the world to our metaphysical conclusion? But here too there is no difference between the two contexts, for we have already seen that the physico-theological inference, like any inference that reveals a new scientific theory, is an explanation of the position on the unknown. This is the only meaning I am familiar with of drawing conclusions from observations.
Although, in the background, the problem of induction, presented by David Hume, looms large: for any collection of facts there may be an infinite number of possible generalizations (or perhaps there is no generalization at all? See the discussion above on Dan's argument). If so, what is our justification for thinking that the generalization that seems simplest to us is the correct one?
But this bewilderment also exists regarding scientific generalization, and therefore this does not undermine the physico-theological evidence. As I said, my goal here is to show that within the framework of scientific and rational thinking, the conclusion that there is a God is required. Those who reject the rational framework are not of interest to us here.
- Another version of this appeal is the positivist claim, which suggests that the conclusion of the physico-theological argument contains ill-defined metaphysical concepts. Such an appeal can be understood in two ways:
- This is the use of concepts that are devoid of real content. The dependence on God is nothing more than an admission that I have no explanation or understanding. We already dealt with this in the previous column, so I will only mention here that the conclusion of the physico-theological argument is that there is some factor that created the world and determined the natural laws that govern it. The argument says nothing about that factor except that it exists and that this is what it did.
Such a statement is certainly meaningful, and I do not see it as ambiguity. In any case, no more so than the ambiguity of what is called in mathematics a 'non-constructive existence theorem', that is, a theorem that states that a certain equation has a solution (without pointing to it). The conclusion of the physico-theological argument is also a statement of existence without explicit pointing. It is true that the field it deals with is metaphysics, that is, that which is beyond physics. But anyone who is not stuck in logical positivism and the analytic philosophy of the last century understands that dealing with metaphysics and ambiguity are not synonymous.
- The problem of falsifiability. Philosopher of science Karl Popper defined a criterion for the scientificity of a theory, which, in a simplistic and very imprecise formulation (but sufficient for our purposes), says: A theory is scientific only if it provides predictions (predictions) that can be put to experimental test (I don't even demand refutation).
A claim that does not identify the factors it points to as existing makes it very difficult to test empirically. A claim that deals with something beyond physics is certainly not amenable to empirical physical testing. I certainly agree with this claim, as I am not aware of any predictions of belief in God that can be put to an empirical test.
Further insight
We have come to the conclusion that despite the similarity in the method of inference between the physico-theological argument and scientific induction, belief in God is not a scientific claim. Now, the picture obtained so far can be described as follows: Although the physico-theological inference is an inference with a logical pattern like a scientific generalization, and although its conclusion is a (uncertain) claim of fact, it has another notable drawback that prevents it from being considered science: it does not posit a prediction that can be empirically tested.
A note on the heavenly teapot
It is worth mentioning briefly here an argument in favor of atheism, put forward by Bertrand Russell. Many quote it, as it has a very convincing and rational flavor. Consider a situation in which a person appears before us and informs us that there is a small, transparent teapot orbiting the planet Jupiter, and because of its size and transparency it cannot be observed in any way. Would it be correct to say that since we know nothing about this teapot, our position regarding it is doubtful? Russell argues, and rightly so, that a rational person should not think this way. We have no reason to even accept this possibility, and therefore it is reasonable to reject it out of hand.
If so, Russell continues to argue, the claim that there is a God, who is not susceptible to empirical-scientific tools because of his abstraction, is also a similar claim. Regarding this too, it is not right to hold even an agnostic (skeptical) position, but rather to reject it outright, and to hold to a firm atheism.
This is an argument that at least some of the uses made of it are problematic. The reason for skepticism about the teapot is that we have no indication (independent of our own) of its existence, and to the best of our estimation, the speaker himself has no better information. Regarding such a pot, I would also be an atheist. But regarding belief in God, the situation is different. There is the physico-theological argument, which establishes the hypothesis of its existence, or at least denies its absurdity. If someone now comes along and claims that God exists (for example, he claims to have met him at Mount Sinai), we cannot reject it out of hand. This is already a hint of the path ahead: from the philosophical God to the religious God, but another vision for the future.
Two different levels of discussion should not be mixed up here. Even if someone is not convinced by the physico-theological argument, at most he can use the teapot argument as an addition: if you are not convinced, you must be an atheist (and not content with agnosticism). But the teapot is by no means an argument that stands on its own. We have seen that if the physico-theological argument is correct, then the analogy to the teapot is meaningless to our discussion. Therefore, the teapot argument does not undermine the physico-theological evidence in any way. The relevant discussion is conducted solely on the question of whether the physico-theological evidence is reasonable. The teapot is nothing more than a meaningless nuance in the theological discussion.
The meaning of it all: between science and science
Our conclusion, then, is that belief in G-d is indeed not a scientific claim, since it does not make predictions that stand up to empirical examination. Does this challenge its validity, or its plausibility? Is it correct to say that claims that cannot be empirically examined are meaningless? We have already seen that they are not. Is it correct that it is not reasonable to use them, or to believe in them? As I understand it, if the physico-theological inference is reasonable, the fact that its conclusion is not scientific is irrelevant to the discussion.
When I see footprints in the sand, I assume that someone was there to make them. This conclusion is not scientific, because I have no way to put it to an empirical test (how would I repeat this experiment?). Claims about the past are usually claims that are very difficult to put to an empirical test. Should I therefore doubt the conclusion that someone left these footprints in the sand? Should I think that they created themselves?
It is important to understand that the alternative that says there is no such person (which is also of course not empirically testable), is much less likely. Why? Because of the principle of sufficient reason, or causality. These traces were caused by something, even if I cannot point to it or describe it. And even if I do not know a creature that leaves such traces.
The positivist claims presented above are based on an approach that can be called 'scientism', that is, seeing science as the be-all and end-all, that is, as the exclusive criterion for truth. I am one of those who think that science is an excellent tool, and that if done properly it is worthy and proper to trust. Still, if after logical examination I come to the conclusion that some non-observational claim convinces me (such as the claim about the footprints in the sand), I adopt it.
Those who hold the 'scientific' position tend to reject such claims simply because they are not empirically testable. But faith in science does not mean that everything that is not scientific should be rejected. I am certainly in favor of scientism, but I am opposed to 'scientific' religion. I am almost repeating here the distinction between rationality and rationalism from the previous column.
The atheist church
One of the expressions of 'science' is the transformation of science into a kind of church, in which a deep mystical spirit and a vibration of holiness blow. Its god is the Flying Spaghetti Monster (and before it, Vonnegut's Bokonon fromCat cradle), its believers are endowed with a fanaticism that would not shame the American Bible Society (one can get an impression from a quick glance at the agitated talkbacks to these columns), and its priests carry their deserts under every green tree.
These priests are a few scientists whose every word is considered by devout believers to be the words of a living God. Quotations of their words are considered by believers to be a substitute for arguments, as if they were the Holy Scriptures. Any quote from Stephen Hawking or Richard Dawkins, both of whom are apparently quite talented scientists but rather poor philosophers, even if it contains nonsense, is considered a crushing argument. The words are said whether these are expressed in the scientific field in which they are experts, or whether they require philosophical considerations that only touch on scientific fields, if at all. They themselves, and even more so their devout believers, usually do not even notice their reckless transition between science and philosophy. An example of this phenomenon will be discussed in the next column, when I deal with the appeal from evolution.
I will conclude by saying that I do not intend to argue anything against science, or against scientists. My words are directed at a certain group of scientists and their followers (the fools), whose dominance in public discourse far outweighs their real weight. They see science as a kind of religion, and believers in God as infidels. They see science as their private property, and if we catch a non-believer (in God) who is following its path, woe to him and woe to his soul ("What is he doing on Ynet, science? Send him to Judaism immediately!").
In the next column we will come (with God's help) to the challenge of evolution.