Reference to the Jerusalem Regional Court Decision on Marriage Registration

With God’s help

Notes on the Psada – Michael Avraham: Original Version

The things are written as a response The scandalous verdict of the Jerusalem District Court, who did not approve the registration of a marriage for a couple I married under a condition.

I will preface here what I will see in more detail in these pages. Our situation is similar to the case in which Shimon sues Reuven for not doing what he should have done, when Shimon himself, as the person with authority, prevented him from doing so because of his own (Shimon's) clear interest that does not concern the public good. But Shimon is not satisfied with that. He himself ascends to the judges' stand and judges Reuven for the criminal offense that he himself committed. And not only that, but in his ruling he bases his judgment on baseless reasoning, some of which are completely incorrect and some of which are irrelevant, and in the end, unsurprisingly, he convicts Reuven. Does this sound like Korah's story about Moses and the ram? As I will now show, it is actually more like a story by Kafka.

introduction

On page 9 of the Psahd, the following is stated:

The applicants' attorney herself notes in Section 27 of the briefs the serious attitude of the Jewish judges and rabbinical courts towards the phenomenon of private marriages without proper registration at an authorized rabbinical office. She refers to Rabbinical Case No. 911486/1 dated 1 Tammuz 5773 (9.6.13) and Rabbinical Case No. 857865/2 dated 25 Chesvan 5774 (29.10.13), in which they noted that the Marriage and Divorce Ordinance (Registration) (No. 2) 5774-2013 was amended before the judgment was signed and a criminal sanction of up to two years in prison was imposed on anyone who does not take care of registering their own marriage or divorce or the registration of a marriage or divorce that they have arranged for someone else. We also note the Personal Status Amendment Case No. 794163/1 from the Court of Appeals. A decree dated 29 Adar 5769 (25.3.09) was published in Nevo, in which the court appealed "to the President of the High Court and all the authorized entities within their power to bring about legislative amendments that will define private marriages as a criminal offense, and to determine penalties and fines for those who violate the directives of the Council of the Supreme Court in all matters relating to the registration and conduct of marriages as a public institution, and the conduct of marriages and their registration lawfully and properly. In this regard, we ask the President of the High Court to contact the private courts and inform them of the seriousness of the matter and the problems caused by this."

The court presents things as if the law prohibits holding private weddings. But as the wording of the law indicates (and confirmed by several expert lawyers I consulted), this is a false representation. Section 7, which was added to the Marriage Ordinance, states:

7. Anyone who does not take care of registering his own marriage or divorce, or the registration of the marriage or divorce he has arranged for someone else, is liable to two years in prison.

A criminal offense is defined here, punishable by up to two years in prison, for "anyone who does not take care of registering their marriage or divorce or the marriage or divorce that they have arranged for someone else." What is written here is the opposite of what the court presents, since here there is an obligation to register a marriage and there is no offense in conducting private wedding ceremonies. On the contrary, the language of the law is "to register the marriage that he has arranged for someone else," meaning that the obligation is to take care of the registration after the marriage has taken place. If there was a prohibition on conducting private wedding ceremonies, the law should have established an offense for someone who conducts a wedding ceremony before registering, and not for someone who does not register after conducting a wedding ceremony. The conclusion is that those who are breaking the law here are the court and the Chief Rabbinate, who refuse to register the couple who are legally married.

I would like to point out that our goal here was not to conduct private Kiddushin against the law, but rather, to sanctify ourselves as we see fit (i.e. conditional Kiddushin, which the Rabbinate does not allow) and follow the provisions of the law and register the marriages that were legally arranged. The ones preventing this are the High Court and the Chief Rabbinate.

A. Confirmation of singleness.

Rabbi Levin's confirmation of singleness was not a test of singleness, but only a confirmation of singleness. I had tested singleness even before. In any case, confirming singleness does not delay the consecration if it turns out retroactively that the couple were single.

B. Prenuptial agreement

The prenuptial agreement was drawn up by Rabbi Pearl of Malon Shvut, who is authorized by the Chief Rabbinate, and many other rabbis use this wording. It is precisely now that the court has been called and we have become aware of the need to examine the issue. Is Rabbi Pearl also such a "people of the land" (like me, MA) who does not know the nature of gittin and kiddushin? So why is he authorized by the Chief Rabbinate to deal with them?

It is surprising to us that the High Court itself is now asking the Chief Rabbinate to regulate guidelines regarding prenuptial agreements and conditional weddings. The issue has been at the center of public debate for years. Many have expressed their opinions one way or the other, and the debates are heated. There are different versions of agreements and conditions, and everyone uses what they see fit. The Chief Rabbinate, which is supposed by law to regulate all of this, says nothing about the conditions or the prenuptial agreements.

Suddenly, Rabbi Perl and the HM are receiving harsh criticism. Suddenly, they remembered that there is a burning issue here that is important to our hearts, and that the Chief Rabbinate is not doing its duty. The plight of the agunot and refused women and the plight of the couples did not bother them. The heated debates did not affect any of them. But as soon as the matter reached the point of harming the monopoly of the Rabbinate, then the court immediately called and called on the Chief Rabbinate to establish a policy in an area that is its responsibility. I will point out that if there were indeed a reasonable prenuptial agreement or deed of marriage that the Rabbinate would approve of using, I am sure that many (including us) would use them. No one is looking for trouble and problems. It is no wonder that where there are no people, there are those who fulfill the instruction of our rabbis: Try to be a man.

C. The witness's withdrawal from his testimony

In the Pesahd it is stated that one of the witnesses testified that he did not remember signing a promissory note. Later it turned out that he had signed the note, and he remembered that he had indeed done so. This is testimony given several months after the act, and it is no wonder that a witness does not remember all the details of the act and what exactly was there. Therefore, the matter does not arouse any suspicion whatsoever (and regarding the law, there is no circular and Magid, see the Necham on Maimonides, hal., testimony of pg. 355). In any case, the promissory note is in no way related to the application of the kiddushin, and therefore the discussions regarding it are in the nature of false excuses and do not concern the matter.

D. The date on the promissory note.

It really puzzles me that the date on the bill is one day late (13 Av). I'm not sure how this mistake happened. But the bill was signed by the witnesses, after I explained to them and the couple what was involved, and then proceeded to the Kiddushin.

In any case, the two witnesses testified explicitly in the court that it was done before the Kiddushin, and there are other witnesses to this (the parents of the bride and groom and the guests who were there and saw the signing ceremony). The court gave me a bad name as if all of this raises suspicion about what was done there (I see no other interpretation than that I cheated, and acted against the halacha and forged a conditional deed after the marriage, and I was also stupid enough to write the correct date on it, i.e. the later one). In any case, even if one suspects a fake and fictitious deed, there are one of two possibilities: either the date is correct and the deed was signed after the Kiddushin (i.e. I am a complete fraud) and then of course there is no condition at all here. Or the deed was signed on time and there was a scrivener's error in the date (which of course was the case). If so, at most it is a late deed due to a scrivener's error (it was mistakenly written later after the deed was done), and this certainly does not invalidate the deed, even in a deed where there is a fear of consequences, which is not the case here. And if the bill is invalidated, then there is unconditional sanctification here, and the order of succession is eliminated.

The claim that in light of the witness's recantation of his testimony, there is concern about what happened at the time of the act is baseless and biased. This is a clerical error on a single day's date.

It goes without saying that in the Gemara and the Poskim it is common for people to sometimes make mistakes even by a few days in the date (see, for example, Shulchan Aruch 33:67 and many others). In any case, the witnesses now testify that the condition was indeed made on time (before the Kiddushin). Even if the deed and the condition were invalidated by this, then in such a situation the condition is null and void and the deed exists as if the conditions were canceled in every respect. Therefore, the Kiddushin is certainly valid, and according to their shameful and baseless claim that I forged the deed of the condition, it follows that these were Kiddushin without conditions and in any case there is no reason to register them.

E. Appeals on the validity of the condition

There are other hints in the Pesahd concerning the validity of the condition because of the wording of the contract. I will not enter into this discussion, since if the condition is void then the entire discussion is unnecessary. We have unconditional consecration and marriage and there is no obstacle to registering them.

In the margins of my remarks, I will note that although the Talmud states that after marriage the condition stipulated in the kiddushin expires because a person does not commit adultery on the grounds of fornication, it is clear that this is not the case in the case under discussion. The couple, with full knowledge and a willing mind, declared that they intended this condition to apply even after marriage. In such a situation, it is certain that the condition does not expire at any time. But as stated, this discussion is unnecessary, since even if, in the opinion of the court, the condition expires with the marriage – then there is no room for discussion. As stated above, we now have kiddushin without conditions and there is no obstacle to registering them.

F. Kiddushin by mistake on the understanding that there is a condition.

In the Peshad, the claim was raised (by way of an anecdote) that the couple thought that this was a conditional kiddushi, and since the condition was not valid, one must discuss here a mistaken kiddushi, since they did not sanctify themselves knowingly.

As any child understands, this claim has no basis. After all, any condition that is void due to formal halachic requirements (such as a double condition, both before and after, a condition that is not in the Torah, etc.) according to halachic law, the condition is void and the act exists (see the explanation in the words of Rabbi Yitzhak in Torah Ketuboth 8:1 and many others). According to the reasoning of the dayanim in the Pesahed, we should have said in all these situations that the condition is void, then the act is also void, since they knew that they did not do the act (this is precisely the question of the Torah there, which made it difficult to say why they did not say this, and then the explanation). Therefore, it is clear that if the condition is void, the act exists even if the couple thought that the kiddushin was in accordance with the condition and were mistaken.

G. Registration of conditional kiddushes and their status.

The court raises the strange argument that it is unreasonable to register a wedding ceremony that was held under a condition, since in the future it may turn out that because of the condition, the couple is not married at all.

This claim is wonderful in our eyes. And did the court fail to see that the halakha, as well as every legal system in the world, recognizes conditional transactions as valid and strictly kosher? As long as the condition is not violated, the transaction is valid. Furthermore, the accepted view in the law of conditions (see a large collection of evidence for this in the novellas of Rabbi Shimon Yehuda HaCohen (Shekap) on Gittin, last paragraph – the booklet of conditions) is that even if the condition is violated, the annulment of the deed is made “from now on and retroactively.” That is, the deed is valid and exists in any case, but if the condition is not met, it is displaced from its place and annulled (and not as is sometimes thought that the non-fulfillment of the condition reveals that the deed never applied). See the implications there. If so, according to the halakha, a deed with a condition applies to each party, whether the condition was met or not. However, if the condition was not met, the deed is displaced from its place retroactively. Therefore, as long as this has not happened, there is no doubt about the deed and the transaction is completely valid and existing.

And here, even if the conditionality of marriage is not necessarily recognized in ordinary civil law systems, for our purposes what is important is that the halakhah views the kiddushin as a type of transaction that can be conditioned. Let us not forget that the halakhah recognizes conditional kiddushin, and as long as this is done lawfully, there are valid kiddushin for all intents and purposes. Therefore, there is no halakhic or legal impediment to registering them. On the contrary, there is a legal obligation to register them, since these are valid kiddushin for all intents and purposes, and they are now a married couple (and even if in the future one of them violates the condition and the kiddushin is annulled). At most, a "warning note" can be recorded, as is customary in the sale of land subject to conditions, but this does not cloud the legal and halakhic treatment of them as a married couple for all intents and purposes.

Come to your own conclusion, according to the logic of the Psada, it follows that it is impossible to register any couple as married, since there are situations in which the halakha itself invalidates their kiddushin retroactively. For example, if the husband appoints a messenger for divorce and they annul it without his presence, the halakha considers the kiddushin to be invalid retroactively. In other words, every act of kiddushin is done based on a condition (perhaps implicitly, and according to some of the first scholars, the condition is explicit in the language of the Temple, which says "according to the law of Moses and Israel"). In every act of kiddushin of the Temple, there is a condition that if such and such happens, their kiddushin is invalid. If so, we should not register any couple who married according to the law, lest in the future the husband appoints a messenger to divorce and annul it (or another reason for forfeiture arises), and then it turns out that their kiddushin will be forfeited retroactively. Is it reasonable because of this not to register any couple in the world for marriage at all?!

H. Separating the Kiddushin from the marriage.

During the Talmud, it was customary to separate the Kiddushin and the marriage for twelve months. After a while, most communities began to combine them for various reasons (so that the husband would not run away or to save on a meal, etc.). It is clear that this custom has no effect on the validity of the Kiddushin except in places and times that have made a special regulation that forfeits the Kiddushin or the Kiddushin money. The poskim cited in the Pesach Had imposed a boycott on them that the citizens of the city can boycott. I am not aware of any citizens of Jerusalem boycotting anyone who separates the Kiddushin from the marriage. And it is certainly not possible to create a retroactive boycott at will. And it is certainly clear that this court has no authority to set aside the Kiddushin money and to forfeit the Kiddushin itself, and it certainly has no authority to do so retroactively without determining in advance that the person who does so has his Kiddushin invalid.

Even if we see such a break as an actual separation, some separation between the consecration and the marriage is a custom that existed in some communities.[1] He who claims that the one who does so has his sanctifications nullified, with his vain mouth, nullifies many sanctifications that were performed in the communities of Israel in several places, and this should not be done.

It is true that the Pesachad cites a rumor about a boycott imposed at some point in Jerusalem on the separation of the kiddushin and the chuppah. Before I discuss this unfounded claim, the dayanim allowed me to remind them that there is a much less ancient Jerusalem boycott on entry to the Temple of Solomon, and there is also a not-so-ancient Jerusalem boycott on children's education in schools (the Shakales ban). Do any of them adhere to this today? The Chief Rabbinate itself was located in the Temple of Solomon. And in general, would anyone think of canceling kiddushin today by virtue of this strange and anonymous boycott because of the separation between them and marriage? If we adopted every boycott ever imposed in any community on any subject, we could cancel almost all the kiddushin that have ever been performed. We have never heard of such a reckless cancellation of kiddushin without cause. I wish the Chief Rabbinate's Rabbinate would do this in difficult cases of divorce refusals. But for some reason, in the case of Didan, they have become committed to every rumor about an esoteric boycott ever imposed, and that alone is enough to confiscate a child.

But now I will see that these are just empty things. Even if we accept that boycott, it says not to consecrate separately from the marriage in Jerusalem. But after all, we did not do our consecration in Jerusalem, but in Kibbutz Ein Zurim. Only the marriage took place in Jerusalem a few hours later. And now I will see that a review of the sources that cite that strange boycott shows that in this way, even if we accept for some reason that Jerusalem custom, there is no problem.

In the Responsa Admat Kodesh, Avha'az 63 (mentioned in the Pesahed) wrote:

However, I have written here for my consideration a word that our ears have heard from our ancestors to the saints who are in the land, that there is an ancient agreement between the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the rabbis and the sages of the world, who are in the land of their foundation in a worldly ban until a righteous teacher comes that no man may consecrate a woman before bringing her into the inner courtyard of Jerusalem from the wall and inward, and not from the city wall, and beyond to the end of the thousand cubits, which is the Sabbath boundary, and our eyes, which see that on the occasion that a woman needs to be consecrated for some necessary reason according to the need of the hour, the sanctuary invites ten people and he and his matchmaker go with ten people outside the city to the holy place where the righteous Simeon is buried, which is outside the boundary and is consecrated there…

It is clear to us in his language that there is no impediment to going out and consecrating outside of Jerusalem in the name of the righteous Shimon. This is also explained in the words of the Responsa Pri Haaretz, which were cited in the Responsa Yabia Umer, which were cited in that pashad:

For it is known from the passages mentioned in the Halacha in the Responsa Peri Haaretz 33 (Hahaha 326 33) and Zal, it is known to all the scholars of the Holy Land of Jerusalem 55, that there is an ancient agreement among us regarding the banishments and excommunications and all the validity of the sanctifications that are in the land of the living, that no daughter of Israel may be sanctified before the time of marriage within the boundaries of a city, and whoever passes through the land to be sanctified, those sanctifications are nullified and stand, and even if there are a hundred witnesses, our rabbis will have him make a sanctification of one of them, and indeed he is caught in the net of Nachash. And this agreement is practiced among us until a righteous teacher comes. And so we practice in the matter of a matter. And no woman is sanctified except at the time of marriage in the Holy Land of Jerusalem, except in Shimon the Tzadik, who is outside the boundaries of Jerusalem. Therefore. This matter was also mentioned in the Responsa Admat Kodesh (Chaha'a 33:106b), which is a global prohibition not to make kodesh except during the time of the wedding.

It is important to note that the prohibition is "to sanctify within the city limits" (within the land), and not on someone who sanctifies in Shimon the Righteous, and certainly not on someone who sanctifies in a kibbutz further away.

Now we must ask: What did these Jerusalemites do in ancient times who went out to consecrate themselves in Shimon the Righteous? Where did they then hold the marriage? Probably in Jerusalem, because if they also performed the marriage along with the consecration in Shimon the Righteous, then why did they go out at all? After all, they could have done the consecration and marriage together as they wished, in Jerusalem itself. The conclusion is that they performed the consecration in Shimon the Righteous and then performed the marriage in Jerusalem. But that is exactly what we did in Ein Zurim and Jerusalem.

And in general, how much separation does there need to be between the kiddushin and the marriage in order to annul it? Does someone who reads the ketubah (as is usually done to separate the kiddushin from the marriage) with melodies and dances, so that it takes about an hour, annul the kiddushin? So how much is needed for the break to be considered? An hour, two hours, three hours? Or maybe a day, or a week? In the Pesach, it was clear to the dayim that a few hours were enough. And it was so clear to them that they sided with the kiddushin being invalid. And here the son asks: Where do you get this from? Is this enough to annul kiddushins that were performed in a manner that is not customary?

Furthermore, it seems simple to explain that a separation of a few hours between the Kiddushin and the wedding when they are already married and are together, having a meal in the evening, and constantly engaged in the same matter, is like a ritual of arikta (as if playing music while reading the Ketubah, see above) and a shita that should not be seen as a break between the Kiddushin and the marriage.

In fact, this is proven from the same answers, since they did not have cars at that time, and therefore I assume that it took them several hours to get from Shimon the Tzadik to Jerusalem. For us, a break of several hours between a wedding and a kiddushin is not considered a break (at least when the kiddushin is performed outside of Jerusalem). If so, our break is not a break either.

Ultimately, the claim about the separation of Kiddushin and marriage is completely unfounded. This is another idle argument that does not hold water and shows the tendency of the Psada.

In the margins of my remarks here, I cannot avoid another comment and protest. The ruling presents me as someone who acts against the customs of Israel from the beginning (this is also what they accused me of doing in the court session). This sounds extremely puzzling, if you remember that the Av Beit Din, Rabbi Lavi, headed the panel that ruled on the acquittal of a divorce that they heard went against all of Israel, and he did so contrary to the halachic opinion of all the jurists and sages of Israel in all generations (and not just against accepted customs). One can argue about the halachic reasonableness of that ruling and this is not the place for it, but one cannot argue that it is contrary to the practice and ruling in the communities of Israel in all generations and places, and of course also in our country. And now the author of the act (Rabbi Lavi) comes and accuses me of deviating from the customs of Israel?! I wonder.

9. Arranging a legal document by someone who is not qualified.

The claim of arranging the Kiddushin by someone who is not qualified is very puzzling. My summaries submitted to the court and also mentioned in their Psahed indicate that the Shulchan and Nukk themselves do not have such a problem, and certainly, by all accounts, this does not affect the validity of the Kiddushin themselves (at most, the one arranging the Kiddushin is a criminal).

For the benefit of the readers, I will copy here the relevant section from the document I sent to the court, which for some reason did not convince them. The reader will see and judge whether their words have a place in the Psahed after these clarifications:

onShulchan Arba'ah Abba Zechariah 64:3 wrote: Anyone who is not familiar with the quality of Gittit and Kedushin should not have any business with them to instruct them, for he could easily make a mistake and violate the modesty, causing the proliferation of bastards in Israel. Here the author states that proficiency is required to "instruct" in gittin and kiddushin. AndB.S. There is a Sqd. who wrote on behalf of the16: To instruct them. The Tez is precise in that it is forbidden to instruct, but it is permissible to arrange a kiddushin. There is no mention of instructing, but it is permissible to arrange a get. There are many details that are forbidden to arrange, but I know the nature of the gettin: And16 There he stated that it was indeed customary to honor the Kiddushin siddur without any special conditions: […] And the custom among us that honors the Kiddushin arrangement is not even a great scholarly study of divorce. Although inB.S. There, SKB wrote: To instruct them. The Hebrew text is accurate, but it is permissible to arrange holy things, as in Ts'ho' Sha'bii Ch'3, 317, which is not so, but that God does not arrange holy things from the beginning, and that the Shas did not take any business with him, meaning any business with the matter of holy things and gittin, and also Rashi, the late, who said that there should be no judge in the matter, not because it is precisely because there should be a judge to decide on the gittin or holy things, whether they are proper, but that God does not arrange them from the beginning, and this is included in the general category of a judge, and so it is meant in Ts'ho' Mahri's Ch'6, 35, 36, and certainly not in the absence of these generations who were accustomed to arranging holy things without the permission of the Rabbi, because one must feel that there are many obstacles that come to the holy things, such as the prohibition of nakedness or other things, as has happened in our times, and there in Ts'ho' the Gaon, the author of the same, wrote that this matter was a regulation of the rabbis of France who were in the time of the Rabbi. They decreed and said that no one shall arrange for a holy place, 21. He who is elected as a rabbi or a chief priest in his community, and whoever transgresses these 22. As for the name and the like, this is from the second part of the second part of the third part of the fifth He cites a regulation in France from the time of the Rabbis, who used to order the Kiddushin ceremony under the authority of a rabbi or a religious leader in his community. The Rabbis and the French sages apparently followed the method of the Torah scholars, but Rashi decided that this instruction was only for teaching and not for ordering the Kiddushin ceremony, etc. It is important to note that the author ofShulchan Arba'ah He who was aware of the disagreement between Rashi and Tos on this matter and yet used the phrase "to instruct them" certainly intended to decide the halakhic law according to Rashi's method. And so he did in the Hadiya, where he wrote: To instruct, etc. Rashi, there is no explanation, there is an addition: We have learned that, according to the owner of theShulchan Arba'ah himself (and the Rema does not disagree) and several other important poskim do not prevent anyone from arranging Kiddushin even if they do not know their nature. And certainly someone who knows the nature of the GOK but does not have the authorization or permission to do so. And also the opinion that prohibits (theB.S.) This is only a law to begin with (which was "practiced" and "customed" to be so), and it certainly has no effect on the validity of the kiddushin. And actions that occur every day, even in recent generations, where yeshivot heads and rabbis are honored with arranging kiddushin for their students and acquaintances, and there is no excuse here. The Chief Rabbinate itself has approved and authorizes various rabbis to arrange kiddushin solely by virtue of their public status. And I did not mention granting approval to gettin arranged in private courts, even for a gett, which, according to the majority of all poskim, is permissible. I will add here that students who studied with me arrange kiddushin with the approval of the Chief Rabbinate, and some were even required to bring a certificate from me in order to be tested for teaching (on Shabbat) in the Chief Rabbinate exams. Therefore, I think I can estimate with a high degree of probability that even though I do not have a certification from the Chief Rabbinate (and I have never sought to receive one), I am more knowledgeable about the nature of the GOK than many others who have received certification from the Chief Rabbinate. Therefore, from a legal perspective, there is nothing wrong with what I did, and there is certainly nothing wrong with the kiddushin themselves. Furthermore, in my personal view, the required certification in halakhic law is not necessarily a certification from the Chief Rabbinate, since to the best of my understanding it has no halakhic status, but at most a legal-legal status. I have received the authority and recognition of my Torah knowledge from my rabbis and friends over the years and from students who study in my classes, and from those who read my writings, and from those who ask me about halakhic law and thought. As stated, this is also common practice in the religious and rabbinical world in general. How many of the greatest yeshivot heads and poskim were not certified to teach, and certainly not by the Chief Rabbinate. And would it occur to anyone that these scholars are not well-versed in the quality of gittin and kiddushin? Let the matter sink in and remain unsaid.

And here, in the Pasha, a renewed claim was made against my words: All of this is true only with regard to ordinary kiddushin, but not in special and complex kiddushin such as in the case of Didan, the arrangement of which is in the nature of a halakhic ruling regarding these matters themselves. Therefore, here it is obligatory that the orderer of the kiddushin be formally qualified, since he must know how to instruct in halakhic law in such a complex case.

Beyond the fascinating innovation that the dayanim introduced ad hoc, which has no real source in the words of the poskim and no logic, even if they are still right about the halakhah of the kiddushin themselves, there is no complexity here and no doubt and no ruling is required. At most, it is a matter of the complexity of the condition, and the poskim who compiled it, not the rabbi of the kiddushin order, have already ruled on it. As a kiddushin order, I did not need to review the questions of conditions in the kiddushin, and I was not required to rule on it at all.

And in general, what is the point of the condition and its validity for the health of the kiddushin and their complexity? I will now repeat that even if we accept the strange innovation that the condition is not valid because the person who performed it (and not the kiddushin) is not qualified, the kiddushin is still completely valid. And is the court now reissuing a new ruling from its belief that conditional kiddushins themselves are not valid because of the complexity of the condition? No rabbi, including the most ardent opponents of conditional kiddushins, has said this anywhere. Therefore, none of this concerns the validity of the kiddushins themselves, of course.

I would also add that there is a selective approach here, since there are several rabbis and also people who are not rabbis who conduct private Kiddushin, and their names are known to all (some of them have appeared in newspaper articles). Furthermore, all of these are not criminals, since as I showed above, the law does not prohibit conducting private Kiddushin (see the introduction), but they do not comply with the law that requires registration after arranging the Kiddushin (see my comments there). And look, it is a wonder, they are left to their own devices and the Chief Rabbinate ignores them and their actions despite the difficult problems that their actions create. And it is precisely we who insist on enforcing the law as it is and preventing all the problems that arise from the failure to register a legally married couple, who are perceived and presented as criminals. I saw an upside-down world. The Rabbinate refuses to register the couple, thereby creating the problems that the law is intended to prevent.

J. The consent of the legal counsel to undertake not to do this again.

In the Pesahad, the dayanim repeat over and over again that the wedding officiant (meaning me) did not agree to commit not to do it again as an excuse not to register the marriage (according to the instructions of the Director General of the Chief Rabbinate). Their words indicate that if I had committed to this, they would have been willing to register the couple as married. And I wonder where all their learned reasoning went? Where did the date on the contract deed go, the mistaken kiddushin, the performing of the kiddushin by someone who is not qualified, the separation of the kiddushin from the marriage, and so on and so forth. Would my commitment have solved all these problems? Needless to say, this also proves that all of these are false and empty excuses that have no substance.

As stated in the introduction, the language of the law clearly indicates that conducting private Kiddushin is not a criminal offense at all. The law only requires that they be registered, before or after they are held. Therefore, the one who is violating the law here, if at all, is the court and the Chief Rabbinate that refuse to register the couple, and certainly not the rabbi or the couple. But in light of these things, there is now room for wonder, if indeed, as the Psahed states, conducting private Kiddushin is a criminal offense, then it is not clear what the relevance of my undertaking, even if it were given, not to do it again? It is an undertaking not to commit a criminal offense again. After all, I am obligated and will not do it due to the law, regardless of the undertaking that I give or do not give before the court. And will the undertaking prevent what the criminal law fails to prevent? The Chief Rabbinate decided to copy into state law the halakhic concept of Nidrei Ziruzin (an oath to fulfill a mitzvah or to refrain from a prohibition).

11. Summary.

As explained here, there is no real challenge from any party to the validity of the Kiddushin, and in any case, there is no reason not to register them, for the following reasons:

1. Even the jurists who oppose conditional kiddush and prenuptial agreements have not considered annulling the kiddushin performed on a condition. Therefore, the question of whether or not it is appropriate to perform a conditional kiddushin is irrelevant to the question of the validity of the kiddushin, and therefore also to the question of their legal registration.
2. A later date does not invalidate the promissory note.
3. Even if the condition itself is void, whether because of the date, whether because there is no condition in the marriage, or because of another detail in it – a situation is created in which the condition is void and the act exists. If so, we are talking about unconditional kiddushin and the problems that appear in the Pesahed regarding the condition have disappeared.
4. As we have seen, the claim that kiddushin performed on the basis of a condition when there is no valid condition are kiddushin of error and are therefore invalid is baseless. It stands in stark contrast to settled law that is agreed upon by all poskim.
5. Conducting a Kiddushin by someone who is not qualified does not invalidate a Kiddushin according to any opinion in the world, and according to most poskim, I am not even prohibited from doing so. Furthermore, I certainly see myself as someone who is worthy and knowledgeable enough to do so (and I have proven that knowledge is enough and no permission is needed, certainly not from the Chief Rabbinate), and therefore in any case the discussion is irrelevant.
6. Separating the Kiddushin from the marriage is at most a custom. It is not forbidden and it certainly does not invalidate the Kiddushin. As we have shown even to the Jerusalem custom (which itself is apparently not binding in the case under discussion), what we did was completely proper and therefore the Kiddushin is not invalidated by any opinion in the world. We have shown that in a case like ours, where there was an out-of-bounds departure, none of the boycotters ever thought of prohibiting it, and certainly not of applying the boycott. Not to mention the fact that the separation was for a few hours while they were "busy with the same matter," and this does not constitute separation.
7. The prenuptial agreement was prepared and signed by a qualified rabbi on behalf of the Chief Rabbinate (Rabbi Perl), and therefore it is not possible for the Chief Rabbinate to invalidate it, especially when there are no other guidelines that it itself has established. It is surprising that no systematic guidelines have been established regarding the agreement as well as regarding the condition. In any case, of course, defects in the prenuptial agreement do not invalidate the consecrations and do not affect their validity.
8. I have shown that there is no obstacle to registering a marriage just because it was made on condition, like any other transaction made on condition. An act made on condition is fully valid, and only if the condition is not met is it nullified retroactively.
9. In my opinion, no unconcerned rabbi would say that he has even the slightest doubt about the validity of the Kiddushin themselves in the case under discussion. We have seen that the Masada itself indicates that the dayanim view the Kiddushin as completely valid, for they would be willing to register them if the drafter of the law had undertaken not to repeat it again.

Two questions about the Kafkaesque dimension of the matter

I will conclude with two questions about the conduct of the Beit Din and the Chief Rabbinate in general.

The reversal of fortunes. The Criminal Code accuses the couple and me of a criminal charge of failing to register a marriage, when the institution responsible for the registration (the Chief Rabbinate) refuses to register them even though they were married legally. To me, this is similar to an income tax official refusing to accept from a taxpayer the tax payment he owes, and then charges him with criminal charges for not paying his taxes properly.

Conflict of interest. The bottom line is that it is clear to everyone that the claims in the Civil Procedure Code are unfounded, to say the least, and they come only from the court's unwillingness to register the couple as a married couple. Reliance on esoteric methods taken out of context, biased and baseless interpretation, presenting trivial matters as if they were mountains hanging by a thread, all of these testify to a biased approach by the court. It is clear that they decided to seek every possible way not to register these Kiddushin, no matter what. In their distress, when they found no halachic basis to invalidate the validity of the Kiddushin, they needed a collection of several flimsy arguments, none of which would have been accepted in any other context. This testifies to the inherent conflict of interest in this discussion, since the Chief Rabbinate and its representatives (the Beit Din) are discussing their own powers here. It follows that the judicial authority here is not independent, as it should be. In this case, it is clear that not only the fear and the law of the law are before its eyes, but also a clear interest. The Beit Din is protecting the powers of the institution by virtue of which it operates and is trying to prevent them from being violated. As the last of the interested parties. Supposedly there is a discussion here between Reuven and Shimon, when Shimon himself is one of the judges sitting in judgment.

Now I return to the starting point of my remarks. What emerges from these two perplexities is that our situation is similar to the following case: Shimon sues Reuven for not doing what he should have done, when Shimon himself, as the person with authority, prevented him from doing so due to his own clear interest that does not concern the public good. But Shimon is not satisfied with that. He himself ascends to the judges' stand and judges Reuven for the criminal offense he himself committed. He bases his ruling on groundless reasoning, partly incorrect and partly irrelevant, and in the end, unsurprisingly, convicts Reuven. Franz Kafka could have made a point of this.

12. Concluding remarks.

Registering a marriage is not a privilege that can be denied to someone, even if they acted unlawfully (which, of course, we argue, is not the case here). It is a legal obligation in any case where the consecration is valid. Anyone who does not register a valid marriage is violating the criminal law and deserves punishment.

In a purposive interpretation, it is clear that the obligation to register is intended to prevent serious halachic and legal problems, as the court itself notes and as is clear from the language of the law. It is amazing to our understanding that it can be argued that the failure to register will prevent, in the court's opinion, the problems that registration itself is intended to prevent. After all, this policy of the court results in many getting married privately and not registering at all. And many more other couples are not getting married at all as a common-law couple, neither private nor public, because of the disgrace of the Chief Rabbinate and its ways. Is this result what is being sought? Are these not the problems that the law in whose name the dayanim wave their hands was intended to prevent? We were the ones who tried to prevent this problem, and ironically, we are accused of creating them.

It is precisely the distorted and monopolistic policy of the Chief Rabbinate that creates the problems that I/we are accused of. The problems that stem from the failure to register marriages fall entirely on the shoulders of the Chief Rabbinate, whose conduct creates antagonism and causes people to avoid using its services and try to bypass it, thus creating extremely serious legal and halakhic problems (as is publicly known that she is halakhically married to another and much more). The Chief Rabbinate has no one to blame but itself.

Furthermore, beyond couples who were married as a civil marriage and were not registered as I mentioned, there are also couples who were not married as a civil marriage or who were married privately and were also registered as legally married. Is registering a "Cyprus marriage" better than registering a marriage that was performed as a civil marriage in a clear and strictly valid manner and according to all opinions as I did? So why would private Kiddushin that are performed here in Israel be deducted from civil marriages in Cyprus? Or just from marriages abroad?

We saw that the law requires that valid marriages be registered, and a decision not to do so is not within the court's authority. The court examined what we did and the findings indicate that these are strictly valid marriages according to all opinions and all methods, down to the last. You will not find a single rabbi who will challenge them. So if this is the case, then according to Section 7 of the Marriage Ordinance and from the time it comes into effect, they must register the couple even if they did not previously practice doing so.

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Commentary by Rabbi Avraham Dov Levin

Hello Rabbi. The things are clear and bright. In my role as the director of the marriage department in Jerusalem, I remember quite a few cases in which the court approved marriages retroactively, at the request of Rabbi Yitzhak Ralbag (then the marriage registrar of Jerusalem), although I do not remember their details. I also remember a case in which Ralbag himself registered a marriage certificate retroactively for Rabbi Avraham Farbstein, z"l (Rosh Yeshiva of Hebron), at his request, 50 years after the marriage, without any marriage file at all. I wrote a note about the court's strange ruling to register the couple on the list of those who were delayed in marriage. This goes against the High Court of Justice. Because the High Court of Justice ruled that the court is not a rabbinical institution that teaches halakha in the laws of prohibition and permission, but rather as a judicial authority, and where does it have the authority to cast a stain on the couple and register them as a marriage suspect, without determining by law whether they are married or not or need a divorce.

With great respect, in friendship, Avraham Dov Levin

[1] See, for example, Benjamin Shlomo Hamburger, Two Canopies on the Wedding Day, in Customs of Israel – For the Torah and the Covenant, pp. 6 et seq. See also a brief review in Israel Ta Shema's article, Wedding and Marriage in Halacha, From the bottom PG 5723 and more.