On repentance, atonement, and punishment

With God’s help

Book of Yossi Laor – 1970

These words are dedicated in honor of my friend Oz, Rabbi Yossi Laor, who was endowed with many wisdoms, having reached old age (see Avot Pa'a 5:11). It is true that old age is today perceived as a type of defect or deficiency. To say this about someone who has reached old age almost sounds like a derogatory term. And in terms of life expectancy, the situation today is that age sixty is not really old age (I wish at the age of twenty I could run and walk like Yossi the 'old' today).

But in our tradition, old age is a state between advice (age 50) and return (age 70). And the Sages have already said, "There is no old man but a wise man" (see Kiddushin 33:1, and similarly there in 2). They also said: "Whoever takes advice from the elders does not fail" (Shamor 53:8).

Our best wishes for a long life, continued growth in Torah and wisdom, and the best of health and happiness for all of his descendants, along with his wife, who will live to see the end of time.

Dafna and Michai Avraham

introduction

The Torah commands us with commandments and warns us against transgressions. When we commit certain transgressions, we are subject to punishments in the law. For every transgression or undoing of a deed, repentance must be made, and the Torah reiterates that repentance atones for sin. A person returns to being as he was before he sinned.

As a result of repentance, is he also freed from the punishments of the Jewish Law? For example, a person ate pork and committed 40 lashes. After eating, he fully repented, and now they come to flog him. Is he free from the lashes, or not?

It is acceptable to us that it is not. But this requires explanation: why does repentance not completely return us to the state before sin, as if we had never sinned at all.[1]

Yossi is always looking for applications of abstract ideas (=heaven) on the ground of reality (=earth), as if he were saying, "Hearing is the key to understanding." If possible, it is advisable to touch them with your own hands. On the other hand, it is also important for him to reveal the abstract ideas that lie behind factual facts and events (which is closer to my inclinations). Perhaps this article, which concerns the relationship between heaven and earth, also does something in these directions.

Primary sources

In the mishna at the beginning of Pag 3 Damchut (page 13a), a list of those liable to be flogged is given:

And these are the signs: He who brings upon his sister, and upon his father's sister...eats a dip, and the first tithe whose offering was not taken, and the second tithe and the holy things that were not redeemed...

Rashi on Atar insists that the list is not complete, and he explains:

These are not exactly, we have given and we have seen good. Rather, we have given those who are guilty of circumcision to their own guilt, we have given those who are guilty of circumcision to their own guilt, and we have given widows and divorcees to their own guilt…

And in the Gemara there:

Gm. Those who are responsible for amputations, give me, those who are responsible for deaths, do not give me?

And in the same place:

Those liable to be executed by a court of law – all those liable to be executed by a court of law who do not have a death sentence were mentioned in our mishnah regarding flogging, and none of those liable to be executed by a court of law was mentioned in it as being subject to flogging if they permitted him to be flogging.

And later in the Gemara, they explain:

Who are they? Rabbi Akiva is; Datania: One who is guilty of amputation and one who is guilty of a court death sentence is subject to a total of forty lashes, the words of Rabbi Yishmael; R.A. says: One who is guilty of amputation is subject to a total of forty lashes, and if they repent – in the case of a higher punishment, they are forgiven. One who is guilty of a death sentence is not subject to a total of forty lashes, and if they repent – in the case of a lower punishment, they are forgiven.

The conclusion of the Gemara is that the Mishnah teaches us (according to the method of the Rabbis) that those liable to be executed are liable to forty lashes, while those liable to death are not. What is the relationship between the obligation of being executed and the obligation of being executed? Are there two simultaneous punishments here? The Gemara explains that these are indeed two punishments, but this is not 'two evils' since the penalty of being executed can be absolved through repentance. In contrast, the obligation of being executed for fourteen years, as well as the obligation of being executed, cannot be absolved through repentance.

And so Rashi writes:

Rabbi Akiva says that those who are liable to be cut off – if they are allowed to be beaten, they include both beatings and whippings, and there is no reason here for those who are liable to two evils, whose punishment is beatings with a conviction, and why are they not two evils, since he can exempt himself from the penalty of conviction by repenting from the Divine Law of the High Court. But those who are liable to death are not at all punished, because there are two evils here, beatings and death, and the end result is to kill, even if he repents, there is no Divine Law below that forgives him the death penalty.

This is the reason why it is impossible to get rid of the punishments of the Day of Judgment through repentance. Only the punishments of Heaven are absolved through repentance. This is also explained in the Ramban in the Wars of the End of Plagues, and see also in Ein Zochor Lachida, edition M, letter 20, at the end.

Answer regarding testimony

As is known, a wicked person is disqualified from testifying. And according to Medina DaGamara, when he repents, he regains his kashrut. This is also stated in the Shulchan Shulchan HaMoshiach, 345:

A thief, as well as a robber, are disqualified from testifying from the time they stole or robbed, and even if they have returned it, until they repent.

And also there in the 22nd chapter:

Those who commit rape, and heretics and converts to star worship, are less than star worshipers and are disqualified from testifying.

Haga: And even if he forgives him, the one who is given is invalid, until he repents (B"Y Besam Mak"2 and the words of Maimonides in P"2, and this is how it is understood in Asheri v. 72). A convert who repents and receives repentance for him is kosher immediately, even though he has not yet done so (Maharik Shorseh v. 5).

And in 28-29 there:

28. If two people testified that one of them was guilty of one of these offenses, and two people came and testified that he repented or repented, then it is kosher…

29. Anyone who is liable to be flogged because he has been beaten in the Sabbath returns to his kashrut. But the rest of the disqualified witnesses, who are disqualified because of money they have stolen or stolen, even though they have paid, need to answer and are disqualified until it is known that they have turned from their evil ways.

Since when did you return a loan with interest, when they tore up their bills of exchange and returned them with a complete return, so that they would not lend with interest even to a pagan. And one must return everything that he took with interest to its owner; and if he does not know from whom he took it, he must do many things with it. He thought: And this is especially true for someone who is accustomed to stealing and robbing, but someone who stole and robbed at random, as soon as he returned what he stole and robbed, he is forgiven. And indeed, if he returned it of his own accord, but if he did not return it only through compulsion, then he is not entitled to return it until he makes a restitution (Tur and Rosh, 58), and so on.

Later in the passage, he continues to detail how the return of all types of criminals should be accomplished, and this is the end of it. In any case, we have learned that the answer is useful in restoring a person who has been disqualified due to wickedness, to be kosher to testify.

It is true that it is ruled here that even whippings are beneficial for this, and this means that even without repentance. That is, repentance is required only where there is no punishment of whippings. And this is a 27-point rule, since punishment without repentance does not atone (see on this in Rambam, p. 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159

And the Sama'a there in the Saka'a cites the source for this law from the issue of blows 23a:

Since it is a curse in the Bible, it is written [Deuteronomy 25:3] and your brother is cursed before your eyes, immediately after he is cursed and cursed, the scripture says, "Your brother is cursed."

And yet this requires explanation, since a wicked person is disqualified because of his wickedness or because of a fear of lying, and both of these did not change if he did not repent. It seems on the surface that a wicked person is disqualified from testifying not because of a fear of lying, but rather it is a type of punishment.

Now, if the disqualification was due to the fear of lying, then it is clear why repentance is useful in restoring him to kosher. Now there is no fear of lying, and he is no longer evil, and therefore he is kosher to testify. But if the disqualification is a type of punishment, then the difficulty returns as to why repentance is useful for this, when we saw that repentance is not useful for exemption from punishment.

Initial conclusion

In the issue of Sanhedrin 27a, Abaye and Rava disagreed on whether only a wicked person who commits a crime involving money is disqualified from testifying or any wicked person (=one who commits a crime that requires flogging). The HaTzvah explained that their disagreement is over the question of whether a wicked person is disqualified because of a suspicion of lying or whether this is the physical disqualification. According to Rava, only a wicked person who commits a crime involving money is disqualified, because in his opinion this is a suspicion of lying, and someone who is suspected of prohibitions is not necessarily suspected of lying. Only someone who is suspected of money is suspected of lying in a financial testimony. Abaye argues that this is the physical disqualification, every wicked person is disqualified from testifying (and a wicked person is one who commits a crime that requires flogging, as it is written, "And the wicked person is one who commits a crime that requires flogging, as it is written, "And the wicked person is one who commits a crime that requires flogging, as it is written, "And the wicked person is one who commits a crime that requires flogging." [2]

Now we can understand that in a wicked person who is guilty of a crime (such as a robber), the disqualification is due to a fear of lying. In such a situation, it is clear that nothing will help except repentance, since he is suspected of lying because of his wickedness, and until he repents, he remains a suspect. Indeed, after he repents, it is understandable why it is beneficial to qualify him, since he is now not a suspect. We should add that even if he were afflicted (there are no lashes for robbery because he was not the one who was punished for paying), this would not qualify him, since he is still a suspect. In contrast, in a normal wicked person (such as someone who ate pork), the disqualification is not due to a fear of lying but rather due to the bodily disqualification. Therefore, here he returns and qualifies both if he repented and if he was afflicted. If he repented, he is no longer wicked, and if he was afflicted, he has 'paid his debt to society' and there is no point in additional social sanctions, and therefore he returns and qualifies as a witness.

We see that whipping and repentance are two parallel paths. Whippings erase the sin and constitute a punishment that society imposes on the offender. Repentance makes him a good person, and brings forgiveness. Therefore, repentance is always useful in qualifying for testimony, but whippings are only useful where there is no fear of lying. Accordingly, the reason why whippings are not mentioned in the 29th chapter of the Shulchan Arba as a possibility for returning to kashrut is not only because there are no whippings for a robber and a wicked man, but also because even if there were whippings, they would not be useful. A wicked man is suspected of lying. Below we will see this duality in more detail.

The impact of the response on the leadership of the headquarters' military academy: additional contexts

In Mishnah Yevamot 22a, the law appears that a bastard son exempts his father's wife from the Yevamot, and is liable for his beating and his cursing. In the same place in the book of באב, it is difficult to say that the father does not commit an act with you, and therefore it is not clear why he is liable for his beating. And they excuse it by saying that this is when the father repented.

And in the Torah, "When He Made a Repentance," there, they write:

And what does it say in the Book of the Choking (Sanhedrin, page 11: and there) that a son is not made a messenger for his father to beat him and curse him, except for inciting him, as in the case of a simpleton when he repented, and in the case of a person who has repented, he is not allowed to curse him, even if he has repented. And it is said that if he mentions the name of God in vain or does something for which he is obligated, he is obligated and not exempted.

Thos states that if the father is liable to whipping or excommunication, he is not exempted from them even if he repents. Indeed, their words state that after repentance, he is not permitted to curse him. In other words, repentance is beneficial for these offenses, but it does not exempt from the punishment, not even from the punishment of excommunication (which is not a regular Jewish punishment).[3]

The same is ruled in the Rambam, Halacha Memariam 5:12 (and it is also in the Shulchan Yod Si' Rama 5:14):

If a person whose father and mother were completely wicked and committed crimes, even if their sentence for murder has expired and they go out to kill, it is forbidden to beat them and curse them. If he cursed or harmed them, he is exempt. If they repent, then he is liable and will be killed for them, even though they will go out to die. What are the things said about his son? But one who came and beat and cursed another whose sentence has expired, even though he repented, then he is exempt, since he goes out to die. And if he shamed him, he is liable to the fine of the shamer.

If so, the answer is useful in restoring a person's kashrut for the purpose of being considered "doing something with you," and certainly for the purpose of testimony, etc., but for the purpose of punishments in the Jewish courts, the answer is not useful.

It should be noted that later in the Gemara it states:

And he is liable for his punishment. What? It is here: +Exodus 22+ and the leader among your people will not be described, in doing an act among you! As Rav Pinchas of Shimea, the son of Papa, said: In doing repentance, behold, when he repented, he repented. And is he not a man of repentance? And the one who is not able to repent, Shimon ben Menasya says: What kind of +Ecclesiastes 1+ is so twisted that he cannot be corrected? This one who came upon the nakedness and begot a bastard from it! Wonder who is doing an act among you?

That is, in order for him to be liable for his beating, it is sufficient for us that he is now doing something to you, even if the answer does not correct the past. And perhaps the same is true regarding testimony and the like, since what is important in testimony is his current state, not the past. Disqualification from testimony and the permission to beat are not punishments, but rather the natural result of a given situation, and when that changes, that is sufficient for us. If so, there is nothing to be learned here regarding punishment, beyond the fact that punishment is not given for the present but for the past (therefore, a reply is not useful with regard to it).

And here is the translation of the candle on the altar, where it is written:

In the Bible, when he repented. He repented. We are told that we do not even know if he repented, because it is forbidden to beat him or curse him, lest he contemplate repentance in his heart. And as we say in the Holy Scriptures (4:2), in the case of a wicked person who sanctifies a woman because he is completely righteous, and they fear for his saints, lest he contemplate repentance in his heart, and here is my punishment.

He also notes that he feared that he had made sufficient repentance, since in any case there is doubt that he had made repentance. His view is on the issue of sanctification regarding a wicked man who sanctified a woman in order to be completely righteous, whose sanctification, according to the law, we fear.[4] Below we will further address a situation of doubt.

Remote city

The Rambam brings the law of a remote city in the laws of idolatry, 44-5. In 46 he writes:

And what is the law of a rejected city? At a time when it is appropriate to be made a rejected city, the Great Court sends them and demands and investigates until they know with clear evidence that the entire city or most of it has been rejected and has returned to idolatry. Then they send them two scholars of Torah to warn them and bring them back. If they return and repent, it is better. And if they stand firm in their convictions, the Court is pleased to send all Israel to rise against them in the army, and they harass them and wage war against them until the city is destroyed…

And the Rabbi comments on this there:

Obtaining the Rabbad: Afterwards, two scholars are sent to warn them and to return them. If they return and make a better repentance, it is better. A. It is good that the repentance benefits them, but I did not find a better repentance after warning and action.

The Rabbi understood from the words of the Maimonides that in his opinion, if the people of a remote city repent, their sin will be forgiven, and they will be freed from the death penalty of the Jewish law that they committed. Hence, he criticizes the Maimonides for not finding that repentance is beneficial after we have already committed the Jewish law penalties (in warning and deed).

The experts there are struggling to understand the controversy, but everyone agrees that one cannot get rid of the punishments of the Jewish law by repenting. It should be noted that the Rambam does not halachically apply the ruling of the Rabbis on the issue of beatings, that if one repents, he is not atoned for, but in any case, this is the assumption of the commentators.

Although the towering Oz there comments:

And I say that there was a scribal error in his book. And I have already checked the book that was written by the late Rabbi and his signature, and it does not say, "Then return." And even if it did, I wonder why it would not be beneficial to return to anything in the world, and is it not written (Jeremiah 3): "Turn back, you naughty children," etc., and as is customary on Rosh Hashanah (18:1) and on Yom HaShanah (10:1) and on Yerushalmi Defia (11:1-12).

He explains how the Rabbi understood this in Rambam (because he argued in his opinion that "then they return and send them two scholars"). But the bottom line is that he wondered why repentance is really not useful in getting rid of punishment? The sources he cites there deal with the divisions of atonement and the act of repentance. For example, in the issue of Yoma Pu A.A. it is stated:

Listen, Rabbi Yehuda says: Whatever is full, you shall carry and below – repentance atones, full, you shall carry and above – repentance hangs, and Yom Kippur atones! You shall not carry and all my blood is for him. Listen: According to what is said in Horeb repentance and cleansing, it is possible that you shall not carry with them – learn to say +Shemot 34+ it will not cleanse. It is possible that the rest of those who are guilty of an offense may do so – learn to say his name – his name is Dayan, who does not cleanse, but cleanses the rest of those who are guilty of an offense! – it is a condition, Datanya: For what does repentance atone – for a deed and for an inaction that is cut off to do, and for what does repentance hang and Yom Kippur atones – for amputations and for court deaths, and for a complete inaction. A Mar said: According to what is said in Horeb and cleansing, where is it from? Datanya, Rabbi Elazar says: It is impossible to say cleanse when it has already been said not to cleanse, and it is impossible to say not to cleanse when it has already been said cleansed. How is that? It cleanses for those who are not guilty of an offense.

Rabbi Matya ben Harash asked Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah in Rom: Have you heard of four atonement clauses that Rabbi Yishmael was seeking? He said: There are three, and repentance with each one. He who has committed a sin and returned – he does not move from there until he is excused, as it is said +Jeremiah 3+, “Return, you naughty children.” He who has committed a sin and not committed a sin and made a repentance – he is suspended in repentance, and on Yom Kippur he atones, as it is said +Leviticus 16+, for on this day he will atone for you from all your sins. He who has committed a sin and the death of the court and made a repentance – he is suspended in repentance, and on Yom Kippur he atones, and he is healed in healing, as it is said +Psalms 55+, “And I will visit their transgression on the tribe, and their iniquity with plagues.” But whoever has blasphemy in his hand – he has no power to suspend repentance, nor on Yom Kippur to atone, nor in torment to heal. Rather, they are all suspended, and death is healed, as it is said +Isaiah 22+, and it will be revealed in the ears of the Lord of hosts whether this iniquity will be atoned for for you until you die.

We see that repentance atones, and sometimes death or flogging or torment is also required. But there is no hint there that after repentance, punishments are given in the Bible. It is presented there as if after repentance we have a new person ("clean").

Several commentators have addressed this question and offered several answers. Here we will examine the main directions, one by one.

The Hidda and Arvah Method

The Hidda, in his book Ein Zochor, edited by M. Ot. 20, discusses this question at length (see mainly the M. D. "And if you say in your heart" and onwards). He explains that as humans we cannot know whether a person has repented or not, and therefore the Bible of the Lower Court does not take this dimension into account when sentencing him to punishment. Similarly, in the Elaruch of the Future Table, Hal. Sanhedrin 62, Noach 62, Baal Me'in Hochma commented on Tarig Mitzvot, page 5, d. h. "This" (and added that if repentance were beneficial, then every offender would say that he repented in order to escape punishment).

It is true that this should be discussed, as we saw above that regarding several matters of halacha, the Jewish Court does discuss the question of whether a person has repented. For example, regarding the matter of returning to kashrut by testimony, or the kashrut of slaughter, etc. If the matters are so personal, then why does the Jewish Court allow itself to discuss this?

It would seem that there was a place to say that the ability to testify does not depend on the process in the heart but on actions, and therefore the Court of Cassation does so and is decisive. And certainly in the matter of being considered a doer of an act with you, which depends only on his current state. But in the matter of being free from punishment, actions are not enough, and in them also a process in the heart, since the punishment is given for the past. And in his opinion, the Court of Cassation cannot decide on this.

Although this explanation may be puzzling: Why don't we cancel the punishment of a defendant? After all, even if we doubt whether he repented in his heart or not, how do we punish a defendant? Ostensibly, the burden of proof is on the one who wants to punish, and therefore a defendant should be lenient and not punished. We also saw above in the commentary of the Arul'n that a defendant should also be qualified. We have not found anywhere that punishment is imposed when there is only doubt as to whether he deserves it. According to halakha, even a warning of doubt (i.e., a situation where at the time of the warning it was not clear that the offender would indeed be obligated to pay the penalty) exempts the person from punishment.

It is true that one can divide and say that here he is liable to punishment by the very fact that he committed the offense, but now he has come to get rid of the punishment. In such a situation, the burden of proof that he repented is on him, since he is under a presumption of obligation regarding the punishment. What we usually do not punish in a situation of doubt is only because when we come to impose and pronounce a punishment on someone, then the burden of proof is on the one who pronounces so. This is the opposite situation to the one who is being judged, because there is a presumption of innocence and exemption from punishment, and whoever comes to impose an obligation must prove that there is such an obligation.[5]

I saw this again written in the Responsa Dovva Meishram (Legion of Tshebin), Ch. 1:31, in the last paragraph. There he explains the Maimonides' method that in a remote city, a confession is also useful for the matter of punishment, since when a person sins, he has the presumption of being a criminal and a confession is not useful to get him out of it. But the problem is that the judgment is for the public, and therefore the presumption of all sinners who have not repented is necessary, and the presumption of one person is not useful for another (see his evidence there). Although it is still unclear why in the testimony the confession is indeed useful, then even there we should have followed the presumption of impermissibility. Perhaps a distinction should be made between the confession required for the matter of the kashrut of testimony and the confession required for the matter of exemption from punishment.[6]

The method of the author of the "Novi"

The author of Novi, in his report on the Och 63, discusses the question of what is the essence of repentance, fasting and suffering, or the act of repentance (repentance and confession, etc.), and he writes there:

But I say all this if fasting were something that hinders repentance. But in truth, fasting is not just a sideline to repentance, and the essence of repentance is the abandonment of sin, confession of things with a broken heart, repentance with a whole heart, drawing closer and enthusiastically loving the Creator. And that would be repentance that would turn to God and have mercy on Him, and that would mean that he would cling to Him. But the rest of the fasting and penance are not essential.

And you know, it is beyond doubt that repentance is a complete atonement, and this matter is made known in the Torah, the Prophets, the Scriptures, in the two Talmuds, and in all the Midrash, and the prophet says (Ezekiel 18:18): "And when the wicked turns from his wickedness, etc. (Ibid. 33), all his sins that he has committed will not be remembered against him, etc. And there is no doubt that at the time the Sanhedrin would have practiced if it transgressed against those who were guilty of death after the warning, even if they were witnesses and did not come to the court for many years, and in the meantime he had made repentance and many penances and fasts, more and more numerous than the repentance of the weight mentioned in the Rokach, and again after all the repentance, witnesses came to the court and testified that it is certain that the court does not supervise his repentance and burn and flog him according to the punishment of the sin. And this is surprising, since it is certain that the repentance was beneficial and his iniquity had already been removed and his sin had been atoned for, why should he be put to death? And the righteous and the righteous shall not be killed, as it is written. And in the Hadith they said in broad terms that these are the ones who are guilty of death who have repented, and the court will not forgive him.

But surely the decree of Scripture is that if this were not so, the punishments of the Torah would be nullified in general, and no one would be put to death in the Bible for saying, "I have sinned, and I will return." And since God, blessed be He, wanted to impose the death penalty for some sins so that man would fear committing them, it is necessary that repentance would not be of any use in saving from the death of the Bible.

And why is it that the weight of repentance is the main thing in repentance? It is certain that it was said to Moses from Sinai that every sin and guilt has its weight, and the weight of its repentance is according to its value. From now on, why will repentance not be of any use in saving from the death of the devil? And yet, all the punishments of the death of the devil will not be canceled from the punishment of the devil if one repents according to his weight, and in particular, there are many penances that cannot be calculated, such as sitting naked in front of bees and rolling in snow, and the like, mentioned in the books of repentance, and whoever does not do according to his weight will be put to death in court. And even in fasting, one must not calculate, for if the witnesses come immediately to court, he will be put to death, since he has not yet repented.

And it should not be said that all the punishments of the B"D were nullified because at the time of the warning he is doubtful lest he repent and this is a warning of doubt, would it not have been that the witnesses would have brought him immediately to the B"D, and furthermore, the warning of doubt is not called a warning but to the B"D is called a warning and so on. May I say that I am not here to say, but certainly there is no essence of the Torah for penances and fastings and the essence of repentance is complete repentance. And this can happen in a single moment, and if you say that repentance will save from death by the B"D, then all the laws of death by the B"D are nullified.[7]

The Novitiate explains that there is no forgiveness for the punishment because it is a geziak to deter. And if a person could be released by repentance in the heart – he can always claim that he has repented, and we cannot know what is in his heart. And in the last paragraph he explains that this is evidence that the essence of repentance is not the suffering and fasting, so that God would have us waive the punishment for him after he repented, because actions that are actually done are not devoted to the heart, and everyone can see whether he has repented or not.

Although there was room for hardship, what is the concern that he will be relieved of the punishment? If he does not deserve it, then it is better that he be relieved. The Nobi there explains that the punishments are intended to deter, and therefore it is important to give them (even to a party who is concerned that he has made a genuine repentance). In any case, any claim that could cancel the imposition of punishments is completely clear that it is impossible.

If so, he explains that a punishment in the Jewish Law is not forgiven upon repentance because we cannot know whether a person has repented or not. This reasoning is similar to what we saw in the Hidda, except that he adds that the purpose of the punishment is deterrence and there is a reason not to exempt him because of repentance. It seems that he does not accept what we explained in the Hidda system, that the repentance comes to exempt from punishment, and therefore the burden of proof is on the one who exempts. He apparently understands that the burden of proof should have been on the punisher in such a case as well. Therefore, he needed another justification, and he explains that the social purpose of the punishment will not be achieved if we consider this justification.

The reason for this may be that in his view the argument that the answer came to exempt from a presumption of guilt is incorrect, perhaps because of the law of 'and they saved the congregation.' Therefore, he needed another justification. He explains that the Torah wants the punishment to be given, apparently to deter, and if the answer had exempted from punishment, the punishments could not have been given and deterrence would not have been created. We see that in his view the gist of the law is that the answer should indeed have exempted, and there is only a geziyya that does not exempt. In other words, he sees the situation as a presumption of innocence (perhaps because of 'and they saved the congregation') and not as a presumption of guilt.

It seems that there is a perception of punishment here that sees punishment as a form of deterrence. In contrast, the Hida apparently sees punishment as something essential, the purpose of which is to purify the sinner and atone for him, and therefore if he truly does not deserve it, then he should not be punished.

The Maharal Method[8]

The Maharal, in his book Netivot Olam, Nativ Teshuva Refa B, also addresses this question, and this is what he says there:

Already in the question, we see that his view is the opposite of that of his predecessors. They asked why the answer is not useful for exemption from punishment in the lower court, while he asks why the answer is useful for exemption in the higher court. In other words, they assume that the explanation of the answer should be useful in every context (and so writes the Magdal Oz and the Novyod), and therefore the question is about the lower court. Whereas he assumes that the explanation of the answer does not erase the punishment, that is, it should not have been useful in any context, and therefore his question is about the higher court: The sin was committed, and history cannot be rewritten, so why is the punishment forgiven?

Below, it appears that the Maharal's answer is also the opposite of that of his predecessors. Furthermore, he also rules out in his words the possibility that the Jewish Court may not know what is in a person's heart, as he writes that the Jewish Court does not forgive a person's punishment even if they know for certain that he has repented (he assumes that there is such a possibility, apparently in light of the testimony we saw above).

The Maharal gives two answers in this section, and it is not entirely clear what the relationship between them is (simply put, they seem to complement each other, and so on).

1. The courts of Ma'ale also discuss reward and benefit, while the courts of Meta are only responsible for discussing punishment and harm. Therefore, the courts of Ma'ale can also judge a person based on the performance of repentance. It is not entirely clear what his excuse is for the question? Why is this related to the question he is discussing?

And it seems that his intention is to say that repentance is not discussed as erasing sin. When a person repents, he deserves to receive punishment for the offense and, on the other hand, reward for making repentance. Perhaps in the bottom line, there is also an offset, and therefore the offense is erased, but basically there are two independent components here. Therefore, in the upper law, repentance is discussed, and in the lower law, only punishments are discussed and not considering making repentance.

This is an interesting view of the answer. According to the Maharal, the answer does not erase the sin even in the heavenly realm, but rather is parallel to it. Perhaps the reward for it offsets the punishment. This is very consistent with what we saw in his Qoshiya. We also saw there that in his opinion the answer does not erase the sin completely.

We also see in Laham 3:3, Teshuvah 53, where Maimonides writes that the middle-aged are in a state of flux and if they do not repent, they are condemned to death. And Laham asks why, if they do not repent, they are condemned to death? Apparently, God is biased towards kindness. He explains that this middle-aged person is punished for not repenting. That is, the repentance has an independent status and value (for good and for the better), and does not merely erase or not erase the offense committed.

1. Continuing his remarks here, the Maharal offers an explanation that seems different: Only God accepts returnees, and therefore only the divine law of Ma'ale cleanses the returnees. The divine law of a lower court acts from the standpoint of the law, and within the boundaries of the law, one cannot accept repentance, since the offense has been committed and cannot be erased from history. In other words, here he explains that accepting repentance is a matter of prior knowledge, and the divine law of a lower court acts according to the law, and therefore it is not affected by the practice of repentance.[9]

Here he seems to perceive the answer as erasing the sin, not as in his method above. But it is only that the sin is as if erased. After all, he assumes that, in principle, sins cannot be erased retroactively, as we saw in his method in the difficulty and also in the first excuse. Therefore, he explains that receiving the answer is a priori from the Lord, and therefore only God is authorized to do so.

In any case, according to the Maharal's view, the answer does not erase the obligation to punish in the lower court even if we could know for sure that the person has made an answer. This is not a matter of the impossibility of knowing what is in a person's heart, but a matter of essence. This is in contrast to the Hidda and Nuvi's view. This is not at all a question of presumption of obligation or presumption of exemption, and in his opinion, the answer does not at all stand on the level of punishment in the lower court.[10]

This continues what we saw in the Shulchan Arba's testimony, that the punishments of the Day of Judgment expiate the sin, and repentance brings about kashrut and forgiveness (makes the person righteous and truthful). Therefore, these are two parallel paths, each of which performs a different action.

It is further stated that according to the Hidda and the Novi, it appears that the Teshuvah does indeed correct the past and does not merely offset it. Their entire problem is based on the fact that the Teshuvah corrects the sin as if it had not been committed, and therefore they find it difficult to understand why it is subject to punishment in the lower realm. They assume that the Teshuvah does the same thing as the punishment. The Maharal, on the other hand, finds it difficult in the higher realm, and therefore he also offers an explanation(s) that assumes exactly the opposite: the Teshuvah does not correct the sin.[11]

The method of the owner of 'Beit Shearim'

I recently saw a unique and renewed method by the author of the Beit Shearim Responsa, O.H. Si' Ratsed, where he deals with the ways of repentance, and he also investigates the question of the Nubians as to whether the essence of repentance is repentance in the heart according to the boundaries of halakhah, or whether the essence of repentance is suffering and acts of atonement. He explains that both are needed, but repentance without suffering does not atone. Among the words, there in the book of the Bible, "Ala Delfi" 7, he writes:

But Delfez must discuss the new matter of the first verse

And according to the above, repentance without suffering does not atone for the sin of the weight, and if he did so truly in the Book of Revelation below, he is forgiven. And did they not say that if he repented, there is no Book of Revelation below that he is forgiven, that is, only if he repented only by abandoning the sin, confessing things, and repenting, since this is something that cannot be stood upon, but if he repented of the weight, he is forgiven, and in the Book of Revelation there are no whippings at all. Whippings and repentance of the weight are two wickednesses, and whippings are less than repentance of the weight of those who are obligated to die in the Book of Revelation, but those who are obligated to cut off their limbs. If he repented with his heart in the Book of Revelation above, he is forgiven, and repentance of the weight or suffering in the Book of Revelation that is necessary later is less than whippings, therefore there are generally four whippings:

He explains that repentance without suffering does not atone. Accordingly, if a person makes atonement for the weight (= suffering), he does indeed atone, and he thereby also gets rid of the punishments of the יהוד of the מטע. And what is written in the Gemara Makot 13b that repentance is not beneficial for the punishments of the יהוד of the מטע, is only with regard to the repentance of the heart, and according to the opinion of the Nobi. And this is a tremendous innovation.[12]

Although this innovation is acceptable, since the Jewish Court discusses quite a bit about matters of the heart (they are supposed to assess whether a person is seriously intending, etc.), and therefore it is not clear why here we would not accept their ruling regarding whether that person is a Baal Teshuvah or not, and especially if it concerns acts of repentance regarding which the KYL states that matters of the heart are not deeds. And this is similar to a Dagiyor, where the deed is followed and the matters of the heart do not elevate or demote (unless they are in his heart and in the heart of every person). Only if we believe, as the Maral does, that even if it is completely clarified to the Jewish Court that he is a Baal Teshuvah, he is not exempt from the Jewish Court's punishments, can we say that the Teshuvah is truly not useful for exemption from the Jewish Court's punishments of a lower rank.

General picture: punishment and retribution

In Hal' Edut we see that punishment and repentance are alternative paths. The main argument is that punishment is concerned with the removal of sin and repentance is concerned with forgiveness. In fact, the entire path of atonement (including torment) is concerned with forgiveness. The removal is only in the punishment of the Day of Judgment. However, in Beit Shearim we see that in his opinion there are not two separate paths here: the punishment of the Day of Judgment is nothing but part of the torment in the atonement. Therefore, when a person undergoes torment, there is no need to punish him, because the punishment is the torment.

This brings us back to the ordination controversy. In the ordination pamphlet of the Rabbi Lbach (at the end of his responsa), it is stated that the basic motivation for the renewal of ordination was the desire to flog the offenders in order to atone for them. The view of those in favor of the renewal of ordination was that without punishment in the Jewish courts, the atonement is incomplete, which is exactly as we have stated here. The Rabbi Lbach, however, disagrees with them, and his argument is that when there are no ordinations, the teshuvah does all the work. The atonement is complete even without punishment in the Jewish courts.

His words seem to make sense, because according to their theory, when there are no relatives, all of Israel has no possibility of atonement, which is unreasonable. On the other hand, if the Rabbinate is right, then it is not clear why when there are relatives, we do not settle for repentance but also punish them with a whip. After all, repentance does all the work. From this, it seems that the existence of relatives and flogging only harms us.

And it seems that this dispute is exactly the dispute of the latter that we have seen here. The Maharbach apparently studies as the Beit Shearim, and in his opinion, the punishments of the day are part of the divisions of atonement (these are the torments). Therefore, even when there were samuchim, if a person were to repent, he would atone even without punishment, and therefore his punishment would be forgiven. The punishments of the day were given only to those who did not do penance. Today, when there are no samuchim, then there is no possibility of the punishments of the day, but it is certainly possible to atone through torments. On the other hand, the Maharishi Beirav and his students believed that the punishments of the day are a parallel path, and their concern is the atonement and not the forgiveness, and this cannot be achieved without the punishments of the day. For this method, it is clear why the Gemara does not bring the punishments of the day in the Yoma, because it deals with the path of forgiveness, that is, with the divisions of atonement. The atonement is done through the punishments of the day only, and as the question of the Tower of Oz. Although according to the Maharlbach and Beit Shearim, the issue is also discussed there, because the Gemara does refer to the punishments of the 14th century, when it speaks of the atonement differences of suffering. And the 25th century argues that there are whippings in them, that in terms of the atonement differences there, they atone even without suffering, how, according to their opinion, should the punishment of whippings be explained, and the 26th century.

According to this, it follows that according to the law, we ruled as the Maralbach, since they did not renew the ordination.[13] In other words, according to the law, we were reduced according to the method of the House of Shearim, but this is not evident from the statements of the poskim and commentators.

General note

All the questions we have raised so far are based on the assumption that the punishment of the 14th century does not require a response. However, according to the halachah, Maimonides ruled in the first chapter of the 1st chapter:

All the commandments in the Torah, whether done or not, if a person transgresses one of them, whether intentionally or unintentionally, when he repents and turns from his sin, he is obligated to confess before God, blessed be He, as it is said, "If a man or a woman commits a sin, etc., and confesses their sin which they have committed, this is a confession of sins."

Confession is a positive commandment. How is it done? Say: Please, God, I have sinned, I have transgressed, I have transgressed before You, and I have done such and such, and I am ashamed and embarrassed by my actions, and I will never return to this. And this is the essence of confession, and the more one confesses and lingers over this matter, the better.

Likewise, those who commit sins and guilt when they bring their sacrifices for their mistake or malice are not atoned for in their sacrifice until they repent and confess the things that were said and the confession that they sinned against. Likewise, all those who are liable to be put to death by the court of law and to be flogged are not atoned for by their death or flogged until they repent and confess. Likewise, the one who injures his friend and the one who harms him with his money, even though he has paid him what he owes him, is not atoned for until he confesses and returns from doing such a thing to the world, as it is said of all the sins of man.

The Rambam rules here that all punishments in the 14th century also require repentance. Without repentance, the punishment does not atone. Of course, this does not mean that those who have not repented are not punished, since punishment has additional purposes (deterrence, etc.). But there will be no atonement for them without repentance. Regarding death, this is explained in the Mishnah Sanhedrin 34b (the Kss quoted from there), and regarding flogging, the Rambam apparently expanded on his understanding. It is true that he also cites a midrash from the verse "from all the sins of man," and its source is in the books of Zuta. And see this in the response of the Mahalbach, "Kuntras Hasmicha" in Oroch.

In any case, it is not clear at this point how it even comes to mind that repentance will exempt a person from punishment, since punishment also requires repentance in order to atone, and without it it does not atone at all. From the premise of the question, it follows that when there is repentance, there is always no need for punishment, so what are the Midrash and Rambam talking about?!

According to the author of Beit Shearim, it seems that the answer spoken of here is the answer in the heart, and it does not atone without the punishment. This is how the Rambam explained it, for he certainly does not speak of a person bringing torment upon himself before he dies, but rather that he confesses. But Beit Shearim speaks of the answer of the weight, and it atones instead of the punishment. And I said to the Ktzela, if he is already a Baal Teshuvah, then why should they not send him to the synagogue to also make the answer of the weight, and thus he will be freed from the punishment? Therefore, the Rambam does not seem to favor this method.

And it must be said that if a person makes the weight answer on his own, this exempts him from punishment, but if the Jewish authorities sent him to do so, then he is not exempt from punishment. And this is how the Rosh and the Tur cited in Rama Sohkat 9 above divided, regarding returning to kashrut in testimony.

The conclusion is that the punishments in the Bible have two aspects: 1. Atonement – which is obtained from the punishment and repentance together. 2. Deterrence, etc. – which is obtained from the punishment, even without repentance. Perhaps it would be appropriate to say that atonement is obtained only from repentance, and that what is punished for those who repent is only to deter (as the above-mentioned Novi).

Summary: The controversy and explanations

We saw a threefold disagreement regarding the relationship between judicial punishments and repentance:

A. The Hidda and the Nubians – that repentance does not exempt from punishment, because we do not know what is in a person's heart.

B. Shay's Maharal – that the answer does not exempt one from punishment even if we knew what was in his heart.

C. The House of Shearim – that the weight answer does exempt from the punishments of the 14th.

These disputes involve two variables: punishment and response. Any such opinion can be hinged on either of these two parameters.

The House of Shearim understands that the answer of the scale and the punishment do the same thing. He probably understands that the goal is atonement and forgiveness. Although the mental answer does not exempt from punishment, he explains this according to the Nubian view, because we do not know. If we knew, that would be enough. The answer of the scale is torment instead of punishment (see further in his remarks, where he discusses that this is considered two evils, meaning that two punishments are not imposed, and therefore the answer of the scale exempts from punishment). It is clear that in his opinion the answer does not erase the offense, because mental answer would have been enough. He explains that the answer of the scale is instead of punishment, and therefore it is useful. In other words, the offense exists and punishment is due, and torment is the punishment.

According to the Novi, the answer would be exempt from punishment if we knew what was in his heart, because in his opinion, after the answer, the offense disappeared as if it had never been committed. This is how he also formulates his question (and so does the Hidda). If so, now there is no reason at all to punish.

The Maharal does not accept this, and in this sense he stands against the other two opinions. In his opinion, the answer performs a different function than the punishment. Technical answer is offset, and only God, the Blessed One, is permitted to offset, because only He judges regarding good and reward. In other words, in his opinion, the answer does not erase the offense. Whereas substantive answer is a special grace in which the act of the offense is erased, but in the Jewish Law one is supposed to act according to the law. In other words, the answer does not erase the offense, but only as if it erases it. Therefore, only from God's perspective does this happen, and not from our perspective.

[1] And I am reminded of this issue by Rabbi Yitzhak Mirsky, in his book Logical Halacha – On Shabbat and Festival Matters, 1919, Mossad Ha-Rabbi Kook, pp. 147-148.

[2] The explanation may be that we do not want to give the wicked a social status. We disqualify him from testifying without him being suspected of lying, because we do not want to give him a status that the Jewish People believe in and act on his words. This is a social sanction. This may be why the floggings qualify him, since he has served his sentence for society. See more on this below.

[3] The law of excommunication was also brought into the halakhah in the Talmud, Talmud Torah, Vol. 16, p. 12. See also the inside of Iroth, Ch. 10. And in the responsa of Shevut Yaakov, Ch. 12, p. 13, which claimed that the Rif and Rosh disagree on the Toss in this regard, and in their opinion excommunication is permissible with the rebuke. Indeed, he saw at great length in the book Ein Zochor Lachida, edited by M. Aut. 20, which rejected his words and refuted him from all the Rishonim and from the issues of the Shas.

He assumes throughout that there is no difference between excommunication and the other punishments of the Jewish Law, but it seems that the Return of Jacob does not accept this directly. It is possible that in his opinion excommunication is a sanction aimed at bringing about repentance, and not an actual punishment, and in any case when one repents there is no reason for his excommunication. Therefore, it is not comparable to the punishments of the Jewish Law, where the goal is different.

[4] This is how he also explains the innovation of the Rambam (in the halacha cited above), that even in the case of a father who has not repented, his son is initially forbidden from beating him. He attributes this to the fear that he may have repented. It is usually understood that according to the Rambam, there is an obligation of respect and reverence even with regard to a wicked father.

[5] It is true that one must consider the law of 'and they saved the congregation,' by virtue of which there may have been room for leniency even in the 3rd century. After all, arguments for reducing the obligation to punish are also accepted by virtue of 'and they saved the congregation.' (It is true that one must consider this, since there is room to explain that all the arguments are only before the imposition of the obligation to punish, and therefore they come against a background of a presumption of exemption. Only the argument from the reply is a true argument for exemption.)

[6] The division can be based on the fact that the testimony is determined according to the current situation and the punishment according to the time of the sin. Or the punishment is reduced only if one has made a complete repentance, as is the case with regard to the kashrut for testimony.

[7] Several recent scholars have already commented on the issue of warning of doubt. See HaMeir Lo'am, Drush 3, Sudah and 'Beza'. Also in the Beit She'arim Responsa, which is quoted below, and also commented in Ein Zochor to the Hidda, there, on the words of the Nuvi.

[8] In the above-mentioned Meir Lom, he also brought a settlement to the matter, and it seems to be in line with the Maharal's direction, although the wording is unclear.

[9] And this should be discussed. In the Tosho"a of the Rabbis, the law "B"D prepares and punishes outside the law" appears. Is it not possible for B"D to also exempt from punishment outside the law (or from the law of the Rabbis)? From the Maharal's words here, it seems that it is not.

[10] Perhaps according to his first direction, it is indeed on the same plane (since there is an offset between the two things), but nevertheless, in his opinion, the Meta Bible does not deal with this.

[11] How does this reconcile with the Maharal's words in the book of Mantiv Teshuva, cited in the 29th chapter of the book of Enosh Kehatzir, regarding the two types of teshuva? It is possible that in the Beit Shel Ma'ale there is a special grace that a person who has made teshuva has his sins treated as rights, meaning that even sin is cleansed.

Furthermore, the punishments of cutting are also meant to be wiped, like whipping and death. However, here the wiping is done in heaven. But perhaps that is precisely why God tells us to leave the cutting to me (see my article on Shosher 14, where we suggested that this is the approach of the HaG, who enumerates cutting as a mitzvah, and the mitzvah is to leave the punishment to God, in the name of Tiv). This is a stain whose wiping can also be done through repentance. Therefore, God leaves the wiping to heaven, which can accept repentance as a substitute. The wiping that is done in the lower realms cannot be done through repentance, since it only leads to forgiveness and not wiping.

[12] He then discusses why there is no doubt here, which eliminates the possibility of imposing capital punishments at all. In his opinion, the current presumption of criminality tells us not to consider a future change, unless we are certain that it will happen. For a long discussion on this. See also the note we provided below the words of the Novi, who wrote that this is indeed a doubt.

[13] Although it is worth discussing whether this ruling is because he is right in his claim, or because not all the sages of Israel agreed, the ordination was annulled, but it is not necessarily that Mahalbach is right in the content of his claims.