Two types of 'what side': conceptual construction

With God’s help

Meishram – 5764

introduction

A. The method of Maimonides and Rabbi Migash is explained in Mishnah Shavuot 24b.

B. The conceptual construction in the Oath of the Guardians.

C. Conceptual construction in Sabbath work.

D. What is the difference between the measure and the side in these two cases?

E. Consequences and NPF.

V. Fathers and History on Shabbat and Nazikin.

G. Additional examples: The meaning of the construction is conceptual.

H. A brief logical discussion.

attache

introduction

One of the qualities that the Torah requires is 'what is the side' (or: 'the equal side'). And below[1] It will be clear that there may be a difference between these two.)[2] The measure of 'what is the side' is used to learn new halakhic law from two well-known teachers. In this article, I would like to point out a certain procedure in halakhic logic that is formally similar to the measure of 'what is the side', but in fact is different from it, and may not be able to be generalized under the same heading at all. Hereinafter, this procedure will be referred to as: 'conceptual construction'.

The structure of the article is as follows. First, we will present two examples of conceptual construction, one from the laws of Shavuot (chapters 1-2 below) and the other from the laws of Shabbat (chapter 3). We will then compare it with the measure of "what side" that the Torah requires, and we will see some implications of the differences between them (chapters 4-5). Next, we will discuss a certain implication of our distinction regarding the meaning of the concepts "father" and "offspring" in halakha (chapter 6). We will then discuss additional contexts in which the conceptual construction appears, which will further clarify its meaning (chapter 7). We will conclude with a brief logical analysis of the conceptual construction as defined here (chapter 8).

A. The method of the Rambam and the Rabbis is explained in Mishnah Shavuot 24b.

Dispute between the Rabbis and the Sages

Ita in the Mishnah (Shavuot 24b):

Rabbi Meir says: There are things that are in the ground and are not like the ground, and no sages acknowledge him. For example: I gave you ten loaded vines, and this one says they are only five. Rabbi Meir requires an oath, and therefore everything that is connected to the ground is like the ground.

And in the same vein, Rabbi Yossi bar Hanina presents the controversy in the context of grapes that are about to be harvested (ibid., 34a):

Rabbi Yossi bar Rabbi Hanina: Here is the case of grapes that are about to be harvested, a camiple. Rabbi Meir considered them as imaginary forms, and Rabbi Sabri did not consider them as imaginary forms.

And so it is in parallels.[3]

There is a disagreement here about the conditions of whether grapes that are about to be harvested are like grapes or not. The NFP in which the mishna discusses is about an oath, since it is forbidden to swear on land. Therefore, the disagreement between the Rabbis and the Sages is whether one swears on these grapes, since they are like grapes, or not, since they are like land.

In the parallel issues (Gittin 33a, and Sanhedrin 15a), it is explained that according to the R.M. we divide between grapes that need soil and those that do not. The disagreement in the conditions is only in the case of grapes that do not need soil (see Ritva in Sugein, and in MM. 5 from Ton. 9:4, which raise the possibility of three degrees, and AKH.) When the grapes still need soil, they are considered connected.

The Rishonim on Atar raise several questions about issues in which it seems that grapes that are about to be harvested are as forms of the K'A, and are planted in different ways (see Tod'ah 'as forms', and Rishba and Ritva and other Rishonim here, and in parallel). The common aspect for all of them is that they understand the dispute between Ram and the sages as a sweeping dispute, which concerns several matters (and some of them are explained in the parallel issues, which link this dispute of conditions to additional matters under discussion). In light of this, they point to exceptions that appear in the conflicting issues, as individual cases.

The Method of Maimonides and Rabbis Appears in the Explanation of the Dispute Between the Rabbis and the Sages

In contrast, Rabbi Migash and the Rambam in Pihamash interpret the Mishnah differently. According to them, the dispute concerns only the laws of the Shomron, and only there do the Sages say that grapes are not like grapes. However, in other halachic contexts, grapes that are about to ripen are like grapes.

An explanation of this is found in the Chayyah of the Rabbis, here, which explains that only in the case of shomers are grapes not considered as fruits, since the shomer does not have permission to harvest them. As stated, in other contexts, grapes are as fruits for the shomer.[4]

And it seems difficult to argue with their method from the rest of the Mishnah (see above). There, the Rabbis and the Sages are quoted as disagreeing on a situation in which the plaintiff claims the deposit of ten vines loaded with grapes, and the defendant claims that only five were deposited with him. Such a situation does not deal with the guardian's oath but rather with a somewhat ordinary oath of confession, since the defendant does not at all admit that he is guarding the additional five. He is apostatizing in the very act of guarding. The guardian's oath is relevant in a situation where there is a known guardian, and he is sued for a crime, and apostatizes in it (i.e., claims that it was not a crime, and the deposit was forcibly taken). In contrast, here the discussion is on the very question of whether he is a guardian, that is, whether the additional five vines were deposited with him at all. In the 23rd, it seems clear that the guardian's oath does not apply. This is also what some of the later scholars have commented on (see, for example, Chai Ha'Iluy from Mechat 37, and in the later ones cited below).

Therefore, according to the explanation of Rabbi Migash and the Maimonides, that every disagreement between the Rabbis and the Sages is in the laws of the Shomron, it is very difficult to understand why the Mishnah explains that their disagreement is in a drawing in which the defendant is actually required to swear a somewhat affirmative oath, a drawing that has nothing to do with the laws of the Shomron.

It can be said that although this is a somewhat confessional oath, since in the Civil Procedure Code we are dealing with a claim based on a claim of preservation, the grapes are not as good as they are. The reason for this is that the plaintiff claims that the defendant is a keeper, and therefore, according to his own theory, the grapes are not as good as they are, and therefore he cannot demand that he swear an oath about them.

And so the intention of Maimonides is seen in the Pihamash on Atar, and the following:

The disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the Sages is regarding grapes that are about to ripen. And the ruling is according to the Sages. And specifically if they were given to him in the Torah of preservation. But regarding the matter of buying and selling and the laws of inheritance and gratitude to a certain extent, If the main argument was not in the doctrine of preservation, the general rule is that they are considered movable.

The Rambam makes it clear that even with regard to the oath of partial acceptance, if the claim is that it was handed down to him in the Torah of Mishnah, even though the oath is apparently not the oath of the Sages (but rather a partial acceptance oath, as stated above), the ruling is that the grapes are not as shapes. This also seems to be said in the method of Rabbi Migash. It is very clear that the addition emphasized in his words is intended to provide an answer to the difficulty of the latter mentioned in the continuation of the Mishnah.

Maimonides speaks specifically about the laws of the Shumarites.

However, in the Hebrew word "Shikirot" we see a different wording from the Rambam, and the wise man (ibid., 2:4):

The moral is to protect something connected to the ground, even if it were grapes that were about to ripen, they are like soil. In the law of the Samaritans.

This means from his language that he refers to grapes as land only in the "law of the keepers," and not in every situation of keepers. In the situation of one who somewhat concedes the claim of a keeper, as appears in our Mishnah, we are not dealing with the law of the keepers, but only in a situation of a claim based on the claim that he is a keeper. And it means from the language of the Rambam here that according to the 23rd chapter, grapes are considered as forms. If so, it appears from his language that only in the matter of the oath of the keepers (which, as mentioned above, our Mishnah does not deal with) are grapes not as forms.

What emerges from the Rambam's language in the Laws is that he interprets the Mishnah differently. Ostensibly, he is explaining the disagreement between the Rambam and the sages regarding the laws of the Sumerians, and not the claim of a Sumerian, and therefore he must explain that in our Mishnah we are talking about the oath of the Sumerians and not the oath of a partial confession.

This is also evident from the fact that he places this halacha in the laws of the Shomerim and not in the laws of the Ton"t, as he would have to do if we were indeed dealing with the laws of the Ton"t here. We should also note that in the Hol. Ton"t (5:4) the Rambam cites the case of a partial confession that appears in the Mishnah, but there he does not at all indicate that it is a claim for protection. There he also rules from the Rambam that grapes are like movables. If so, it seems that this is not a ruling based on what is said in the Mishnah of the Hadith, but perhaps only more precise than it (i.e., according to the Rambam, the Mishnah does indeed deal with the oath of the Shomerim, but it is possible to derive precise laws from it regarding the partial confession oath in other contexts, which the Rambam cites in the Hol. Ton"t).

The ruling of the Rambam should be extended in the dispute between the Rabbis and the Sages, and many have already discussed it, and so on.[5]

What arises in our case is that Rabbi Migash and the Rambam perceive the dispute between the Ram and the Sages as a dispute over the laws of the Shimrim specifically, and not over any claim based on Shimrim. And in light of the Rambam's words in the halakhah, it seems that this is also his intention inPIAMS, which comes from the claim of protection, there are actual laws of protectors here, and not just a situation of protection (as we suggested above). And according to the Jewish tradition, this may also be the explanation in the method of Rabbi Migash, that the dispute is precisely in the laws of protectors, as the meaning of Maimonides' words here is.

It also seems that the latter understood, in accordance with the Rambam's method, that the dispute regarding the grapes depends on the actual laws of custodianship, and not on a situation of a claim based on a claim of custodianship, as will now be explained.

In Hebrew The Mishnah makes it difficult for the Rambam to explain why the Mishnah adhered to the concept of a partial confession, since the oath of the guards according to the Rambam's ruling does not require a partial confession. It is proven that he assumes that the Mishnah is talking about the oath of the guards, and makes it difficult for them to explain why they are drawing a partial confession, since according to the law, a guard swears even when he renounces everything.

And the Grek'a emphasized this in his additions there, stating that the mishnah does not at all refer to the oath of the guardians, but rather to a somewhat accepting oath (as mishnah above), and he omitted the words of theTUT In the GCC.

And in the name of Baraka, who brought up another difficult question for Maimonides, and this is our question above: Why does the Mishnah actually impose the obligation of a partial oath of acceptance (and not asTUT The difficulty: Why did they resort to drawing a somewhat accepting figure in the context of the obligation to swear the oath of the guards) and not in a situation where the obligation to swear is the oath of the guards, and after all, according to its interpretation, only in this did the Rabbis and the Sages disagree. And the difficulty The Shekh (See 13:9). And his language clearly shows that he understood that this was also his intention. The T'T, but in the language The T'T It clearly seems that this is not what he intended, by the way.

It should be noted The Sheik Rejects the Maimonides' method from the halakha by virtue of this difficulty: If indeed the debate is only about the oath of the guards, why does the Mishnah not present the dispute in the context of the oath of the guards?

It turns out that the assumption The T'T That the mishnah does indeed deal with the guardian oath is based precisely on the question of The Shekh And Reka. Because the commentary of the Rambam and the Rabbis does not engage in the controversy between the Rambam and the Sages, we must understand that the mishnah deals with the oath of the guardians, and not with the oath of a certain consent. But it was not clear To the T'ai-t'ai Why is the Bible in their eyes a painting of a somewhat confessional nature?[6]

If so, it seems that all of these latter understood the Maimonides' method to be that he was speaking of the laws of guardians, and were not satisfied with the possibility we raised above that the Maimonides and the Rabbi of Migashes were speaking of the situation of a guardian and not of the laws of guardians. It is possible that the reasons for this are the meaning of the Maimonides' language in the Hebrew Shekirot (as we noted above), and the very nature of their questions. Apparently, this is how they would also interpret the Maimonides' language inPIAMS, that when the plaintiff comes with the claim of a guardian, it is the guardians' oath. Although the explanation of this is very difficult, after all, there is a somewhat affirmative oath here, and therefore these latter remain in the Tza'a according to the Rambam's method. This will be explained in the next chapter.

The aspect of gait

The first in the Shavuot (242b, 341a) questioned the Rabbis and the Sages, why they discuss exemption from an oath based on the rule that grapes that are about to be harvested are like soil, and their yield is subject to the rule of a move. Here, he acknowledges the soil and the grapes that are attached to the soil, and therefore woe to the move (both the Rabbis and the Sages). If so, he is exempt from an oath even if the grapes are like fruits (as the Rabbis understood), since he acknowledges the soil and the grapes that are attached to it.

See also the Rabbis and the Ritva here, who stated that it is necessary to assume that at least some of the grapes were in the form of grapes (and there are two directions in explaining the matter, and so on).

However, if we look at the laws of the Torah (P. 5:4), and certainly in the Laws of Lease, it seems that the Rambam did not at all mention that these were grapes in the form of grapes. This clearly means from his language that this is a situation where the grapes are still attached to the vines. Similarly, Rabbi Migashes in his commentary on the Mishnah and the Book of Leviticus does not deal with this issue at all. If so, the apparent difficulty of the question of the Rishonim is: Why should he not be exempt from the law of the Hilach?

Interim summary

Before we move on to the proposed method of Maimonides and Rabbi Migash, let us summarize. There are two difficult questions about the method of Maimonides and Rabbi Migash:

1. Why does the Mishnah not place the controversy in the oath of the guardians, but in the oath of partial confession, even though, according to the Maimonides and Rabbi Migashes, there is no controversy at all? On the other hand, if this is the oath of the guardians and not the oath of partial confession, then the halakha (at least according to the Maimonides) does not at all concern partial confession. Furthermore, as we have seen, it is clear from the language of the Mishnah itself that this is not the oath of the guardians (and not as the Torah seems to have assumed).
2. Why shouldn't he be freed from the oath of allegiance?

Direction to the solution

From these two difficulties it emerges that according to the method of the Rambam and Rabbi Migash, it should be said that the Mishnah did indeed speak of the oath of the guards. For this reason, they were not troubled by the problem of the hilach. The exemption from the oath from the law of the hilach is stated only in the oath of the somewhat accepting one, but in the oath of the guards we find no such exemption.

It is true that one must understand what kind of painting is involved. If the plaintiff demands payment for the guard's crime, and the guard claims that he was raped, which is the usual painting of the guards' oath, then it is not in their interest to confess a little in order to commit an oath (and this is the question of theTUTAnd furthermore, it does not mean yes from the mishna, since it means that they are arguing about the very act of keeping, whether he was given five vines or ten (and this is the assumption in the difficulty of theShch And the Greca on theTUT and on Maimonides).

Therefore, as the language of the Mishnah suggests, we should say that the argument is not about the crime of guarding the vines, but about the quantity of vines that were given to him to guard. However, it seems on the surface that this is not an oath of the guards but rather an oath of partial confession. In other words, in this case all the previous difficulties return.

B. Conceptual construction in the Oath of the Guardians

The Mishnah indeed mentions the oath of the guards.

Therefore, it seems to say that the Mishnah is truly speaking of the oath of the guardians. As we have seen from the Rambam's method, this is clearly the case, and so the later scholars understood it. And in the P'iz, also in the A'ish, why is there no exemption from the oath from the law of the Hilach, and as the Mishnah says.

As we noted, if this is indeed the interpretation in the mishna, then the language of Maimonides inPIAMS It should be interpreted this way. What he writes is that there is an oath if it does not come with the claim of protection, the interpretation is that if it comes with the claim of protection, it is the oath of the keepers, and in any case the grapes are not as they are (and not as we explained above in his words, which is a state of protection. Here we explain that this is the 'law of the keepers', as he says in the book of Shekirot). And we have also seen that the latter understood him (there is no reason to assume that his words in the laws contradict his words inPIAMS). And according to R. Migash, this is also the interpretation in the Mishnah (as is known, Maimonides often follows his method).

And yet, it is unclear how such an oath, in which the very act of deposit is discussed, is the oath of the guards.

How did the obligation to take the Oath of the Guardians come about here?

And it seems that the explanation for this is as follows.

Let us examine the situation of a partial confession oath in a loan claim. When Reuven sues Shimon Mena, and he denies everything, he is exempt from the Torah oath. However, when he confesses to him fifty, he is obligated to take a partial confession oath. The simple explanation for this is that a situation has arisen in which it is known that there was a loan, and the dispute between the parties is only about its amount. Therefore, someone who confesses to some admits that there was a loan, but he claims that the amount of the loan was fifty, and against him the plaintiff claims that its amount was Mena. If so, it appears, at least according to this understanding, that in such a situation the defendant is in the legal status of someone who says "I have defaulted," and not as someone who denies the claim. It should be emphasized that his claim in practice is, of course, a denial of the loan itself with respect to the additional fifty. However, since we know that there was a loan, the Torah reiterates that our approach to his claim should be that his legal status is as if he were a wild claimant, and not as a claimant for a loan. That is, he is in a defensive position, and not that the other party is 'expelling him from his friend,' and therefore we do not dismiss him without an oath. This is the accepted logical-legal basis for requiring a somewhat affirmative oath.

In light of what has been said here, we will now examine the situation described in the mishna. Reuven claims that he deposited ten vines with Shimon for safekeeping, and Shimon accepts five and redeems five. If so, the custodian here had a safekeeping contract, but the custodian claims that he only received five vines for safekeeping, and the custodian claims that he deposited ten with him. If so, according to the logic we presented regarding partially accepting a loan, it is also said here that the custodian is known to the custodian as a custodian, and the legal status of his claim, that the remaining five were not deposited with him at all, is as if he were claiming rape (which is equivalent to the claim of a pervert in a loan). In other words, he is similar to a custodian who wants to get rid of his obligations, and not as someone who completely denies the claim.

If so, in light of this innovation, which we learned from the oath of a partial admission, we treat him as a keeper who wants to be freed from his obligations. However, now we have a second piece of information: from the parsha of the Shavuot of the Shumarim, we learn that a keeper who comes claiming exemption (and not in the Hadam) cannot be freed from his obligations except by an oath. This is the innovation of the Torah in the parsha of the Shavuot of the Shumarim. If so, it follows from our words that in a situation where he admits to some of the vines, he is obligated to take the oath of the Shumarim (and not the oath of a partial admission) for the rest.[7]

We have learned that from the two well-known teachers, the somewhat accepted and the Oath of the Guardians, we learn about a new oath obligation in the situation discussed here. This obligation is a type of Oath of the Guardians.[8]

It seems that in the 2nd century he would also be obligated to take a normal oath of partial confession for the rest, since in the 3rd century he also admits part of the claim. However, with regard to the oath of partial confession, there is no obligation to take an oath here, since this is a drawing of a hill (according to the Sages, the grapes are not like shapes, and therefore they are like soil), as the Rishonim noted, and the same applies. As we recall, according to the method of the Maimonides and Rabbi Migash, it does not seem that this is a situation where the grapes have been harvested. Therefore, there remains only the obligation of taking an oath of guardianship for the rest.

Therefore, in a situation where Reuven claims that he deposited ten vines with Shimon, and Shimon only admits to five, Shimon will be obligated to both the oath of the guardians and the oath of partial acceptance. And in the case of land, where he is exempt from the oath of partial acceptance because he has moved, only the oath of the guardians remains.

Resolving recent issues

And this is the basis of all the latter questions (Toyita, Reka, and the Shacha). According to Rabbi Migash and the Rambam, this is truly a mishna on the guardians' oath. On the other hand, it is clear that this is only because there is a situation of partial admission, since, according to the Shacha, if the defendant were to confess everything, he would also be exempt from the guardians' oath. The obligation to swear the guardians' oath arises only because he admits that he received protection for some of the vines. Therefore, the mishna conforms to the picture of a partial admission.

And this will also explain why there is no exemption for the traveler here, since, as stated above, exemption for the traveler is stated only for the oath of partial acceptance and not for the oath of the guards.[9]

Commentary in the Maimonides' Method

Although the Rambam himself does not seem to have followed this legal principle, since in Halacha Ton"t (P. 5:4) he requires an oath on grapes that do not need to be planted, even when it is not a matter of a Shumer's drawing (there he cites the Mishnah's drawing, not necessarily on Shumer's claim). If so, it seems that the KJV does not have a legal basis for it, and not because it is a matter of the Shumer's oath.[10] And another thing, as we have already noted above, is that the Rambam nowhere brings up the great innovation that the 23rd chapter of the Book of Revelation mentions the oath of the Shumarites. It should also be noted that I am a little confused in the Mishnah as to why they did not include the usual depiction of the oath of the Shumarites, since they were used to clarify the disagreement between the Rambam and the Sages regarding grapes, whether they are like grapes or not (although it is true that the Mishnah also wanted to convey to us this innovation, that the obligation to take the oath of the Shumarites was created in the 23rd chapter of the Book of Revelation).

And above we have already seen that Rabbi Migash can interpret the Mishnah in this way. Furthermore, even in the Rambam's method according to these akhorimon, it appears that the Mishnah should deal with the oath of the guardians, and therefore it seems to say that he also admits that the Mishnah is interpreted in this way (but that according to the law he divides the ruling like the Sages, and as mentioned in the note above).

An explicit source in the Rambam says:

After writing all this, Rabbi Shehal's question and question, Maimonides writes as follows (ibid., 5:6-7):

If a person deposits fruits with him that are not measured, and a guarantor with his fruits and does not measure them, then this is a criminal. The owner of the deposit says so and so they were, and the keeper says I do not know, he will pay without an oath, since he himself is obligated to pay and does not know how much he owes. And he is found obligated to take an oath and cannot swear. And this is what the sages of Rabbi Yosef Halevi and his rabbis taught.

Likewise, any guard who is obligated to pay and says, "I don't know how many bloods I owe," and the owners say, "We know," and so and so it was, will be assessed without an oath...

And why is the law like this? Suppose someone deposited a bag full of gold coins with him and stole it, and the owners say there were two hundred dinars in it, and the guard says there were certainly dinars in it, but I don't know how many there were. It was found that the man claimed two hundred and he was partially credited and said I don't know the rest, that he was bound by oath and could not swear, and he pays as he sees fit.

And in this case, a case is presented where the guard claims he does not know about everything, and there the plaintiff swears and takes an oath, and the following:

There was a case of a man who deposited a sack of bundles with his friend and committed a crime. The depositor says that there were gold nuggets and pearls and the like in it, and the keeper says that he does not know whether there was slag or sand in it. And the sages said that the depositor should swear and take it… And why did the depositor swear here? Since the keeper is not obligated to take an oath. Even if he admitted and said that it was full of slag, and the depositor says that there were pearls, the keeper swore, and died, like someone who had been loaded with wheat and admitted to him with barley, and so on. And in the laws of the claimant and the defendant, the main points of the matter will be explained.

It emerges from the words of the Maimonides that a keeper who denies the claim of a shema in part of the value of the deposit is obligated to take an oath. However, if he denies the shema in the entire value of the deposit, the plaintiff is charged without an oath, according to the law of 'from'. However, if the keeper denies and raises the possibility (in the shema) that there were slags there, he is exempt from the oath at all, as he claimed wheat and admitted to him barley. In such a situation, the plaintiff is not charged, since there is no law of 'from' on the defendant.

From the beginning of his words in the first halacha, it seems that an obligation to take an oath has been created, even though he does not even admit to anything.[11] Although it is unclear what he meant here, it is still clear that his confession was not something of a certain extent, and therefore he should have been exempt from the oath. And so the Rabbis there and other rishonim on the Rambam reached the same conclusion.[12]

In light of our remarks above, it appears that the oath imposed on a guard who denies the value of the deposit is the guard's oath, and not an oath of partial admission. And it seems that this can be said even if he did not admit even a penny, since he admitted that there was a deposit here (even if it was worthless), and as we have seen, if it is known that there was a deposit, the defendant's status is that of someone who claims to have been raped, and therefore he does not die without the guard's oath.

If so, why is there an obligation to take an oath here even though he did not admit to anything (as understood by the aforementioned Shach, and as the Maimonides puts it).

And this is also the argument of the Rav and other Rishonim against the Rambam, that it is a confession that does not have a minimum measure and weight, and therefore he had to get rid of the oath. And the explanation according to the Rambam's method according to our words is, as the Chazo'a wrote (Homom 30:12, 18), that in the oath of the guards there is no requirement at all for a claim that has a minimum measure and weight. Such a requirement was stated only in the oath of a partial confession, and so on.[13]

And the rabbinic opinion is what the Rishonim considered the law of two silver coins. After all, in any case (even if there is a penny in his confession), it is not clear here that he confesses to the amount of two silver coins, and that he is obligated to take an oath. And according to our own words, the opinion of Rabbi Migashes (in the New Testament Shavuot 40:1, and also cited in the Rashba there) and the Rambam (Shekirot 2:58, and 19:35) is that there is no law of two silver coins in the oath of the guards.

Indeed, one must examine this to see why Maimonides writes in the 7th chapter that when he claimed gold and he said that perhaps there were slags, he is exempt from claiming wheat and he acknowledged it with barley. If this is indeed a matter of the Sumerian oath, then we do not find an exemption from claiming wheat and he acknowledged it with barley.

However, our statement above seems to be contradictory. We have seen that the obligation of the Shumarites' oath in the 23rd chapter is the creation of a new oath obligation from the logic of a partially affirmative oath with the renewal of the Torah in the Shumarites' oath. If so, where a partially affirmative obligation is not created, such as in the case of Didan's painting, which Hittin claimed and acknowledged in the Sha'orim, then the new oath obligation will not be created either.

And it seems that there is a difficulty, for we have found that with regard to the law of the halach (as mentioned above), as well as with regard to the law of a thing in terms of measure and weight and the law of two silver coins (as we saw in the opinion of the Rambam here), the fact that there is an exemption from the oath of partial acceptance does not exempt from the oath of the guardians. If so, why, in the matter of the law of the wheat claimed and the barley was accepted, does the exemption from partial acceptance also exempt from the oath of the guardians?

And we will see this model for KM. The law of claiming wheat and thanking him for barley is not the law of the halakh, or the law of a measure and a weight and two pieces of silver. In claiming wheat and thanking him for barley, the basis for the exemption is because it is faded as atonement for everything on the wheat, and therefore there is a substantial exemption here from the oath of a partial pledge. In light of the previous explanation of the law of a partial pledge, it follows that in claiming wheat and thanking him for barley, no situation arises at all in which we know that there was a contract to protect the wheat. If so, it is clear that in the 23rd century he is not considered to be claiming an exemption claim, and the legal logic of an oath of a partial pledge has not been renewed at all. Therefore, the new obligation of the oath will not arise here either. However, the exemption from the law of the halakh (at least for some of the first, as we noted above), and the exemption of a measure and a weight and two pieces of silver (as seems clear from the explanation) are unique exemptions in the law of a partial pledge. The reason for this is not because in the Civil Code there is no evidence that there was a loan, or that there was a custody contract, and therefore even when it comes to a transaction or a claim that does not have a measure and weight or two of money, the defendant is still considered a wild claimant, but rather that the Magzia is exempt from the oath of acceptance to some extent. Therefore, in these cases he will be obligated to take the new oath that we learned about.[14]

And in our words, it will also be explained why the Rambam brings these laws in the laws of question and deposit, which belong to the laws of preservation, and not in the Law of Ton"t, which deals with the laws of claims and oaths (partially acknowledging, etc.). And in our words, it is very good, since here we are talking about the oath of the Shumarim. And what the Rambam writes in the Law of Ton"t, in the Law of Ton"t, will explain the main points of the matter. His intention is to say that the laws of the oath of the Shumarim here are derived from the laws of the oath of the Shumarim, since an exemption from the oath of the Shumarim will not create an obligation to take the oath of the Shumarim. Therefore, the Rambam adds that the laws of the Shumarim and the oath of the Shumarim themselves will be explained in the Law of Ton"t. Here he brought this only to show the implication of these laws to the laws of the Shumarim.

It should be noted that no clear source is cited for these words of Maimonides. And in our words, its source is pure, and it is in our Mishnah (and what he did not bring our illustration is because the illustration is unnecessary, since this innovation is known. From our Mishnah he only brings the conclusion that grapes are not considered as forms for the purpose of preservation in general).

And if our words are honest, and indeed the Rambam's source for the fact that the 23rd chapter is the oath of the guards can be in our mishna, then it follows that the Rambam did bring the innovation in our mishna, and he does so in the aforementioned question and deposit. And what we have complicated above is why the Rambam does not bring this innovation in his laws.

A final point that should be noted here is that the source for this law is Rabbi Migash (as the Rambam writes in the Hadiya in the Ha-V), and as we saw above, he is the source for the entire Rambam system, including its subject matter. And the first who dealt with these words of the Rambam on the subject of pledge (Shavuot 34a), disagreed about it because they did not understand that an obligation to swear an oath of guardianship could arise here, and therefore interpreted everything somewhat from the law of acceptance. And they too, in their opinion, did not accept his interpretation in our Mishnah, and disagreed about it even in the interpretation of the Mishnah.

Summary: Conceptual construction

In conclusion, we have seen that there is a possibility that a guardian's oath obligation may arise by virtue of a partial admission of a claim for protection. This is an oath obligation that is constructed by virtue of two "fathers," or two teachers, in the following way: 1. The logic of a partial admission oath, which states that a partial admission indicates the existence of a contract, as claimed by the plaintiff, and thus weakens the defendant's claim. Therefore, the defendant's claim is considered legally as a claim of exemption and not as a denial. 2. The obligation that the Torah imposes on a guardian to swear when he claims a claim of exemption, i.e. the obligation of the guardian's oath.

This is one example of what we will call here 'conceptual construction'. In such a construction we build a new concept on the basis of two known concepts, each of which 'contributes' part of the new concept. In the next chapter I will try to present another example of this type of logic, and then we will discuss its relation to the 'what is the side' measure.

C. Conceptual construction in Sabbath work

'What is the side' in the case of fathers of torts and fathers of craft

At the beginning of Tractate B"K (2 E"a, 3 E"a), the Gemara discusses the relationship between Avot and Tolodot. The Gemara states that with regard to Shabbat, "their Tolodot are like them," and with regard to the matter of damages, the Gemara concludes that some of them are like them and some are not.

Against this background, we will notice a puzzling phenomenon in the relationship between the fathers and the toledot in the laws of Shabbat. In the context of damages, the Mishnah Barish BK states that there are toledots that are taught in the 'Ma' Tzad' from two fathers: "The side that is equal in them...". And in the Gm (ibid. 6a) several examples of this are given, such as: Our son took a knife and a burden that he placed on the top of his roof and it fell in a strong wind, and he did not leave it and cause damage. This is taught in the 'Ma' Tzad' from Bir and Ash. And here are a few more examples.

In contrast, with regard to Shabbat, we do not find any study of 'what is the side', meaning histories that are learned from two fathers together in the study of 'what is the side'.

Apparently, this can be attributed to the fact that regarding the Sabbath, their history is similar to it, and therefore every history is learned from the father who is similar to it, but this is not an explanation but an indication. Perhaps the opposite is true: because there is no study of 'what is the side', therefore their history is similar to it.

If so, this requires explanation: What reason do we have for not observing Shabbat, the study of a child from two ancestors?[15]

An example of conceptual construction in Sabbath crafts

And here we find one case where it seems as if such a situation also exists in the Hebrew Shabbat. Ita in Yerushalmi (Shabbat, p. Clal Gadol 52): "A branch of a tree whose blossoms are covered with a branch of a tree is liable to be destroyed, and anything that lacks a branch of a tree is liable to be destroyed."

It was also ruled in the law inArm light (Hebrew Bible)pharmacist (Si. 62), and the Rema (O'C Sus'i Shit), and the late Rema (ibid.): "He who spits in the wind on Shabbat, and the wind scatters the spit, is liable because of a zora."

Some commentators have explained that it is the wind that breaks the saliva into small pieces (see, for example, Ka'a (About the Jerusalemite there).[16] However, they commented on this (see Chayaa). In the human soul Rule 15 letter A, and the Greek answer 20, and the rest in 6. Rest of love 13) It is proven from our Talmud that the whole point of Zora is to separate food from waste, as Deborah says, for the Gn. (Shabbat 33b) asks: "Were we Zora, were we a picker, were we dancing?"

Therefore, some have corrected and interpreted that it is obligatory because of the word "thrower" and not because of the word "zora." See also in the glosses. Bread value To the Mahariksh (Sousi Shit) and the Responsorial Psalm Yahveh Daat (Ch. 6:25).

hall In the explanation of Halacha Brought in the name of Rabbi Menashe of Elijah, one of the disciples of the Gra, and the late (Sus"i Shit, i.e. 'scatterer'):

And in the book Alfei Menashe He explained that the Jerusalemite intended that in transferring four cubits in public property by the wind, and he is an example. According to him: Just as in the case of a bezorah, even though the wind is his assistant, even the most obligated, so in the case of a bezorah, transferring it by the wind is also obligated, and he is correct.

If so, it seems that Rabbi Menashe of Ilya interprets the Yerushalmi's intention as meaning that he is obligated to make a rakika from a rabbi (and it turns out that he is also obligated to make a rakika from a rabbi and vice versa). In this regard, he is like the aharonim who interpret that he is obligated because of a thrower. However, unlike them, he holds that in Yerushalmi's law, the word "zora" means "thrower," not "throw," and he explains that the work of zariya is an example of a rakika.

If so, it appears from his words that Rakika is the product of two ancestors: Zora, and the transmission of the Da'a in the Bar'ar.[17] From the work of the Zora we learn that a forbidden work done through the spirit is considered as if it was done by a person, and therefore also the transfer of a Da'ah from a Rabbi, which is certainly a forbidden work, even if it is done by the spirit, is forbidden.[18] It should be noted that this also appears to be the conclusion of the M.B. himself, as appears at the end of his remarks.

This case is similar to what we saw in the laws of Shavuot. There we created a new oath obligation, from the combination of two different obligations. Here we create a new craft from the combination of two different crafts. Both of these are examples of conceptual constructions, that is, the construction of a new concept from two previous concepts, each of which contributes, or constitutes, a part of the new concept.

D. What is the difference between the measure and the side in these two cases?

The measure of 'what is the side': the example of 'immediately and for generations' from the Tok

The measure of 'what is the side' is called in the baraita of Dr. Ishmael (which was quoted in the Tok) 'Baniyan Av' (and the rabbis were divided on whether this is from one or two scriptures).[19]. It also describes a situation of two 'fathers', or two teachers, from whom we learn a third law, 'a consequence'. In this sense, there is a parallel here to the two examples we saw above. Ostensibly, there is a logical mechanism here that constitutes a prototype for the two examples we saw above. We will now try to examine it in more detail.

In order to follow the process of learning the regular "what is the side", we will take the example given in the above baraita (in the Tovuk) as an example of building a father from two scriptures, and the following:

How is it written from the two writings of Benin Ab? The mountains of the parshat of the lamps are not like the mountains of the parshat of the sending of the unclean, and the parshat of the sending of the unclean like the mountains of the parshat of the lamps. The similarity between them is that they are in the command from the beginning and for generations, even everything that is in the command will be from the beginning and for generations.

In fact, a part that appears in most cases of "what is the side" in Shas is missing here, and that is the attempt to learn from each one separately and its rejection due to a special quality that each of the teachers has. The Rav, according to the Tok there, fills in the gap and explains as follows:

There is material in the Temple candles, as they are used in internal work, and it is impossible to learn from them what is not in internal work. There is material in the sending away of unclean people, which is in circumcision, and it is impossible to learn from them what is not in the obligation of circumcision. But we learn from the equal side of both, as it is said in them that the commandment to the children of Israel, and it is practiced immediately and for generations.

Here appears the basic mechanism of 'what is the side', which the attempt to learn from each of the fathers does not work well because this father has a special feature that is not in the outcome (= Pirka). However, the second father does not have such a feature, and yet the law applies to him. Therefore, it is proven that this feature is not what causes the law (Yochicha). And on the other hand, with regard to the second father. Therefore, the conclusion is that the feature being learned stems solely from the equal side of the two fathers, and their two special characteristics are not relevant to the law in question. Therefore, the conclusion is that we learn from this equal side, which also exists in the outcome being learned, that the law in question will also apply to the outcome.

If so, in the end, one does not learn from the two fathers, but from the equal side that exists in both. And so the scholars of the rules explained (Worldly life, Aaron's measurements On the whole, Book of Cuttings and more) the study of the 'equal side' (see AnciT (E. 'Building a Father'). Moreover, for the conclusion we do not need both teachers at all, and only one of them will suffice (and it does not matter which of the two). The second is needed only to negate the relevance of the unique attribute of the teaching father.[20]

The attitude towards conceptual construction

Such a logical structure differs from the conceptual construction we saw in the two examples above. There, we learned from each of the fathers a certain part in relation to the consequence. The combination of the two creates the consequence in its entirety. Here we see a different structure: what is common to both fathers teaches about the consequence. Each of the fathers is intended to eliminate the relevance of one of the unique properties of the other, and in the end we are left with only the equal side, the one that is found in each of the fathers. With respect to the law being learned, neither father has an addition in relation to the other father. Both are equal in this regard, but we needed both in order to be convinced that it is only their equal side (and not any of their unique properties) that causes the law.

Therefore, it can be said that the measure of 'what is the side' is a learning measure. We need both fathers to complete the logical process. However, the need for them is not essential. Ultimately (after we realize that the unique properties are not relevant to the law being studied) we can learn from each of them separately, since in each of them there is also the equal side, which is what causes the law. Learning requires both teachers, but drawing the conclusion itself does not require them at all.

In contrast, in the two examples of conceptual construction that we saw above, the law being learned is not merely a learning outcome of the two fathers, but is a concept that is actually constructed and composed of both. Every part of it is learned from one of them, and therefore even at the end of the process we actually need both to build it (and not that we need each of them only to remove a hindrance, that is, to prevent the learning from the other, as we saw in the measure of 'what is the side').[21]

Therefore, in the two examples discussed above, it is not apparent that we are dealing with the measure of 'what is the side', as we know it in the Shas. It seems that there is a different mechanism here. This is a construction of a concept from two other concepts, and the concept that was born (the 'outgrowth') is composed of both of them.

The example is from the story of two fathers of torts.

However, when we now turn to the example from 6:1 mentioned above, it seems that this view is problematic. The discussion is about the obligation to pay a person who placed his son, his knife, and his burden on the roof of his house, and then they fell in a strong wind, he abandoned them, and they caused damage. As stated, the Gemara teaches this from a pit and fire, and the process is as follows: a pit will prove. What about a pit, since there is no other force involved in it, you will say that another force is involved in them. Fire will prove. What about a fire, since it has its way to go and cause damage. a pit will prove. And the judgment is repeated.

The logical structure is a structure of 'what is the side', and this is how it is also presented in the Mishnah Resh Bek, and in the Gemara and the commentators there. However, if we examine it closely, it seems that there is also a conceptual construction here that is very similar to the examples we gave above.

There was certainly room to understand the process in the Book of Genesis 6:1 as consisting of two stages, each of which is based on one of the teachings: in the first stage, the fire fell from the roof in a prevailing wind, and we prove this obligation from fire, whose movement in a prevailing wind does not exempt it from payment. In other words, we learned that a harmful thing that moves with the wind obliges the owner to pay. Then, when they reach the ground, another source of damage is created here: a hole (the fact that it was created in a prevailing wind, as we have already seen, is irrelevant, since the father Dash taught us that this does not relieve us of the obligation to pay). At this stage, the second source, the hole, arrives, and teaches that my property, which is placed in a ravine and is harmful (even though it has no way to move and cause damage), obliges me to pay.

Therefore, although this is a question of 'what is the side', as is clear from the language of the Mishnah and the Gem, here too we are apparently constructing the new detriment from a sequential combination of the two melamedim. The move here does not seem like removing the interpretation and learning from the equal side. Moreover, it seems that in this example, even for the conclusion, neither of the two melamedim can be dispensed with, and this is also like in conceptual constructions and not like in the usual 'what is the side' measure, and as is the case with the Mishna.

On the other hand, as stated above, in the Mishna Reish Bek, this is presented as a study of the 'equal side'. That is, the logical structure is what determines, not the conceptual construction. The logical structure is that we prove from both fathers that the property of immobility and the involvement of another force are not properties that exempt from damage. Therefore, it is clear that the equal side, meaning that all of this is money that is mine and that I am responsible for keeping (as explained in the conclusion of the Mishna Reish Bek), is what obligates me to pay. From this equal side, which exists in each of the two teachings, we learn about the Asum. This is already a normal learning process of 'what is the side'.

The conclusion is that the example of BK can be presented both as an educational measure of 'what is the side', and as a process of conceptual construction.

And again, 'what is the side' and the conceptual construction

Therefore, it seems that we must examine whether the degree of 'what is the side' and the conceptual construction are not simply two sides of the same phenomenon. In other words: Can the other examples also be presented in both ways? And in more detail: Can the learning in our two examples be presented as a learning 'what is the side'? And can the 'what is the side' of the Baraita Datu Ke be presented as a conceptual construction? We will try to examine this now.

Let's start with the example of the guardian's oath, and try to formulate it as a learning process of 'what is the side': We will learn the obligation of an oath in the drawing of a man who gives five vines, from the obligation of a man who gives a little. And we will explain: What about a man who gives a little that is exempt from the law of the loan, if so, here too he will be exempt from the law of the loan. The guardian's oath will prove that there is no exemption from the law of the loan. And we will explain: What about the guardian's oath, since it is already known that he is a guardian, but here he is a disbeliever in the very act of keeping. A man who gives a little will prove that there too he is a disbeliever in the very act of the loan and in the 27th he is obligated to take an oath. And the law repeats.

Also regarding a wafer in the Rah, we can formulate it in a similar way: we learn that the wafer in the Rah is obligated to be removed. And we explain: What about the removed, since it separates waste from food. A thrower will prove that he does not separate but only transfers the object in the Rah. What about the thrower, since there is no other force involved in it. A thrower will prove that another force is involved in it and is obligated. And the law is repeated.

It should be noted that the description of these two examples as 'what is the side' is problematic and somewhat forced. The need for the second father does not stem solely from the fact that there is an exemption for a child over a person who admits a little, for even if there were no exemption for a child, we would need the oath of the guards to require the oath of the guards in addition to the person who admits a little. And vice versa. Therefore, it turns out that these two are not examples of 'what is the side' at all, but a different logical process, in which the new concept is constructed from the sequential connection of its two predecessors.

In contrast to these two, it seems that the "what side" of the TUK cannot be presented convincingly at all as a conceptual construction. The attempt to do so may appear similar from a formal point of view, but it is clearly seen that in essence this is not a process of conceptual construction, but a purely educational process.

Overall, it seems that the difference between these three cases and the Tok's "what is the side?" depends on the question of whether we are trying to create a new halakhic concept, and the laws only branch out from the fact that such a concept is renewed, or whether we are trying to learn the application of a particular halakhic principle to an existing concept (and not to create a new halakhic concept). In the Tok's example of "from generation to generation," it is clear that we are not creating any concept, but rather learning a halakhic principle that applies to the two teaching commandments, and applying it to other commandments. Therefore, it seems that such a procedure can only be formulated as a scholastic "what is the side?" and not as conceptual construction. Perhaps for this reason, the Tok chose this particular example to demonstrate the quality of "building a father from two written texts."

In contrast, in the BK we are trying to create a new halakhic concept, or a new cause of damage, and the laws (the obligation to pay) will apply to it anyway (by its very definition as a cause of damage). Therefore, there the learning process can also be presented as a conceptual construction. It should be noted that, as we have seen in this case, it is also possible, albeit somewhat forcedly, to present the procedure as a purely educational process of the degree of 'what is the side'.

It should also be noted that in both of our examples, it is not possible to end with 'the equal side...', since the two fathers do not have an equal side. Although, as we have seen, learning can also be presented as a learning process, and not just as a conceptual construction, the learning process is not an ordinary 'what side' either. It is also done in a way that ultimately requires both teachers.

Apparently, even in the example of the BK, the "what is the side" can be concluded with a statement regarding the equal side of the teachers (who are yours and keep them for you). Therefore, this case is presented as a learning process of "what is the side". For our purposes, it is important to point out here that it also has clear characteristics of conceptual construction.[22]

Summary

In summary: We have seen two types of secondary learning from teachers:

The construction is conceptual, which creates a new halakhic concept, and the laws branch out from the very definition of the concept. We have seen that this process can be presented both as a conceptual construction and as a learning process, but in this case the learning process also requires the two teaching fathers.

'What is the side' that introduces a new law on an existing subject? This can only be presented as a learning process (to the extent that the Torah requires it), and not as a conceptual construction. As we have seen, in this case the learning process ultimately does not require the two fathers.

Regarding our two examples, we saw that it is more plausible to treat them as a conceptual construction and not as a learning process of 'which side is which.' Whereas the example of the Tok is actually a learning process and not a conceptual construction.

However, regarding the examples of BK 6a, there is room for debate. As stated, the Mishnah there presents them as 'what is the side', and this is how the Rishonim understood them. It is true that in the GK they end every study with the words 'and the law is repeated', and not with the words 'the equal side'. Therefore, there is perhaps also room to understand them as the degree of 'what is the side', and then there are really two types of 'what is the side', and so on. Perhaps this is nothing more than the conceptual construction, and then it is possible to divide this from 'what is the side', which is nothing more than a purely educational process. In the next chapter, it appears that the Rishonim apparently disagreed on this point.

E. Consequences and NPF

The Dispute Between the Rosh and the Elders Regarding the History of Two Fathers of Harm

Ostensibly, a learning process that requires both fathers is nothing more than conceptual construction, and if so, it turns out that in a situation where we are trying to create a new halakhic concept, there are not two options but only one: conceptual construction. To understand why this is not so, we will examine the disagreement between the Rosh and the gedolim on the issue of BK 6 above. We will see there a difference between conceptual construction and 'what is the side'.[23]

The Rosh, in the issue of B.K. Shem, deals with the question of the status of the histories that are learned from two teachers. These exemptions, if any, will apply to them. This is the Rosh's statement (B.K. 31):

And there are some of the great ones who wrote that only what is obligatory is obligatory in both cases, and that the requisites for damage to vessels and the death of a person, such as a pit, and the requisites for a treasure, such as fire, are not binding. Therefore, when asked about the question of "what is the side," they will understand that it is the easier of the two.

And some are content with that.

And it seems to me that every law of ignorance they have... is complete ignorance, except that we do not find a Milf from ignorance to ignorance because the ignorance was not completely responsible for the damage at the beginning of his actions or because another force was involved in their commission, or his actions did not cause him or that their commission was with his permission. It is necessary to bring proof of other damages that cannot be divided between them and ignorance because these are solutions that do not prevent liability for them.

Therefore, these too did not come out of the abyss, for these are the divisions, and it is a complete abyss, and every law is an abyss for them, sounds and meanings in them. And they will not understand the sounds of fire and footsteps…

The Rosh brings a disagreement among the Rishonim regarding the examples that appear in the G.M. there, for histories that are taught by two different teachers. The question in dispute is what special laws will apply to these histories. For example, asumam that are taught by a pit and a fire, they can be given the laws of a pit (exemption for vessels and for the death of a person), and/or the laws of fire (exemption for a hidden object).

It appears from the above words of the Rosh that there are three methods in this regard in the Rishonim:[24] Some of the great scholars believe that the Tolada accepts the special laws of both teachers. There are those who are satisfied with this. While the Rosh himself believes that the Tolada accepts the special laws of only the Ber.

On the face of it, this is a general disagreement over the law of 'which side is which', how to define the new law learned from both fathers. However, as we will see immediately, it is not entirely clear that there is no unique disagreement here.

The root of the controversy

If this is indeed a normal 'what is the side' procedure, then it seems that according to the accepted description that we eliminate the predicates and then learn from the equal side, it should follow that the result will not receive any of the special laws of the fathers. It is not completely similar to either of them, but is learned only from the equal side of both. The reason for this is that the special laws stem from the special characteristics of each father, and the equal side in itself does not require any unique law (otherwise it would apply to all fathers, and in any case it would not be a unique law).

Therefore, the esos that are learned from the pit and the fire should have been exempt from the esos in the tamon and the esos, since the equal side does not obligate these. The obligation of each of these is derived from the special character of each of the fathers discussed here, which does not characterize the tolda. Therefore, the tolda should have been exempt from all the exemptions of the two fathers.

And there is room to reject and say, on the contrary, that the toluda should actually have been obligatory in all situations, since these special exemptions (and not obligations) that the fathers have are those that derive from the special nature of the teaching fathers, which does not characterize the toluda. If so, the toluda does not have such unique exemptions. According to this view, the equal party is obligatory in every situation, and each unique father is exempted (and not obligated) because of his special nature.

This dilemma depends on the question of whether the special law is that a broken object is liable for damage, or whether the special law is that fire is exempt from damage. Alternatively: whether the special law is that a broken object is exempt from damage, or whether the special law is that fire is liable for damage.

This dilemma is formal, meaning it is derived from the very logical structure of 'what is the side'. However, from explanation it seems more likely that the exemption is unique, and not the obligation. The reason for this is that the exemption exists only in one case of damage, and the obligation exists in all the others. In any case, it turns out that the exemption is unique, and not the obligation. Therefore, the equal party should have obligated in all situations, and not granted any of the exemptions.

On the other hand, if we are really talking about conceptual construction here, that is, the construction of a new father of harm from two existing fathers (Bur and Fire), then in the new father there is actually a combination of the fathers Bur and Fire (and not just as academic assumptions), and then it follows from the explanation that it should have had both exemptions of the two fathers. Here too, there was room for formal disagreement (perhaps the exemption depends on it having only its own characteristic and not its friend's, and therefore the complex consequence would not have the exemption), but from the explanation it seems more like what we are saying here.

If so, it seems that the great scholars understood that this is a conceptual construction, and therefore believed that the result has the two exemptions of the two fathers. However, the Rosh understood that in fact one learns mainly from ignorance, and the fire only removes a learning obstacle, that is, it is a learning process of 'what is the side'. In any case, it is clear that there is an innovation in the Rosh's words. The Rosh's innovation is that there are situations in which the educational measure of 'what is the side' is not the 'equal side'. That is, we do not learn from the equal side but from one of the sides. The other is only intended to remove a learning obstacle, and as a mushnat.

Regarding the first ones who are cited in Rosh as being satisfied, it is not clear whether they were content with either of these two positions, or whether they had a third option: that there would be no exemptions for the outcome.[25] And this is a conclusion from the understanding of the process as a learning "what side" but without the aforementioned innovation of the Rosh. In any case, these Rishonim believe in principle, as does the Rosh, that this is a process of "what side" (but one must be satisfied with whether there is a dominant father, or whether both are of equal status. That is, whether one learns from "what side" or from the equal side).

We will note here that in our discussion above (Soph. B), we saw that in the conceptual construction of the oath of the guardians, there are features of the father's oaths that transfer to the outcome (he claimed wheat and accepted it in barley, which is exempt from the partial acceptance and also from the oath of the outcome), and there are features that do not transfer (the exemption of a person who is a slave, and something that, to some extent and in a measure, from the partial acceptance oath is exempt in the 23rd century and is not exempt from the oath of the outcome).

There we depended on the essence of the exemption, whether it removes the instructive feature (the legal conclusion that it was a contract, a loan, or a safeguard) or not. In the context of torts, this relationship is more difficult to see, since the exemptions seem to be a "gas" as such,[26] Therefore, the discussion we have had here is more formal, and not substantive.

And according to our words there, it is possible to interpret the disagreement between the Rosh and the rabbis on this level: for the rabbinic court in tort, this is the conceptual construction, and they disagree on whether the unique exemptions are essential (as in the case of Hitin's claim and his acceptance of the shar'i), or not (such as the journey, and the requirement of a measure of number and weight). And below, we will see that according to the Rosh's method, it is possible that he does not accept the procedure of conceptual construction at all.

The commentators disagree: Is 'what is the side' always a parent construction?

We will now see another point that concerns the distinction between 'what is the side' and conceptual construction. As is known, there are two types of 'what is the side': one begins from a simile (=a construction from one text) to the first melamed, and after raising a pirka, another melamed (Yochicha) is brought in to remove the pirka. The second, begins from a pirka (and not from a simile) from the first melamed, and then continues in a similar manner.

And here the first and the last differed as to whether the 'side' of the second type, after the educational process of the two fathers is completed, has the status of a KOH, or whether it ultimately receives the status of a father building (or: the 'equal side'. See for example AnciT (See 'Benin Av', note 59-61).

In the book Worldly life (Chapter 4, Chapter 2) and in the book Aaron's measurements (Chapter 2:9) They understood that now this is a father building, meaning like 'what side' of a regular father building. And in contrast, dropping (Part of Toshab's Midyat Koch), and also cited in the book Aaron's measurements (Ibid., in the name of Rabbi Almoshenino) believed that it remained a manuscript.[27]

And it seems that this disagreement is like the disagreement between the Rosh and the great ones. If indeed, in the end, one learns from the equal side, then this is a father's building. For indeed, in relation to each of the teachers there is a situation of a KOH, but this relationship is refuted as a result of the unique characteristics of each of the fathers. Therefore, in the end, we are left with learning from the equal side only, and this is the learning of a father's building.

However, if the basic teaching is from one of the fathers, and the Pircha on the Koch is the one that is rejected by the power of the 'Yochi' (the second father), then ultimately we are left with the teaching from the first father, which was done in the Koch.

From the perspective of the subject Didan, it seems to be noted that in conceptual construction it is clear that the teaching that will remain at the end of the process is a "Koh". The reason for this is that each of the fathers builds half of the outcome, and regarding that half he teaches in the "Koh". The "pirka" that is on it is that it does not contain the second part, but this part was built by the second father, also in the "Koh". In other words, here it seems that there is no room at all for this dispute between the Rishonim, and the "Koh" here will be a process of "Koh".

And as we explained above in the method of the great ones, that the example in the BK is the conceptual construction (and not the regular scholastic 'what is the side'), then it is clear that this is not a matter for dispute among the above-mentioned rules. The great ones did not intend to state a general principle regarding 'what is the side', but only in contexts in which 'what is the side' appears as a conceptual construction. In other contexts, where it is a scholastic measure, they may admit to the Rosh that it is the characteristics of the main teacher that are passed on to the outcome, and that ultimately one learns only from him. If so, it is possible that the final learning in a parent building of the type discussed here (which is the scholastic 'what is the side' measure, and not the conceptual construction) will be a parent building, and not a parent building.

F. Fathers and History on Shabbat and Nazikin

On Shabbat, there is, if anything, only conceptual construction.

We will now return to the question of why we did not find the origin of two fathers in the laws of Shabbat, while in torts we do find it.

First, we must note that in the example of the Rakika, we find the conceptual construction in the Halacha of Shabbat. It seems that it is not agreed upon by most poskim (since we have seen that there are those who reject the Rema from the Halacha). However, according to The Alphi Menashe (andMB (who agreed with him) and the Rema, it seems that there is such a logical process in the Shabbos Law. Furthermore, according to the method of Rashi (BK 60a), who understands (not as Rosh there, who disagrees with him) that the interweaving and the assisting spirit is a general principle in all Shabbat practices, it turns out that we would have to say so even if it were not for the Jerusalemite. According to Rashi, this is a principle that necessarily follows from the words of Rabbi Ashi in the Babil, and in fact this is what Rabbi Ashi says there. If so, according to Rashi, not only is the law of the prohibition of rakika not hidden from the Babil, but the principle from which it is derived (the conceptual construction) is written in the Babil Hadiya.

If so, it follows from these words of Rashi that an action by the spirit, which is usually considered to be a grama, will be binding on all Shabbat works. And in simple terms, his intention is precisely to depict it as such: doing some work with the help of the spirit (when his thought was realized). If so, he even goes further thanThe Alphi MenasheAccording to Rashi, it seems that there will be such a Toldo in many Shabbat works together with Zora, and not necessarily in Zorek and Mevir, as in the Rabbi. The conclusion is that at least according to Rashi, there is an appearance of a Toldo of two fathers also on Shabbat, but it comes from a process of conceptual construction and not from the academic 'what side' criterion.

In tort, the first to disagree on this

On the other hand, in tort we do indeed find 'what is the side', but according to the great scholars in the Book of Genesis it seems that this is the conceptual construction and not the ordinary 'what is the side'. So, on the other hand, it seems that in tort too there is no ordinary learning 'what is the side', but only the conceptual construction.

The conclusion that emerges according to the method of the great men in the Rosh is that it seems that in all cases where the gemid is a collection of ancestors (and therefore, generations), it refers to a complete collection from which every element is consumed. If we study in 'Ma' Ha-Tsad' other generations, then it follows that in fact this collection is not needed, that each individual in it has unique characteristics, since what is required (payment for damages, or stoning on Shabbat) is only the equal side. Therefore, in these situations, a generation by virtue of a scholastic standard that the Torah requires ('Ma' Ha-Tsad') does not come into consideration, but only the conceptual construction.

'What is the side' will appear in halakha only when the two teachers are not members of a complete collection of 'fathers', or of any types. 'What is the side' can only be done when the two teachers are from two different fields, and then they do not pretend to cover an entire field. Only then can a halakhic principle regarding another case be learned from their equal side.[28] It seems that in these cases the goal is usually not to create a new concept, but rather to study a halakhic principle.

When the teachers are members of a collection, then this collection includes all the elements that exist in the halakha in this field. In such a situation, each element of the collection is essential, and it is not possible to say that it represents only the equal side of all of them (if that were the case, there would be no point in building this collection, and we would have to present only the equal side).

It should be noted that the Gm (BK 5b) concludes that in fact the avot ha-hazkim are really unnecessary, since they could all be learned from a rabbinate and one more. And this is exactly what we said, that the collection that the halakhah enumerated cannot represent only an equal side, otherwise we would not need the entire collection, and most of its items were unnecessary. However, according to the Gm, it is really not clear why the Torah wrote all the avot ha-hazkim. However, the Gm says there that it is only for their halakhah (i.e., for their special exemptions, which do not depend on the equal side but on their unique properties, and in the first place. See also the Gm, Resh Ha-Ha's Ha-Grizz, Nazkei Mamon, in this regard).

All of this is according to Rashi, the great men in Rosh, and perhaps also Maimonides and the Rishi Migash mentioned above. However, as we have seen, the Rosh (BK 60a) disagrees with Rashi in the Shabbos chapter, and believes that it is not possible to make a conceptual construction (at least the one that Rashi proposes) from the fathers of the work of Shabbat. In addition, we note that he disagrees with the great men in BK 6a, and there too he believes that it is not possible to make a conceptual construction from the fathers of the torts.

Possible generalization of the Rosh method

It is possible that this is a general method of the Rosh, who does not accept this logical process at all. According to him, it is not possible to construct concepts from other concepts, and all that is left for us is a learning process of 'what is the side', which is an interpretive measure that the Torah requires.

We note that the Rosh in Shavuot does not address this issue, but in his Tosafot (ibid., 44b, 45 'And he said, 'And he said,') the Rosh wrote in the Hadith that it is said that the grapes were harvested, and that the Lord went away. And it is proven that he learned there that it is a somewhat affirmative oath and not a guardian oath, and not according to the Rambam and the Rabbis of Migashes. And perhaps there too, according to his opinion, Azil, and according to the opinion of most Rishonim.[29]

Of course, the Rosh's approach will return to the question of why we found "what side" in Avot Nizikiin and did not find such a history in Hala Shabbat.[30]

G. Additional examples: The meaning of conceptual construction

It seems that we find conceptual construction in halakha in other contexts as well. We will now look at two examples of this.[31]

Maimonides' method regarding the addition of Shabbat to the Sabbath

Maimonides (Hal. Avodat Yom Kippur, 4:1) rules that the sabbaths of Yom Kippur that fall on a Sabbath of sacrifices may be performed only by the High Priest. Author Happy light Al Atar explains that Maimonides intended to say that the sacrifices offered on Yom Kippur that fall on Shabbat are as important as the sacrifices offered on Yom Kippur itself, and therefore they too must be performed by the High Priest.

United Nations There, one draws a practical conclusion from this, namely that a sick person who needs to eat on Yom Kippur, who falls ill on Shabbat, is not obligated to perform kiddush on this day (and as is known, the latter disagreed on this).

The explanation is that the Rambam understands that Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat is not a combination of two days that 'fell' on each other by chance. This combination defines a day whose essence is different from both, a third essence. Therefore, the laws regarding it are not a mere combination of the laws of the two days that make it up. Therefore, on a Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat, there is no law at all to sanctify it, not even from the laws of Shabbat itself, since this day is not Shabbat at all. Of course, it is also not a regular Yom Kippur. This is a Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat, that is, a combination that defines a day of a third type. Of course, we learn the laws concerning it from the types known to us that make up this day, but it is not a simple combination of these laws.[32]

So, here is another example of conceptual construction. We are constructing a new concept of a new type of good day, out of two existing concepts of good days.

Here we can discern the essence and meaning of such a composition, which perhaps in the examples we saw above is not necessarily pointed out. As we see here, in a concept created in the process of conceptual construction, although there is a component from each of the ancestors that create it, it is certainly not a simple sum of them.

If there were a simple sum here, then we would not say that a new concept was created here, but rather, in the words of the Grach: that there are 'two laws' here. However, here we see that these are not just two laws, but one law of a third type. If there were two laws of the Grach here, then the Sabbath sacrifices would be offered by a lay priest, and the Yom Kippur sacrifices would be offered by a high priest. The main innovation of the Maimonides is that this is not the correct approach. The Sabbath sacrifices also take on a Yom Kippur flavor, and as a rule,

New Year's Eve that falls on Saturday

We find this in the Responsa: Encryption decryption (C. 2) which discusses the question of whether someone who performed soul-eating acts on a Yom Tov that fell on Shabbat, such as someone who cooked on such a day, violated a prohibition also from the perspective of the Yom Tov that day, or only from the perspective of Shabbat.

His conclusion there is that it also passes from the Sabbath in this case. It is true that the wording of the Yo'ush is not the same as that of Ben Iru (the O'ush), and his explanation for this is different. However, in our way it is also said here that the combination 'Yo't that falls on Shabbat' is not a coincidental joining of two types of days, but rather the creation of a third type of day from the two known types.

If so, it seems that here too we encounter conceptual construction. And in the answer of the CCP there are additional examples of this matter.[33] In any case, we have learned that conceptual construction creates a new concept that is not a simple sum of its components. The construction is not a mere addition, but a more complex logical construction of a new concept from two known concepts. In the language of Rogchover, we can say that there is here a 'temporal composition' between the two concepts, and not a 'neighborhood composition'.[34]

Possible generalization using Maimonides' method

We will end the chapter with a general comment. If above we saw a consistent approach on the part of the Rosh, against conceptual constructions, it is possible that here we see that Maimonides, in his view, is also at fault. We saw that in the laws of Shavuot he also bases himself on conceptual construction, and here too he seems to do so. And this is not the case with the Rosh above.

H. A brief logical discussion

As we have seen so far, there are at least two ways to learn a new derivative from two (or: several) ancestors:

1. The study of 'what is the side' is based on the generalization of the two fathers, and the study of the consequence is done from the generalization directly to it. In fact, nothing new is created here, but the case studied (the consequence) is another example of the general principle that emerged from the generalization of the two fathers. Moreover, the study of the 'equal side' is essentially a study of a general principle, which is relevant to a general collection of cases: all cases that are included in the generalization (=equal side) of the two fathers.
2. The construction is conceptual, which is not based on generalization at all, and therefore it is not based on the equal side of the two fathers. It is a specific composition of the two fathers, which takes into account their special nature and not only their equal side. This composition creates a specific concept that is composed of these two special fathers. Here there is no creation of a law regarding a general collection of concepts, or situations, but the creation of one new concept.

The process of 'what is the side' is an expansive process. It involves generalizing from two known cases, and creating a broad rule (see, for example, the above-mentioned Tok 'Regarding Immediately and for All Generations', where we learn a principle that is valid for all the mitzvot). To do this, we must locate the equal side, which is the essential part of the law being studied, and eliminate the non-essential components. This is the thinking process of logical generalization, which in logic is called 'induction'.[35]

In contrast, conceptual construction is an almost mathematical process. It does not involve an expansion of the Fathers into a broader generality, but rather a detailing of them, or at most a study based on an analogy to them. The construction process can be perceived as a Father's building, and this is how the great men of the Hebrew Bible understood it (who included it under the heading 'Father's building'). According to this view, this is a process of inference based on analogy, what is called in logic 'analogy'.

However, as mentioned, it is also possible to perceive the construction process as a completely analytical process. According to this view, we only analyze the two parent concepts, and necessarily deduce from them their corollary. Here appears a consideration known in logic as 'deduction'.[36]

The Rosh certainly did not perceive it this way, as the Shalak could not dispute the validity of the construction process (deduction is a necessary logical process). However, it seems that even the great ones, although they did accept the construction process, did not perceive it as deduction. If they had understood that it was a deduction, they would not have associated it with the measures that the Torah requires ('what is the side'), since the measures are essentially analogous processes.[37]

And in the words of Maimonides and Rabbi Migashes, it is not explained how they understood this procedure, and the Tzlaa is not in accordance with their method.[38]

Appendix: The Meaning of Mixing the Cases

The meaning of our explanation according to the Rambam method

As is known, most Rishonim believe that a keeper is required to take an oath only when he claims that the property was stolen, and his claim is intended to exempt him from his responsibility for this. However, as we have seen (above, note 7), the Maimonides' approach is different: according to his approach, a keeper is required to take an oath every time he claims exemption. For example, when a keeper claims that I returned it, according to the Maimonides, he is required to take an oath.

Here we will add that it is also evident that this is the method of Rashi (BK 17:1, 2), who believes that in a deposit, unlike a loan, an oath is required even for the one who repays everything. Rashi there explains that the verse "because he is the one" deals only with the lender, and not with the deposit, even though it appears in Parashat Shomirim, meaning that there is a mixture of Parashits here, since in a loan the defendant is exempt from the oath when he repays everything because there is a presumption in his favor that he does not dare to face his debtor.

And in the Tod "Eruv" (BK ibid.), and other Rishonim, they often made it difficult for him, and proved from several sources that the unbeliever who redeems a deposit on the claim of a lien is exempt from the oath.

And according to us, it can be said that Rashi's intention is not to say that every disbeliever in a deposit is obligated to take an oath. It is possible that Rashi's intention to require the disbeliever in a deposit to take an oath is only when the keeper claims to have returned, in which case even if he claims yes for everything (and not just for a part) he is obligated to take an oath. The reason for this is, as in the Maimonides' method, that this is a claim of exemption and not an actual disbelief. Rashi intends to say that in a deposit, every claim of exemption, even though it claims yes for the entire claim (and not just for a part), requires an oath. And this is the reason for the above-mentioned questions of the Rishonim, since their proofs deal only with the keeper who claims to have returned, and so on.

If so, it is possible that Rashi is also like the Rambam, who says that a watcher is required to take an oath when claiming a return, and in any claim of exemption (as opposed to the claim of the Hadam, which is a denial and not a claim of exemption). And above in the body of the article we saw that Rashi also makes the conceptual construction in the work of the Sabbath, and therefore it is possible that he also accepts it in the context of watchers, and according to the method of the Rambam and the R. Migash.

It should also be noted that according to our words, it is very clear that the two oaths, the oath of a partial confession and the oath of the guards, are different applications of the same oath. It can be called: the oath of the defenders. Every defendant who is in a defensive position must swear. A guard in a defensive position (such as being raped, or I returned), and also the oath of a partial confession, are both examples of the situation of a defendant in a defensive position, and therefore there is an obligation to swear in both.

This explanation will explain the mixing of the passages described in the G.M. B.K. 17a. The G.M. there concludes that the verse "because he is this" deals with an oath that somewhat acknowledges a loan, even though it appears in the Torah in the context of a deposit. And indeed, it seems obvious why the Torah mixes these two passages together.

And in our opinion, it can be said that these two are examples of the same oath, and therefore the cases are rightly intertwined. The entire case deals with the oath of the defending defendant, which appears in the context of the case of the guards. The guard is a clear example of a defending defendant, and within the context, the Torah provides another example of a defending defendant, who is also bound by the same oath, and is the defendant who admits somewhat.

And this will clarify what we have noted among some of the Amoraim (see the issue in the same chapter, in the parallels of the book of Zechariah), and also among some of the Poskim (see inTUT On the Mishnah Shavuot (cited in the body of the article), which require some confession even in the oath of the watchmen. The source of their words is probably the very fact that the Torah includes these passages, and therefore they understand that even a watchman, like a Levite, needs some confession in order to commit to an oath.

However, Maimonides does not rule in this way (seeTUT (ibid.), and it obligates a defender (defender) to swear an oath even without partially admitting. Therefore, it is clear that the Rambam must interpret the mixing of the parashits in a different way. His understanding of the mixing of the parashits is as we said above: every defender is like a partially admitter. A partially admitter is only an example of a defendant defending himself, and as stated. In other words, the parashit deals with defendants defending themselves, and all of it appears within Parashit Shomerim, which is a clear example of a defendant defending himself. The oath of partially admitting and the oath of the guards are two examples of the same oath, and therefore it is not surprising that the Torah mixes them together.

The meaning of mixing the stories: another possible angle of the example of the vines

We have seen that the obligation to swear regarding the five vines that the keeper disbelieves in derives from the keeper's oath in light of the logic of the partially admitting moda. Indeed, in light of our discussion of the Maimonides' method, it follows that in any claim of exemption by a keeper, he will be obligated to swear. As we have seen here, it is possible that any defendant defending himself (who is not a disbeliever) will have to swear, and a keeper defending himself, as well as partially admitting, are just two examples of this.

If this is indeed the perception in the positives of these oaths, then the oath of the guards and the oath of a certain amount are two examples that appear in the Torah of the same oath: the oath of the defendant defending himself.

And according to this, it is possible to say that the construction of the oath of the guards in the case of the vines is not a conceptual construction, but another example of the oath of the defending defendant. This is another situation of a defendant in defense, which can be proven from the two known examples (guardians and somewhat confessing) which also constitute an example of this oath.

But if this is indeed the case, then this case is largely parallel to the "what is the side" of the Fathers of Torts. There too, the two different Fathers can be perceived as teaching in their "equal side," which they both have appointed and their preservation on, that any other tortfeasor who fulfills this characteristic, which he has appointed and his preservation on, will require him to pay. There too, we saw that the process can be understood both as "what is the side" and as a conceptual construction. Therefore, it should not be surprising that in the example of the vines, we can perhaps see a learning process of "what is the side," of the type of "asm" that fell from the roof, and here, as there, it can be understood in both ways: both as a conceptual construction, and also as "what is the side."

According to this, the obligation to swear in the case of the vines can perhaps be formulated as follows: From a little consideration, and from the oath of the guards, one can see an equal side in both cases, in which there is a defendant defending. Therefore, any other case of a defendant defending, as in the case of the vines, will also be obligated to swear. After we have completed this educational process, we can again be satisfied with either of the two teachers, and we do not need both. If so, here too the process is educational, just like in the usual 'what is the side'.

And perhaps all of this will depend on the dispute between the Rosh and the elders, whether such a procedure is 'what side' or whether it is a conceptual construction. And I will be the judge of this.

[1] See, for example, at the end of Chapter 4 (before the conclusion, and in the conclusion itself).

[2] See in this regard In the Anzit By 'Benin Av'.

[3] Although there are places where the version is that there are things that are 'on the ground', in the Beit HaMatani, and there are places that say 'on the ground' in the Kaf. There are also places where Rabbi Yossi bar Hanina's mimra appears to be an okumitha, and the dispute is interpreted as a broader dispute, and there are places where he seems to present the dispute in the image of grapes about to be bound by his body. It is possible that both of these differences depend on the ZBZ, and the AKM.

[4] And in the rest of the contexts cited in Shas that depend on the dispute between the Rabbis and the Sages, we will have to say that there are similar circumstances as in the case of the guards, and therefore the name of the grapes is also not as pronounced for these reasons, and so on.

[5] We conclude that Rabbi Migash perhaps understands that the Sages disagreed only in the context of a guard, but Maimonides understands the disagreement as sweeping. According to Maimonides, the split between the laws of guard and the rest of the areas of halakhic law is only at the level of halakhic jurisprudence. There, he rules as the Sages only in the laws of guards. However, according to his view, unlike what Rabbi Migash could have understood, the Sages themselves believed that grapes were not as objects in all halakhic contexts.

This also means in his aforementioned language in the Pihamash, that the split is in the ruling of halakhic law and not in the interpretation of the words of the sages, as in the case of the Rabbis. And the Rabbis of Migashes say that this is not clear. And it is understood that this will explain all the contradictions in the rulings of the Maimonides regarding grapes that are about to ripen and hair that is about to be cut (which the latter have already extended), and so on.

It is true that there is a case of splitting the ruling in the Tannaim dispute, and apparently the Maimonides rules without hesitation. However, it can be said that he is dependent on the parallel issues from which we see that grapes are like shapes, and perhaps they themselves learned the dispute in this way, or they themselves ruled in this way in the dispute.

However, the latter did not teach this in the Rambam, as we have said. Most of them explained that he was studying the disagreement between the Rambam and the Sages only regarding the laws of guardians. And in fact, according to our words, it turns out that the continuation of the mishnah that deals with a claim based on guardianship is not halakhic, and this is compelling.

Therefore, we will assume in the remainder of our discussion that according to the Rambam and the Rabbis, the disagreement between the Rabbis and the Sages in our mishnah is only in the laws of the Shomerites.

[6] The T'T Apparently he understood that the Maimonides would teach the Mishnah that this is a claim that the grapes were damaged, meaning that the keeper committed a crime in guarding them. And the defendant admits that he committed a crime in some of the vines, and in this the keeper's oath was normal. And he makes it difficult The T'T Why do we see a somewhat confessional image? Indeed, in the language of the Mishnah, this is a very great compulsion, and therefore the Grek"a And the Sheik They did not accept this. Below we will offer a commentary by Rambam that will clarify the language of the Mishnah, and in this way eliminate the need to enter into the author's arguments. The T'T.

[7] And apparently there is room to complicate our words, since we have accepted that a guard who claims a refund is exempt from an oath, and after all, even there he is a guard who came to get rid of the obligation to pay. Refund is a clear claim of exemption, and therefore, according to us, the guard had to swear in order to get rid of it. It is ostensibly proven from this that not every time a guard who comes to get rid of it is required to take an oath, but only when he claims rape. Therefore, in the matter under discussion, it is also necessary to discuss why the defendant, who is avenged by five grapes, should be likened to a person who claims a refund, and not to someone who claims a refund? Is the refund claim of someone who is known as a guard worse than the situation of a slightly confessor regarding a claim of protection?

And now, if we examine the opinion of the Rambam on this, it seems that we disagree on this. The MMM And the KSA P.B. Rents 11. The KSA He brought convincing evidence for his theory from the words of the Maimonides, Question and Deposit, 6:4 (and the Rabbad, which is divided on it), where the Maimonides writes to the Hadiya that when the guard claims to have returned an object, he swears by taking it. Indeed, The MMM There he was very surprised by these words of Maimonides. And also In the KSM There, who reiterates his disagreement with the MM from here.

and writes The KSA (In both places) In explaining the Maimonides' method, whose understanding is that someone who is known as a keeper and comes to be released from the obligation to pay, is obligated to take the keeper's oath from the rabbinate. And this ruling is true for any claim he makes.

If so, our words above are well in line with the Maimonides' method, and it is proven from this that according to his method, Azil is wrong. Here too, we see that the obligation of the watchman's oath is upon anyone who is known to be a watchman and comes to get rid of payment, for whatever reason.

It should be emphasized that for most Rishonim, the oath of the guards is only for a guard who claims to have been raped, while for one who claims to have returned, the oath of the guards is not required. According to their view, it cannot be said that every guard who claims to be exempt (as opposed to a guard who has become an infidel) is required to take an oath. However, we have seen here that the Maimonides' view, consistently, is that a guard cannot be released (whether on the claim of having been raped or on the claim of having returned) unless he swears the oath of the guards. It is clear that according to the Maimonides' view, a guard who denies all guarding will be exempt without an oath (except for menstruation), and according to the Mishnat.

And according to the above, Moda's logic is somewhat proven that in the Didan painting, the guard is considered to be claiming an exemption, and therefore, according to the Rambam, he is obligated to take the guard's oath.

And see further additional explanation of the meaning of this view of Maimonides below in the appendix.

If we return to the Didan controversy, it follows from the PIZ that the Rav and most of the Rishonim who disagree with the Rambam on this point are also, in their view, eternal. As we will see below, the Rav believes, like other Rishonim who do not accept the Rambam's innovation, and they hold that in our mishnah we are talking about a somewhat moda oath and not a Shumarim oath.

It should be noted that according to this method of the Rishonim, there is no reasonable possibility of understanding the Mishnah as dealing with the oath of the guards, even if we accept the logical procedure that will be referred to below as the 'conceptual construction'. The reason for this is that the oath of the guards, which is one of the concepts of the father, does not teach us that every guard who comes claiming exemption is obligated to take an oath, and the evidence is a recursive argument. Only the Maimonides' understanding of the law of the oath of the guards allows for the creation of the renewed obligation to take an oath described above.

Therefore, even the Rishonim who explain differently from the Rambam and the Rishi Migash who interpret the Mishnah in Shavuot do not necessarily reject the logic of the conceptual construction. Below, it will be seen from the Rosh's approach that he rejects it completely.

[8] It is necessary to discuss whether there is a new oath here, which is not the oath of the guards and not the oath of the partial acceptance, or whether this is actually the oath of the guards, but the conclusion that they are obligated to do so is also based on the logic of the partial acceptance. See below in the dispute between the Rosh and the elders, on a similar matter.

[9] Although this too will depend on the different understandings of the law of 'going away', etc.

[10] For a possible explanation for this, see mm The T.T. P.G. T.V.

[11] And so on. In the Shch. The Rabbi of the Sixth Council of the Seventy, who wrote this on behalf of the Rosh on the 6th of Deshavuot, understood that this was a Rambam who admitted to less than a Shish, and rejected his words. See also the words of the Ramban, Ritva, Rashba and Ran on the issue of mortgage on Shavuot (Meg 33a), who discuss this in relation to the method of the Rabbi Migash.

[12] See, for example, the above-mentioned Rishonim on the issue of a mortgage (Shavuot 34a). They explain, in various shades, that the Rambam intends to say that there was a confession of a penny here, and the Shach challenges this as I mentioned above. They also challenge their own proposal in the Rambam regarding the ruling on a matter of measure, number, and weight.

[13] And the first and the last debated all this, in accordance with the opinion of the Rambam. See, for example, The innovations of the G.I.D. (Soloveitchik) for Shavuot 34 A.D. (Ret-Riv in its pages), and in the book Fruit of Moses In matters of Shavuot, Ma'mun, 1981, letter B-C.

[14] And below we will see a disagreement among the Rishonim (the Rosh and the Gedolim in the Book of Genesis 6:1) as to whether the qualities of the teachers are transferred to the offspring learned from them, as in

[15] And when I spoke about this with Rabbi Asher Deutsch, one of the leaders of the Ponivez Yeshiva, he offered two explanations for this:

1. 'What is the side' is a measure in Torah interpretation. Avot Nizkin are explicitly written in the Torah, and therefore they can be expanded by means of the measures that the Torah requires. However, Shabbat works are not explicitly written in the Torah, but Chazal defined them in light of the connection of Shabbat to the tabernacle (and perhaps by virtue of the fact that there are 3 Avot, which means that in the Torah there are 3 times the verb 'work'. See Babylonian Shabbat 44b). Therefore, it is not appropriate to expand them by means of any sermonic measure.
2. Chazal define three different Avot Melacha, by virtue of the inference of Shabbat from the Tabernacle. If there were an additional Melacha that was taught in the "Ma' Tzad" from two Avots, then it would have to be another Avot, the forty in number. However, it is known that there are only three Avot Melacha, and therefore it is clear that they cover all the basic possibilities of Melacha.

And we must admit that these explanations are not enough for us. As for the first explanation, it is clear that in all of the Torah we learn from the learned, except for holy things (see Zebachim, page 50 and surrounding). That is, in all of the Torah, except for holy things, it is possible to use the standards that the Torah requires even with regard to laws that themselves were created from the teachings. If so, why can't we use "what is the side" in relation to the works that were learned from the teachings?

As for the second explanation, it can be said that here we are talking about a consequence and not a father. The work that will be learned in the "what is the side" from two different fathers of work will be a consequence of both of them and not a new father. There is no point in defining it as a father, since it can be learned from the existing fathers (although in them there are two for this, and not a kind of one). In torts, there are consequences of two fathers and they are consequences. The reason why they are classified as consequences is precisely this: that they can be learned from the existing fathers. Fathers are fundamental modes (of work, or damage) that cannot be learned from the other fathers, not even from a combination of several of them, unless the Torah renewed them themselves. And see below, Chapter 6, which expands on the definition of the concepts "father" and "progress."

If so, I do not see sufficient reason why such a situation should not also exist in Sabbath work.

In the note below, we will return to these two explanations, and it seems that perhaps the first of them underlies the Rosh's method.

[16] And will a man not be liable for grinding because of a miller? And for a man who is a miller, he is only responsible for the crops of the land, since a person is like the land, and some of the latter also explained this regarding the law of the work of a scythe. Perhaps he is not interested in grinding at all. However, he is interested in the scythe, since his desire is to keep the scythe away from him. And see the comment that follows.

[17] Indeed, the Rishonim disagreed on whether transferring and throwing are a verb or a result. See Ramban, Shabbat 33:1, which says that transferring is a result. And the Ritva there was satisfied with this. And the Rambam, in his 52nd chapter on Shabbat, wrote that transferring is like taking from the Rabbi to the Rabbi, and in the BH it says that reaching and throwing is a result.

And if there is a birth, then a rakika is a birth that is born on Shabbat. However, most Rishonim seem to think that even in a birth that is born on Shabbat, one is obligated (except for the method of Rabbi Shabbat 37b), and so on. In any case, for our purposes, there is no nefm in this, Dr. Menashe learns from the Hadith of Transfer and Injection regarding a rakika.

It should be noted that it is not clear whether he meant that the relationship between Raqiqa and the two teachers is like that of a descendant to its ancestors, and see this below, p.

[18] It should be noted that such a study is conditional on a certain understanding of the issue of BK 60a, where Rabbi Ashi says regarding the obligation of a zora and a spirit assisting him, that on Shabbat he is obligated and on Neziki he is exempt because on Shabbat the work of thought is forbidden by the Torah. And the early ones differed on the intention of his words. Rashi there explains that his thought was fulfilled by the spirit assisting him. And this means that this is a general principle, if his thought is fulfilled then even when he does a work with the spirit he is obligated. Whereas the Rosh there explains that although this is a work done in the gram (by the spirit), in the work of a zora the essence of its doing is by the spirit, and therefore he is obligated. And it follows from the Rosh that this is a principle that is true only with regard to the work of a zora, and nothing else.

Rabbi Menashe's teaching from Elijah seems reasonable, and even necessary, according to Rashi's understanding, that there is a general principle in all Shabbat work that when one is inspired by the Spirit, one is obligated. However, according to the Rosh, this is a special rule for the work of a zora, and one should not learn from it to discuss it.

It should be noted that Rashi's understanding of R. Menashe is not necessary. Rashi does not necessarily state that the rakika is the result of a Zora and a Mevir, but rather that it is the result of a Mevir. Zora himself is also one of the examples of the fact that a spirit is not exempt from the obligation to perform Shabbat work, but he is not the father of the other examples. Therefore, according to this formulation, even according to Rashi's method, there is no result here of two fathers. And I agree with Tzala on this.

In any case, one should examine the words of Rabbi Menashe, why he here considered it appropriate to be in the spirit, and after all, his purpose is not to bring the spit to another place, but to remove it from his people. This should be peppered with the ruling of the Shatlag and other sides, etc.

[19] See AnciT E. 'Building a Father' columns 3-5.

[20] See also in my book Two carts and a hot air balloon, pp. 404-406, where it was explained that the basis of the criterion of "what is the reason" is the assumption that every law in the Torah has only one reason.

[21] At the beginning of the first chapter, the Gemara discusses whether to liken the events of nezikin to the events of Shabbat, whose events are listed as 12, or to the events of impurity, which are not listed as 12. And it explains David's legacy (In his novellas, ibid.) that the Gem's doubt is whether the consequences of damages are educational consequences, as in Shabbat, or practical consequences, as in Toma'ah. In Toma'ah, the consequence is created by contact with the father, so this is not a way to learn the consequence but a way to create/beget it. In contrast, in Shabbat, the consequence is educational, meaning it is learned from its father. And in the Gem's opinion, what is explained in the course of the Gem'rah is that the consequences of a leg, for example, are things that the animal's leg kicked and caused damage, meaning practical consequences and not educational. According to the Gem's conclusion, even in Toma'ah the consequences are educational and not practical (perhaps with the exception of the rabbinical commentary, which may be the Gem's own conclusion, ibid. 3a, which is not the case with 12, since they are practical and not educational, and so on).

In light of what we said above, this distinction and its relation to our distinction here should be clarified further. The two types of histories that we saw in the OT according to The Nahalad, different from the examples of conceptual constructions. Here we create a concept from two other concepts. This is a theoretical construction. Here the derivative is not actually created from its parent, nor is it just learned from it as a principle. Here a new concept is created as a generalization, or combination, from two previous concepts.

[22] In the Mishnah and the Aramaic, each of the studies ends with the words "and the judgment is repeated," and not with "the equal side." Indeed, the Mishnah there ends with these words, and the Mishnah is nothing more than a detail of what is said in the Mishnah (the issue begins with the question: "for the sake of the day"). See this below.

[23] For this matter, please refer toThe innovations of the Griz Reish hl. Nazkei Mammon, in what he wrote there about this dispute, and in what he discussed there in general in all his words. It is possible that his intention is as we say below.

[24] The latter generally understood that there are only two methods in the Rosh: the great ones, and his own. They do not address the fact that some are content. The assumption is that the doubt is between these two positions, and therefore there is no position here that is fundamentally different.

However, we find that in the Rosh, three different positions are presented. Moreover, the position provided does not hesitate between the other two sides, but between the first side (that there should be all exemptions) and a completely opposite side (that there should be no exemptions at all). The Rosh's own side has not yet been presented at this stage, and therefore it is unlikely that he himself constitutes one of the doubters in the position provided.

[25] And in the comment above we saw that it is clear that they should be understood this way.

[26] Perhaps with the exception of the exemption of a tooth and a foot in the Rabbinical Council, which according to the Rif derives from the right of everyone to walk in the Rabbinical Council, and if so, it is not a geziak but a substantive exemption. And the Rishonim have already made it difficult for him in this regard (it is a requirement of the Te'ama Dekra). And see Genesis 16Solomon's, and ECM.

[27] And see this in the books of rules of the author of the Pamag, Lily of the Valley Rule A And a rose garden Rule 18.

[28] And in this we have somewhat returned to the formulations of the Gra Deutsch mentioned above, and so on.

[29] Although see the note above, where we stated that those who disagree with the Maimonides in interpreting the Mishnah on the Shavuot, and are reluctant to interpret it as the Shumarim oath, this is not necessarily because they do not accept the logic of the conceptual construction. The reason for this could certainly be a perception, as most of the Rishonim understood, that a Shumarim is not always obligated to take an oath when he comes to be discharged. For example, in the claim of the Rebbe, he was discharged without taking an oath from Torah. If this is so, then it cannot be concluded from the conceptual construction, even if we accept such a procedure on the logical level, that it is a Shumarim oath.

Although in the Rosh's method we see a consistent disagreement on this, and therefore it is certainly possible that he does not accept the very process of conceptual construction, and the problem in his opinion begins already on the logical level.

[30] And perhaps the Rosh's method is as explained by the aforementioned Gra Deutsch. Although this is only possible according to his first proposal, namely the proposal that 'what is the side' is an interpretive measure regarding what is written in the Torah for the Hadith and not regarding the Sabbath works that came out of the medrsha (the hikesh of the tabernacle). According to the second proposal, if there were such developments, they would have to be considered a separate father, and this would contradict the minyan of the lat Avot Melacha, this cannot be said according to the Rosh's method. The reason for this is that the Rosh in the 6th chapter understands that 'what is the side' is a teaching from only one of the teaching fathers, and the second father is only intended to remove a rifka. If so, in the end, this is a development of one father (of a fool, in that case) and not of both. If so, according to the Rosh, according to his method, it is clear that even if we were to find such a development, it would be a development of the same father from whom it is primarily learned, and there is no reason to treat it as an additional father. Above, we also argued the same for the method of the great men, who believe that the learning was done by the two teaching fathers. However, in the method of the Rosh, this seems completely clear, and it seems that here it would be very difficult to disagree with this.

[31] For an expanded discussion of the principles, see my book Two carts and a hot air balloon, Bethel, 5772, at the beginning of Chapter 4 of the second chapter, and especially in commentary 10 there.

A significant portion of the discussion in the second chapter deals with the meaning and essence of concepts in general, and this discussion is also indirectly related to the subject of Didan, et al.

[32] See my articles inNoon B, 'What are the laws?', which deals with a similar example of stacking laws (conflicting, in the case discussed there) on top of each other.

[33] These two examples of conceptual constructions are not explicitly presented in Shas as a teaching from two fathers. Shas perceives them as such intuitively, as a combination of these two fathers. The logical procedure is implicit. Only United Nations AndC.P. They are the ones who point out that there is a change in construction here, and not just a mere conceptual addition.

[34] See the book of the Grand Master of the Order of the Holy See, Kosher. Northern decoder, Jerusalem 1950, in the eighth chapter.

[35] See my upcoming article inNoon Tu.

[36] These distinctions relate to what I called in my aforementioned book an analytical (analytical) consideration, or form of thinking, which is contrasted there with a synthetic (expansive) form of thinking, or consideration.

[37] See my articles onNoon 12, 2logic In, and in the aforementioned books, Illumination 2 and 22.

[38] It should be noted that Maimonides is difficult, because if he did indeed study the Mishnah on Shavuot as we have said, it is not clear why he did not bring the halakhic innovation of conceptual construction anywhere in his book. Or perhaps if he understood the construction process as a necessary deduction, then the matter was simple in his eyes, and therefore he found no place to bring it.

And above, we saw that it is possible that he brings this up in the context of a wish and a deposit, in the name of.