Advances – 2007

 Rabbi Michael Avraham

A. Introduction

The crime of idolatry is one of the three most serious offenses for which one must surrender one's soul. As described in the Bible and the Sages, idolatry usually also involves human and moral degradation, including adultery and murder in addition to the crime of idolatry itself.

Therefore, it is no wonder that the law treats idolaters harshly and instructs us to have a completely negative attitude towards them. There are many laws that are directed towards non-Jews, such as not making restitution for a loss. Some schools of thought do not have the prohibition of "thou shalt not murder" regarding them (and certainly there is no death penalty for this). Likewise, it is forbidden to save their lives, at least in the event that this involves desecrating the Sabbath, and even on weekdays they are lowered into a pit and not raised. And there are still many laws that reserve the treatment of them as creatures that are not fully "human" (such as "you are called a man and they are not called a man," or "the flesh of donkeys is their flesh," and so on).

Nowadays, many feel that the situation is different. It does not seem that the Gentiles of today (at least most of them) deserve such treatment, and therefore various proposals are being made to change these laws that concern them.[1] Among other things, quite a few of the words of HaMeiri come up in these contexts, who in several places renewed a fundamentally different type of reference to the Christians of his time, who were "bound by the ways of religions," as he put it.

As far as I understand, in many of the references to non-Jews there is a misunderstanding regarding the essence of HaMeiri's main innovation, and therefore the applications of his position sometimes seem quite shaky. In this article, I would like to discuss HaMeiri's unique position, clarify his main innovation, and see what halakhic implications arise from this position, to this day. The discussion is based largely on the article by Prof. Yaakov Katz, 'Religious Tolerance in the Method of Rabbi Menachem HaMeiri in Halacha and Philosophy' (hereinafter: Katz), which also appears in his book: Halacha and Kabbalah.[2] It seems that Katz also made the same mistake, and therefore some of his research conclusions are also flawed by inaccuracy.

According to HaMeiri, they are of great principle, even beyond the issue of the attitude towards non-Jews. They constitute a paradigm for legitimate change in Halacha, and we can learn from them some guidelines for this broad and current issue as well. It is interesting to note that Rabbi Chaim Halevi,[3] In an article that also deals with the Meiri innovation, he ended his remarks by addressing the question of changes in halakha at length. It turns out that the Meiri innovation arouses a sense of difficulty (and, so to speak, a whiff of 'reform'), even among the poskim who study and interpret it.

In the course of my remarks, I will attempt to demonstrate, through the issue of the attitude toward Gentiles, the lines that are supposed to characterize a legitimate change (which perhaps cannot be considered a change at all) in halacha. In order to focus on this aspect, I will precede with a brief a priori discussion (only to the extent necessary for the continuation) on the subject of changes in halacha.

B. On changes in halacha[4]

Demands for changes in halakha may arise due to a change in circumstances and reality, or due to a change in values. Here I would like to deal with an argument that belongs to the first type (I doubt whether the second type is even possible, and I agree). Such demands arise in several contexts: the status of women, the attitude towards external wisdom and various occupations, the attitude towards non-Jews, and so on.

logic

Typical arguments that arise in these contexts are based on this pattern:

Assumption 1: The words of the sages were spoken in relation to the reality of their time.

Assumption B: The reality today is different.

Conclusion: Therefore, the halachic conclusions of Chazal must be changed in order to adapt to our times.

For example, with regard to disqualifying women from testifying, one can argue as follows: Disqualifying women from testifying was stated with regard to the women the Sages knew, who were not educated in everyday life and did not possess minimal education. Today, the situation has changed, as women are educated in all areas of life, and are no less educated than men (and sometimes more). Therefore, this halakha should be changed and women should be permitted to testify.

It should be noted that this pattern is not at all 'reform' in nature. This is a legitimate halakhic argument, similar to which quite a few poskim have made throughout the generations. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether this is even a change in halakhic law, in the essential meaning of the concept 'change'. This argument actually assumes that even Chazal would have treated the reality of our time differently, had they encountered it. Therefore, this demand does not deviate from their path in any way.

The point we have come to emphasize here is that this argument pattern, on its own, is not logically valid. Such a pattern contains an additional, very important implicit assumption, which must be exposed in order to put it up for discussion as well: In order for the conclusion to actually follow from the assumptions, it must be assumed that the halakha in question does indeed depend on the same parameters that have changed. For example, in an argument regarding women, an assumption must be added that their disqualification from testifying stems from their being uneducated or socially uneducated. Without this additional assumption, the conclusion does not follow from the assumptions, and the argument is an invalid argument.

Therefore, a valid pattern for a legitimate change in halacha should be a pattern like this:

Assumption 1: The words of the sages were spoken in relation to the reality they recognized in their time.

Assumption B: The halakhah in question depends on parameters X, Y, and Z that were correct at the time. Changing these parameters also requires changing the halakhic approach.

Assumption C: These specific parameters have indeed changed in our time.

Conclusion: In our day and age, the halakhic approach must be changed.

It should be emphasized that assumptions A and C are of a factual nature. Their examination is fundamentally empirical. However, assumption B is of a halakhic nature. In order to examine it, one must consult the sources of halakhic law, and there is no possibility of basing it on any empirical observation.

This seems to be the reason why arguments in favor of change often ignore this important addition. While assumptions A and C can be proven relatively easily, through observation of the facts, it is usually quite difficult to prove assumption B, which is of a halakhic nature. For example, it is very difficult to reach a clear conclusion from a study of the sources of halakhic law as to the reason for disqualifying women from testifying: is it because of a lack of education, or because they are not socially accepted, etc., or is it a 'scriptural decree', such as a birth without a cause.

sociology

Here I would like to bring an enlightening example that I once heard from a friend,[5] which helps define types of reference to tradition and changes in it. A group of people dressed in light clothing are walking in the desert. The journey has been going on for generations, and their ancestors also walked this way, wearing the same type of clothing. Therefore, the form of clothing is a tradition they have inherited from their ancestors, and they feel committed to it. Now comes a stage when they approach the border of the desert, and the weather begins to cool. At this point, the group splits into two parts: the first group advocatesSimplistic conservatismThese claim that they are not willing to change from the traditions of their ancestors, and therefore they will remain dressed in light clothing despite the changes in the weather. If their ancestors wore summer clothes, so do they. They would be called 'fundamentalists'. A second group advocatesMidrashic conservatism. These claim: We too faithfully continue the tradition of our ancestors, and therefore we will change our clothing to winter clothes. Just as they walked in clothing appropriate to the weather, so do we. They demand the custom of their ancestors (that walking in summer clothes stemmed from a desire to adapt themselves to the weather), and implement the sermon (as a kind of 'tema dakra').

Which of the two groups is indeed continuing the path of its ancestors? Ostensibly, both. The difference between the two is not in their conservatism, that is, their commitment to tradition. The difference between these two groups is only in the interpretation they give to the tradition in their hands. These believe that tradition instructs them to wear light clothing, and this is what they are supposed to continue (as mentioned, they give tradition a simplified interpretation). While their friends believe that tradition instructs them to wear clothing that is appropriate for the weather (this is an interpretation of the sermon), and this is what they continue, with the same devotion. Both are complete conservatives.

It is important to note that this difference concerns the same implicit assumption that we discussed in the previous section. These two groups differ in their interpretation of the tradition they are discussing (and in our example: whether women are disqualified from testifying due to lack of education or some other hidden reason). One group adheres to the simple, the other to the strict.[6] The possibility of a 'conservative' change by virtue of the argument presented above stems from an approach of midrashic conservatism, according to which a change in circumstances can lead to a normative change. But here the additional assumption is required that links the halakha in question to those circumstances that have changed. This is the midrash that underlies the claim for change (and in our example: that walking in summer clothing is indeed related to the same parameter that has changed – namely, the weather). The simple conservatives would say that this is a categorical command (the 'scripture of the text'), and therefore it must be followed literally. In any case, in order to establish a conservative argument for change, we necessarily need a 'midrash'. There is no conservative change without a midrash at its foundation. This 'midrash' is the implicit assumption that we discussed above.

And now, in addition to these two groups, there are two other groups, which will not enter into this discussion at all. The third group is the group ofInfidelsThese people will say that they do not give any weight to tradition, and therefore, although it may be a deviation from tradition, they change their clothing into winter clothes.

The fourth group is theReformists. These will say that tradition has its place, and it certainly has some weight, but this is not an absolute value. There are other considerations that may override the provisions of tradition, such as suitability for the weather. For them, unlike the infidels, changing clothes is 'rejected', not 'permitted'. The application of these two approaches to the example of disqualifying women from testifying is obvious.

The attitude towards halakha today is shaped through arguments that belong to these four types. Ostensibly, it is possible to identify sociological groups in Judaism according to these categories. Roughly speaking, one can divide them into Haredi (=simple conservatism), Modern Orthodoxy (=midrashic conservatism), Reform and secularism. This is of course a superficial and general identification, since some of these groups use arguments of several types (in different doses. The doses are probably what define the group's tone, and therefore there are many more than four groups on the Jewish map). Therefore, from our point of view, the classification proposed here is a classification of the arguments and not of the arguers.

As for our discussion, let us summarize it this way: assuming that halakhic Judaism belongs to the category of midrashic conservatism, change in halakhic law is indeed possible (if we call it change at all, since, as we have seen, it is full preservation of tradition, according to a 'midrashic' interpretation). But such a change should be based on proving all three assumptions that underlie the pattern of argument presented above. The halakhic assumption that we added to the two factual assumptions is the interpretative 'midrash' of the tradition, which, as we have seen, is essential for establishing the validity of the argument for change.

Halacha

We find in the Rishonim and Poskim several laws concerning the treatment of Gentiles (and laws in general) that have changed due to changing circumstances. This change could be a change in the nature of Gentiles, or a change in the situation of Jews and their relationship to Gentiles. A change of circumstances of the second type is, for example, the transition to isolated Jewish communities, whose main trade is with the Gentiles in their surroundings. During the period of the Mishnah and the Talmud, the people of Israel were concentrated in places where their main contact was with Jews. In such a situation, it was possible to impose restrictions on the treatment of Gentiles. However, when there are not many Jews around, we find ourselves in need of trade with Gentiles.

An example of such an argument is the Tosafot in Bovad Zara 15:1, i.e., 'Imor', which discusses the sale of a coarse animal to a non-Jew. Such a sale is prohibited according to the law of the Mishnah, but in the time of the Tosafot, the Israelites used to sell their animals to non-Jews. The Tosafot there explain that today there are not many Jews living together, and therefore what would an owner of an animal do if he could not find a seller for Israel, he would lose all of his wealth. Therefore, the Ge'onim in exile were more lenient on the matter (and saw there a halachic conclusion from this, that it is forbidden to be a horse trader with non-Jews. Only if he bought for himself, is he permitted to sell to a non-Jew without losing his wealth).

It should be noted that this is a rabbinical law. It seems that in Torah law it was much more difficult to permit, although such examples can also be found in Prof. Chaim Soloveitchik's book, Halacha, economics and self-image.[7] Here it seems that the permission is based on necessity and not on a substantial change in circumstances, but there is room to see this permission as also being based on a pattern of argument similar (though not identical) to the pattern presented above: the Sages decreed in a situation where Jews lived together and could make a living from each other. This situation has changed, and today the Jews are scattered, and without trade with Gentiles there is no reasonable possibility of making a living. Conclusion: the Sages themselves would not have prohibited trade with Gentiles in such circumstances. Indeed, the Tosafot further on in their remarks provide evidence that they never decreed in such a situation. The difference between this argument and the full and valid argument presented above is the absence of the 'midrash.' Ostensibly, there is no basis here for the claim that in the absence of necessity the Sages did not decree, since the decree is not based on any realistic circumstances. The claim here is that in difficult circumstances there is room for leniency even without an interpretative midrash. This is a kola by virtue of necessity and not by virtue of a conservative midrash.[8]

A similar example is found in the Tosafot in Bava Metzia, p. 2b, i.e., "Tashich" regarding interest on foreigners, see there.

C. The Meiri Method Regarding the Attitude to the Gentile: Katz's Interpretation

The Meiri's words: sample sources

The words of the Meiri are found in his books of innovations, The House of Choice, Lev. Kama 17b, 13b; Gittin 62; Pesachim 21b; Yoma 5db; Lev. Metzia 27b, and more, and especially in many places in his commentary on Tractate Avoda Zara (2b a, 6b, 15b, 20 a, 22 a, 25 a, 57 a and many parallels. Some of them appear in Katz). In all these places he repeats his claim that various laws regarding the Gentiles were stated only towards the Gentiles who were in the time of Chazal, but the Gentiles in his time were 'bound by religious etiquette', and therefore these laws do not apply to them. We should note that this refers here to both the laws of the rabbis and the laws of the Torah.

For example, one of many, in Baba Kama 123b he writes:

It is found that even idolaters and those who are not bound by religious rules are forbidden to rob. If Israel is sold to him, it is forbidden to leave his hand without redemption. Likewise, it is forbidden to confiscate his loan. And in any case, a person is not obligated to seek his loss in order to return it to him, and moreover, even someone who finds his loss is not obligated to return it, because finding it is part of property, and its return is through piety, and we are not subject to piety for someone who has no religion. Likewise, if his mistake was obvious and not due to his trickery or effort, there is no need to return it. And in any case, if it became known to him, in any case, he is obligated to return it. And likewise, even in the case of a loss, any party that would be blasphemous in returning it must return it.[9]

All those who are bound by religious boundaries and worship God on this side, even if their faith is far from ours, are not included in this, but rather they are like Israel, completely equal to these things, even in loss and in error, and to all other things without any distinction.

The changes stipulated by the Meiri relate to a complete prohibition on robbing a Gentile; the obligation to keep the Sabbath was lost for a Gentile; a prohibition on forfeiting his loan (The House of Choice, Bava Kama 113b; 33b); permission to give gifts to a Gentile (The House of Choice(Idol worship, p. 46)[10]; renting a house to a Gentile (ibid., p. 48); delivering livestock to them (ibid., p. 53); trading with them on their day of reckoning (ibid., p. 28), and more.

Katz's interpretation

In many of these contexts, there are other rishonim who find a permit for their time (see sources in Katz), but the general element is absent from their words. It is always a qualified permit that should be avoided as much as possible, and it is presented as a retrospective basis for a custom that was created in reality due to hardship, and already exists in practice. Usually, the permit is supported by additional branches, and it is never stated as a general and sweeping principle from the outset. None of these exist in the Meiri. Katz sees in all of these characteristics aspects that distinguish the Meiri's innovation, and make us understand that in his case it is a fundamental innovation that completely and decisively displaces these laws from the Gentiles of his day.

1. The conceptualization and generalization of the permit. He drowns in a language that distinguishes between Gentiles who are 'bound by the ways of religion and their manners' and Gentiles who are not, and repeats it consistently in dozens of places. The Meiri also does not content himself with stating that they do not practice idolatry, but also describes them in terms of obligation.
2. The decisiveness and uniqueness of the permitThe Meiri consistently permits this in several places and in Shas halakhah. He does not refer to a specific halakha in which the people practiced iter, and generally does not present his argument as a defense of an existing custom, but rather as a correct and proper law from the outset. It seems that he establishes a principle that has implications that can also be applied to things in which iter was not practiced. If so, all the halakha here have iter on one basis, which is a sweeping and binding principle from the perspective of the Meiri.

For comparison, the Tosafot in Bova Zara 2 A.A., i.e., "Forbidden," describe a custom of permitting trade on the day of Idum. They tried to reconcile this by saying that there was a fear of hostility (so did theFearful 29a), and rejected this. In conclusion, they state that in their day Christians do not worship idols. This means that they mean Christians who give things to their barbers and priests, not for the sake of idolatry but for their own pleasure only (hence it means that only because it is for their pleasure is permitted, but in principle Christianity is idolatry). And indeed, the first who relied on the Tosafot excuses generally added that a person of conscience should be strict in this, and did not rely on these excuses except to reconcile the custom of the world retrospectively. This is what is written regarding trading on the day of Idum in the Tosafot there, inFearful Ibid., in the Ramban on idolatry 13a, and more.

On the other hand, the Meiri at the head of Tractate Avoda Zara[11] He rejects all these excuses and says that they are unnecessary. He remains faithful to his principled assertion that Christians are 'bound by the ways of religion', and therefore all these prohibitions do not apply to them at all. In conclusion, he writes there (d. 'Yes') that in his day there is no one who is careful in negotiations with a Gentile, even on their day of reckoning, "neither a genius nor a rabbi nor a wise man nor a disciple nor a follower nor a pious person." He seems to accept this from the outset, as a clear statement, and not just as an afterthought.

3. The consistency of the permitAlso in other places in Shas (mainly in Tractate Avoda Zara)[12]While all the first ones seek different special permits regarding the same place and the same issue, the Meiri consistently relies on his permit.

An example of this can be found in the matter of the prohibition of robbing a Gentile (about which the Sages disagreed in Baba Kama 13b). Some ruled in favor of the prohibition, and some wrote that it is forbidden because of blasphemy. The Meiri does not need any of this. According to him, the entire controversy concerns only the ancient nations that are not bound by religions. And in his time, according to all opinions, there is a prohibition against robbing a Gentile just like a Jew (see the quote above).

Katz concludes from this that the Meiri developed a general thesis here (the principle of expropriation), and in his opinion it should be applied consistently, and there is not even any point in being stricter where this is possible. The Gentiles of his time clearly do not belong to these prohibitions and permissions, both from the Torah and from the rabbinic texts.

In the second part of the article, Katz comments that none of these poskim drew the necessary conclusions regarding the status of Christianity as idolatry. In discussions regarding the status of objects of worship and the permissibility of trading in them, the poskim assume for granted that these are objects of idolatry, and therefore even if they find a permissibility, it is only on a local basis, and the permissibility is very hesitant.

However, as he notes there, surprisingly, on this issue the Meiri joins the Asarim. Although he usually uses the past tense (he is talking about a ritual that was practiced in ancient times), nowhere does he explicitly apply his sweeping permission when it comes to the objects of Christian worship.

This is evident in relation to objects of worship that are not mentioned in the Talmud at all, such as candles, bread, and priestly vestments. The prohibition of such objects cannot be justified by their association with ancient nations. These are objects taken from the Christian world that the Meiri knew in his environment. It is clear that he is trying to evade his own permission when it comes to objects of worship. Here, he suddenly speaks of the need for a person to be strict, as the other Rishonim express themselves in other contexts. The permission, even if it is granted, is hesitant.

Let us further sharpen the puzzle. The previous permissions of the Meiri that we described above are necessarily based on an interpretive midrash. In order to permit giving a gift to a gentile, it was not enough for Meiri to claim that the gentiles of his time were not worshippers of idols. He should also have cited the 'midrash' (in the terms of Chapter 2 above) which states that these prohibitions are based on the gentiles not being 'bound by the manners of religions', and since the gentiles of his time were 'bound by the manners of religions', the prohibition is not valid. On the other hand, the permission of the prohibition on objects of worship is not a fundamental change of customary law. Here, a 'midrash' is not even required to change the law. The prohibition on enjoying objects of worship of idols is a prohibition from the Torah. It is clear that it is only relevant to objects used for idolatry. Therefore, if the Christianity of his day is not considered idolatry in his eyes, then there has never been such a prohibition on Christian objects of worship. Here, no 'midrash' is required at all, and therefore we would expect the Meiri to permit the prohibition on objects of worship more easily than the other prohibitions. But this is not the case.

At this point, Katz finds it appropriate to resort to psychological explanations. He explains this by the need for the Meiri to rely on the permits that were in use at the time, and not to renew other permits that are not yet in use. He further suggests that the Meiri had a reluctance (psychological, not halakhic. Since from a halakhic perspective, he absolutely determined that Christianity is not idolatry) to treat leniently the objects of worship of another religion.

Katz is generally careful to analyze the halakhah based on intra-halakhic considerations, and not to offer contextual explanations (i.e. psychological and sociological explanations, which are based on influences, needs, reluctances, etc.).[13] However, at this point he returns to the custom of many scholars, and explains the Meiri in purely psychological terms.

Between academia and Beit Midrash: Different levels of explanation

This explanation may well be correct, since no person is exempt from psychological and other influences. But in the Beit Hamidrash such an explanation is not acceptable. In the Beit Hamidrash every halakhic position is examined in the crucible of the halakhic test and explained in halakhic terms. Influences, needs, and reluctances cannot be components of a halakhic explanation, but perhaps part of an academic-contextual explanation.[14]

When a posak asks himself what the halakhah is regarding Christian objects of worship, he cannot claim that the Meiri spoke out of reluctance, but must formulate a position that will provide an adequate interpretive framework for all of the Meiri's statements. He must understand why the Meiri did not permit Christian objects of worship with pleasure, despite his principled approach. Of course, if one manages to find an intra-halakhic explanation for the Meiri's consideration, the need to resort to psychological and contextual explanations is eliminated.[15]

The main difficulties in Katz's interpretation of Meiri

As we have seen, Katz, like many others, interprets the focus of the Meiri's innovation by claiming that the Christianity of his day is not idolatry. But this interpretation is very problematic, for several reasons:

1. As Katz himself points out, the Meiri does not use his principled foundation to indulge in the worship of Christians.
2. The Meiri does not comment at all on the fact that he deviates from the Maimonides' path in this. Normally, the Meiri is a clear Maimonides, and we would expect him to at least comment on the fact that on this issue he completely disagrees with the Maimonides.
3. As far as I know, the Meiri does not write anywhere explicitly that the Christianity of his day is not idolatry. The expression he uses is that they are 'bound by the manners of religions.' He distinguishes them from the ancient idolaters who were not bound by these manners. This expression sounds like a statement that they have proper human behavior, but it is not necessarily related to the question of whether they commit halachic offenses of idolatry.
4. Many of the laws discussed in the various issues in which the Meiri applies his principle are not related to idolatry (unlike the prohibition on objects of worship, which is clearly a prohibition on objects of idolatry, and it is precisely with regard to which the Meiri does not rule out the prohibition in a blanket manner).[16] The prohibition against giving a gift to a Gentile (learned from "Do not beg") is simply not a prohibition against idolaters. The same is true of the permission to steal from a Gentile, or to forfeit his loan, etc. If indeed the innovation of the Meiri was that the Christianity of his day was not included in the scope of idolatry, then this was not a sufficient basis to permit these prohibitions in relation to it, since they are also valid in relation to Gentiles who are not idolaters.

We note that most halakhic references to the question of the status of Christians primarily require a discussion of whether Christianity is included within the boundaries of idolatry or not (is a Gentile commanded to share, etc.).[17] Those who mention the words of the Meiri on this subject probably learned from this.[18] But as mentioned, this interpretation of Meiri's words does not seem reasonable.

D. Alternative proposal: 'Enlightened idolatry'

Our proposal in explaining the Meiri method

The obvious conclusion from all that has been said so far is that the Meiri does not mean to say that Christianity is not idolatry. What he means is to say that modern Christianity (at the time), unlike the ancient idolatry religions (and those that still exist at the time in 'extremes'), is indeed a false religion, but this does not exclude its believers from the 'etiquette of religions', that is, from the realm of proper human and moral conduct.

Maimonides IIInterpretation of the Mishnayot On Baba Kama 17b, which is of course also cited in the Meiri's novellas there, he writes as follows:

And do not be surprised by this and do not let it be difficult in your eyes, just as the slaughter of animals, even though they have not sinned, is not difficult in your eyes. According to him who does not possess human qualities, he is not a human being at all, but the purpose of his existence is for the sake of man.

The Maimonides explains that idolaters, because of their corrupt behavior in terms of morals, are unworthy of human treatment, and therefore he eased the stricter law for them. The Meiri follows his example, but goes one step further, and claims that if there are idolaters who are not corrupt in their morals, these laws will not apply to them. The main application of this conclusion is with regard to the Christianity of his time, which does not fall within these categories, and therefore, in his opinion, these laws are invalid for it. However, there is no reason to assume that Christianity, even that of the Meiri's time, did not appear to him to be idolatry.

The Meiri makes a similar claim in several places:

R.L. It is said that among the idolaters, they were not bound by the ways of religion, and on the contrary, every transgression and every ugliness was beautiful in their eyes. And the chief of the philosophers has already said: 'Kill those who have no religion.' So everyone who is a worshiper of the Deity, even though he is not of the religion, is not under this law, God forbid (Avoda Zara 26a, cf. 'The Gentiles').

We will quote one more quote from another central source, where the Meiri writes as follows:

And it has already been clarified that these words were spoken at the time when those nations were idolaters, and were polluted in their deeds and ugly in their manners, as in the matter mentioned above: "You shall not do after the manner of the land of Egypt, in the land where you dwell, and after the manner of the land of Canaan, etc." But for other nations that are bound by religious rules and that are free from the ugliness of these manners, and on the contrary, are punished for them, there is no doubt that these words have no place at all, as we have explained.

And we have already repeated this many times in our words, so that you will not have to resort to some unnecessary exhortations that you find in the news and additions (Avoda Zara 26b).

The Meiri reiterates here that this is a fundamental innovation, and that it renders all the local excuses put forward by the Tosafot and other commentators superfluous. However, in the two sources cited here (as in many others) it is clear that he attributes his innovation to the change that the Gentiles underwent regarding the improvement of their morals, and not to their views or religious practices.

Katz himself (before note 55 in his article) insists that the illuminator does not express any appreciation for the views of Christians and the ideological side of Christianity, nor for its commonality with Judaism. He focuses on evaluating its practical and behavioral trend.

We would also like to point out that there is reason to pay attention to the letter "Yu" that appears in the quote we cited above from the issue of Bava Kama 113b, where the Meiri writes as follows: "It is found that even the idolaters and"Those who are not bound by religious rules must not be robbed." If this version is indeed a dictum, it seems that the Meiri is clearly saying here that these are two different categories: 1. Idol worshippers. 2. Those who are not idol worshippers, but nevertheless are not bound by religious rules. Here our argument is that the Meiri believed that this division is true in both directions: just as there are those who are not idol worshippers who are corrupted in their morals, so there are also idol worshippers whose morals are corrected.

Therefore, the innovation of the Meiri is not in defining the nations as idolaters, but in their moral evaluation, and therefore in the moral attitude toward them. He does not claim that the Christianity of his time was not idolatry, but rather that it was 'enlightened idolatry.' The Meiri essentially challenges the automatic connection we make between idolatry and moral corruption. He argues that this connection was true for those who worked in foreign occupations in the ancient Near East (as described in the Bible) and in the time of the Sages, whose work involved adultery, bloodshed, and human sacrifice.[19] But by the time of the Meiri, the situation had already changed, in his opinion, and even though their religions are wrong, their behavior is bound by religious etiquette, and therefore the attitude towards them must change.

In other words, it can be said this way: The Meiri is not referring in his words to the concept of 'idolatry', but rather to the concept of 'gentile'.[20] He claims that Christians are not included in the concept of 'Gentile', but he does not claim that they are not included in the concept of 'worshippers of idolatry.' Of course, they are indeed considered Gentiles for the purpose of prohibiting marriage, intercourse, etc., as the Meiri himself notes in his innovations to idolatry 26a (p. 59). After repeating his innovation there as a permanent rule, he writes:

And in any case, with regard to the concern about the prohibition of the Sabbath and the concern about the prohibition of foods and drinks such as wine, wine alone, and other prohibitions similar to these, both those that were prohibited in eating and those that were decreed upon them out of concern about marriage, all nations are equal in it, except for the prohibition of enjoyment in wine alone, according to the majority of commentators, as will be explained in its place in this tractate (Avoda Zara 67b).

Immediately afterwards, he reiterates that this is a general and binding principle, a principle from the outset:

From now on, the things will be set straight on your heart, and we will not have to answer them in every single detail, but you will examine whether this island you interpret them about the ancient nations and this island you interpret them about the whole world. And you will understand and know.

Solving the difficulties

According to our words, all the difficulties we raised above have been removed. The Meiri nowhere states that Christianity is not idolatry, simply because he does not really claim so. Therefore, he also refrains from permitting their objects of worship (apart from local and qualified permits, like the other Rishonim). He also does not comment at all on the fact that he deviates from the path of the Rambam, since he really did not deviate from it. The opposite is true: as we saw in the issue of Baba Kama 37b, the Meiri follows exactly the Rambam's argument, which bases the attitude towards the Gentiles on their moral level and not on their being idolaters.

Now it will not be difficult for us to understand why the Meiri is also bringing about his revolution in relation to prohibitions that concern Gentiles in general, and not specifically idolaters. As we have seen, his argument is in relation to the concept of 'Gentile' and not in relation to the concept of 'worshipper of idolatry.' The concept of 'Gentile', against which all these prohibitions were stated, means a person who is corrupt in his character, and not specifically an idolater. On the contrary, in the context of idolatry there is indeed no revolution, and therefore the Meiri believes that the objects of worship of Christians are still prohibited.

A note on Katz's conclusion: Does Meiri's position have a philosophical origin?

Katz devotes the second half of his article to a discussion that grounds the Meiri's unusual position on philosophical foundations, which link virtues to faith and reason, and place reason and faith at the center.

But for the record, the basis of this entire discussion is a mistake. The discussion was conducted by Katz in light of his erroneous interpretation, according to which the Meiri treated Christianity as a non-idolatry. He attributes this to the Meiri's positive attitude towards other religions (this too, according to his claim, is contrary to the Rambam). To explain this, Katz claims that according to the Meiri, the treatment of idolatry is not only on the technical-halakhic-formal level, but as an intellectual idea. Other religions that are correct in their actions and on their theoretical-conceptual level, cannot be idolatry.

But in light of our statement that the main point of Meiri's innovation does not concern the question of Christianity being idolatry, there is no need for such a discussion.[21] In any case, the connection that Katz sees between the development of halakhah and the philosophical ideas that underlie it (it seems that these are the main purpose and conclusion of his article) is not necessarily at the heart of this issue. If so, it is possible to describe the development of Meiri's halakhic approach using purely halakhic tools, and the traditional-Yashivite explanation is entirely sufficient. There is no need to resort to academic-research psychologism.

Precedents in understanding the Meiri

There are several precedents for the interpretation proposed here in the opinion of the Meiri, although most of them combine it with the claim that Christianity is not idolatry, and the distinctions in all of them are not sharp. Nevertheless, I will provide here a few sample quotes to reinforce my point.

Rabbi Kook writes:

The main thing is, according to the opinion of the Meiri, that all peoples who are bound by decent manners between one person and another are already considered residents in all human duties (Rai'ah fees(Pat's letter).

Rabbi Shlomo Aviner follows in his footsteps, and even explicitly makes our distinction:

The Meiri mentions in several places that the Christians of his day are not considered idolaters. Moreover, sometimes they are not even considered gentiles.[22]

Rabbi C.D. Halevi[23] The Meiri's words oscillate between these two extremes. On the one hand, he discusses the question of whether Christians are idolaters, and on the other hand, their moral and human level and the obligation derived from it. In most places, he formulates his words in ways that made it difficult for me to deduce what he meant, and it seems that he himself has not formulated a clear position on this.

A clear example of such a formulation is found in the words of Rabbi Moshe Rivkach (author of The Exile's Well on Table set, Choshen Mishpat, Siman Raso, which are cited by Rabbi HaLevi on page 77:

And from what Maimonides wrote, the reason is because he holds the hands of the wicked of the world, we learn from the testimony of the Lord that Rav did not say in the Sanhedrin except about the Akkadians who worship stars and zodiac signs, and not about the Akkadians of this time, who acknowledge the Creator of the world and whose manners bring about loss.

He specifies that the Rambam links the prohibition of the Sabbath of a lost thing to the fact that the one who returns a lost thing to them is holding the hands of the wicked of the world, which means that the matter is dependent on wickedness and not on idolatry. Therefore, he concludes that the prohibition does not apply to the Gentiles of his time. It is not clear whether the phrase "Akm in this time" is a colloquialism (and refers to a Gentile and not to Akkm - idolaters), or whether his intention is, as we have said, to define them as "enlightened" idolaters. A similar ambiguity can be seen in his words about Table set, Choshen Mishpat, Sign of the Strike, regarding the Akkadians who do not raise them:

The Sages did not say this except about the Gentiles who were in their time, who worshiped stars and zodiac signs, and did not believe in the Exodus from Egypt and the renewal of the world. But these are the Gentiles among whom we, the Israeli nation, are sheltered by the shadow and scattered, they believe in the renewal of the world and the Exodus from Egypt and the principles of religion, and their whole intention is to the Maker of heaven and earth, as the poskim say and the Rema quoted in the Book of Revelation, chapter 6, verse 11, verse 12, verse 13, verse 14, verse 15, verse 16, verse 17, verse 18, verse 19, verse 20, verse 21, verse 22, verse 23, verse 24, verse 25, verse 26, verse 27, verse 28, verse 29, verse 30, verse 28, verse 29, verse 31, verse 32, verse 33, verse 34, verse 35, verse 36, verse 37, verse 38, verse 39, verse 40, verse 41, verse 42, verse 43, verse 44, verse 45, verse 46, verse 47, verse 48, verse 49, verse 50, verse 51, verse 52, verse 53, verse 54, verse 55, verse 56, verse 57, verse 58, verse 59, verse 60, verse 59, verse 61, verse 52, verse 56, verse 57, verse 58, verse 59, verse 60, verse 59, verse 61, verse 62, verse 53, verse 56, verse 57, verse 58, verse 63, verse 58, verse 59, verse 60, verse 61, verse 62, verse 59, verse 63, verse 59, verse 63, verse 64, verse

It should be noted that here the criteria are clearly religious, not moral, whereas in the previous section he justified his words with faith in the Creator and the manners of the lost Sabbath.

In any case, these references (which exist in other Rishonim, as cited by Rabbi Chaim Halevi there) do not express a comprehensive and systematic view like that of the Meiri, and sometimes there is even room to see them as apologetics out of fear of offending others (as Katz noted).

Additional indications: the existence of the conservative 'midrash'

If we are honest, the Meiri's intention is to say that the Christians of his time were enlightened idolaters, and therefore quite a few laws do not apply (or are superfluous) to them.

And now, if the Meiri's intention was to claim that they were not idolaters, this was enough to substantiate his expropriation thesis: if these laws refer to idolaters, then the claim that the Christians of his time were not such is enough to say that these laws do not refer to them.

But according to our understanding of his method, it seems that the pattern of the argument for change by the Meiri is not valid. What is missing here is the conservative Midrash, or the proof of assumption B, which has a halakhic nature. As we have seen, in order to establish a thesis like this, it is not enough to show that the character of the Gentiles and their moral and human behavior have changed (assumption C). In addition, it must be shown that the laws in question do indeed depend on the same parameters that have changed (assumption B). And in our examples, the Meiri had to show that the prohibitions of the lost Sabbath or giving a gift, etc., are derived from the moral level of the Gentiles, and not from the fact that they are worshippers of idols. This is a halakhic thesis whose proof requires study and substantiation using halakhic tools.

We will not enter here into the question of proving this thesis, which should be done with respect to each of the laws discussed separately. Even if it seems that the prohibition of the Sabbath being lost to a Gentile stems from his poor moral standard, this does not prove that the forfeiture of his loan, or the renting of a house and an animal, is also the same. In each of the laws that require change, it must be shown that its foundation is the poor moral standard of the Gentiles and not the sins of idolatry that they commit.

In most places, the Meiri does not deal with such a 'midrash' at all, and seems to take it for granted. It seems that this is an intuitive assumption, which in his opinion does not require reasoning from the sources. It is possible that he really was unable to prove this from the sources, and therefore both interpretations are equally acceptable, in which case he allowed himself to adopt the interpretation that seems to him more in line with Hasbara.[24] In the next section, we will see that this situation is not exceptional. It is the symptomatic situation in which the approach of midrashic conservatism will appear.

There are several places where he seems to be aware of this additional assumption. For example, in the issue of Bava Kama 13 he explicitly claims that Shabbat Avda is a way of Hasidism, and we are not obligated to it for those who do not practice Hasidism. That is, he needed to argue that the prohibition concerns virtues and not the crime of idolatry.

Also on the issue of idolatry 26b quoted above, he quotes from the 'Chief Philosopher': 'Kill those who have no religion.' If the claim was halakhic and concerned idolaters, the words of the Chief Philosopher are irrelevant. It seems that he is trying to prove a moral-human claim and not a religious claim.

On the issue of idolatry, 6b, he proves that there is no prohibition against trading with them even on their day of Eid, since their worship today does not extend to sacrifice. This clearly means that he refers to them as idolaters, but that this is a weak form of idolatry (see below).

Even at the beginning of Tractate Avoda Zarah, he goes to great lengths to prove that trading and negotiating with them is not an acknowledgement of their worship, and they do not use goods for sacrifice, and therefore the conditions of the prohibition are not met (see ibid., 2:11).

In the issue of Baba Kama 37b, Maimonides himself proves that the laws of torts are not valid in relation to someone who is not a human being, from the permissibility of slaughtering animals that have not sinned, and from a philosophical argument that someone who lacks human qualities is not a human being.

In this way, the Meiri also brings two proofs that he repeats in several places:

In the issue on page 27, end of chapter 1, he compares the corrected nations to a resident alien, and proves from there that these Torah laws do not apply to every gentile, since a resident alien is also a gentile. From this, the Meiri proves that these laws apply to wicked gentiles, and hence his conclusion. Likewise in the issue on page 20, beginning of chapter 1, regarding their permission to reside among us. If these laws were only directed towards worshippers of idols, there would be no room to prove anything about a resident alien. The Meiri proves from a resident alien himself his 'midrash' that these laws do not refer to worshippers of idols, but rather to gentiles who are not corrected in their conduct.

In the issue of Bava Kama 17b, he proves from the midrash that appears in the Gemara (ibid., 38a), that the prohibition of theft was permitted only because the Gentiles did not accept the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah, and hence it does not reflect an essential attitude towards every Gentile. From this he apparently concludes that the law for those who are circumcised in religious and moral ways is different.

The absence of the conservative 'midrash'

We have seen that the Meiri claims that the attitude towards the Gentile Christians of his time should be changed, due to a change in their moral behavior. Assuming that the Meiri represents a conservative position, the conclusion is that he is a 'midrashic' conservative and not a 'pashtic' conservative, since a pashtic conservative would not call for a change in the halakhic attitude even if the circumstances had changed. The main problem with this thesis about the Meiri is that we expect a midrashic conservative to present a 'midrash' that would form the basis for his claim (which would prove assumption b above). The Meiri had to prove that the laws in question are indeed based on the moral behavior of the Gentiles, and not on their being idolaters. But such a midrash does not appear anywhere in the Meiri's writings. Doesn't this undermine the very thesis that we have presented here?

This important point brings us back to the theoretical models we presented in the introduction. What could the Meiri really do to substantiate his position? Ostensibly, he would have to cite a source, from the Bible or the writings of the Sages, that would prove that these prohibitions stem from the moral corruption of the Gentiles. But if such a clear source were indeed available, any conservative of any kind would agree with the Meiri's claim. After all, if there were a clear source that these prohibitions only relate to corrupt Gentiles, then the simple conservative would also teach exactly as the Meiri teaches. This is the very result derived from loyalty to the sources as they are.

The conclusion that emerges from this is that the distinction between the two types of conservatism arises precisely when there is no clear canonical source to prove the renewed thesis. When there is no evidence of the conservative midrash. In such a situation, the commentator must decide how he will act: the simple conservative continues to act as he has been accustomed to until now, and would not consider the change in circumstances. The midrashic conservative, on the other hand, allows himself in such a situation to act according to his understanding. He interprets the prohibitions as being based on the moral corruption of the Gentiles, even though he has no clear source for this (of course, only when there is also no contradictory source). It is precisely here that the 'midrashic' nature of his conservatism comes into play.

Therefore, the situation in which the claimed change is not based on a source is not merely 'possible' for the Midrashic Conservative, as we argued above. This is the only situation in which the difference between him and the Pashatic Conservative arises. The Pashatic Midrash is nothing more than a consideration based on a sourceless explanation, which claims that the factual foundation of a given halakha is X, and therefore, following the change in this factual foundation, the halakha in question must be changed. The absence of a clear source for the Pashatic Midrash is a condition for it to be a 'Midrash', otherwise it is a Pashatic interpretation and not a Midrash, and such a Pashatic procedure is also a valid procedure according to the Pashatic Conservative.

Intermediate levels: Slight idolatry

So far we have presented the two sides in a very dichotomous way: one possibility was that the Meiri believes that Christians are not idolaters, and the other possibility was that he believes that they are 'enlightened' idolaters. There are some indications that he is referring to a model that compromises these two theses: Christianity is moderate idolatry. What we mean is that in addition to the moral improvement, the Christians' idolatry is also not like that of the ancient peoples or those on the fringes. Therefore, there are two horns to the Meiri's principle of expropriation: they are humane and moral, and they are not fully idolaters.

This principle requires distinction and refinement, and this is not the place to deal with it in detail. We will only cite a few sources in the Meiri's words from which it is implied that this is indeed his method.

1. In his novella on foreign labor 6b (d. v. 'below'), he writes regarding trading with them on the day of their birth:

It certainly seems reasonable that these words were not spoken except at a time when idolatry was widespread, with sacrifice and confession... and they would worship the host of heaven with fire and with bricks and with omens and with wood and with stones...

He does not seem to be claiming that Christians are not idolaters, but rather that their idolatry is not as extreme as it was in the past (or at the 'extremes'). On the other hand, it should be noted that his criteria here do not concern manners and morality, but rather the essence of the worship and outlook. Ostensibly, the claim is that it is mild idolatry.

But it should be remembered that the discussion here is about trading on the day of Eid, and not about a law such as the lost Sabbath, etc. Therefore, it is reasonable that the reasoning here must be based on the essence of their worship, and not just on their moral and human level.

2. The Meiri in his novellas on idolatry 57a discusses the status of Ishmaelites with regard to wine made with wine and just wine. He cites the Maimonides' theory that they are not idolaters, and therefore only prohibitions based on the fear of marriage apply to them, and not prohibitions on idolatry. He then cites "some of the Ge'onim" who made it easy to lower them one level above the rest of the people:

What is forbidden in pleasure among other peoples, is permitted in pleasure among these peoples but forbidden in drinking. And what is permitted in pleasure among other peoples, such as unintentional contact with a Gentile, is permitted in drinking.

There is an intermediate level here between worshippers of idols and those who strictly forbid marriage. If so, Muslims are like worshippers of a slight form of idolatry. And he brings up something similar there in the name of the sages regarding the common people at this time.

We note that here there may be a practical implication for the different perceptions we are examining regarding the principle of expropriation: if the leniency towards Gentiles stems from their 'enlightenment,' then there will be Muslims who are unjustly treated in this way. But if this depends on the definition of weak idolatry, Islam is certainly not blatant idolatry, if it is idolatry at all.[25]

3. In his novella on idolatry, 26a, the Meiri discusses medicine and hairdressing among Gentiles, and he writes there as follows:

They are all ancient nations that were not bound by religious traditions, and are devout and persistent in the worship of idols, stars, and talismans. All of these and similar things are the main points of the Law, as explained.

His division here seems to be between works that require talismans and stars and between idolatry and the Trinity, which is a more abstract and refined idea, although it is also idolatry. Here too, the criterion for distinction is not morality and human level, but the essence of the worship.

4. The phrase that appears in the quote from the Meiri's Chiddushei on the issue of Baba Kama 13, cited above, can also be interpreted as follows:

All those who are religiously inclined and worship God on this side, even though their faith is far from ours, are not included in this.

There is a statement here that there is a problem with their faith, and yet they are worshippers of God in some way. Although this does not necessarily mean that it is a weak form of idolatry, perhaps there is a heresy here that is not idolatry.[26]

It is therefore not surprising that Rabbi Chaim Halevi and his The Exile's Well And other sages have adopted vague formulations regarding Christians, from which it is difficult to deduce a clear position in either of the two directions we have set out here.

E. Saving a Gentile on the Sabbath

We will conclude our remarks with a current halachic implication of the Meiri's position regarding the question of saving a Gentile on Shabbat. This question looms large in our world as an extremely difficult moral question.[27] According to Jewish law, it is forbidden to violate the Sabbath (at least in Torah prohibitions) in order to save the life of a Gentile. The moral sentiment on this matter is difficult, but it seems that there is no fundamental and substantial halachic source that would permit this. In fact, the poskim permit violating the Sabbath in order to save a Gentile, since failure to save him is liable to arouse hostility of varying degrees and even a real danger to the lives of Jews throughout the world (both because of riots as a result of anger over this attitude, and because Gentile doctors would not be willing to provide help to Jewish patients).

Additional halachic-technical solutions also arise in this context, but the fundamental feeling remains difficult: How can we understand that there is a situation in halachic law that allows for such contempt for human life?

The words of the Meiri constitute the only possibility to resolve this difficulty from a substantive (and not just a practical) perspective: these words were also spoken to the Gentiles of old who were not considered human because of their corrupt qualities (if it is commanded to lower them into a pit, it certainly would not be permissible to violate Shabbat in order to save them). But the "enlightened" Gentiles around us - their lives are not cheap, and the halakha permits us (and probably even obligates us) to violate Shabbat in order to save them.

In most discussions on the issue of saving the life of a Gentile on Shabbat, this possibility is not presented. There is a passing reference to it in Rabbi Shlomo Aviner's article and a more extensive reference in Rabbi Gershuni's article.[28] We will discuss it briefly here.

The words of the Meiri in the daily

It turns out that the Mayri himself, in the issue of Yoma Pad 2, writes the following (in the book 'Pikuach Nefesh'):

A courtyard where Israel and the idolaters were with them, for whom we are not commanded to desecrate the Sabbath, since they have no religion.

We hear from him that among Gentiles who have their own religious law, the law can be different. And here Rabbi Gershuni brings a slightly different version of the words of the Meiri, and there the words are more explicit:

Pikuach Nefesh is not followed by the majority, as is the case with the court where there were Israelites and the ancient worshipers of the stars and horoscopes with them, for whom we are not commanded to desecrate the Sabbath, since they have no religion at all, and they are not afraid of the duty of human society…

Rabbi Gershuni concludes from this:

Here it is clear in his words that nations that have a religion and are bound by religious traditions and worship God on some side, even though their faith is far from our faith, and they are not idolaters, we are commanded to desecrate the Sabbath for them, and this is especially true for a resident alien, whom you command to revive.

It should be noted that the permission presented here is not because of enmity or ways of peace, etc., but rather a permission in the first place. There is no prohibition at all on such Gentiles to violate the Sabbath, and perhaps there is even an obligation to do so (as Rabbi Gershuni claims, that we are commanded to violate the Sabbath for them).

'He made one Sabbath sacred so that he would keep many Sabbaths'

The fundamental difficulty with such a position regarding the laws of life-saving is that the basis for the permission (and obligation) to violate Shabbat in order to save a life, as presented in the Gemara Yoma and in many of the poskim, is a consideration that one must violate one Shabbat so that the survivor can keep many Shabbats in the future. Quite a few poskim draw conclusions from this regarding saving a life when the rescue will not result in keeping Shabbats (such as Yisrael Momar, Chai Sha'a, etc.).

Although in the issue of Yoma Me 2b, it seems that this source is rejected, further study reveals that the Gemara merely adds another source from its study: "And let him live in them" - and not let him die in them, since from the consideration of "he has violated one Sabbath" it is impossible to learn the permissibility of desecrating the Sabbath in doubt of pikuach nefesh. And evidence of this is the Gemara in Shabbat Kanna 2b, which brings this source into the halakha as the basis for saving the life of a newborn baby (because in the future he will observe many Sabbaths).

If so, there is room for the conclusion to remain with the original from 'one Sabbath was broken upon him,' and this is indeed the opinion of some poskim.[29] What is the Meiri's opinion on this matter? It turns out that he actually believes this reason to be halachic, and he brings it up in the issue of Yuma (Badah 'Avoda and Mila') along with the other reasons. Below it appears that he probably even believes that this is the main reason.

One of the important implications of the controversy regarding the grounds for permission is whether it is permissible (or necessary) to violate Shabbat in order to save a person's life for a moment: If the basis of permission is the value of a human life, then the same can be said regarding a moment's life. But if the basis of permission is 'so that he may keep many Shabbats', then it is unlikely that the temporary use will lead to 'keeping many Shabbats'. Another implication is the saving of a person who does not keep Shabbat (a convert, a 'captured infant', a Gentile, etc.).

And here Meiri himself has a surprising and unique position regarding saving a life (in Chiddushei Yoma, on the fifth mishnah, here a, i.e., 'Amer HaMeiri' said):

And even if it turns out that he cannot live even for one hour, at that very hour he will change his mind and confess.

The very difficulty he raises (why violate Shabbat in order to save a life) indicates that he understood that the main reason is 'so that he may keep many Shabbats.' Therefore, he has difficulty understanding the basis for the permission to violate Shabbat for the sake of a life, since many Shabbats will not be kept here. And indeed, this is how the poskim explain it (see 2Halacha explanation AndTit Eliezer) his method. But they continue to explain his words here and say that in his opinion, 'keeping many Sabbaths' does not mean keeping Sabbaths specifically, but rather keeping commandments in general. We desecrate one Sabbath so that the survivor can keep many commandments. Therefore, he says here that even in one moment he can pray, repent and confess, and therefore Sabbath must be desecrated in order to enable him to keep these commandments.

If so, the Meiri can continue with his theory in the matter under discussion. Although in his opinion the main reason is 'so that he may keep many Sabbaths,' then it is seemingly difficult to see why a Gentile who is bound by the customs of the nations can be saved, since he will not keep Sabbaths (he is forbidden to do so). The answer is that the Meiri himself teaches us that it is not specifically about Sabbaths but rather about certain commandments.[30] And even a Gentile, especially one who is bound by etiquette, has many commandments to observe, and therefore there is no obstacle to permitting the desecration of Shabbat in order to save him. The picture that emerges from this is that the Mairi believes that the desecration of Shabbat is not intended to enable the observance of Shabbat in the narrow sense, but rather to enable a person to fulfill his duty in this world.

According to this, a reasonable conclusion arises that if the Holy One, blessed be He, also created Gentiles in His world, it appears that He also assigns them a role in the world and imposes commandments on them. Therefore, it is possible to desecrate Shabbat in order to save their lives, thereby allowing them to fulfill their obligations (the Seven Commandments of the Children of Noah), even without observing Shabbat (which is forbidden to them). For this very reason, a resident alien is also saved, since he fulfills the Seven Commandments that He commands.[31] From this it is proven beyond a doubt that the permission does not depend specifically on observing Shabbat, just like the proof we saw above in the words of the Meiri regarding the other mitzvot.[32]

[1]       A blatant example in my opinion can be found in Rabbi Benjamin Lau's article, 'Rosh Rosenthal on Saving a Gentile on Shabbat', entree, 13 (Nisan 5763), pp. 7-32. And see also my response 'A Scholar and an Ally', entree, 14 (Tevet 5764), pp. 257-264.

[2]       Yaakov Katz, Halacha and Kabbalah: Studies in the History of the Jewish Religion on Its Divisions and Social Connections, Jerusalem 1984.

[3]       Rabbi C.D. Halevi, 'Paths of Peace in Relations Between Jews and Non-Jews', Areas, 9, 1988, pp. 71-81.

[4]       This topic is discussed at length in my book (the third in the quartet 'Two Carts and a Balloon'), Human as hay, which is currently being edited. There the topic is discussed in a broader philosophical perspective, and the change in halakha appears as a particular example of changes in normative systems in general.

[5]       My thanks to my friend Amnon Levav for the example. He used it to present the first two (conservative) groups, even though he himself clearly belongs to the third.

[6]       In fact, many would say that the second group is the Pashatistik and the first is not. This debate is reminiscent of the debates that have been going on in recent years about the relationship between Pashatistik and Darsh (whether Pashatistik consists solely of linguistic considerations, or whether Hasbara also plays a part in determining Pashatistik, even at the expense of conformity to literal meaning: in the sense of 'it is better to push with language than with interpretation').

[7]       Chaim Soloveitchik, Halacha, economics and self-image, Jerusalem 5765.

[8]       Sometimes claims are made that necessity has caused the jurists to interpret the halakhic sources in a way that is different from what is accepted or from what they consider to be the correct interpretation. But this seems to be intellectual dishonesty, and therefore an illegitimate way to change the halakhic law. A jurist is supposed to rule according to his best understanding of the sources in the given circumstances. Interpretation is not supposed to be influenced (consciously) by necessity, but perhaps in a state of doubt (and this too requires clarification, and Akmal).

If a need arises, the posek can see this as motivation to sit on the bench and look for a valid halakhic mechanism for change, that is, a convincing basis for a different interpretation of the sources. But need in itself cannot constitute a basis for interpretation. Of course, sometimes, unconsciously, need can influence the posek's way of seeing, and he will adopt the different interpretation innocently, since it really seems true to him. Here, the influence of needs only enters indirectly, and this is certainly a possible scenario. See my response to this inentree 14 (above, note 1), and also in my book, What is and what is not, Tam Publishing, Kfar Hasidim 2006. See ibid., sixth chapter, chapter 3.

[9]       Note that the Meiri here also leniently treats the law of non-Jews who are not bound by manners. See a similar position in his novellas on paganism, 26a, 35 'Hogim', and in what Rav Sofer commented in note 9 in his edition there, that this is a unique method among all the Rishonim.

[10] The references are to pages in the book Beit Bechirah LeMeiri, published by Rabbi A. Sofer, Jerusalem 1954.

[11] And also later, see Katz (above, note 2), notes 21, 22.

[12] Ibid., notes 23-27.

[13]      This methodology is conscious in Katz. He is careful to point out that the Tosafot in Bova Zara 15:1 also provide proof for their words, and explain that necessity is not enough to justify a halakhic change.

[14]      See my articles on this, 'Between Research and "Review" – The Hermeneutics of Canonical Texts', entree, 9 (Tammuz 5770), pp. 161-179, and in my response to Rabbi Benny Lau (above, note 1).

[15]      In my book What is and what is not (Especially in the fourth chapter) I have detailed many and varied possibilities in which several explanations (at different conceptual levels) for the same phenomenon can be valid at the same time. In the sixth chapter there are presented demonstrations similar to the one here.

[16]      See a general discussion of this inTalmudic Encyclopedia, the value 'Goy'.

[17]      See, among others, the following sources (and the references therein): Rabbi Yitzhak Herzog, 'Minority Rights According to Halacha', Areas, 2, pp. 174-179; Rabbi Yehuda Gershuni, 'Minorities and Their Rights in the State of Israel', Areas, 2, pp. 187-189; Dror Pixler and Gil Nadel, 'Are Christians Today Idolators?', Areas, 22, pp. 68-78; Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, 'Judaism's Attitude to the Christian World', Areas, 8, 1987, pp. 375-368. See also the article by Rabbi Elisha Aviner, 'The Status of the Ishmaelites in the State of Israel', in the same issue, pp. 337-362. And see also inThe evidence fees, Part I, p. 16.

[18]      See, for example, the article by Rabbi C.D. Halevi (above, note 3), and in a slightly modified version: Amichai Berholz (ed.), Country, religion and state, Jerusalem 5762, pp. 147-158. Although in this article it seems that he understood the Meiri as we say, and Tsa.

[19]      In several places he adds that even in his day there were 'idolaters in the extremes' (i.e. in distant places) who were not yet circumscribed. See his novellas on idolatry 2:1, 6:2, 20, 7:1, and several more places. See Katz's discussion near notes 68-70 in his article, where he compares this to the idolaters mentioned by Maimonides (the Tsaba sect).

[20]      We note that this is how it is presented in everyday language as well.Talmudic Encyclopedia Roughly 'Gentile' (see mainly notes 28-33), without refining this point.

[21]      This development, of course, reflects Posk's openness and courage, but not necessarily any concrete philosophical positions.

[22]      Rabbi Shlomo Aviner (above, note 16).

[23]      Rabbi C.D. Halevi in his article (above, note 3), which is repeated with minor changes in the book Country, religion and state (above, note 17), and so on. And see also his response. You did a great job., Part 9, p. 13.

[24]      See the articles 'Autonomy and Authority in Halacha Ruling' on this, Straighteners, A (5762).

[25]      Regarding Islam, see also the article by Rabbi Elisha Aviner (above, note 16).

[26]      This is evident from the statements of all the rabbis who have addressed the question of whether Ben Noach commands the practice of sharing. Their claims that Christianity is not idolatry because their belief in sharing is not forbidden to Gentiles necessarily speaks of a false belief (since sharing is certainly factually incorrect), and yet they are not included in the category of idolaters.

[27]      See on this in the article by Rabbi Benjamin Lau inentree 13 (above, note 1), and in my response in issue 11, and much more.

[28]      Above, note 16.

[29]      See about that. Halacha explanation, Mark 29, Halacha 4, i.e. 'except for a specific time'; Tsitz Eliezer, Part 5, Ramat Rachel, Chapter 28. Clarification: This is how this edition is noted in the Responsorial Psalm Project. This is probably the place of publication or writing.

[30]      Hence the excuse for the strong difficulty of theAuthor of the book In the novella Ketubot 15:2 (d. v. 'to feed him carrion'), regarding a baby found in a city that is half Jewish and half Gentile, and it is judged as if there were a Jewish person and a Gentile person.Author of the book It is difficult to see how one can rule that one desecrates Shabbat in order to save him from a deficiency, when according to the law he is forbidden to keep Shabbat (a deficiency, after all, a Gentile is forbidden to keep Shabbat), and therefore he will not keep many Shabbats. According to the Meiri, the answer is simple: we save him so that he may keep other mitzvot. What the Gemara has taken to mean by keeping Shabbat is not necessarily Shabbat.

[31]      See Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Shabbat, 2, 12, and in Poskim (for example, Yeshurun Elementary School (To Rabbi Gedaliah Felder), Jerusalem 1990, Collection of Sabbath Laws, p. 200).

[32]      A question may arise here: What about a Gentile who is well-mannered, but does not believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore is exempt from observing the commandments? (See my article on this, 'On the Matter of Causing a Secular Person to Fall into Sin', Noon, 25, Aviv 5766, pp. 9-20). Apparently here the rescue will not lead to any mitzvah, but at most to the good deeds of a good person. Is there a permit to desecrate Shabbat in order to save such a person? It turns out that the law will depend on the law of desecrating Shabbat to save a Jew who does not believe (such as a 'captured infant'). There could be a perception that the rescue is to enable him to fulfill his duty, even though he is not yet aware of it. If this person chooses not to make use of this option, his problem is with his Creator, but we are commanded to desecrate Shabbat in order to save him. However, according to this, one must examine why not also save an evil gentile and ancient idolater in order to enable him to fulfill his duty. This can be explained in several ways, and so on.